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Vol. 78 March 1984 No. 1

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The American Political Science Review appears in March, June, September, and December of each year. It is published by the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, and sent to all members. Dues: Regular members with income: under \$20,000, \$40; \$20,000-\$29,999, \$50; \$30,000-\$39,999, \$65; \$40,000 and over, \$75; Student Members (limited to 5 years), \$15; Retired Members, \$20; Life Members, \$1,000; Institutional Members, \$75. Dues allocated for a subscription to the APSR: \$10. Changes of address sent to the Membership Secretary of the APSA. Postmaster: Please send notification regarding undelivered journals to address above. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional mailing offices. Copyright © 1984 by The American Political Science Association (ISSN-003-0554).



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## The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice

Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1983

WILLIAM H. RIKER University of Rochester

One contemporary method of reconciling the conflict in methodology between determinism and indeterminism is the notion of rational choice, which allows for both regularities in behavior and artistic creation. A detailed explanation of artistry within the rational choice context has not yet been developed, so this essay offers such an explanation in terms of the notion of heresthetics or the dynamic manipulation of the conditions of choice. The running example used throughout is the decision on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 on the method of selecting the president.

#### The Philosophical Issue

Looking backward at the climax of some earlier social event, for example, at the decision of a committee, it often appears to have been inevitable, as if there were just one admissible outcome and as if the committee were driven to that outcome by its composition, its internal customs, and its external constraints. A history written from this deterministic point of view admits no human choice and no element of chance and describes each step in the causal chain as forcing, with certainty, each succeeding step toward the decision.

It is true that, once an event has happened, an alternative event with a different outcome cannot occur, at least not in this world. But before the event has begun or is over, its outcome does not seem so inevitable. For example, if a committee has eleven members and operates by majority rule, then there are over a thousand winning coalitions. Each one, with its different personnel, might produce a different outcome. Furthermore, if the subject of decision allows for several different standards of judgment, then it is almost certain that no outcome is preferred by a majority to all others (McKelvey, 1976, 1979). In other words, for every outcome, p, that some majority might adopt, there is another outcome, q, supported by another majority, that can beat p. In this sense there may be no predictable equilibrium outcome(s) toward which the committee moves by reason of internal forces and members' tastes. Rather, with many procedurally equivalent possibilities, among which prediction seems difficult, the world seems quite undetermined. That a particular outcome occurs is a function of the

decisive coalition that happens to exist at the time of decision, of the outer boundaries in a policy space of members' most preferred alternatives, of the sequence in which alternatives are considered, and of many other constraints, including accidents, on the decision-making process. And until a decision is actually made, there is some probability for each of a set of possible outcomes.

Neither of these viewpoints, determinism or indeterminism, is philosophically attractive. Although determinism easily admits scientific generalization, it denies choice and artistry, which, however, many people believe they experience. They may merely confuse an indecipherable complexity with freedom of the will. Yet their sense of invention is still very lively. Similarly, determinism denies natural accident, which may be no more than an incapacity to measure, but which may also reflect genuine randomness in the world.

On the other hand, although indeterminism provides for choice and chance, it denies the possibility of generalizing about social outcomes. Yet the idea at the core of social science is that outcomes can be subsumed under general laws. And they are. For example, the well-attested law of demand (namely, that, with appropriate conditions, demand curves do not slope upward), can be used for many kinds of accurate predictions. So although social science is, of course, only modestly successful, it does have some triumphs, and a philosophical viewpoint that denies them is clearly untenable.

A third viewpoint, which circumvents the defects of both determinism and indeterminism, is the method of rational choice. This is in fact the

traditional paradigm in political science, although in the absence, until recently, of a well-developed political theory (Riker, 1982a,b, 1983), most of those who subscribed to the paradigm were not conscious of the nature of their allegiance. The fundamental assumption of this paradigm is that people maximize expected utility, namely that, given their goals, they choose those alternatives likely to result in the largest net achievement of goals. The scientific merit of the assumption is that it allows both for regularities and for freedom of choice. Since presumably all persons with the same goals in the same circumstances rationally choose the same alternative, regularities can be observed. Inasmuch as social institutions impose similar circumstances on persons with similar goals, the role of randomness is minimized, but the role for choice is fully preserved. Thus, generalization and social science are reconciled with choice and chance.

Merely to assert the reconciliation does not. however, explain how artistic creation can be subsumed under scientific generalization. To begin the reconciliation I point out that, for any reasonably complicated situation, the range of alternatives and outcomes is tremendous. Furthermore, often no alternative or outcome dominates (i.e., is socially chosen over all others), so that there is no obvious rational choice. The problem, then, is to explain how, in the face of apparent disequilibrium, regularities can be discerned and, simultaneously, creativity recognized (Fiorina & Shepsle, 1982; Riker, 1980). The first step, which is what social science has traditionally been concentrated on, is the identification of constraints imposed on possible outcomes by institutions, culture, ideology, and prior events. The next step, which rational choice models provide for, is the identification of partial equilibria from utility maximization within the constraints. The final step, to which this essay is addressed, is the explication of participants' acts of creative adjustment to improve their opportunities.'

Conventional political science has provided considerable understanding of institutions, the first step. (For the history of an example of one such development, see Riker, 1982b.) Recent elaboration of rational choice theory, from Duncan Black to the present, has provided under-

'In economics one can easily identify these three steps with, first, the analysis of institutions like markets and auctions, with, second, the analysis of trading equilibria (i.e., Walrasian general equilibrium analysis or Edgeworthian study of the core of exchanges relations), and with, third, the Austrian emphasis on the dynamic role of entrepreneurs in the expansion of economic systems. I owe this analogy to William Mitchell.

standing of the second step, utility maximization in a political context. Unfortunately, not very much effort has been devoted to the third step, the study of creative adjustment, or what I have elsewhere described as heresthetics, the art of political strategy (Riker, 1983). Because this third step has hitherto been neglected, I shall devote this essay to the detailed study of one creative act with the intention, not simply of explicating it, but also of explaining how it can be placed within models of partial equilibria.

#### **Background** of the Event

The act to be studied is the decision, at the Federal Convention of 1787, on the provisions of the Constitution for the choice of the president. Admittedly this subject was not as politically intense or important as several others about which delegates either withdrew or threatened to withdraw. Nevertheless, the decision on the choice of the executive is appropriate for analyzing creativity because it was protracted—it recurred all summer; confusing—the decision was changed several times; and multifaceted-it involved consolidation and equality of states as well as the separation of powers. Near the end of the Convention, with the subject still unsettled, James Wilson (Pa.) remarked exasperatedly, "This subject has greatly divided the House, and it will also divide people out of doors. It is in truth the most difficult of all on which we have had to decide" (Farrand, 1966, II, 501).2 An exaggeration, of course, but an understandable one. Part of the difficulty was that many methods were feasible, and some were shown to be in a cycle. Another part was that alternative methods were invented and revised, nearly to the very end of the Convention. The successive invention, revision, and elimination of alternatives is a distinctive feature of the dynamics of social choice. I call it heresthetics (Riker, 1983), or the method and art of influencing social decisions. Through heresthetical manipulation, individual artistry enters decision making. Hence, the analysis of the development of an agenda which, like this one, was heresthetically manipulated, is an excellent vehicle for the explication of political creativity.

As a preface to the analysis of dynamics, it is useful to place before us the full set of possible

'Hereafter, Farrand (1911/1966) is cited simply with volume and page number, and, if relevant, the date. All quotations of speeches are Madison's *Notes* and are Madison's precis of what was actually said. See Jillson (1979) for another version of the event studied here.

outcomes, as they would appear in a static analysis:

- Election by the national legislature or some subset of it, analogous to the method of electing governors in most states;
- Election by the people, or by electors chosen by the people, analogous to methods of electing governors in New York and in the New England states;
- 3. Election by some institutions of state government, analogous to the election of members of Congress under the Articles of Confederation;
- Selection by various combinations of elements from the foregoing categories.

The method actually chosen was from the fourth category (i.e., by electors chosen in a manner prescribed by state legislatures, with election by the House of Representatives in the absence of a majority among the electors), as is the method used today (i.e., by electors popularly elected in states, with the same method of breaking ties). Although our present method was not thought of at the Convention, something very similar was rejected.

Another possible method, certainly technologically feasible in 1787, was hereditary succession, but for ideological reasons the framers did not consider it.

Altogether, we can arrange the alternatives in sets, thus:

- 1. Alternatives the framers discussed or voted on:
- Feasible alternatives, which include all four previous categories;
- Possible alternatives, which include all feasible alternatives as well as infeasible ones like hereditary succession.

Considered alternatives is a proper subset of feasible alternatives, which is a proper subset of possible alternatives.

I turn now to a discussion of how considered alternatives were brought up and a decision reached among them.

#### **Election by National Legislature**

The first alternative, placed before the Convention in the Virginia plan, was election by the national legislature. This alternative had substantial support, was in fact adopted three times, and was incorporated into the penultimate draft. But it also had substantial opposition, which repeatedly invented substitutes. In the end an invention

The reason for the popularity of the original alternative was, I believe, that it harmonized with

the nationalism of the Virginia plan, which served as the basis for discussion and, ultimately, as the skeleton of the Constitution itself. In essence, the Virginia plan provided for a strong national government, politically separated from the states. To preserve the separation, the federal government was to administer its own laws, to supervise state legislation, and to be mostly independent of the states for renewal. It was to have a tripartite form:

- a bicameral legislature, with a popularly elected branch and a smaller branch, elected by the first, though nominated by state legislatures, and with the right to negative state laws;
- an executive elected by the national legislature and constituting (with some of the judiciary) a council of revision over legislative action;
- 3) a judiciary chosen by the national legislature.

The finished Constitution is very much like the Virginia plan, changed only in these main particulars: representation in and election of the Senate, where finally the Senate was to represent states equally and to be elected by state legislatures; election of the president, who finally was to be elected by electors—chosen in a manner to be prescribed by state legislatures—and, in the event of no majority, by the state delegations in the House of Representatives; council of revision, which, though eliminated, survived as the presidential veto; and, negative on state legislation by the national legislature, which though eliminated, survived in the supremacy clause. Aside from the council of revision, these modifications either grant state governments a role in selecting federal officials or liberate state governments from federal supervision. By so doing, they obscure the intense nationalism of the Virginia plan. This plan had provided for a separate national government which would supervise the states, but the modifications in Convention blurred it with concessions to provincialism.

The reason the Virginians made this extreme proposal was, I believe, their conviction that state legislatures were incompetent and unjust. Earlier, in the spring of 1787, Madison, their intellectual leader, has written a widely circulated manuscript, Vices of the Constitutions of the United States, in which state legislatures were blamed both for the weakness of the national government and for ten of the eleven "vices" (e.g., "injustices of the laws of the states") (Madison, IX, 345-358). In the Convention he ultimately deserted election of the executive by the national legislature because it might be like state legislatures which "had betrayed a strong propensity to a variety of pernicious measures" (II, 110, 25 July). So deeply did he distrust state legislatures that, throughout

the Convention, he pushed for a national negative on state laws (see, especially, I, 164, 169; II, 27, 589) and, afterward, writing to Jefferson, he described the Constitution pessimistically because it did not include the negative (Hobson, 1979; Madison, X. 211-212, October 24). The other Virginian delegates similarly despised state legislatures and indeed state governments generally. In Madison's record of the vote (8 June) on a motion to extend the national negative on state laws from "unconstitutional" laws to "improper" laws (I, 168, roll call 34), he noted that Blair, McClurg, and he voted for this extreme form of the negative, whereas Mason and Randolph voted nav. (Washington was not consulted, which probably means he was regarded by his colleagues as favoring Madison's position. Had Washington not, his vote would have produced a tie and would therefore have been obtained.) But Mason and Randolph also distrusted state governments, even though they were not willing to push the negative as far as the others. During the Convention. Mason frequently disparaged state legislatures.3 And Randolph based his opposition to a departure from the Virginia plan on his dislike of state power: "A Natl. Executive thus chosen (i.e., by state executives) will not be likely to defend with becoming vigilance & firmness the national rights agst. State encroachments" (I, 176). Furthermore, he maintained his opposition to all methods other than by the national legislature right to the end of the summer (II, 502).

Most of the other delegates shared the Virginians' distaste for state governments. Of the 55 delegates, only four could be regarded as genuine Anti-Federalists, that is, wholehearted supporters of provincial political establishments. These were Yates and Lansing of New York, who, however, went home on 10 July, Mercer of Maryland, who was present only two weeks in August, and Luther Martin of Maryland, the only one of the four to participate long and actively. (Gerry of Massachu-

'His bluntest remark, uttered in support of the executive veto, justified it on the ground that the national legislature would "resemble" state legislatures and would therefore frequently "pass unjust and pernicious laws" (II, 78). Mason is often supposed to have been a principled Anti-Federalist because he refused to sign the Constitution. But as Ellsworth (Conn.) alleged, Mason's motive was not to defend state governments. but rather to support a provision for a regional economic interest, namely a provision to prevent eastern monopoly of the carrying of southern agricultural exports (Ford, 1892, pp. 161-162; The Landholder V, 10 Dec. 1787). In a letter to Jefferson in 1788 and again in conversation with him in 1792, Mason himself explained his defection on the same grounds (III, 304-305, 26 May 1788; III, 367, 30 Sept. 1792).

setts, Mason, and Randolph ultimately refused to sign, but they had, until near the end, cooperated fully in planning a stronger federation.) Every other delegate who stayed to the end and probably most of those who went home early either had federalist sympathies throughout the Convention or acquired them during the summer. Even the small state diehards, who fought for a role for state legislatures in electing the Senate, cared very little for the state governments themselves. They wanted simply to protect Connecticut and New Jersey against New York, Delaware against Pennsylvania, Maryland against Virginia, etc. As C. Pinckney (S.C.) predicted, cynically and correctly: "Give New Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the National system" (I, 255).

As a consequence of federalist sympathies, most delegates appreciated the Virginians' intention to avoid, as much as possible, allowing state governments a part in selecting federal officials. Although those who favored election by the national legislature seldom rationalized their position, they adhered to their preference through most of the summer, mainly I believe, because of their intense conviction that the provincials should be supervised by the national elite. Accordingly, the less elitist ultimately abandoned the Virginia plan, while the most elitist persisted, right up to the end of the summer, in favoring election of the executive by the national legislature, e.g., Mason (Va.), Randolph (Va.), Williamson (N.C.), Rutledge (S.C.), and C. Pinckney (S.C.).

#### Opposition to Legislative Election

But this method was ultimately opposed by people like Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) who believed that, "of all possible modes of appointment that by the Legislature is the worst" (II, 103). The opponents were just as federalist as Madison, but they had different expectations about how the Virginia proposal would work out.

To begin with, the opponents attributed the vices of state governments to legislative supremacy, not simply to provinciality. They agreed, of course, with Madison that state legislatures were reckless, myopic, and fiscally irresponsible. But in their view the worst problem was that the legislatures were unrestrained. Despite the lipservice in the state constitutions to the idea of the separation of powers, in most states the governors were elected by the legislature and thus subordinate to it, as were indeed the popularly elected governors in New England and New York. Most of the delegates probably agreed with Madison's remark, "Experience has proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the Legislative

vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent' ( $\Pi$ , 35).

It follows from this diagnosis that the appropriate constitutional structure is not merely the separation of the federal executive from the states, as in the Virginia plan, but also and especially the separation of the federal executive from the federal legislature, as James Wilson (Pa.) initially made clear when he "renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States" (I, 69).

Both nationalism and an ideal of separated powers stand behind this remark. Madison himself, once he was converted to Wilson's view, intellectualized it—both in the Convention and in the 51st *Federalist*—in the way it has survived in the constitutional tradition (II, 34):

If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: & Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislature, if dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a reappointment. . . .

Thus justified, the mode ultimately adopted of electing the President is an essential institution for the ideal of the separation of powers, which is, perhaps, one reason why the nonseparationist Virginia method was rejected.

But although a desire for consistency may have predisposed the delegates to some alternative method, the positive force came from Pennsylvanians, especially Wilson and G. Morris. Pennsylvania was the only state with a unicameral legislature and thus wholly lacking in an institutional expression of the separation of powers. In its domestic politics, the unchecked legislative supremacy was so central an issue that one of the names of the political parties derived from it: the Constitutionalist (populist) and the Republican (anticonstitutional and liberal). Since most Pennsylvania delegates were Republican, the Convention had a core of distrust of legislative supremacy from the very beginning. Wilson initiated the attack on the Virginia method and G. Morris, an adept and persistent heresthetician, ultimately maneuvered the Convention into adopting the electoral college. So it is to them, I think, that the bulk of the credit should go for inventing and fleshing out this institution.

#### Displacement of the Method of Legislative Election

I turn now to an analysis of the rhetorical and heresthetical strategy by which the Virginia proposal was displaced. After the Convention was organized (25-29 May), the procedure to deal with the Virginia plan was:

Stage 1. Committee of the Whole (29 May to 13 June): to consider the Virginia resolutions and report them, as revised, to the Convention:

Stage 2. Report of the Committee of the Whole (15 June to 26 July): to consider the resolutions of the Report and refer them, as revised, to the Committee of Detail;

Stage 3. Report of the Committee of Detail (6 August to 10 September): to consider the Articles of the Report and refer them, as revised, to the Committee on Style;

Stage 4. Report of the Committee on Style (12-17 September): to revise the Articles of the Report and adopt the Constitution.

The drama of events on Presidential election was that in Stage 1 the nationalistic Virginia proposal was adopted 8-2 (roll call 12, I, 79) but near the end of Stage 3 it was rejected 2-8 (roll call 445, II. 508) with one divided, and a separation of powers proposal was adopted 9-2 (roll call 457, II, 520). In brief, the course of that remarkable reversal was: In Stage 1 the separationists offered only minor opposition. In Stage 2, although nationalists easily defeated a motion for popular election, the separationists responded with a clever rhetorical and heresthetical attack. Then they coalesced with the small-state interest, fresh from its triumph on the equality of states in the Senate, in support of an electoral college chosen by state legislatures. This motion passed, but then the nationalists came back (with support from delegates from distant states) and displaced the college with the original Virginia method. Thus ended Stage 2. But in Stage 3, after initial failures for popular election and for electors, the matter was referred to a Committee of Eleven, composed mostly of separationists, including especially G. Morris. Its report was the substance of our present electoral college, which satisfied the small state interest because election was initially to be in a college chosen by state legislatures and ultimately in the Senate, which satisfied the delegates from distant states because a state's electors were to meet in the state capital, and which satisfied, most of all and fundamentally, the separationists because it avoided election by the national legislature. A diehard nationalist motion to substitute the Virginia proposal for the college failed decisively, and the college was adopted by a large majority. It, of course, survived with minor revisions into Stage 4 and the Constitution as adopted.

#### The Method of Popular Election

The separationists probably preferred some kind of popular election, either direct or by electors. But they could never muster enough support for such proposals on their own, even though they tried four times, so they were inspired both to launch a rhetorical and heresthetical attack and to coalesce with the small state interest. Thus, the first step along the road to the adoption of the electoral college is the repeated failure of both kinds of popular election.

Although support for popular election increased over the summer, as indicated in Table 1 (i.e., from roll call 11 to roll call 359), it could not ultimately win, as indicated in roll call 361. Why not? The short answer is, I think, that the arguments for it simply were not persuasive for the majority who found it distasteful. That it was distasteful even its most convinced proponents recognized. Wilson, for example, introduced his motion (roll call 11) with the admission that he was "almost unwilling to declare" his preference because he was "apprehensive that it might appear chimerical" (I, 80). As for others, some

thought popular election unwieldy (Butler (S.C.). II, 112; King (Mass.), II, 56); others thought the people incapable of judging executive talent (Sherman (Conn.), II, 29; Williamson (N.C.): "There was the same difference between election ... by the people and by the legislature, as between an appointment by lot, and by choice" II. 32: Mason (Va.): "It would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a Chief Magistrate to the people, as it would, to refer a trial of colours to a blind man" II, 31; and still others feared the people would be misled by demagogues (C. Pinckney (S.C.), II, 30; Mason, II, 119; Gerry (Mass), II, 57, where the typical demagogues are on the left, i.e., the Shaysites who turned out Governor Bowdoin for doing "his duty," and II, 114, where the typical demagogues are on the right, i.e., the Cincinnati). But probably the most telling argument was uttered by Madison, speaking ostensibly in favor of popular election: "the right of suffrage was more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern states, and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes" (II, 57). The effect of this viewpoint is seen in the fact that North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia never voted for popularelection and in the fact that Ellsworth immediately picked up on Madison's reiteration of his argument, saying that the "objection from different sizes of states was unanswerable" (II, 111).

Table 1. Motions for Popular Election of the President

Date and Stage	Roll Call Number and Page	Movers	Motion	Outcome	Yea	Nay	Divided
2 June Stage 1	11 1, 79	Wilson	Electors, popularly chosen in districts	2-7-1 (N.H., N.J. absent)	Pa., Md.	Mass., Conn., Del., Va., N.C., S.C., Ga.	N.Y.
17 July Stage 2	165 Ц, 24	G. Morris	Citizens of U.S.	1-9 (N.H., N.Y. absent)	Pa.	Mass., Conn., N.J., Del., Md., Va., N.C., S.C., Ga.	
24 August Stage 3	355 II, 399	Carroll Wilson	People	2-9 (N.Y. absent)	Pa., Del.	N.H., Mass., Conn., N.J., Md., Va., N.C., S.C., Ga.	
24 August Stage 3	359 II, 399	G. Morris Carroll	Electors chosen by people of several states	5-6 (N.Y. absent)	Conn., N.J., Pa., Del., Va.	N.H., Mass., Md., N.C., S.C., Ga.	
24 August Stage 3	361 II, 399	G. Morris	Electors	4-4-2 (Mass., N.Y. absent)	N.J., Pa., Del., Va.	N.H., N.C., S.C., Ga.	Conn., Md.

On the other side, there was very little to recommend popular election. The best argument was practical: that it would guarantee the election of a person of "general notoriety," "continental reputation," and "distinguished character," polite references to Washington who was sitting up front of the room (by Wilson, I, 68, G. Morris, II, 29, and Madison, II, 57, and II, 111). But the delegates were, of course, practically certain that Washington would be offered the office whatever the method, so this was far from a conclusive argument.

Relatively few persons can be identified as favoring popular election. From quotations in Madison's Notes we know about: Wilson, G. Morris, Madison, Carroll (Md.), Dickinson (Del.), Franklin (Pa.), and possibly King (Mass.). Beyond that we know that Jenifer (representing Maryland by himself) voted yea on vote 11, but apparently he then changed his mind, because Maryland voted nay on votes 165, 355, and 359. Had Jenifer voted yea on any of these, his vote with Carroll's would have divided Maryland, as it probably did on vote 361. We also know that Hamilton must have voted yea on vote 11-on which New York was divided—because only he and Yates then represented New York, and Yates must surely have voted nay. But the New Yorkers went home before any other votes in Table 1 occurred. Dickinson must have persuaded at least two others from Delaware to vote yea on 24 August, although the record of Delaware is erratic on that day. Morris, Wilson, and Franklin must have been joined consistently by at least one other from Pennsylvania. And for votes 359 and 361 Madison must have persuaded Blair and Washington, because surely Mason and Randolph were too devoted to the Virginia plan to approve popular election. Connecticut also voted yea on 359 and was divided on 361, which means that Sherman and Johnson once agreed and once split on a yea vote. Finally, on 24 August, New Jersey was represented by Brearley, Dayton, and Livingston, at least two of whom must have voted yea on 359 and 361. Altogether, then, at its best showing, no more than about 14 to 20 delegates (out of 42 then in Philadelphia) approved of popular election. These were concentrated in four delegations: Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, and New Jersey. Furthermore, it is likely that delegates from Connecticut and New Jersey, who voted for electors but not for direct popular election, were mainly interested in electors as a way to increase the influence of small states and only incidentally supporters of the extreme separationist doctrine. If so, no more than 11 to 17 favored popular election itself.

As against these, we know, by inference from Madison's *Notes* and from the number present in

each delegation, the number required for the delegation to vote, and the vote actually cast, that toward the end of the summer two of the five delegates from Virginia, two of the three from Massachusetts, three of the four from Maryland, and all the delegates from New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia were solidly against popular election in any form. This is a total of at least 19 delegates controlling at least 6 of the 11 delegations. Clearly, the method of popular election could not have been adopted.

#### The Rhetorical Attack: "Intrigue"

My count, arrived at by immersion in detail, was immediately evident to the separationists. Once aware of their shortage of votes—on 17 July when the Convention took up the election of the executive in Stage 2—they responded with the argument from the doctrine of the separation of powers. G. Morris was first: "If the Executive be chosen by the Natl. Legislature, he will not be independent on it; and if not independent, usurpation & tyranny on the part of the Legislature will be the consequence" (II, 31). Others reiterated his theme: G. Morris (Pa.) himself: II, 52, 103-104, 112, 500; Madison (Va.), by then a convert to the separationist cause: II, 34-35, 56-57, 109; McClurg (Va.): II, 36; King (Mass.): II, 67; Wilson (Pa.): II, 102-103; and Dickinson (Del.): II, 114.

The structure of this argument is the inference of an institutional form from an accepted principle of philosophy. Such abstract arguments are not universally convincing among practical men of affairs. More persuasive, probably, are simple analogies with well-known situations that the auditors agree are undesirable. Exactly such an analogy was available in the widely accepted proposition that legislative election of executives involved "intrigue." By "intrigue" the framers probably meant no more than maneuvering to form cabinets in fragmented parliamentary systems. (The one concrete example was G. Morris's discussion of the intrigue by which, in 1784, Pitt came to office by defeating Fox's India bill (II, 104).) This now-ordinary behavior is, however, what the framers found distasteful because it seemed to place office above principle, and hence, for the separationists, it was an appropriate symbol of the evil in legislative election.

That many framers disapproved of parliamentary "intrigue" cannot be doubted. Of course the separationists referred to it often, gradually substituting Morris's striking phrase "cabal and corruption": G. Morris (Pa.): II, 31, 103-104, 112, 403; "cabal and corruption" II, 500, 501; Madison (Va.): II, 109-111; Wilson (Pa.): II, 30, 32, 103, 501. But others, who were not separa-

tionists, also seemed fearful of intrigue and cabal, which indicates the probable effectiveness of this analogy: Mason (Va.), who used the word "intrigue" in the first discussion of election of the executive: I, 68, 1 June; I, 86; II, 500; Gerry (Mass.): I, 80, 175; Randolph (Va.): II, 54-55; Butler (S.C.): II, 112, 501; Williamson (N.C.): II, 113, 501; and Hamilton (N.Y.): II, 524-525. At the end of the Convention, G. Morris identified the "principal advantage" of the electoral college as "taking away the opportunity for cabal." Presumably, he thought this was the most important rhetorical theme, not only for himself but also for his auditors.

#### The Heresthetical Attack: McClurg's Motion

Although it doubtless was rhetorically desirable to reiterate the threat of intrigue, it probably appeared even better to link "intrigue" logically with the Virginia proposal. The separationists accomplished this by what seems a consciously heresthetic maneuver. (In this connection the distinction between rhetoric and heresthetic is that rhetoric involves converting others by persuasive argument, whereas heresthetic involves structuring the situation so that others accept it willingly.) Here the maneuver was to induce acceptance of the proposition that, if elected by the legislature, then, in order to avoid intrigue, the executive should have a long term and be ineligible for a second one. Mason himself had assumed the linkage when, in Stage 1, he proposed a sevenyear term to minimize "a temptation . . . to intrigue" (I, 68). Then in Stage 2, just after the rejection of popular election, G. Morris (Pa.), Houston (Ga.), and McClurg (Va.) conducted a remarkable heresthetic maneuver to reimprint the stigma (II, 32-35).

On 17 July the Convention unanimously reaffirmed (II, 24, roll call 167) the resolution (from Stage 1) "to be chosen by the National Legislature" and it was in order to consider "for the term of seven years." Houstoun moved and Morris seconded to postpone, and the Convention approved. Then "to be ineligible a second time" came up in order, and Houstoun moved and Sherman (Conn.) seconded to strike it out. Morris argued that ineligibility "destroyed the great motive to good behavior," as if "saying to him, make hay while the sun shines." Ineligibility was struck out, 6-4 (II, 24, roll call 168), and "for a term of seven years" was again taken up, presumably pursuant to Houstoun's first motion. McClurg moved and Morris seconded to strike out "seven years" and insert "good behavior." This motion failed, 4-6 (II, 24, roll call 169), but it certainly stirred things up.

Implying, as it did, life tenure, it shocked McClurg's Virginia colleagues, especially since Washington was the only serious candidate. Mason sharply rebuked McClurg, prophesying that, if adopted, his motion would lead to hereditary monarchy and revolution. Madison, on the other hand, was embarrassed and felt obliged to defend McClurg by showing that his motion embodied the separation of powers, even though it might not be the "proper" expedient. This was the first time Madison joined the separationists. It seems certain that respect for McClurg forced him to speak out.

The main effect, however, was that McClurg's motion embedded intrigue in the Virginia proposal: If legislative election meant repeated elections with intrigue at each one, then the only way out for those fearful of intrigue was life tenure with only one election. If the Morris-Houstoun-McClurg stratagem did nothing else, it forced a general reconsideration on 19 July.

Were Houstoun's and McClurg's motions consciously heresthetical? Madison thought that McClurg's motion was contrary to his true taste and thus wholly a maneuver. Certainly his motion was no threat of monarchy without the prior elimination of ineligibility, which is what Houstoun's motions accomplished. I infer, therefore, that McClurg's motion was part of a planned sequence that included Houstoun's as well. (Observe that the reversal of motions from term length first and ineligibility second to ineligibility first and term length second was necessary to delete ineligibility. Almost certainly, in regular order, with a long term adopted first, the Convention would not have deleted ineligibility. Hence Houstoun's motions were essential both to consider term length on its own merits-which may be all that Houstoun intended—and, as Morris probably intended, pave the way for McClurg's motion, which was entirely appropriate and made sense once it appeared likely that the term would be short and that there would be "intrigue" at each election.) Of course McClurg may simply have stumbled into Morris's plot, although it is equally likely that Morris may have exploited McClurg's innocence and Houstoun's simple intention to debate the length of term on its own merits. From the omnipresence of Morris in the

"Adding a later footnote (doubtless to protect himself from a charge of monarchical sympathies), Madison explained that he spoke "to aid in parrying animadversions likely to fall on . . . Dr. McClurg, for whom J. M. has a particular regard and whose appointment to the Convention he had actively promoted. The Docr. though possessing talents of the highest order, was modest and unaccustomed to assert them in public debate" (II, 34).

whole event—seconding Houstoun's first motion and McClurg's, speaking for Houstoun's second motion and McClurg's—I suspect, without chance of verification, that Morris planned the whole sequence. (It is less likely Houstoun did, for he seldom participated, and Sherman seems to have happened into the scene out of an ideological preference (I, 68) for reelection as a reward.)

Whoever may have been the master heresthetician, we know from Madison's footnote, inserted, it is true, after 1787, that he thought McClurg's motion was consciously heresthetic: "The probable object of this motion was merely to enforce the argument against the re-eligibility of the Executive" (II, 33). McClurg himself implied the same in the debate, saying that, after ineligibility was removed (by Houstoun's motion) the "only mode left for effecting" independence was tenure during good behavior (II, 36). Actually, the heresthetical intent was probably deeper: to stigmatize legislative election as necessitating either ineligibility or monarchy. In a contemporary footnote appended to the record of the vote on McClurg's motion, Madison sensed this deeper heresthetic: "This vote is not to be considered as any certain index of opinion [i.e., in favor of 'during good behavior' or monarchyl, as a number in the affirmative Ifour states, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginial probably had it chiefly in view to alarm those attached to a dependence of the Executive on the Legislative, & thereby facilitate some final arrangements of a contrary tendency" (II, 36). Later he added that "the avowed friends" of "during good behavior" were no more than three or four. If so, given that at least ten delegates had to vote yea in the four supporting states, clearly at least six delegates—including, of course, Madison himself who was necessary for a yea vote in Virginia-voted contrary to their true tastes to bring about an advantageous parliamentary situation. They succeeded for their heresthetical tactic certainly "facilitated" "contrary arrangements."

#### Rhetorical and Heresthetical Success

Two days later the Convention reconsidered ineligibility. This discussion led to, and subsequent decisions revealed, the rhetorical success of associating legislative election with the single term. On 17 July the currently adopted method was "by the national legislature," and the Convention retained the seven-year term (4-6, II, 24, roll call 170). But on 19 July, after the method of electors had been adopted, the Convention rejected both ineligibility for a second term (2-8, II, 51, roll call 184) and a seven-year term (3-5, with two divided), finally settling on six years (II, 51, roll calls 185, 186). Presumably, with legis-

lative election out, protections against intrigue were no longer needed. When, however, "by the national legislature" was reinstated on 24 July, both the seven-year term and ineligibility were also reinstated (7-3, with one absent, II, 118, roll call 224). The return of legislative election apparently required the return of the protections. And when the electoral college had been finally adopted, the Convention twice rejected, by large majorities, motions for a longer-than-four-year term, presumably because the college obviated the need for protection against intrigue (II, 520, roll calls 453, 454).

Rather complacently and perhaps slyly, Wilson, who was surely one of the architects of the separationists' rhetoric, observed: "It seems to be the unanimous sense that the Executive should not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he is rendered ineligible a 2d. time" and he used this association to urge popular election, which would allow second terms (II, 56, 19 July). Wilson was almost, but not quite, correct about unanimity. Delegates on both sides did agree that legislative election implied ineligibility for a second term:

Supporters of legislative election: Mason (Va.): II, 112, 119 ("a second election ought to be absolutely prohibited"); Randolph (Va.): II, 54-55; L. Martin (Md.): II, 52, 58, 101; Williamson (N.C.): II, 58, 100-101, 501; Rutledge (S.C.): II, 57; C. Pinckney (S.C.): II, 111-112; and Butler (S.C.), ultimately a separationist: II, 112.

Separationists: G. Morris (Pa.): II, 54, 500; McClurg (Va.): II, 33; Wilson (Pa.): II, 56, 501-502; Hamilton (N.Y.): II, 524; Gerry (Mass.): II, 57; II, 100-102, 112.

Not all the delegates were, at the time Wilson spoke of unanimity, possessed of his sense of it. Four New Englanders refused the association because they, like G. Morris, believed strongly in re-eligibility as a reward. Ellsworth (Conn.) specifically denied that ineligibility was a "natural consequence of his being elected by the Legislature" (II, 101), and King (Mass.) elaborated by quoting Sherman (Conn.) (I, 68) "that he who has proved himself most fit for an Office, ought not to be excluded from holding it" (II, 55). Strong (Mass.) offered a different argument when he "supposed that there would be no necessity, if the Executive should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him ineligible a 2d. time; as new elections of the Legislature will have intervened; and he will not depend for his 2d. appointment on the same sett of men as his first was recd. from" (II, 100). Strong's argument was probably not persuasive, however, because most framers worried about intrigue for future election, not intrigue in the past. By the end of the summer, even Sherman had accepted the entire rhetorical stance of the separationists. Originally he had

thought that "an independence of the Executive on the supreme Legislative, was . . . the very essence of tyranny" and "he was against throwing out of office the man best qualified" (I, 68). But as a member of the Brearley committee, he defended the electoral college as a way "to get rid of ineligibility, which was attached to the mode of election by the Legislature, & to render the Executive independent of the Legislature" (II, 499). Surely this is a remarkable instance of persuasion. It was accomplished by rhetorically and heresthetically associating intrigue with legislative election and then by associating legislative election with no second term. But although Sherman's capitulation is especially striking, the previously cited roll calls at the end of Stage 2 (184, 185, 186, and 224) indicate that Sherman's reversal was not unique.

The beauty of this whole maneuver is that the separationists used the agreement they shared with the legislative electionists about intrigue to persuade the New Englanders of the relevance and danger of intrigue. Having done so, the separationists used the support of the New Englanders to eliminate entirely election by the legislature. Altogether, G. Morris, Wilson, and Madison deserve great credit for their rhetorical success, but mostly, I suppose, Morris, for he was a dominant figure both in debate and in committee.

#### Coalition with the Small State Interest

Brilliant as was the rhetorical success, it was not enough to win. The separationists also needed allies. So I now turn to an analysis of their alliances.

Once the separationists brought about reconsideration on 19 July, King (Mass.) revived the proposal for popularly chosen electors and Paterson (N.J.) suggested that electors be chosen on the ratio of one for the smallest state and three for the largest. Ellsworth (Conn.) put Paterson's suggestion as a motion to strike out "by the national legislature" and to insert "electors appointed by the Legislatures of the States in the following proportion: One person from each State whose numbers shall not exceed 100,000—Two from each of the others, whose numbers shall not exceed 300,000—and Three from each of the rest." Temporal considerations are important for understanding this motion. Three days earlier (16 July), the Convention had voted (roll call 156) for equal representation in the Senate, doubtless its most important decision because it ensured that the small states would stay in the Convention and that the Constitution would be written. The vote was extremely close and pitted the delegates of the small states against the main intellectual leadership from Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South

Carolina. Paterson (N.J.) had been the floor leader of the small states—or so I infer from Madison's *Notes* (II, 18). Now, in his euphoria, he was, with Ellsworth, apparently intending to push the small state interest even further by providing a relatively large voice for them in choosing the executive.

There was a great difference on 19 July from 16 July, however. On the subject of equal representation in the Senate, Wilson (Pa.), Morris (Pa.), Madison (Va.), Mason (Va.), Randolph (Va.), and Rutledge (S.C.) had fought to the bitter end. Indeed, on 17 July, when the large-state cause was wholly lost, G. Morris opened daily business with a motion to reconsider roll call 156, but he did not even get a second. In a pathetic aside, Madison remarked: "It was probably approved by several members, who either despaired of success, or were apprehensive that the attempt would inflame the jealousies of the smaller States" (II, 25). Morris, Wilson, and Madison were politically resilient, however, and on 19 July they immediately allied their delegations with the small state bloc, presumably because that was the only way to beat legislative election. In Table 2 roll calls 156 on representation and 182 on electors are set forth for comparison. The main changes from 156 to 182 are that Virginia and Pennsylvania joined the small-state side and North Caroina left it for the legislative election bloc. This must have been easy for North Carolina. Only four delegates were present, and only three voted yea on 156. Hence only two were necessary to join Spaight for the nay vote on 182. Williamson spoke against 182, so a nay on 182 needed only the conversion of the totally silent A. Martin or the almost silent Davie.

Unfortunately for the separationists, the small state-separationist coalition was disrupted by the interests of distant states. Butler (S.C.) (II, 59), Williamson (N.C.) (II, 59, 526), Spaight (N.C.) (II, 95, 99, 526), and Houstoun (Ga.) (II, 95 99) complained about the cost of sending electors to a capital in the Middle Atlantic states. An odd concern, so it seems today. Gerry (Mass.) thought so too (II, 100). But both New Hampshire and Georgia had difficulty that summer in financing their delegates. So on 23 and 24 July Houstoun moved and Spaight seconded the reinstatement of legislative election. The Convention approved (7-4, II, 98, roll call 215). As is apparent from Table 2, five of the seven states that voted yea are geographically peripheral. New Jersey and Delaware are, however, pivotal in the change from 182 to 215, and I can only guess why. Three New Jersey delegates were present in late July (Brearley, Livingston, and Paterson, III, 588; IV, 72), and the delegation did not have the required three to vote on 18, 21, and 23 July. My guess is that the delegation was split 2-1 on the method of

election, and one person changed sides on vote 215, perhaps in deference to peripheral states. As for Delaware, no explanatory evidence exists, although I suspect, from its otherwise erratic voting, the same kind of absence and individual change as in New Jersey.

The reinstatement of legislative election did not, however, settle the issue. The separationists and others continued to offer alternatives. Wilson (Pa.) proposed a method of lot, but this was clearly heresthetic to emphasize his hostility to legislative election, and he seconded a motion to postpone (II, 105-106). Ellsworth (Conn.) offered a compromise: legislative election, except when an incumbent was re-eligible, in which case electors would elect. This failed 4-7 on roll call 218 (Table 2), with the previous blocs splitting up in curious ways. C. Pinckney (S.C.) offered a motion restricting the executive to six years' service out of

any twelve. This too may have been intended as a compromise, but it failed (II, 108, roll calls 219 and 220). On 26 July Mason spoke powerfully for legislative election and moved reinstatement of "seven years" and "ineligible a second time." This passed 7-3 (roll call 224) and was followed immediately by reaffirmation of the whole resolution 6-3, with one divided and one absent (roll call 225). It is not hard to explain roll calls 224 and 225. The majority was made up of states devoted to legislative election, peripheral states, and New Jersey with its wobbly and knife-edge majority. Massachusetts was divided or evasive, as on most of these votes. Virginia, however, shifted from separationist to legislative election for easily explicable reasons: Its separationist majority on votes 182 and 215 doubtless consisted of Madison, McClurg, Washington, and Blair against Mason and Randolph. But McClurg went home before

Table 2. Indecision at the End of Stage 2

Date and Stage	Roll Call Number and Page	Movers	Motion	Outcome	Yea	Nay	Divided
16 July Stage 2	156 II, 15		To accept the report for equal representation in upper house	5-4-1 (N.H., N.Y. absent)	Conn., N.J., Del., Md., N.C. (small state bloc)	Pa., Va., S.C., Ga. (large state bloc)	Mass.
19 July Stage 2	182 П, 51	Ellsworth	To strike out "by the national legislature" and insert "by elec- tors in the ratio of"	6-3-1 (N.H., N.Y. absent)	Conn., N.J., Pa., Del., Md., Va. (small state and separa- tionist bloc)	N.C., S.C., Ga. (logisla- tive election bloc)	Mass.
24 July Stage 2	215 II, 98	Houstoun Spaight	To strike out "by electors" and insert "by the national legislature"	7-4 (N.Y. absent)	N.H., Mass., N.J., Del., N.C., S.C., Ga. (distant states and legislative election block	Md., Va. (small states and separa- tionists)	
24 July Stage 2	218 II, 108	Ellsworth	To add "except when the magistrate last chosen in which case the choice shall be by electors"	4-7 (N.Y. absent)	N.H., Conn., Pa., Md.	Mass., N.J., Del., Va., N.C., S.C., Ga.	
26 July Stage 2	224 II, 118	Mason	To insert "for a term of seven years, to be in- eligible a second time"	7-3 (Mass., N.Y. absent)	N.H., N.J., Md., Va., N.C., S.C., Ga.	Conn., Pa., Del.	
26 July Stage 2	225 П, 118		To agree to the resolution on election of the executive	6-3-1 (Mass., N.Y. absent)	N.H., Conn., N.J., N.C., S.C., Ga.	Pa., Del., Md.	Va.

the votes of 26 July, and Blair switched between votes 215 and 225. (Blair was the swing vote in Virginia, and we know almost nothing else about him. Of the six Virginia votes for which Madison records the detail, Randolph and Mason were always opposed to Madison. Washington joined Madison four times out of five, and McClurg joined him two out of two. But Blair sided with Randolph and Mason thrice and with Madison thrice.)

Thus ended Stage 2 with a victory for legislative election, although the separationists had raised considerable doubt about its propriety.

#### Revelation of a Cycle

In Stage 3, on 24 August, when the Convention again took up the method of election, Rutledge (S.C.) immediately moved to elect by joint ballot of the two houses. This was great luck for the separationists. Rutledge had been a diehard opponent of equal representation in the Senate (roll call 156, Table 2), and this motion was doubtless an oblique counterattack to regain part of what the large states had lost on 16 July.

The New Jersey and Connecticut delegates responded rigorously, playing the role of leaders of the small states—as they had on the issue of representation in the Senate—even though by 24 August the original captains, Paterson and Ellsworth, had gone home. Sherman (Conn.) objected that a joint ballot would deprive the "States represented in the Senate of the negative

intended them in that house" (II, 401); and Dayton (N.J.) said he "could never agree" because a "joint ballot would in fact give the appointment to one house." Brearley (N.J.) supported them and Wilson (Pa.), Madison (Va.), and Gorham (Mass.) defended Rutledge. Here flared up, with immediate intensity, a reflection of the great dispute on representation: Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, and South Carolina against Connecticut and New Jersey, When put to a vote, Rutledge's motion passed 7-4 (roll call 356, Table 3). Then Dayton moved that, on the joint ballot, each state have one vote, which failed 5-6 (roll call 357, Table 3). Note also in Table 3 that Dayton reactivated the small state bloc of 16 July. (On roll call 356 Delaware inexplicably voted against its interest, but on 357 it had rejoined the bloc. Only New Hampshire, not present on 16 July, voted with the big states, which Langdon (N.H.) explained was owing to its experience of deadlock between the Houses in gubernatorial elections.)

G. Morris, ever the opportunist and an exceptionally adroit parliament man, took the chance to reactivate the coalition of small states and separationists. He moved for a combination of the electors espoused by small states and the popular election espoused by separationists. Morris lost (roll call 359, Table 3), but he reactivated the coalition he and Ellsworth had formed in Stage 2. Pennsylvania and Virginia—presumably Madison had won back Blair—joined Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware. Only Maryland is

Table 3. The Approach to the Committee on Postponed Matters: Stage 3

Date	Roll Call Number and Page	Movers	Motion	Outcome	Yea	Nay	Divided
24 August	356 П, 399	Rutledge	To insert "joint" before "ballot"	7-4 (N.Y. absent)	N.H., Mass., Pa., Del., Va., N.C., S.C.	Conn., N.J., Md., Ga.	
24 August	357 II, 399	Dayton Brearley	To insert "each State having one vote"	5-6 (N.Y. absent)	Conn., N.J., Del., Md., Ga.	N.H., Mass., Pa., Va., N.C., S.C.	
24 August	359 II, 399	G. Morris Carroll	To be elected by electors chosen by the people	5-6 (N.Y. absent)	Conn., N.J., Pa., Del., Va.	N.H., Mass., Md., N.C., S.C., Ga.	•
24 August	360 II, 399	Broome	To commit last two clauses of Article X, section 1	5-5-1 (N.Y. absent)	N.J., Pa., Del., Md., Va.	N.H., Mass., N.C., S.C., Ga.	Conn.
24 August	361 II, 399	G. Morris	To be elected by electors	4-4-2 (N.Y., Mass. absent)	N.J., Pa., Del., Va.	N.H., N.C., S.C., Ga.	Conn., Md.

out of place. (I think Jenifer left the room: on 356 and 357 at least three Maryland delegates voted with the small states. On 359—if Jenifer was out—McHenry and Martin probably outvoted Carroll. On 360 Maryland was back with the small states, and on 361 Maryland divided, perhaps with Carroll and Jenifer together.)

Then Dayton (N.J.) moved to postpone, which failed by voice vote, and Broome (Del.) moved to refer to a committee, which failed in a tie (roll call 360, Table 3), with Maryland back in place and Connecticut inexplicably divided. Doubtless encouraged by the tie vote on 360, Morris moved for electors without specifying how they would be chosen. This too resulted in a tie (roll call 361, Table 3). The Convention, now warned of deadlocks, postponed consideration and later consigned the issue to a committee on postponed matters (II, 463, 31 August), which invented the electoral college.

The route for reopening the issue was the revelation of a voting cycle. Let: a stand for "legislative election without joint ballot," b stand for "election by electors," c stand for "legislative election with joint ballot." Then observe:

- a beat b, in roll calls 215 and 225 (Table 2), Stage 2,
- b tied with c, in roll call 361 (Table 3), Stage 3,
- c beat a, in roll call 356 (Table 3), Stage 3.

Had Rutledge not brought up the joint ballot, this cycle would not have been revealed—indeed, would not have existed. Legislative election would probably have survived. Once revealed, however, the cycle appeared as a deadlock, which is the way cycles are usually interpreted by those who do not know about social choice theory. However interpreted, the significance of the cycle that Morris revealed was that it gave him another chance in the committee.

#### **Committee on Postponed Matters**

The delegates elected to the Committee on Postponed Matters were almost entirely separationists or their allies. G. Morris (Pa.) and Madison (Va.) were the most vocal separationists. King (Mass.), Dickinson (Del.), and Carroll (Md.) had usually supported them, when others from their states had not. Sherman (Conn.) and Brearley (N.J., the chairman) were at this time the spokesmen for the small state interest. As for the others,

Probably the delegates voted individually rather than by states in electing committees, thereby giving the large delegation from Pennsylvania an advantage with which it significantly affected the outcome here. for each state the one elected was the one most likely to support the coalition: Gilman (N.H.) rather than Langdon, who had spoken for the joint ballot; Baldwin (Ga.) rather than Few, who never uttered a word, according to Madison's Notes; Butler (S.C.), who had spoken of "intrigue" rather than Rutledge or C. Pinckney, highly vocal supporters of legislative election; and Williamson (N.C.) who feared "intrigue," rather than Spaight, who seconded Houstoun. Thus the separationist-small state coalition had at least seven sympathizers, and perhaps ten, because Baldwin, Gilman, and possibly Butler voted for the committee report. Only Williamson persisted in opposition.

As a result the committee tailored a plan to satisfy all those who might oppose legislative election. For distant states, electors were to meet in the states, thereby saving a trip to the capital. For those in favor of popular election, electors were to be chosen in the manner prescribed by state legislatures, which allowed for popular election. For the separationists, the college avoided the legislature entirely, if any candidate got a majority. For the small state interest, there were two provisions: First, each state was to have as many electors as Representatives and Senators, which gave the small states an edge. Second, if no candidate had a majority of electoral votes, the Senate (wherein states were equal) was to choose from the five highest.

It is uncertain just what the framers expected about election in the Senate. Some separationists accurately forecast that one candidate would usually get an electoral majority (G. Morris, II, 512), because, as Madison pointed out, it was to the advantage of large states to avoid decision in the Senate (II, 513) and because, as Baldwin pointed out, "increasing intercourse . . . would render important characters less and less unknown" (II, 501). On the other hand, some supporters of the committee plan (Sherman, II, 512-513; King, II, 514) apparently believed the Senate would usually elect, perhaps as often as "nineteen times out of twenty," as legislative electionists like Mason (II, 512) and C. Pinckney (II, 511) believed. On balance, most people anticipated just what would benefit them, a systematic bias that rendered the plan almost universally appealing.

Georgia, with two delegates, voted yea, so Baldwin did. New Hampshire, with two delegates once voted for (roll call 457, II, 520) and once was divided (roll call 445, II, 508), from which I infer Gilman voted yea against Langdon and then converted him. South Carolina voted nay; but if C. C. Pinckney joined Rutledge and C. Pinckney, then Butler could have voted yea without a trace.

Consequently, the plan survived on the floor without substantial emendation and was twice approved by a large majority: (a) on a motion by Rutledge to postpone to take up legislative appointment (roll call 445, II, 508), which failed 2-8-1, with New Hampshire divided and the Carolinas nay; (b) on the report of the committee (roll call 457, II, 520), which passed 9-2, with the Carolinas dissenting.

One change was adopted on the floor: to relocate the residual power to elect from the Senate to the House, voting by states. This preserved the advantage for the small states and satisfied some who thought the Senate might be too powerful. Otherwise the committee plan stuck. It is astonishing that a compromise put together over a weekend to satisfy diverse, parochial, and temporary interests has, with only slight modification by the Twelfth Amendment, served adequately for two centuries.

We know nothing for certain about how this compromise was made, but I infer that G. Morris put it together. He was an active and dominating floor leader,7 whose colleagues respected his ability, who creatively suggested deals, and who knew how to abandon hopeless positions. 10 So he was precisely the kind of person to take charge of a committee. Furthermore, on the floor he acted as committee spokesman, giving "the reasons of the Committee and his own" (II, 500). Even more suggestive, however, is his response to Wilson's criticism of the plan for ultimate election in the Senate. Through Madison's emotionless precis, one still senses Morris's sharp resentment, as a proud and offended author, of the remarks of a colleague from whom he expected support: "Mr. Govr. Morris expressed his wonder at the observations of Mr. Wilson so far as they preferred the plan in the printed Report [i.e. of the Committee on Detaill to the new modification of it before the House, and entered into a comparative view of

<sup>7</sup>By Madison, *Notes*, we know he spoke more frequently than anyone else (Rossiter, p. 252).

\*They chose him for committees more frequently, relative to expectations, than any other active delegate. (For him, the ratio of actual to expected committee membership was 2.8, for King 2.5, for Rutledge and Williamson 2.3.)

\*He suggested the compromise on the slave trade and navigation laws (II, 374).

<sup>10</sup>In the debate on impeachment, he initially opposed it on separationist grounds as just another chance for "intrigue," but when Davie (N.C.), Wilson (Pa.), Mason (Va.), Franklin (Pa.), Madison (Va.), Gerry (Mass.), and Randolph (Va.) favored it and only two young men, C. Pinckney (S.C.) and King (Mass.), supported it, Morris quickly acknowledged his "opinion had been changed" (II, 64-68).

the two, with an eye to the nature of Mr. Wilson's objections" (II, 523).

But although we can only guess at Morris's role, we know that the report took the supporters of legislative election by surprise. Randolph (Va.) and C. Pinckney (S.C.) "wished for a particular explanation . . . of the reasons for changing the mode" (II, 500). Morris responded. But what he could not tell them were facts he probably did not fully understand himself: that the Virginia proposal was about to be finally replaced because of the separationists' rhetorical and heresthetical skill and persistence, because of the cycle generated by Rutledge's unwise motion, and because of the clever appeal to diverse interests put together in the proposal for the electoral college.

#### Generalizations about Heresthetics

I undertook this interpretation of the origin of the electoral college in order to explicate political invention and the relation between creativity and social regularities. Now I extract the moral from my story.

In the static model of decision making, choice is made from a fixed set of alternatives. The dynamic process differs. The set of alternatives is not fixed, and the alternatives themselves change over time. In my example, only one alternative existed initially, many were invented during the course of "narrowing the alternatives," and the winning one was not created until most others were disposed of. Furthermore, all the continuing alternatives were changed in gross or subtle ways throughout the event. As shown in Table 1, the motion for popular election was never incarnated in the same words twice. The system of electors adopted on 19 July differed much from the college adopted on 6 September. Even the Virginia proposal was transformed. When Rutledge offered it against the electoral college on 5 September, it was changed by his idea of a joint ballot from simply a method of election, as it had been on 23 June or 26 July, to an expression of the power of the large states.

In my example, and probably in general, the set of alternatives is indefinitely large, and the continuing elements are constantly revised. This continuous creation is, of course, the artistic element of the dynamic world that differentiates it from the static model.

The setting for creation in this example was the composite of the desire to win and the expectation of losing. The separationists' intense will to win was demonstrated by their persistent invention of new forms of popular election and by their readiness to ally with the small state interest, even though they had lost to that interest on something much more important and painful. Their expecta-

tion of losing on the presidency was demonstrated by the large majorities by which legislative election was adopted on roll calls 215 and 225 (Table 3). Even the one (disastrous) creation by the supporters of legislative election (namely, Rutledge's motion for a joint ballot) was immediately interpreted, not so much as a motion on the method of election (on which Rutledge was winning), but as a motion on the composition and authority of the Senate (on which Rutledge had lost). So creativity on both sides emanated from the will to win in the face of prospective loss.

I believe this motivation, so clear in my example, is probably quite general. The political world selects for people who want to win politically; that is, those who do not want to win are more likely than others to lose and thus be excluded from political decisions. (In my example McClurg, whom Madison thought something of an innocent, was so taken aback by the adverse reaction to his one heresthetical effort that he went sulkily home (II, 67).) Consequently, most of the people -and certainly most of the leaders-in the political system display the same kind of persistence as did G. Morris, Madison, Sherman, Rutledge, and others. In the Philadelphia Convention this persistence was layers deep: after Paterson and Ellsworth went home, Brearley and Dayton were just as determined in the small states' cause as their more significant colleagues had been. This more or less general motivation is, so I believe, what makes generalization about politics possible. Most participants have the same goal, namely, to win on whatever is the point at issue. Assuming they think seriously about how to achieve their goals, they may be expected to behave in similar ways.

This characteristic of political actors is the basis for the reconciliation, by rational choice analysis, between determinism and indeterminism. The combination of an open-ended set of alternatives with the presence of people motivated to win makes possible many generalizations about the process of winning. Both the size principle and the median voter principle, for example, depend on exactly these conditions: participants who are motivated to win and who creatively adjust alternatives to arrive at minimal winning coalitions (Dodd, 1976; Enelow & Hinich, in press; McKelvey, 1976, 1979; Riker, 1963; Riker & Ordeshook, 1972, chap. 11-12). So also other recent generalizations about political dynamics depend on these conditions (Kramer, 1977; McKelvey, Ordeshook, & Winer, 1978).

It seems to me that many more such generalizations are possible, which is why I recommend the study of heresthetics. We know, for example, almost nothing about the way alternatives are modified in political conflicts. Yet this kind of heresthetical maneuver is how groups are forced into minimal winning coalitions and coalitions aimed at the median voter. In my example the separationists adopted a rhetorical stance and hammered at it until they were successful. They tested out alternatives, rejecting or exploiting them as appropriate. I suspect there are patterns of such behavior. Perhaps there are regularities in the way rhetorical positions are established, appeals, for example, to well-established references and symbols, like the separationists' appeal to well-established and hallowed principle (i.e., the separation of powers doctrine) and to a well-established argument (i.e., about the danger of intrigue in legislative election). Perhaps there are regularities in the way losers coalesce with defecting subsets of apparent winners, as separationists allied with the small state interest. Perhaps even there are regularities in the way apparent losers develop cycles and exploit them when revealed, as Morris developed and exploited a cycle out of Rutledge's motion for a joint ballot. The evidence from an anecdote like the one I have related is not, of course, enough to establish any generalization. But to me the evidence suggests there are underlying patterns which are worth looking for. There is no chance they will turn out to be a general equilibrium (Riker, 1980), but they may be partial equilibria or at least involve some repetitive events. And so, as retiring president, I commend this search to you.

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# Changes in the Vote Margins for Congressional Candidates: A Specification of Historical Trends

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Recent research on House elections has focused on the decline in congressional competition since the mid-1960s. However, this body of research suffers from three major problems: 1) an imprecise specification of the nature of change in the degree of congressional competition, 2) its exclusive reliance on a limited time frame, which calls into question the generalizability and adequacy of its explanations, and 3) its overemphasis on incumbency-oriented explanations. Using a Multiple Interrupted Time Series (MITS) analysis of trends in aggregate electoral data from 1824 to 1980, we find that current low levels of congressional competition are not historically unique, but instead constitute a continuation of a long-term trend established in the mid-1890s. In addition, and in contrast to the general thrust described in the literature, there appears to be a post-1965 trend toward greater competition, although the absolute level of competition is lower after the mid-1960s. Finally, a disaggregation of electoral results by incumbency status suggests a growth in the incumbency advantage since the mid-1890s, but that lower post-1965 levels of congressional competition are the result of a winners' and not an incumbency, advantage. Such findings cast doubt on the adequacy of explanations that focus on post-1965, incumbency-oriented factors.

The decine of competition in congressional elections during the 1960s and 1970s has been a widely recognized contemporary development. In recent years a large number of analyses have been undertaken in an attempt to explain this phenomenon (Alford & Hibbing, 1981; Born, 1977, 1979; Collie, 1981; Erikson, 1971, 1976; Ferejohn, 1977; Fiorina, 1977a, b; Gross & Garand, 1982; Mayhew, 1974). Four types of explanations have dominated the literature: redistricting (Tufte, 1975); a growth of incumbency resources (Fiorina, 1977a, b); weaker opponents (Hinckley, 1981; Jacobson, 1981; Mann & Wolfinger, 1981); and changes in the electorate (Burnham, 1970; Ferejohn, 1977).

Given the volume of literature on the subject, it is surprising to find that so few analyses have attempted to define the precise nature of recent developments in congressional competition. Although Erikson (1971) and Alford and Hibbing (1981) established that the increase in electoral margins was uniform across incumbency levels, it is not clear that only incumbents have increased their electoral margins since 1965. Nor is it clear how post-World War II developments in congres-

sional competition compare with those of earlier years. Thus, what may seem to be a major development in the 1960s might seem to be only a minor development when compared to earlier, more significant and long-lasting changes. Finally, the precise nature of changes in the degree of competition, whether from a long-term or short-term perspective, remains unspecified. In this article we consider each of these three problems. By developing a detailed description of long-term historical trends in congressional competition, we hope to gain further insight into the applicability of various explanations of cross-temporal variation in congressional election outcomes.

#### Evaluating Change in Congressional Competition

As a point of departure it is important to consider alternative representations of change in congressional competition over an extended time series. As such, Figure 1 illustrates four hypothetical examples of change in the mean percentage of the vote obtained by winning congressional candidates over the period from 1946 to 1980. Since 1965 is often seen as a turning point in congressional competition, we can divide the entire time series into two periods of theoretical importance:

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Received: January 3, 1983


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
1946 to 1964 and 1966 to 1980. In each of these four examples the mean percentages during the first half of the time series are equal  $(\bar{X}=55)$ , as are the mean percentages for the second half of the time series  $(\bar{X}=73)$ . Hence, in each of these four hypothetical examples the mean vote is 18% higher in the second half of the time series than in the first half.


In the first example there is a pure incremental process of change across the entire time series; that is, the rate of change from every t to every t+1 remains constant. Example 2 illustrates a situation in which one rate of change operates in


the period from 1946 to 1964 and another rate of change operates in the period from 1966 to 1980. Thus, it can be said that there is a change in the incremental process of change from one period to the next. In Example 3 the process of change is the same in both temporal periods; however, the same process operates at a different level in each period. Finally, Example 4 again illustrates a situation in which a similar incremental process operates at different levels in each period. Unlike Example 3, however, the incremental process operates such that there is not a process of systematic change within each period—i.e., the dif-

Figure 1. Four Hypothetical Examples of Change in the Mean Proportion of the Vote for Winning Congressional Candidates, 1946-1980









ference between each t and each t+1 is equal to zero within each period.

In terms of our understanding of recent developments in congressional competition, each of these examples should focus our attention upon different phenomena to be explained and different types of explanations. For Example 1, the theoretical utility of distinguishing between the pre- and post-1965 periods would be greatly suspect, as would all explanations based primarily on such a distinction. The phenomenon of greatest interest is the ongoing constant process of change over the entire time series, with the greatest need being explanations that focus upon this process. Example 2 requires explanations of the process of change occurring within each temporal period and the reason why the process is different in each period. The constant process of change and the causes of the observed level shift are the phenomena of interest in Example 3. Since there is no process change in Example 4, analyses of change in congressional competition need only focus on factors that may account for the level shift. Although these examples illustrate the need to describe precisely the nature of change in congressional competition, it is important to recognize that numerous combinations of process and level changes are possible for a given time series.2

Not only have analysts failed to distinguish among alternative representations of change in congressional competition, most analysts have examined only a fairly limited time frame: 1946 to 1980. Reliance upon such a limited time series can result in three major problems. First, it may be difficult to distinguish among alternative representations of change in the time series. Changes in the level of the time series may be confused with process changes, and vice versa. Second, what may appear to be a significant and major change in the short run can appear as an insignificant or minor change from the perspective of a longer time series. Finally, as is suggested by Cooper and Brady (1981), the reliance upon relatively short time series prevents the political scientist from utilizing history as a laboratory—a testing

'Although there are important theoretical differences between example 3 and example 4, from a methodological perspective the latter is merely a special case of the former, where change within each period is set equal to zero.

\*The methodologies employed in many previous analyses cannot distinguish among various representations of change; in fact, they mask such differences. For example, Alford and Hibbing (1981) compared the mean of the scores for one time period with the mean for the second time period. All four examples in Figure 1 would give the same results when the means for each period are compared.

ground, if you will—for theories offered in temporally constrained analyses.

Having discussed the need to describe precisely the nature of change in congressional competition over a more extensive time series, we must address one final consideration: can changes in congressional competition be attributed to changes in congressional elections that involve particular types of candidates? Most analyses have attributed recent declines in congressional competition to changes in elections that involve incumbents. On the other hand, it is not clear that the trend toward increased electoral margins is confined to incumbent candidates. Data presented by Collie (1981) suggest that others—i.e., winners in open-seat elections-have also benefitted from post-1965 changes.3 Thus it is important to consider the likelihood that there are changes in the electoral margins of particular types of nonincumbents. However, it is inappropriate merely to compare all nonincumbents with all incumbents. The essential problem with such a comparison is that all incumbents can be considered, almost by definition, as viable candidates, whereas a large number of nonincumbents are not viable candidates.4 (Incumbents have shown that they are viable by winning in at least one previous election.) Nonincumbents are much more heterogeneous in terms of resources and electoral viability, with any subsequent calculations affected by this heterogeneity. It is important, therefore, to reduce the heterogeneity among nonincumbents and compare only viable nonincumbents with incumbents. Since electoral viability is difficult to define empirically and precisely, the easiest, and we feel best, way to undertake comparisons is to compare winning nonincumbents with winning incumbents. We may not be able to say anything about various losing candidates, but we do know

Extrapolating from the data given in Table 1 of Collie's (1981) article, the mean percentage of open seat winners with safe victory margins from 1952 to 1964 is 32.24, whereas the mean is 38.88 for the period of 1966 to 1976. An analysis by Gross and Garand (1982) also indicated that nonincumbent winners have achieved greater electoral margins after 1964.

'It is difficult to define precisely what one means by a viable candidate. It may be suggested that one can solve the problem of weak candidates only by dealing with contested elections. Ignoring the problem of defining contested elections, we do not feel that focusing exclusively on contested elections is an adequate solution to the problem. One would still have a large number of nonincumbent candidates who are, for all practical purposes, very weak opponents. It is also important to recognize that in any given election an incumbent, because of scandal or various other reasons, may not be a viable candidate.

that all individuals in both winning categories are viable candidates.

Having now defined the need for greater precision in the description of changes in congressional competition, we can begin by describing the nature of changes in congressional competition for the period from 1824 to 1980.

#### Trends in Congressional Competition over Time

Before we begin to describe trends in competition for congressional elections over the period from 1824 to 1980, a discussion of the data used in this analysis is in order. General election results and data on candidate attributes for all congressional candidates were used to create several important candidate variables: North vs. South, winner vs. loser, and incumbency status (nonincumbent, first-term incumbent, and multipleterm incumbent).5 Only the top two candidates in each election were selected for inclusion in this study, with each candidate's proportion of the vote defined in terms of the proportion of the two-party vote. Thus minor party candidates could be removed from the analysis with little impact on each election. In addition, mean proportions of the two-party vote were computed for each congressional election year during the period

The data utilized in this article were made available in part by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation presented herein. Because of data problems, approximately 2 to 3% of the congressional candidates in any given year were misclassified in terms of their incumbency status. Southern states excluded from the analysis were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Like all previous analyses of electoral competition in congressional elections, ours excludes Southern states from consideration because of the unique political history of the region. For most of the post-Civil War era Southern congressional elections were decidedly onesided, with Southern congressmen winning by extreme margins and maintaining high levels of tenure and electoral safety. Beginning in the 1960s the "solid South" began to break down, and Southern congressional elections began to become more competitive. The inclusion of Southern congressional elections in our national totals could, therefore, mask important national trends with the unique political history of the region. For the purposes of this study, we follow the lead of Alford and Hibbing (1981) by concentrating on northern states only, although our set of southern states is slightly more inclusive than that employed by these authors.

under study and for five sets of congressional candidates: all winners, nonincumbent winners, firstterm incumbent winners, multiple-term incumbent winners, and all incumbent winners.


The trend in the average proportion of the twoparty vote going to northern winning congressional candidates is shown in Figure 2. Since competition is highest when two competing candidates hold roughly equal electoral support, this figure can be seen as representing the reciprocal of congressional competition: when the vote proportions for winning candidates are high, competition is low, and vice versa. Several important features of this trend stand out. First, the vote proportions of northern winning candidates exhibited a generally negative trend from 1824 to 1894, then turned sharply upward and followed an upward trend from 1896 to 1930. After a sharp decline in the vote proportions in 1932, the trend again began to follow a positively sloped line until 1965, when the time series shifted up to a higher level but underwent a significant dampening out of the slope parameter.

Second, the current high proportion of the vote for winning candidates (and associated decline of competition) is not a unique contemporary development, given the equally high vote proportions existing during the 1920s. Recent trends in winners' vote proportions appear to be consistent with a long-term trend beginning in 1932, and consistent with an even longer-term upward trend beginning in 1896. It would appear that the contemporary high level of vote proportions for winning congressional candidates is not unique, given the equally high vote proportions existing during the 1920s. One might argue that explanations of recent patterns in congressional competition during the 1960s should encompass the similar trend occurring since the turn of the century and, more specifically, the low levels of congressional competition found in the 1920s.

Third, it appears that shifts in the trend of congressional competition are closely tied to periods that are viewed as critical realigning periods (i.e., the early 1850s, the early 1890s, and the early 1930s). Before the election of 1860, a downward trend in winners' vote proportions was broken temporarily in 1854 by a moderate rise in the trend line, after which the downward trend resumed until the early 1890s. The election of 1894 was followed by a steep positive trend in the vote proportions of winning congressional candidates, broken temporarily by a sharp drop in 1932, after which a positive slope to the trend line resumed.

A more rigorous specification of patterns of congressional competition can be achieved through the application of multiple interrupted time series (MITS) analysis to the plot of vote proportions of winning congressional candidates over

Figure 2. Mean Proportion of the Two Party Vote for Northern Winning Congressional Candidates, 1824-1980



time. Since shifts in the time series appear to occur during the theoretically relevant periods of realignment, specific elections occurring during

these periods are utilized as interventions in the time series. These interventions were specified in the following regression equation:

6MITS is a statistical procedure utilized primarily in policy studies to analyze and specify the impact of some set of interventions over an extended time series (Albritton, 1979; Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979; Hibbs, 1977; Lewis-Beck, 1979; Lewis-Beck & Alford, 1980; McDowell et al., 1981). It allows the researcher to assess the degree to which the parameter values (slope and intercept) of the trend shift from one time period to the next. MITS is conceptually equivalent to running separate regressions for each time period and determining the similarity of parameter estimates (or values) for the time period before and after some intervention. A series of dummy variables (representing shifts in the intercept) and counter variables (coded 0 before and 1, 2, 3, ..., N after an intervention, and representing shifts in the slope) are introduced into the time series regression equation; significant parameter estimates for these dummy and counter variables indicate significant shifts in the intercept and slope, respectively, of the regression associated with the hypothesized intervention. For an excellent application of MITS see Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980).

$$WIN_{t} = b_{0} + b_{1}COUNTER_{t}$$
  
+  $b_{2}DUMMY854_{t} + b_{3}COUNT854_{t}$   
+  $b_{4}DUMMY894_{t} + b_{5}COUNT894_{t}$   
+  $b_{6}DUMMY932_{t} + b_{7}COUNT932_{t}$   
+  $b_{8}DUMMY966_{t} + b_{9}COUNT966_{t}$   
+  $e_{t}$ . (1)

'Interventions utilized in the MITS analysis were seen as occurring in 1854, 1894, 1932, and 1965. With the exception of the latter intervention, these time points were determined primarily on the basis of general agreement about periods of partisan realignment found in the literature. Although there has been extensive debate about the occurrence of a partisan realignment in the 1960s, the 1965 intervention point was included in the analysis because of the importance attributed to the post-1965 period by scholars of congressional elections such as Fiorina (1977a, b).

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where WIN, = average annual proportion of the vote captured by winning congressional candidates;  $COUNTER_t = a$  counter for each election year from 1824 to 1980, coded from 1 (1824) to 79 (1980);  $DUMMYyyy_t = a dummy variable coded$ 0 before year yyy and 1 for yyy and after;  $COUNTyyy_t = a$  counter for election years. coded 0 before yyy and 1, 2, 3, ... for yyy and after;  $b_0$ ,  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $b_3$ ,  $b_4$ ,  $b_5$ ,  $b_6$ ,  $b_7$ ,  $b_8$ , and  $b_9$  are parameters to be estimated; and  $e_t$  is a randomly distributed error for each election year t. Significant parameter estimates obtained for any of the intervention dummy variables indicate a statistically significant shift in the regression intercept associated with the respective intervention point, and significant parameter estimates for any of the counter variables (excluding COUNTER) indicate a statistically significant shift in the slope.4 In addition, the actual slope coefficient for each time period can be obtained by summing the counter coefficients associated with earlier time periods.

The results of the MITS analysis for winners' vote proportions over time are shown in Table 1.9 These results indicate a clearly specified pattern of congressional competition from 1824 to 1980 which is compatible with the general description of the trend offered above. The time series begins with a negative slope (indicating a trend toward greater competition) from 1824 to 1852 and then undergoes a significant positive shift in both the intercept and slope, although the overall slope for the period from 1854 to 1892 remains negative. Starting in 1894, the trend line again shifts significantly in the positive direction. Although there is no associated shift in the level (intercept) of the time series, the slope for the third (1894 to 1930) time period is positive, indicating for the first time a trend toward less competition in congressional

"We strongly agree with those who argue that it is erroneous to use significance tests on data consisting of an entire population. However, we recognize that others find that significance tests are appropriate for data such as ours. In deference to this position, and for illustrative purposes, the significance results from the multiple interrupted time series analysis have been reported throughout this article, although we do not feel compelled to base our inferences exclusively on these results.

\*Although we are well aware of the problems associated with autocorrelated error terms in time series analysis (see, for instance, Ostrom, 1978), we have not presented the Durbin-Watson statistics and appropriate tests for serial correlation in our tables. Even though there is evidence of serial correlation in a few of our regression models, the results and substantive interpretation of our analysis are unchanged by the substitution into our tables of parameter values that are corrected for the effects of autocorrelation. Hence, all parameter values reported in our tables are OLS estimates.

Table 1. Multiple Interrupted Time Series Results for Winners' Vote Proportions Over Time

Variable	В	Standard Error
Intercept	.6442*	.0082
COUNTER	0055*	.0009
DUMMY854	.0417*	.0102
COUNT854	.0038*	.0011
DUMMY894	.0113	.0097
COUNT894	.0066*	.0009
DUMMY932	0614*	.0101
COUNT932	0011	.0010
DUMMY966	.0225	.0137
COUNT966	0070*	.0024

N = 79  $R^2 = .8738$  \*Significant at the .05 level.

elections. The realigning period in the early 1930s resulted in a negative shift in the level of the time series (as manifested in a major, significant intercept shift), but the slope of the trend line for the fourth (1932 to 1964) period was not significantly different from the slope for the preceding period. Essentially, the similarity in slope coefficients for the third and fourth periods suggests that the latter process of change in election outcomes is merely a continuation of the former process of change, albeit at a different (lower) overall level. Finally, although the absolute level of competition is lower after 1965, the occurrence of a significant negative shift in the slope of the trend line reflects a post-1965 trend toward greater competition in congressional elections.

Given these trends in vote proportions for northern congressional winners from 1824 to 1980, what can be said about the nature of change processes in congressional competition? First, it is clear that there has not been a monotonic increase in congressional winners' vote proportions since 1824. Much of the variation in patterns of congressional competition can be explained by each separate time period under consideration. It should be obvious that there is a slightly negative trend in winners' vote proportions during the 19th century and a positive trend during the 20th century, although even within these two centuries there are shifts in the parameter values of the time series which indicate patterns of change tied to realignment cycles.

Second, the different combinations of significant parameter shifts occurring at each intervention point in the time series suggest the occurrence of different types of change in congressional competition. For instance, the slope and intercept changes in the time series after 1854 indicate not only a change in the intensity of the underlying change process, but also the occurrence of an up-

ward shift in the level of the process—perhaps in response to some combination of endogenous (process change) and exogenous (level change) factors. Likewise, the significant slope change for the period from 1894 to 1930 suggests the importance of the early 1890s as a source of major change in the process of determining congressional election outcomes. On the other hand, the change in congressional competition which occurred in 1932 can be seen as a short-term deviation from the post-1894 pattern. The resumption of the post-1894 trend (and the insignificant slope differential) following the 1932 intervention suggests the continuation of the underlying process that impacted upon congressional election outcomes between 1894 and 1930, albeit at a lower level. In other words, explanations of the post-1932 trend in congressional competition must look to the period from 1894 to 1930 to capture the nature of the underlying causal process.

Third, the MITS results demonstrate that questionable inferences about patterns of change in congressional competition from one time period to the next can result from undue aggregation of election results over time. A standard argument made in the literature on congressional elections is that, when compared with the period from 1946 to 1964, the post-1965 period exhibited a sharp increase in the trend toward less electoral competition. If one examines mean vote proportions for winning candidates during these consecutive time periods, this appears to be the case: the average winners' vote proportion for the pre-1965 period is .662, and is .686 for the post-1965 periodleaving a difference of .024. One might infer that there is an upward trend in winners' vote proportions, and a subsequent decline in congressional competition. Yet if one examines the MITS results and the plot of winners' vote proportions found in Figure 2, one can readily see a positive shift in the level (intercept) of the time series and, more important, a significant dampening of the previous upward trend which suggests a shift in the process of congressional election change over time. This is particularly important, because several scholars have argued that the post-1965 era can be best characterized by its trend toward decreasing competition in congressional elections. In fact, although our results are necessarily tentative owing to the few (eight) time points in the post-1965 period, they suggest a trend toward increased competition (i.e., decreased winners' vote proportions), or at least a discontinuity or leveling off of the long-term trend toward less congressional competition which began in 1894. Our empirical results lead us to posit that absolute levels of congressional competition are lower, but

that *trends* in congressional competition are in the positive direction.

#### **Explanations for Historical Trends** in Congressional Competition

Of the four types of explanations in the literature used to explain the post-1965 trend toward greater congressional safety, the redistricting explanation offered by Tufte (1975) has been the most easily dispelled. Both Ferejohn (1977) and Fiorina (1977b) have presented solid evidence that calls into question the importance of redistricting to the post-1965 drop in congressional competition levels. The trends shown in Figure 2 offer additional long-term evidence that redistricting is not likely to be an adequate systematic explanation of major aggregate trends or shifts in patterns of congressional competition. The 1894-to-1930 and 1932-to-1946 trends toward electoral safety. as well as the 1932 shift point, simply do not correspond to any significant developments in redistricting.

Perhaps the dominant explanation of patterns of congressional competition found in the literature pertains to the incumbency advantage. This explanation attributes higher levels of congressional safety in the post-1965 period to specific electoral advantages that are unique to incumbent candidates. These advantages are seen as arising from either increased electoral resources (e.g., franking privilege, travel allowances, casework opportunities) or weak opponents, or else some combination of the two. Since electoral campaigns can be seen largely as a resource acquisition and distribution problem, 10 any factor that enhances the resource differential between competing candidates—whether based on incumbent resources or lack of challenger resources (i.e., weak challengers)—can be seen as contributing to the difference in vote proportions for incumbents and challengers.

From a long-term historical perspective, the importance of specific incumbent-unique resources in determining patterns of congressional competition seems suspect. For instance, Fiorina (1977a, b) suggests that it is no accident that congressional safety, the amount of casework, and the size of the federal bureaucracy all tended to increase in the mid-to-late 1960s. But when we

<sup>10</sup>By resource we refer to any commodity that, in the absence of equal counter resources, produces votes for a candidate. Some of the important resources for a candidate are party affiliation, individual appeal, image, political career, issue positions, name recognition, constituency contacts, and record of casework.

examine Figure 2, it is obvious that the dramatic decrease in congressional competition which occurred from 1896 to 1930 is simply not matched by major increases in federal expenditures. In fact, higher levels of federal expenditures in the mid-to-late 1930s correspond to higher levels of congressional competition than were seen in the 1920s. Thus, the higher levels of federal expenditures which are necessary to provide the basis for effective casework did not exist during the 1920s. A similar lack of correspondence between historically low levels of competition and other incumbent resources such as franking privilege and travel allowances casts doubt upon the historical applicability of specific incumbent resources as singular explanations of longitudinal variation in congressional competition. In terms of post-1965 developments in particular, there would seem to be a fundamental theoretical tension between the incumbency resource explanation and the results shown in Figure 2 and Table 1: that is, there does not appear to be any readily apparent reason why incumbent resources would dramatically lower the overall level of competition after 1965 while simultaneously reversing a trend toward less competition and initiating a trend toward greater competition.

Perhaps the best way to examine the impact of incumbency-unique advantages on patterns of congressional competition over time is to compare the electoral results (and subsequent contributions toward electoral competition and safety) of incumbent candidates with other types of candidates for whom the advantages of incumbency do not exist—namely, all nonincumbent candidates. Unfortunately, and as is already stated, such a comparison is generally inappropriate in that, although all incumbents can usually be considered viable candidates, many nonincumbents are not viable candidates. In our view, it is necessary to reduce the heterogeneity among nonincumbents which may distort comparisons used in testing alternative explanations of congressional election outcomes. Since electoral viability is difficult to define precisely, the easiest, and we feel best, way to undertake such comparisons is to restrict our analysis to winning candidates and compare winning nonincumbents with winning incumbents. Because congressional competition can be accurately specified on the basis of knowledge about the vote proportions of winning candidates, it is not necessary to consider nonwinning candidates in evaluating the impact of incumbency on patterns of congressional competition over time. Presumably, if incumbency-based factors account for cross-temporal patterns of congressional competition, the electoral results for incumbent winners should differ in a systematic fashion from those for nonincumbent winning candidates; otherwise,

similarities between these two classes of candidates should be prevalent.

It is clearly the case that the advantages of incumbency are not likely to accrue equally to all incumbent candidates. Erikson (1971, 1976) has discussed the importance of the so-called "sophomore surge," which suggests differential impacts of incumbency factors for different classes of incumbent congressional candidates. Thus, in order to assess properly the impact of incumbency factors, it is useful to concentrate on differences and similarities in trends of vote proportions for nonincumbent winners, first-term incumbent winners, multiple-term incumbent winners, and all winners. If there is no advantage in the congressional election process which can be attributed to incumbency factors (whether to all or particular subsets of incumbents), one would expect trends in congressional election outcomes (i.e., as shown by slope coefficients for the time series) within each time period to be relatively uniform across subsets of congressional candidates. In other words, trends in vote proportions for each group of winners should be quite similar to the pattern exhibited by all winning candidates. On the other hand, if there is an incumbency advantage, one would expect trends (slopes) in vote proportions for incumbent winners (particular multiple-term incumbents) to surpass those for nonincumbent winners. Given this, declines in congressional competition could be attributed to processes that grant to incumbent winners some types of advantages over other winners.

MITS results for the plots of vote proportions over time for nonincumbent, first-term incumbent, and multi-term incumbent winners are shown in Table 2. What is striking about these results are the similarities in significant slope and intercept shifts for each subset of winners over time. In each case the pattern of change is similar: a negative slope in the pre-1854 period, a positive (and statistically significant) shift in both the level (intercept) and trend (slope) of the time series from 1854 to 1892, a significant upward shift in the trend (but not the level) after 1894, and a sharp decrease in the level (intercept) in the post-1932 period accompanied by a continuation of the post-1894 trend through 1964. After 1930, there are two cases in which there are significant deviations from the uniformity of these patterns. First, there is a significant negative slope shift in the trend of vote proportions for nonincumbent winners after 1932 which suggests a slight trend toward greater competition in those elections involving a nonincumbent winner, whereas there is no significant interruption in the same trend for all winners (see Table 1) and first-term and multiple-term incumbent winners. Second, all winners and first-term incumbent winners under-

.0061

 $R^2 = .6785$ 

	Nonincumbent		First-term	Incumbent	Multi-term Incumbent	
Variable	В	SE	В	SE	В	SE
Intercept	.5964*	.0077	.7058*	.0162	.8458*	.0205
COUNTER	0033*	.0009	0079*	.0018	0189*	0023
DUMMY854	.0031*	.0096	.0489*	.0201	.0693*	.0255
COUNT854	.0019**	.0010	.0051*	.0021	.0170*	.0027
DUMMY894	.0107	.0092	.0250	.0191	.0168	.0243
COUNT 894	.0033*	.0008	.0058*	.0017	.0066*	10022
DUMMY932	0292*	.0096	0458*	.0200	0507*	.0254
COUNT932	0018**	.0009	.0025	.0019	0021	.0024
DUMMY966	.0149	.0129	.0131	.0270	.0239	:0342

-.0134\*

Table 2. Multiple Interrupted Time Series Results for Vote Proportions of Nonincumbent, First-term Incumbent, and Multiple-term Incumbent Winners Over Time

COUNT966

went a significant negative shift in the trend (slope) of vote proportions over time after 1965, whereas nonincumbent winners experienced a small (nonsignificant) increase and multiterm incumbent winners a small (nonsignificant) decrease in the trend of vote proportions. Essentially, the overall trend in the post-1965 era toward increased congressional competition can be attributed primarily to the significant increase of the trend in congressional competition among first-term incumbent winners, and can perhaps be secondarily attributed to the weak increased competitive trend among multiple-term incumbent winners.

.0019

.0023

 $R^2 = .4592$ 

We can also examine the differences in intensity of changes in the longitudinal trends of vote proportions for each class of winning candidates in order to assess the differing contributions made in determining overall trends in competition. During the first (1824 to 1852) period of these three time series, it appears that by virtue of their large negative slope coefficients for that time period, multiple-term incumbents made a disproportionately large contribution to the competitive trend in vote proportions; this is not surprising, given the initial high levels of electoral safety for multiterm incumbents at the very beginning of the time series. In the second (1854 to 1892) time period, there is an overall positive shift in the trend in vote proportions which is the result of a positive shift for all three classes of winners, although in each subset of candidates the overall slope remains negative. However, it appears that incumbency status is an important factor in this process of trend change, for the slope shift is greatest for multiterm incumbent winners, second

for first-term incumbent winners, and the least for nonincumbent winners. 11

-.0041

.0048

 $R^2 = .6185$ 

After 1894 there is a trend toward increased winners' vote proportions (and hence, decreased competition), with multiterm incumbents again providing the greatest contribution in this trend. The rate of improvement in vote proportions for multiterm incumbent winners during this period exceeds that of non-incumbent and first-term incumbent winners, suggesting a disproportionate impact on the overall trend in competition.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup>During the first two time periods (1824 to 1894), nonincumbent winners were the largest subset of all winners. As such, they consistently made the largest overall contribution to the slope coefficient for all winners. This does not negate the importance of incumbency because the contribution of incumbents to the actual slope and intercept changes remained disproportionate to their numbers.

<sup>12</sup>Incumbents also provided a disproportionate share to the trend toward increased winners' proportions over. the period of 1894 to 1964 because over this period the proportion of all winners who were incumbents tended to increase dramatically as shown in the previous work of Polsby (1969) and Price (1975). However, it is equally clear that the increase in the vote proportions of winning congressional candidates cannot be attributed solely to the increased proportion of winners who are incumbents. If one examines the trend lines-shown in Table 2-for first-term and multiple-term incumbent winners, one finds that the slopes for the post-1894 period are all positive. Since both trends are independent of the number of incumbents winning, and since the trend for first-term incumbents is independent of the number of multiple-term incumbents, factors other than the mere number of incumbents must be affecting the

N = 79

<sup>\*</sup>Significant at .05 level.
\*\*Significant at .10 level.

26

After 1932 the results became a bit more ambiguous. For all winning candidates there is a slightly negative, nonsignificant shift in the trend of vote proportions. However, the trend behavior for the three classes of winners is not uniform. Nonincumbent winners exhibit a significant negative slope change, indicating a slight trend toward greater competition. On the other hand, the slope shifts for both incumbent classes of winners is nonsignificant, although first-term incumbent winners are characterized by a slight positive trend shift and multiterm incumbent winners by a slightly negative trend shift. In other words, the rate of increase in patterns of vote proportions (i.e., congressional safety) for first-term incumbent winners is greater than that for nonincumbent and multiterm incumbent winners, although the significance levels make such a conclusion highly tentative.13

Perhaps the most surprising set of results occurs during the final period of the time series. The literature on congressional elections posits that the post-1965 period has been characterized by an increase in the electoral advantage of incumbent candidates. If one only focuses on the absolute level of competition, this would appear to be the case. However, one would also expect the increasing importance of incumbency to be reflected in the slope coefficients by the exhibition of progressively higher shifts as incumbency status increases. Yet this does not seem to be the case. In fact, it appears that nonincumbent winners are the only group to enjoy a positive shift in the trend of vote proportions, whereas both classes of incumbent winners show a decline in their trend as compared to the previous period. In addition, nonincumbent winners are the only candidates who exhibit an overall positive slope (i.e., trend

toward increased electoral safety) in the post-1965 period. Both first-term and multi-term incumbents exhibit trends toward greater competition over time during the most recent era, although the actual level (intercept) of competition is lower after 1965 than before. In any event, such findings call into serious question the validity of previous work on congressional elections which posits an increasing trend toward incumbency advantage in the post-1965 era.

A more proper specification of the incumbency

A more proper specification of the incumbency advantage can be established by focusing directly on the difference between the electoral performance of incumbent and nonincumbent winning candidates. If viable incumbent candidates hold electoral advantages over viable nonincumbent candidates, one might expect to see the vote proportions for the former to be greater than the vote proportions for the latter; hence, the difference in vote proportions at time t between viable (winning) incumbents and nonincumbents should represent adequately the concept of incumbency advantage. In addition, the plot of these differences over time should give us an accurate portrayal of longitudinal trends in incumbency advantage. In order to specify more properly patterns of incumbenty advantage over time, difference scores between all incumbent winners, first-term incumbent winners, and multiterm incumbent winners, on one hand, and nonincumbent winners, on the other, were calculated. These scores represent the advantage that all incumbent winners, first-term incumbent winners, and multiterm incumbent winners, respectively, have over viable (winning) nonincumbents.

The MITS results for the plots of these three sets of difference scores over time are shown in Table 3. In addition, Figure 3 shows the difference scores for all incumbent winners and nonincumbent winners from 1824 to 1980. These results provide a striking contrast to that which would be expected, given the current state of the literature. The first and most important conclusion that can be deduced from Figure 3 is that there is no gain for incumbent over nonincumbent winners in the post-1965 era. The post-1965 decrease in the level of congressional competition is, therefore, more properly seen as an increase in winners' advantage and not solely an increase in incumbency advantage. The immediate importance of this finding is that it calls into question explanations that are based upon the sole importance of casework and other incumbent-exclusive resources. Such explanations simply cannot explain why nonincumbent winners are also doing. better after 1965.

Figure 3 and the results shown in Table 3 indicate that, from 1894 to the present, incumbent winners generally increased their average electoral

trends toward less competition in elections involving incumbents and thus the general trend toward less competition in all congressional elections.

13 Here again, the issue of applying significance tests to population trends arises. If we base our inferences solely on the statistical significance of intervention shifts (i.e., if we treat the counter coefficients as estimates of parameter shifts), we cannot draw any conclusions about parameter shifts for trends in vote proportions for both classes of incumbent winners. In this case, we must interpret the insignificance of the results as suggesting that no shift had occurred (i.e., that the slope before intervention is equal to the slope after intervention). On the other hand, we can infer the existence of trend changes if we treat the slope and intercept coefficients as actual population parameters. Throughout this article we have reported significance tests of regression results in deference to those who argue for their use in analyses such as ours. However, we do not feel constrained to be bound by these significance results in interpreting our data and findings.

Table 3. Multiple Interrupted Time Series Results for Difference Scores Over Time:
All Incumbent Winners, First-term Incumbent Winners, and Multiple-term Incumbent Winners

`	AII		First-Term		Multi-Term	
Variable	В	SE	. <i>B</i>	SE		SE
Intercept	.1460*	0115	.1093*	.0171	.2493*	.0206
COUNTER	0071*	.0013	0046*	.0019	0156*	.0023
DUMMY854	.0175	.0143	.0178	.0213		.0256
COUNT 854	.0061*	.0015	.0032	.0022	.0151*	.0027
DUMMY894	.0059	.0136	.0142	.0202	.0061	.0243
COUNT894	.0039*	.0012	.0026	.0018	.0033	.0022
DUMMY932	0256**	.0142	0166	.0211	0215	.0254
COÚNT932	.0005	.0014	.0043*	.0020	0003	.0025
DUMMY966	.0057	.0192	0018	.0285	.0089	.0343
COUNT966	0081*	.0034	0153*	.0051	0060	.0061

N = 79

 $R^2 = .6974$ 

 $R^2 = .4952$ 


 $R^2 = .5911$ 

\*\*Significant at .10 level.

advantage over nonincumbent winners. 14 This trend toward a greater disparity between incumbent and nonincumbent winners seems to have levelled off, and perhaps has been reduced, since the mid-1960s. Where the average difference was approximately 3 to 5% in 1896 to 1898, the difference peaked at approximately 16.5% in 1966.

"We do not concentrate our efforts on difference scores for the period of 1824 to 1892, although it should be noted that there is a negative trend in the difference scores from 1828 to 1840. After 1965 a definite negative trend in the differences between incumbent and nonincumbent winners is evident; an examination of the slope coefficients for the two classes of incumbents suggests that although there was a clear (but statistically insignificant) erosion in the incumbency advantage for both first-term and multiterm incumbents after 1965, the former incumbent group contributed the greatest amount toward the decrease in the incumbency advantage. Nonetheless, one must conclude that it is during the era from 1894 to 1964 that there is an almost

Figure 3. Difference Scores for All Incumbent and Non-Incumbent Winners, 1824-1980



<sup>\*</sup>Significant at .05 level.

incumbent-exclusive growth in electoral margins.<sup>15</sup> Any incumbent advantage that remains after 1965 appears to be the result of this earlier trend, but also seems to have eroded somewhat since 1965—primarily (but not exclusively) as a result of a declining advantage among first-term incumbent winners.

Thus far, it would seem that redistricting and specific incumbency-unique resources do not provide adequate singular explanations of either the pre- or post-1965 developments in congressional competition. We are left with two explanations: weak opponents and changes in the electorate. Although our data are generally insufficient to provide a direct test between these two alternative explanations, the data in Figure 3 suggest a theoretical problem in the weak opponents argument. Why should the benefits of weak opponents accrue primarily to incumbent winners before 1965 and to nonincumbent winners and (to a lesser extent) incumbent winners after 1965? Unless reasons can be developed to explain why opponents to incumbent winners became weaker from 1894 to 1980 whereas opponents to nonincumbents became weaker only after 1965, the weak opponents argument must be considered suspect.

How, then, can we explain patterns of congressional competition over time? In our view, the only explanation that comes close to fitting the data that we have presented here is the changing electorate argument similar to that found in the writings of Burnham (1970, 1974, 1975a, b). Central to Burnham's explanation is the concept of party disaggregation. As voters' attachment to the major parties decreases—manifested in increasing numbers of independents and more split-ticket voting—the parties' role as action intermediaries in electoral choice is diminished. As electoral disaggregation continues, party cues are replaced by other types of cues in the voter's decisional calculus.

According to Burnham, one result of party disaggregation is a lower level of competition in aggregate electoral outcomes. Burnham notes the trend toward lower congressional competition beginning in the mid-1890s and suggests a linkage between this trend and the trend toward greater party disaggregation beginning around the same time. Our data seem to be compatible with this ex-

<sup>15</sup>Of course, since throughout most of the 20th century the majority of winners were incumbents, they make a disproportionately large contribution to the total upward trend for winners. Although we do not present the data, incumbent losers lose at about the same rate after 1965 as they did in the period from 1946 to 1964.

planation. As was shown in Figure 2, winners' vote proportions increased dramatically between 1894 and the 1920s, which corresponds exactly with Burnham's first period or movement of party disaggregation and the resulting shift to a mercantilist campaign style.16 Burnham sees 1932 as a temporary respite in the trend toward party disaggregation with partisanship being reinvigorated as a result of the polarity induced by the Great Depression. Here again the trend shown in Figure 2 corresponds nicely to Burnham's argument. Finally, once the shock to the electoral system brought about by the Depression died down following the election of 1932, there was a return to the trend toward greater party disaggregation and, subsequently, toward lower levels of congressional competition.

The fact that major changes in the trend line in Figure 2 correspond to what are widely recognized as realigning periods lends strong support to the changing electoral explanation of change in congressional competition. But what about post-1965 patterns exhibited in Figure 3? One might argue that this trend appears to contradict the arguments posited by Burnham. We disagree. First, the apparent levelling off of the difference in the vote margin of incumbent winners vis-a-vis nonincumbent winners after 1965 corresponds to widely recognized changes in the electorate. The mid-1960s may not be considered a realigning period, but there were major changes in the number of Independent-identifying voters, increases in the amount of split ticket voting, and increases in what is generally referred to as the volatility of the electorate. Second, as Burnham points out, the impact of a changing electorate must be viewed in terms of the ability of politicos to respond to the changes. Taking this perspective, what is important about the 1960s is that it is the beginning of an era of new campaign technologies-opinion polling, well-financed television campaigns and other media events, and mass mailings-which, unlike casework and the pork barrel, are available to incumbent and nonincumbent candidates alike. Thus, it is possible that the nature of new campaign technologies allows nonincumbent congressional candidates, as well as incumbent candidates, to take greater advantage of a changing electorate.

We are not suggesting that Burnham's (or anyone else's) changing electorate explanation of longitudinal patterns of congressional competition has been upheld by our analysis. On the contrary, we suggest the need for additional research

<sup>&</sup>quot;Burnham borrows the term "mercantilist" and "militarist" campaign styles from the work of Jenson (1968).

into the linkage between party disaggregation and congressional competition. However, we do contend that the changing electorate class of explanations is the only one that is compatible with our data and analysis. The other explanations offered in the literature—reapportionment, incumbency advantages, and weak opponents—do not address changes in congressional competition over the entire 1824 to 1980 time series adequately enough to convince us of their empirical validity.

In this context it is particularly important to recognize the need for additional research on the relationship between party disaggregation and partisan realignments. Although both of these concepts emphasize the importance of changes in the electorate, each focuses on a related but different type of change. Although the partisan realignment literature is concerned primarily with changes in the electoral support for particular parties, the emphasis in the literature on party aggregation-disaggregation is on change in the commitment of the electorate to parties in general. It is likely that these two types of change are related in an ongoing, interactive, and dynamic manner. For instance, as the electorate changes in its commitment to political parties in general, such a change is likely to affect the nature of subsequent realignments. Likewise, a particular realignment can affect the future commitment of the electorate to political parties in general.

The data that we have presented in this article indicate trends toward greater competition before 1894 and trends toward less competition after 1894. Assuming an inverse relationship between party disaggregation and electoral (congressional) competition and an expected interaction between party disaggregation and partisan realignments. one would expect to see differences in the nature of the realignments of the 1850s, 1890s, and 1930s as a result of this interaction. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to undertake such an analysis, the recent work of Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale (1980) suggests that this is indeed the case. In their analysis these authors indicate that the realignments of the 1850s, 1890s, and 1930s each had a number of unique characteristics. In particular, Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale indicate that the realignment of the 1930s began to deteriorate most rapidly, whereas the realignment of the 1850s was the slowest to deteriorate. Given that the realignment of the 1930s took place in a period of growing party disaggregation, or lack of commitment to parties in general, it is not particularly surprising to find that, after a temporary reinvigoration of parties as a result of the Great Depression era, the coalition based upon this reinvigoration began to break down quite rapidly. The realignment of the 1850s, on the other hand, can

be seen as having deteriorated at a much slower rate because it occurred during a time of growing party aggregation (i.e., growing commitment to political parties in general). What appears most unique about the 1890s is that during this time the nation not only underwent a partisan realignment but also a fundamental change in the process of party aggregation-disaggregation.

## Implications and Conclusions

What can be said, then, about patterns of congressional competition during the period from 1824 to 1980? Given the preceding analysis, we can draw several important conclusions. First, trends in competition for congressional elections are not as easily specified as one might believe; this is important, because a mis-specification of cross-temporal patterns of congressional competition may result in invalid inferences about the causes of such patterns. For instance, in our view it is improper to infer an increasing trend in congressional safety on the basis of aggregation of electoral outcomes (i.e., means) from one period to the next. Such a strategy may mask actual trends that can be uncovered only through an examination of trends in the entire time series.

Second, it is clear that there has been a long-term trend toward congressional safety since 1932, and perhaps even since 1894. This trend calls into serious question research that suggests the unique nature of post-1965 levels of congressional competition and that tries to explain these levels on the basis of post-1965 developments and incumbent-unique resources. In fact, one of our tentative findings is that there is actually a negative trend in electoral safety in the post-1965 period, although a level shift occurring around 1965 has resulted in a higher average level of safety from 1966 to 1980.

Third, the incumbency-based explanations of the post-1965 levels of congressional safety which dominate the literature must be viewed as suspect, given the trend in winners' vote proportions and differences in incumbent winners and nonincumbent winners vote proportions over time. Post-1896 trends require us to look for explanations that are applicable to a long time series. Incumbent winners have always done better than nonincumbent winners, but the margin of difference increased from 1896 to 1966 and has stabilized, or begun to decrease, thereafter. The growth in incumbency advantage would appear to be a pre-1965 development. Because incumbent winners are not doing any better vis-a-vis nonincumbent winners after 1965, it becomes necessary to speak of a recently developed "winners' advantage" and not an "incumbency advantage."

Perhaps the only set of explanations that con-

form with our data are those that explain changes in the level of congressional competition on the basis of changes in the electorate. The conformity of changes in congressional competition and known changes in the electorate during realigning periods seems to suggest the possible applicability of these explanations. Although the nature of our data does not allow us to examine the differences among various changing electorate arguments, the findings of this article should provide a useful basis for future research on congressional competition.

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# Free Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation

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Several of the earliest advocates of proportional representation upheld the "principle of free association": that electors should be free to choose the constituencies to which they belong. This article analyzes this principle in game-theoretic terms and investigates how far the free association "game" can be simulated through proportional representation. It is assumed that each voter's prime concern is that his most-preferred candidate should be elected. If preferences are single peaked, the outcome of an election based on free association can be predicted; the same outcome would result from a modified form of the single transferable yote.

Duncan Black, in his pioneering work The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958), discussed proportional representation with some care and with particular reference to the single transferable vote (STV) system. A scheme of proportional representation, he wrote, could not be called satisfactory unless it was "a mathematical scheme, stating a unitary principle, and not merely an arithmetic rule of thumb" (p. 76). The STV system, he concluded, was not a mathematical scheme in this sense, but merely "a practical directive for counting votes and electing candidates." However, he conceded that he was unable to supply a suitable unitary principle; thus to the "essential question" of whether STV was a just system, "we cannot (he wrote) give any proper answer . . . since we ourselves have been unable to arrive at a scheme which we regard as satisfactory and which might afford some criterion for the satisfactoriness of other methods" (p. 80). Although most of Black's insights have since been explored and developed with great rigor by social choice theorists, this particular problem has not, to my knowledge, yet been satisfactorily resolved. The purpose of this article is to offer a solution. I shall present a unitary principle against which practical schemes of proportional representation might be evaluated; I shall show that this was the principle to which the earliest proponents of STV appealed; and then I shall investigate how far this principle really does provide a justification for STV.

## The Principle of Free Association

Supporters of the idea of proportional representation say that a representative assembly should represent all interests and opinions in proportion to their numerical strength in society. Two arguments are commonly offered in support of this principle. The first might be summarized as the right to be heard. Democracy, say the proponents of proportional representation, means government by the whole people and not just a majority of them. When it comes to a final decision, it may be democratic that the will of the majority should prevail; but in the process of deliberation and debate, all opinions should, as far as possible, be heard. Thus in designing a system of representation the ideal to be aimed for is an assembly in which every citizen has someone who will speak for him. Carl Andrae, one of the inventors of STV, put this idea clearly:

In final decisions the majority should indeed rule and its will be respected, but so long as we are dealing with deliberation . . . so long should we not shut the mouth of minorities; so long should we give them a chance to come forth in proportion to their strength and express their differing opinions quoted by his son, Andrae, 1926, pp. 11-12).

In a similar vein, John Stuart Mill wrote in support of STV that Parliament should be

an arena... where every person in the country may count on finding someone who speaks his

Received: March 15, 1982. Revision received: September 3, 1982 Accepted for publication: April 8, 1983

This article was originally presented to the Wednesday Group at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne and later to seminars at the University of Birmingham and at the Center for Study of Public Choice at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Much of the article was written while I was enjoying the hospitality of that Center. I am grateful for the comments I received from participants at the three seminars, from Kevin Keasey, and from four anonymous referees.

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mind, as well or better than he could speak it himself (1861, ch. 5).

On this argument it is not enough that each citizen belongs to a constituency that has a representative in the assembly, because if the representative does not speak the citizen's mind, the representation is more nominal than real.

The second (and closely related) argument for proportional representation is that there should be no double counting of majorities. Even if democracy is construed to mean no more than that the will of the majority should prevail, it may be undemocratic to exclude minorities from a representative assembly. If a final decision requires only the approval of a majority in the assembly, and if the whole assembly represents only a majority of citizens, the final decision may be approved by people who represent little more than 25% of the citizens (cf. Buchanan & Tullock. 1962, p. 242; Mill, 1861, ch. 7). Representation should be designed, it is argued, so that any majority of representatives are in a real rather than nominal sense the representatives of a majority of the citizens.

Thus, one might argue, it is not enough to divide the citizens into equally sized constituencies: the constituencies must be formed so that people with similar opinions or interests are grouped together. Some procedure is needed to group people together in this way. But what could this procedure be? Any procedure that does not rely on voters choosing their own fellow constituents is fundamentally arbitrary, since it must rely on some a priori ideas about the sort of diversity that is to be represented. It is not surprising, therefore, that the early theorists of proportional representation took as their ideal what I shall call the principle of free association: citizens should be free to choose for themselves which constituencies they belong to.

Andrae defended his STV system as an approximation to an ideal of elections based on free association. Suppose, he wrote, that 65 representatives are to be chosen by a society of 13,000 voters:

then it is clear that 200 voters must be said to have a natural right of being represented by one representative. This is very simple and natural; and according to my conviction it is also the right idea, the aim towards which all electoral laws should progress. . . . I am inclined to believe that there would be no danger whatever in making the elections entirely unrestricted on the basis I have elections entirely unrestricted on the basis I have indicated [i.e., allowing any voluntary association of the appropriate number of voters to nominate its own representative] (quoted by his son, Andrae, 1926, pp. 12-13; emphasis in original).

Thomas Hare, who is usually credited with the invention of STV, presented a very similar argument:

The ordinary man is not precluded from choosing his friends or associates beyond the boundaries of his own borough, and there does not seem to be any sound reason why he should not be allowed, with a like freedom, to seek elsewhere his fellow-constituents. If the legal obstacles in the way of this exercise of individual volition were removed, and the elector were enabled to add his votes to the votes of any other of his countrymen, agreeing with him in sympathy and opinion, and sufficient to form a constituency, the question as to minorities [being unrepresented] would cease (1873, p. 21).

Mill supported Hare's proposal for electing Parliament by STV, saying that:

Real equality of representation is not obtained unless any set of electors amounting to the average number in a constituency, wherever in the country they happen to reside, have the power of combining together to return a representative (1861, ch. 7).

Andrae, Hare, and Mill are all arguing that any group of citizens, provided it is large enough to qualify as a constituency and provided that all its members can agree on a nomination, should be allowed to have the representative of its choice. (Each citizen, of course, should be permitted to join no more than one such group.) But how large must a group be to qualify as a constituency? All three writers seem to imply that the qualifying size of group—the quota—should be equal to the ratio between the number of electors and the number of representatives. However, it is not necessary to set the quota so high. If m representatives are to be chosen and if n citizens take part in choosing them, the quota may be set at any number greater than n/(m + 1) without there being any possibility of more than m candidates qualifying for election. Thus there is a strong case for setting the quota at the smallest integer greater than n/(m+1): this, in the context of STV, is the Droop quota. If this case is accepted, the principle of free association may be formulated more precisely as follows: any group of more than n/(m+1) citizens, all of whom agree on a nomination, should be allowed to have the representative of its choice.

One can conceive of an electoral system in which this principle would be the sole rule, voters being left free to bargain among themselves as they saw fit. Bargaining would be essential if the principle were to work. For example, suppose that a minority group is not large enough to qualify for a representative of its own, but wants its interests

to be represented in the assembly. Its best strategy might be to combine with some other minority group to nominate an agreed candidate, but this might be possible only if both groups were prepared to compromise. This kind of bargaining must be distinguished from the kind that involves side payments—for example, a deal by which a voter agrees to nominate a particular candidate in return for a cash payment. Most people, I suggest, would regard this latter kind of bargaining as improper. I shall therefore assume that an electoral system based on the principle of free association would incorporate a rule forbidding all side payments. I shall call the system consisting of these two rules—the principle of free association and the prohibition of side payments—election by free association, or EFA for short. A historical example of an election of essentially this kind has been described by Enid Lakeman (1974, p. 114) who is one of the most forceful modern advocates of STV, and interestingly, she claims that this is "an admirable example of the use of the STV."

Election by free association can be regarded as a game of strategy in which voters bargain and coalesce with one another in an attempt to influence the composition of the assembly. I shall use some of the concepts of game theory to analyze BFA and to predict the outcomes if that system were put into practice. I shall then investigate how far STV can be interpreted as an approximation to, or a simulation of, EFA.

## Election by Free Association: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

First let me present some notation and assumptions.

Assumption 1. Candidates, seats and voters. There is a set S of candidates; the number of candidates is M. There are m seats to be filled, where M > m > 0. There are n voters, where n > m. The quota, q, is the smallest integer greater than n/(m + 1).

Assumption 2. The number of voters. The number of voters is such that (n + 1)/(m + 1) is an integer; hence q = (n + 1)/(m + 1).

Assumption 2 deserves some explanation. First, this assumption is not without precedent. In the special case where m=1 (the case of an election in which there is only one seat to fill), Assumption 2 entails that the number of voters is odd. This particular assumption is often used in social choice theory, for reasons of convenience. It turns out that a generalization of the "odd number" assumption has a similar value in the analysis of

EFA. The reason, essentially, is that under the rules of EFA, the smallest group that can secure the election of one candidate is a group of q voters. Hence the smallest group that can secure the election of m candidates—that is, that can dictate how every seat is filled—is a group of mq voters. Thus any group of at least n - mq + 1 voters has some negative or blocking power: it is impossible for the voters outside such a group to fill all m seats without some support from within the group. Assumption 2 entails that n - mq + 1 = q. Thus the smallest group with blocking power is the same size as the smallest group with the power to elect a candidate.

This argument may help to explain why Assumption 2 is convenient, but it does not make it any more realistic. Taken literally, this assumption is undoubtedly restrictive. In the simplest case, where m = 1, it requires that the number of voters should be odd, or equivalently, that n + 1should be a multiple of 2. Taking any large electorate at random, it would seem that there is only a 50% chance that the assumption will hold. If m = 2, the assumption requires that n + 1 should be a multiple of 3, which will be true only 33% of the time. And so on. Nonetheless, the assumption would be defensible if it could be shown that what is exactly true when the assumption holds is approximately true when it does not. In the Appendix, I show that this is in fact the case.

In the theoretical sense, EFA is a game in which the voters are the players. Each voter must choose one of M + 1 possible strategies: he may nominate one of the M candidates, or he may nominate no one. The list of the strategies chosen by the n voters is, in the language of game theory, the strategy n-tuple. The rules of EFA prescribe an outcome for every possible strategy n-tuple; the outcome is the set of candidates who are elected and is made up of all those candidates who have been nominated by at least q voters. It is impossible for more than m candidates to be elected, but it is possible that fewer than m candidates—or even none at all-are elected. To analyze EFA in game theoretic terms, voters' preferences must be defined over all possible outcomes.

Assumption 3. Preferences over slates. Any subset of S that contains no more than m candidates is a slate. Each voter has a strict preference ordering on the set of all logically possible slates.

That voters have preference orderings over slates—that is, over the possible outcomes of the election—should be uncontroversial. The additional assumption that these preferences are strict—that a voter is never indifferent between slates—is a convenient simplification.

EFA is a game of bargaining and coalition forming, a cooperative game. For such games the most natural solution concept, and the one most widely used by game theorists, is the *core*. In the context of EFA, this concept may be defined as follows:

Blocking. A slate A is blocked if and only if there exists a set of voters V, and a particular strategy for each voter in V, such that if these strategies are followed then, irrespective of what the other voters do, the outcome will be a slate that every member of V prefers to A.

Core. The core is the set of all unblocked slates.

Now consider the special case in which m = 1, in which there is only one seat to be filled. By Assumption 2 the number of voters is odd, and q is the smallest integer greater than n/2, that is, a bare majority of the voters. Under the rules of EFA, any group of q voters can guarantee the election of any one candidate; and since there is only one seat to be filled, this amounts to determining the winning slate. A group containing fewer than q voters cannot guarantee either the election or the nonelection of any candidate. Thus in this case a slate (or candidate: the two are equivalent when m = 1) is blocked if and only if there exists some other slate that is preferred to the former by a majority of the voters. So the core (if it is not empty) contains just one one-candidate slate  $\{x\}$  where x is the candidate (if there is one) who can beat every other candidate in pairwise contests by majority vote. That such a candidate ought to be chosen is the well-known Condorcet criterion (Black, 1958).

When m > 1, however, a slate that satisfies the Condorcet criterion is not necessarily in the core of the EFA game. Here is a simple example. Suppose that m = 2 and n = 8; thus q = 3. There are three candidates, x, y, z, competing for the two seats. Five voters agree that the best of all possible slates is  $\{x,y\}$ , followed by  $\{x,z\}$  and then  $\{x\}$ . (Notice that these are the three slates that include x.) The other three voters believe that the best slate is  $\{y,z\}$ , followed by  $\{x,z\}$  and then  $\{z\}$ . (Notice that these are the three slates that include z.) Clearly, the Condorcet criterion would choose  $\{x,y\}$ ; since it is the most preferred slate for a majority of the voters, it must be able to beat any other slate in a pairwise contest by majority vote. Nonetheless, given the rules of the EFA game,  $\{x,y\}$  can be blocked. The three voters in the minority have the power to elect candidate z, and thus to ensure that the outcome is either  $\{x,z\}$ ,  $\{y,z\}$ , or  $\{z\}$ . Since these voters would prefer any of these outcomes to  $\{x,y\}$ ,  $\{x,y\}$  is blocked. The only slate that cannot be blocked is  $\{x,z\}$ . (The

five voters in the majority can block any slate that excludes x, and the three voters in the minority can block any slate that excludes z. Neither group, acting on its own, can guarantee an outcome that its members prefer to  $\{x,z\}$ , and since there is no slate that both groups prefer to  $\{x,z\}$ , this slate cannot be blocked by the two groups acting in concert.)

This example helps to show how, when more than one seat has to be filled, the outcome of EFA may be fairer than the outcome of using the Condorcet criterion. The Condorcet criterion would allow a bare majority of voters to determine how every seat should be filled: if five of the eight voters want x and y to be elected, x and y are elected. In contrast, EFA gives some weight to the preferences of minorities, allowing the three voters who want z to be elected to have their way. EFA respects the minority's "right to be heard" in a way that the Condorcet criterion does not.

As the example may suggest, the EFA game is rather difficult to analyze when m > 1. To make the problem tractable, I shall make the following assumption about voters' preferences.

Assumption 4. Lexicographic preferences. Each voter has a strict preference ordering on S, the set of candidates. A voter's preferences between slates are derived lexicographically from his preferences between candidates; that is, a voter prefers slate  $A_1$  to slate  $A_2$  if and only if either (i) after ignoring all those candidates who are common to  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ , the most preferred candidate in  $A_1$  is preferred to the most preferred candidate in  $A_2$  or (ii)  $A_2$  is a proper subset of  $A_1$ .

This is a strong assumption that requires some defense.

My ultimate purpose is to evaluate schemes of proportional representation in general and STV in particular. Practical schemes of proportional representation generally do not ask the voter to record an ordering of all possible slates: if m and M were at all large, this would be far too time-consuming a task. (For example, if m = 3 and M = 10, here are 176 possible slates.) Under STV each voter records an ordering of candidates. But when one is evaluating STV, it is natural to ask how the outcomes of STV relate to voters' preferences, and the outcomes are slates, not candidates. Thus there is no escaping the necessity for an assumption about how preferences over candidates relate to preferences over slates.

To say that some simplifying assumption is unavoidable is not of course enough to justify a particular assumption. Assumption 4 corresponds with a particular view of the purpose of representation. It says that each voter's prime concern is that the candidate he most prefers should be elected. This makes sense if one holds that the principal job of a representative is to act as a spokesman or advocate for the people he represents: his job is to ensure that the opinions of his constituents are presented in public. And this in turn fits naturally with the idea that a representative assembly is primarily a forum for debate—an idea that is implied very strongly in some of the passages I quoted from Andrae and Mill.

It is perfectly possible to take a different view of the purpose of representation. One might consider a representative assembly not as a forum for debate but as an institution for decision making; one might say that the representative's main job is not to *speak* on behalf of his constituents but to *vote* on behalf of them. On this view little is served by having a representative who is consistently outvoted in the assembly; presumably voters would be more concerned with the composition of the assembly as a whole than with the election of any particular candidate.

So Assumption 4 is just one of perhaps many possible starting points for an analysis of proportional representation. However, it is a starting point that seems to be in tune with the arguments presented by the earliest advocates of proportional representation. I shall show that this particular assumption leads us in the direction of a justification for STV (although it does not take us all the way). It may be that alternative assumptions would lead to justifications of other schemes of proportional representation, such as the list system. Even so, it is useful to know the grounds on which STV might be defended.

Given Assumption 4, the concept of blocking can be formulated more precisely. Let A be any slate, and suppose that it is blocked by a particular coalition of voters. Then this coalition must have the power to guarantee the election of certain candidates (whom I shall call the nominees of the coalition), and every member of the coalition must prefer any slate containing those nominees to the original slate A. The former condition will be satisfied if and only if the coalition contains at least q voters for every nominee. Now consider the latter condition. Call a nominee a repeat nominee if he is a member of A and a new nominee if he is not. If a voter prefers at least one of the new nominees to every candidate in A who is not a nominee, then (because of Assumption 4) he must prefer any slate containing the nominees to A. Conversely, suppose that he prefers one of the un-nominated candidates in A, say x, to all the new nominees. Let A' be any slate that contains all the nominees, excludes x, and contains no candidate who is not either a nominee or a member of A. Then the voter in question must prefer A to A', and so he does not prefer every slate containing the nominees to A. These conclusions may be summarized as follows.

Necessary and sufficient conditions for blocking. A slate A is blocked if and only if there exist (i) p repeat nominees (where p > 0) drawn from A, and (ii) r nominees (where r > 0) drawn from S - A, and (iii) a coalition of (p + r)q voters such that each member of the coalition prefers at least one of the new nominees to every candidate in A who is not a nominee.

In the case where m=1, the core of the EFA game contains at most one one-member slate  $\{x\}$  where x is the candidate (if there is one) who would be chosen by the Condorcet criterion. So we know from Condorcet's paradox that the core of the EFA game may be empty in the case where m=1. Similar paradoxes can occur for any value of m. For example, suppose that m=2, M=4 and n=20, and that the profile of voters' preferences over candidates is:

```
Example 1. n = 20; m = 2; q = 7.

5 (1, ..., 5): w, x, y, z

5 (6, ..., 10): x, y, z, w

5 (11, ..., 15): y, z, w, x

5 (16, ..., 20): z, w, x, y
```

(This notation means that the five voters  $1, \ldots, 5$  have the ordering w, x, y, z in strict descending order, the five voters  $6, \ldots, 10$  have the ordering x, y, z, w, and so on.)

Notice that for every candidate there is another one such that the latter is preferred to the former by 15 voters, and that 15 voters are more than enough to secure the election of a complete slate. Thus every slate is blocked. (For example, the slate  $\{w,x\}$  is blocked because 15 voters prefer the slate  $\{x,z\}$ .)

When m = 1, the core cannot contain more than one slate. But this result does not generalize. Here is a simple example where the core contains two slates:

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Example 2. n = 29; m = 2; q = 10.
15 (1, ..., 15): y, x, z
14 (16, ..., 29): y, z, x
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Of the three possible slates of two candidates, only  $\{x, z\}$  can be blocked.

It is well known that in the case where m=1, if voters' preferences are single peaked, there is one (and only one) candidate whose election satisfies the Condorcet criterion, and this candidate is the one who is the first preference of the median voter (Black, 1958, ch. 4). I shall now show that this result can be generalized.

Let me begin with a definition of single peak-edness.

Single-peakedness. Voters' preferences are single peaked if and only if there exists some strict ordering L on the set of candidates S such that for any three candidates  $x_1$ ,  $x_2$ ,  $x_3$ , if  $x_1Lx_2L_3$ , then no voter prefers both  $x_1$  and  $x_3$  to  $x_2$ .

For the rest of this section I shall assume that preferences are single peaked. In principle it is possible that several L-orderings might exist—that a given profile of voters' preferences might be single peaked along several different dimensions. For the purpose of my argument it is necessary to select one such ordering (it does not matter which); this ordering will be called the political spectrum, and the relation L will read as "lies to the left of" or "is more left wing than." I shall now adopt the following notation.

Indexing of voters. Voters are indexed by the integers  $1, \ldots, n$  such that (i) no two voters share the same integer, and (ii) for any two voters, i, j where i < j: either i's most preferred candidate is more left wing than j's or i and j share the same first preference candidate.

These index numbers describe voters' positions on the political spectrum: the more left wing is a voter's first preference candidate, the lower is that voter's index number. To the extent that a group of voters share the same first preference candidate, the numbering of the voters is arbitrary; nonetheless, for the purposes of my argument, some particular assignment of index numbers must be selected—arbitrarily if necessary. Notice, however, that although the identity of "voter i" is in some degree arbitrary, the identity of "the candidate who is the first preference of voter i" is not (once the political spectrum is given). This allows the following notation:

The candidates  $C_1, \ldots, C_m$ . For all  $i = 1, \ldots, m$ ,  $C_i$  is the candidate whom voter iq most prefers.

Black's median voter theorem can now be formulated in the context of EFA: if m = 1, and if voters' preferences are single peaked, then the core of the EFA game contains just one slate, and the single candidate who constitutes this slate is  $C_1$ , the candidate who is the first preference of voter q. (if m = 1, q = (n + 1)/2, so voter q is the median voter.) This theorem can be generalized as follows.

Theorem 1. The median voter theorem generalized. If voters' preferences are single peaked, and if there are m distinct candidates  $C_1, \ldots,$ 

 $C_{m}$ , then the core of the EFA game contains just one slate, and this slate is made up of those m candidates.

The theorem is proved in the Appendix. An example may help both to illustrate the implications of the theorem and to suggest how the proof works.

Example 3. n = 8; m = 2; q = 3. 3 (1, 2, 3): w, x, y, z2 (4, 5): x, y, w, z1 (6): y, x, z, w2 (7, 8): z, y, x, w

In this case, voters' preferences are single peaked in relation to the spectrum w L x L y L zand they are indexed accordingly, from voter 1 on the left to voter 8 on the right. According to the theorem, the core of the EFA game should contain just one slate,  $\{w,y\}$ . (Since q=3, the core slate should contain the candidates who are the first preferences of voters 3 and 6.) It is easy to see why any slate that excludes either w or y can be blocked. Any slate that excludes w can be blocked by a coalition of voter 3 and all those voters to the left of him—that is, voters 1, 2, and 3. These voters prefer w to all other candidates and have the power to elect him. Any slate that excludes y can be blocked either by a coalition of voter 6 and all those voters to the right—that is, voters 6, 7, and 8-or by a coalition of voter 6 and all those voters to the left—that is, voters 1, ..., 6. For example, the slate  $\{w, x\}$  can be blocked by voters 6, 7, and 8 nominating y; the slate  $\{w,z\}$  can be blocked by voters  $1, \ldots, 6$  nominating w and y. The formal proof of the theorem generalizes this basic idea and establishes that a slate such as  $\{w, y\}$ —in general, the slate  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$ —cannot be blocked by any coalition.

The theorem contains a clause about the candidates  $C_1, \ldots C_m$  being distinct; the point of this clause can be illustrated by Example 2. In the example preferences are single peaked along the spectrum x L y L z, and the voters are indexed in a way that is consistent with this spectrum. Since q = 10,  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  are the first preferences of voters 10 and 20, respectively. Thus  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  refer to the same candidate,  $y_1$  and the theorem does not apply. This is a case in which, despite voters' preferences being single peaked, there is no unique

At first sight Theorem I may seem paradoxical. It says that the core of the EFA game contains just one slate and that the candidates who make up this slate can be identified by their positions on the political spectrum L. But I have already said that voters' preferences might be single peaked in relation to more than one spectrum and that the choice of a particular spectrum for indexing can-

didates might be arbitrary. How can the core of the game depend on the arbitrary definition of the political spectrum? This paradox can be resolved only if it is a logical truth that whichever spectrum is used to index voters, the candidates who form the set  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  remain the same. That this is indeed a logical truth is proved in the Appendix.

Theorem 1 has an interesting implication. In effect it predicts that EFA will choose an assembly made up of the candidates  $C_1, \ldots, C_m$ . Now suppose that within the assembly decisions are taken by majority vote (and that there is an odd number of seats in the assembly). Then, applying Black's median voter theorem, the measures that the assembly passes will be those favored by the median representative. But the median representative is  $C_{(m+1)/2}$ , and (since q = (n+1)/(m+1)) this is the candidate who is the first preference of voter (n + 1)/2, the median voter. In a direct democracy the preferences of the median voter would prevail; in a representative democracy based on EFA, the median voter's preferences still prevail, although at one remove. Thus if direct democracy can be taken as a datum for evaluating systems of representation, EFA produces a representative assembly that can be said to be unbiased. This ties in with the argument about the double counting of majorities in the first section. Such double counting, which proponents of proportional representation have criticized, is one instance of the kind of bias that EFA may be able to avoid.

# The Single Transferable Vote

Andrae, Mill, Hare, and (more recently) Lakeman have all appealed to the principle of free association as a justification for STV, but that principle can be put into practice most directly and most naturally in the form of EFA. What is the connection between EFA and STV? One way of answering this question is to consider some objections that might be made against EFA.

EFA is a cooperative game. It is a vital part of the procedure that each voter takes account of what the others are doing and that there is scope for any voter or group of voters to bargain with and coalesce with any other individual or group. Voters are expected to act strategically and not simply to nominate their most preferred candidates, irrespective of the plans of other voters. This is foreign to a long tradition of disapproval of strategic voting. (Recall Borda's famous remark about designing voting systems for honest men.) It might be objected that to make elections into games of strategy is to give an unfair advantage to those voters who happen to be most skilled at such games. In addition, elections of this kind are likely to be costly and time-consuming, for it may not be easy for voters to seek out those people who share their opinions. Thus wealthier voters may be at an advantage. Finally, EFA and secrecy are incompatible. How can people freely seek out those who share their opinions without publicizing what their opinions are? To anyone who is committed to the principle of the secret ballot, this is a very serious objection to EFA. (Neither Hare nor Mill would have seen this as a strong objection, since they were both strongly opposed to the secret ballot: cf. Hare, 1873, ch. 7; Mill, 1861, ch. 10.)

One way of overcoming these objections is to design a voting system that allows voters to record their preferences in secrecy and then simulates the bargaining and coalition forming that would take place under EFA. Then voters would not have to express their opinions in public and would be relieved of the burdens of thinking strategically and of seeking out like-minded fellow voters. Voters would be called on to record their true preferences, and so the system would be designed for honest men rather than for strategists. If STV is to be justified in terms of the principle of free association, the most promising route seems to be to justify it as a simulation of EFA. And this, I believe, is roughly what Andrae, Mill, and Hare had in mind.

I shall now investigate how successfully STV simulates EFA. For the purposes of my analysis I shall simply assume that, under STV, voters record their true preferences. In other words, I shall ask whether STV elects those candidates who would have been elected by EFA had voters really had the preferences they recorded on their ballot papers. The possibility that voters might instead behave strategically raises some interesting questions about STV, but I shall not address those questions in this article. I shall assume that the number of voters satisfies Assumption 2 and that voters' preferences satisfy Assumptions 3 and 4, but I shall not (until the end of the article) invoke the assumption of single peakedness.

In an election by STV each voter records a strict ordering over as many candidates as he wishes. To simplify matters, however, I shall assume that each voter records a strict ordering over the whole set S of candidates. The ballot on which a voter records his ordering is his vote. The process of counting votes involves two main operations, transfer of surpluses and exclusion. I shall begin by analyzing the first of these operations.

To secure election a candidate must get q votes, where q is the Droop quota, that is, the smallest integer greater than n/(m+1). Any votes that a candidate has in excess of q are surplus to his requirements. The fundamental principle of the transfer of surpluses is that any given vote should, in the first instance, go to the voter's first prefer-

ence, but if that candidate does not need the vote for his quota, it may go to the voter's second preference, and so on. This principle can be formulated by way of the following concepts.

Allocations. An allocation of votes is an exhaustive distribution among candidates of all the votes cast.

Election. A candidate is elected (with respect to a given allocation of votes) if and only if he is allocated at least q votes.

Validity. An allocation is valid if and only if no candidate is allocated more than q votes, and for all voters i and for all candidates x, y, if i prefers x to y and if x is not elected; then i's vote is not allocated to y.

The operation of transferring surpluses is the operation of arriving at some valid allocation. This is the first stage of any election by STV. If that valid allocation has the property that exactly m candidates are elected, the process of vote counting is at an end; those m candidates make up the slate of elected representatives.

The idea of transferring surpluses has a rationale in relation to the principle of simulating EFA, as the following theorem shows.

Theorem 2. Valid allocations and the core. If there exists any valid allocation such that m candidates  $x_1, \ldots, x_m$  are elected, then the slate  $\{x_1, \ldots, x_m\}$  is in the core.

This theorem is proved in the Appendix. Thus, if the operation of transferring surpluses succeeds in electing m candidates, that slate of m candidates is a member of the core.

Theorem 2 does not involve any assumptions about the procedure by which a valid allocation is accomplished. This is significant, because it may be possible to allocate a given set of votes in various ways, all of which are valid; and different valid allocations may elect different candidates.

Example 4. 
$$n = 9$$
;  $m = 4$ ;  $q = 2$ .  
5 (1, 3, 5, 7, 9):  $x$ ,  $z$ ,  $v$ ,  $w$ ,  $y$   
4 (2, 4, 6, 8):  $y$ ,  $z$ ,  $w$ ,  $v$ ,  $x$ 

The modern conventions of STV (set out in detail in Lakeman & Lambert, 1955, Appendix 4) would work as follows. The first step is to count first preferences; x (15 votes) and y (4 votes) both exceed the quota, so x and y are elected on the "first count." Candidate X has the larger surplus, so his surplus (3 votes, e.g., those of voters 5, 7, and 9) is transferred to z. Now z (3 votes) has exceeded the quota and is elected on the "second count." The largest surplus outstanding is y's,

and so this surplus (2 votes, say those of voters 6 and 8) is transferred to w. (The surplus is not transferred to z because z has already been elected.) Now w (2 votes) has just reached the quota and is elected on the "third count." Logically, the final stage (which in practice is omitted as unnecessary) would be to transfer z's surplus (1 vote) to v. The result of these transfers is the valid allocation (v: 9; w: 6,8; x: 1,3; y: 2,4; z: 5,7), i.e., candidate v has been allocated the vote of voter 9. candidate w the votes of voters 6 and 8, and so on. So conventional STV would elect the slate  $\{w,x,y,z\}$ . A different and rather simpler procedure for transferring surpluses was proposed by Carl Andrae (Andrae, P., 1926, pp. 4-5), whose method is to put all the ballot papers into a container and then to draw them out at random. Each vote is allocated to the first preference of the voter concerned unless that candidate has already reached the quota, in which case the vote is allocated to the voter's second preference (or if he too has reached the quota, to the voter's third preference, and so on). In the example, if votes were drawn out in numerical order, the result would be the valid allocation (v: 7,9; w: 8; x: 1,3; y: 2,4; z: 5.6), so Andrae's method would elect the slate  $\{v,x,y,z\}.$ 

Theorem 2 establishes that where two different procedures for transferring surpluses would elect two different slates of candidates, both slates are in the core. To this extent, then, any particular procedure is arbitrary, although the principle underlying the whole family of procedures is not.

Unfortunately, it is quite possible that no valid allocation of votes will elect m candidates.

Example 5. 
$$n = 9$$
;  $m = 1$ ;  $q = 5$ .  
4 (1, 2, 3, 4):  $x$ ,  $y$ ,  $z$   
2 (5, 6):  $y$ ,  $z$ ,  $x$   
3 (7, 8, 9):  $z$ ,  $y$ ,  $x$ 

In this case no candidate is the first preference of q voters, so the question of transferring surpluses does not arise. The only valid allocation is (x: 1,2,3,4; y: 5,6; z: 7,8,9); no candidate is elected. However, the core is not empty: it contains one slate, namely  $\{y\}$ . (Voters' preferences are single peaked in relation to the spectrum x L y L z; y is the first preference of the median voter, voter 5.) This example establishes that for a slate to be in the core, it is not necessary that the slate can be elected on the basis of some transfer of surpluses. (This condition is, of course, sufficient; that is Theorem 2.)

When the transfer of surpluses produces a valid allocation that fails to elect m candidates, STV falls back on the second operation, exclusion. The candidate who has been allocated least votes is

excluded from the contest, and his votes are transferred.

The principle here is to divide the votes among the remaining candidates in a way that would have constituted a valid allocation, had the excluded candidate not been standing for election. If after excluding one candidate and arriving at such an allocation, there are still fewer than m elected candidates, another candidate—the one who has been allocated least votes—is excluded; and so the process goes on until m candidates are elected.

It has occasionally been suggested that the operation of exclusion can lead to perverse results (Doron & Kronick, 1977). My analysis confirms this suggestion. Because of exclusion, STV can elect a non-core slate even though a core slate exists. Consider Example 5 again, in which STV would exclude y after the first count had failed to elect any candidate; y's votes would then be transferred to z who would thereby reach the quota and be elected. But  $\{y\}$  is in the core and  $\{z\}$  is not. Similar problems can arise when m is greater than 1, as Example 3 shows. In this example m =2, preferences are single peaked, and there is a unique core slate,  $\{w,y\}$ . STV would elect candidate w at the first count, but there would be no surplus votes to transfer. None of the other three candidates would reach the quota, and so y would be excluded, and his one vote would be transferred to x; the result would be the election of the slate  $\{w, x\}$ .

It is now possible to explain how successfully STV simulates EFA. Insofar as STV relies on the transfer of surpluses, it simulates EFA; in all cases where STV relies only on this operation, it chooses a slate from the core. But STV's other operation, exclusion, does not have a firm justification in terms of EFA.

This prompts a further question: is there any way of modifying STV so as to do away with the need for exclusion? One possible line of inquiry is suggested by the observation that if there are only m + 1 candidates, every valid allocation of votes elects exactly m candidates. (Because of Assumption 2, q = (n + 1)/(m + 1); it follows immediately that every valid allocation of n votes among m + 1 candidates must give q - 1 votes to one candidate and q votes to each of the others.) It is therefore possible to do without the operation of exclusion by means of a succession of contests by STV, each of which involves only m + 1 candidates. After each contest, the loser drops out of the election, whereas the winning m candidates go forward into further contests, rather in the style of a knockout sporting tourmanent. If M candidates stand for election, a succession of M - msuch contests will leave only m candidates undefeated; these could then be deemed to be elected. I shall call this procedure knockout voting by STV. Notice that in the special case in which m = 1, knockout voting by STV is equivalent to a sequence of pairwise contests by simple majority vote, a procedure that is bound to elect the candidate (if there is one) who satisfies the Condorcet criterion.

Unfortunately, if m > 1 this procedure does not necessarily choose the core slate. The problem is this. The set of candidates is S. Suppose that, in relation to a contest among all these candidates. one slate, A, is in the core and that another slate B is not. Now consider any subset of candidates S'  $\subseteq$  S such that S' contains both A and B. Clearly A must be in the core in relation to a contest between the candidates in S'. (This follows immediately from the concept of blocking described above.) But, as far as the contest between the candidates in S' is concerned, B may be in the core as well. If it is, then B rather than A might be elected by STV from S'. An example of this kind is presented in the Appendix. There are four candidates, w, x, y, z for two seats; only one slate,  $\{x,z\}$ , is in the core when the contest is among all four candidates. But in a contest among the three candidates x, y, z, the standard rules of STV would elect x and y. Thus the procedure of knockout voting by STV might fail to elect z, even though z is a member of the only slate in the core.

However, this problem will not arise if voters' preferences are single peaked. If preferences are single peaked, there is a unique core slate; in terms of the notation introduced above, this slate is  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  (see Theorem 1). The following theorem can be proved.

Theorem 3. Single peaked preferences and knockout voting by STV. If voters' preferences are single peaked, then in any contest by STV between exactly m + 1 candidates drawn from S and given any valid allocation of votes, any candidate in the contest who is a member of the set  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  will be elected.

A proof is given in the Appendix. The theorem establishes that none of the candidates  $C_1, \ldots, C_m$  can be defeated in any contest between m+1 candidates by STV. Thus a succession of such contests must end in the election of the slate  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$ . So in the case of single peaked preferences, knockout voting by STV will always choose the core slate, even though (as Examples 3 and 5 show) the direct use of standard STV rules may not.

## **Conclusions**

This article suggests an answer to the problem posed by Black: is there a unitary principle underlying proportional representation? I have pre-

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sented a principle of free association, that electors should be free to choose the constituencies to which they belong. Given this principle, schemes of proportional representation are justified to the extent that they simulate elections based on free association. This idea can be expressed in terms of the core of a particular kind of game: my criterion for evaluating schemes of proportional representation is that, so long as the core of that game is not empty, the set of candidates who are elected should be a member of the core.

'I have shown that this criterion yields unambiguous recommendations if voters' preferences are single peaked; that STV may fail to satisfy this criterion even under the assumption of single peakedness; and that a modified form of STV would satisfy the criterion under that assumption. Thus Carl Andrae, Thomas Hare, and John Stuart Mill were partly—but only partly—right when they appealed to the principle of free association as a justification for STV.

## **Appendix**

# A Proof of Theorem 1

Part (a) (To prove that any slate excluding one or more of  $C_1, \ldots, C_m$  can be blocked.) Let A be any slate that excludes at least one of the candidates  $C_1, \ldots, C_m$ . Thus there must be some integer k (where  $1 \le k \le m$ ) such that  $C_k \notin A$ . Consider any such candidate  $C_k$ . The slate A can be partitioned into two subsets, L and R, where L contains all those candidates in A who are more left wing than  $C_k$ , and R contains all those candidates in A who are more right wing than  $C_k$ . Let the number of candidates in L be j. First suppose that j < k. Because preferences are single peaked, each of the voters  $1, \ldots, kq$  must prefer  $C_k$  to every candidate in R. These voters, kq in number, have the power to elect k candidates, where  $k \ge j$ + 1. Thus the coalition of left-wing voters 1, ..., kq can block A by nominating all the candidates in L, plus  $C_k$ . Now suppose instead that j > k. Each of the voters  $kq, \ldots, n$  prefers  $C_k$  to every candidate in L. These voters, (m - k + 1)q in number, have the power to elect m - k + 1 candidates, where m - k + 1 > m - j + 1. The number of candidates in R cannot be greater than m - j. Thus the coalition of right-wing voters  $kq, \ldots, n$  can block A by nominating all the candidates in R, plus  $C_k$ .

Part (b) (To prove that  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  cannot be blocked.) Suppose that the slate  $B = \{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  is blocked. Then there must exist p "repeat" nominees (m > p > 0) drawn from B and r "new" nominees (m > r > 0) drawn from S - B and a coalition of (p + r)q voters, each of whom

prefers at least one of the r new nominees to every candidate in B who is not a nominee. Let those candidates in B who are not nominees be called un-nominated candidates (UCs). Now consider which voters can be in the blocking coalition. For each UC, say  $C_i$ , there is one voter, namely iq, who cannot possibly be in the blocking coalition. since we know that his first preference candidate is  $C_i$ . Since there are m - p UCs, we can eliminate m-p voters from the class of possible members of the coalition. These voters can be called eliminated voters. The remaining voters can now be partitioned into m - p + 1 sets defined in relation to the eliminated voters. If lq is the most leftwing of the eliminated voters, the first set,  $V_1$  is  $\{1, \ldots, iq-1\}$ . If jq is the secondmost left wing of the eliminated voters, the second set,  $V_2$ , is  $\{iq+1,\ldots,jq-1\}$ , and so on until the final set.  $V_{m-p+1}$ , which is  $\{kq+1,\ldots,n\}$ , where kq is the most right wing of the eliminated voters. Similarly, if we exclude the UCs from the set of candidates S, the remaining candidates can be partitioned into m - p + 1 sets defined in relation to the UCs: the first set,  $W_1$ , contains all those candidates who are more left wing than the most left-wing UC, the second set,  $W_2$ , contains all those candidates occupying places on the political spectrum between the most left-wing UC and the secondmost left-wing UC, and so on.

Now consider any set of voters,  $V_i$ , and the corresponding set of candidates, W1. Because preferences are single peaked, one of the following must be true: either  $W_l$  contains at least one new nominee or no voter in  $V_I$  is a member of the blocking coalition. (First consider the set of voters  $V_1 = \{1, \ldots, iq-1\}$ . All of these voters prefer C<sub>b</sub>, who is a UC, to every more right-wing candidate, so if there is no new nominee to the left of  $C_i$ , i.e., no new nominee in  $W_i$ , these voters cannot be in the blocking coalition. Similarly for  $V_2$  $= \{iq+1, \ldots, jq-1\}$ : all of these voters prefer C<sub>i</sub> to every more left-wing candidate and prefer C<sub>i</sub> to every more right-wing candidate, and so if there is no new nominee between  $C_i$  and  $C_j$  on the spectrum, i.e., no new nominee in  $W_2$ , these voters cannot be in the blocking coalition. And so

Since there are only r new nominees, no more than r of the sets of candidates  $W_1, \ldots, W_{m-p+1}$  can contain a new nominee. Thus the voters in the blocking coalition can be drawn from no more than r of the sets  $V_1, \ldots, V_{m-p+1}$ . Consider any set of voters  $V_l$ . If the number of repeat nominees in  $W_l$  is s, the number of voters in  $V_l$  is (s+1)q-1. What is significant is that this number is less than (s+1)q. There are only p repeat nominees in all, and the members of the blocking coalition can be drawn from no more than r sets; so the total number of voters in the blocking coalition

must be less than (p + r)q. But this contradicts the original supposition that the coalition contains at least (p + r)q voters.

# A proof that the slate $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$ is uniquely defined

A candidate will be said to be supported if he is the first preference of at least one voter. Notice that nonsupported candidates are irrelevant as far as the definition of the slate  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  is concerned, since  $C_1, \ldots, C_m$  are supported candidates by definition, and the indexing of voters is based only on the position on the political spectrum of voters' first-preference candidates. Let T be the subset of S that contains all supported candidates. I shall now prove that if voters' preferences on the set S are single peaked, there are only two ways of ordering the candidates in T to form a political spectrum, and one is the exact inverse of the other. In other words if  $x_1 L x_2 L ... L x_k$  is an ordering of the k candidates in T that is consistent with single peakedness, the only other ordering that is similarly consistent is  $x_1L \dots L x_2 L x_1$ .

Suppose that voters' preferences are single peaked along some spectrum. Then in the set T (provided it contains at least two candidates), there must be two candidates who lie at the extremes of this spectrum, and these are the only candidates who can be ranked "worse in T" by any voter. But since each of these candidates is some voter's first preference, each of them must be ranked worst by someone. Thus there are two and only two candidates who are ranked "worst in T" by any voter, and these candidates must lie at the extremes of any spectrum along which preferences are single peaked. Suppose that one of these two candidates, say  $x_1$ , is arbitrarily called the most left wing; the other, say  $x_k$ , is then the most right wing. Now remove  $x_1$  from T, leaving the set T'. By the same argument, if T' contains two or more candidates, there are exactly two candidates who are ranked "worst in T" by any voter. One of these must be  $x_k$ ; the other, say  $x_2$ , must be the second most left-wing candidate in T. Continuing like this, one eventually arrives at the spectrum  $x_1Lx_2L...Lx_k$ . If instead  $x_k$  had been called the most left-wing candidate, one would have arrived at the spectrum  $x_k L \dots L x_2 L x_1$ . Whichever of these two spectra is used, provided that q = (n + 1)/(m + 1), the slate  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  is the same. (If a candidate is called  $C_1$  in terms of one spectrum, he is called  $C_m$ in terms of the other; if he is called  $C_2$  in terms of one, he is called  $C_{m-1}$  in terms of the other; and so on.)

### A Proof of Theorem 2

Suppose that  $x_1, \ldots x_m$  are elected for some valid allocation Q but that the slate A = $\{x_1, \ldots, x_m\}$  can be blocked. Then there must be p "repeat" nominees, say  $x_1, \ldots, x_p$ , drawn from A, and r "new" nominees  $y_1, \ldots, y_r (r \ge 1)$  drawn from S - A, and a coalition of (p + r)qvoters such that each member of the coalition prefers one of  $y_1, \ldots, y_r$  to all of  $x_{p+1}, \ldots, x_m$ . By assumption, none of  $y_1, \ldots, y_r$  is elected, given the allocation Q. Therefore  $x_{n+1}, \ldots, x_m$  are allocated no votes belonging to coalition members. Since  $r \ge 1$  and q > n/(m+1), the number of voters in the coalition is greater than n(p + 1)(m + 1); thus the number of votes allocated to  $x_{p+1}, \ldots, x_m$  is less than n - n(p+1)/(m+1), i.e., less than (m-p)[n/(m+1)]. But this in turn is less than (m-p)q. If  $x_{p+1}, \ldots, x_m$  are elected, they must be allocated exactly (m - p)qvotes. The original supposition therefore entails a contradiction.

# An example in which knockout voting by STV does not choose a core slate

$$n = 101; m = 2; q = 34$$
  
 $32 (1, ..., 32): x, y, z, w$   
 $30 (33, ..., 62): w, x, y, z$   
 $5 (63, ..., 67): z, w, x, y$   
 $34 (68, ..., 101): x, z, y, w$ 

Notice that (n + 1)/(m + 1) = 34; so Assumption 2 holds for this example. Any slate that excludes x is blocked because more than q voters prefer x to all other candidates.  $\{x,y\}$  is blocked because more than q voters prefer w to both x and y.  $\{x,w\}$  is blocked because more than 2q voters prefer z to w. But  $\{x,z\}$  cannot be blocked: it is, therefore, the only slate in the core. Now suppose that there is knockout voting by STV and that the first contest is to choose two candidates from the set  $\{x,y,z\}$ . Voting would be as follows:

$$n = 101; m = 2; q = 34$$
  
 $62 (1, ..., 62): x, y, z$   
 $5 (63, ..., 67): z, x, y$   
 $34 (68, ..., 101): x, z, y$ 

x has 96 first preference votes and so must be elected. But which of y and z is elected depends on how x's 62 surplus votes are distributed. The standard STV procedure (Lakeman & Lambert, 1955, Appendix 4) would divide these between y and z in the ratio 62:34, thus giving 40 votes to y. This is well in excess of the quota, and so the slate  $\{x,y\}$  would be chosen, and z would drop out. Obviously, then, the outcome of the succession of

contests would not be the election of the core slate  $\{x, z\}$ .

## A Proof of Theorem 3

Consider any contest among m+1 candidates, at least one of whom, e.g.,  $C_k$ , is a member of the set  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$ . Let the remaining candidates be denoted  $x_1, \ldots, x_m$ ; thus the set of contestants is  $\{x_1, \ldots, x_m; C_k\}$ . It follows from part (a) of the proof of Theorem 1 that the slate  $\{x_1, \ldots, x_m\}$  can be blocked and therefore is not in the core. Thus, by Theorem 2, there is no valid allocation of votes such that all the candidates  $x_1, \ldots, x_m$  are elected. But because there are exactly m+1 candidates in the contest, every valid allocation of votes elects m candidates. Therefore every valid election elects  $C_k$ .

# Generalizing the analysis for any number of voters

If Assumption 2 is dropped, n can be any integer greater than m, and q can be defined as  $n/(m+1)+\delta$  where  $n/(m+1)+\delta$  is an integer and  $1/(m+1) \le \delta \le 1$ . (Assumption 2 then corresponds with the special case  $\delta = 1/(m+1)$ .) Dropping this assumption does not affect anything of substance in the article until the candidates  $C_1, \ldots, C_m$  are defined.

Candidate  $C_i$  is defined as the first preference of voter iq. As I have proved earlier in this Appendix, the set of candidates  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  is uniquely defined and is independent of which end of the spectrum is called "left" and which "right," provided that Assumption 2 holds. Given that assumption, if voters are numbered  $1, \ldots, n$ where 1 is "left" and n is "right," the (iq)th voter counting from the left is also the [(m + 1 i)q]th voter counting from the right. In general, however, this may be not the case. The [(m+1-i)q]th voter counting from the right is voter  $iq - [\delta(m+1) - 1]$ , and this is not necessarily voter iq, since  $\delta(m+1) - 1$  may be positive rather than zero. This problem can be avoided by defining a set of voters  $H_l$  where  $H_l$  =  $\{iq - [\delta(m+1) - 1], \ldots, iq\}$ . In other words,  $H_i$  is the intersection of the set containing the first iq voters, counting from the left, and the set containing the first (m + 1 - 1)q voters, counting from the right. The number of voters in this set is  $\delta(m+1)$ , and we know that  $1 \le \delta(m+1) \le$ m + 1. Assumption 2 represents the special case where  $H_i = \{iq\}$  for all  $i = 1, \ldots, m$ .

Here an example may help. Let n = 9 and m = 2; thus q = 4 and  $\delta = 1$ .  $H_1$  is the intersection of the set containing the first 4 voters, counting from the left, i.e.,  $\{1, \ldots, 4\}$  and the set containing the first 8 voters, counting from the right, i.e.,

 $\{2, \ldots, 9\}$ ; thus  $H_1 = \{2,3,4\}$ . Similarly,  $H_2 = \{6,7,8\}$ . Notice that the number of voters in each set is 3, where  $3 = \delta(m+1)$ .

The following theorem, which does not depend on Assumption 2, can be proved in essentially the same way as Theorem 1, and entails Theorem 1 as a special case:

Theorem 1A. If voters' preferences are single peaked, and for all  $i = 1, \ldots, m$ , all the voters in  $H_i$  share a common first preference candidate  $C_i$  and  $C_1, \ldots, C_m$  are distinct candidates, then the core of the EFA game contains just one slate, namely  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$ .

Theorem 1 is silent unless (n + 1)/(m + 1) is an integer; Theorem 1A is silent unless all the voters in each set  $H_i$  share a common first preference candidate. How great an advance is this? If the number of voters, n, is large in relation to both the number of seats, m, and the number of candidates, M, then the advance is considerable. Notice that the number of voters in any set  $H_i$  is never greater than m + 1, and that the voters in such a set are (in an intuitive sense) located next to one another on the political spectrum. Thus if the total number of voters is large and the total number of candidates is small, the probability is high that all the voters in a set  $H_i$  will share a common first preference candidate; for any given m and M, this probability approaches 1 as the number of voters approaches infinity. Elections, particularly the most significant elections in national political life, typically involve a large number of voters and a relatively small number of candidates; in such cases, Theorem 1A is highly likely to apply.

The first part of the third section, up to the start of the discussion of knockout voting, is independent of Assumption 2. In particular, Theorem 2 holds for any number of voters. However, if Assumption 2 does not hold, it is possible for a valid allocation of votes to fail to elect m candidates, even if only m+1 candidates are standing for election. (For example, suppose that n is a multiple of m+1; then q=n/(m+1)+1. If first preference votes are divided equally between the m+1 candidates, each candidate will receive n/(m+1) first preference votes, and none will reach the quota.) Despite this apparent problem, Theorem 3 can be reformulated in much the same way as Theorem 1:

Theorem 3A. If voters' preferences are single peaked and for all i = 1, ..., m, all the voters in  $H_i$  share a common first preference candidate  $C_i$ , then in any contest by STV between exactly m + 1 candidates drawn from S, any

candidate in the contest who is a member of the set  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_m\}$  will be elected.

The proof is straightforward. Let D be any set of m + 1 candidates, and suppose that for some integer k (where  $1 \le k \le m$ ), the candidate  $C_k$  is a member of D. Suppose also that there is some valid allocation of votes that does not elect  $C_k$ . Because preferences are single peaked, each of the voters  $1, \ldots, kq$  must prefer  $C_k$  to any more right-wing candidate, so none of these kq votes can have been allocated to any candidate who is more right wing than  $C_k$ . But no candidate has been allocated more than q votes, and  $C_k$  has been allocated fewer than q votes. This is possible only if there are at least k candidates in D who are more left wing than  $C_k$ . But similarly, each of the [m+1-k]q most right-wing voters must prefer Ck to any more left-wing candidate, from which it follows that there must be at least m + 1 - k candidates in D who are more right wing than  $C_k$ . These two results together entail that D must contain at least m + 1 candidates in addition to  $C_k$ ,

and this contradicts the supposition that D contains only m+1 candidates in all. Thus any valid allocation of votes must elect  $C_k$ 

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# Advocacy, Interpretation, and Influence in the U.S. Congress

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This article examines the relationship between two variables: interpretations by members of Congress of the consequences of legislative proposals and the influence of those who advocate particular actions on the proposals. The article investigates how the legislative decisions of members depend on interpretations, how the arguments of advocates shape interpretations, and how the influence on interpretations translates into influence over patterns of congressional support expressed for a legislative proposal. The major thesis is that member interpretations and hence legislative influence are unstable, a result of basic features of human decision making in the congressional context. As a result, advocates are hypothesized to have considerable influence in maintaining and expanding the size of their congressional coalitions in some legislative situations, but not others. In particular, when faced with weakening amendments or motions, advocates are unable to prevent defections among their supporters. Evidence of the legislative influence of the National Education Association during the Ninety-fourth Congress is found to be consistent with these hypotheses.

In the past decade, most explanations of legislative decision making in Congress have been teleological. Members of Congress are described as seeking a variety of personal goals. For example, the goals may pertain to the realization of their conceptions of good public policy, the development of their careers both in the chamber and back home, and the implementation of their views of representation. Legislative decisions are explained as the result of members pursuing these goals in accordance with their perceptions of a rich and complex decision environment, consisting of constituents, colleagues, party leaders, personal and committee staff aids, interest groups, bureaucrats, presidents, and journalists.

Yet all these explanations share a common shortcoming: they devote little attention to the process by which members come to understand how a legislative decision may affect the achieve-

Received: May 24, 1982 Revision received: February 4, 1983 Accepted for publication: March 25, 1983

I owe an enormous debt to the government relations staff of the National Education Association. Their patience and generosity is greatly appreciated. I also wish to thank John P. Crecine, Richard Fenno, Gregory Fischer, Patrick Larkey, Richard Lau, Keith Poole, William Riker, and Joel Tarr for their useful comments on earlier versions of this article.

The research is too extensive to cite in its entirety. But notable examples are Arnold (1979), Fenno (1973, 1978), Florina (1977), Mayhew (1975), and Price (1978).

ment of their goals. The process involves interpretation and has two stages. The first stage consists of determining the consequences (and their associated probabilities of occurrence) of a legislative decision. Members must discover who will be affected by the legislative decision, in what ways, to what extent, and with what reaction. The discovery, however, is rarely complete: the quantity of information required is too large, the time available to attend is too limited, and the calculations required are too complex (e.g., Bauer, Pool, & Dexter, 1972, pp. 408-413; March & Simon, 1958, pp. 150-158). To simplify the decision task, members construct interpretations of the consequences of a decision. These interpretations are simple models or representations of the more complex ways in which a legislative decision may affect the lives of citizens and the institutional and electoral careers of the members. The second stage consists of relating these interpretations to the personal goals of members; that is, once an interpretation of consequences is formulated, members must then discover how the consequences affect the attainment of their personal goals. This is not a straightforward task. Because of cognitive limitations, the goals of members often are formulated in ways that lack precision. It is difficult to make goals reliably operational in the evaluation of different consequences (Bauer, Pool, & Dexter, 1972, chap. 25; March, 1978, p. 596). As a result, the discovery of how consequences affect goal attainment is also partial. Members develop interpretations of the impact.

This article explores some of the implications of this two stage interpretation process for coalition building on the floors of the Congress. Its main objective is to explain the relationship between advocacy—the presentation of arguments in support of a legislative proposal-and influence over the decisions of Congress. The article advances two central arguments. First, the influence of advocates, whether they be presidents, interest group lobbyists, or members of Congress, depends on the interpretation process. Second, the influence of advocates is unstable; advocates can exert substantial influence on congressional floor decisions only to see that influence dissipate in crucial legislative situations. These arguments are developed by examining three questions: how do the lègislative decisions of members of Congress depend on interpretations, how do the arguments of advocates shape these interpretations, and, finally, how does the influence over interpretations translate into influence over the patterns of congressional support expressed for a legislative proposal?

The article is divided into two parts. The first part is a theoretical discussion of the relationship among advocacy, interpretation, and influence. The discussion has its origins in research designed to understand how one type of advocate—interest group lobbyists-influences congressional decisions. During the spring and summer of 1977, the lobbying activities of the National Education Association were observed in detail, and extensive, open-ended interviews were conducted with members of the government relations staff. Since these observations and interviews provided detailed information about how one kind of advocate tried to establish and maintain a relationship with the Congress for the purpose of influencing legislation, they served as a basis for thinking about how efforts by any advocate to influence legislation might actually affect congressional decisions. The theoretical discussion that follows owes much to the observation and interviewing experience. However, since the discussion centers on the decision processes of members of Congress, little interview evidence is presented. Rather than using the perceptions of lobbyists to describe member decision processes, a far richer and more accurate description of the processes is developed by drawing on propositions from the behavioral theories of individual choice developed by cognitive and social psychologists, organizational theorists, and political scientists, especially students of Congress.

The second part is an empirical analysis. Its primary purpose is to provide evidence of influence by an advocate that is consistent with the theoretical relationship posited for advocacy, interpretation, and influence. To this end, two hypotheses about the nature of an advocate's influence on maintaining and expanding the size

of its supporting congressional coalitions are tested with data provided by the National Education Association (NEA). The data concern the NEA's lobbying activities and legislative interests in the 94th Congress. At one time, comparative analyses of several interest groups were planned, but after preliminary investigations of nearly 20 interest groups, it was ascertained that only the NEA maintained the records necessary to determine the entire range of its legislative interests and gave the access necessary to collect and interpret the data. The latter consisted of members of the government relations staff making available written records, spending hours describing their relationships with staff assistants and members of Congress, and permitting unrestricted observation and questioning of their lobbying activities regarding different legislative proposals. Whether the empirical results for the NEA generalize to other interest groups and other kinds of advocates in other congresses can only be determined through further empirical analyses. But these initial results serve the important dual functions of demonstrating how to test some of the implications of the theoretical arguments of this article as well as establishing the plausibility of those arguments.

# Interpretation, Decision Making, and Legislative Influence

The interpretation process occupies a central place in the legislative decisions of members, and hence the influence of advocates over those decisions. Its place can best be delineated by the discussion of five propositions.

1. For many legislative proposals, the positions of most members are not directly influenced by interpretations.

Because of both time and cognitive constraints, most members so simplify their decision task outside their areas of specialization that the interpretation process largely disappears. The simplification may take a variety of forms, but one of the most common is cue taking. Matthews and Stimson (1975, p. 45), for example, argue that "when a member is confronted with the necessity of casting a roll call vote on a complex issue about which he knows very little, he searches for cues provided by trusted colleagues who-because of their formal position in the legislature or policy specialization—have more information than he does and with whom he would probably agree if he had the time and information to make an independent decision." (For evidence, see Matthews and Stimson, 1975, and Kingdon, 1973, especially chaps. 3 and 4.) Yet because of the reliance on cue taking, the interpretation process can still have a major,

although indirect, impact on the overall pattern of support for a legislative proposal. Interpretations are likely to be a critical variable in the decisions of many cue givers, especially those members who serve on the committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over the legislative proposal. These members receive the greatest quantity of information about the consequences of the proposal, and they have the most time and interest to develop interpretations. Since their decisions will serve as cues to less informed and interested members, the interpretation process indirectly influences the decisions of many members. The process, therefore, can be a central variable in the dynamics of coalition formation, even though it generally has little apparent role in the decision processes of many members. Consequently, the remainder of this discussion focuses on those members whose positions are directly influenced by interpretations.

2. When the positions of members are based on interpretations, they are rarely optimal in the sense of positions that would best accomplish the personal goals of members.

The development of a position by members on a legislative proposal depends significantly on two variables: their personal understanding of how the position affects the achievement of their goals, and their public explanation of the position to interested audiences (e.g., constituents and other members of Congress) who can aid the members in the achievement of their goals (e.g., those regarding the development of a career within the chamber or at home or both). The aim of public explanations is to show how a position on a legislative proposal is consistent with the interests and preferences of interested audiences. If members believe they cannot successfully explain their position, they may seek an alternative position that is more publicly defensible (Fenno, 1978; Kingdon, 1973). Both personal understandings and public explanations depend critically on knowledge of the consequences of a position. Obviously members cannot understand how a position will affect their goals if they have no knowledge of its consequences. Nor can they explain why interested audiences should accept their position if they cannot show how the consequences of the position are consistent with the interests and preferences of the audiences.

The adoption of the optimal position on a legislative proposal would require complete knowledge of the consequences of alternative positions on a legislative proposal. Members would take the position with the set of consequences that they believed best contributed toward their personal goals and permitted explanations that were most likely to be accepted by interested audiences.

However, members rarely take optimal positions. The major reason is that members do not know all the consequences of different decisions regarding a legislative proposal. Discovering the consequences is a complex problem, requiring the processing and evaluation of tremendous quantities of information about who is affected, in what ways, and to what extent. Because members are boundedly rational decision makers, they discover only a subset of the actual consequences of a proposal. These partial discoveries result in simplified models or interpretations of the full set of consequences. The positions and attendant explanations based on such interpretations can be considerably different from those given if the larger set of consequences were known.2

From a bounded rationality perspective, there are two reasons why members (and more generally decision makers) discover only a subset of the actual consequences of a proposal. First, the information that members acquire about the consequences of a proposal is the result of a limited search. The personal goals of members are typically expressed in the form of aspiration levels. (For a general discussion of the concept, see March, 1978; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1955.) Members process information and develop interpretations about the consequences of different positions regarding a legislative proposal until they believe a particular position will yield some acceptable or satisfactory level of accomplishment of their personal goals. Other positions

<sup>2</sup>As Simon (1957, pp. 198-199) has argued about rational decision makers in general:

The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. ... The first consequence of the principle of bounded rationality is that the intended rationality of an actor requires him to construct a simplified model of the real situation in order to deal with it. He behaves rationally with respect to this model, and such behavior is not even approximately optimal with respect to the real world. To predict his behavior, we must understand the way in which this simplified model is constructed.

For extended discussions of this point, see Simon (1957), Part IV, especially pp. 196-206; and March and Simon (1958), especially pp. 136-171. For related experimental evidence, see Tversky and Kahneman (1981) on decision frames and Taylor and Crocker (1980) and Fiske and Linville (1980) on schematic information processing.

may please more constituents, lead to better public policy, or result in greater influence within the chamber or perhaps all of these. But, because of time and cognitive constraints, members are content with a position that appears to be good enough. Members are satisficers rather than maximizers (Simon, 1955).

Second, members often ignore potentially relevant information about the consequences of a proposal. The oversight occurs because they simply do not perceive its relationship to the achievement of their personal goals. The poor perception is the result of cognitive constraints on human memory and information processing capacity. These constraints can cause the goals of members to be "unstable, inconsistent, incompletely evoked, and imprecise" or, in a word, ambiguous (March, 1978, pp. 593-599, especially p. 598). Or the constraints can make it difficult for members to see how disparate pieces of information fit together in a way that establishes some consequences of a proposal (Smith, 1980, pp. 71-93). In either case, members will fail to perceive the link between some of the consequences of a proposal and the achievement of their personal goals.

3. By offering various interpretations, advocates can show members how an alternative position may better accomplish their mixes of personal goals than the ones they currently espouse.

Advocates devote considerable effort to trying to structure how members process information about consequences and, therefore, construct interpretations. Indeed, a major portion of their coalition-building activities consists of presentations of arguments that establish various interpretations of the consequences of different positions on a legislative proposal. The aim is to show how the position favored by the advocate is also one consistent with the goals of the members-either by shaping the members' personal understandings of the consequences or by providing members with acceptable explanations of their positions.3 As an example, consider the two presentations reproduced in Table 1. They concern an amendment offered by Robert Michel of Illinois to the FY1978 Labor HEW Appropriations bill (HR 7555). The amendment proposed trimming the committee approved bill by \$563 million. Presen-

Fenno presents some examples of explanations that clearly suggest the place of interpretations in explanations. The explanations of two House members of their potentially unacceptable positions on the Voting Rights Act of 1970 are particularly illustrative (Fenno, 1978, pp. 151-152). For a more extended discussion of the relationship between interpretation and explanation, see Smith, 1980, pp. 93-99.

tation A is a portion of a "Dear Colleague" letter written by Representative Michel. Presentation B is the text of a mailgram sent by the National Education Association to all members of the House. The two presentations are in striking contrast to one another. They emphasize different consequences (e.g., Michel raises the prospect of a presidential veto if his amendment is not adopted). And they disagree about others (e.g., Michel claims his amendment still provides generous support of federal programs, thereby making any cuts in regular school programs or increases in local property taxes unlikely).

Such presentations are made at every stage of the congressional process, beginning with the drafting of a legislative proposal before its introduction in the House or Senate and ending with the final floor vote on the proposal. They are also made in a variety of ways, including testimony before congressional committees, conversations with members or their staff assistants, and letter and telegram campaigns. Presentations can influence the interpretations and decisions of members for two reasons. First, they structure how members search for information about consequences, and second, they can cause members to reconsider information that they may have overlooked in prior searches. Advocates appear to recognize the importance of making presentations. Both interest group lobbyists and members of Congress, for example, see presentations as the most important activity for influencing the decisions of Congress (Berry, 1977; Milbrath, 1959, 1963; Scott & Hunt, 1966).

However, the influence that results from presentations has one significant drawback for advocates: it can be very fragile. The very information-processing characteristics of members that give advocates the opportunities to influence the decisions of members also give opposing advocates similar opportunities. Since members form interpretations as a result of limited search and oversight, opposing advocates may have opportunities to overturn existing interpretations (and positions) by making members aware of alternative, more appealing interpretations. As an example, consider an incident reported by Eric Redman (1973, pp. 206-207), involving the Senate's con-

'Just how much either of these presentations actually influenced the interpretations and decisions of member is unknown. Michel's amendment was defeated by a vote of 334-72. Because of the protracted dispute over the provisions of federal funds for abortion, the appropriation levels established in conference report of H.R. 7555 were enacted into law in a continuing appropriation resolution (HJ Res. 662) approved in December of 1977. See Public Law 95-205.

Table 1. Two Presentations Regarding an Amendment to the FY 1978 Labor-HEW Appropriations Bill

#### Presentation A

As you are undoubtedly aware, the vast special interests communication network being what it is, I plan to offer an amendment to reduce the Labor-HEW Appropriations Bill by \$563 million when the bill is taken up on the Floor on Wednesday, June 15.

Enclosed is a table which shows the items in the bill, the dollar amounts, and various comparisons. There has been some concern expressed that this amendment would cut current program levels. That is not the case. As you will note from the table, in no case does the amendment reduce funding below the current (FY 1977) level. The one apparent reduction, in new capital contributions for the Direct Student Loan program, is more than offset by a \$24 million increase in the Direct Loan revolving fund. Most importantly, in every instance but one, there would be an increase over the current funding level, in some cases a very substantial increase. In every case but two, the amendment would result in a funding level above the Carter budget.

What the amendment would do, in other words, is basically just moderate some of the major increases in the bill. Since the bill is a substantial \$2.1 billion above the Carter Budget, and in view of the President's talk about a possible veto of the bill, I believe we ought to seek to make the measure somewhat more reasonable in nature in order to head off a confrontation. My amendment treats each program in a fair and generous manner, and would reduce the total in the bill without hurting any of the programs involved. A vote for the amendment would be a vote for a more moderate bill and still for increases in the programs.

I hope to have your support.

#### Presentation B

The National Education Association urgently needs your support of education funding as reported by the House Appropriations Committee in the FY 1978 Labor-HEW bill, H.R. 7555. Specifically, we ask your support of the committee recommendations—without amendments in the education sections. The rationale of our position is as follows.

- The committee recommendation falls well within the target for education spending adopted in the first concurrent resolution on the budget. That target was approved by the full House May 17 after full debate and conference with the Senate.
- 2) Most of the programs in the Bill have been mandated by the Federal Courts and by Congress. Such programs as ESEA Title 1, Impact Aid, Education of the Handicapped, and Student Assistance, affect the vast majority of children and youth in school, directly or indirectly. Regular school programs will have to be trimmed if the major federal-funded programs are cut.
- 3) Inflation of school costs have been worsened by steeply rising energy prices. Without the full amounts recommended in H.R. 7555, local governments will have to increase property taxes drastically in order to maintain current programs.
- 4) The federal share of school funding must be stable and reliable. The Appropriations Committee figures represent the rock-bottom level of support needed to prevent certain disaster.

sideration of an amendment offered by Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Washington to block a proposed shipment of nerve gas from Okinawa through the Pacific Northwest. The amendment appears destined for defeat. Redman writes:

I prepared a memorandum cataloging the arguments he (Magnuson) had marshalled against the shipment and took it to him at his desk on the Senate Floor. He surveyed the memo cursorily, then handed it back with annoyed "No, no, no!" Bewildered, I retreated to the staff couch and waited to hear what argument he intended to use instead of familiar ones of possible sabotage, dangerous sections of track along the proposed route, and populations that would have to be evacuated as a precaution against leakage. When the time came, he took a wholly novel and ingenious approach. The issue he told his colleagues, was not one of the people versus the Pentagon, as the news media seemed to assume. Instead, it was another case of the President versus the Senate. The Senator from West Virginia (Robert C. Byrd) had recently offered a resolution, which the Senate had passed, stating that the Senate expected the President to keep it informed throughout the treaty negotiations with the Japanese government on the subject of Okinawa. The President's sudden decision to move the nerve gas off Okinawa must reflect some aspect of those treaty negotiations, Magnuson Insisted-and the Senate had not yet been informed of, much less consented to, any such agreement. To allow the nerve gas shipment under such circumstances, he asserted, would be to abandon the Byrd resolution and to abdicate the Senate's rightful role in treaty-making generally. The President, Magnuson said, might get the idea that he could ignore the Senate and its Constitutional prerogatives whenever he wished. Jolted by this reasoning, the Senator from West Virginia and his Southern colleagues friends of the Pentagon almost to a man, but vigilant guardians of the Senate's Constitutional responsibilities-voted down the line with Magnuson. The amendment, which had been doomed a few minutes earlier, passed overwhelmingly.

Magnuson's arguments seem to be influential because they provided an interpretation that demonstrated to some senators how an alternative position was superior to the one they currently held. The arguments were effective because they demonstrated the connections between pieces of disparate, seemingly unrelated information. His arguments provided no new information. The senators all knew about the Byrd resolution, they all knew about the President's decision to remove the nerve gas, but few if any senators saw the connection between the two and hence, the connection with the transportation of the nerve gas across the Pacific Northwest. Magnuson simply suggested how the two pieces of information were related, thereby allowing him to identify a set of consequences previously overlooked by senators. The result was the construction by many southern Democratic senators of the President-versus-the-Senate interpretation—one that apparently dominated their prior interpretations.

All of this is not to suggest that the positions and interpretations of all members are equally subject to manipulation. They are not. Manipulation is also a function of other variables. One of the most important is the level of agreement between advocates and members on previous legislative proposals: the higher the level of historical agreement, the greater the probability that the advocate will develop an interpretation that members will find appealing over all others. The level of historical agreement is important because it reflects a basic similarity in the goals (or at least relevant subsets of them) of advocates and members. For example, advocates and members may share similar conceptions of what constitutes good public policy, pursue common career ambitions, or profess corresponding views of representation. When the similarity in goals is high, the advocate finds that the member has similar preferences over the various consequences of different positions on a legislative proposal. It thus becomes relatively easy to develop interpretations that will elicit a position by the member that is desired by the advocate. And over time, the member will become a regular supporter of the advocate's positions. When the similarity in goals is low, the advocate will have many more conflicts with the member over the desirability of various consequences. It becomes far more difficult for the advocate to develop an interpretation of the

consequences that will cause the member to take the position desired by the advocate. And over time, the member is likely to be only an occasional or *irregular supporter* of the advocate's positions.

4. The probability that advocates can demonstrate the superiority of their desired positions to members depends significantly on two variables: the level of resource advantage (i.e., the quality and quantity of resources committed to the advocacy effort compared to what opposing advocates have committed) and the amount of time available for the advocacy effort.

Consider first the notion of a resource advantage. In order to influence the interpretations and positions of members, advocates must develop interpretations that members find appealing and superior to those they already hold (if any). Advocates can control to some extent how successful they will be in developing such interpretations. The probability of developing appealing interpretations depends on the quality and quantity of resources devoted to the advocacy effort. In particular, the probability depends on the availability of the requisite resources for the acquisition of information about the consequences of various positions on a proposal and the presence of creative, experienced people who can transform information about consequences into interpretations that are appealing to members of Congress. The probability of developing appealing interpretations that are superior to those that members presently hold depends upon the advocates devoting more and higher quality resources to the advocacy effort than their opponents.

Advocates can increase the probability of establishing resource advantages over their opponents in two ways. First, they can increase the overall quantity and quality of resources available for advocacy efforts. For example, interest groups and presidents can hire more experienced, creative lobbyists and give them better staff and research support. Similarly, members of Congress can hire more experienced legislative assistants who have established relationships with other topnotch legislative assistants as well as lobbyists of various interest groups. Second, given an existing set of resources, advocates with multiple legislative interests can choose the proposals on which they want to attempt to establish their greatest advantage. On such proposals, presidents and interest groups, for instance, can assign their most experienced, most creative lobbyists and members of Congress can assign their best legislative aides.

However, the extent to which resource advantages translate into legislative influence is conditional upon the length of time available for advocacy efforts. The shorter the length of time, the smaller the likelihood that any resource

<sup>&#</sup>x27;A transcript of Magnuson's speech may be found in the *Congressional Record*, Volume 116, Part 16, pp. 22019, 22021-22023.

advantage will have an impact on the decisions of Congress. Advocates must attract both regular and irregular supporters to the coalitions that support the desired positions of the advocates. Advocates rarely have so many regular supporters that they need not worry about the infrequent supporter when building a winning coalition (Smith, 1980, pp. 39-47). Because of the similarity in goals, advocates can quickly develop interpretations that their regular supporters will find attractive and superior to those offered by opposing advocates. However, advocates require far more time to attract the support of irregular supporters. Since there is less similarity in goals, advocates find it more difficult to formulate interpretations that irregular supporters will find attractive, much less superior, to those they may already hold. Moreover, advocates find it difficult to make irregular supporters aware of potentially appealing interpretations. Kingdon (1973, chap. 11), for example, has argued that members pay attention to those actors with whom they historically agree. Advocates will therefore have to work harder (e.g., make personal visits to the member, make repeated presentations of the arguments) to make the member attend to the interpretation. Given sufficient time, advocates who enjoy a resource advantage are likely to experience considerable success in attracting irregular supporters to the supporting coalition. But when time is short, they are likely to have far less success.

5. The extent to which advocates can influence the decisions of the Congress regarding a legislative proposal varies as the proposal is considered in different legislative situations.

This relationship between resource advantage and time creates a significant problem for advocates who seek to pass legislative proposals into law. The problem is that their influence over the congressional treatment of the proposals is likely to vary substantially as the bills move through different legislative situations. Consider two especially significant situations that often arise while a proposal is under consideration on the floors of the House and Senate. In the first situation, members are asked whether their support of an advocate's position on the proposal also extends to support for its position on alternative versions of the proposal, especially those that the advocate views as weakening or destroying the most desirable provisions of the original proposal. These alternative versions are proposed in the form of amendments and recommital motions. In the second situation, members are asked, after having already voted on whether to pass a proposal into law, whether they will take the same position on a conference report, and when applicable, the vote to override the President's veto.

Advocates seeking to pass a proposal into law must maintain their support in both situations: failure to do so can lead to drastic alterations in the proposal, including total defeat. The first situation is especially troublesome. An advocate has a difficult time translating resource advantages into legislative influence. Because the provisions of alternative versions of the proposal are different (often substantially), members have cause to consider whether their interpretations of the proposal also apply to the alternative version. to seek out additional interpretations, and to form new interpretations and positions. The advocate, therefore, needs to present interpretations that result in members supporting its positions on the alternative versions. But time is short; the length of time available for the advocacy effort may range from a few minutes to a few days, but something less than 24 hours is typical. The lack of time creates few difficulties among the regular supporters of the advocate; the basic similarity in goals allows the advocate to devise and disseminate interpretations that regular supporters will find attractive and superior to those offered by opposing advocates. But the lack of time does pose significant difficulties among irregular supporters. Because of the lack of commonality in goals, the advocate finds it difficult and time consuming to develop and get across interpretations that irregular supporters will find more appealing than those offered by the opposing advocates. As a result, regardless of the level of resource advantage, the advocate is especially prone to lose the support of its irregular supporters on alternative versions of a proposal and, consequently, finds it difficult to maintain, much less expand, the size of its supporting coalition in the face of amendments or motions that threaten to weaken or eliminate desirable provisions of the original proposal.

By contrast, in the second situation, an advocate who has established a resource advantage can expect to retain the support of those members who supported the initial passage of the proposal, regardless of whether they are regular or irregular supporters. Moreover, if it desires, the advocate can even expect to gain the support of some of those members who opposed the passage. The reason is the greater length of time available to develop the advocacy effort-time that allows the advocate to make effective use of any resource advantage it may enjoy. The period of time between the dates of the initial passage vote and the conference or veto override votes is typically weeks, often months. An advocate, therefore, has the time to make sure that all members who supported the original proposal still believe their interpretations and positions are applicable to the conference version. For those who are in doubt.

the advocate has ample time to use its resource advantage to develop and disseminate interpretations that many of the members will find superior to those offered by opposing advocates. Furthermore, if the advocate chooses, it has enough time to attract the support of some of those members who opposed them on the passage vote. Because of its resource advantage the advocate can create and get across interpretations that some members will view as superior to those they currently hold or those being offered by opposing advocates. The result is that an advocate can expect to maintain and, if it desires, to increase the size of the supporting coalition for the proposal, so long as it can establish a resource advantage.

In sum, the relationships between advocacy, interpretation, and legislative decision making suggest the following pattern of legislative influence.

An advocate can have substantial success in maintaining and, if he chooses, expanding the size of its supporting coalitions from the time of the passage of a proposal to the time of the conference or veto override vote. Because of the ample time available in this legislative situation, resource advantages are likely to translate into legislative influence: the greater the resource advantage, the greater the success that the advocate is likely to experience in maintaining and increasing the size of its supporting coalitions.

An advocate is likely to have far less success in maintaining the size of its supporting coalition for a proposal in the face of threatening amendments and motions. Because of the lack of time available to develop advocacy efforts, the advocate will find it difficult to use its resource advantage effectively and will, therefore, lose the support of many members, especially irregular supporters. Hence, regardless of the level of its resource advantage, the advocate is likely to experience little success in increasing the size of its supporting coalitions and may often encounter significant difficulties in even maintaining their size.

The influence of an advocate over the decisions of members is, therefore, both substantial and fragile. Despite desires to the contrary, there are legislative situations in which the advocate can experience great difficulty in controlling the outcome. My analyses of the legislative influence of the National Education Association during the 94th Congress offers evidence of this difficulty.

# Variations in Legislative Influence: The NEA Experience

## Measuring an Advocate's Resource Advantage

Providing evidence of the pattern of influence described above depends critically on measuring the resource advantages of an advocate. However,

resource advantages are extremely difficult to measure directly. One major problem is the development of indicators of both the quantity and quality of the resources allocated. Indicators of quality are especially difficult since they must capture such key dimensions as intelligence, creativity, and political savvy. Another major problem is that direct measurement requires the collection of enormous quantities of data. Establishing the level of resource advantage that one advocate enjoys on a legislative proposal involves not only the measurement of that advocate's resource allocation, but also the resource allocations of all other advocates interested in the proposal. This task is extremely demanding: it requires the collection of information that is more systematic and detailed than that found in the most careful and exhaustive legislative case studies to date.

Because of these difficulties, less direct measures of the level of resource advantage are necessary. One such measure is the *priority* given to a legislative proposal by an advocate. It can serve as an excellent indicator of the level of resource advantage for those advocates who are interested in many legislative proposals. The reasons are briefly described below. A more extended discussion may be found in Appendix 1.

Advocates try to influence congressional decisions by developing and executing lobbying strategies. However, advocates face resource constraints that affect both the development and implementation of these strategies. In particular, resources are uneven in quality and limited in quantity. Therefore, advocates must decide how to allocate their resources among several proposals. One method is a priority allocation rule; the more important a legislative proposal, the higher the probability that the necessary quantity and quality of resources are allocated to develop and implement fully the lobbying strategy that the advocate believes is necessary to aid the passage of the proposal. The level of priority indicates the resource advantage established by an advocate so long as there is not a strong positive correlation between the priorities of the advocate and those of opposing advocates.

During the 94th Congress, the lobbyists of the National Education Association used a priority allocation rule to distribute resources among the 60 proposals of interest to their organization. (See Appendix 2 for a list of the proposals.) In the next section, those priorities will serve as the cornerstone of the empirical analyses of the legislative influence of the NEA.

# Influencing Conference and Veto Override Decisions

Influencing the conference and veto override votes regarding a legislative proposal is a significant problem for advocates. This was especially the case for the NEA in the 94th Congress. During that time the White House was occupied by a Republican who was unsympathetic to many of the legislative objectives of the NEA. As a result, many of the proposals in Congress that were supported by the NEA encountered the active opposition of the White House, often culminating in a veto by President Ford. In fact, eight legislative proposals that were of interest to the NEA were vetoed by Ford (six were subsequently overridden), with an unknown number of proposals escaping a veto because of the existence of strong levels of support in the House and Senate, both at the time of the passage of the proposal and, more important, at the time of the adoption of the conference report. Thus, in order to be in a position. to prevent or override presidential vetoes, an important task for the lobbyists of the NEA was not only to maintain, but to continue to build support for a proposal after it initially passed the House or Senate.

NEA lobbyists are likely to be quite successful in this task. As was argued above, the legislative situation provides ample time to turn resource advantages into legislative influence. As the NEA resource advantage over proposals increases, its lobbyists are more likely to ensure that all members who supported the original proposal at the time of its passage still believe their interpretations and positions are applicable to the conference and veto override versions. They are also more likely to devise and disseminate interpretations that many members who may question the applicability of their original interpretations and positions will find superior to those offered by opposing advocates. Finally, the NEA lobbyists are more likely to create and get across interpretations that some members who opposed the NEA during the passage of the proposal will view as superior to those they currently hold or those being offered by opposing advocates.

For these reasons, a strong, positive relationship is hypothesized to exist between the priority of a proposal and the influence of the NEA on the size of the congressional coalition; that is, the higher the priority given to a legislative proposal by the NEA, the greater the increase in the level of support at each successive consideration of the proposal on the floor of the House or Senate. However, it should be remembered this hypothesized relationship does rest on a key assumption. The NEA lobbyists must have the opportunity to establish a resource advantage when they choose;

there cannot be a high positive correlation between the priorities of the NEA and those of opposing advocates. If there were, any gains that the NEA made might be counterbalanced by losses from their irregular supporters.

In order to test this hypothesized relationship between organizational priorities and success in expanding the size of congressional coalitions, the following OLS regression equation was estimated for proposals of interest to the NEA when they were considered in the House of Representatives:

```
\Delta \text{ SUPPORT} = a + b_1 \text{ PRIORITY} 
+ b_2 \text{ INTEREST} + b_3 \text{ MARGIN} 
+ b_4 \text{ PRESINT} + b_5 \text{ VETO} + b_6 \text{ TIME} 
+ b_7 \text{ APP} + b_8 \text{ EDL} + b_9 \text{ WM} 
+ b_{10} \text{ PW} + b_{11} \text{ JUD} + b_{12} \text{ HA} 
+ b_{13} \text{ PO} + e  (1)
```

where all variables are defined in Table 2 and a is the intercept, the bs are regression coefficients, and e is the error or the disturbance term. The variable of primary interest is PRIORITY. It is expected to have a strong positive coefficient, thereby reflecting the hypothesized ability of advocates to maintain and expand the size of their supporting coalitions. All other variables in equation (1) are included as controls to approximate as nearly as possible ceteris paribus conditions. For example, INTEREST is included to control for variations in interest that may translate into variations in influence. Proposals vary in the extent to which they are of interest to advocates. In some cases, such as an education appropriation proposal, NEA lobbyists will be concerned with most, if not all, of the provisions of the proposal. In other cases, their interest may extend to only a few provisions of a proposal, such as the school lunch appropriation section of the Department of Agriculture Appropriations bill. MARGIN is intended to control for those times when the size of the coalition in support of the NEA position was greater than what was needed to pass or even override a potential veto. The relationship between MARGIN and  $\Delta$  SUPPORT is expected to be negative. Finally, the committee variables (e.g., APP) are included to help control for potential variation in the level of House support that is due to variation in the chambers' reactions to differences in the subject matter and decision making processes of the standing committees (e.g., Fenno, 1973). (The effect on House support for a proposal due to its consideration by the House Budget Committee is included in the intercept.)

Other variables serve as controls, but also have substantive interest. For example, two variables provide evidence of presidential influence in Con-

Table 2. Description of Variables Used to Assess the Legislative Influence of the NEA

Equation	Variable	·
1 and 2 only	∆ SUPPORT	The increase in the size of the supporting coalition for a legislative proposal from the time of initial passage of the proposal to the adoption of the conference report and the time of the adoption of the conference report to the vote to override the President's veto.
,		The size of the supporting coalition is measured in terms of the proportion of those members who voted for the legislative proposal. All cases in which the level of support on the first vote of the pair exceeded .90 have been excluded from the analyses.
	VETO	Coded 1 if the increase in the size of the supporting coalition concerned a veto override vote; 0 otherwise.
3 and 4 only	ΔSUPPORT	The extent to which the congressional support for a legislative proposal is resistant to amendments or motions which threaten to weaken or kill the proposal. It is computed by subtracting the proportion of members who supported the NEA's position on the legislative proposal from the percentage of members who voted in support of the NEA's position on the weakening amendment or motion to recommit the legislative proposal. A negative difference indicates a loss of support in the face of a threatening amendment or motion.
	CONF	Coded 1 if the weakening action occurred as a motion to recommit the conference report on the legislative proposal, 0 if otherwise.
1, 2, 3, & 4	PRIORITY	The priority that the NEA attached to the legislative proposal. Proposals were given 1 of 15 ordinal rankings, coded on an equal interval scale ranging from 0 to 1. The coefficient, therefore, represents the full range of the NEA's lobbying influence on the proposal of interest to it.
	INTEREST	The extent of NEA's interest in all aspects of the legislative proposal (coded 1 if the NEA is interested in all or most of the provisions of the legislative proposal, 0 if interested in only some of the provisions). The coding is based on a comprehensive review of the publications and internal documents of the NEA.
	MARGIN	The proportion of votes in support of the NEA's position minus the proportion needed to pass the proposal;
	PRESINT	The presidential interest in the legislative proposal (coded 1 if the president takes a position on the legislative proposal, 0 if the president announces no position). The coding is based on information in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1975 and 1976.
	TIME	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal was considered during the two periods of peak legislative activity in the 94th Congress, 0 otherwise. Both periods occurred in the second session of the 94th Congress. The first began June 14, 1976 and ended July 1, 1976, the second period from Sept. 15, 1976 to October 1, 1976;
1, 2, 3, or.4	APP	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the House Appropriations Committee, 0 if otherwise;
,	EDL	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the House Education and Labor Committee, 0 if otherwise;
,	<b>WM</b>	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the House Ways and Means Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	PW	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the House Public Works and Transportation Committee, 0 if otherwise.
	JUD	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the House Judiciary Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	РО	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	GO	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the House Government Operations Committee, 0 if otherwise;

TABLE 2 (continued)

Equation	Variable	
1, 2, 3, or 4	на	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the House Administration Committee, 0 if otherwise;
2 or 4 only	SAPP	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the Senate Appropriations Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	SBUD	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the Senate Budget Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	SLPW	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	SFIN	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the Senate Finance Committee, 0 if otherwise;
,	SPW	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the Senate Public Works Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	SJUD	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the Senate Judiciary Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	SPO	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the Senate Post Office Committee and Civil Service Committee, 0 if otherwise;
	SRUL	Coded 1 if the legislative proposal originated in the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, 0 if otherwise.

Table 3. Influencing Conference and Veto Override Decisions: The NEA Experience in the House of Representatives—94th Congress  $(N = 24)^a$ 

			Regression Coefficients	Standardized Regression Coefficients	t valueb
Δ SUPPORT =	a		062	_	
	$b_1$	PRIORITY	.085	.32	1.86
	$\hat{b_2}$	INTEREST	.081	.50	2.25
b	$\bar{b_3}$	MARGIN ,	531	86	4.12
	b4	PRESINT	046	29	1.42
	b 5	VETO	094	57	3.16
b	$b_6$	TIME	.058	.34	2.98
	$b_7$	APP	.145	.85	4.82
	$b_8$	EDL.	.252	1.07	6.34
	bg	WM	.117	.42	3.04
	b 10	PW	.184	.88	4.35
_	b11	JUD	.152	39	2.61
	b <sub>12</sub>	HА	.206	.53	3.04
	b 13	PO	.046	.16	.79

(The House Budget Committee is included in the Constant)

 $R^2 = .93; \overline{R}^2 = .83; S.E. = .033$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>This analysis does not include eight cases in which the level of support expressed on the first vote of the pair exceeded 90%. When included, the regression coefficients of prime interest (e.g., PRIORITY) remain largely unchanged, but the total variance explained by the equation declines considerably  $(\overline{R}^2 = .69)$ .

bGiven the degrees of freedom, a t value of at least 1.37 is necessary for a .10 level of significance, 1.81 for a .05 level of significance. However, since the entire population of cases is under analysis, the meaning of the t values is ambiguous. They are included for the interested reader.

gress. PRESINT controls for influence that is due to the White House simply announcing a position on the legislative proposal. Since the NEA was frequently at odds with the White House during the 94th Congress, the variable is expected to have a negative coefficient. VETO controls for the possibility that it may be more difficult to expand the size of a supporting coalition to override a presidential veto than to approve a conference report (and perhaps stave off a veto). The variable, therefore, is also expected to have a negative coefficient. TIME is another control variable of substantive interest. It was included in equation (1) to indicate if the consideration of the conference report or the veto override occurred during a period of peak legislative activity. During such periods, members are more likely to rely on cue taking since they have less time to consider personally any proposals outside their committee jurisdictions. If lobbyists can persuade some of the cue givers who were previously hostile or who took no position on the proposal to support it, then many more members are also likely to support the proposal than would be the case if cue taking was at lower levels. TIME is, therefore, expected to have a positive coefficient.

Table 3 presents the results of OLS estimation of equation (1). As expected, the PRIORITY coefficient is positive. Given two legislative proposals, one given the NEA's highest priority and the other the lowest, the NEA lobbyists were able to expand the size of the supporting coalition for the high priority proposal by about 9% of the members who were present and voting (typically 30 to 35 House members). This is the case whether the lobbyists are trying to increase the level of support from the time of passage or from the time of the adoption of the conference report. However, attempts to expand the supporting coalition that existed at the time of the conference report (in preparation for overriding a presidential veto) are generally undertaken under less favorable circumstances than is the case at the time of passage. In fact, unless the legislative proposal receives the highest priority of the NEA, the supporting coalition is likely to decrease in size. The VETO coefficient indicates that in the face of a Ford veto, approximately 9% of the House membership who originally supported the conference report version of the proposal will no longer do so.

The values of the other coefficients in the equation seem quite reasonable. Both the coefficients of MARGIN and PRESINT, for example, have the predicted, negative sign. Also, the TIME coefficient is positive as was hypothesized; that is, whenever there is a period of peak legislative activity, the task of expanding the supporting coalition is considerably easier. Taken together, then, the estimates of the coefficients in Table 3

appear quite plausible.

As for the Senate, there were too few cases to conduct a separate analysis. The only feasible alternative was to do a combined estimation of the House and Senate cases. The following equation was estimated.

```
\Delta SUPPORT = a + b_1 PRIORITY
+ b_2 INTEREST + b_3 MARGIN
+ b_4 PRESINT + b_5 VETO + b_6 TIME
+ b_7 APP + b_8 EDL + b_9 WM + b_{10} PW
+ b_{11} JUD + b_{12} HA + b_{13} PO + b_{14} SAPP
+ b_{15} SBUD + b_{16} SLPW + b_{17} SFIN
+ b_{18} SPW + b_{19} SPO + b_{20} SRUL + e (2)
```

where all variables are defined in Table 2.

The results of the OLS estimation are presented in Table 4. The coefficient estimates continue to offer support for the hypothesized relationships. The addition of the thirteen cases from the Senate did not alter the basic relationships among the variables of equation; the values of the coefficients of all the variables are remarkably similar to those in Table 3. Moreover, in preliminary estimations of equation (2), a variety of interaction terms were included to control for Senate specific differences in the effects of variables (like PRIORITY) on  $\Delta$  SUPPORT. The addition of those terms did not alter the value of the PRIOR-ITY coefficient. Nor did their addition increase the level of explained variance significantly. Hence, by several indicators, the addition of the Senate cases to the analyses suggests that the NEA's lobbying influence was no different in the Senate from in the House.

# Maintaining Support in the Face of Threatening Motions

If advocates are to have a full measure of control over the destiny of the legislative proposals of interest to them, they need to be concerned about more than influencing the size of the congressional coalitions that support them on conference and veto override votes. They also need to be concerned about maintaining the size of their supporting coalitions in the face of motions or amendments that threaten to weaken or eliminate those aspects of the committee proposal that the advocate favors. The appearance of weakening amendments and recommital motions represent the major opportunities for the opponents of a committee-approved legislative proposal to test the resolve of supporting members and, hence, the stability of supporting coalition.

However, advocates, including the NEA, are not likely to be able to do much to maintain the size of their supporting coalitions. As was argued

Table 4. Influencing Conference and Veto Override Decisions:
The NEA Experience in Both the House and Senate—94th Congress (N = 37)<sup>a</sup>

		Regression Coefficients	Standardized Regression Coefficients	t valueb
$\Delta$ SUPPORT = $a$		066		-
<i>b</i> <sub>1</sub>	PRIORITY	.085	.39	1.39
$b_2$	INTEREST	.071	.52	1.49
$b_3$	MARGIN	<b>443</b>	78	2.68
b <sub>4</sub>		049	36	1.13
b <sub>5</sub>		082	55	2.22
<i>b</i> <sub>6</sub>		.051	.32	2.23
b <sub>7</sub>		.134	.78	3.25
<i>b</i> 8		.239	.96	4.38
b		.114	.38	2.18
$b_1$		.166	.76	2.89
$b_1$		.138	.33	1.71
$b_1$		.211	.50	2.31
$b_1^z$		.051	.17	.65
$b_1$		.133	.44	2.35
$b_1$	SBUD	.094	.38	2.11
$b_1$		.172	.41	2.48
$b_1$		114	.46	1.69
$b_1$		.182	.61	3.14
$b_1$	-	.036	.07	.34
$b_2$	SRUL	.080	.19	.89

(The House Budget Committee is included in the constant)

 $R^2 = .81; \overline{R}^2 = .56; S.E. = .045$ 

above, the proposal of amendments and recommital motions creates a legislative situation in which it is difficult to turn resource advantages into legislative influence. Because the provisions of alternative versions of the proposals are different (often substantially), members have cause to seek out and develop new interpretations and positions. But there is little time to develop and to disseminate the interpretations that will result in members supporting the advocate's position on a legislative proposal. An advocate is especially prone to lose its irregular supporters since they are most likely to become aware of and find persuasive those interpretations offered by opposing advocates. Consequently, the lobbyists of the NEA are likely to experience little success in maintaining supporting coalitions in the face of threatening amendments and motions. There is likely to be little relationship between the priority given a legislative proposal and the stability of a supporting coalition.

To test this hypothesis, the following OLS regression equation was estimated for proposals of interest to the NEA when they were considered in the House of Representatives.

$$\triangle$$
 SUPPORT =  $a + b_1$  PRIORITY

 $+ b_2$  INTEREST  $+ b_3$  MARGIN

+  $b_4$  PRESINT +  $b_5$  TIME +  $b_6$  CONF

 $+ b_7 \text{ APP} + b_8 \text{ EDL} + b_9 \text{ WM} + b_{10} \text{ GO}$ 

$$+ b_{11} PW + b_{12} JUD + b_{13} PO + e.$$
 (3)

where all variables are defined in Table 2 and a is the intercept, the bs are regression coefficients, and e is the error or the disturbance term.

Once again, the variable of primary interest is PRIORITY. This time, however, the coefficient is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>This analysis does not include 13 cases in which the level of support expressed on the first vote of the pair exceeded 90%. When included, the regression coefficients of prime interest (e.g., PRIORITY) remain largely unchanged, and the total variance explained by the equation declines only slightly ( $\bar{R}^2 = .53$ ).

bGiven the degrees of freedom, a t value of at least 1.34 is necessary for a .10 level of significance, 1.75 for a .05 level of significance. However, since the entire population of cases is under analysis, the meaning of the t values is ambiguous. They are included for the interested reader.

expected to be near zero. As before, all other variables in the equation serve as controls. The rationale for most of them has been given above. but a few words of explanation are in order about three of the variables. First, a new variable, CONF, was included in order to control for any differences in the House response to recommittal motions concerning conference reports compared to the response to weakening amendments and recommittal motions offered during the initial consideration of the proposal. Second, as was the case in the previous legislative situation, MARGIN was included to control for those times when the NEA enjoyed a large margin of support and, therefore, did not have to be so concerned about the stability of that support. MARGIN is expected to have a negative coefficient. Finally, TIME was included in the equation to indicate those periods in which the House's consideration of the proposal and any weakening amendments or motions was likely to be rushed. Hasty consideration of a proposal is likely to decrease the stability of the supporting coalition. During the periods of peak legislative activity, there is likely to be a greater reliance on cue taking. Hence, the defection of cue givers, especially those who are not regular supporters of the NEA's positions, is likely to affect a greater number of members than during more slack periods. Accordingly, the TIME coefficient is expected to be negative.

The results of the OLS estimation for equation (3) are presented in Table 5. They are consistent with the hypothesis. The PRIORITY coefficient is small, of the wrong sign, and statistically insignificant, thereby suggesting the absence of a relationship between NEA's legislative priorities and the stability of its supporting coalitions on all proposals of interest to it. This finding seems especially plausible in light of the reasonable signs of the coefficients of other noteworthy variables. For example, the TIME coefficient has a negative sign (as expected), suggesting that the crush of legislative business can make it even more difficult for the NEA lobbyists to hold on to the House support expressed for the NEA's positions on the proposals of interest to it. Moreover, as was the case in the first legislative situation, the task for the NEA's lobbyists was made even more difficult when the Ford administration took an official position on the proposal and the weakening amendment or motion. That increased difficulty is reflected in the negative sign of the PRESINT coefficient. And as a final example, the negative sign of the MARGIN coefficient indicates that the level of instability of the supporting coalition is indeed related to the level of excess support

Table 5. Maintaining Support for Proposals in the Face of Threatening Motions: The NEA Experience in the House of Representatives—94th Congress (N = 21)

	·	Regression Coefficients	Standardized Regression Coefficients	<i>t</i> value <sup>a</sup>
$\Delta$ SUPPORT = $a$		.131	-	
b	PRIORITY	041	10	.64
<b>b</b> -	INTEREST	.002	.01	.03
<b>b</b>	MARGIN	<b>271</b>	<b>35</b>	2.05
b		091	26	2.41
bs b6 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12	•	161	63	4.32
	CONF	123	52	4.55
		044	21	1,18
	EDL	170	<b>59</b>	3.67
	·	131	38	1.76
		.003	.01	.05
		.070	.20	1.20
		190	40	2.44
b		140	29	1.46

(The House Budget Committee is included in the constant)

 $R^2 = .96; \overline{R}^2 = .90; S.E. = .033$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Given the degrees of freedom, a t value of at least 1.42 is necessary for a .10 level of significance, 1.90 for a .05 level of significance. However, since the entire population of cases is under analysis, the meaning of the t values is ambiguous. They are included for the interested reader.

Table 6. Maintaining Support for Proposals in the Face of Threatening Motions: The NEA Experience in Both the House and Senate-94th Congress (N = 29)

		Regression Coefficients	Standardized Regression Coefficients	t value <sup>a</sup>
$\Delta$ SUPPORT = $\phi$		.117	****	_
b <sub>1</sub>	PRIORITY	019	05	.23
$b_2$		.050	.23	.83
$b_3$		<b>373</b>	42	2.65
b <sub>4</sub>		008	02	.21
. b <sub>5</sub>		094	33	2,47
b <sub>6</sub>		099	35	2,77
b <sub>7</sub>		049	20	1.02
b <sub>8</sub> b <sub>9</sub> b <sub>10</sub> b <sub>11</sub> b <sub>12</sub>		176	50	2,93
		168	40	1.88
		030	05	.36
		.003	.01	.04
		199	34	1.99
$b_1$		156	27	1.31
b <sub>14</sub>		088	21	1.55
$b_1$	7	006	01	.12
$b_1$		163	39	1.60
$b_1$	o .	373	64	3.73
$b_1$	,	053	09	.43

(The House Budget Committee is included in the constant)

 $R^2 = .94$ ;  $\overline{R}^2 = .83$ ; S.E. = .045

<sup>a</sup>Given the degrees of freedom, a *t*-value of at least 1.37 is necessary for a .10 level of significance, 1.81 for a .05 level of significance. However, since the entire population of cases is under analysis, the meaning of the *t* values is ambiguous. They are included for the interested reader.

expressed for the legislative proposal. Taken together, then, the results presented in Table 5 appear to be plausible estimates that are most consistent with the hypothesis of little or no legislative influence.

As for the influence of the NEA lobbyists in the Senate, there are no apparent institutionally based reasons to expect that their influence on the stability of Senate supporting coalitions would differ from what it is in the House. In fact, the absence of a relationship between an organization's lobbying priorities and the stability of the supporting coalition seems even more plausible, given the greater unpredictability of the Senate treatment of committee-approved legislative proposals (e.g., Fenno, 1973). Unfortunately, there were too few cases to conduct a separate analysis of Senate decisions. Once again a combined estimation of the decisions of the House and Senate was the only alternative. The following equation was estimated,

 $\Delta$  SUPPORT =  $a + b_1$  PRIORITY +  $b_2$  INTEREST +  $b_3$  MARGIN

 $+\ b_4$  PRESINT  $+\ b_5$  TIME  $+\ b_6$  CONF  $+\ b_7$  APP  $+\ b_8$  EDL  $+\ b_9$  WM  $+\ b_{10}$  GO  $+\ b_{11}$  PW  $+\ b_{12}$  JUD  $+\ b_{13}$  PO  $+\ b_{14}$  SAPP

 $+ b_{15} SBUD + b_{16} SFIN + b_{17} SJUD$  $+ b_{18} SPO + e$  (4)

+ 01851 0 + 6

where all the variables are defined as before.

The results of the estimation are presented in Table 6. As before, they indicate no relationship between the NEA's legislative priorities and the stability of its support. Moreover, the other coefficients of interest retain the same sign with the exception of the PRESINT coefficient which declined to zero, suggesting that presidential influence in the Senate differs from the House. Also, a variety of interaction terms were included in preliminary estimations to control for Senate specific differences in the effects of the independent variables (like PRIORITY) on  $\Delta$  SUP-PORT. In no case did the addition of such terms change the value of the PRIORITY coefficient. Nor did their addition change the explained variance appreciably. By several indicators, then, the addition of the Senate cases to the analyses does not produce different estimates. In both the House and the Senate, the lobbyists of the NEA appear to be unable to influence the stability of their supporting coalitions.

### Conclusions

One of the primary aims of the scholarly study of governmental institutions is to develop theories about policy formation. This research has sought to establish interpretation as a significant variable in such theories. In so doing, the research has indicated that the level of congressional support for a policy alternative is fragile. Those who seek to formulate and shape public policy may experience considerable success, but their success may be fleeting.

This conclusion (and the arguments and evidence supporting it) have implications for at least four streams of research regarding congressional policy formation. First, they underscore the existence of short-term change in the voting decisions of members of Congress—change that is seen as critical by advocates trying to build winning coalitions. This emphasis on short-term change is in contrast to the existing models of legislative voting which have stressed the continuity and stability of members' voting decisions. (For reviews and recent work, see Asher & Weisberg, 1978; Poole, 1981; Poole & Daniels, 1982.) There is no question that considerable continuity and stability exist. Indeed, advocates count on the continued support from their regular supporters in their efforts to influence congressional decisions. At the same time, if advocates are to develop winning coalitions, they must induce some members to take positions that are not consistent with their historical positions. This article suggests how and why advocates are partially successful in these efforts. More complete models of legislative voting need to emphasize both the stable and dynamic elements of voting (see Weisberg, 1978, for one attempt).

Second, this research is further evidence against those interest-group dominance theses that continue to have currency today, especially in journalistic and "economic" explanations of legislative decision making (e.g., Mayhew, 1975). The NEA is an impressive organization. It has a wellrun, high quality lobbying operation, supported by extensive research, political action, and public relations efforts. It also has advantages that many interest groups do not have, primarily in the form of a large (approximately 1.8 million members), well-educated, politically active membership which is fairly evenly distributed across most congressional districts. Clearly, when coupled with well-planned lobbying campaigns these advantages have an effect on Congress. The NEA was

found to have considerable influence in increasing the size of supporting coalitions, but it would be a mistake to interpret this finding as evidence of interest-group dominance since, in an important sense, the NEA cannot control its destiny. Try as it might, the NEA seems to be unable to exert influence on the stability of supporting coalitions. Their ability to protect key provisions of a legislative proposal is, therefore, limited. If this result is found to generalize to other interest groups (and there is no reason to believe the NEA is a special case), then an important limitation on interest group "power" has been identified.

Third, this research suggests that the sources of influence of interest groups (and more generally advocates) are more complex than typically portrayed. Students of lobbying have long argued that the major effect of lobbying is to increase the intensity of the commitment of members of Congress to an already established position on a legislative proposal. Lobbyists are seen as reinforcing and mobilizing those members who already support the organization's position on the proposal. (For examples, see Bauer, Pool, & Dexter, 1972, Part IV; Berry, 1977, pp. 216-223; Kingdon, 1973, chap. 5; and Milbrath, 1963.) Previous work, however, has paid little attention to interpretations. As a result, the influence of lobbyists on establishing and altering (rather than just reinforcing) the positions of members of Congress has been underemphasized. By recognizing the significance of interpretations, a whole new process of influence becomes clear, one that suggests that the influence of lobbyists is both greater and more limited than commonly described in much of the academic literature.

Finally, the emphasis on interpretation in this research stands in contrast to the more familiar models of coalition building that emphasize exchange. In these models, advocates receive the support of members of Congress on a legislative proposal because they can offer attractive exchanges, for example, the promise and delivery of electoral resources, the provision of assistance in securing an important public works project or key committee assignment, or the promise of support on some other bill of strong interest to the member. Exchange models have a well-deserved and important role in explaining influence. But a major implication of this study is that exchange models are not the only, or even the most powerful, models of influence.

This article presents evidence of a pattern of influence that is difficult to explain by an exchange model. The inability of the NEA to control defections among their supporters in the face of threatening amendments is especially significant. For even if one assumes that the exchanges are conditional upon future exchanges (that is, an

advocate can count on a member's support so long as a better deal does not come along), it is still possible for advocates to control to some extent when defections occur. For example, the lobbyists of the NEA could make their best deals on legislative proposals of highest priority to the Association. They would make it clear that the NEA's electoral support (or opposition) for members rested on their support of the NEA positions on those proposals. Defection from that position on key threatening amendments would cost the members the electoral support of the Association (or engender its opposition). And because it concentrated its resources on the highest priority proposals, the NEA would be in a poor position to offer attractive exchanges on legislative proposals of moderate to low priority. Therefore, one would expect the NEA would be most successful at preventing defections on high priority proposals.

Since the evidence is inconsistent with this expectation, it casts considerable doubt on the veracity of an exchange explanation. Of course, one might conclude that the NEA's lack of success in preventing defections is simply evidence of an overall lack of influence. But then one would have to explain its apparent influence on conference and veto override decisions. In short, to understand coalition building, a richer set of influence processes needs to be considered than simply those emphasizing exchange. The attempt of this article to lay out the significance of the interpretation process is one step toward this end.

Of course, much work still needs to be done to develop and refine my arguments and findings. At a minimum, the work should be extended to other interest groups, other types of advocates, other stages of the congressional process (notably committee and subcommittee decision making), and other legislatures. In addition, the role of interpretations in decision making and influence needs to be better established. Some progress is possible in natural settings. One promising strategy is to arrange frequent, regularly scheduled interviews with representatives and their staff assistants in order to record their interpretations of legislative proposals as they develop and move through the legislative process. The major drawback of this strategy is that it requires the availability, patience, and good will of representatives. Since all appear to be in increasingly short supply to students of the U.S. Congress, new research may be most feasible at the state and local levels. At the same time, some questions about interpretations, especially the conditions under which their stability may vary, might also be pursued through experimentation in controlled laboratory settings. These experimental findings could both supplement and inform investigations in natural settings. Whatever the research strategy, the result of this additional work will further the goal of developing theories of policy formation—theories that will lead to a better understanding of the workings of government and the design of reforms to change it.

### Appendix 1: The Priority Measure

In order to understand more clearly the reasons why a priority allocation rule is a good measure of the resource advantages of organizations like the NEA, the concepts of lobbying strategy, scarce resources, and priority allocation require some additional comment. Lobbying strategies are collections of lobbying activities that an organization's lobbyists believe are all the organization can do to aid the passage of a legislative proposal. Lobbying strategies consist of a wide range of lobbying activities that are combined and weighted in kaleidoscopic variety. The activities are wellknown. For example, they include the making of presentations of legislative arguments (in the form of testimony, letters, and telegrams or personal presentations) and the organization and coordination of a variety of grassroots activities, such as letter and telegram campaigns and constituents' visits to members.

The content of lobbying strategies can vary across legislative proposals. The variations are, in part, a reflection of the perceptions of an organization's lobbyists of the difficulties involved in the passage of the legislative proposal. Their perceptions are based on such factors as their knowledge of which members support or oppose the proposal and with what intensity, the level of organizational and constituent interest in the legislation, and the commitment from the White House. As the perceived level of difficulty of passing a legislative proposal increases, the lobbying strategy is likely to be adjusted correspondingly. For example, if there is a great deal of interest and well-defined opposition to a legislative proposal both in the Congress and among lobbying organizations, an organization's lobbyists may believe that an intensive and extensive lobbying effort is required if they are to help pass the proposal. In the case of the NEA, an intense and extensive lobbying effort means that the lobbying staff would try to make presentations to large numbers of members of Congress both by letter and in person. The lobbyists would also encourage their extensive activist network of members to produce letters and telegrams. And if there were time, the lobbyists might coordinate and encourage the NEA membership to contact their members either at home or in Washington. By contrast, a non-controversial proposal requires a less extensive lobbying effort. The lobbying strategy

for the NEA might consist of the lobbyists making presentations to members of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the proposal.<sup>6</sup>

The development of an effective lobbying strategy is dependent on having accurate knowledge of the potential congressional action on the proposal. Intelligence gathering is, therefore, a major, unremitting activity of effective lobbyists, who attempt to discern the nature of the congressional support for the proposal and the kind of actions, especially threatening ones, that are being planned by members of Congress, perhaps on behalf of or in cooperation with their staffers or other organizational lobbyists. For instance, lobbyists seek information about which members are going to offer amendments or circulate "Dear Colleague" letters.

Both the development and implementation of effective lobbying strategies is critically dependent on the availability of the necessary organizational resources. However, organizations typically lack both the quantity and quality of resources required to develop and implement fully lobbying strategies for all the proposals of interest. Organizations have only a finite amount of staff hours. research support, money, and other organizational resources to devote to lobbying, and it is often a quantity that falls short of what is needed to lobby many proposals (see Bauer, Pool, & Dexter, 1972, chap. 23; and Berry, 1977, for an extended discussion). Moreover, those resources that are made available are not comparable in quality. Most important, some of the lobbyists on a government relations staff are likely to be more experienced and creative than their colleagues, thereby increasing the likelihood that they will be

'Variations in the content of lobbying strategies are also due to the organization's lobbyists' perceptions of the competition from other lobbying organizations. If the lobbyists of an organization are supportive of a legislative proposal whose passage is already being lobbied extensively by another organization, their lobbying strategy may consist of maintaining only a nominal presence. For more on this point, see Berry (1977), p. 205.

more successful in performing certain lobbying activities. More effective lobbyists have far greater knowledge of the procedural rules of the House and Senate, which can be significant in structuring lobbying strategies; they have the more extensive contact network and greater political savvy required for superior intelligence gathering and more of the personal qualities and experience in "reading" members of Congress necessary for making successful presentations of interpretations.

Because there are constraints on both the quantity and quality of the resources made available for lobbying activities, the problem for an organization's lobbyists is to decide how to allocate those resources. During the 94th Congress, the lobbying efforts of the NEA appeared to be guided by a priority allocation rule. In interviews conducted in August of 1977, NEA lobbyists had no difficulty in specifying in detail the priority they had given to different legislative proposals. Moreover, over several months of observation it became clear that the less important legislative proposals were lobbied by the less experienced and less able members of the NEA's staff. Furthermore, the willingness to devote the resources required to develop and implement a lobbying strategy declined as the priority attached to the legislative proposals declined. The lower willingness ranged from not making full use of the NEA's extensive grassroots network when needed to not assigning the full complement of lobbyists required to canvas the Congress on a potentially close vote.

Finally, the priorities seem to be largely internally determined; they seem to reflect only gross features of the legislative realities in ways that do not override the organization's internal statements of priorities. Contrary to what one might expect, the NEA's legislative priorities do not reflect the lobbyists' beliefs about where they are likely to be successful; rather, they reflect the lobbyists' commitment to where they want to be effective. The best available evidence for this point is reported in Table A1, where the priorities of legislative proposals of interest to the NEA and

Table A1. The Legislative Priorities of the NEA and the Incidence of Congressional Floor Action on Legislative Proposals (V = 44)<sup>8</sup>

	Legislative priority			
Congressional action	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Floor action	8	10	14	32
No floor action	3	3	6	12
Total	11	13	20	44

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Appropriation and budget proposals are excluded from the analysis since all such proposals were routinely placed on the congressional agenda. See Appendix 2 for a list of the proposals.

on which the Congress took some floor action are compared to those proposals on which no floor action was taken in either house. Clearly, the NEA's legislative priorities are not sensitive to extreme variations in the probability of successful passage. Legislative proposals that did not receive active consideration by the Congress had the same priority distribution as those which did. Consequently, smaller variations in the probability of successful passage, are likely to have only a small, perhaps negligible, effect on the legislative priorities. The legislative priorities of the NEA appear to be a good measure of what its lobbyists wanted to accomplish in the Ninety-fourth Congress.

# Appendix 2: The Legislative Interests of the NEA

Listed below are the legislative interests of the National Education Association during the Ninety-fourth Congress. The list was compiled from a variety of NEA publications and internal documents and was verified by NEA lobbyists. An asterisk indicates when the Congress took recorded floor actions on the proposal, thereby making it eligible for inclusion in the data sets used to examine the legislative influence of the NEA.

### Appropriations

FY 1976 Education Appropriations (HR 5901)\* Emergency Employment Appropriations (HR 4481)\*

FY 1975 Supplemental Appropriations (HR 5899)\*

FY 1976 First Supplemental Appropriations (HR 10642)\*

FY 1976 Agricultural Department Appropriations (School Lunch) (HR 8561)\*

FY 1976 Interior Department Appropriations (Indian Education) (HR 8773)\*

FY 1976 Regular Labor-HEW Appropriations. (HR 6069)\*

FY 1976 Second Supplemental Appropriations (HR 13172)\*

FY 1977 Labor-HEW Appropriations (HR 14232)\*

FY 1977 Agriculture Department Appropriations (School Lunch) (HR 14237)\*

FY 1977 Interior Department Appropriations (HR 14231)\*

FY 1977 Public Works Employment Appropriations (HR 15194)\*

# **Budget Control**

First Concurrent Budget Resolution—FY 1976 (H Con. Res. 215 and S. Con. Res. 32)\*

Second Concurrent Budget Resolution—FY 1976 (H Con. Res. 466 and S. Con. Res. 76)\* First Concurrent Budget Resolution—FY 1977 (H Con. Res. 611 and S. Con. Res. 109)\* Second Concurrent Budget Resolution—FY 1977 (H Con. Res. 728 and S. Con. Res. 139)

## Authorizations

General Revenue Sharing Extension (HR 13367)\* Higher Education Act Amendments (HR 12851 and \$ 2546)\*

Higher Education Guaranteed Student Loans (HR 14070)\*

**Vocational Education Act Amendments** (HR 12835)\*

Cabinet-Level Department of Education (HR 9010, HR 11424, HR 9122)

Juvenile Delinquency in the Schools Act of 1975 (HR 9662 and S 1440)

Gun Control (HR 11196)

Elementary and Secondary Assistance (HR 10145) and S 2546)

Impact Aid Amendments (HR 5181)

Child Nutrition Programs (HR 4222 and S 850)\* **Emergency Summer Child Nutrition Programs** (S 1310)\*

Day Care Standards (HR 9803)\* Day Care Assistance (HR 12455)\*

Reading Motivation—Book Distribution

(HR 8304)

Metric Conversion (HR 8674)

Young Adult Conservation Corps (HR 10168)\* Public Works (HR 5247)\*

Public Works Employment (HR 12972 and

S 3201)\*

Public Service Jobs (HR 11453)\*

Public Service Jobs (HR 12987)\*

Quality Education—Emergency Financial

Assistance (HR 11668)

Block Grants (HR 12196)

Education of Handicapped Children (\$ 6)\*

White House Conference on Handicapped (SJ Res 154)

Indochina Refugee Education (HR 7897 and S 2145)\*

Indochina Refugee Education (HR 8949)

Collective Bargaining—Amendment of National Labor Relations Act (HR 77)

Mobile Teacher Retirement (HR 808 and S 297) Unemployment Compensation for Teachers (HR 10210)\*

Health Security Act (HR 21 and S 6)\*

Comprehensive School Health Education Act (HR 2599)\*

Voting Rights Extension (HR 6219)\* Overseas Voting Rights (S 95)\*

Voter Registration (HR 11552)\*

Federal Employees Political Activities—Hatch Act Revision (HR 8617)\*

Federal Election Commission Reconstitution (S 3065)\*

(S 3065)\*

Copyright Revision of 1909 Law (S 22)\*

Public Broadcasting (HR 6461)\*

Educational Broadcasting (HR 9660)

National Women's Conference (HR 9924)

Library Construction Facilities (HR 11266)

Daylight Savings Time (HR 13089 and S 2931)

Economic Development Act (S 2228)\*

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# Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions

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Interest group theory traditionally assumed that policies advocated by group representatives in some sense grow out of the interests or values of the group's members. Mancur Olson and others compelled important revisions in this assumption, but still left the process of interest advocacy to membership groups. It is contended here that institutions, such as corporations or local governments, occupy a dominant position with respect to interest representation in Washington, and this finding requires substantial revisions in both theoretical and descriptive formulations of the governmental process.

It is common for academics to divide the American political world into two parts, governmental and nongovernmental. In turn, the actors occupying nongovernmental roles of significance sufficient to require textbook chapters treating them are individual citizens (also aggregated into "public opinion"), political parties, and interest groups. The latter two were once often closely tied together, in texts and in courses, with parties clearly the dominant concern (e.g., Key, 1964). In recent years interest groups have come to constitute a largely autonomous subject matter, but almost always they are placed into a conceptual framework that links them closely to parties. Functional arguments assign groups and parties to the articulation-aggregation portions of the functional space, and process formulations place both on the input side of policymaking. By treating parties and interest groups as two types of political organization, Wilson (1973) has perhaps best reflected the implicit conceptual assumption governing descriptive work and shaping the definitions of theoretical problems.

The American political universe, in fact, contains a considerably more diverse array of actors than these conventional headings suggest. In par-

Received: March 28, 1983 Accepted for publication: June 23, 1983

This article owes much to the stimulus of a collaborative research effort, sponsored by the American Bar Foundation, on the role of Washington representatives, in which John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann, Robert L. Nelson, and I are currently engaged. Michael Powell was associated with an earlier stage of this work and contributed to my thinking. My colleagues at Washington University—Robert Blackburn, John Kautsky, Michael MacKuen, and Kenneth Shepsle—read earlier drafts and as usual provided trenchant and constructive criticisms, as did the anonymous referees of the Review.

ticular, notable omissions from textbook treatments and most research literature include individual corporations, state and local governments, universities, think tanks, and most other institutions of the private sector.1 Likewise unnoticed are the multitudes of Washington representatives, freestanding and for hire, including lawyers, public relations firms, and diverse other counsellors. Ad hoc coalitions, issue networks, and other "loosely coupled" cooperative structures of activity are occasionally acknowledged, but are rarely described or given a place in academic characterizations of the essential features of the American system. Yet, attentive readers of what might be called the "inside press" of American politics, such as Congressional Quarterly and National Journal, are regularly informed about these kinds of activity and given to understand that they are often of critical importance to policy outcomes.

In this article I propose to argue that institutions have come to dominate the processes of interest representation in American national politics. Institutions present somewhat different theoretical problems from those we are accustomed to encountering in regard to membership-based interest groups. Moreover there are important empirical differences between a system driven by membership groups and one in which institutions occupy center stage. As the characterization of Washington representation undergoes reconstruction, two important strands of empirical theory

'Business corporations are sometimes considered, sensibly enough, among business interests, but the profound differences in organizational structure and motivation between, for example, General Motors and the Chamber of Commerce have not been remarked, nor has the implication these differences have for interest group theory.

come under scrutiny, interest group theory and theories of representation. It is thus an enormously ambitious undertaking, even presumptuous, that is attempted here. It is intended really as a beginning, however, or perhaps a midstream rechanneling, so as better to accommodate the observables of Washington politics.<sup>2</sup>

There are four essential concepts involved in the proposed reconstruction: interest, organized interest group, institution, and representative. I will seek where appropriate to incorporate the results of recent discussions of these ideas, and in the latter part of the article I will present some fragmentary data illustrating and amplifying the arguments. In general, I will not be concerned as much with defining the key terms with unchallengable clarity as with conveying rather more ostensively the meanings and uses I believe important. In any case, the words bear such heavy accumulations from centuries of everyday employment that it would be of little help or effect to legislate. And, of course, there remains Arthur Bentley's rather insouciant sentiment, "Who likes may snip verbal definitions in his old age, when his world has gone crackly and dry" (1908, p. 199).

#### The Concept of Interest

Toward what end is political activity directed? At one level we might speak of justice, equity, or the redress of grievances. In a more neutral vein, a number of terms are employed, often more or less interchangeably; e.g., values, objectives, and interests. But it is interest that is most often incorporated into our skeins of theory and thus merits special attention. Interest refers to attitudes, of course (Truman, 1951; cf. MacIver, 1932). It involves values and preferences. But it is the perceived or anticipated effects of policy-government action or inaction including all its symbolic forms as well as more tangible allocations—upon values that create politically relevant interests. Similarly, interested behavior expresses policyrelated purpose, sometimes very broadly defined and sometimes highly specific and detailed. To be sure, preferences may be inert, quiescent, held in pectore, or otherwise unattached to any visible

'I make no effort in this article to compare American patterns of interest representatives with those of other advanced industrial democracies. Membership associations with high rates of sectoral participation are considerably more common in European systems, and individual institutions may therefore have less room for assertive advocacy. Some aspects of "American exceptionalism" are treated in Salisbury (1979) and in Wilson (1981). See also Berger (1981).

action. Yet it is often risky for an outside observer to impute interests, asserting that a given policy ought to be seen as having such-and-such an effect on certain values, thus producing interests and, perhaps, eventual political action. Finally, interests are certainly perceived by individuals, one at a time and sometimes uniquely, but it is also possible for other reasonably "unitary" actors to perceive and act politically upon interests. Here we come to the institutional actor, and in examining institutions and their interests we must consider how, if at all, they differ from more conventional notions of organized interest groups.

### How Interests Are Organized into Groups

Until the publication of Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965), comparatively little serious attention had been given to the question of how and whether interests would become organized into associations capable of politically interesting action. Some commentators (e.g., Hagan, 1958), following Bentley's lead, refused to make a distinction between interest and group, treating them as identical phenomena, two words for the same observable activity. In this tradition the main intellectual task was one of mapping, locating the actors involved in the political situation and specifying the policy direction they took. Once all the interests were thus plotted, one would have a complete picture (Bentley, 1908, p. 269), and such a picture, it seems, was expected to yield satisfactory understanding. In any case, Bentley was so anxious not to step outside a strict empirical frame of analysis that little attention was given to the question of how interests developed, or failed to, and why some were more readily mobilized than others.

David Truman, building on and sometimes departing from Bentley, did ask specifically how groups emerged. He specified an initial condition, the sharing of attitudes or interests among potential members, and suggested that these shared values would most often be brought into being by some exogenous disruption of a social equilibrium, such as war or technological change. Formal association for Truman, as for Bentley. was a matter of "mere technique," and not given special theoretical status, but as a practical matter the discussion of group emergence focused mainly on organized groups. Truman went on to suggest that group formation was often a "wave-like" process with organization begetting counterorganization until some new equilibrium was reached within the broad social sector in which the interests were located. In addition to this "homeostatic hypothesis," Truman presented a broader argument to the effect that groups proliferate as a consequence of the processes of social fission that result from the growing complexity of modern society (1951, p. 57).

Homeostatic and proliferation models both operate on a macrosocial level, and neither has anything directly to say about the specific formation of particular organizations. Truman assigned a functional meaning to group organizing—the stabilization of tangent relations—but he did not seem to regard the actual organizational process as problematic. He may well have shared the view that seems to have been the pervasive wisdom before 1965, namely, that like minded people join together to enhance their political power in order to achieve public policies that serve their common interests. It was this conventional view, of course, that Mancur Olson sought to redress.

Olson challenged the assumption that individuals would join an organization in order to press for public policies, the benefits of which they would enjoy whether they had joined or not. Philanthropy, coercion, or downright irrationality might lead some people to join some groups, but those considerations could not be expected to hold for the discernible profusion of extant organizations. It was Olson's central insight that interest groups, at least those concerned with economic interests, are not in the first instance organized for public policy-related reasons at all. Rather, they are constructed around the provision to members of selective incentives, material benefits unavailable outside the organization. Lobbying on public policy, if it occurs, is a byproduct, an activity made possible by the internal exchange of selective benefits, but not necessarily given purposive direction by the values of the group's members. For example, a UAW member may or may not support the leadership's stand on a nuclear freeze or extension of the Voting Rights Act so long as his or her group membership is assured by a job and a union contract, and a doctor may read the Journal of the American Medical Association without sharing A.M.A. politics.

Walker (1983) has shown that in many cases some kind of subsidy, either from other groups or from the government, underwrites some part of the cost of creating and sustaining the organization. Nevertheless, one must still account for the ability of a group to attract members to that group and not some other, and for this problem Olson's argument still holds.

In subsequent revisions of Olson's original thesis, I (Salisbury, 1969, 1975) and others (Berry, 1977; Moe, 1980) contended that, although Olson excluded them, his argument applied fully as well to all the many groups that were organized around public policy goals. These, too, were vulnerable, highly vulnerable indeed, to the free rider problem. Why should any particular environmentalist

join the Sierra Club or the Wilderness Society? Each organization must provide selective incentives, different from the competition and compelling enough to attract the potential free rider, or go out of business. These incentives might include a distinctive formulation of policy purposes—a better "line"—as well as some combination of material and solidary attractions. In more intimate settings interpersonal pressures may supplement the advantages of membership. Moreover, as Olson argued, relatively small groups may be created out of the self-interest of a few large powerful members willing to bear the costs of organization in order to gain the political advantages of group expression.

In all of these cases, however, the political strength of the organization is derived from the support of its members, whatever the means by which that support may have been secured; that is, we grant an organization legitimacy and pay attention to its policy requests because we assume that in some sense the spokesmen for the group represent the interests of the members. To be sure, this assumption is often challenged; we may charge the group with oligarchical tendencies, or in other ways suspect that the leadership is not representative of rank-and-file opinion. Many groups go to elaborate constitutional and procedural lengths to obviate such doubts and establish their bona fides as to the reflection of membership sentiment in the group's policy stands (see, for example, McFarland, 1976). The widespread use of mechanisms providing a "democratic mold" (Truman, 1951, pp. 129-139) clearly indicates that groups which are believed to represent organized membership constituencies have both a legitimacy in the policymaking arenas and potential clout, especially through votes and campaign funds, which "unrepresentative" organizations lack. Further, it is assumed that the policy interests expressed reflect either explicit or tacit concerns of the members, for otherwise they would leave the organization.

In fact, there are several modes of "interested activity" in which the assumption that group policy actions are driven by member preferences might be unwarranted. Under some circumstances, one example would be Olson's byproduct situation. Conceivably the internal exchange of selective benefits might be so secure that no public policy inanity the leadership commits will alienate the faithful. Quite often group leaders espouse policy positions with only tenuous support from their members, although severe discrepancies between leader actions and member wishes are probably rare and generally shortlived. A second type of deviant case is the organization that is nothing more than a letterhead, lacking membership altogether. Interest groups to which no one belongs and which do not even provide for the possibility of membership are quite common among public interest groups, as Berry (1977) has shown. Similarly, Sorauf (1976, p. 19) has noted that in the field of church-state politics a good many "groups" are little more than institutionalized personalities. Leaders without organized followings may claim to have the sympathy of millions, of course, or at least to represent their "true interests," but such claims are likely to be received at a heavy discount.

At the other end of the spectrum there is the political movement, a congeries of organizations and individuals, participating in various ways in an effort to achieve a common set of policy goals (Asch. 1972: Gamson, 1975: Gusfield, 1963: McCarthy & Zald, 1973). It is characteristic of movements that many of the formal organizations within them have brief and highly volatile lives, and a large share of the sympathetically inclined individuals takes part only sporadically, if at all. Consequently, even though a movement may be very large in sympathy, it is typically uncertain in its mobilizable strength. Political movements are often characterized by great uncertainty also concerning who authentically speaks for those who identify themselves with the cause, with or without some formal membership, and typically there is considerable competition among several wouldbe spokespersons. Despite disputes over the correct line to take on a particular policy question, however, there is little doubt that the interests a movement represents are those of the "members," however that constituency is defined. Hence, all the norms and apparatus of representative democracy are applicable, and, in a society in which those norms are widely admired, that in turn places constraints on the tactical options available to movement leaders.

The several kinds of groups we have been discussing-political movements, voluntary organizations of members recruited through the use of selective incentives, and institutionalized personalities—all face the problem of establishing the legitimacy of their representational claims. The policy interests or values addressed are said to consist of the values of the group members, supporters, and identifiers. Mechanisms to allow consultation and display responsiveness are adopted. Moreover, since representational claims are so central to group legitimacy, the designation of group spokesman or representative is also a matter of critical importance. Many lobbying tasks can be performed by any competent hired hands, to be sure, but public articulation of group positions, if they are to be taken seriously, are inevitably caught up in the legitimation process and therefore cannot lightly be delegated or farmed out. The central point to be made is that

in crucial respects the representation of membership-based interest groups differs significantly from the representation of institutional interests. Let us turn to the other side of this pairing to examine the difference further.

#### How Institutions Differ from Groups.

In an earlier phase of the political science discipline a great deal of attention was paid to the theoretical meaning and position of institutions. Nearly all of this discussion, however, was focused on governmental institutions; the state and its parts and subdivisions. Very little mention was made of nongovernmental institutions except occasionally when it was noted that private groups also have governing structures and may exercise power over their members as well as influencing the larger society. Even this observation makes no distinction between voluntary associations of members and hierarchical structures which exercise authority over people within their jurisdiction. A corporation, a local government, most churches, and even universities are different, not totally but in crucial ways, from our conventional notion of interest groups, and the traditional literature on the nature of institutions does not tell us about the difference.

First of all there is the question of interests. We presume that people who join interest groups respond to selective incentives that appeal to their particular values and that whenever the incentives lose their appeal or their personal resources fail, they will drop out-voluntarily. Exit is obviously possible as well from any particular institutional setting (cf. Hirschman, 1970). One may quit one's job (or be laid off), move to another town, be graduated from school, or otherwise depart. Yet in most cases these acts send no message to the institution's leaders, nor are they intended to. To be sure, if half the population leaves, the city fathers may search for a new service formula; if a large number of students transfer, the college will be in trouble. Institutions of this kind must satisfy the needs and serve the interests of those who "belong." But when a corporation seeks to affect public policy-regarding pollution standards, for example—it does not justify its effort by alleging that it is reflecting the values of its employees. Nor does a university seek increased student loan funds on the grounds that its student body has expressed its desire for the money. It is not member interests as such that are crucial, but the judgments of organizational leaders about the needs of the institution as a continuing organization.

A central distinction between an institution and an interest group is that institutions have interests that are politically and analytically independent of

the interests of particular institutional members. In part this derives from the continuing nature of a corporate institution. For example, it is presumed in both law and fact that a university has an existence transcending any agglomeration of individuals who happen presently to occupy its diverse roles. Inasmuch as students surely, and faculty often, are "mere birds of passage," trustees are admonished to be careful not to mortgage the future or rashly to spend the endowment. Similarly, the directors of a corporation can be held liable if they distribute to the stockholders everything not nailed down, with no thought of the long run. A voluntary association does not have the same expectation of eternal life. It must recruit members every year to stay alive.

Unless liquidation or merger destroys its identity, a corporate institution not only has a continuing existence, but it also possesses significant assets which belong to the corporate entity, not to the individual members thereof. It is from this foundation that institutional interests in public policy arise. Institutional leaders are charged with protecting, strengthening, and otherwise enhancing the assets of their institutions, both in the short run and to assure reasonable financial safety and stability for the institution in the future. Much of what they do has no direct political significance, of course. But in the latter twentieth century public policy is of such immense scope that issues continually arise which affect the assets of particular institutions, thus generating politically relevant interests (Salisbury, 1980). Environmental regulation, safety and health regulation, rules regarding employment practices, the host of grants and entitlement programs, tax policies—the list is long. Even an institution of the most modest size and aspiration will encounter both threats and opportunities in this policy array, and insofar as its resources permit may seek to increase its understanding of these possibilities and to influence them.

An institution can monitor public affairs and lobby to affect them only to the extent that it can afford to, of course. It must have resources available for such purposes. What we are calling institutions are generally complex organizations, highly differentiated and often with multiple functions. Such organizations typically command substantial and diverse resources and within limits a meaningful fraction may be allocated to policyrelevant tasks if and when these are perceived as useful to the maintenance and enhancement of the enterprise. Moreover, in most cases such allocations may be made without extensive consultations with members, employees, stockholders, or other constituent groups. They are, in effect, management decisions. And here lies a key distinction between institutions, as we use the term,

and interest groups. Institutions are managed organizations. They are primarily hierarchical in their internal structures of authority, at least with regard to when and how far to become involved in the policymaking process. Membership groups must look far more carefully to the desires of their members, both to assure political legitimacy and to keep their supporters happy.

In distinguishing membership groups from institutions we do not mean to suggest that they are completely unlike. Most interest groups hope to survive into the indefinite future and thus take on institutional characteristics. Many possess substantial assets which they manage with a view to their long-term organizational health, and whenever public policy affects their institutional concerns, appropriate political action may be taken. Similarly, corporations and other hierarchies are not completely unconstrained by the views and needs of various groups both inside and outside the organizational boundaries (see, for example, Vogel, 1978). Demands for "socially responsible" behavior and for adoption of mechanisms to ensure democratic control are part of the political environment of all organizations in the United States, not just of membership groups. Nevertheless, there are important differences. Institutions have greater latitude-more discretionary resources and more autonomous leadership authority—to enter the political arena. Institutions have less need to justify their political efforts by reference to membership approval or demand. Institutions may also have a wider range of specific policy concerns. The instances in which policy impinges upon institutional interests will be numerous indeed for large complex organizations.

One result of these differences ought to be that institutions, not conventionally defined interest groups, will have come to dominate the roster of nongovernmental actors in Washington. This should follow inexorably upon the growth of government and of the scope and impact of policy. Before we turn to some examination of the empirical situation, however, let us consider briefly and in general terms the modes and motives of entering the political arena.

#### Entry into the Political Arena

Until the publication of Olson's *Logic*, the question of how and why groups undertake political activity was scarcely acknowledged to be problematic. Interest groups were essentially defined by their political presence, and although perceptive students clearly understood how much ebb and flow there was in the vigor and direction of political action, they gave it little theoretical atten-

tion. Olson showed that the mere existence of politically relevant shared values or interests could not account for the effective mobilization of those interests into politically relevant action; i.e., action aimed at effecting policy decisions that would supply collective policy benefits. Olson, as we have seen, did provide for the possibility that small homogeneous groups might so act, especially when one or a few members of the group had a particularly large stake in the collective good outcome. Otherwise, however, while persuading us that much lobbying had to be seen as a by-product of the internal organizational exchange of selective benefits, Olson did not explain why groups should bother to engage in political action. Why should the "by-product" of successful group formation be "spent" on political purposes rather than, say, on increased perquisites for the leadership?

One possibility is that securely entrenched group leaders act out of personal whim or conviction, unconstrained by member preferences, institutional needs or factional threats. Some of the late George Meany's positions on foreign policy come to mind in this connection (cf. Radosh, 1969), but it is probably very rare for leadership autonomy to be complete. More often, one suspects, group leaders lobby because they perceive potential effects of some government action on their members or members' values which the members might urge trying to influence if they were fully informed. A second and far more significant explanation is that group leaders are active on policy questions because that is why their members or followers support them in the first place. Here we speak of purposive or expressive groups. Despite Olson's reluctance to include such consumption values aong the incentives that organization offer their adherents, it is clear from subsequent empirical work, as well perhaps as being intuitively pleasing and logically persuasive, that members do often support organized efforts to secure collective public benefits, whether it is truly rational to do so or not. In any case, such purposive group activity presents no mystery regarding why political action is undertaken; it is of the very essence.

A third motive for action is institutional; that is, institutional leaders estimate that investment in political representation would be beneficial to the interests of the organization. One might treat this kind of decision as a rational calculus problem essentially like that faced by individuals in determining whether or not to participate politically, in groups or otherwise. Three considerations make it inadvisable to do so. One is that institutions are far more likely to be part of relatively small, similarly situated groups—Olson's privileged groups—and thus be able to organize more readily

and to anticipate being more effective politically than most individual citizens can expect. Second, although a given individual may hold a large number of distinct values or interests and even embrace a considerable set of political causes, available resources for participation are quickly exhausted, and multiple modes of individual participation are comparatively uncommon. Institutions possess more resources which, combined with a greater sense of efficacy in political action, lead to a considerably increased probability of participation at any given level of intensity of interest or concern.

Finally, the very size and complexity of an institution renders it vulnerable to a much broader array of specific policy impacts, positive and negative, present and prospective. Indeed, insofar as individual citizens are themselves embedded for work and play in large institutional settings, as so many are, they experience many of the effects of policy only indirectly, through their respective institutions, rather than immediately and in person. This would largely be true for much of the "new regulation" of environment and job safety, for example, as well as for national programs affecting state and local government budgets and services. A given corporation is quite likely to find itself in several encounters at once, on different policy issues, being worked on in different institutional settings, and requiring different modes of political action. Perhaps individual level interests also possess such complexity in principle, but in actual practice they do not generate comparable diversity of interest representation.

The forms of political action undertaken by institutions are indeed diverse, although none is exclusively utilized by institutions rather than membership groups or even, in some cases, individuals. One common form is to join organizations of similarly situated institutions. Some of these are trade associations organized along specific industry lines. Others may be closer to "peak associations," attempting to encompass an entire sector of economic activity. A large research university might belong to several organizations of universities-AAU, NASULGC (if public) or NAICU (if private), AAMC (if they have a medical school) and other professional school groups, ACE (as the peak association for higher education), and perhaps some others (King, 1975). A manufacturing corporation may belong to several trade associations, depending on how complex its product line is, as well as the NAM, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable. Part of these memberships may be expressive (the NAM would seem often to have been a forum for venting spleen regarding public policy rather than seeking realistically to affect it), and part may be more conventionally

political, lobbying by small groups for beneficial collective policy goods.<sup>3</sup>

A mode of political involvement that has recently taken on Brobdingnagian proportions is the Political Action Committee (Conway, 1983; Malbin, 1980). Not all PACs have been created by institutions, but most of them have, and the prominence of PACs in campaign finance further illustrates how important institutional actors have become in our political life. Again, it must be stressed that although some PACs have raised significant sums from individual enthusiasts of liberal and, especially, conservative causes, business corporations, trade associations and, to a much lesser extent, labor unions dominate this form of activity, constituting nearly 78% of 3,371 members active at the beginning of 1983 (National Journal, 1983).

Finally, institutions enter the political arena directly. Several thousand corporations maintain permanent Washington offices to monitor the political scene and to help represent organizational interests. Corporate divisions of public or

\*Trade associations present some special complexities for our argument. They themselves are membership organizations, but their members are corporate institutions. The members must be kept satisfied with association policy, selective benefits of other kinds, or both, but being institutions, their calculus regarding membership benefits may contain considerable slack. Moreover, corporate institutions may seldom confine their policyrelated activity to association membership. That trade associations do operate under member-induced constraints has recently been illustrated by the cutbacks in association staff and programs brought about as a consequence of the economic recession (Teeley, 1983). Trade associations, like other groups, are often fragile organizations financially, begun with very shadowy support out of an enterprising lawyer's office, or on some otherwise flimsy basis. One result of this is the appearance of association management companies, interest group wholesalers, which manage the affairs of several small organizations. For example, Smith and Bucklin, a Chicago firm, operates more than 70 trade associations, and the National Center for Municipal Development assists dozens of local governments in their quest for federal support.

'Governmental affairs offices have existed for a considerable time, of course. The Public Affairs Council, an organization composed mainly of corporate government affairs officers, was formed in 1954, and the Brookings Institution sponsored a roundtable discussion among 19 of them in 1958 (Cherington & Gillen, 1962). Little notice has been taken by political scientists, however; the Cherington and Gillen volume was never reviewed in the American Political Science Review.

Dexter (1969) discusses Washington representatives in some detail, but unlike his earlier work (Bauer, Pool, & Dexter, 1962), this book does not seek to tie his discussion into more general theories of interest group performances.

government affairs are standard organizational components, not only of business enterprises but on a smaller scale of universities and many other institutions of contemporary American society. Further, many of these institutions retain outside firms, primarily lawyers and public relations counsel, to represent them in Washington in particular aspects of their wide-ranging institutional encounters with the federal government. The key word here is "represent," for it carries some current meanings that have not adequately been incorporated into the formulations of political science discourse in representation. Let us turn next to that issue.

# Washington Representatives and the Nature of Representation

It is rather startling to pick up a large volume entitled Washington Representatives, 1982 (Close, 1982) and find that among the thousands of individuals listed, not one is a member of Congress. Yet, although these representatives are not accorded that status by customary formulations of social scientists and philosophers (Eulau, 1952, 1967; Pitkin, 1967; Wahlke et al., 1962), they cleary are so designated by the world. There are some differences in functions and activities, of course, between nongovernmental representatives and those who hold authoritative office. Let us consider of what these differences consist.

First, an official representative is said to have a constituency to which he is (or is not) responsive. An elected representative has a legally defined constituency, but he also has an effective one, those who supported him and those whose preferences he actually seeks to advance in policyrelated actions. In this second sense, every official may be said to represent a constituency, i.e., to reflect some values rather than others in decisions. A "Washington Rep," on the other hand, typically represents a client, an organization, group, or individual (and occasionally only himself) who retains the representative and defines the scope of interests to be represented. The concept of client ordinarily implies a narrower range of policy concerns and a more limited set of representational activities than are contained in the idea of constituency representation. A corporation may retain a lawyer to represent it before the Federal Communications Commission on a specific licensing case, or alternatively to monitor the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission decisions on a continuing basis. Client representation may take many forms, but generally it is more specialized in subject matter, more limited in both scope and time, than constituency representation. At the margin the differences grow indistinct. The AFL-CIO is represented in Washington by a substantial

crew of people and is actively interested in a range of questions that very nearly matches the full congressional agenda. Nevertheless, labor lobbyists have broad discretion to choose whether or not to get actively involved, whereas congressmen can hardly pick and choose so as to avoid all the issues about which their constituents disagree or are indifferent.

Client representation is relatively specialized and often quite discontinuous. Any specific representative may work on behalf of a particular client for a purpose that has a short life of relevance. Often, moreover, the representation is directed toward a specific agency, committee, or other unit of government, and once the policy issue moves away from that institutional setting to another, a different representative more familiar with the new arena may be brought in. Thus, specialized client representation often results in a given client retaining several representatives to perform highly focused representative services. The corollary of this is that a given representative often specializes in working with a particular piece of the governmental policy machinery and may represent numerous clients with problems involving that agency or committee.

Implicit in the foregoing discussion is the notion that representation involves three essential components rather than two, as conventional discussions of the topic assert. In addition to the representative and the represented, there is also the agency of government to which the representation is directed. Actually there are several prepositions employed to describe this side of the relationship. A lawyer may speak for a client to a congressional staffer; he may testify in court, before a judge; he may negotiate with an agency over a compliance schedule; indeed, he may only monitor what government does and counsel the client, in which case no prepositional connection with government is made. Even this last is seen as a form of representation, however, and requires the third party's presence to be meaningful.

It is not clear whether a third party is necessarily implied in traditional conceptions of representation. It is rarely if ever mentioned explicitly, but apart from descriptive representation, which can occur simply by possessing the appropriate personal characteristics, representation of constituency interests cannot logically occur unless there is some sort of "other." A legislator does not achieve his or her constituents' interests or even express them meaningfully without official status in an institutional arena where negotiations may be undertaken to accomplish his or her representational purposes. Nevertheless, ordinary speech vocabulary does not force us to recognize the institutional arena as a separate element in constituency representation as it does in considering client representation.

A full analysis of Washington representation requires us then to identify individual clients as well as broader constituencies, to examine who the representatives are and the diverse terms and conditions governing their service, and to understand the specific governmental institutions that serve as the focus of any particular representation activity. As we have said, much of that activity, although by no means all, is highly specific as to client, representative, and agency. It is often short-lived in duration and limited, even imperceptible, in its impact on any part of public policy or the world. Representational activity is very often ineffectual, redundant, or otherwise useless. Moreover, like the dog that Sherlock Holmes realized had not barked in the night, effective representation may entail doing nothing. In any case, however, this conception of representation is broader and more highly differentiated than either of two traditions in mainstream political science to which it is related, legislative representation and interest group lobbying.

Nevertheless, there remains a profound difference between the governmental official who, in either a Bentlevan or a Burkean sense, represents some interest in a specific authoritative choice among policy alternatives and the nongovernmental representative who can never do more than advocate that interest. Each may represent a client or constituency, but there remains a significant gulf between their respective capacities to act. Thus, even though only one key word is used, there are two quite different component processes involving two quite distinct sets of people, a nongovernmental set engaged in policy advocacy and a governmental set engaged in policy determination. If ordinary parlance calls both groups representatives, can we mitigate the confusion somewhat by using sharply distinct terms for the two processes? The answer is probably yes, but not if the advocacy process is called lobbying. That much-abused word is so fraught with ordinary language meaning, most of it unsavory, as to defy rehabilitation anyway, but it is also true that none of its historic uses comfortably fits what many Washington representatives do. The word lobbying does not well convey the meaning of a presentation by a drug company representative seeking approval of a new drug from the Food and Drug Administration. Nor does it capture the character of discussions between a committee on technical standards of the Aerospace Industries Association and Pentagon procurement officials. Amicus curiae briefs presented to the Supreme Court have sometimes been called "lobbying" instruments (Barker, 1967; Krislov, 1963), but they are different in much more than tactical form from the efforts of the National Rifle Association to prevent gun control legislation or of Chrysler to secure financial help. The latter are surely examples of lobbying; amicus briefs and FDA appearances involve a much more restricted kind of policy advocacy, by representatives acting in behalf of clients.

Interest representation is an encompassing term that embraces lobbying in its ordinary use as well as narrower, more rule-bound forms of policy advocacy. Interest representation incorporates the client-representative relationships of a corporation and its lawyer, the membership group and its president, and the congressman and his constituents. Within that conceptual frame we distinguish governmental officials from those outside, policy formulation and enactment from advocacy. Within both those distinctions we may wish also to distinguish among specific institutional settings in which representational activity occurs. The forms of policy advocacy in courts are different from those in legislatures and so are the forms and norms of policy making. One reason that the term lobbying is so awkward is that it was developed initially to characterize policy advocacy in and around legislative settings where its connotations made sense and only later applied to other contexts. In any case, we should try to establish a vocabulary that is compatible with observable political life and is as consistent and straightforward as possible.

If we turn from a focus on process to a focus on role, we find, to begin with, the same confusion between lobbyist and representative as between the equivalent verb forms. The two words have vastly different connotations in the American lexicon but frequently refer to the same phenomena. Again, lobbyist more often is used with reference to policy advocacy in and around legislative bodies (Milbrath, 1963; Ziegler & Baer, 1969). A less clearcut but not uncommon distinction uses lobbyist to refer to an organizational employee, subordinate to those who make policy for the organization, whereas representative connotes a free-standing agent, retained on a fee-for-service basis and often on the assumption that the agent possesses particular skills or credentials of relevance to the advocacy role that are not readily

available within the interested organization, whether institution or membership group. Even when we do not distinguish between the two words in that manner, however, the two roles are distinguishable and of both theoretical and descriptive interest.

As a first approximation of our descriptive needs it will be helpful to know what proportion of the very large community of Washington representatives are employees of the organizations whose interests they represent. Milbrath (1963, p. 150) found that as of 1956, 74.6% of the 114 registered lobbyists he interviewed were employed by the organizations represented. Of the remainder, 21% were outside lawyers, hired on a fee basis, and 4.4% were non-lawyer consultants. Table 1 reports comparable data compiled from the listings in Washington Representatives, 1981 in four broad policy areas, selected to reflect reasonable diversity in subject matter and styles of representation. Not only are the 1981 proportions remarkably similar to those Milbrath found 25 years before, they are essentially constant across the four policy domains.

This consistency is all the more impressive when we remember that it has survived an explosive growth in the numbers of groups and institutions seeking Washington representation as well as in the numbers of individuals providing it. Estimates of raw numbers for earlier years are neither plentiful nor, probably, very reliable. Schlesinger (1949, p. 46) claimed that in 1942 some 628 organizations maintained offices in Washington, whereas Albig (cited in Blaisdell, 1957, p. 59) counted 1.180 organizations located there in 1947-1948. By 1981 there were approximately 1,600 trade and professional associations, about 100 labor unions, over 200 individual states, cities, counties, and other units of government, numerous foreign governments, more than 4,000 corporations, and membership interest groups numbering well over 1000, all located in the Washington area. Temporary and ad hoc issue coalitions and other short-lived organizational efforts make it difficult to establish exact magnitudes, but it seems reasonable to suppose that the contemporary Washington community of interest

Table 1. Organizational Forms of Washington Representation

	Agriculture	Labor	Health	Energy
Law firms Consulting and public relations firms Corporations, trade associations and other institutions	17.9% 6.6 75.5	18.1% 4.9 77.0	16.8% 6.4 76.8	15.9% 5.7 78.4
<b>N</b>	832	304	722	1574

Source: Washington Representatives, 1981.

Table 2. Lawyers and Non-Lawyers, In-House and External Representatives

	Lawyers		Non-Lawyers	
	In-house	External	In-house	External
	%	96	%	%
Agriculture	12,4	79.4	87.6	20.6
Labor	8.3	71.4	91.7	28.6
Health	15.2	84.1	84.6	15.9
Energy	18.9	73.7	81.1	26.3

Sources: Washington Representatives, 1981; Martindale-Hubbell.

representation includes more than 7,000 organizations in more or less permanent residence.

When we turn to individual representatives, the numbers are even more startling. In 1981 the total capital area employment of trade and professional associations headquartered there was estimated to be more than 40,000 (Helyar, 1981). In addition, as is well known, the number of lawyers in Washington has grown enormously. Membership in the District of Columbia Bar Association became mandatory in 1973, and between then and September, 1981, it went from 10,925 to 34,087. This number is somewhat misleading. Significant numbers of lawyers belong to the D.C. Bar who live elsewhere in the country. At the same time, however, a considerable number of people with law degrees who work in Washington do not actually practice law; many work for the federal government. Hence, the total number of lawyers residing in the capital may well exceed 40,000.

We may easily be overwhelmed by these numbers, and they are truly impressive, but we should remember that by no means all trade association employees or all lawyers in Washington are really representing politically meaningful interests. A sizable percentage of the lawyers are engaged in the private practice of private law. The so-called "Fifth Street Bar," for instance, centers around the local District of Columbia courts, and its members never have occasion to lobby on Capitol Hill. Similarly, many association employees are engaged in internal administration and support and are not really relevant to our concerns here. On the other hand, an unknown but substantial number of representatives come to Washington from elsewhere, some often and some only occasionally, advocating policy positions but never becoming part of any register or roster of representatives. If we look only at the Washingtonbased individuals actually performing policy

Twenty-nine percent of all such organizations are located in the Washington area, up from 19% in 1971 (Close, 1981).

representation roles, again drawing on our examination of the listing in Washington Representatives, we can observe that in our four broad policy areas, 4,227 individuals were listed, of whom 35.6% were lawyers. This proportion is remarkably close to that reported by Milbrath and also to the proportion of lawyers among public interest group lobbyists of the early 1970s examined by Berry (1977, p. 88). In the 1981 listings the labor area had a significantly smaller percentage of lawyers (17.1%), but in the other three policy domains the lawyer presence ranged from 31% to 39%.

We pay particular attention to the prominence of lawyers, in part because of the considerable publicity that has been given to them in recent years, but in greater part because the concept of the lawyer as representative carries some interesting connotations. Lawyers traditionally and predominantly operate as free-standing professionals retained by clients for relatively specific defined services and compensated by fee. Although many lawyers actually work in large organizational settings on a salaried basis, we would still expect that lawyers will, more often than non-lawyers, be found outside the organizations retaining them. Table 2 indicates that this is indeed true and that the proportions of lawyers who are in-house employees remain quite similar across the policy domains.

One consequence of the large number of lawyers around Washington may well be increased specialization in the representation process, possibly because lawyers are typically hired as outside counsel. Their services are sought when, and only when, the client firm requires those services, and their billing is ordinarily based on hourly charges. In-house counsel might work on anything the organization requires, but external representatives typically have a more limited assignment in both the time to be given and the official governmental segments to which the representation is made. A law firm might attempt to provide full representational services to a given client, advocating policy positions before all-the

Table 3. Agricultural Interest Representatives in Washington

	Washington Representatives, 1981	Congressional Committee Testimony, 1977, 1979, 1981	New York Times References, 1977-1982
Business corporations	33.5%	10.3%	16.8%
Rural cooperatives	'4.3	10.7	6.3
Governmental institutions	1.5	12.8	5.2
Non-profit private institutions	.4	6.4	4.7
Foreign interests	12.2	.6	1.6
Business trade associations	29.8	16.0	14.1
Farm organizations	9.9	30.7	22,5
Citizens groups, including labor	6.3	9.5	27.8
Not classified	2.1	3.1	1.0
Total	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%
N	466	2579	191

Sources: Washington Representatives (Close, 1981), Congressional Index Service, New York Times Index Service.6

legislative, executive, and judicial agencies that affect the client's interests, but no individual representative can hope to do so. The everincreasing scope and variety of government and policy impact make this strategy a difficult one for even a large firm to employ successfully, however, and the more common response is the use of multiple representation by a given client. Ford, General Electric, IBM, GM, Exxon, and other giants may hire eight or ten separate outside representatives in addition to working through trade associations and their own substantial governmental relations staffs. The government of Japan in 1982 retained nine different representatives for its embassy and four for other parts of its government, while several dozen others work for specific Japanese firms and associations (Madison, 1982).

The heavy reliance on representatives, typically lawyers, chosen to speak to government officials on behalf of a limited set of client interests is more characteristic of institutional representation than of membership groups, especially when the membership is composed of individuals. Such groups seldom can afford the investment in hourly legal fees that such specialized representation calls for, and they are much more likely to adopt a jack-of-all-trades style. The sheer financial scale of institutional representation vastly exceeds the magnitude of purposive group activity, and the

'References in congressional committee testimony and New York Times references were calculated by reference to keywords "agriculture" and "farm," combined with "policy" and "legislation." New York Times references covered the period from January 1, 1977 to June 30, 1982.

respective personnel pools reflect this differential investment level. Only about 1,200 of the nearly 8,000 individuals listed in the 1982 *Directory* worked for purposive groups, and as numerous case studies attest, the salary and support levels enjoyed by this disparate group of advocates are hardly commensurate with the resources available to most institutional representatives.

We can round out this part of our discussion by reporting one other set of data demonstrating the importance of institutional representatives, especially of business corporations. For a single policy area, agriculture, Table 3 compares, first, the representational presence in Washington of different kinds of organizations declaring significant concerns with agricultural policy; private business corporations, rural cooperatives, governmental institutions, nonprofit private institutions, foreign interests, agri-business trade associations, general farm organizations and commodity groups, and other groups with purposive interests in agricultural policy. Only the last three categories are in any sense membership groups, and only in the last two sets are individuals enrolled. Thus, individual membership groups constitute only one-sixth of the community of agriculture interests more or less continuously represented in Washington. It should not be assumed that all individuals listed are equal in political importance or policy input. On the other hand, the representational presence reflected in column 1 permits a wide array of interest-serving activities to be undertaken. Informal lobbying, monitoring and grass-roots mobilization, and representation before administrative agencies are all greatly enhanced by an organizational presence on the scene. Rather than organizations of farmers, it is

institutions, especially those of business, which clearly dominate that presence.

In more public and visible arenas, however, the picture changes. In testimony before congressional committees on matters of farm policy (column 2), farm organizations play the most prominent role. Newspaper mentions of organizations in connection with farm issues (column 3) are even more fully dominated by membership groups. Business corporations and trade associations recede. The lesson to be drawn is partly one concerning legitimation. The public process of policymaking gains more legitimacy through hearing and appearing responsive to self-interested individuals and groups than by deferring to organized institutions and institutional interests. In addition, however, it is probably the case that much of the substantive policy concerns motivating institutional advocacy consists of quite small items of no interest to most groups of farmers or the general public. This is especially likely when, because of the multiple representation phenomenon we have described, a corporation or trade association retains a representative for a single, highly specialized task. This kind of thing counts in column 1 but is not otherwise noticed. When all the small specific policy items are added together the list can be formidable indeed, of course, but few of them may have attracted the attention of the New York Times or congressional committee hearings. Nevertheless, we can surely say that for much of what happens in Washington to influence the authoritative allocation of scarce resources in agricultural policy, the general farm organizations, such as AFBF, NFU, Grange, and NFO, once thought to be so powerful, are less prominent than conventional textbook treatments suggest.

The importance of institutional representation has some significant implications for the likely course of public policy as well as for our theories of how and why things work. The use of multiple representatives, each concentrating on a specialized set of policy concerns, surely must intensify the fragmenting, disaggregating tendencies in public policy so often alluded to in recent literature. Secondly, institutional representation may be expected to be far more durable and persistent in policymaking circles than most purposive groups or even membership groups based on material incentives. Institutional resources are not infinite, of course, but neither are they as often subject to membership demands for review or as vulnerable to shifts in political tides and entrepreneurial fortunes. Institutional representation may be more durable, but it is also typically more prosaic, more pragmatic, than purposive group advocacy. Institutional interests more often concern export licenses than anti-Communism, city

budgetary assistance more than a war on poverty. (Corporate PACs continue to give significant financial support to their supposed ideological enemies, liberal Democrats. Surely this is a prime example of the pragmatism of institutions (Handler & Mulkern, 1982, esp. pp. 20-27).) In a very important sense, the conservative bias that Schattschneider (1960), McConnell (1966), and other critics of pluralist America have long attributed to interest groups is rooted far more in the power of institutional representation than in conventional membership groups. Indeed, it is the comparative weakness and fragility of membership interest groups of every point of view and persuasion, not their strength, that may be argued to be responsible for whatever malaise the American polity has lately suffered from interest-based politics.

This effort to clarify the conceptual map of American policymaking processes has yielded three main conclusions. First, I distinguish between institutions, institutional interests, and their representation, on the one hand, and what we have rather awkwardly called membership interest groups on the other, and I argue that important theoretical differences exist between the two. Second, I note that both these organizational forms of nongovernmental interests are represented in Washington by large numbers of people whose roles have many conceptual similarities to those in formal policymaking positions and who, like their official counterparts, are called representatives in everyday usage. Nevertheless, there remains a critical difference in status and function between policy advocates and policymakers which the fuzziness of language should not be allowed to obscure. Washington terminology is not more precise than that used by political scientists to describe and analyze what happens there, but it is somewhat different and in recent years has grown more so with regard to interest representation and policy advocacy. Finally, we urge that the power and scope of institutional representation is such that our teaching, our research and our normative evaluations will all go awry unless we make the appropriate corrections in analytic focus.

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# Nationalization of the American Electorate

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The conceptual meaning of and the empirical evidence for the nationalization of the American electorate is explored. Two conceptually distinct dimensions of nationalization are identified: nationalization in terms of a convergence in the level of partisan support across geographical subunits of the electorate, and nationalization in terms of a uniformity of response by geographical units to political forces. Empirical estimates for both types of nationalization are derived for the American electorate for the period from 1842 to 1970. Unlike previous scholars, we find no trend toward increasing nationalization of the vote. Possible reasons for this lack of nationalization of the vote are suggested,

A widely accepted observation among political scientists holds that the American electorate has become increasingly nationalized over the past one hundred years or more. In other words, the current electorate is seen as more attuned to national level events, personalities, and issues, and hence is more homogeneous in its behavior than the electorate of the nineteenth century or the first half of the twentieth century. The argument has often been cast in terms of presidential elections, citing, among other things, the growth of the national/media, which present a similar image of the candidates in many different localities, but it has been applied to congressional elections as well. Presidential coattails benefitting congressional candidates everywhere, midterm congressional elections as a referendum on the performance of the incumbent president, and the emergence of national party images in such areas as civil rights, limiting the ability of congressional candidates to dissociate themselves from national party fortunes, have all been suggested as manifestations of the decline of localism and rise of nationalization of American politics.


Perhaps the most influential work in advancing this proposition was done by Stokes (1965, 1967), who sought to measure by analysis of variance techniques the relative magnitudes of national, state, and constituency effects on turnout and vote choice in congressional elections. In the first of these articles. Stokes found that national level forces contributed far more to the variance in turnout during the 1950s than either state or congressional district forces. In contrast, district forces accounted for the largest proportion of the variance in the partisan division of the congressional vote, with the national effect a close second (Stokes, 1965, pp. 75-78). Later, in a longitudinal and comparative study. Stokes concluded that the American system had become increasingly nationalized since the Civil War. His major evidence was a steady century-long decline in the impact of constituency forces on congressional turnout and a somewhat smaller and shorter decline in the impact of constituency forces on the partisan vote (Stokes, 1967, pp. 192-198).


Using less sophisticated methodology, other researchers have echoed or, in one case, fore-shadowed Stokes's findings. In *The Semisovereign People*, Schattschneider argued that the significance of 1932 lay in the replacement of a sectional with a national political alignment and the consequent nationalization of politics (Schattschneider, 1960, pp. 78-96). Similarly, Sundquist saw nationalization in the continuing convergence of party strength across the country since the 1930s (Sundquist, 1973, pp. 332-340). Sorauf's analysis of presidential elections led him to a similar conclusion although he dated the trend as beginning in 1896 (Sorauf, 1980, p. 51).

Perhaps because they seem so consistent with the decline of parochialism and localism under the onrush of modernization, these findings have become part of the core of accepted knowledge in political science and utilized as such by other scholars (see, for example, Converse, 1972, p.

Received: September 27, 1982 Revision received: March 21, 1983 Accepted for publication: May 25, 1983

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Social Science History Association.





Source: Donald E. Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in William N. Chambers and W. Dean Burnham (eds.). The American Party Systems (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), Figure 4, p. 195.

268; Niemi & Weisberg, 1976, pp. 447-448; Polsby, 1981, p. 29).

Other research, not directly concerned with nationalization, suggests that these conclusions may require another look. The recent increase in the incumbency effect and the decline in presidential coattails in congressional elections suggest that the current electorate is still capable of idiosyncratic and localized behavior. For example, in his analysis of congressional voting, Mann concluded, "We are witnessing an increasing localization of political forces in congressional elections" (Mann, 1978, p. 102). Furthermore, Pomper's (1980, pp. 87-91) examination of the homogeneity of shifts away from normal levels of support by states in presidential elections also found little in the way of a trend toward a more nationalized electorate over the last century.

If we look again at the data that Stokes presented, further questions arise, particularly if we consider separately the evidence on turnout and on partisan voting. Stokes's data on constituency effects for turnout and partisan voting in congressional elections from the 1870s to the 1950s are shown in Figure 1. The data on turnout are thoroughly convincing, showing a dramatic decline in constituency effects from 39.8 in the 1870s to a score of 5.2 in the 1950s. There is much less of a trend for partisan voting; in fact, there may be two weak trends in the partisan vote—a long upward trend and a shorter, downward trend.

The more appropriate evidence on increasing nationalization, however, would be the trend in the national effect, since a decline in the constituency effect does not necessarily imply an increase in the national effect. Stokes did present

'The magnitude of the national, state, and constituency effects are all independent of each other. (This, of course, would not be true if the data were normed to data on the national effect for turnout and, although not as smooth as the constituency effect, overall an increasing trend can be seen (Stokes, 1967, p. 194, Figure 3). However, no corresponding data were presented for the national effect for partisan voting, although a footnote promised such data in a future article (Stokes, 1967, p. 196).

This national effect for partisan voting in congressional elections can, however, be calculated very simply with the use of Stokes's method, and we have added those data to Figure 2 along with the constituency component for partisan voting as originally calculated by Stokes. It is clear from

take account of fluctuations in total variation as is done in Figure 5 below.)

The national component was calculated simply by using the national Democratic percentage of the two-party vote in each election as the basis for estimating the variance around the mean of the entire decade. This calculation of the national effect is simple enough, but the national vote totals for each party are not precisely

Figure 2 that there is no substantial increase in the national component over the years from 1872 to

the data Stokes used. He would have eliminated all constituencies in each decade that did not have a Democratic-Republican congressional race in every election. The national totals we used include those data.

We made a second set of estimates which excluded uncontested races but used percentages of total vote, and this showed an overall *decline* in the national effect from 1872 to 1970. Our estimate of the national effect was 9.35 in 1952-1960 and Stokes's was 9.32, which may mean we eliminated data in the same way. We decided it was more cautious to present the data in Figure 2 which show no trend rather than a decline in national effect.

Also, by dividing the data at 1932 a large national effect is ignored between the late 1920s and early 1930s. Using estimates for every set of five elections would not, in any case, lead to the conclusion that the national effect is increasing during the twentieth century.

When using percentages based on the two-party vote only, as Stokes did and as we present in Figure 2, it does not matter which party's percentages are used for this analysis. The results are the same for either party.

Variance
Components

National Influence

10

1900s

1920:

1940s

1960s

Figure 2. Constituency Influence on Partisan Voting as Presented by Stokes, 1870s to 1950s, and the National Influence on Partisan Voting, 1860s to 1970s

Source: Stokes's data same as Figure 1.

1860

1880a

1960. The hashmarked lines before and after these years extend the estimates of the national effect in both directions beyond the years analyzed by Stokes, but these additional data do not alter the conclusion that nationalization in this form has failed to increase. With the exception of the turbulent period from 1912 to 1920, the national component is best described as erratic and low.

At this point one must conclude that there is no nationalization of partisan voting at work in congressional elections. Swings in congressional voting continue to be more influenced by factors within the constituencies, and the impact of national forces on congressional vote choices has not increased over the past century or so.

Note, however, that Stokes's original conclusion (1965) was very close to this—that turnout was much more nationalized than the party vote. In his 1965 article Stokes wrote:

The magnitude of the national and state turnout components make clear that vast numbers of people are drawn to the polls (or kept away) by statewide or presidential races; turnout coattails are cut from tough material. And yet as he votes for Congress, the elector responds much less strongly to partisan forces originating in these other contests. . . . Partisan coattails, apparently, are cut from lighter cloth. (Stokes, 1965, p. 78, emphasis in original)

Only later did he argue that the party vote was also subject to increased nationalization over time. In his comparative study of Britain and the United States, he wrote:

The primary conclusion to be drawn from the turnout and partisan components in the United States over most of a century is the substantial decline of the constituency as a distinct arena of conflict in congressional elections. (Stokes, 1967, p. 196)

However, it is this latter conclusion, which we think is based on incomplete data, that has

'Although it was a simple matter to add the national component, it would be more difficult to reconstruct the state effect, and we have not attempted to do so. Regardless of the pattern demonstrated by the state component over the years, it could not alter our estimation or interpretation of the national effect.

The varying size of a state component could alter our comparative evaluation of national and district effects, but it is reasonable to suppose that the state component has been relatively small and not particularly variable. In the 1952-1960 decade for which Stokes reports a variance component for the state level the value was 5.32 in contrast to 9.32 for the national level and 13.98 for the district.

worked its way most thoroughly into the literature.

Still, the notion of increasing nationalization of American politics remains theoretically attractive. Surely, improved communications, a national economy, national media, and nationwide campaigning by presidents for congressional candidates of their party ought to have produced a more nationalized response by voters. The idea makes too much intuitive sense to abandon cavalierly. With this in mind, we intend in this article to take another careful look at the issue of nationalization: its conceptualization, its measurement, and its empirical contours.

### Conceptualizing Nationalization

As we look at the way in which the concept of nationalization has been used by scholars, the term seems basically to mean a uniformity or universality of political behavior across all areas of the nation. (One exception to this will be noted below.) Within this common emphasis on uniformity, however, two quite distinct aspects, possibly dimensions, of the concept can be discerned. On one hand, nationalization has been seen as convergence in the levels of partisan support across the nation, thereby producing a more uniform electorate geographically. On the other hand, nationalization also has been viewed as uniformity in the response of geographical units to the political forces in an election.

# Nationalization as Convergence in the Levels of Partisan Support

Levels of partisan support converge when the parties draw an increasingly uniform level of support across all geographic subunits of the electorate; that is, nationalization involves the erasing of regional or state differences. Although it may not mean the homogenization of the electorate, it suggests that distinctive regional political cultures and traditions are being replaced by a more similar mixture of political sentiments across the nation.

This interpretation of nationalization is explicit in E. E. Schattschneider's assertion that 1932 was a watershed in the nationalizing of American politics. He wrote:

Elections since 1932 have substituted a national political alignment for an extreme sectional alignment everywhere in the country except the South. Graphically, the nationalization of American politics can be seen in the flattening of the curve showing the percentage distribution of the major party vote outside the south. (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 89, emphasis in original)

Nationalization in this sense also underlies Sundquist's (1973) discussion of the convergence of partisan strength since the 1930s and Sorauf's work (1980), which shows convergence since 1896. For example, Sundquist stated that, "The distribution of the population of basic attitudes toward the aligning principle of the New Deal party system . . . presumably does not differ greatly from region to region and from state to state" (Sundquist, 1973, pp. 332-333). And later,

At that point [after convergence], the whole nation will be in a system of competitive politics in a roughly uniform pattern with an approximately equal balance between the parties. The regional distortions embedded in the party system in the 1850s, solidified by the Civil War and exaggerated by the realignment of the 1890s, will have finally been eliminated. The party system will have been nationalized and aligned on the basis of issues of the twentieth rather than the nineteenth century. (Sundquist, 1973, p. 340)

Three points should be noted about this conceptualization. First, there is implicitly a dynamic element in the idea of convergence. Since we would not require exact similarity among geographic units to satisfy the criterion for nationalized politics, we think instead of an increasing similarity among units over time. Thus the measurement of convergence requires a lengthy time series to demonstrate the progressive nationalization of American politics. Schattschneider and Sundquist essentially compare the similarity in election outcomes among states in the 1920s with the similarity in the post-New Deal period. Although more extended, Sorauf's analysis is also confined to the twentieth century. If the level of similarity or dissimilarity in the fourth party system (1896-1928) is somewhat deviant, it is possible that the trend observed since that time may not characterize the entire sweep of American electoral history.

Second, and more important, nationalization as the convergence of levels of partisan support is inherently an aggregate concept. It represents the increasing similarity of geographic units and hence the lessening of sectional cleavages, not the increasing of individual similarity nor the erasing of individual differences in the electorate. This raises questions, however, about the appropriate aggregate unit of analysis since there are several levels of aggregation that might be employed. Schattschneider, Sundquist, and Sorauf all used states as their units of analysis, but one might well argue for regions if the deterioration of a truly sectional alignment is being considered, or, on the other hand, for a smaller unit such as counties, since a considerable amount of geographic heterogeneity could be masked in statewide totals.

Finally, in both Schattschneider and Sundquist's work there appears to be some confusion between increasing nationalization in this sense of convergence in the levels of support and increasing competitiveness of the party system. These phenomena are not necessarily connected. All geographic units in a political system might be divided 80 to 20% favoring one party-highly uniform levels of support, but in no way competitive. Schattschneider in particular used measures that tap competitiveness more directly than uniformity in levels of party support and comes close to using the terms nationalization and competitiveness interchangeably (Schattschneider, 1960, pp. 89-92). In neither Schattschneider's nor Sundquist's writing is it entirely clear whether the discussion of competitiveness is a commentary on the conceptual properties of nationalization or the empirical observation that competitiveness has been a correlate of the current trend toward nationalization in American politics. Our own preference is to maintain a conceptual separation between nationalization and competitiveness since we can easily imagine national alignments and national cleavages that would not divide the electorate into equal portions.

# Nationalization as a Uniform Response to Political Forces

The dominant conceptualization of nationalization, however, has treated it as a uniform response to political forces. Schattschneider illustrates some of the conceptual ambiguities in this literature by defining nationalization as convergence in levels of support and within a few pages as a uniform political response: "The universality of political trends is an index of the nationalization of the political system. Does the same trend appear throughout the country or do conflicting trends appear?" (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 93, emphasis in original).

Schattschneider compared the number of states in which the Republican Party improved on its performance over the last election in the landslide election of 1904 to the number of comparable states in 1952-1956. Since a far greater proportion of states moved in a pro-Republican direction in the later period than in 1904, he concluded that the system was currently more nationalized than it was at the turn of the century (1960, p. 93).

Stokes's more sophisticated analysis also defined nationalization as a uniform political response. In explaining the conceptual basis of his statistical model, he wrote:

It can be seen intuitively that if the forces moving the electorate were perfectly idiosyncratic to individual constituencies, variations of turnout or party strength would show no more than a chance similarity across the constituencies of a state or region or across the whole nation. Detecting no more than chance similarity, the model would attribute all forces on electoral change to the constituency level. But if politics at the state or national level did have common effects across a number of constituencies, turnout or party strength would show parallel movements, and the model would attribute an influence to these higher levels of politics according to the degree of observed similarity. (Stokes, 1967, p. 185)

Stokes separated the variance in his data into three components. One component, which he labeled the national effect, measured the variance accounted for by the uniform movement of congressional districts across a set of congressional elections. A second component—a state effect—measured the variance explained by the uniform movement of congressional districts within each state in those elections. The third component measured the residual variation, variation presumably resulting from constituency level influences on turnout and vote choice.

Thus both Schattschneider and Stokes discussed nationalization in terms of a similar response by all subunits of the electorate in reaction to the political forces in a given year. It seems reasonable to describe a situation in which all subunits are responding with a uniform surge toward (or away from) a particular party as nationalization. However, a collection of subunits characterized by a high degree of uniformity in political responses may be quite dissimilar in their levels of partisan support. That is, although subunits may shift by similar amounts, their normal levels of support may be quite different. In short, these appear to be distinctive dimensions of nationalization.

# Nationalization as Response to National Level Stimuli—A Digression

Whereas Stokes's method of analysis quite clearly measured nationalization as a uniform response across subunits, his discussion of nationalization often referred to "national influences" on the vote, such as presidential personality or the performance of the legislative party, which led to Katz's complaint (1973a,b) that Stokes underestimated the amount of nationalization in the American electorate by measuring only the uniform movement of the electorate rather than all the movement—uniform and differential—that occurs in response to national forces.

In reply to Katz, Stokes (1973) wrote that he was well aware of the possible nonuniform effects of national forces. However, he asserted that three of the terms in his model, the covariance terms, were designed to measure such effects, and since these terms approached zero, he had concluded that they were negligible in practice and had therefore concentrated on the analysis of the uniform national response and the constituency effects. Stokes dismissed Katz's findings of a substantial nonuniform national effect on technical grounds.

Our own objection to Katz's findings is somewhat stronger in that we believe his conceptualization of nationalization is quite different from the traditional one, and his measurement of that concept uses inappropriate data. Nevertheless, this exchange points up some further conceptual and operational difficulties in the research on nationalization. First, there is a blurring of two quite distinct ideas—the source of the stimulus, national or local, and the form of the response, uniform or nonuniform. Perhaps Table 1 will illustrate this point.

A uniform response to a national stimulus might be illustrated by the coattail effect that results from the landslide victory of a popular presidential candidate or, conversely, by a nation-

Table 1. Sources of Electoral Stimuli and Forms of Response

	Sources of Stimuli		
	National	Local	
Uniform	Presidential Coattails "Throwing the rscals out"	Coincidence 4	
Nonuniform	Response to energy issue by Snowbeit and Sunbelt 2	"Friends and neighbors" Incumbency 3	

wide urge to throw the rascals out after some debacle, like Watergate, in Washington. The response is similar everywhere; the stimulus for it is national-level politics. But, as both Stokes and Katz pointed out, there may also be nonuniform responses to national stimuli, the "downward deflection of national forces," to use Stokes's phrase. The differential response of energyproducing and energy-consuming areas to national deregulation of oil prices might be an example. A third category is the idiosyncratic response of constituencies to local stimuli—the preference for an incumbent regardless of party. or V. O. Key's "friends and neighbors" effect in boosting the vote for a favorite son (Key, 1949). A fourth possibility—a similar response everywhere to local factors-need concern us less, as one would assume such an occurrence to be rare and largely a matter of coincidence.

Once we have raised this set of distinctions, the question becomes: Which of these forms of behavior are nationalization? Katz definitely would include both the first and second; Stokes would also, but would add that the second is an empty cell. It is almost certain, however, that Schattschneider and Sundquist would not include the second cell, since surely one would then have to include as examples of nationalization the sectional responses to the legacy of the Civil War, the epitomy for both Schattschneider and Sundquist of the absence of nationalization.

However one answers this conceptual question, it is accompanied by an operational questionhow to distinguish among these categories. Katz attempted to distinguish only between national and local stimuli, being content to lump uniform and nonuniform responses together. Stokes, on the other hand, asserted that cells 1, 2, and 3 were all measured by his model: 1, by the national effect, 3 by the constituency effect, and 2 by the covariance terms. We believe that this is mistaken. We are convinced that the constituency effect in Stokes's model measures the differential (or idiosyncratic) responses of the constituency to all forces in the election, be they national, state, or local. In other words, there is no means in analysis of variance-based techniques to distinguish among the types of forces which may cause the nonuniform response by the local unit. This is not a problem so long as one is defining nationalization as the uniform response across geographic units since the method does very well in distinguishing uniform response (the national effect) from nonuniform responses (the constituency effect).4 (For discussion of this point and the application of a related technique, see Flanigan & Zingale, 1974.)

If Stokes's constituency effect measures the idiosyncratic response of local constituencies to all electoral forces, what then of the covariance terms in his model? After considerable pondering of the mathematics of this term as offered in Stokes's original article (1965, p. 84), we have concluded that these terms are properly interpreted as measuring the association between the separate effects. Although this can be helpful in examining common patterns of idiosyncratic behavior (see Zingale, 1978, for use of a related analytic technique), it does not appear to be conceptually or operationally an appropriate means to measure the magnitude of such responses.

In contrast, Katz's method is an attempt to distinguish the response to national stimuli from the response to local stimuli, disregarding whether the response is uniform or not. As Katz noted (1973a, p. 819), virtually any pattern of subunit change can be compatible with his view of nationalization. Therefore, the primary methodological problem became partitioning the behavior of subunits into two categories: 1) the varying behavior resulting from the subunits' response to local objects, and 2) the behavior resulting from the subunits' responses to national objects, but since their reactions to those objects may differ, the resulting behavior may also vary. Katz's solution was to assume that, if an electorate responded to the same national objects and if all subunits within a given state responded to the same statewide political objects, then the overtime variation in each subunit would be a linear function of the national and statewide electoral forces. To take account of the varying reactions of different subunits to the same forces, he allowed the parameters of this linear function to vary across units. This strikes us as a tenuous procedure. If responses to the same political forces can lead to a great variety of parameter values across subunits, it would seem likely that the functional form of the relationship linking national and state level forces to subunit response could change as well. But if the functional form of the relationship is allowed to vary across subunits, then partitioning subunit variance into that resulting from responses to national political objects and that which reflects responses to local forces becomes an insurmountable task.

Perhaps more fundamentally, response to national or local stimuli would seem to be an individual rather than an aggregate concept since one is considering such factors as individual

<sup>4</sup>The state effect is, in these terms, the uniform response of districts within a state, but a response that is not uniform across states.

'We would like to extend our thanks to John Kemper of the Department of Mathematics, College of St. Thomas, for his help in understanding these terms.

evaluations of important issues and exposure to information. Thus if nationalization is conceptualized in this fashion, its investigation would better be carried out with individual level data.

### Method and Data

Two overall points emerge from the above review. First, the concept of nationalization has more than one dimension. In order to describe fully the degree to which an electorate is nationalized, we need to measure nationalization both in terms of convergence in the levels of support and in terms of the uniformity of response. Second, existing evidence of the nationalization of the American electorate along each of these dimensions is suspect owing either to various methodological problems in earlier research or the failure of this literature to present the appropriate data. The purpose of the remainder of this article is to fill in some of the gaps in our empirical understanding of the nationalization of the American electorate.

Although we have expressed some reservations about the interpretation of Stokes's method, it remains an extremely ingenious application of a statistical model to a substantive topic and a classic illustration of the appropriate use of aggregate data to investigate an essentially aggregate concept, the behavior of congressional electorates. In this reinvestigation of nationalization, therefore, we plan to use basically the same methodological approach to the problem. We have, however, dropped Stokes's covariance terms from the analysis of variance model since these terms have little substantive interest for us. We have also added an additional term to Stokes's model, allowing us to examine within a common framework both dimensions of nationalization: convergence in levels of support (which Stokes did not include) and uniformity in the movement around such levels.

If we partition the total variation in a set of subunits I across a set of elections J, we can use the following analysis of variance formula:

Total sum of squares (SS) = election SS

- + subunit SS
- + election-subunit interaction SS

or more formally:

$$\sum_{I}^{l=1} \sum_{J}^{j=1} (x_{ij} - \overline{X}_{..})^{2} = \sum_{J}^{j=1} (\overline{X}_{.j} - \overline{X}_{..})^{2} 
+ \sum_{I}^{l=1} (\overline{X}_{l.} - \overline{X}_{..})^{2} 
+ \sum_{I}^{l=1} \sum_{J}^{j=1} (x_{ij} - \overline{X}_{.j} - \overline{X}_{l.} + \overline{X}_{..})^{2}$$
(1)

In words, this means that the total variation of the subunit scores around the grand mean of the entire set of data can be partitioned into:

- (a) The election sum of squares—the variation attributable to the impact (effect) of differences among the election means;
- (b) the subunit sum of squares—the variation attributable to the differences among the subunit means; and
- (c) the election-subunit interaction sum of squares—the residual variation due to the impact of a particular election on a particular subunit.<sup>6</sup>

The election sum of squares measures the average variation of all subunits across the set of elections, that is, the portion of the total variation which is uniform across the subunits.7 In other words, this measures the extent to which subunits respond uniformly to forces in the election and is strictly comparable to the "national effect" in Stokes's analysis. The subunit sum of squares measures the divergence among the average behaviors of the subunits. In other words, the larger the subunit sum of squares, the greater the difference in average level of support among subunits and the lower is the amount of nationalization in terms of the uniformity of levels of support. This aspect of nationalization was not considered by Stokes, and consequently he eliminated this term from his formulation.4 The subunit sum of squares is similar to the use of standard deviations in Schattschneider's and Sorauf's work, and there is no particular advantage in substituting it here other than the ability to look at it in a common framework with the uniformity in response. The

<sup>6</sup>Since there is only one score per cell in this model, all the variation in the data are captured by these three terms. Consequently there is no error term.

 ${}^{\prime}$ Actually, this measures the *average* movement across all subunits.

"Rather than presenting this term as part of the formulas, Stokes took acount of it in the handling of his data. Thus the subunit sum of squares was subtracted at an earlier point in his analysis than in ours, but the effect is the same and the results are strictly comparable.

election-subunit interaction term measures the residual variation in subunit behavior after the variation attributable to the uniform effects of particular elections and to the average vote of that subunit have been accounted for. Put differently, it measures the idiosyncratic movement of subunits away from their own expected voting patterns in response to the characteristics of particular elections. This is identical to the constituency effect in Stokes's analysis. Unlike Stokes, we believe that this term picks up all such idiosyncratic movement regardless of the stimuli (national or local) that may have prompted it.

We can elaborate this model in a fashion similar to Stokes by introducing the nesting of subunits within a higher level subunit. (For reasons discussed below, we have chosen to nest the subunits in regions rather than states.) The formula is:

Total SS = election SS + region SS

- + subunit (within region) SS
- + election-region interaction SS
- + election subunit (within region) interaction SS

More formally, this can be expressed as:

$$\sum_{I}^{l=1} \sum_{J}^{f=1} \sum_{K}^{k=1} (x_{l(k)j} - \overline{X}_{.(.)})^{2} = \sum_{J}^{f=1} (\overline{X}_{.(.)j} - \overline{X}_{.(.)})^{2} 
+ \sum_{K}^{k=1} (\overline{X}_{.(k)} - \overline{X}_{.(.)})^{2} + \sum_{I}^{f=1} \sum_{K}^{k=1} (\overline{X}_{l(k)} - \overline{X}_{.(k)})^{2} 
+ \sum_{J}^{f=1} \sum_{K}^{k=1} (\overline{X}_{.(k)j} - \overline{X}_{.(.)})^{2} 
+ \sum_{I}^{f=1} \sum_{J}^{f=1} \sum_{K}^{k=1} (x_{l(k)j} - \overline{X}_{.(k)} - \overline{X}_{.(.)j} + \overline{X}_{.(.)})^{2} \cdot (2)$$

We can now measure the uniform movement across subunits within regions (election-region interaction SS) and the divergence of the expected voting patterns of regions (region SS), as well as the uniform movement of all subunits (election SS) and the idiosyncratic movement of districts within regions (election-subunit (within region) interaction SS). The measure of the divergence of subunits becomes less useful as a measure of nationalization of support levels since it now measures the divergence of subunits within regions (the subunit (within region) SS).

In implementing this analytic approach, our handling of the data has differed in several ways from that of Stokes. The main changes are: 1) changing the base for calculating percentages to the total vote and examining both parties; 2)

changing the units from congressional districts to counties; and 3) changing the nesting from states to regions. We also extended the time period forward and backward, so that we are able to cover elections from 1842 to 1970.

Calculating Percentage over Total Vote. Stokes used the Democratic and Republican votes exclusively in his analysis. In years with little thirdparty support, e.g., the decade following 1952, the two-party percentages are about the same as those calculated over the total vote. Furthermore, two-party percentaging makes the parties mirror images of one another, so analysis need be done only once. However, the parties are not strictly mirror images, and the intrusion of third parties usually affects one party more than the other. So calculating percentages of the Democratic and Republican vote over the total vote captures the dissimilarities in party voting and creates the possibility that different findings will emerge in examining the two major parties.

Congressional Districts vs. Counties. We imagine that the potential for different results is greatest in our shifting the basis of analysis from congressional districts to counties. Obviously. counties are not the same as congressional districts for this analysis since they do not represent a single congressional constituency. Many counties are subunits within a district, and a few counties have more than one congressional district within their boundaries. There are many more situations where counties are subunits of a congressional district, so the effects of this condition are potentially greater. In such cases, our use of counties allows different parts of a district to demonstrate differential behavior, thus presumably increasing the constituency component. In the rarer case of a large county with several congressional districts within it, we would expect unusually large variation in voting from election to election if the races are sometimes uncontested. Of course, the more districts there are within a county, the less the impact of such irregular contestations in any one district. Still, this is a source of local variation in our analysis which is absent in Stokes's work because he omits a district if any of the five races in a decade is uncontested. Although the absolute level of the constituency effect should be affected by this substitution of counties for districts, it is less clear how this substitution would influence the trend in this effect over time.

What is important to note is that this substitution does not alter either the magnitude nor the dynamic trend of the national effect. In both Stokes's analysis and in ours, the national effect is calculated from the actual nationwide election percentage and is, therefore, unaffected by the choice of subunit.

The greatest concern we had with using coun-

ties was their uneven size. Whereas in certain decades there have been discrepancies in sizes of congressional districts that raise problems in democratic theory, as units of analysis they are relatively uniform. Counties, on the other hand, vary tremendously in size, and there is the clear possibility that a large number of small counties, representing relatively few voters, could dominate the analysis.' In order to assess how much of a problem this created, we carried out parallel analysis with the counties weighted by size. Generally, weighting depressed the local effects but not by much, and overall the same patterns emerged.

The choices of counties, on the other hand, allows us to maximize the number of cases in the analysis. By using congressional districts, Stokes was forced to omit all states having only one district since there would be no way to differentiate state and constituency effects. In addition, Stokes also dropped a district from the analysis if it were uncontested in any one of the five elections in a decade. The combined impact of these rules is that in no decade do more than two-thirds of the districts enter into the analysis, and in some decades fewer than one-half of the districts are included. Because so many southern districts are periodically uncontested, virtually the entire South is eliminated from the analysis. Since the South has been the most deviant region politically, its elimination would almost certainly increase the estimation of the degree of nationalization. To avoid this problem, we have decided to include all counties for which data are available, regardless of their contestation status. As a result, over 80% of the counties remain in our analysis during each decade examined. The majority of southern counties are included, although it remains true that the bulk of the missing cases are southern. The inclusion of uncontested counties will no doubt inflate the constituency effect in our analysis, 10 but the overtime trend should be less affected.

State vs. Regions. We altered Stokes's model in another way by nesting subunits within regions

\*Counties have varied greatly in size over the years. In the nineteenth century counties might increase in population several hundred percent in a decade. Even greater disparities occur between counties. For example, in 1970 in California one county had a population of 484 and another had 7,032,075. For a discussion of the size of units in electoral analysis see Austin, Clubb and Traugott (1981, pp. 81-103).

10 This greater constituency effect would result from the large and idiosyncratic fluctuation in a party's vote between election years in which the congressional seat was contested and those in which it was not. rather than states.<sup>11</sup> A nested design cannot affect the estimate of national effects, but it could change the variation assigned to the local units. Our expectation was that either states or regions would behave in about the same way in a nested design. We could have tried both states and regions and compared results, but it was one of many minor variations that was never carried out. Conceptually we are marginally more interested in regional effects than state effects since most previous discussions have emphasized regional differences. Basically, however, this constituted a modification that we expected would have little impact on the results.

Like Stokes, we have used sets of five congressional elections, each spanning a decade following the decennial reapportionment, and repeated analysis for each successive set of five elections. Our analysis begins with 1842 and ends in 1970.12

#### Results

# Nationalization as Convergence in Levels of Support—Evidence

Figure 3 displays our measure of the degree of convergence in the levels of partisan support across geographical subunits of the United States from 1842 through 1970. The county scores come from the subunit sum of squares in Equation (1) above, "whereas the regional scores are based on the region sum of squares in Equation (2). The scores in Figure 3 were derived from an analysis of the Democratic percentage of the congressional

11The regional categories are: New England—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont; Middle Atlantic—Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; East North Central—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; West North Central—Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; South—Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia; Border—Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia; Mountain—Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico; West—Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington.

<sup>12</sup>The congressional vote data were supplied by the Historical Archive of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The ICPSR bears no responsibility for the analysis or interpretations offered here. The coding of parties is available from ICPSR in study numbers 0019 or 0075.

<sup>13</sup>As noted above, the subunit sum of squares in equation (2) would not be useful for these purposes since it would measure the divergence in levels of support of counties within regions, thereby ignoring the impact of regional differences among counties.


vote, but parallel analysis of the Republican vote yielded substantially similar results. Also included in Figure 3 are the scores for the non-southern counties only. Each sum of squares has been normed by taking the square root of the sum and dividing by the number of subunits in the calculation, thereby taking account of the increasing number of counties over the time period and allowing the result to be expressed in easily interpretable percentage terms. (The result is essentially a standard deviation of the average votes of the subunits over the decade.) The higher the score, the greater the dispersion among the mean votes of the subunits and hence the lower the level of this form of nationalization.

Both the county scores and the regional scores demonstrate the same trend: a steady increase in the dissimilarity in levels of support from the 1840s through the 1920s, a small and temporary decline in the 1930s, a return to higher levels in the 1940s and 1950s, followed by another decline in the 1960s. The unchanging scores for the non-southern counties indicate that the trends in the national data are primarily a result of the changing partisan distinctiveness of the South compared with the rest of the country.

Clearly, the national electorate is less nationalized, in the sense of a convergence in the levels of partisan support today than it was in the 1840s. Part of the difference in our results from Schattschneider (1960), Sorauf (1980), and Sundquist (1973) lies in our use of the congressional vote rather than presidential data. A comparable

analysis of the presidential vote, not shown here. shows a steeper decline in dissimilarity (and a greater increase in nationalization) in the 1950s, as one would expect given the departure of the South from the Democratic presidential coalition. One might argue, however, that this represents not the breakdown of a sectional subculture but rather its continuance in the face of the pro-civil rights position of the national Democratic party. (There are, of course, possible causes of this decline that are more supportive of an interpretation of increasing nationalization—greater in- and out-migration, for example.) The difference also lies in our use of a longer time series. Although one can easily see the dip in dissimilarity that was part of the New Deal, the significance attached to this lessens when its temporary nature is made clear and when it can be compared to the much greater convergence existing before the Civil War.

The trends reported in Figure 3 have implications concerning the causes of nationalization. Explanations that emphasize modernization, national development, or innovations in transportation and communication, all of which seemingly imply an inevitable and inexorable movement toward increasing nationalization, are at best only partial explanations. No inexorable movement toward greater nationalization is seen in these trends in convergence in levels of support. Rather, a more political explanation is suggested. The high degree of similarity in levels of support in the 1840s and 1850s and the subsequent decay of this similarity over the remainder of the nineteenth







Figure 4. Square Roots of the Variance Components for National, Regional, and Local Effects, 1842 to 1970



century cannot be plausibly explained by suggesting that the South, in terms of its economic and social base, became more distinctive after 1860 than it was before 1860. But it is certainly plausible to suggest that the high nationalization found during the pre-Civil War period may reflect the conscious strategy by the elites of both major parties to avoid candidates and minimize issues that would pit the South against the other parts of the nation. The decline in nationalization after the Civil War can then be explained by a shift in party strategies. Instead of minimizing regionally divisive issues and candidates, party elites of the 1870s and 1880s sought to inflame regional cleavages in the bloody shirt campaigns of that period. (See, for example, Sundquist, 1973, pp. 39-47, 109.)

The convergence in levels of partisan support in congressional voting in the 1950s may reflect, in part, the decreasing social and economic distinctiveness of the South. Political factors surely also play a role. The gradual removal of impediments to black voting in the South, the shifts in ideological position of the Democratic party in the New Deal and in 1948 and 1964, and the development of a conscious "southern strategy" by the Republican party have all doubtless contributed to the convergence in levels of support. This form of nationalization remains, however, considerably less impressive than we might have supposed it would be.

# Nationalization as a Uniform Response to Political Forces—Evidence

Before presenting our estimates of the magnitude of this form of nationalization, let us summarize our measures and the terminology we will use to discuss them:

National effect—the election sum of squares; measures the amount of uniform movement across all subunits.

Regional effect—the election-region interaction sum of squares; measures the amount of uniform movement of counties within regions.

Local effect—the election-county (within region) interaction sum of squares; measures the idio-syncratic movement of counties within regions and the nation.

Figure 4 displays these three effects for the Democratic percentage of the congressional vote from 1842 to 1970. The analysis was carried out, as before, on sets of five elections, each set encompassing the decade following reapportionment. Also as before, the square roots of the sums of squares have been taken and the results divided by the appropriate degrees of freedom (n-1).

The results found in Figure 4 tell much the same story as our reconstruction of Stokes's data presented in Figure 2 above. The largest component is the local effect, and there is a small, if erratic,

downward trend. The national effect, however, far from increasing, declines dramatically in the late nineteenth century and remains low with some fluctuation thereafter.

A theoretically more appealing way of looking at the data would take account of the differing amounts of total variation in the data over time. Since we are interested in the relative contributions of the national, regional, and local components, we could be misled by changes in the absolute amounts of these effects if the changes merely reflected increases or decreases in total variation. Figure 5 displays the same results but with the scores expressed as a proportion of the total variation attributable to these three effects. thereby normalizing the results to take account of the differing amounts of total variation in the data over time.14 Again, no nationalization of the American electorate is uncovered. The only appreciable difference between Figures 4 and 5 is the failure of the constituency effect in Figure 5 to decline over time: rather, it remains fairly stable.


It is important to stress the reasons for the divergence of our results from those of Stokes. Stokes based his conclusion of increasing nationalization in vote choice solely on the decline in the

"Stokes presented normalized results in his 1965 article, comparing the contributions of his components to variation in turnout and in partisan vote. He did not use normalized figures in his overtime analysis, presumably because he looked only at the constituency effect and did not measure either the national or state effects.

local or constituency effect. The local effect in our analysis also declines, although only slightly and rather erratically. Whatever differences there are here between his and our results may well have come from changing the units of analysis from congressional districts to counties or the consequent recapturing of subunits that were missing in Stokes's analysis or both. These slight differences, however, are not the basis for our conclusion that there has been no increase in nationalization. Instead, our conclusion stems primarily from our examination of the national effect that stays quite steady or, if anything, declines slightly; there is certainly no evidence of increase as would be expected under the nationalization hypothesis. Stokes did not offer any data on the national effect for vote choice; if he had, the results would have been virtually identical to ours, since the calculation of the national effect is not affected by choice of subunit. In other words, our differing conclusions rest on examination of additional and more appropriate data, not on any variations in method that may have been introduced.

#### Conclusion

The failure to find any increase over the past 100 years in the nationalization of party voting in either a convergence in the levels of partisan support or in the uniformity of response ought to provoke some further rethinking of the concept of political nationalization and its relationship to those societal trends in communication and transportation that appear so obvious. We wish to em-






Figure 5. Normalized Variance Components for National.

phasize that the data presented here in no way undermine the observation that *turnout* is highly nationalized, becoming so over the course of the last hundred years. Rather, our data show that the casual extension of this observation to include partisan voting is not warranted.

Even in the area of turnout, however, a reservation must be expressed. If non-normalized figures are used, as Stokes did in his overtime analysis, the national effect on turnout will increase as the variation in turnout among elections increases. When dealing with congressional elections, this means that the national effect will get larger as the difference in turnout between presidential and off-year elections increases. This is, in effect, a measure of "drop-off," to use Burnham's (1965) terminology. Although the increase in drop-off is an interesting enough phenomenon, we wonder whether it is exactly what we have come to think of as nationalization of the vote. Put another way, would we want to interpret a decline in dropoff as a decline in nationalization? The best test for the existence of nationalization in turnout—a test we will leave for later or for other analystsmay be to separate presidential year elections from congressional year elections and analyze the uniformity of turnout responses within each category.

Despite this reservation, we have no difficulty in accepting Stokes's original conclusion (1965, p. 76) that "the great contests for the presidency have extraordinary importance in getting people to the polls but they do not dominate what the people do there in voting for Congress." It remains surprising that "the great contests for the presidency" appear to generate no more of a uniform response on the part of the electorate in the age of television than they did at the turn of the century.

The key to understanding this result may lie in the distinction made earlier between the source of the stimulus and the form of the response. The plausibility of the nationalization argument rests on television, along with rapid transportation and other forms of communication, creating a national political environment and bringing the same events and issues to the attention of people (and voters) everywhere—in short, providing a common set of national stimuli. But then the argument makes something of a leap: not only does television provide a common set of stimuli, it also provokes a common set of responses. We hear (and probably make) this argument in a variety of circumstances: that television is breaking down regional political cultures, replacing them with a single national culture; that regional dialects and speech patterns are not long for this world; that regional racial prejudices will be overcome by integration openly practiced on TV.

But counterthemes have also been heard, perhaps most notably that the racial unrest of the 1960s was fueled by television literally bringing home to the poor and black the advantages enjoyed by affluent white America. Thus a common set of national stimuli is no guarantee of a uniform national response.

Nationalization has been most often defined as increasing uniformity in response or in level of partisan support across all areas of the nation. This has never meant homogeneity in the behavior of all individuals but rather similarity in the proportions of differently behaving individuals in all geographic subunits. The implicit assumption is that modernization will increase the similarity of this mix across the nation and thus increase the uniformity in level of support and in political responses. Perhaps in this we have been influenced by the Marxist view of industrial development—in an advanced industrial society, the most important cleavages will be class or economic cleavages and all moderately large geographic subunits will have roughly similar mixes of middle and working class people.

However, to the extent that the salient political cleavages in a society follow, rather than cut across, geographic divisions, a national political environment and national media focusing attention on the same issues everywhere may serve to accomplish the opposite of nationalization, that is, to stimulate dissimilar behavior on the part of geographic units. As the issues pit Sun Belt against Snow Belt, energy-producing states against energy-consuming states, the Bible Belt against the "godless" cities, the developers in the West against the conservationists from the East, we should not be surprised if national attention to and knowledge of these issues conveyed by television and all the other accourrements of advanced technology bring no increase and perhaps even a decline in the nationalization of the American electorate.

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# In Search of the Center of European Party Systems

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Duverger's famous dictum that "the center does not exist in politics" is the starting point of an inquiry into the possible meanings of the concept of a center, and of center parties, in European party systems. This article consists of six sections; the first five sections deal with the center as a pivot in voting, the center in traditional left-right distributions, the notion of a center in multidimensional party spaces, the center in terms of mechanics, applying rather different metaphors of scales-in-balance and of centripetal versus centrifugal forces, and the center analyzed in terms of social cleavages. Following this search for conceptual meaning, in which the writings of Duverger and Sartori receive particular attention, the record of European party systems is examined to see whether the presence or absence of center parties in party systems can contribute to a realistic classification of European party systems.

This article has its origin in a curious anomaly. Writings about European party systems abound with references to the Left. They also give considerable attention to a less easily defined Right. Yet, there is practically no systematic treatment of the center or of center parties. Admittedly, the term center is widely, if loosely, used in both journalistic comment and in academic descriptions of the functioning of party systems in individual countries. Nevertheless, European party systems are rarely viewed from a center perspective. On the contrary, the idea of a center tends to find little favor with scholars. More than a quarter of a century ago, Duverger argued in a famous paragraph of his book, Political Parties:

The center does not exist in politics; there may well be a Center party but there is no center tendency, no center doctrine. The term "center" is applied to the geometrical spot at which the moderates of opposed tendencies meet: moderates of the Right and moderates of the Left.

Received: March 16, 1983 Accepted for publication: June 6, 1983

The idea to study the possible use of the "center" concept in the analysis of European party systems originated in a seminar on Recent Changes in European Party Systems which I directed at the European University Institute in Florence in 1978-1979. A number of seminar participants formed a small working group in which a number of preliminary papers were presented. Members were Stefano Bartolini, Karl Dittrich, Maurizio Ferrera, Lars Johansen, Peter Mair, Francois Petry, and Pier Vincenzo Uleri. Gunnar Sjöblom also participated in some of the group meetings.

I am most grateful to Giovanni Sartori and Galen A. Irwin for their critical dissection of an earlier draft, and to Peter Mair for editorial help.

Every Center is divided against itself and remains separated into two halves. Left-Center and Right-Center. For the Center is nothing more than the artificial grouping of the right wing of the Left and the left wing of the Right. The fate of the Center is to be torn asunder, buffeted and annihilated: torn asunder when one of its halves votes Right and the other Left, buffeted when it votes as a group first Right then Left, annihilated when it abstains from voting. The dream of the Center is to achieve a synthesis of contradictory aspirations; but synthesis is a power only of the mind. Action involves choice and politics involve action. . . . There are no true Centers, only superimposed dualisms. (Duverger, 1964, p. 215).

Giovanni Sartori has written of center parties in hardly more positive terms. He greatly values what he terms centripetal drives in party systems -i.e., a competition of parties for votes at the center. But for precisely that reason he takes a negative stance toward the "physical occupation of the center" by one or more center parties, which he singles out as one of the distinctive features of systems of "polarized pluralism." For this implies that "the central area of the political system is out of competition. . . . In other terms, the very existence of a center party (or parties) discourages centrality, i.e., the centripetal drives of the political system. And the centripetal drives are precisely the moderating drives. This is why this type is center-fleeing, or centrifugal, and thereby conducive to immoderate or extremist politics" (Sartori, 1976, pp. 134-135 and secs. 6.1 and 10.4; for earlier versions, see Sartori, 1966, 1970; for a very useful and more complete anthology of his contributions in Italian, arranged in chronological order, see Sartori, 1982).

Such critical attitudes toward center parties

stand in marked contrast to the rhetoric of many participants and observers of European party systems. Clearly, the idea of center parties has been regarded as an attractive one by politicians, who in recent decades have regarded the very word center as a positive label for their parties. The term has been adopted by former agrarian parties in Scandinavian party systems, by new parties in various reemerging democracies of Southern Europe, and among would-be reformers of party systems in a Giscardist France or a Jenkins-type Britain. N'en déplaise Duverger, terms like centripetal competition, centrism and center generally carry positive overtones. But such sentiments are rarely given specific meaning or explanation.

Academic writings in this area are neither extensive nor well focused. Scanning the literature (e.g., on party systems, political cleavages, or coalition theories), one finds few explicit references to the concept of a center and its use in the study of party systems. In addition to Duverger and Sartori, only Downs (1957) seems to have made the idea of a center a key variable in his writings. Impicitly, some attention is given to the notion by authors who have studied the formation of European cabinet coalitions, based on an assumed location of parties along one or more dominant dimensions (e.g., De Swaan, 1973; Dodd, 1976; Taylor & Laver, 1973). The writings of formal theorists shed some indirect light on the subject, notably because they specify the conditions that must be met if one is logically to speak of a center in a multi-actor game. As a whole, however, the literature offers few cumulative lessons, possibly owing to at least two factors.

First, the term center forms part of at least three rather different kinds of metaphors. Thus, some authors reason in locational terms, holding that a particular individual or party occupies a center position in a given political space. Others reason in metaphors taken from mechanics: e.g., certain parties hold the balance in a political system, or the interaction of parties shows the operation of centripetal or centrifugal forces. Yet other writers focus in particular on specific kinds of cleavages, which may be inherently dualistic in nature (as Duverger would argue as a matter of course), or may allow more variegated positions.

A second confusion results from failure to specify the unit of analysis. For some, the center is a theoretical point, to which parties may be near or distant. For others, the center is an actual actor, whether a pivotal deputy in an actual parliamentary vote or one or more parties in a given party system. But in treating a party as an actor, new ambiguities may arise, depending upon whether or not a party can in fact be treated as a unitary actor, or whether it should be analyzed in

terms of possible internal divisions (e.g., within the parliamentary group or between this group, party activists outside parliament, and voters for a party).

The importance of these distinctions should become clearer in the course of the following exploration, which will move from the spatial concept of center (sections 1-3), to approaches reasoning in mechanistic terms (section 4), to analyses in terms of actual social cleavages (section 5).

### The Center in Voting

# The Median Member or the Median Party

It is clear from the passage quoted above that Duverger bases his view of the nonexistence of the center on the need for a voting body (such as a parliament) to say either yes or no to a particular proposal. Hence, he refers to the center as a mere "geometrical spot," which separates the proponents and opponents of a particular decision. As the word suggests, such a point is most easily envisaged as a point on a line on which all members of a voting body are arranged. The center, then, equals the position of the "median member"-a conclusion substantiated in formal theory by Black (1958). Certain problems emerge from this proposition, however. How does one know who the median member is? If one is to locate the median member of a voting body, members must be somehow arranged in a logical order, which is tantamount to saying that there must be a common underlying dimension, a point that will be taken up shortly. But how can one substantiate this dimension, except in a concrete vote, and only a posteriori?

If one analyzes decisions of a voting body in terms of parties as actors rather than in terms of individuals, what is the relationship between this median member and the party in which he is included? Can one describe the latter party logically as the center party, or should one instead speak of a party containing the median or central member?

If one wishes to denote the party containing the central or median member as the central party, then difficulties arise when one tries to apply the concept to a two-party system. For in such a system the majority party would become the center party by definition. In the case of alternating majority parties, this would imply alternating center parties. If parties do not alternate, one is in the presence of a *predominant* party. Although such a party must be of central importance to a system of this kind, does one gain any insight by also calling such a party a center party?

In systems with more than two parties, two conditions may exist. On the one hand, although there are more than two parties in the system, one party may still have the majority. Hence, it occupies the center point by definition. In this case, nothing changes from the previous situation, except that now there are more noncentral parties. On the other hand, in cases where no party has a majority, one must have some way of establishing which party contains the median member, which again raises the problem of an underlying dimension, which will be treated in the next two sections.

Finally, one might attempt to shift the argument from the median member to the median party, i.e., the party that finds itself hemmed in by as many parties on one side as on the other. But such a shift presupposes that it is the number of parties which is important rather than their relative sizes. This proposition clearly leads to ridiculous conclusions where a party finds two very small actors on one side and two very much larger ones on the other. The party that would find itself in such a middle would in any case not be the party containing the center, as defined by the median member.

In summary: to make the center in a voting body identical with the median member or median party and to apply these concepts to party systems raises at least two major problems. First, one must find some way in which to rank-order members or parties or both in relation to one another. Second, one must somehow take into account the different sizes of the parties in a particular system (for an example, see Budge & Herman, 1978).

#### The Problem of Successive Votes

Even though one may solve the problem of locating the median member in a particular vote, no solution is yet given for locating the center in a succession of votes. Although each vote may logically have its median member, there is no reason whatsoever that the same member will be the central member for each vote, unless all votes represent only one common dimension.

This dilemma is typically solved in escapist ways. One approach focuses on one crucial vote only, e.g., on the vote necessary to confirm a new cabinet in office. All other votes are then made subordinate to the needs of the cabinet coalition thus formed. Another approach seeks to arrive at a stable positioning of individual members (and their parties) by shifting from voting to self-location, e.g., by asking members to place themselves on a left-right scale. A third approach seeks

to analyze a selected number of actual votes in order to determine whether members (or parties) fall in place around so-called pivotal actors who are thought to be of central importance. In all such cases, successive votes are really subordinated to presumed dominant alignments. If in practice more than one dimension is found, that one specific dimension is thought to be the decisive one. Hence one can maintain the concept of a median member (or center), even though that member is not central in all actual votes.

### The Shifting of the Center

The assumption that the median member is the center becomes particularly questionable in the following cases.

- 1) In a well-known study in the mid-1960s, Giovanni Sartori arranged the Italian parties along one line and noted that different "centers of gravity of the parliamentary majorities" existed according to the issues faced by the Italian parliament, e.g., an economic majority, a political majority "committed to the defense of the system, that would unite on basic constitutional issues, and that opposes any shift in international alliances," and a religious majority (Sartori, 1966, pp. 160-165). Sartori did not pursue this idea and still speaks in the same article of the center in the singular rather than in the plural. But he then adds: "a center is relative to its left and right wings, it will follow in the long run the general trend of the polity" (p. 164) and "the center will move if the balance between its left and its right should shift" (p. 165).
- 2) The location of the effective center will change if the votes of certain parties at the extremes are regarded as illegitimate, and conversely if the area of legitimate space expands, situations that have characterized the French Fourth Republic and postwar Italy.
- 3) One might argue in a similar fashion that the formation of a relatively permanent political coalition logically implies a shift of the pivotal member away from the median of parliament to the median of the coalition. But this argument is in turn subject to criticism—e.g., by those who see the key to power within a specific coalition to be in the hands not of its median member or party, but of those supporters of a coalition who provide the last necessary votes and who conceivably could also shift their votes to an alternative winning coalition, which again suggests that the idea of the median member (assuming such a member can be located) is of little value in the analysis of

successive votes and potentially changing coali-

# The Center in Traditional Left-Right Assumptions

### The Influence of Geometric Thinking

The idea of arranging parliamentary deputies or parties on a left-right dimension has an immediate and intuitive appeal. It is general practice in expositions of single-country studies, and it is widely acceptable to political elites and citizens alike, as is amply proved by the success of surveys containing questions in which respondents must place themselves or parties on linear scales (e.g., Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Sani & Sartori, 1983; Sidjanski, 1979).

At a minimum, however, one must be wary that a left-right imagery does not take an uncritical upper hand because of the sheer ease of geometric understanding. The terms *left* and *right* had their origin in the seating arrangements of the French Convention. Just as seats gained a symbolic importance, so the very terminology has tended to acquire a bias towards the left which unavoidably affects future spatial locations.

Undoubtedly, the idea of a linear left-right dimension is highly evocative, as it permits not only notions such as the extremes or the center, but also intermediate ideas like center-left or center-right. But the same notion can also be deceptive, if it is assumed that apparently similar distances at any part of the scale are also similar in political content and affect.

Finally, the left-right image is also compatible with that other intuitively attractive geometric representation: the bell-shaped curve of a normal distribution, which is easily superimposed on a left-right scale. Since in a normal distribution the large majority is clustered near the median, the idea that there is a logical force working for moderation in electoral competition may be uncritically adopted as a basis for further analysis. In that case, no attention needs to be paid to problems of real-life situations, where the mean, median, and mode are not coterminous, let alone to the critical importance of there being only one or more modes in a given distribution of political preferences.

Because the idea of a center depends on the possibility of locating parties on a left-right scale, the manner of obtaining such placements is of critical importance. There are at least three ways in which scholars have sought to solve this problem: asking respondents thought to be representative of a party to place themselves, their own party, and other parties on an imposed left-right

scale; scaling or factor-analyzing responses to other survey questions so as to trace underlying dimensions; and analyzing of actual behavior.

# Individual Self-Locations and Placement of Parties on an Imposed Left-Right Scale

Subjective placements on imposed left-right scales meet with certain problems such as nonresponses (generally found less frequently among elites than in mass responses); faulty responses (the authors of the Eight-Nation study found by follow-up questions that as many as 1 out of 5 voters might have a totally irrelevant notion of the scale on which they were prepared to place themselves (Barnes, Kaase et al., 1979); a tendency with many respondents to play safe and choose a center location or to eschew the more extreme positions; differing interpretations about the use of the scale: assumptions concerning the interval nature of the scale, necessary to execute arithmetical operations; the problem of scale length (e.g., the finding that the use of 7, 9, or 10-point scales makes for material differences. See the excellent treatment in Irwin & Wiebrens, 1979, to which the findings of Van der Eijk & Niemöller, 1983, should be compared).

Assuming that these problems are not of major importance, scholars have used the responses of both mass and elite surveys to obtain an "average" placement of a party. Thus, Sani and Sartori (1983) take averaged responses from the mass surveys in the eight-nation study to obtain the locations of parties, which they then use in a large-scale systematic analysis that regards the ideological distance existing in party systems as a key variable. They then use these data for a crossnational comparison of the extent of ideological polarization of party systems. Other writers have preferred to rely on elite data as providing more authoritative responses. The problem of finding the correct respondents for the desired location of parties is an important one whenever substantial differences are found, for example between the self-location of a party leader, individual members of the parliamentary party, the leaders

'In the following pages I rely heavily on experience with different types of analysis of data obtained in two oral surveys held with members of the Dutch Lower House in 1968 and 1972. The 1972 questionnaire formed part of a study of representation initiated by Philip Stouthard and Warren Miller in which a cross-section of the population was also surveyed. For reports on the data see Daalder and Rusk, 1972; Daalder and Van de Geer, 1977; De Leeuw, 1973; Hazewindus, 1971; Hazewindus and Mokken, 1972; Irwin and Thomassen, 1975; Irwin and Wiebrens, 1979; Thomassen, 1976; Van de Geer and De Man, 1974.

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outside parliament, and the party voters, not to speak about the assigned locations of one party by leaders or voters of other parties.

The problem becomes particularly crucial if certain systematic biases have an influence on the data. Thus, it has been a common finding that party activists take up more extreme ideological positions than either party leaders or party voters (e.g., May, 1973). Such a crucial finding should not be hidden behind the analytical need to locate a single placement of a party. Survey responses suggest a consistent tendency in some countries for legislators to place themselves to the left of the location they attribute to both their fellow deputies and their voters (e.g., Van de Geer & de Man, 1974).

# Scaling Other Survey Questions

In a number of countries (e.g., the United States, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands), studies have been undertaken to compare the responses of legislators and voters to the same issue questions. The findings of the 1972 Dutch study may illustrate some of the problems that are likely to come up if one seeks to use these data to trace the existence or nonexistence of one dominant left-right dimension. It contained the following items relevant to attempts to place parties on some form of underlying dimension (in addition to locations on a self-imposed left-right scale): preference rank orderings, sympathy ratings for particular parties, and placements of self, one's own party, party voters, and the other major parties on seven issues (each issue represented by 7- or 9-point interval scales). The following conclusions were drawn.

Strong indications were indeed found for the existence of a left-right scale. However, the best result was not one straight line, but rather a horse-shoe curve, with the extremes on the left and right approaching one another at either end, and the major system parties showing substantial differentiations in the lower bend of the figure. The Dutch psychologist Van de Geer explains these findings in terms of a general law of perception which allows for much greater discriminatory perceptions in intermediate zones as compared to extremes. Does this finding tally with Sartori's use of the concept of space elasticity and his particular conclusion?

A short space does not allow, or does not facilitate, the perception of a center: It has, so to speak, no room for it. A short space is defined simply by its ends—left and right. A third point of reference—the central point—becomes meaningful and perceivable only as the space extends, and particularly when the ends of the space are

perceived as being two poles apart (Sartori, 1976, p. 347).

However, the placement of parties that results from the scaling of voter responses showed substantial differences from the results obtained from interviews with legislators. This is true both of the general space, and more important, also on the location of parties by voters and deputies on particular issues. Hence, the question arises again: whose placement is decisive, and what issues are the significant ones?

Also, some issues clearly broke out of a leftright dimension. This was particularly true of abortion, defense, and law-and-order issues at the elite level, and of abortion and development aid at the mass level. In other words, although a leftright dimension was consistently found (if one reads along a horseshoe curve), and although the placement of parties along this dimension tended to substantiate stereotyped notions on the assumed location of parties in relation to one another on particular issue scales, the dimension did not fit important issue areas that the parties must deal with. Said differently, the left-right dimension was sufficiently robust to allow the singling out of some parties as having a center location. But on certain issues, neither the scale nor the location held. Clearly, presumed center parties are not center parties on all issues!

Finally, a separate analysis of deputies from the major party groupings showed that not all groupings saw the space obtained from scaling all responses by all deputies in a similar manner. In particular, members of parties that others assigned to a location on the right tended themselves to see the space as one in which their location was much more in the middle. In other words, some parties' centers need not be other parties' centers!

#### The Analysis of Actual Behavior

At least three kinds of actual behavior lend themselves to a test for left-right (and hence center) placement of parties: participation in government coalitions, parliamentary voting, and official party pronouncement such as campaign statements or party platforms.

Analyses of coalition behavior have increasingly considered the role of ideology. The most successful explanations have been what are called "minimal range" or "minimum connected winning" theories which hold that coalitions are formed containing adjacent parties in sufficient number as to ensure a majority (e.g., De Swaan, 1973; Taylor & Laver, 1973). However, the placement by De Swaan, Dodd (1976) and others of parties in relation to one another is based on the judgment of "authoritative observers" of the

politics of a particular country. As these judgments may well be based mainly on their knowledge of actual coalition behavior, there is a danger that coalitions are explained on the basis of knowledge of coalition behavior: this clearly smacks of a tautology. Notions like range, adjacent, and connected or closed coalitions meet with the problem of whether one dimension is sufficient to account for actual coalition behavior. In constructing a policy scale defined mainly in socioeconomic terms, De Swaan must take considerable liberties in forcing parties on to such a scale. (One should note in particular his placing of religious parties, and his reinterpretation of the right part of the scale so as to accommodate authoritarian and national-socialist movements. as well as anticollectivist groupings, at one and the same end of a continuum.) Finally, the placement of parties on a scale is generally static over time. Hence, the data throw little light on dynamic movements that may affect the center as much as either end of the scale.

Data on the way parties line up in parliamentary voting have a considerable advantage over coalition data in any attempt to place parties on a scale. As Pedersen, Damgaard, and Nannestad Olsen (1971) have convincingly shown, analysis of such data allows inspection of the movement of parties over time. It also makes it possible to trace the actual behavior of parties in certain issue areas as distinct from others. Parliamentary voting is, of course, heavily influenced by whether or not parties participate in a government coalition. But this problem may to some degree be overcome, particularly in cases where there is some degree of autonomy between the governmental and the parliamentary arenas.

A third indicator may be found in a systematic study of party manifestoes along the lines of the study on British manifestoes by David Robertson (1976). An international project in this area has been initiated by Robertson and Ian Budge. One must await publication of the results before one can conclude whether or not this type of study makes it easier to arrange parties on some more durable left-right scale.

#### Conclusions on the Left-Right Scale

Whenever a robust left-right scale can be established, the assumption that there is a center at some intermediate point or area offers at least some promise. However, the foregoing paragraphs have raised certain difficulties: the actual placement of parties on such a scale may differ according to the category of respondents interviewed, the kind of data and analysis techniques used, the actual issues at stake, or the time studied. Although left-right perceptions are

strongly present, there is not necessarily an immediate relation between perception and behavior. More important, for certain actors, and in certain issue areas, the left-right dimension does not hold. Often political realities prove stubbornly resistant to attempts to reduce a multidimensional universe to a unidimensional ordering.

# Does a Center Exist in a Multidimensional Space?


# Geometric Representations


Clearly, the idea of a center in a multidimensional world is intuitively a great deal more difficult to grasp than in a linear representation. Even in a simple two-dimensional representation of a triangle (see Figure 1a), with three parties B, C, and D at the points, one could associate the idea of a center with four positions: the midpoints between BC, CD, and BD, and the point A equidistant from B, C, and D. Even easier to grasp is the idea of a circle (Figure 1b)—or in a threedimensional representation, a sphere—on which all parties are placed. In such a representation there is indeed only one center, but this emerges at the expense of any meaningful insight into dimensions. Another possible location is the point of intersection between two dimensions: at this point one actor (A) would be placed centrally on two dimensions, unlike other actors who might be central on one dimension, but not on the other (B and C, respectively)—see Figure 1c. Such spatial locations are less suggestive, however, than locations on a simple line. (But see Budge & Farlie, 1977, chap. 9, for an imaginative use of the concept of central "zones" between parties.)


# Duverger: The Center as a Result of Superimposed Dualisms

As we noted above, Maurice Duverger derives the existence of a center or centers from "superimposed dualisms." Figure 2 reproduces his wellknown circle of overlapping cleavages. The figure indeed suggests one possible explanation of multipartism. But such an explanation does not say anything about a center, unless one projects all parties onto one dimension. Thus, the Socialists, the Progressive Christians, the Radicals, and the MRP become center parties if one takes the Communists and the RPF as the end points of the decisive dimension. This is saying little else than that a center emerges if one reduces a multidimensional space to a unidimensional ordering. Such apparently is the strength of the left-right imagery, even for an author who sets out deliberately to

Figure 1. Three Possible Geometric Representations of Parties in a Multidimensional Space







Source: Duverger, 1964, p. 232.

analyze the simultaneous existence of more cleavage lines!

One should add that on closer inspection Duverger does not offer just one theory about the ("non-existing") center, but many. Thus one may distinguish at least the following three:

- 1) the assumption that all real political choices are inherently dualistic. Hence, a center can only be defined as a pale reflection of the real forces at the poles and is inevitably divided between the opposing attraction exercised from the two poles, of one and the same dimension;
- 2) the proposition that a center is the result of projecting parties on one overriding axis where others form the defining poles (e.g., Communists vis-à-vis the Right);
- 3) the view—still to be treated—that center parties are really the residue of past history, as once-progressive forces are being overtaken by new forces on the Left (Duverger's sinistrisme).

## Sartori: A Unidimensional Space of Competition in a Multidimensional Political Universe?

No writer has grappled with the dimensionality problem more gingerly and persistently than Giovanni Sartori (see in particular Sartori, 1966; 1976, chap. 10; and Sani & Sartori, 1983). Sartori has been aware from the outset of the multidimensionality of issues and identifications in contemporary politics, and he has been very conscious of the indeterminacy of meaning, and the strong biases, of left-right imagery. He has strongly criticized authors who rely on a socioeconomic interpretation of a left-right scale in the face of contrary evidence and has suggested instead that priority should be given to a constitutional-political interpretation. He has warned against the facile assumption that similar intervals in a spatial representation also reflect the same actual political distances. A major point in all his writings has been that there are indeed major ideological divides which separate system parties from nonsystem parties. He therefore uses terms like different spacings and disjointed spaces. Yet, again and again, he has attempted to reduce the multidimensionality of modern politics to a mainly unidimensional interpretation, at least as far as the dynamics of interparty competition are concerned. To do so he follows a number of roads.

- 1) His primary interest in Volume 1 of Parties and Party Systems is to push for an interpretation of the interaction of parties as independent rather than dependent variables. Hence his strong emphasis on the role of the number of parties, and the mechanical effects of their interaction. From it he deduces a number of properties vital for his interpretation, including his notion of space elasticity (the larger the number of parties, the wider the space), the appearance of one or more parties occupying a center position, the displacement of centripetal competition in a system with bipolar mechanics by centrifugal competition in a multipolar one, and eventually as a result of a policy of out-bidding and out-flanking by irresponsible extremist parties, the likelihood of the growth of antisystem parties in a polarized system bound for destruction.
- 2) Following Converse, Sartori suggests that in given systems a variety of dimensions may coexist, but that these may be of unequal "length." In that case, a process of foreshortening may effectively drive a party on the shorter dimension onto the longer—more salient and dominant—dimension. (See also Sjöblom, 1968, pp. 170 ff.)
- 3) As we saw, Sani and Sartori (1983) present extensive evidence that on a self-imposed left-right scale voters place themselves much wider apart in some European countries than in others. The resulting degree of polarization (for which they provide a variety of measures) shows a gratifying correspondence with Sartori's distinction between "polarized" and "moderate" multiparty systems. In the same article, these two authors also relate self-locations on a left-right scale to responses to a number of important issue and attitude questions and often find a substantial relationship.

4) Sartori also continues to grapple with the problems, most clearly posed by the so-called segmented societies, in which there clearly is a world of multidimensional identifications. He submits that these identifications cannot by definition enter strongly into the world of electoral competition because that would effectively suppose the presence of at least two parties competing along one and the same ideological dimension for such voters as are available to either contestant. Instead, Sartori submits, the major dimension for electoral competition in most European countries today is left-right competition. Parties not on that dimension can only engage in defensive competition, not in expansive strategies. They also do not really affect the decisive interplay of the party system, unless they engage in the struggle along the general and dominant dimension. In this way, Sartori explains why in certain party systems (e.g., the consociational democracies characterized by segmented societies), there are five parties or more, which yet do not show a tendency toward increasing polarization. There may be numerous parties with various identifications, but for the effective dimension of competition, such systems represent cases of party crowding rather than of strong polarization.

I have summarized Sartori's arguments rather extensively because his distinction between "domains and identification" (which are often multidimensional) and a "space of electoral competition" (which is much more likely to be unidimensional) could solve the problem of whether a center can exist in a multidimensional party landscape. If the space of competition is effectively unidimensional, a center emerges as a result of the interplay of numerical factors in the way Sartori describes.

I offer the following comments.

At first reading, Sartori's reduction of a multidimensional world of identifications to a unidimensional space of competition shows some resemblance to Duverger's reasoning. In Duverger's case center parties emerge because they are forced to locate themselves between the end points of a continuum which is apparently thought to be the dominant one. Duverger does not make clear, however, why parties not on the dominant dimension should end up near "the" center of a party system, or even at some point in between the extreme poles. Is this because parties formed on the basis of another dimension are likely to harbor rather heterogeneous elements, if looked at from the standpoint of the overriding dimension, which in the analogy of the "crosscutting" proposition forces such parties to choose a somewhat interdeterminate and hence "centrist" position? Whenever different dimensions exist, there is no logical reason to hold that they will intersect anywhere near the center of any other relevant dimension. The manner of intersection is a matter for empirical enquiry and should take into account that a particular point of intersection need not be a stable one. Much will depend on such varying factors as the angle of crosscutting, the compatibility of the dimensions, the bargainability of issues, and *ad hoc* or lasting coalitions (which may lessen the salience of particular dimensions).

The actual location of parties on a dimension (which is not the dimension on which they themselves are based) proves in practice to be a task of considerable complexity. As we saw, Abram de Swaan went through the exercise of trying to fit all European parties in the countries he covers on one overriding dimension, which, following Downs, but unlike Sartori, he defines in socioeconomic terms. He inevitably met with great difficulties which he could only solve by a combination of arbitrary choices and a redefinition of the right end of the scale, so as to accommodate clerical, extreme liberal, nationalist, authoritarian, and fascist parties indiscriminately, rather a case of saving the hypothesis of one unidimensional analysis!

Sartori's view on the existence of one overriding "space of electoral competition" is argued in terms of logic rather than based on strong empirical validation. To my reading, he is in danger of paying too little regard to the dynamic nature of interparty conflict. Is interparty conflict not exactly about the relative salience of different dimensions? Both old and new parties seek to exploit new issues, possibly resulting in new dimensions of conflict. Each party tries to exploit to the maximum that dimension in which it finds itself most comfortable, while attempting simultaneously to drive a wedge into the ranks of its adversaries whose main advantage may lie on another dimension. Sani and Sartori offer interesting data on the congruence of attitudes on diverse questions and self-locations on a left-right scale. But even their own graphs show such a relationship to be far from absolute, which must imply that there is ample opportunity for parties to compete selectively with one another (see also Budge & Farlie, 1983). Sani and Sartori single out Belgium as a special case of two-dimensional electoral competition. Is Belgium really unique, or only one rather clear example of multidimensional competition, not unknown elsewhere?

Sartori's propositions need more empirical enquiry, and his theoretical scheme needs further consideration from the perspective of center and center parties as well as in other ways. For Sartori uses not only *spatial* metaphors and insights derived from properties of *perception* (the center becoming salient as an ideological space

stretches), but also views about the *mechanical* interaction among parties as the number of relevant actors increases—changing a centripetal into centrifugal competition—and criteria of relative size (e.g., the development of more than two poles in a system, and the occupation or nonoccupation of the center by one or more center parties).

### Can a Center Exist in a Nonreduceable Multidimensional Space?

Here we tread on a terrain that is best covered by formal theory. Judging by one study that specifically investigates our problem (Petry, 1978), it seems solvable only if we redefine the notion of the center as some form of equilibrium point in a game-theoretical setting. It appears that such a point can be obtained only if certain specific conditions are set, e.g., considerations of minimum size, familiarity or inertia considerations which focus on established links between actors and which restrict the range of possible coalitions ruling out unfamiliar combinations; and considerations concerning the relative dependence of different preferences of actors on one another, in order to compel certain combinations of stands because they are logically connected, and to rule out others. I fear that at this point I must leave the argument to specialists in formal theories who move in a mathematical world well beyond my horizon.

## Is the Spatial Image (Whether Unidimensional or Multidimensional in Nature) Applicable to All European Party Systems?

One could think of two situations in which the spatial representation becomes meaningless:

A situation of complete Allgemeinkoalitions-fähigkeit<sup>2</sup> of all parties. In such a situation only office counts, rather than with whom one gets office. Neither past coalition experiences, nor ideological dimensions, nor future policies offer any restraints. This situation is nearest to the reasoning of the coalition theory of the minimum-size variety. That this theory performed most poorly in empirical tests of European cabinet coalitions (Browne, 1970; De Swaan, 1973) suggests that the assumptions are not very realistic. The need to reintroduce ideological dimensions or other restraining conditions or both may therefore

"It has been a particular pleasure to watch the development of this term—invented during an academic conference by that famous punster, the late Val Lorwin, to make light of both Belgian politics and German academic language—into a "serious" term of contemporary scholarship.

yet save the notion of a center in European party systems.

The second situation might be one of complete segmentation, dividing society into closed subcultures between which no logical relations exist. Typically, in such a situation neither normal majority assumptions nor considerations of ideological affinity hold. Instead, government proceeds by *Proporz*, a deliberate depoliticization of issues, a far-reaching autonomy of subcultures.<sup>3</sup>

#### The Center in Terms of Mechanics

If one moves from spatial reasonings to conceptions drawn from the world of mechanics, one meets with two rather different metaphors. First, one can imagine a set of scales that a particular force tips toward one side or the other. Second, one may conceive of centripetal against centrifugal forces working in a given party system. In either case, one can reason in terms of voters or of parties. In the case of voters, the emphasis is on the outcome of elections. In the case of parties the accent is rather on the formation or breakup of government coalitions.

## The Image of the Scales: Floating Voters

A large body of writings—whether on formal models of party systems (e.g., Downs, 1957) or more descriptive surveys of particular countries (one should note the substantial new work of Browne & Dreijmanis, 1982, and Luebbert, 1983) —gives a crucial place to voters in the middle. By moving their weight from one (alternative) coalition of parties to another, voters can determine the composition of governments. One often assumes that voters in the middle also represent a force for moderation. But many analysts question why this must be so; are the floating voters the best informed or the most responsible? Or, on the contrary, are they the least interested and most indifferent? Or should one regard them as those most likely to be subject to cross-pressures, which makes them reject extremist demands on any particular issue? The debate on the floating voters is now at least two decades old (see Daudt, 1961), and it is clear from empirical study that there is not one simple answer. A reification of "the" floating vote does insufficient justice to the fact that it is in practice composed of varied and

'See the various analyses of Lijphart (1968a, b; 1977, 1979) and Daalder (1974, 1979). It is perhaps intriguing to note that Lijphart rarely uses concepts like center or centrism in his analysis of Dutch politics, whereas my own more descriptive writing abounds with the concept.

changing groups of voters. The very image of one "floating" vote pays too little attention to cross-currents, to changes in the makeup of the electorate through the entry of new voters and the deaths of older ones, and to the additional effects of voting or nonvoting. Voters in the assumed "floating vote" represent very different opinions, regard rather different issues as salient, and need not be in the center at all.

Such problems are evaded in another mechanistic metaphor—e.g., the assumption that there is a natural swing of the pendulum. A party or parties in power—so it is argued—cannot escape growing criticism that eventually will lead to a loss of voters shifting to opposition parties. That mechanism holds governments at least indirectly accountable, so that it cannot afford to move far out from the middle ground between it and the opposition. Empirical data (as presented by Rose & Mackie, 1983), do not offer substantial proof for that mechanical conception.

#### The Impact of the Scales: Key Parties

In a similar analogy, particular parties—of various sizes—are thought to occupy a position in which they can determine the formation (or ending) of a particular government coalition. Their role in this respect has been characterized also with a variety of other mechanistic metaphors such as pivotal parties, key parties, hinge parties, or partis charnières. Logically, their special position depends on the circumstance that their cooperation is necessary to form or maintain a government, given a situation that parties on either side of them lack a majority of their own and prove unable to enter into a (larger) coalition between themselves, bypassing parties in between. The argument has been strongly influenced by the traditional finding that before the Fifth Republic France was governed by what Duverger called the éternel marais of the Center, and by the postwar position of the Liberal FDP in West Germany. Yet here again questions must be raised. Is it justified to lump together—all and sundry—small parties that can balance two very much larger parties, the size of which makes the inclusion of any one of them in government a foregone conclusion? Should one argue that in an evenly balanced position of rival governing teams any party can develop into a hinge party, irrespective of its own political positioning in relation to the other parties? There are some empirical pointers in that direction (as the wooing of the nationalist parties in Britain in the 1970s. or the rather odd position of the Austrian FOeP in relation to Socialists and Catholics has shown). Yet in that case the

mechanical metaphor is pushed so far that what would otherwise remain an out-party is made into a center party by definition. Compared to that type of argument, the earlier assumption about a relatively persistent patterning of parties in relation to one another in known dimensions of politics seems rather more persuasive.

The chief problem with both the voter and the party metaphor based on the image of the scales is the underlying assumption that a party system provides potential rival teams that must be in some form of rough balance with one another. In many actual party systems, that is not a realistic assumption: e.g., in systems with a predominant (let alone a hegemonic) party, or in complex party systems that do not spontaneously divide into two alternative blocs. In the latter situation, the likelihood that movement by a specific group of voters, or by one particular party, can force a drastic readjustment of forces is not very great. How useful is it, anyway, to reason in a metaphor of a set of scales, if a rather large party, rather than a small one, actually straddles the equilibrium point?

#### Centripetal and Centrifugal Mechanics

We must now return to Sartori's analysis of centripetal competition for voters at the center, which he regards as characteristic for systems with two to four relevant parties—competing along one and the same dimension with a low degree of ideological polarization—and of centrifugal competition, which to him is the mechanical disposition of systems of five or more relevant parties—not being segmented polities—with a high degree of ideological polarization (see in particular Sartori, 1976, pp. 342-351). A major element in his analysis is the view that in the latter case the occupation of the center by one or more center parties encourages centrifugal drives. I offer the following comments.

Sartori has generally taken a rather negative stand toward center parties, although he grudgingly gave these parties a somewhat more positive evaluation in later years. I quote from two different publications:

In a situation of centrifugal pluralism the center party (or parties) appears to be more than anything else a feedback, or a retroaction, of the centrifugal drives. . . According to this interpretation, then, the center is more a negative convergence, a sum of exclusions, than a positive agency of instigation. And this is why it is likely to be a passive, rather inert, and—all in all—immobile kind of aggregation. (Sartori, 1966, pp. 164-165)

and

I still believe in this diagnosis, but the recent Chilean experience—which was characterized by a chronic fickleness of the in-between partiesvindicates a more positive interpretation. I would put it thus: Even though the center parties tend to be immobilistic, they remain an equilibrating force that performs a "mediating role," and mediation, or brokerage, is not the same as immobilism. This having been conceded, I hasten to add that a center positioning seemingly condemns to a policy of mediation, in the sense that a different role backfires on the party's positioning without paying off in performance or accomplishment. A center party that attempts to outdo the parties located on its left or right will contribute, more than to anything else, to a crescendo of escalation and extremization. (Sartori, 1976, p. 135)

Sartori posits that the very occupancy of the center area by one or more center parties puts that area "out of competition," and hence encourages centrifugal rather than centripetal drives. It is difficult to concur with this argument: as long as there are votes in the center, why should parties not in the center refrain from going after these votes in what must by definition be centripetal electoral tactics? Rather than speaking of centripetal competition in systems of moderate pluralism (generally having three to five parties) and of centrifugal competitions in systems of polarized pluralism (having five or more parties effectively competing with one another), is it not more reasonable to argue that in any system of three or more parties (in which at least one party finds itself in an intermediate position between other parties), there will always be both centripetal and centrifugal drives? In a visual representation of competition among five parties (Sartori, 1976, p. 349), large extreme parties on the Left and Right overlap only with the intermediate parties, not with the large party at the center. But why should large out-parties not attempt to move toward the center at the expense of the intermediate and center parties both? Are not both the PCI and the MSI competing with the DC directly for electoral votes in contemporary Italy? (For criticism of Sartori's position in this respect, see Farneti, 1983, and Sartori's reply to Farneti in Sartori, 1982, pp. 320-322. See also Daalder, 1983.)

Sartori's argument is possibly influenced by the fact that the DC represents a center that is really based on a criterion other than the formal left-right dimension. Yet if so, he should be led to different conclusions by his own view that it is typically the left-right space of competition rather than domains of identification which governs the decisive relations among parties. A comparison of the Italian and the Dutch case would seem to con-

firm that conclusion. In both systems, the center is occupied and has been so occupied for many years. In the Dutch case, this fact has been a major element in forcing both Socialists and Liberals to tone down whatever anticlerical proclivities they may once have had, and indeed in forcing them to compete both in policies and electorally in above all a centripetal manner (see Daalder, 1966, 1979).4 Sartori will argue that the Dutch and Italian cases are not really comparable, given the presence of sizeable antisystem oppositions and a much wider ideological space in Italy as compared to the Netherlands. This is of course true, but is not one major reason for the lower polarization in the Netherlands that parties once distant from one another eventually learnt to compete in a centripetal manner, and hence in the end contributed toward depolarization?

On a more theoretical plane, Sartori finds one distinguishing feature of "moderate" as contrasted to "polarized" pluralism in the existence of "bilateral oppositions" in the latter against "bipolar mechanics" in the earlier case. In a selflocating left-right scale, the Netherlands comes out as a country that generally shows a number of distinct modes (e.g., Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Sidjanski, 1979. One should note, however, that this finding comes out much more clearly with the use of 9- or 10- than with 7-point scales, Niemöller, 1981, pp. 231-234.). Although the weight of the extremes in the Dutch system is very much smaller than that in Italy, it is far from evident that the Netherlands could really be regarded as an example of a "bi-polar coalitional configuration" (Sartori, 1976, p. 179).

One is struck by the fact that Sartori gives relatively little attention to size factors, in that the proportionate size of a center party, of adjacent parties, and of more extreme parties including whenever relevant antisystem parties, may be more important for the actual functioning of party systems than the absolute number of relevant parties. One should attempt to specify the importance of such size factors.

'A point in favor of Sartori's analysis is the sharpening of centrifugal political strategies (in continuous rivalry with centripetal ones) which occurred when the barriers between segmented subcultures began to break down in the Netherlands. For a short discussion see Daalder (1979). Such strategies—practiced particularly by the left—eventually met with failure, including first the unexpected formation of a center-right government in 1977 and then considerable electoral losses by the aggregate older left in favor notably of the D'66 Party. That party loosened itself deliberately from an erstwhile embrace in a left coalition, to choose a decisively centripetal course. This in turn forced the Socialist party—great clamor of some of its activists notwithstanding—to follow suit.

#### Analyses in Terms of Cleavages

Yet another manner to treat the presence or absence of a center in party systems is through analysis in terms of social and political cleavages. Here we again encounter Duverger, with his reference to the center as "the moderates of opposed tendencies" and also in his derivation of the center from a "superimposition of dualisms." The following comments seem in order. (See also Lijphart, 1981.)

#### The Dangers of the Cleavages Terminology

The term cleavage has the unavoidable connotation that there is a sharp divide that separates social or political groups. It follows that the middle ground is a dangerous place to be, or even one that is logically nonexistent as indeed Duverger would have us believe. (For an interesting analysis of the origins of the dualist interpretation of French politics, see Graham, 1964.) However, if one inspects the nature of actual political and social cleavages, it becomes apparent that the idea of a clear divide is much more applicable to certain categories of cleavages than to others. There is indeed little between blacks and whites, Catholics and Calvinists, native speakers of one tongue or another, or members of different tribes. But such a statement is not true for many other social bases on which parties have been formed, e.g., the criteria that to Hume were the three alternative bases of party: interest, affection, and principle; social class (except in a vulgarized Marxist sense); regionalism, or even some of the new social cleavages arising from a reorientation of values in a postindustrial society toward the environment, women's rights, issues of organizational scale, international peace, or special concerns with the Third World. A realistic analysis in terms of cleavages should lead one to conclude therefore that centrist and intermediate positions are a much more realistic proposition for some cleavages than for others, without succumbing immediately to what one might call the tyranny of polar types.

#### The Importance of Numbers

Even if political life were organized solely around exclusive cleavages, it makes considerable difference in practice whether it leads to the formation of two groups or more. Compromise and adjustment would seem much more easy to reach when more than two ascriptive groups are involved, and especially when no single group has a definite majority position. This finding is indeed one common in both anthropological literature and in the writing on modern segmented polities

(e.g., Lijphart, 1977). When one group has an unassailable majority, there is much less scope for brokerage than when numerical relations make some form of bargaining inevitable even to reach a majority point.

#### The Degree of Political Affect

One further disadvantage of a reasoning in terms of cleavages is that one concludes too rapidly that particular cleavages are unavoidably loaded with political content. It may be true that survey data demonstrate highly skewed patterns which suggest that different groups are opposed on matters like religion, class, or language. Yet the political relevance of such a finding depends on the actual degree to which such cleavage divisions are politicized, a point underlined also by Sani and Sartori (1983) when they argue that conflicting identifications need not result in effective political combat.

#### The Superimposition Hypothesis Once More

Duverger's derivation of a center through a superimposition of dualistic cleavages logically presupposes that particular cleavages have different salience for different groups of political actors. By assuming one cleavage to be the dominant one from a systemic point of view, groups on another cleavage end up having a heterogeneous, hence by definition an ambiguous, position. This is indeed Duverger's biased view, but tenable only if one accepts the a priori assumption of the existence of one overriding dimension. It is a telling illustration of the powerful normative sentiments that accompany discussions of a center. What is detested by Duverger as preventing "real" choices is hailed elsewhere under the perspective of "cross-cutting cleavages," regarded as the force par excellence which ensures moderation in a homogeneous political culture!

#### The Center as a Historical Residue

In yet another generalization, Duverger explains parties in a center position as the result of new parties springing up to the left of existing ones, which force the previously existing parties from their original left position to the center or even the right of the system. One is probably not far amiss in thinking that Duverger sees the new parties as representing the future, relegating older parties to eventual oblivion as no longer representative of living forces. The argument underplays the possibility of new parties coming in, not from the Left but from the Right, or even into the middle of the existing political spectrum (e.g., in Duverger's France the Gaullists and reforming

Centrists, D'66 in the Netherlands, or the not easily placeable Progress Party in Denmark).

Even if one were to accept Duverger's law of a gradual displacement of older parties by newer parties on their left (i.e., in the light of the historical rise of new working-class parties), one should recognize that older cleavage lines are not necessarily doomed to extinction. One famous example is the course of events in Norway, where the original Left of peripheral protest parties was indeed shifted away from its original position to such an extent that one wing (the Agrarians) was eventually to re-name itself Center Party. Yet as Rokkan and Valen had correctly forecast (1962, 1964; see also Rokkan, 1970; Valen, 1976), older cleavages could indeed become salient again once their values were threatened. In the 1972 battle over the EEC Referendum, many of the presumed Centrists joined modern New Left groups in polar opposition to a modern pro-European front of conservatives and estalishment socialists alike. Clearly, one must reason not in terms of a static superposition of dualisms, but in terms of a dynamic interplay of cleavages, historically and in the contemporary world. History does not freeze parties in immovable positions, nor does it force them into an irreversible momentum in one direction only.

#### Labels and Positions: The Concrete Experience of European Party Systems

So far, our search for the center has mainly followed conceptual lines. We have explored spatial analogies, ranging from a concentration on the median voter or median party, moving on to the assumption of the existence of a left-right dimension (which easily suggests the notion of a center location as well), and ending with the intractable problem of a multidimensional political universe. We have turned toward mechanistic metaphors in terms of a balancing of the scales and of centripetal versus centrifugal forces. Finally, we have concentrated on analyses of cleavages which can be more or less dualistic, and hence allow or not allow for intermediate or brokerage positions. Our search has been far from conclusive. Our most difficult problem has been that of the inevitable multiplicity of issues, dimensions, and cleavages in political life which stubbornly resist attempts to reduce them to one dominant underlying dimension. (If that analysis is true, then one should query the facile use of the terms left and right as much as that of the term center, as all such terms become inherently ambiguous.) A further problem is the mixing of metaphors. Finally, there are clear signs of bias. Whereas some like a center, others do not. And with Sartori, one may even frown on center parties because one does like competition for the center.

Can one do better by inspecting the actual record of European party systems? One could do so by investigating to what degree the use of the term *center* by particular parties in particular party systems throws light on our problem, and by exploring the extent to which European party systems are in practice characterized by having parties at the center or not.

#### Checking the Labels

There is little doubt that the label center has gained in popularity among European parties in recent years. In Nordic countries a number of parties formally took on the label center as former agrarian parties renamed themselves Center Party in Sweden (1957), Norway (1959), and Finland (1965). In Denmark a splinter party from the Socialist Party called itself the Center Democrats (1973). In the re-emerging democracies in Southern Europe at least one party adopted the label center, although this label covered rather different parties in different countries, e.g., Suarez's Union of Democratic Center in Spain, the Democratic Social Center (now Christian Democratic Party) in Portugal, and the Center Union of Makros in Greece. (Duverger would have noted with satisfaction that neither parties nor labels proved durable, however. See Di Palma, 1978.)

Appeals to a center designation are also made in other countries, even though parties did not take on the actual label. Thus, in Italy the DC, the PRI, and the PSDI have claimed the presumed center space in the political system, and even the Liberal PLI has sought to out-center the DC from the right in recent times. In French politics a center tendency has been a consistent phenomenon, and the label has constantly reappeared for one or other group within it (see Irving, 1976, and the excellent essay of Bartolini, 1981). One finds a general usage of the term in Dutch political dialogue. There was widespread discussion in Britain of the need for a Center Party before the new Social Democratic Party ws formed in 1981 (e.g., The Times, January 17, 1980, following Roy. Jenkins's Richard Dimbleby Lecture of November 22, 1979).

The concept *left* has been so strong, however, as practically to preclude the use of the term *center* by parties that find themselves hemmed in by a large party on their left (whether Communists or Socialists or both), and large parties on their right. Non-socialist reform movements have generally preferred terms like *radicals*, *democrats*, or *progressives* to that of *center*. In some cases parties that have willy nilly found themselves in what might easily be regarded as objectively a

center position have deliberately disclaimed the label that they found uncongenial for ideological reasons (e.g., the Italian PSI). Even academic writers unblushingly dichotomize European parties into left and center-right parties, clearly regarding the label center as being more right than left (Budge & Herman, 1978; Morgan & Silvestri, 1982).

#### Checking the Positions

One can also explore when and where parties have in fact acted as center parties in European party systems, irrespective of their labels. The following attempt at a simple classification is based mainly on the mechanistic assumption of the presence or absence of one or more parties which can effectively tip the balance to one government combination rather than another.

In a pure two-party system (such as the stereotyped British one), the idea of a center party would not logically fit. At most, with Downs and Sartori one should argue in such a situation in terms of the center as a point of gravitation to which the two competing parties would be irresistibly drawn. The traditional interpretation of British politics in terms of a Front Benchers' Constitution (Wheare, 1954) where the "Butskells" rule, whatever the more militants in either party say, illustrates—and probably inspired—this way of reasoning. But at least two developments have since then-changed this classical conception: the loss by Labour of a majority position in the Commons in the 1970s, and growing concern about the Downsian movement of the two main system parties away from the center. The first event gave life to the idea that other parties might occupy a balancing position (e.g., the Liberals, but also the various nationalist parties and, since 1981, the new SDP c.q. the Alliance). Resistance against a growing adversary politics, on the other hand, has done much to upgrade the view that what Britain needs are not majority parties, but center parties (e.g., Bogdanor, 1983; Finer, 1975, 1980).

A second case has been dubbed a two-and-a-half party system, i.e., a system with two large rival parties, each of which needs the support of a third party to obtain a majority in parliament. The archetype is of course the German Federal Republic since the early 1960s, where the FDP has used its leverage to obtain representation in national and Länder-governments well beyond its proportionate share. As compared to the German FDP, the Austrian Freedom Party seemed to be too far removed from what would be regarded as a legitimate center position to play a similar role. Yet with the fall of the Kreisky Cabinet in 1983, the strength of mechanical factors was such as indeed to propel that party into government with

the Socialists. Could Irish Labor eventually develop similarly into a third force between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael?

In a number of European systems a situation has occurred where party conflict consisted of one large party facing a number of smaller parties. The clearest examples of such a situation have been Ireland and Sweden, where Fianna Fail and the Socialists face a number of much smaller rivals. Somewhat similar situations occurred for a time in Norway and in the German Federal Republic (when the CDU/CSU crossed or came near to the majority point). Often the out-parties had little choice but to remain opposition parties in such a situation, ruling out the possibility of regarding them as center parties. Yet such a situation presents a standing temptation to one or other of the smaller opposition parties to move over, as indeed the Agrarians did repeatedly in Scandinavia even before they called themselves center parties.

In a fourth situation conflict has been mainly between two rival blocs, as in the traditional twobloc parliamentarism of Denmark, or in the more recent period of the French Fifth Republic. In such a situation, the movement of a single party can be of decisive importance. Witness, for example, the change in the balance of Danish politics when the Danish radicals went over decisively to a bourgeois bloc, or the flirtation of some socialists and majority centrists with the idea of a new center coalition, before the victory of Mitterrand in 1981 put an end to such speculations for the time being. What clearly distinguishes this type of political situation from the third situation mentioned above is the absence of a realistic expectation of an independent majority for any one party. Hence, there is room for tactical maneuvering for what is intuitively described as the Center-Left and the Center-Right to move either toward each other, or each to a possible ally in a centrifugal direction, which underlines the importance of quantitative proportions in addition to locational ones. It also suggests that terms such as centripetal and centrifugal may have a different explanation, depending on electoral or coalitional politics.

In other countries—or at different times in countries mentioned earlier—the typical situation has been one of continuous (or at least very frequent) rule by one or more parties that have changed allies from time to time (for data on the period from 1918 to 1969, see Daalder, 1971, p. 290; for a similar table on the period from 1946 to 1980, see Von Beyme, 1982, p. 393). The typical cases are those of the Netherlands, Italy, and to a degree also Finland. The hold on the system by the Catholics (and to a large extent their Protestant allies, now all amalgamated in a new

Christian Democratic Appeal) in Holland, of the DC in Italy, and of the Finnish Agrarians who were later to call themselves explicitly the Center Party, has been such as to make them of pivotal importance to the system. Yet within this category certain differences exist, depending on the extent to which these parties can actually enter alternating coalitions (the case of semiturnover, typically found in the Netherlands), or are forced to look mainly in one direction (Italy, ever since parties on the right of the DC were regarded as clearly illegitimate, thus leaving only the choice between minority government and an apertura a sinistra).

In this category one should also place most of the French Fourth Republic and Belgium and Luxemburg, even though the role of the Christian Democrats has been somewhat less dominant in these countries than that of their Dutch counterparts.

Some countries resort frequently to the practice of *minority governments* (cf. Daalder, 1971; Herman & Pope, 1973). Parties frequently called to exercise the role of government in such countries could conceivably be regarded as center parties to the extent that their presence in government, paradoxically, is resented least by all other relevant parties. However, for an understanding of the nature of actual interparty relations, the operation of parliamentary coalitions may be just as telling as the presence of a particular party in (minority) government.

Finally, there is a residual class which for want of a better term one might call that of changing coalitions. Relations of parties are such that neither clear alternation nor semiturnover is present sufficiently to constitute a regular pattern. The chief candidates for this category would seem to be Iceland, but also Finnish and maybe Belgian politics offer some illustrations. Typically, parties may ally themselves along frequently changing dimensions and opt for grand coalitions as much as for caretaker governments of experts or minority parties.

#### The Relevance of the Notion of Center Parties for Different European Party Systems

If the short inventory given above is correct, European party systems seem to fall in at least three different groups.

In some systems the notion of a center party hardly applies. This is logically the case under any of three conditions: countries with stable single-party majority governments (e.g., Britain, France under De Gaulle and Pompidou, Austria under Kreisky, Sweden until at least 1976), countries with clear alternating governments even when

often not of the single-party majority variety (Denmark until 1973, Norway, Ireland), and in the rather different case of *Proporz* systems, in which all major parties enter government by definition (e.g., Switzerland).

In a second group of countries, the idea of center party or center parties is a key variable. This was the case in the French Fourth Republic and has been true of Italy, Finland, and also the Netherlands ever since the religious system parties forced Liberals and Socialists into the position of alternate suitors. It is also true for the German Federal Republic as long as the FDP can effectively play off Christian Democrats and Socialists against one another.

Finally, there is a third group of countries where the relevance of the notion of center parties is contingent on both size and positioning of major parties in relation to one another, which is dependent on the outcome of elections and the issues to be handled. In this intermediate category one might place Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark since 1973, and possibly Iceland.

As this grouping suggests, the major determining variables are the relative size of parties (above all, majority or minority) and how stable the parties' positions are in relation to one another. Countries differ markedly from one another in both respects, and a particular country may also change from one category to another over time.

#### Power and Prejudice

The preceding pages leave two possible approaches still untreated.

First, one might pay special attention to parties continuously in power. Continuous exercise of power is clearly not the same as being a dominant party, since the first notion is compatible with the continuous presence of a small party in successive government coalition. Such a categorization points to a group of parties which provide important questions for detailed study, e.g., of the forces that make such a party indispensable for governments, and of the consequences that result from long government tenure for the electoral position of the party, for its role in relation to other political actors (notably the bureaucracy), as well as the consequences that result from its relationship to parties not in the government. But equating center parties with perennial governing

"If the role of a center party depends above all on the relative size of parties in relation to one another, this would logically imply that specific parliamentary situations rather than countries are the more promising units of analysis.

parties otherwise confuses rather than clarifies understanding.

Second, we clearly need an explicit study of normative assessments of center parties. We have frequently drawn attention to the many unspecified value judgments associated with the treatment of notions like center and center parties. A careful review of such value judgments might help us to obtain clearer insights into alternative theories of good government, which after all lay a heavy hand on our discussions and comparative research on the empirical functioning of party systems.

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# The Constituency Service Basis of the Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament

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Under the guise of the "incumbency advantage," American research of the past decade has devoted heavy emphasis to what may be termed the "personal vote" in congressional elections. Is this phenomenon purely American, or is it susceptible to comparative treatment? This article contrasts the personal vote in the 1980 U.S. House elections with that in the 1979 British general election. The analysis utilizes data from surveys conducted by the Center for Political Studies and British Gallup in combination with interviews of congressional administrative assistants (AAs) and British MPs and party agents whose constituencies fall in the sampling frames of the mass surveys. The analysis finds an incumbency advantage or personal vote in Britain which is much weaker than that in the United States but of somewhat greater importance than is commonly believed. As in the United States, constituency service appears to be an important component of the personal vote.

During the past decade an especially active research area has developed around the study of the advantages of incumbency in U.S. House elections. Erikson (1972), Tufte (1973), and Mayhew (1974a) first called attention to the temporal increase apparent over the course of the 1960s, and numerous succeeding scholars (Burnham, 1975; Cover, 1977; Ferejohn, 1977; Fiorina, 1977; Hinckley, 1980; Parker, 1980a) have theorized about the bases and the consequences of the trends identified by Erikson, Tufte, and Mayhew. This outpouring of scholarly effort has produced a reasonable understanding of the multifaceted nature of the incumbency advantage in contemporary elections, although the lack of appropriate longitudinal data hinders efforts to

determine precisely what and how much has changed over time (Florina, 1982).

As with much of the congressional literature, a notable feature of the research on incumbency is its exclusively American perspective. In particular, attempts focus on American political institutions and the American political context. Little effort has been made to compare candidate effects in House elections with those that might be present in the legislative elections of other countries,2 and virtually no effort has been given to abstracting from the American case in an effort to develop more widely applicable theories of the conditions that enhance or depress candidate effects in legislative elections. This article aims principally at the former, empirical, lacuna. Although the significance of any comparative work depends on some basic theoretical ideas that render comparison meaningful and interesting, a detailed comparative theory of voting in legislative elections lies outside our present scope.

Received: June 15, 1982 Revision received: February 1, 1983 Accepted for publication: June 6, 1983

The research reported in this article was made possible through support of the National Science Foundation (grants SOC78-15413 and SES8010662). For comments on earlier versions of this article we thank James Alt, Ivor Crewe, Gillian Peele, Richard Rose, and Graham Wilson; all were helpful, none is responsible.

'This extensive literature is cited, discussed, synthesized, and otherwise dealt with in two recent books on congressional elections by Hinckley (1981) and Jacobson (1982).

Pierce and Converse (1981) is a notable exception, albeit one that focuses on candidate visibility rather than the vote. Also to be noted are Tufte's (1973) crossnational comparison of swing ratios, and Stokes's (1967) contrast of "swing" in the United States and Great Britain. Such aggregate comparisons reflect relative differences in district-level forces, if not necessarily individual candidate effects.

#### The Concept of a Personal Vote

By "personal vote" we mean that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record. In legislative elections especially, political science research emphasizes that part of the vote which is not personal—support based on shared partisan affiliations, fixed voter characteristics such as class, religion, and ethnicity, reactions to national conditions such as the state of the economy, and performance evaluations centered on the head of the governing party. This imbalance in emphasis is reasonable enough; most empirical work suggests that factors such as the preceding account for the lion's share of the variation in election outcomes. Only after American scholars realized that the personal vote had reached significant proportions did they really give it much attention.

Still, even if small, the personal vote has potentially great political significance. In contrast with votes based on party or class identifications, religious affiliations, the national economy, or national executive performance, the individual legislator has by definition some impact on the personal vote, and because it is under his control. he may give it disproportionate attention. This in turn has implications for party cohesion in the legislature, party support for the executive, and ultimately, the ability to enforce national electoral accountability in the system.3 A personal vote reflects a principal feature of the single-member district plurality electoral system: the distinction between the interests and fortunes of an individual representative and those of any collectivity, especially party, to which he or she may belong. It is logically possible for any given representative to win while all fellow partisans are defeated. This simple fact creates an incentive for each representative to build a personal base of support within the geographic district, support not subject to the vagaries of national swings arising from popular reactions to national events, personalities, and conditions. To be sure, myriad features of a political system may work to circumscribe the operation of the individual representative's incentive—the resources available to him, the nomination system, the electoral system (e.g., independent executive or not), the needs, ideologies, and party loyalties of constituents—to name but a few of the more obvious ones. Thus, the gap between individual and collective interests may be large in some systems (e.g., the American) and virtually nonexistent in others (e.g., the textbook British

For an extended development of this argument, see Fiorina (1980).

account). The incentive still exists, however, and fragments of the existing literature gave us reason to believe that it operates even in a system like Great Britain's, although with effects much weaker than those observed in the United States.

The preliminary statistical analysis presented in Table 1 illustrates this discussion. The data are from the 1980 NES/CPS American National Election Study and a British Gallup survey conducted after the May 1979 election.4 The estimates (probit) show the association of party identification, executive performance ratings, and candidate incumbency status (coded from standard sources and merged with the survey files) with the vote for or against the parliamentary and congressional candidates of the incumbent Labour and Democratic parties. Evidently, the American and British findings differ in several respects. First, partisanship exerts a much larger impact, ceteris paribus, in British parliamentary voting than in American House voting. Although this difference is expected, one would imagine that the difference has increased from what it would have been in the late 1940s, for example. A second even more noteworthy difference between the two equations concerns the importance of Callaghan ratings for the fates of Labour candidates, and the virtual irrelevance of Carter ratings for the fates of Democratic candidates.4 Again, these results are consistent with the tenor of traditional discussions of British voting behavior, and the more recent studies of House elections. From the standpoint of this article, principal interest attaches to a third difference between the two equations: the much greater importance of incumbency status in American House elections than in British parliamentary elections. The differences here are fully as great, ceteris paribus, as those between the effects of party identification and executive ratings.

4The 1980 NES/CPS post-election survey included 1408 respondents. The British Gallup survey included 2031 respondents interviewed during the week after the 1979 election in a sampling frame covering England, Scotland, and Wales. In consultation with British Gallup staff we selected a subset of the 1978 CPS/NES items and modified them (when necessary) for administration to a British sample.

'Note, however, that the effects of Callaghan ratings are not nearly linear, nor even monotonic. Relative to the omitted reference category, very poor, those who rate Callaghan fair, good, or very good are significantly more likely to vote Labour. Strangely, the small group of voters who offer no opinion of Callaghan are as positively disposed toward Labour as those who rate Callaghan very favorably. Consistent with the argument of Converse (1966), these are individuals with lower educational levels and little knowledge of public affairs.

Table 1. Summary Vote Equations, Great Britain and United States

		·		
		Great Britain (n = 1527)	United States (n = 711)	
Party identification	Strong con	-1.86**	<b></b> 89**	Strong Rep
•	Weak con	-1.43**	<b>71**</b>	Weak Rep
	Other	15**	<b>46**</b>	Ind Rep
•	Liberal	46**	.40*	Ind Dem
	Weak lab	1.34**	.40*	Weak Dem
	Strong lab	2.12**	.83**	Strong Dem
JC job rating	Very good	1.13**	.25	Strongly approve
	Good	1.18**	.06	Approve
,	Fair	.80 <b>*</b> *	.09	Disapprove
•	Poor	.09	·	
	Don't know	1.15**	13	Don't know
Incumbency status	Labour	.32*	.78**	Democrat
•	Other .	<b>26*</b>	46*	Republican
Constant		-1.59**	<b>36</b>	
Correctly predicted		89%	75%	
R <sup>2</sup>	•-	.76	.47	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

 $<sup>*</sup>_{D} < .05$ .

Still, we daresay that most scholars will be less taken by the difference in the importance of incumbency status in the two countries than by the fact that statistically significant effects appear in Great Britain at all. The estimates show that other things being equal, Labour incumbents ran significantly better than Labour candidates who were contesting open seats, and the latter in turn ran significantly better than Labour candidates

seeking to unseat incumbents of any other party (open seats—those for which no incumbent ran—are the omitted reference category for the incumbency status variables). Although significant, these effects are not substantively large; Table 2 contains a translation of the probit estimates into probabilities of supporting candidates of the incumbent party as a function of the respondent's party affiliation and executive performance

Table 2. Estimated Probability of In-Party Vote by Party Identity
Executive Performance and District Incumbency Status

		Incumbency					
Great Britain	Non-Labour	Open -	•	Labour			
Strong conservative—fair	.00	.00		.01			
Weak conservative—fair	.01	.01		.03			
No party identification-fair	.15	.21	-	.32			
Liberal-fair	.07	.11	-	.18			
Weak Labour-good	.75	.82	: (	.89			
Strong Labour-very good	.92	.95	-	.98			
		Incumbency		- <del></del>			
United States	Republican	Open	• • • •	Democrati			

•			
United States	Republican	Open	Democratic
Strong Republican-very poor	.04:	.11	.32
Weak Republican-very poor	.06	.14	.39
Independent-poor	.24	.40	.70
Weak Democratic-good	.36	.54	.81
Strong Democratic—good	.53	.70	.90

<sup>\*\*</sup>p < .01.

ratings, and the incumbency status of the constituency. Each party identification category is assigned the modal executive rating of that category.

As Table 2 shows, the impact of Conservative party identification was so strong in 1979 that candidate status made little or no difference among Conservative identifiers (the raw data show that all of the 81 strong Conservatives in Labour districts voted against the incumbent). This contrasts sharply with the American case, where a one-third minority of strong Republicans reported support of Democratic incumbents. For those not attached to the Conservative party, however, the effects of incumbency status were more pronounced. Voters offering no party identification, for example, were twice as likely to vote for an incumbent Labour candidate as for a Labour candidate running against an incumbent of another party. The figures are similar for Liberals, and even weak Labour identifiers show a nontrivial effect of incumbency status. In the United States, of course, the general effects of incumbency (looking across the rows) are relatively much stronger, perhaps two-thirds or so as great as the effects of party identification (looking down the columns).

Tables 1 and 2 suggest that there is indeed a personal vote for us to compare, contrast, and explain. Given the amount of research devoted to American voting, our emphasis in this article will be on the British. By way of introduction, let us briefly consider several of the components of the personal vote identified in American research and how they may or may not apply to the British case. The first and most obvious explanation of the House incumbency advantage arises from the sheer quantity of electorally productive resources provided to all incumbents, such as staff, office space, long-distance telephone privileges and the frank, and travel (Cover, 1977; Cover & Brumberg, 1982; Mayhew, 1974b; Parker, 1980b), estimates of the value of which range up to a million dollars per term. This factor can hardly operate in Britain because MPs have very little in the way of personal support. The average MP shares a secretary and may work with a party agent in the constituency.6 Another partial explanation of the House incumbency advantage focuses on the differential campaign funding of incumbents and challengers (Jacobson, 1980). In Britain, however, campaigns are much cheaper, constituency spending is severely limited, candidates

do not raise money individually, and spending decisions are more centralized. Thus, the financial muscle of MPs would seem to be a hypothesis that we can safely dismiss (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1980). Third, some authors have suggested that less tangible factors partially explain the House incumbency advantage. One could argue that strong incumbents deter strong challengers, and that incumbent strength is at least to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy which results when weak challengers are the only ones willing to make the race (Hinckley, 1980; Mann, 1978). Here again, the hypothesis would not appear as plausible for Britain. Unlike American candidates who await the proper time to run, many aspiring MPs look for a suitable location—a winnable, if not safe, district. An important qualification for the nomination in such a district is a reputation as a good candidate, and an effective way to earn such a reputation is to wage a strong campaign in a hopeless district. King (1982) reports that in the 1970s Parliaments, one-half of all MPs had lost at least once before winning their seats, and onefourth had lost twice or more.7 Thus, it appears that incumbent MPs are less likely to get an electoral free ride than are incumbent congressmen (MCs), given that ambitious challengers in Britain cannot hope to impress future selection committees by merely going through the motions.

All in all, the foregoing considerations suggest that the personal vote in Britain is very personal indeed. Its existence would seem to reflect the particular characteristics and activities of particular candidates. Such a vote is contingent; it depends on whom the MPs are and what they do. A likely possibility for an important component of this contingent personal vote corresponds to a fourth partial explanation of the House incumbency advantage-constituency service, by which we mean the nonpartisan, nonprogrammatic effort to help individual constituents in their dealings with the larger government, and to defend and advance the particularistic interests of the constituency in the councils of the larger government. In the next section we present new data on constituency service in Britain, some from the mass survey already introduced, and still more from an elite survey coordinated with the mass survey sampling frame. Analogous American data also will be presented. In the fourth section we report statistical analyses that show the importance of constituency service as an explanation of the personal vote. A concluding section relates our findings to discussions

\*Butler and Kavanagh (1980, pp. 58,72) report that in 1979 Labour had only 70 full-time paid agents, and in 1978 the Conservatives had 346. In addition, there are part-time volunteer workers, typically party activists.

'King finds that in the post-World War II period there has been a steady upward trend in the proportions of MPs with previous election defeats in their background.

of embryonic developments in the British electoral system.

### Constituency Service in Great Britain and the United States

The textbook portrait of British politics leaves little room for a personal vote. Although MPs appear desirous of retaining their office (the retirement rate in 1979 was approximately 10%), and thus have an incentive to fashion a personal vote, the instruments available to them appear too paltry to permit them to do so. Most MPs are faceless troops in the party ranks who vote in accord with the party whip. They have little or no personal power (e.g., committee based as in the United States) to procure "pork" for their districts or to provide favors to individual constituents. As mentioned, they have very little staff and office resources, and their campaign spending is both limited and largely out of their control. Their parliamentary careers hinge not only on their continued local renomination and reelection, but also, and more important, on the impressions they make on national party leaders. To cap it all off, their constituents can register a preference for the executive only through their vote decisions for Parliament. Consequently, voters naturally pay scant attention to individual MPs and make their choices on the basis of such general factors as party affiliations, class position, and reactions to top party leaders, particularly those who will constitute the government.

The preceding textbook portrait is familiar to American scholars, many of whom use it to highlight a contrasting textbook portrait of the Congress. Like most textbook portraits, however, the British one is painted in bold relief. Strong tendencies become incontrovertible generalizations, and traces of inconsistent evidence seem to disappear. Knowledgeable observers of British politics have long been aware that MPs are not quite so helpless and electorally irrelevant (or at least don't believe they are) as some textbooks suggest. Moreover, the recent literature increasingly focuses on changes in British politics, changes of a kind different from the generalizations of the older textbooks.

A number of British scholars (Butt, 1967; Chester & Bowring, 1962; Crick, 1970) have observed that in the postwar period the average amount of time devoted by an MP to government legislation has decreased and that devoted to representing constituents against the bureaucracy has increased. Barker and Rush (1970, pp. 183-184) report that Labour and younger members are especially prone to emphasize the "welfare-officer" role. The phrase "a good constituency man" has entered the popular literature on voting

(Hartley-Brewer, 1976), and the Liberalpioneered strategy of grass-rooting has received academic notice (Kavanaugh, 1969, pp. 49-50; King, 1974). Relevant data are scarce, however. In an older publication, Dowse (1963) studied an important aspect of constituency relations—surgeries—via a mail survey of 100 MPs. Of 69 responses, only one-fifth of the MPs held no surgery whatsoever, and those with fewer than nine years of service tended to hold them more frequently than more senior members. But Dowse found no relation between electoral margins and frequency of surgeries, and on that basis concluded that constituency work stems from the "genuine desire to win public esteem and to be of service" (p. 336). When queried directly, only one-third of the MPs viewed their activity as electorally profitable.

In contrast to Dowse's findings, our interviews 16 years later indicate that contemporary MPs are considerably more prone to hold surgeries (Table 3). As seen, 37% of Dowse's 1963 respondents held no regular surgery; by 1979 only a corporal's guard did not hold surgery on a regular basis. At the other extreme of the distribution, one-third of Dowse's respondents held surgeries at least every two weeks, whereas well over one-half of our respondents did so. In two decades surgery has apparently become a standard aspect of an MP's life.

Surgeries produce contact with constituents, generally those having some request, grievance, or other claim vis-à-vis the government. Our interviews explored at length the topic of casework; several salient features of the responses are of interest before we proceed to the statistical analyses. As government has grown, one would naturally expect that demands in the form of casework would grow commensurately, but some authors (e.g., Fiorina, 1977) have hypothesized that electoral incentives lead legislators to stimu-

In each country we attempted to procure an elite interview for each constituency in the sampling frame of the mass survey. In the United States we completed interviews for 102 of the 108 districts in the sample. Our target was the congressional administrative assistant who preliminary research indicated would be the best source of information on office organization and activities. In Great Britain we completed interviews with MPs or party agents or both in 101 of the 133 constituencies included in the sample. When reporting the data, of course, we include only one interview for each of the 101 constituencies in the sampling frame, or in some cases only for the 69 constituencies in which we interviewed the incumbent MP.

The MP responses, along with analogous MC responses, will be discussed at length in a book now in preparation.

Table 3. Comparative Frequency of Surgeries, 1963 v. 1979

	Dowse (1963) %	CFF (1979) %	
None	17	4	
Ad hoc basis	20	3	
Less than monthly	_	4	
Monthly	23	25	
Every three weeks	. 6	6	
Every two weeks	22	32	
Three per month	· _	11	
Weekly or more often	12	15	
N=	65	100	

late constituent demands. To be sure there is a broad range of possibilities, from a simple invitation in a newsletter for constituents to write to a given address, to passing out stamped, preaddressed postcards in nursing homes. At any rate, the interviews showed that at least some level of solicitation is the rule (85%) in the United States. The figure is lower (64%) in Britain, although a clear majority indicates some degree of initiative. In contrast, MPs are more likely (50%) to seek publicity for successful casework. Whereas MCs publicize casework in general terms and in the aggregate, they more often (67%) express the sentiment that publicizing the details of cases would be an invasion of their constituents' privacy.

In the United States the most common types of casework are social security and veterans' benefits (almost universally mentioned). In Britain citizen requests and complaints stem most frequently from housing (mentioned by 85% of our interviewees), pensions (72%), taxes (37%), and immigration (22%). Thus, the single most common source of casework in Britain is a program that is legally a responsibility of local government. An overwhelming majority of MPs (83%) report that they do handle such local casework, although a considerable proportion (33%) do so with reluctance. In contrast, a majority of MCs report they do not handle state and local cases, although they would advise constituents on the appropriate officials to contact.

Obviously, MPs are not geared up to handle casework to the same extent as MCs—they have nothing like the extensive, permanent district operations now common in the United States. Moreover, the much smaller size of British constituencies (about 90,000 people on average, as opposed to 525,000 in the United States) would lead us to expect a smaller case load. However, the estimated case loads reported in Table 4 are

higher than we had anticipated. Given that some MPs still answer their mail in longhand, their reported workload is quite impressive.

There is, then, a great deal of constituency-oriented activity apparent in Great Britain. And although we have presented data only on casework, MPs are in their constituencies more often than they hold surgery: the modal MP returns to the constituency at least weekly (many of them, of course, live in London), and more than 80% go home at least twice a month. Partially as a result of this contact, MPs enjoy high visibility in their constituencies. Referring back to the mass surveys, incumbent MPs enjoyed a spontaneous name recall of 66% in 1979, nearly twice the level achieved by MCs. <sup>10</sup> About an eighth of British respondents claimed to have met their MP personally.

Does the constituency attentiveness of an MP have any electoral payoff? Little in the literature bears directly on the question. As mentioned, only 32% of Dowse's 1963 respondents thought that it did. In our survey, however, 83% (57 of 69) answered definitely yes, and another 16% thought that a limited effect was present. Only one MP flatly denied an electoral effect. This response distribution is virtually the same as that for MCs, although very different from that which Dowse reported. Perhaps there has been a major temporal change, or perhaps Dowse's respondents hesitated to commit a seemingly crass admission to paper. Apropos of the latter possibility, consider that Barker and Rush (1970, p. 177) note that MPs queried in 1967 universally believed that

<sup>19</sup>Approximately 48% of the respondents could recall the name of any challenger for the parliamentary seat, which is much lower than the percentage who could recall the incumbent's, but also more than twice the recall rate for challengers of MCs.

Table 4. Number of Cases Handled per Week by MCs and MPs

	Congressmen %	MPs %
< 20	9	23
21-40	28	23
41-60	18	14
61-80	6	10
81-100	14	8
100+	16	3
MV <sup>a</sup>	10	19
N	102	101

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>MV = Refused to answer, didn't know.

their personal reputations and activities had some impact on the vote.

British academics, however, tend to accept the findings reported by Dowse. Like congressional scholars of the 1960s, British scholars appear reluctant to believe that MPs might be motivated to any significant extent by mundane electoral considerations. The edited transcripts of the King and Sloman BBC interviews reflect (and to some extent underlie) the prevailing consensus; they are worth quoting at some length. The first segment comes from a conversation with Shirley Williams, then a member of the Labour shadow cabinet, and Norman Tebbit, a junior Tory MP, although one from an extremely safe seat. The program was titled, "M.P.s and their Surgeries" (King & Sloman, 1973, pp. 13-14):

King: If it takes up so much time, if M.P.s have to write so many letters, if they sometimes find the work depressing, why do almost all members of Parliament hold surgeries? The cynic would say 'in order to win votes, of course.' But the cynic would be wrong. There is no evidence that this sort of careful individual constituency work makes any substantial difference at the time of a general election, and M.P.s know it. I asked Shirley Williams how far she thought her surgery work helped her win the allegiance of the voters.

Williams: I don't think that it makes much difference. All you can say is that perhaps you gradually build up a reputation as a conscientious or reasonably hard-working M.P., and that is of some advantage. But with the individual cases I suspect there's almost no influence at all.

King: How much advantage—hundreds of votes, thousands?

Williams: At most, hundreds.

King: Norman Tebbit seemed surprised even to be asked. Had he won any votes that morning?

Tebbitt: Do you know I've never thought of it? I can't say that for me the favorite part of my life as a Member of Parliament is being a social worker, . . . But I just regard it as part of my job and, as to whether it wins votes or not, you know, I'm not really particularly interested.

Similarly, in a segment titled "The Case of Flora Genetio" (King & Sloman, 1973, pp. 26-27), we read the following colloquy between King and Roy Hattersley, then a Labour front-bencher:

King: But in the end doesn't all this constituency work, doesn't the writing of all these letters, the holding of surgeries and advisory sessions, boil down to an effort to win votes, to make sure of getting in next time? Roy Hattersley, and I think most M.P.s, would deny this vigorously. How much help, I asked Roy Hattersley, do you think your constituency work is going to help towards your re-election when the time comes?

Hattersley: Very little indeed. My re-election when the time comes depends on the standing of the two parties. I hope I shall poll about nineteen or twenty thousand votes. If two or three hundred of those are the result of my constituency work, I shall have done rather well.

King: Why, then, does he do the work?

Hattersley: I do the constituency work, not for a political bonus, because there isn't a political bonus in it. I do it because it's part of the job.

King: Part of an M.P.s job. The non-partisan, non-speech-making, little-publicized part that goes on week in and week out, even when Parliament is in recess.

Evidently, the MPs quoted above do not share the views of most of those MPs we interviewed. Perhaps we were duped, or perhaps our interviewees did not understand the question as we intended it. But then again, perhaps constituency work is a more important concern of backbenchers, who are academically less interesting than frontbenchers. Perhaps, too, prominent politicians are loathe to announce over the BBC that their actions stem from anything but the highest of motives.

At any rate, there are at least three questions that research would do well to keep separate: 1) Do MPs believe that their constituency work has electoral payoffs? Based on our interviews we think the answer is now generally yes. 2) Is the constituency work of MPs motivated primarily by electoral considerations? The academic consensus is probably no, but in any event ascertaining "real" motivations is terribly difficult. 3) Whatever the motivation, does constituency work have an electoral impact? Aside from Dowse, an older study of the electoral strength of "experienced" candidates in 65 marginal seats (Williams, 1966-1967), and a recent study of 18 marginals by Curtice and Steed (1980), there is little research that sheds light on this last question. In the next section we present some findings based on the elite interviews and mass surveys discussed above.

#### Constituency Service and the Vote: Great Britain and the United States

Both mass surveys pursued at some length the subject of constituency service. Constituents were asked whether they had ever contacted the incumbent and if so, why, whether they had gotten a response, and whether they considered the response satisfactory. In the United States about one in seven respondents (a higher proportion of actual voters, of course) had initiated some communication with their MC; of these, 7% reported that they had requested help, 4% that they sought information, and 4% that they expressed their

opinions. In Great Britain 1 in 12 respondents had contacted their MP, with 5% requesting help, 2% information, and as would be expected, fewer than 2% expressing an opinion. Nearly all constituents in both countries reported that they were "very satisfied" with the response, and fewer than 25% reported either no response or dissatisfaction.

In addition to personal experiences, a fifth of the American and a sixth of the British samples claimed they knew of someone else who had contacted their MC or MP (we refer to this as secondhand contact in the discussion that follows). Further, one-fifth of the American sample and oneeighth of the British maintained that they could recall something special the incumbent had done for the district. The probes accompanying this item elicited a very mixed bag of responses by the Americans, with only about half referring specifically to local concerns and programs. In Britain, however, the modal answer, offered by two-fifths of the respondents, is that the MP champions local causes. Smaller, roughly equal proportions mention housing, local industries, aid to individuals in trouble, and the MPs general interest in local affairs.

Each survey included a generalized evaluative item designed to tap the incumbent's relationship to his constituency. First included in the 1978 NES/CPS election study, the item was dubbed "expectation of access." It was intended to capture some aspects of Fenno's (1978) emphasis on the reputation for accessibility and trustworthiness that a representative seeks to develop. We think that the wording of the question makes it a fair general measure of the extent to which a representative is perceived as "a good constituency man." It reads,

If you had a problem that Representative (your MP) (name) could do something about, do you think he/she would be very helpful, somewhat helpful, or not very helpful to you?

In both countries constituents expressed fairly positive expectations. <sup>12</sup> Some indication that these

"Munroe (1977) similarly finds that only a small proportion of constituent approaches to MPs involve general issues as opposed to personal concerns. In addition, Barker and Rush (1970, p. 175) comment that "we noticed that every one of a very varied group of constituencies produced more letters raising personal cases and problems than offered opinions on local or national issues."

<sup>12</sup>Across the response categories—very helpful, somewhat helpful, not very helpful, don't know, and depends—the American distribution was 27%, 34%, 10%, 25%, 4%, whereas the British distribution was

expectations have real content and are neither purely random nor pure rationalization appears in Table 5. The figures in the table are probit estimates for statistical models in which expectations of access are the left side variable. The models presume that incumbents enhance their images by achieving visibility and by actually compiling a good record, or at least one that is perceived as good. In addition constituents may have more positive expectations about an incumbent who shares their party affiliation. Conversely, a visible challenger might dim the luster of the incumbent, given that the former may attack the incumbent's record or person as part of his or her campaign. All of these suggestions are no more than common sense, and all are reflected in the data.

The British and American equations are quite similar. MPs may get more political mileage from personal contacts than MC's, 's and MCs perhaps more out of secondhand contacts (i.e., contacts with friends, relatives, and co-workers about whom the respondent has heard). After taking reported contacts into account, spontaneous name recall appears to have little effect in either country. 'A Party affiliations are more important, ceteris paribus, in Britain, with minor party identifiers significantly less likely to evidence positive expectations than even those who identify with

28%, 28%, 11%, 24%, 10%. The analyses in Table 5 do not include the "don't know" and "depends" responses. The vote analyses in Tables 6 and 7, however, represent these categories, along with the three ordinal categories, as dummy variables.

"The contact variables are created from the following survey item: "There are many ways in which MPs (MCs) can have contact with the people from their constituency. On this page are some of these ways (respondent receives card). Think of (name) who has been the MP (MC) from this constituency. Have you come into contact or learned anything about him/her through any of these ways?" Based on Parker's (1981) analysis the responses were used to create two dummy variables: personal contact (met the incumbent, heard him/her at a meeting, talked to staff, agent, secretary or other employee), and media contact (mail, newspaper/magazine, radio, TV).

"The U.S. equations in Tables 5 and 6 were also estimated using name recognition in place of spontaneous name recall. Generally the former has a larger and more highly significant coefficient, but other coefficients in the equations are no more than .02 different, and the overall fit of the equations is no better. Thus, in order to maximize comparability we report only the American equations using name recall. We also included campaign spending in the American equations, but failed to find significant effects. Spending presumably purchases contacts and visibility, but direct measures of the latter already appear in the equations.

Table 5. Expectation of Access Equations: United States and Great Britain

ī	United States (N = 811)	Great Britain (N = 821)
Contact		
Personal	.36**	.56**
Media	.39**	.23**
Secondhand	.24*	02
Casework		•
Very satisfied	1.07**	.92**
Somewhat satisfied	.17**	60*
Not satisfied	-1.22**	-1.39**
Secondhand casework	`	
Satisfied	.66**	
Somewhat satisfied	.02	.57**
Not satisfied	67*	
District service	.38**	.55**
Party identification	•	
Independent	.02	_
Minor	<del>-</del>	44*
None	<del>-</del>	.24*
Same	.19*	.41**
Recall incumbent	.16	.05
Recall challenger	05	02
Year elected	01*	.01
Constant	1.25**	.14
<b>₹</b> 2	.36	.29

<sup>\*</sup>p < .05.

national parties different from the incumbent's (the latter constitute the omitted reference category in the set of dummy variables). If Identifiers with the incumbent's party are the most sanguine about the likelihood that he or she would help in a pinch. Finally, in the United States senior incumbents are expected to be more

<sup>15</sup>In Tables 5 and 6 party affiliations are coded as follows. In the American sample all respondents fall into mutually exclusive classes: same party as incumbent (51%), independent (14%), opposite party from incumbent (35%). In the British sample 38% share the party affiliation of the incumbent, and 17% admit to no party identification. The opposite party category includes adherents of any party whose MP is not of that party-45%. In order to pick up any additional differences between national and minor party identifiers, an additional dummy variable, minor party identifier, is included. This variable takes on a value of one for those 2.5% of the respondents who report an identification with other than the Conservative, Labour, or Liberal parties. To avoid statistical degeneracy in the analyses, one category, opposite party identifier, is omitted from each equation reported in Tables 5 and 6.

helpful than junior ones; no comparable relationship is apparent in Britain.

However, the largest coefficients in Table 5 reflect the effects of the incumbent's previous efforts. Satisfied constituents are highly positive about his or her future potential, and dissatisfied constituents (rare) highly negative (the omitted reference category for these dummy variables comprises those who report no casework experience). Those who recall something already done for the constituency are likewise very positive. Not surprisingly, these figures show clearly that incumbent representatives can behave in a manner calculated to enhance their constituents' images

<sup>16</sup>We did not get a measure of satisfaction with secondhand casework experience in Britain. Thus, the dummy variable takes on a value of one for all those who report knowledge of friend, relative, or co-worker experience. The large and highly significant coefficient suggests that the effects of satisfactory secondhand experience are very strong, given that the estimate in the table is watered down by inclusion of a presumed minority who recall unsatisfactory experiences.

<sup>\*\*</sup>p < .01.

of them, and that conclusion holds for MPs as much as for MCs. As yet, however, we do not know the degree to which positive images translate into supportive votes.

Table 6 represents a first attempt at answering the preceding questions. The equations reported in this table treat the vote decision as dependent on the visibility of the incumbent and challenger, the reputation of the incumbent for being "a good constituency man," the party affiliation of the incumbent vis-a-vis the constituent, and evaluations of the executive. 17

17In the analyses reported in Table 6, the executive performance ratings are collapsed into three categories: approve (very good, good), fair/don't know, and disapprove (very poor, poor). Because the effect of executive approval on the vote will depend on the party of incumbent—relating positively to votes for Labour MPs and negatively to votes for Conservatives—we have formed interaction terms between performance ratings and the party of the incumbent MP, which yields six dummy variables, one of which—conservative incumbent, disapprove Callaghan—is omitted from the analysis. Analogous procedures were followed in the American case, although the results are completely

Taking the more familiar American results first, the estimates are consistent with recent accounts of House elections in the academic literature, the popular press, and the laments of political leaders. By achieving visibility and developing a reputation for constituency service, the MC can exert a major impact on his or her electoral fate. All else being equal, a very favorable image as a good constituency representative is more important to the candidate in determining the vote than having the same party affiliation as the voter. As in Table 1, the effects of Carter ratings on the House vote in 1980 were nil, even though the present analysis is restricted to incumbents who have a record vis-a-vis Carter.

And what about Britain? The estimates demonstrate much that anyone would have expected, and perhaps a bit that some would not. As in Table 1, the effects of party identification are nothing short of massive (recall that "opposite party identifier" is the omitted reference cate-

insensitive to how or even whether Carter ratings enter the equation.

Table 6. Incumbent Vote Equations, United States and Great Britain

	United States (n = 644)	Great Britain (n = 1,111)
Incumbent name recall	.44**	.46**
Challenger name recall	77**	35**
Challenger contact	<b>– .</b> 57 <b>**</b>	<b>-</b> .
Expectation of helpfulness		
Very	1.76**	.35*
Somewhat	.82**	<b>.07</b>
Don't know	.43*	22
Depends	_	02
Party identification		
Independent	.57**	, <del>-</del>
None -	<u>-</u>	.99**
Other	-	.99**
Same	1.19**	2.43**
Executive job rating		
Out-party incumbent		
Approve	.23	.01
Fair/DK	47	.34*
Disapprove	29	.50*
In-party incumbent		
Fair/DK	- <b>.76</b>	20
Disapprove	13	60**
Constant-	71**	-1.65**
Ŕ <sup>2</sup>	.51	.64
Correctly predicted	80%	86%

Table 7. Estimated Probabilities of Incumbent Vote by Expectation of Helpfulness

Incumbent's party	Voter's identification	Not helpful	Somewhat helpful	Very helpful
Great Britain				
Lab	Lab	.89	.91	.94
1 -	None/Other	.34	.37	.48
	Cons	.06	.07	.11
Cons	Lab	.12	.13	.20
	None/Other	.56	.58	.69
	Cons	.95	.96	.98
United States			•	
Dem	Dem	.58	- <b>.90</b>	•99
	Ind	.39	.71	.93
	Rep	.20	.49	.82
Rep	Dem	.32	.63	.90
	Ind	.33	.65	.91
	Rep	.58	.84	97

gory). How difficult it is for other influences to have an impact in the face of such strong partisan effects is shown in Table 7 (below). The other major influence on British voting decisions offers a clear contrast to the American results. Ratings of Callaghan's performance have significant effects on the vote for MPs. The omitted reference category is "in-party incumbent, approves Callaghan performance" (the expected effects of Callaghan ratings on the vote are obviously conditional on the party of the incumbent MP). Thus, the estimates show that constituents who disapprove of Callaghan's performance are significantly more likely to vote for a Conservative MP than those who approve; constituents of a Labour MP who disapprove of Callaghan are significantly less likely to vote for the MP than are those who approve of Callaghan.

Of most interest, however, are the variables that capture aspects of the personal vote in Britain. As in the U.S. equations, incumbent visibility has a positive and highly significant impact on electoral support (and challenger visibility has a comparable negative impact). Well-known incumbents do better than unknowns, other things being equal. Of even greater interest is the estimate attached to a reputation for constituency service. Those constituents who hold highly positive expectations of their MP are significantly more likely to vote for him or her than those not holding such expectations. There is no denying, however, that the effects of constituency service are but a shadow of what they are in the United States. Table 7 gives some idea of the comparative magnitude of the effects; the variable of interest is the voter's

expectation of helpfulness. We examine six configurations obtained by crossing three party-identification categories with two incumbency categories. The figures in the table are calculated from Table 6 under the assumption that the voter has the modal value for variables other than expectations of helpfulness. In the British calculations this means that the voter is assumed to recall the incumbent, not recall the challenger, and rate Callaghan good if a Labour identifier, fair if a nonidentifier, and the average of poor and fair if a Conservative identifier. Given these conditions the voters' estimated probabilities of voting for the incumbent MP are given in the top part of the table.

The party identification and Callaghan rating effects are so strong that the vote is almost a foregone conclusion in many cases, but at the margins the effect of being "a good constituency man" emerges. The smallest effect is a .03 increase in the probability that a Conservative identifier would support a Conservative incumbent, whereas the largest is a .14 increase in the probability that a nonidentifier would support a Labour incumbent. These numbers contrast with the American figures in the bottom half of the table. There we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>That is, .03 is the difference in estimated probability of a Conservative identifier supporting a Conservative incumbent whom he believes would not be helpful if a problem arose and that of supporting a Conservative MP who would be very helpful. The other differences mentioned in the text are analogous.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>The American figures are calculated under the assumption that the voter does not spontaneously recall

see that an incumbent's perceived reputation can have enormous effects. Consider, for example, the range of probability estimates for identifiers of one party who have a MC of the other: these probabilities triple as a function of perceived reputation. All in all, an MC's reputation for helpfulness appears to have a potential impact as great as that of party identification.

How large is the personal vote in Britain? Is it the negligible few hundred that some observers dismiss? Using Tables 6 and 7 to arrive at a precise estimate is not easy, inasmuch as the estimates vary considerably with voter characteristics and attitudes, but for illustrative purposes imagine some hypothetical races. Looking across our sample we find a constituency quite negative about the expected helpfulness of their MP: 8 electors distributed 0, 1, 7 across the categories "very helpful," "somewhat helpful," and "not very helpful." Another constituency is distributed in exactly the reverse fashion: 7, 1, 0 (a few constituencies have everyone in the first category, incidentally). Applying the probability estimates given in Table 7, and weighting by the actual distributions of party identification in Labour and Conservative incumbent constituencies, respectively, we arrive at estimated differences in expected vote of a little less than 6.5% in the case of Conservative MPs and a little more than 6.5% in the case of Labour MPs. We emphasize that these are not estimates of the actual personal vote in 1979, even in an "average" constituency, but rather illustrations of the potential difference between the vote-attracting abilities of MPs with reputations as excellent constituency men and those with reputations as very poor ones. Still, because it is at least partially an MP's decision to become known as an excellent constituency man or a very poor one, the figures represent maximum bounds on the personal vote in contemporary Britain.

We recognize, of course, that some readers may be skeptical of the kind of exercise just reported, inasmuch as it relies on a survey item that measures voter evaluations, and such items always entail a risk of contamination from other evaluative factors. Even given the results in Table 5, should we not worry that responses to the expectation-of-access item are in some part rationalizations, that people who plan to vote for a given incumbent naturally say that he would be very helpful? As a precaution against this pos-

A noteworthy feature of the 1979 general election was that the traditional uniform swing was much less uniform than usual: North Britain swung to the Conservatives by 4.2%, whereas South Britain swung by 7.7% (Curtice & Steed, 1980, p. 395). Because of regional variations, recent analyses of British electoral behavior have used regional swing figures rather than a single national average. We follow this practice in the analyses reported in Table 8 by regressing the swing in our sample districts on the swing in their larger region, several demographic variables previously identified as important (Crewe, 1979), and their score on the constituency work index.21 The results are quite indicative. The statistically significant estimates imply that variations in constituency work (0 to 4) account for swings of something between 1.5 and 2% for Conservatives and of something between 3 and 3.5% for Labour. Thus, depending on the party, variations in constituency attentiveness have an electoral effect potentially as large as one quarter to one-half of the observed regional swings. The figure for Labour is almost twice that for Conservatives, consistent with the estimates of Williams (1966-1967) for an earlier period.22 The estimates are

sibility we report a second analysis based on the elite surveys discussed in the preceding section. Many of our interviewees voiced the opinion that diligent constituency work could dampen swings against their party or augment swings to their party. Given the data they reported, it is a fairly straightforward matter to examine the accuracy of their beliefs. We formulated a simple additive index based on the MP's description of his constituency work. The index gives a value of one for each of the following: does the MP encourage casework, does the MP publicize successful casework, does the MP handle local cases, and does the MP hold surgery more than twice monthly? The 101 districts for which we have interviews range from zero to four on this index.20 Do these accounts of constituency work bear any relation to objective swings in the vote? Table 8 shows that they most certainly do.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>The actual distribution of the 101 districts across the 0-4 scale was 16, 21, 28, 31, 5. The analysis in Table 8 utilizes 85 of the 101 cases, excluding retirees, seats won in by-elections during 1974-1979, and seats held by Liberals and Nationalists.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>The details of this analysis are discussed at length in Cain (in press).

<sup>27</sup>Williams's (1966-1967) analysis did not utilize a measure of constituency effort. Rather, he sought more broadly to estimate the personal votes of "familiar" Labor versus "familiar" Conservative MPs. A

the incumbent or challenger, approves of Carter's performance if a Democrat, and disapproves if an Independent or a Republican. Again, these assumptions reflect modal responses in the sample,

Table 8. Effect of Constituency Work on Swing<sup>8</sup>

	Conserva	ative Seats	Labour S	Labour Seats		
	(1)	(2) <sup>b</sup>	(3)	(4) <sup>b</sup>		
Regional swing	.59**.	.56**	.83**	.79**		
Constituency work	.42*	.44*	74†	88*		
Immigrant (%)	-4.24**	-4.03**	-1.17	٠ ـــ		
Metropolitan cities	.19	· _ ,	2.23*	1.92*		
Nonmetropolitan cities	89	• _	.17			
Constant *	1.15	1.22	2.45	3.06		
n	55	<b>55</b> .	33	33		
$\hat{R}^2$	.41	.39	.55	.52		

p < .05.

realistic bounds on the actual size of the personal vote, moreover, since it is well within the capability of the average MP to determine where he or she scores on the index of constituency work. We should also note that these estimates are generally in the ballpark, although somewhat larger than those calculated by Curtice and Steed (1980, p. 409) from analysis of 18 "switched" districts.<sup>23</sup>

#### Discussion

The estimates reported in the preceding section do not show that constituency work is a major influence on the vote in Britain. Rather, our analyses confirm the standard findings that party allegiances and evaluations of party leaders account for the lion's share of the variance in electoral decisions, although it seems clear that party loyalty accounts for less than it once did (Crewe, 1974). Is it the case, then, that constituency service in Britain is of only mild academic interest, not deserving of anything like the attention it has received in the American literature? In our opinion, no.

In the first place, what is of importance to

tenured professors seeking to explain variance. and what is of importance to elected officials seeking to win reelection may not correspond very closely. Individual MPs can do little or nothing to alter their constituents' evaluations of party leaders. But individuals can affect their images in the constituency, and the little they can affect may be of greater importance to them than the great deal that they cannot. Moreover, within the ranks of elected officials, there are further distinctions. The minister sitting in a safe seat may share the professor's disdain for a piddling personal vote, but the ambitious politician in a marginal seat may view those one thousand to two thousand votes as the difference between a successful political career and oblivion.24

Second, constituency service in Britain might be of more importance than its present impact on the popular vote would indicate, owing to indications that service activity is a growth industry. Our elite interviews contain numerous suggestions that "this sort of thing" has become a larger part of the MP's job in recent years—sometimes to the dismay of older MPs. Constituency parties increasingly require their MPs to establish a local residence. And, as discussed earlier, there has been an increase in the frequency of surgeries. Such indications of increasing constituency orien-

<sup>\*\*</sup>p < .01.

 $t_p < .10$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup> Swing is defined as the average of the gain in Conservative share of the vote and loss in Labour share. The figures are drawn from the Times Guide to the House of Commons.

bEquations (2) and (4) omit nonsignificant demographic variables included in equations (1) and (3).

<sup>&</sup>quot;familiar" MP was defined as one with eight or more years' service.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Bear in mind, however, that Curtice and Steed attempt to estimate the actual personal vote in their sample of marginals. In contrast, our figures again represent the potential electoral difference between a very low level of constituency effort and a very high level, averaged across both marginal and nonmarginal districts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>In another article (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, in press) we show that electoral marginality is significantly associated with an MP's inclination to engage in a variety of constituency-oriented activities. Not surprisingly, those whose fates are more dependent on a few votes more actively seek those votes.

tation have potentially important electoral implications. Whatever the significance of constituency work for electoral behavior today, it might be considerably greater than it was two decades ago, and perhaps considerably less than it might be two decades hence. To explain the importance of that possibly emerging trend, we need to develop a further line of argument.

This article presents a simple cross-sectional analysis based on the static theoretical proposition that single-member district electoral systems provide incentives for candidates to cultivate personal bases of support. This proposition is significant in and of itself, we believe, but it takes on even greater significance when embedded in a dynamic theory of the evolution of party systems. In the United States, for example, a number of scholars have argued that the increasing importance of the personal vote and the decreasing importance of party affiliations are not independent phenomena. Burnham (1971) was probably the first to argue that the decline of party provides fertile ground for the growing importance of personal candidate appeals, which in turn further contribute to the decline of party. The argument is a dynamic one which our data are not adequate to test, but a few moment's consideration will demonstrate its plausibility.

Consider a single-member district system perfectly structured by party. Then by definition there is no personal vote: election outcomes simply reflect the automatic support of partisans for candidates of their party. Now if the hold of party should weaken, perhaps because of poor performance by the party in office, or unpopular issue positions by one or more of the parties, then a context is created which did not exist before. With some voters willing to employ decision criteria other than partisanship, the personal characteristics and activities of the candidates might, but not necessarily, begin to take on significance. As Fenno writes (1978, p. 211):

Incumbency is not an automatic entitlement to a fixed number of votes or percentage points toward re-election. . . . Incumbency should be seen as a resource to be employed; an opportunity to be exploited; and the power of incumbency is whatever each member makes of the resource and the opportunity.

But, assume that some incumbents seize the opportunity and work to build personal bases of support. Then we would expect some feedback effect from their activities: observing hardworking incumbents making special efforts to serve their constituents, still more voters will decide that partisanship should matter less and the individual candidates more, thus further weakening the hold of party. In short, once the dynamic is set in mo-

tion it is self-reinforcing; declining parties contribute to increasing personal votes which in turn detract further from the importance of party.

How does the dynamic begin in the first place? Perhaps through some exogenous event(s) as with the aforementioned suggestions of bad performance or unpopular issue stands, or even as a result of more-or-less nonpolitical factors such as a changing media environment, social or technological change, or whatnot. On the other hand an endogenous cause is conceivable. No party system has the kind of complete control posited at the beginning of this argument. There is always some slack in the system. And if incumbents begin to take advantage of such slack—for whatever reason—their resulting electoral benefit may encourage others and thus help weaken the hold of party even in the absence of exogenous disturbances.

What is the upshot of the preceding argument? Are we suggesting that the British party system is undergoing the same sort of decomposition as the American? Not at all. What we are suggesting is that the existence, size, and variation in the personal vote for legislative incumbents is of interest not only for the citizen voting decisions it affects, but also as an important indicator of the strength and trend of a nation's party system.25 And that is a topic that has aroused considerable interest among British commentators. To complete the argument we need refer to nothing so grand as the current Social Democratic challenge to the established Conservative and Labour parties. Less dramatically, Crewe (1974) describes such trends as the declining share of the vote captured by the two major parties, declining turnout, and increasing interelection volatility in the two-party swing. Proably less significant, but even more interesting from the standpoint of the research described in this article, are the reports of departures in the 1979 results from established patterns of British electoral behavior. Consider some selected remarks of Curtice and Steed in their detailed statistical appendix to the most recent Nuffield election study (Butler & Kavanagh, 1980):

The 1974-1979 swing was not uniform: it varied more from seat to seat than in any other election since 1950 (1980, p. 394).

<sup>23</sup>Of course, happenings in the electoral arena are not the only indicator of the state of the party system. The importance of party in the decisionmaking arena (i.e., Parliament) is of equal if not greater importance, although the two arenas undoubtedly have some connection to each other. In this regard an interesting topic for future research is whether the observations of Norton (1980) and Schwartz (1980) on the 1970s weakening of parliamentary party cohesion bear any relation to the concerns of this article.

It is clear that Labour kept down the swing in its marginal constituencies, particularly in those with less than a 2% two-party majority. . . . A major reason for the low swing, particularly the very low swing in the most marginal seats, is the effect of a change in incumbent MP since 1974. Because of the greater attention he can command in the media and the constituency services he can render, an incumbent MP is more likely to be able to establish a personal vote, consisting of those who support him as an individual rather than as a party representative. Where an MP does build such a personal vote in his favour. that vote will be lost if he is defeated. If he does lose, by the time of the next election the new incumbent MP may have acquired his own personal vote. The combined effect of these two personal votes would be a lower swing against the second incumbent at the following election. . . .

These 18 clear cases amount to strong evidence of the personal vote that an MP can build up. The low swing in them is consistent and appears to be independent of location or type of constituency. For the period from 1974 to 1979, it would appear that the double effect amounted to around 1500 votes in an average sized constituency. . . . It is, of course, in marginal seats that MPs have the greatest incentive to work for such personal votes (1980, pp. 408-409).

The more important and unexpected change is the reduction in the number of marginal constituencies. The figures in Table 13 show that, on average, about 12 seats would change hands for each 1% swing. However, the equivalent tables produced after the 1964 and 1966 elections showed that about 18 seats would change hands for each 1% swing. This dramatic reduction in the number of seats liable to change hands has undermined the "cube law," which if it holds, does result in practice in about 18 seats changing hands for each 1% swing (1980, pp. 428-429).

Are the 1979 results aberrant? Apparently not. In a later analysis Curtice and Steed (1982, pp. 268-269) view the 1977 results as the continuation of trends which in retrospect began several elections earlier:

In 1955 the preconditions for the operation of the cube law were still largely met.... Between 1955 and 1970 not a great deal of change occurred, except that there was some evidence of a small secular increase in the standard deviation.... In the 1970s both major parties won more seats by large two-party majorities: the distribution of the two-party vote widened and flattened. Before 1974 it was unimodal with a peak near its centre; the distribution is now bimodal with peaks where both parties win safe seats by moderately safe majorities. As a consequence of these changes, the exaggerative power of Britain's electoral system has been systematically reduced in the last three elections.

Nonuniform national swings? Incumbency effects? Vanishing marginals? Decling swing ratios? The American student of Burnham, Erikson, Mayhew, and Tufte should be forgiven a sudden rush of déjà vu, although the magnitudes of the changes discussed by Curtice and Steed are but a pale reflection of those observed in American congressional elections. The changes are noteworthy enough, however, that scholars should not blithely dismiss MPs' activities and their associated personal votes. Whatever its current importance, the personal vote may indicate the condition of important features of the larger electoral system and presage future alterations in that system.

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### Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan

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This article extends the recent empirical work on the perceptions and role of bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking. The question of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and the role of each in policymaking is especially important in the case of Japan, because the prevalent models of Japanese politics and policymaking are those of the "bureaucracy dominant" or of a closely interwoven "ruling triad" of bureaucracy, big business, and the governing Liberal Democratic Party.

Data are from a systematic survey of 251 higher civil servants and 101 members of the government and opposition parties in the House of Representatives, supplemented by data from other surveys and, wherever possible, compared to equivalent data from western democracies.

The results indicate that Japanese politicians and bureaucrats resemble Western European elites both in social background and in the fact that although the roles of politician and bureaucrat are converging, there are still differences in their contributions to the policymaking process. However, politicians influence policymaking more than most models of Japanese politics have posited, and even government and opposition politicians share some consensus about the most important policy issues facing Japan. A factor analysis demonstrated that higher civil servants' orientations toward their roles vary significantly with their positions in the administrative hierarchy.

The 27-year incumbency of the LDP as ruling party has been particularly important in determining the Japanese variant of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. We suggest that the Japanese case shows that the bureaucracy's increasing role in policymaking is universal; however, in late-modernizing political systems like Japan's, where the bureaucracy has always been a dominant actor, the growing power of politicians in postwar politics has been the most significant actor in bringing about more convergence in the two elites. Our data on this trend argue for a more complicated and pluralistic view of Japanese policymaking than that provided by either the bureaucracy-dominant or the ruling-triad model.

In the last few years, political scientists have discovered the bureaucracy and bureaucrats as political actors. An expanding literature has focused, not just on the classic questions of public administration, but on the power of bureaucracy

Received: October 18, 1982 Revision received: March 31, 1983 Accepted for publication: April 27, 1983

The authors would like to thank especially Robert Putnam, T. J. Pempel, and Sidney Tarrow for their very helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. We are also grateul to the participants in faculty seminars at Cornell University, the University of Michigan, the University of Pittsburgh, the Wilson Center, and Harvard University for their feedback on various parts of this article and to our anonymous reviewers for useful criticisms. Finally, we appreciate the manuscript typing services provided by the Bureau for Faculty Research, Western Washington University. Responsibility for contents is entirely our own.

and its specific role and influence in the democratic political systems of advanced industrial societies (for example, Crozier, 1964; Dogan, 1975; Suleiman, 1974). Beginning with Weber's hypothesis that the two greatest shapers of the modern state would be the professional politician and the professional civil servant, a growing subfield has been concerned specifically with their interaction, with the relative degree of their influence, and with their conflict or convergence in the policymaking process. Using systematic sampling and survey techniques, analysts have investigated the related issues of the self-perceptions of bureaucrats toward their role in policymaking and politics, of the personal and professional backgrounds of politicians and bureaucrats, and of the perceptions and attitudes of politicians and bureaucrats toward each other.

The results of this research have been rich but varied. In terms of what politicians and bureaucrats do—their roles in policymaking and whether or not they engage in politics—the latest comprehensive comparative study by Aberbach, Putnam,

and Rockman (1981) indicates that the Weberian ideal distinction between politicians who make policy and bureaucrats who merely implement it does not realistically describe their roles in modern democracies. Rather, these authors find that both engage heavily in politics, and each understands that the other plays a role in policy-making. This convergence of the two elite groups may well result from the increasing complexity and overlapping of functions in the modern state on the one hand, and the political requirements of operating in democratic systems with everincreasing societal demands from enfranchised citizens and pressure groups on the other.

Yet the proposition that the roles have converged completely is also rejected: if some functions, such as formulating policy and brokering interests, have come to be shared by both politicians and bureaucrats, others still tend to be the preserve of one or the other elite. Bureaucrats still tend to dominate policy and implementation, whereas politicians still tend to be the articulators of ideals (Aberbach et al., 1981, p. 239).

Moreover, there are still important differences between who becomes a politician and a bureaucrat, and how they perform their political and policymaking roles. In democracies as diverse as England, Germany, and Italy, bureaucrats typically had different social origins (more homogeneous) and recruitment patterns from those of politicians. Bureaucrats also had different motivations and approaches to their jobs and different modes of policy analysis, which stem in part from the fundamental natures of their roles. "Politicians and bureaucrats both do policy analysis, but in important respects they do it quite differently" (Putnam, 1975, p. 193).

Aberbach et al. (1981, pp. 9, 24) summarize the main differences; first, "whereas politicians articulate broad and diffuse interests of unorganized individuals, bureaucrats mediate narrow, focused interests of organized clienteles." Second, politicians bring "energy" to policymaking, being partisan and idealistic advocates in style, whereas bureaucrats provide "equilibrium," seeking to avoid conflict, seeking technical and incremental solutions and agreements on narrowly defined problems.

If generally in the Western democracies politicians and bureaucrats are converging somewhat in their roles in policymaking and politics, but not in their style of performing those roles, there are also important variations across nations. Thus, the United States is a consistent aberration, with American congressmen and civil servants somewhat more similar in social backgrounds and much more alike in role focus than are politicians and bureaucrats in Western Europe (Aberbach et al., 1981, pp. 94-100). There are variations even in

the Western European nations where politicians and bureaucrats differ in background and policy approach. For example, Putnam (1973, pp. 110-120) has shown that despite the similar parliamentary systems, recent historical experiences, and very common social origins, Italian bureaucrats were more likely to hold classical administrative attitudes toward their and the politicians' roles than German bureaucrats, who were much more political and like British civil servants in their pluralistic attitudes toward the policy process.

In this article we raise many of the same issues about the perceptions and roles of bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking in Japan. Using systematic survey data on samples of politicians and bureaucrats, we seek to test whether Japanese politicians and bureaucrats are similar or different in social background, recruitment, role in policymaking, and orientations to policymaking roles, and the consequent degree of conflict or convergence between them. One of our goals is to place the roles of politicians and bureaucrats in Japan into comparative perspective. Another is to use that perspective for insights into politics in Japan. Especially, we wish to discover the nature and sources of the major cleavages among the political elite in contemporary Japanese policymaking.

#### The Japanese Case: Major Questions

There are a number of significant reasons why the case of Japan is particularly interesting to analysts of the roles of politicians and bureaucrats in policymaking.

First, whereas the Western democracies have been investigated using systematic attitude surveys, there has been no such English language study of the only non-Western democracy in an advanced industrial society. Aberbach et al. (1981, p. 3) emphasize the uniqueness of the division of labor between elected politicians and career bureaucrats, the phenomenon being found primarily in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe and North America. Japan is one of those few modern states outside the West which has witnessed such trends.

Second, there is a particular historical dimension to the Japanese case that invites both comparison and contrast to some European states. As in Italy and Germany, the long-term rise of professional politicians and bureaucrats has taken place in the context of great historical discontinuity. All three countries are late nineteenth-century modernizers with strong bureaucratic traditions; all have experienced both the destruction of democracy before World War II and its reinstitution after the war.

Yet the professionalization of political and

bureaucratic elites took place within a shorter time period and with even greater discontinuities in Japan than in any European nation. Neither the beginnings of political parties nor a modern bureaucracy were established in Japan until the 1880s, although the foundations of bureaucratic organization and ethos were laid much earlier, in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868) (Najita, 1974, pp. 16-42). A parliament was not instituted until 1890. Even these institutions differed significantly from their Western European counterparts. Political parties never attained a real mass organizational base, and the principle of Cabinet responsibility to the Diet was never institutionalized in the prewar period, even if the practice emerged for a brief period in the 1920s. Universal manhood suffrage was not granted until 1926, and women were disenfranchized until 1947.

The bureaucracy was "modern" and professionalized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but never in the context of party control over the state apparatus. Until the American occupation of Japan, bureaucrats were technically servants of the Emperor (which in fact meant of civilian or military leaders of the Cabinet who except for very brief periods were not party politicians). It was not until the postwar reforms that the context existed to develop a truly professionalized political elite that had access to the levers of state power and a professionalized administrative elite that had to contend with party and parliamentary institutions and politicians.

Thus, just as in the economic sphere, where Japan began to catch up to the West before the war, but the modernization reached fruition only in the postwar period, politically too, elements of the modern state existed before the war but the full institutionalization of the two political elites in the context of universal suffrage and a democratic framework had to await the postwar era. One key question, of course, is whether this telescoping of the stages of state modernization and the very recent institutionalization of a modern democratic framework has created similar or different patterns of politicianbureaucrat interaction than in the West. Another is whether the postwar democratic reforms have resulted in a bureaucracy that accepts the pluralistic rules of the democratic game, as seems to have happened in West Germany, or whether the prewar patterns of classical bureaucratic norms have remained entrenched, as they seem to have done in Italy (Putnam, 1973, pp. 110-120).

The third major reason for exploring Japan as a case of politician-bureaucrat interaction is that the question of the relationship and relative power of bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking has been at the heart of most interpretations of postwar Japanese politics. The two most preva-

lent and influential models of Japanese politics among both Japanese and American political scientists have been the bureaucracy-dominant and the ruling triad models, although which has been the major and which the minor chord seems to have varied in the two countries.

Among Japanese political scientists, the view that the bureaucracy still has predominant influence in politics is a common one (Ito, 1980; Misawa, 1967; Tsuji, 1969). Misawa (1967) thus analyzes the interaction between politicians and bureaucrats and recognizes the influence of party politicians but ultimately argues for the bureaucracy-dominant theory. Ishida (1960) has implied that many pressure groups are subordinate to bureaucratic influence, and in extreme cases it has even been argued that both the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and interest groups can be viewed as mere dependents of the bureaucracy. The bureaucracy-dominant model of Japanese politics has influenced Japanese political science for thirty years, with the causes of the bureaucracy's superior power claimed to lie in the historical development of Japan directly from absolutism to the contemporary administrative state, skipping the stage of citizen society (Tsuji, 1969).

Some American political scientists too have argued for other reasons that the bureaucracy dominates policymaking. First, it has been pointed out that the higher civil service not only survived the Occupation reforms more intact than any other prewar political and social institution, but actually increased its power under the Occupation's policies of economic recovery and post-occupation government's priorities for rapid economic growth (Johnson, 1975, pp. 14-22; 1982, pp. 44-46).

Second, the bureaucracy has seemed to dominate the legislative process to the extent that the Japanese Diet has appeared as merely the ratifier of bureaucratic policy. Most government bills (the overwhelming majority of those passed by the Diet) are initiated by bureaucrats in the various ministries. Additionally, bureaucrats are involved throughout the legislative process. Because of their control over information and technical expertise, they are consulted by the ruling party in their decisions on policy and legislation and are invited to Diet committees to defend drafts of proposed bills. Bureaucrats or ex-bureaucrats even dominate the membership and staffs of the many deliberative and advisory councils that have become important in the policymaking process. The ruling party itself is closely intertwined with the higher civil service. The LDP was formed in 1955 and has continuously been the single, majority government party. During this entire period, ex-bureaucrats (kanryō seijika) have constituted at least 30% of the LDP membership in both houses of the Diet and have been seen as more influential in the party than the "pure politician" group (tōjinha). The great majority of Prime Ministers have also been ex-officials (see Pempel, 1974, 1982). Finally, it also has been argued that, whatever the role of the bureaucracy in the formal policymaking process, it also actually makes policy through the use of "administrative guidance," bureaucratic ordinances, directives, and informal persuasion (Kaplan, 1972; Pempel. 1974, pp. 654-656). For all these reasons when the question, "Who governs postwar Japan?" has been asked, at least one political scientist has: answered directly-"the bureaucracy" (Johnson, 1975).

The second major model of postwar Japanese politics, one with somewhat more influence in the United States than in Japan, is the ruling triad model. Here, the bureaucracy is still one of the major policymaking actors, but is joined by the governing LDP and big business. In this conception, big business supplies most of the political funds to the LDP in exchange for that party passing pro-business policy in the Diet (Yanaga. 1968). The bureaucracy works closely with the LDP and big business to assure conservative policies, and higher bureaucrats retire young to positions as LDP Diet members or as members of the boards of big business. Connected by these vested interests, the same elite social backgrounds, and an old-boy network of school and marriage ties, they share the same values and policy priorities. In sum, "the nation is governed jointly by organized business, the party government, and the administrative bureaucracy" (Yanaga, 1968, p. 27) which constitute a homogenous, interwoven conservative elite that by itself determines national policy (Tsurutani, 1977, pp. 70-116; Yanaga, 1968). They are seen not just as the major elements in Japanese politics, but as Japanese politics and as the policymakers. The opposition parties, interest groups other than big business (and to a lesser extent agriculture), and the Diet itself are seen as powerless and irrelevant to policymaking.

The ruling triad model has attracted only a few adherents among Japanese political scientists (e.g., Taguchi, 1969), although in a more popular and extreme form it becomes the power elite view of Japanese politics held by, among others, many journalists and intellectuals and some opposition parties. Interestingly, a close cousin of this view is shared by many of a different ideological persuasion, namely the image of "Japan, Incorporated" perceived by many businessmen and journalists on the American side of the Pacific.

Despite the existence of a minority who saw Japanese politics as more complicated and pluralistic (Curtis, 1975; Ike, 1978, pp. 58-63; Reischauer, 1977, pp. 286-297), the bureaucracy-dominant and ruling triad models have been pervasive and have formed much of the basis for discussions of postwar politics. Yet in relation to the comparative literature on bureaucrats and politicians, they have significant weaknesses. First, they are concerned primarily with the question of the relative power of bureaucrats and politicians or their presumed common interests and backgrounds and not with the question of their specific roles (and role conflicts) in, and perceptions of, policymaking. Consequently, many of the questions so salient in the comparative literature have not been analyzed with respect to Japan.

Another problem with both models is that they usually deal only with higher level bureaucrats and the LDP. Thus, middle-level civil servants and opposition party politicians are not taken into account. Yet, to form a complete picture of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and the potential sources of cleavages among the Japanese political elite, these groups too must be considered. Most important, the evidence for the models is not based on systematic data on how the participants themselves view each other, their roles, or politics and policy. Observation of the operation of a particular ministry, data on the formal role of bureaucrats in policymaking, and general speculation on the common orientation of policy actors must be supplemented, even confirmed, by evidence of the informal attitudes and norms of the actors involved.

Below we present data from a systematic survey of a sample of Japanese higher civil servants and politicians, both middle and higher bureaucrats, and LDP and opposition politicians. The aim is to consider the related questions of the relative influence of politicians and bureaucrats, of their collaboration or contention in the policy process, and of the roles of these two elites in comparative perspective.

#### Sample and Methodology

Our data are based largely on elite surveys of bureaucrats and politicians conceived and analyzed by one of the authors and administered in two stages during the period from November, 1976 to March, 1978 by one of Japan's top professional survey research organizations. The bureaucrat sample consisted of 251 higher civil servants. First, eight of the most important bureaucratic organs of the Japanese government were selected: the Ministries of Finance, International Trade and Industry, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Health, Construction, Labor, and Home Affairs, as well as the Economic Planning Agency of the

Prime Minister's office. Second, six of the eight administrative vice-ministers (the highest career post in the Japanese civil service) and forty-nine bureau chiefs were interviewed to represent the "higher bureaucrats." Then, "the middle-level bureaucrats" were selected from among the same organs' section chiefs and councillors (shingikan). These posts are often steps on the way to advancement to the higher posts and represent what have been called the "high flyers" in studies of European bureaucracies (e.g., Putnam, 1973).

The politician sample consisted of 101 members of the 511-member House of Representatives, the most important chamber in the bicameral Diet. The sampling method ensured a representative sample of Diet members in terms of party affiliation and number of times elected. Thus, at the time of the survey, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party held a bare majority in the House, and in our sample 50 of the respondents were LDP members and 50 were members of the five opposition parties, who were also divided in proportion to their strength in the House at that time. For further details on sampling and samples see Muramatsu (1981, pp. 25-28).

The survey's questions concentrated on social background of the elites, career patterns, and attitudes toward each other and toward policymaking and policy. Cross-national surveys by Aberbach et al. (1981), however, also have tested for bureaucrats' perceptions and evaluation of pluralist policy and social conflict. Thus, to supplement our own survey in this area we will also report the findings of a survey of Japanese bureaucrats and politicians conducted by Akira Kubota using questions comparable to the Aberbach et al. study. Kubota's data, which have been published extensively in Japanese but not in English (Kubota, 1977, 1978-1979), will also be used to confirm and check our own findings where similar attitudes are being tested.

#### Data

#### Social Backgrounds and Recruitment

First, we shall summarize briefly our findings on the social backgrounds of the politician and bureaucrat samples. Our data showed that bureaucrats come from families with more educated fathers than did politicians, having a higher proportion of both higher and middle-educated fathers. Indeed, almost half the sample of politicians' fathers had only an elementary education, whereas nearly half the bureaucrats' fathers had university backgrounds.

In terms of occupation, we found that the highest percentage of both politicians and bureaucrats (49% and 40%, respectively) had fathers in

some public or private managerial position. But there are major differences between the samples. Whereas nearly one-quarter of the bureaucrats had fathers in the professions, only one in ten of the politicians did. If we combine all white-collar and professional occupations except management, more than twice as many bureaucrats (45%) come from this type of social background as do politicians (21%).

A further difference between representatives and civil servants, and a sign of significant inbreeding in the two political elites, is provided by their responses to questions about whether they had any relatives who were bureaucrats or politicians. More bureaucrats (43%) had a bureaucrat in their family than did politicians (30%), whereas many more politicians had a politician in their family (50%) than bureaucrats did (18%). The tendency of Japanese politicians to come from political families has become striking in recent years, especially within the Liberal Democratic Party (Pempel, 1982). This trend, combined with the homogeneous and administrative family background of bureaucrats, may well indicate the increasing social institutionalization of the two political elites.

In terms of region of birth, bureaucrats and politicians diverge, with the latter coming from a wide variety of areas, and the former hailing disproportionally from Tokyo (37%) and the surrounding Kanto area (11%). The same result is found for the location of bureaucrat's high schools: almost 38% received their secondary education in Tokyo.

The divergence between politicians and bureaucrats is even greater when we look at their own educational background. Eighty-five percent of civil servants went to the two most prestigious national universities in Japan, Tokyo University and Kyoto University. Tokyo University especially has been the training ground for elite government bureaucrats since its establishment in the late nineteenth century, and today it continues its overwhelming predominance as the supplier of the nation's best and brightest to the state administration. By contrast, only about one in five of the politicians was graduated from one of these universities, but nearly a third went to a private university and another 30% attended two-year institutions or had no university education at all.

Our results on Japan are strikingly similar to the data from Western European countries. As is shown in Table 1, bureaucrats in all the advanced industrial democracies tend to come from managerial or professional families with fathers who had intermediate or university educations, and to have been educated at a university themselves. Further, just as a disproportionate percentage of Japanese bureaucrats tended to come from the capital region and be educated there, Suleiman (1974, p. 64) found the same was true for French higher civil servants and Aberbach et al. (1981, p. 66) report a similar finding for British bureaucrats. Further, one-third to one-half of the bureaucrats in Britain, Germany, and Italy had relatives in the civil service (Putnam, 1975, p. 97), as in the Japanese case. In both Japan and Western Europe, bureaucrats and politicians both have elite social origins, but the civil servants derive from even more homogeneous and elite backgrounds than the elected representatives.

Incidentally, the differences between bureaucrats and politicians in Japan remain, although at a slightly reduced level in some cases, even when we separate LDP politicians and opposition politicians. Thus, the bureaucrats still have a tendency to come from families with more highly educated fathers and with more fathers in the professions compared with LDP politicians, and in general there is not much difference between LDP and opposition politicians in terms of father's occupation. More LDP politicians (approximately 30%) than opposition politicians went to Tokyo University, but still nowhere near as many as the bureaucrats. One element of the ruling triad model, therefore, that conservative politicians and bureaucrats come from the same elite social backgrounds, is only partially confirmed. There are some differences between the two groups, differences similar to those found between

politicians and bureaucrats in the Western democracies.

In Japan, the recruitment and career advancement norms further reinforce the homogeneity of the elite civil servant. Our survey found that two-thirds of the bureaucrat sample majored in law while at university. Also, because all bureaucrats are recruited directly from university and because the Japanese bureaucracy follows rather strict seniority norms in career advancement, there was little difference across ministries in average age at time of recruitment to the civil service or at time of promotion to section or bureau chief level.

Overall, we find the Japanese bureaucrat to come from elite family and educational backgrounds and to be recruited and promoted according to norms that reinforce the homogeneous nature of the group.

#### General Attitudes Toward Politics, Decision Making, and Society

Differentiation in social background alone does not necessarily guarantee a potential for conflict between political and administrative elites. Such latent conflict requires that these social and career backgrounds produce divergence in perception and attitude as well. The key question is whether bureaucrats from such homogeneous social backgrounds, recruited according to such stringent standards and nurtured in the environment of an

Table 1. Comparison of Social Backgrounds of Politicians and Bureaucrats in Western Europe and Japan

	•	Bureaucrats					. Po	diticia	ns	
	It	Ger	Fr	Br	Ja	It	Ger	Fr	Br	Ja
Father's occupation <sup>8</sup>										
Managerial or professional	82	67	96	68	64	41	51	76	64	59
Other nonmanual	16	21	3	21	21	27	20	18	12	11
Manual	3	12	1	13	7	33	29	6	25	27
Father's educationb										
None or primary	13	36		29	21		_		-	48
Intermediate	52	34		43	30	-	_	-		14
University	35	30	-	27	45	_	-	-		31
Education <sup>c</sup>					1					
University	100	99	97	83	98	84	67	79	71	67
Less than university	0	1	3	16	2 <sup>d</sup>	16	33	21	29	27

European samples do not always sum up to 100% due to rounding; Japanese samples do not always add to 100% owing to NA and DK responses. Blanks indicate no data were available.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>European data source: recalculated from Aberbach et al. (1981, p. 55).

bEuropean data source: recalculated from Putnam (1975, p. 97).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>c</sup>European data source: based on Aberbach et al. (1981, p. 49).

dIncludes two-year colleges and technical schools.

Table 2. Bureaucrats' Attitudes toward Pluralism (% agreeing)

	Japan	It	Br	Ger
<ol> <li>Interest groups' conflict endanger country's welfare</li> <li>Political parties exacerbate conflict</li> <li>Civil service guarantees reasonable public policy</li> <li>Technical considerations should outweigh political</li> </ol>	69	88	18	19
	96	85	54	28
	80	-	21	16
	49	77	21	50

Japan percentages include those who "agreed" and those who "agreed somewhat." Percentages that were transposed from Kubota's figures are approximate to within 1 to 3 percentage points.

Source: Kubota (Kankai 3/78, pp. 107-110; Chūō Kōron, 1977, p. 194); Putnam, 1975, p. 101.

elite administrative corps, bring to their role attitudes consonant with the requirements of pluralist politics in democratic systems. Such backgrounds may well produce classical bureaucrats, who see problems amenable to solution by nonpartisan and objective analysis and thus who downgrade the role of parties, parliaments, and pressure groups in decisionmaking. Studies of European bureaucrats indicate that Italian civil servants fall close to this end of the continuum of bureaucratic types. But this need not inevitably be the case. The advance of democratic ideals in the postwar era, the rise of new generations within the bureaucracy more committed to those ideals than older generations, and over 35 years of experience with pluralist political systems may well produce bureaucrats who at least accept and at best are committed to political pluralism. Such seems to be the case of the West German administrative elite (Putnam, 1973).

What about Japan? Do Japanese bureaucrats with their highly elite and homogeneous background and career environments favor the norms and perceptions of rational bureaucracy over the messier world of pluralistic politics? Or have they come to accept politics, politicians, pressure groups, and conflict as a normal, even desirable, part of governance?

Lacking data from our own survey to answer these questions, we turned to results reported by Akira Kubota (1977, 1978-1979). He administered a series of questions identical to those asked of European bureaucrats by the Aberbach et al. (1981) study, and which the latter used as part of an index of political pluralism. The question wording was as follows: 1) The general welfare of the country is seriously endangered by the continual clash of particularistic interest groups; 2) Although parties play an important role in democracy, they often uselessly exacerbate political conflicts; 3) Basically, it is not the parties and parliament, but rather the civil service that guarantees reasonably satisfactory public policy in this country; 4) in contemporary social and economic affairs it is essential that technical considerations be

given more weight than political factors. Agreement with these items would indicate bureaucrats who had relatively less tolerance for pluralistic politics and a strictly classical, administrative approach to policymaking. The results for Japan, along with comparative data on Italy, Germany, and England where available, are presented in Table 2.

The findings indicated that Japanese bureaucrats, both absolutely and comparatively, score rather highly in negative attitudes toward pluralism. Almost all of the Japanese civil servants believe that political parties often needlessly intensify political conflicts, and a large majority of them also believe that the clash of interest groups seriously endangers the national welfare. Further, they believe that it is they, not the parties or legislature, who ensure reasonable public policy and that technical factors should have precedence over political ones. Comparatively, Japanese bureaucrats are relatively more like the classical bureaucrats of Italy than the more pluralistic bureaucrats of Britain and Germany.

Kubota also reports the evaluations of his Japanese bureaucrat and politician respondents and their European counterparts concerning the extent of conflict that exists among groups in their societies. His data show that a larger percentage of Japanese bureaucrats (58%) view society as harmonious than do Japanese politicians (35%). Even on a comparative scale, Japanese bureaucrats see the relationship among groups in society as much less conflictual than do the bureaucrats of any other nationality. About a third of Japanese politicians see social group relations as harmonious and about 40% as conflictual, which is more or less in line with their European counterparts, but Japanese bureaucrats are twice as likely or more to see society as harmonious than their European colleagues (58% to a range of 15-29% for the four European countries).

Kubota's sample differs from ours, so we can-

'Among other differences, Kubota's sample was drawn from four other ministries in addition to the ones

not say with complete certainty that the bureaucrats in our survey would have responded similarly. Based on his data, however, it appears that the Japanese civil servant's view of politics and society is less pluralistic than either the Japanese politician or most European bureaucrats (except perhaps the Italian). He is likely to approach his task with a fear that social interest groups and political parties create conflict, yet a strong tendency to see his own society as having few conflicts. He also tends to believe that it is the bureaucracy and a technical approach to problem solving that will benefit the public interest. A modern tradition of bureaucratic dominance, the collapsing of historical phases of modernization, the relatively recent implementation of political party democracy, and elitist background, recruitment, and career factors seem to have left their mark on the attitudes of Japanese bureaucrats (see also Craig, 1975, pp. 4-11).

In general attitudes toward politics, Japanese bureaucrats' perceptions are in accord with the bureaucracy-dominant model. It remains to be seen whether this also applies to the attitudes they bring to their specific roles.

#### Policymaking Roles

Even if Japanese civil servants have different backgrounds from those of politicians and lean toward the classical bureaucratic approach in their general attitudes about society and the political process, they may or may not differ from politicians in their specific evaluations of the proper and actual role of the two groups in the policymaking process. Current role experiences can reinforce the divergent backgrounds and general attitudes that exist between politicians and bureaucrats, or they can mitigate those differences to produce elite groups who view the process and content of policy similarly. Or the current role variables and experiences can outweigh other factors, producing different and more important lines of division, for example, between those with greater responsibility, such as higher bureaucrats and ruling party politicians, and those with less responsibility for policy, the middle bureaucrats and opposition politicians. In the next sections we will look at the more concrete orientations of how political elites perceive their

represented in our sample: Legal Affairs, Transportation, Posts, and Education. His sample also includes assistant bureau chiefs in addition to the positions in our sample. Finally, Kubota's survey was conducted during a period that only partially overlapped the administration of our survey. See Kubota (2/77, p. 193). roles, their influence in policymaking, and policy issues. In effect, we will be testing for whether social backgrounds and general attitudes, institutional roles, or organizational responsibilities produce the lines of greatest cleavage among the political elites. In order to do this, we will want to subdivide further our samples into higher and middle level bureaucrats and LDP and opposition politicians.

In their recent study of European and American bureaucrats, Aberbach et al. (1981, pp. 4-21) described four possible types (what they called "images") of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats. Image I (Policy/Administration) represented the traditional division that politicians make policy and bureaucrats administer it. i.e., that there is a strict division of labor with bureaucrats uninvolved in any aspect of policymaking except its implementation. Image II (Facts/Interest) gives bureaucrats a somewhat greater role in policymaking, but the very specific one of bringing facts and knowledge to the process. The politicians' role is to emphasize responsiveness to interests and constituencies in policy formation. Thus, civil servants provide neutral expertise, whereas politicians make decisions on the basis of values and interests. Image III (Energy/Equilibrium) has both groups heavily involved in both politics and policymaking, but with politicians providing the ideals and energy to the system, whereas bureaucrats emphasize incrementalism and pragmatism. In this type of role division, bureaucrats are the conflict managers, particularly of organized interests, whereas politicians address broader and more controversial issues and articulate unorganized interests. Finally, Image IV (The Pure Hybrid) is one in which both clites' functions and roles have merged: politicians increasingly acquire administrative skills, technical expertise, and bureaucratic orientations, whereas bureaucrats are totally involved in the political and policymaking process, including the setting of the broader directions of policy.

It should be noted that these four images provide a continuum, with each successive type cumulatively adding another policy function to the bureaucracy. Thus, whereas in Image I the bureaucracy only implements policy, in Image II it also helps formulate it (by providing the groundwork for politicians' decisions), in Image III it additionally brokers interests, and in Image IV it articulates ideals as well (Aberbach et al., 1981, pp. 238-239). Each progressive image of this typology also represents the increasing involvement of the civil service in political roles, from neutral implementation, through involvement in decisionmaking and brokering interests, to articulating the ideal goals and direction of the nation.

In the Western democracies study, no single

Table 3. Specific Role of Bureaucracy

	Higher Bureaucrats	Middle Bureaucrats	LDP Politicians	Opposition Politicians
,	%	%	%	%
Implement Diet and party policy (Image I)	9	10	16	22
Lay groundwork for political decisions (Image II)	44	34	44	39
Coordinate competing interests and views (Image III)	27	40	24	27
Change society in desirable directions (Image IV)	15	15	8	6
NA	5	1	8	6
	100	100	100	100
N	(55)	(196)	(50)	(51)

question measured the four images, but rather these images represented a summary conglomeration of many of the measured attributes. By coincidence, however, our survey, administered in Japan, contained a question whose responses conformed closely to the image types in Aberbach et al.'s study. The question asked respondents what role the bureaucracy was usually performing at present and offered them the choice of "policy implementation that reflected the wishes of the parties and Diet," "laying the groundwork for political decisions on important problems,' "coordinating competing interests and views," and "transforming the social structure in desireable directions." This categorization is not a perfect description of the four images and was not designed originally as a continuum. Nevertheless, each of these choices parallels nicely the essence of each of the roles for bureaucracy in the abovedescribed images and can be treated as a continuum. Thus, they provide us with a view of how Japanese politicians and bureaucrats perceive the relationship between civil service and politics in contemporary Japan. The results are presented in Table 3.

There is little support for the perception that the civil service is either purely administrating or implementing political decisions made by parties and parliament (Image I-type), or that it is usurping the role of elected officials to decide the nation's goals and lead the country toward social transformation (Image IV-type). Rather, the bureaucracy is definitely seen as involved in politics and policy, but as a provider of information and technical expertise to the politician (Image IItype) or as a broker and manager of social interests (Image III-type). This result is strikingly similar to those found in Western Europe. Aberbach et al., found that Image I and Image IV were rejected by their respondents, whereas Image II was the most popular formal choice, but Image III was probably the most realistic interpretation of their role in practice (Aberbach et al., 1981, p.

241). In both Japan and Western Europe, the role of politicians and bureaucrats has been converging, but there are still differences in their contributions and emphases in the policymaking process.

The partial convergence of the two roles is confirmed in data reported by Kubota (3/79, p. 119). When asked directly whether politicians and bureaucrats were similar or different from each other, the majority of politicians and bureaucrats in all countries respond in terms of moderate similarities or differences rather than that they were "very" or "more or less" similar or that they were completely different.

Turning again to our own survey, although the differences among categories of actor were not great, they are interesting. The politicians are more likely to see the bureaucrats as pure implementors of policy or as aids in its preparation. Bureaucrats themselves are more likely to see their role as political—managing social conflict or leading the way toward desirable social change. We also find some indication of the impact of role position on perceptions: the middle-level bureaucrat diverges from the politicians, and from top bureaucrats, especially in choosing the coordination of competing interests as the main role of the civil service. Thus, we find evidence that although the roles of bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking may be converging-civil servants performing political functions and playing a major role in the policymaking process—there are some differences of perception between politicians and bureaucrats and between higher and middle bureaucrats about what the role of the civil service is in that process.

In contrast to their general attitudes toward politics, when asked about their specific role in policymaking, Japanese bureaucrats do not display particularly bureaucracy-dominant perceptions. Rather, they see their role as aiding politicians in decision making or as conflict managers of social groups. The ruling triad model, on the

other hand, predicts only the bureaucracy's connections to both politicians and interest groups in a vague and generally equal relationship; it does not suggest the specific decision-maker role of the politician vis-a-vis the bureaucrat, nor the active coordinator role of the bureaucrat vis-a-vis the businessman. We find that neither of the standard models of Japanese policymaking fits the perceptions that the participants themselves have of their roles.

#### Influence in Policymaking

If bureaucrats in Japan as elsewhere are playing more of a role in policymaking, albeit in ways still somewhat different from politicians, how much influence do they have in that process? This question, of course, has been central to discussions of the postwar Japanese political system. Do Japanese political elites themselves believe that the bureaucracy dominates policymaking to the extent that some political scientists have described? Or do they see themselves as part of an interconnected elite with politicians and businessmen as in the ruling triad model?

The respondents were asked which group had the most influence in deciding national policy. Table 4 shows the results. There is agreement among the groups that the only influential actors are party politicians and bureaucrats, against whom all other groups' perceived influence pales by comparison. And, except for the LDP representatives, who tend to see party politicians as more influential than bureaucrats by a wide margin, the other groups are all almost equally divided as to which dominates the decisionmaking process of postwar Japan. Given the prevalent

view of the great influence of the higher civil service, these are somewhat surprising results. Also surprising is the perceived weak influence of businessmen on policy, given the conceptions of the ruling triad model.

Some might argue that these surprising results are caused by methodological artifact. For example, one could object that LDP politicians would naturally exaggerate their own influence, whereas the Japanese bureaucratic style is to be "selfeffacing" about their role in policymaking. Although superficially appealing, these arguments cannot consistently explain the results. For example. Japanese bureaucrats were certainly not selfeffacing about the superiority of the bureaucracy in their general attitudes toward politics; why should they be arrogant on one dimension and self-effacing on another? Further, opposition party politicians' responses provide a check on the validity of the other responses: they have every ideological reason to exaggerate the role of business and the bureaucracy in policymaking. and yet they too see politicians as influential as bureaucrats and much more so than businessmen. Finally, in surveys of this kind if there is a bias at all it is for each group to exaggerate the influence of the other (Putnam, personal communication). thus mitigating a unidirectional bias.

On the other hand, we ourselves would not necessarily debate that business' influence on policy may be somewhat greater than is reflected in these figures. Undoubtedly, some respondents interpreted the question to mean "direct influence." Business may have indirect influence as well through its connections to LDP politicians. Yet the fact that both bureaucrats and politicians, even opposition politicians, attribute far more

Table 4. Group Most Influential in Policy Process

Higher Bureaucrats	Middle Bureaucrats	LDP Politicians	Opposition Politicians
%	%	%	. %
47	45	68	43
46	40	-30	41
*		*	*
*	5		14
*	*	*	*
	3	*	*
	•		•
· •	1	* *	*
4	4	2	*
4	3	*	3
101	101	100	101
(55)	(195)	(50)	(51)
	# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #	Bureaucrats         Bureaucrats           %         %           47         45           46         40           *         *           *         5           *         *           *         3           *         1           4         4           4         3           101         101	Bureaucrats         Bureaucrats         Politicians           %         %         %           47         45         68           46         40         30           *         *         *           *         5         *           *         3         *           *         1         *           4         4         2           4         3         *           101         101         100

<sup>\*</sup>None or less than 1%.

Table 5. Influence of Bureaucracy and Diet in Policymaking

	,		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	Higher Bureaucrats	Middle Bureaucrats	LDP Politicians	Opposition Politicians
	% %	%	%	<b>%</b>
Influence of bureaucracy	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	•	,	•
High (18-21)	38	19	66	65
Medium (14-17) Low (0-13)	55 7	58 22	28 6	32 4
	100	99	100	101
Preference for Bureaucracy's Future Influence	•			
Desire increase Desire present level	6 26	8 32	2 8	6 8
Desire decrease Other	66 i 2	55 5	90 *	86 *
	100	100	100	100
Influence of Diet	* E			
Quite a Bit; or A Great Deal Not Much	84 16	70 27	84 12	81 16
Hardiy Any		4		4
•	100 ]	101	100	101
N	(55)	(196)	(50)	(51)

<sup>\*</sup>None or less than 1%.

influence to their own groups than to business should make us pause before accepting uncritically the assertions of the ruling triad model.

Nor would we argue that these data show that the bureaucracy's role is at all insignificant. We asked our respondents directly to rank the bureaucracy's influence on a scale from 0 to 7 (0 = none; 7 = very much influence in policy) in three different policy areas (economic, agricultural, and health). Putting these three evaluations together into a composite index, we see in Table 5 that all groups evaluate the bureaucracy as having at least moderate influence. There are two interesting differences between the groups, however. On the one hand, there is a bureaucratic-politician split, with the politicians perceiving the influence of the bureaucracy to be much greater than the bureaucrats themselves see it. On the other hand, within the bureaucracy we also see a difference between higher and middle bureaucrats: higherlevel bureaucrats are more than twice as likely than middle-level civil servants to see the bureaucracy as having a very great influence.

We also asked the respondents whether they desired an increase or decrease in discretionary administrative decisions under bureaucratic leadership. Table 5 indicates that none of the categories of politicians or civil servants desires bureaucracy's independent influence to increase;

over half prefer to see it decrease. But there are differences between the politicians and the bureaucrats: representatives of both the governing and opposition parties are more likely, and in overwhelming proportions, to prefer that independent bureaucratic decision making decrease in the future. Again, however, higher and middle-level bureaucrats differ, with top civil servants being closer to the politicians in desiring a decline.

Finally, when asked the extent to which Diet deliberations currently influenced the formation of policy, we note in Table 5 that both higherlevel and middle-level bureaucrats and both LDP and opposition politicians believe the Diet does have such power (about two-thirds or more of each category responded "quite a bit"; the proportions answering "a lot" were much smaller). Significantly, on the influence of the Diet on policy, higher-level bureaucrats and LDP and opposition representatives differ hardly at all. The deviant group is the middle-level bureaucrats, who see the Diet as having somewhat less influence than the others. When it comes to evaluating the extent of parliamentary influence on policy, therefore, the bureaucrat-politician split is not as significant as the divergence of the middle-level

These results are somewhat different and more

complicated than those that might have been predicted on the basis of the bureaucracy-dominant themes in the literature on Japanese politics. The findings indicate that although the bureaucracy is a major and powerful actor in the policy process, the political organs of party and parliament are perceived to play a very influential role as well. Further, although there is a tendency for bureaucrats and politicians to disagree about the extent of bureaucratic influence and the desirability of independent bureaucratic power on policy, the extent of that divergence is not great. Finally, again we find that perceptions of higher bureaucrats resemble more closely those of politicians than of middle-level civil servants in estimations of the relative power of actors in the policy process, just as they did in defining of their specific policymaking roles.

Results of one question from Kubota's study (3/78, p. 110) confirm both our earlier results that Japanese bureaucrats tend to have rather negative and classical views of pluralist democracy and decision making and our results indicating that they nonetheless perceive politicians as having great influence in the policymaking process. Among Japanese civil servants, 41% agreed unqualifiedly, and another 36% agreed less strongly, with the statement that "One of the unfavorable tendencies in contemporary politics is for politicians to interfere in problems which ought to be left to the bureaucracy." Comparatively, Japanese bureaucrats resent political "interference" more than the bureaucrats of Germany and England. Only the highly classical bureaucrats of Italy score higher on this measure. Japanese bureaucrats' reactions to this question reinforce our other findings that Japanese politicians have greater influence, and have been increasing it, than most models of Japanese politics have described, and that the homogeneous, elite, and also influential Japanese bureaucracy does not particularly like this new tendency in postwar politics.

# The Impact of Organizational Roles and Generations

Before turning to perception of policy issues, we want to explore further the question of whether Japanese bureaucrats are classical or political and to see if part of that answer can be found by testing for the influence of organizational roles and generational age. In terms of general tendencies in our overall sample of bureaucrats, Japanese civil servants, on the one hand, seem to fit the classical bureaucratic type: they are part of a homogeneous, inbred bureaucratic elite who are skeptical about the messy world of pluralistic democratic politics and who

resent the increasing tendency of politicians to interfere in policymaking. On the other hand, they also have characteristics of the political bureaucratic type who recognizes the dominance of the party and legislative apparatus in democratic policymaking and who acknowledges as legitimate the demands of social pressure groups in a pluralist society (Putnam, 1973). For example, they perceive parties and parliament to have a major role in policymaking, and even desire to see the independent influence of the bureaucracy diminish in the future. They further define their own role as an adjunct to decisions made by politicians or to be managers of social group conflict. We wanted to see whether this ambivalence in the sample as a whole could be explained by the effects of organizational role, by the effects of generational differences among bureaucrats, or by both.

In considering this seeming paradoxical mixture of classical and political bureaucratic attitudes in the Japanese civil service, we became aware that these concepts themselves may be part of the problem. Indeed, as Putnam (1975, p. 120) has suggested, this dichotomy may be oversimplified. We suspected that the notions of classical and political bureaucrats actually contain, and confuse, at least two conceptually distinct ideas. First they imply an official can favor bureaucratic leadership or party leadership in policymaking (classical bureaucrats the former, political bureaucrats the latter). But they also imply an official may place priority on defining and advancing the national interests or on managing purely sectarian and social interests (classical bureaucrats the former, political bureaucrats the latter).

Indeed, when we conducted a factor analysis by a method commonly used by Japanese social scientists, using a series of questions on bureaucratic norms from our survey of civil servants,

The method, which is closely related to Guttman Scale Analysis, involves a method of classification of individuals based on the similarity of responses to questions having several categories, the simultaneous classification of individuals and categories, and vector analysis. For details in English on this quantification on response pattern: factor analytic method for qualitative data (known as Quantification Theory III-type analysis in Japan), see Hayashi (1982) and Hayashi and Suzuki (1975).

Four questions were used: 1) The question concerning the role of the bureaucracy discussed above and in Table 3; 2) In a case where you were making a discretionary administrative judgment, one that took a high degree of judgment of the type that called for approved office and administrative leadership, what would you take as your main standards; technical stan-

the results showed two separate dimensions, one of national vs. interest-group orientation, and the other of administrative vs. political leadership. With these two dimensions, we find four different types of bureaucrats instead of a simple political vs. administrative distinction: 1) bureaucrats who accept political leadership as dominant but are more oriented toward governing in the "national" interest (the party government type); 2) bureaucrats who accept political leadership as dominant and who see their role as managing social interests (the pluralist type); 3) bureaucrats who desire administrative leadership but recognize the legitimacy of social interests as long as they are tied to a primarily administrative state (the corporatist type); and 4) bureaucrats who desire administrative leadership governing primarily in the name of an overarching national interest (the *classical* type).

Further, we hypothesized that these types of bureaucrats might vary with position in the organizational hierarchy, in other words, that the specific norms of one's bureaucratic position and

dards, conformity with policy goals, a balance of interests, the national interest? 3) Supposing you have to persuade your Minister to abandon a policy he was thinking about, what argument do you think would be the most effective: technical difficulties, legal difficulties, the opposition of interest groups? 4) When there is a conflict among the contentions of upper-level public bureaucrats, the opinions of the party to which your minister belonged, and the demands of interest groups with which your minister has contacts, on which do you think your minister places the most priority?

task might be related to attitudes toward elite leadership and toward national and social interest. We were particularly interested in testing for this relationship because we have already found a consistent pattern of moderate but distinct differences between higher- and middle-level bureaucrats in Japan. The middle-level bureaucrat does not recognize the influence of the Diet in the formation of policy as much as the higher bureaucrat, but he is more likely than the higher bureaucrat to see his role as the political one of coordinating competing social interests. We therefore factored administrative position into the previous analysis.

Figure 1 gives the results of this factor analysis. placing each bureaucratic role in two-dimensional space on our classification according to their average score on the dimensions. The figure shows that bureaucratic roles are clearly differentiated according to type of bureaucrat. Thus, the vice-ministers and bureau chiefs were firmly in the upper lefthand quadrant of party government types, recognizing both political leadership and oriented toward the national interest. The middle bureaucrats of councillor and supervising section chiefs were in the lower lefthand quadrant of classic bureaucrat (although the supervising section chiefs were closer to the corporatist side than the councillors). Finally, the low-middle bureaucrat, the ordinary section chief, was in the pluralist quadrant.

These results indicate strongly that how classical or political bureaucrats are, including Japanese civil servants' attitudes toward bureaucratic or political leadership and toward governance oriented to national or social group inter-

Figure 1. Types of Bureaucrats

Leader	chip Orientation: Political Dominant
Party Government	Pluralist
X Vice Minister; Bureau Chief	General Section Chief
Interest-Orientation: National	Interest Orientation: Social
Supervisection Councilor X	sing X chief
Classic	Corporatist
Leadership	Orientation: Administrative Dominant

est, is related at least in part to one's position and task in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Another possibility is that some of our results about the mixture of classical and political attitudes of the Japanese bureaucracy may be explained by generational effects. Putnam (1975) found, for example, that in Germany and Italy. two countries with authoritarian, bureaucraticdominant states just a generation ago, classical bureaucratic attitudes were more common among those raised in the prewar years and less so among younger bureaucrats. Since Japan has a similar modern history, such a phenomenon might also be present in Japan. When we tested for the impact of generational effects, we found only a mild influence on certain measures, with prewar (older than 48 years of age at the time of the survey) bureaucrats somewhat more likely to emphasize technical expertise and the political aspects of their role and to evaluate their influence in policymaking highly, whereas the postwar generation (under 47 years of age) was more likely to focus their role on the relationship to pluralist interest groups and was less sanguine about bureaucracy's influence. The view that the Diet has a significant influence on policy is not subject to any generational differences, and even older bureaucrats share this view. It would appear that some differences between bureaucratic generations exist, but these are very selective and moderate in impact.4 Moreover, because of the strict seniority norms in promotion within the Japanese civil service, such generational effects become inextricably bound up with the stronger and wider effects of organizational rank.

# Policy Issue Area

Finally, we come to the question of how similar or different bureaucrats are with respect to their perceptions of policy itself. In other words, here

\*The differences between generations on the question of the role of bureaucracy were neither large nor statistically significant, with large pluralities of both groups agreeing that coordination of interests and providing information to politicians is the prime administrative role. The prewar generation is more likely (32% to 16%) than the younger generation to score highly on our index of bureaucracy's influence in the three areas of policy, is more likely (48% to 35%) to choose bureaucracy as having the most influence of any group in policy. And is also more likely (61% to 45%) to see bureaucratic influence in the near future as remaining the same as at present. One measure on which there was no appreciable difference at all was on the question of the influence of the Diet in policymaking where both age groups by two to one majorities rated its power as considerable or strong.

we will be concerned with the content of policy rather than the role of the actors in the policymaking process. Perceptions of policy may be strongly influenced by politicians' or bureaucrats' ideological positions. We would expect this particularly in Japan, where during the 1950s and 1960s the country was polarized into conservative and progressive camps, and numerous clashes took place, some violent, between the LDP government and the opposition forces both inside and outside the Diet. The polarization and confrontations took place particularly over such policy issues as national defense and foreign policy, education, and public order. Analysts described Japanese politics during this era as "cultural politics." because at the root of the policy differences were basic value and ideological differences between the two camps over the question of the relationship between the governors and the governed (Kyogoku, 1969; Passin, 1962; Watanuki, 1967).

Some of the vestiges of ideological differences could be seen in a question in the survey which asked their degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with present society, and in which we found that opposition party politicians are much more dissatisfied with present arrangements than LDP politicians and top-level bureaucrats.' However, at a less abstract level, in recent years ideological differences seem to have moderated, and there is evidence of an emerging center and incipient consensus in Japanese politics. One of the key questions we must raise, therefore, is whether any remaining ideological policy differences between the ruling LDP and bureaucracy on the one hand, and the opposition party politicians on the other, impinge on their evaluations of policy.

One way to test this question is to investigate our respondents' view of the most pressing problems facing contemporary Japan and to ascertain whether they differ systematically in terms of their perceptions of the areas of policy that need the most attention. The samples were asked to name the three most important problems facing Japan in rank order, and their answers were then grouped according to general issue areas. Their responses for the first most important problem chosen are shown in Table 6, which demonstrates a fair degree of unanimity concerning contemporary issues: no category of respondent differs on any issue area from any other by more than 20%. Generally, the pragmatic problems of

'Only 22% of the higher bureaucrats were "dissatisfied" with contemporary society (the remainder "satisfied" or "average"), with that rising to 40% of the middle bureaucrats and 46% of the LDP politicians, compared to 91% of the opposition politicians.

Table 6. Bureaucrats' and Politicians' Evaluations of the Most Important Problem Facing Japan

	Higher Bureaucrats	Middle - Bureaucrats	LDP Politicians	Opposition Politicians
(	%	. %	.96	. %
Energy; resources	22	13	26	27
Reform of education	. 18	14	16	`6
Search for new values; correcting ills of modern society Search for new state-society relations;	24	24	26	37
new decisions in public policy	16	<b>29</b> .	10	12
Security; international relations	13	13	18	12
Other	7 .	- 8	4	6
	100	101	100	100
<b>N</b>	(55)	(196)	(50)	(51)

energy and resources, security and international relations, and the value problem of dissatisfaction with modern society are the most frequently chosen by most groups.

But within this general consensus, there are important variations. The two groups that most closely resemble each other are higher bureaucrats and LDP politicians. The percentage of each of these groups is nearly exactly alike on all the issue areas, and the relative order of the alternatives chosen is very similar. Both middle-level bureaucrats and opposition politicians deviate from the consensus within the party and administrative governing elites, but in different ways. Opposition politicians are more likely to choose the problem of the values and defects of modern society than any other group. Given the ideological differences of many opposition politicians with those who govern, and their dissatisfaction with the status quo in Japan, this is perhaps not surprising.

Middle-level bureaucrats also differ from both the governing party and their own superiors in the bureaucracy. These bureaucrats tend to see statecitizen relations and public policy itself as more of an issue than the other groups, including the opposition parties. They are less impressed with energy and resources as a pressing issue. Once more we see that there are differences in the perceptions of middle-level and top civil servants in Japan, a finding for which neither the bureaucracy-dominant or ruling triad model would have prepared us. We shall discuss some of the possible reasons for this consistent tendency below.

## Conflict and Consensus among Political Elites

Our data demonstrate a complex pattern of relationships between politicians and bureaucrats in policymaking, a pattern organized along three important cleavages among Japanese elites: the institutional, the organizational, and the political.

First, we find a mixed pattern on the institutional cleavage of politicians versus bureaucrats. As in Western Europe, politicians and bureaucrats are converging in the sense that both play important roles in the policymaking process, and both recognize the role the other plays in that process. The bureaucrat does not simply administer policies decided upon by the politicians; he also plays a political role in helping to formulate policy with the politicians by providing expertise and knowledge and by managing conflict among interest groups.

Also as in Western Europe, however, the two roles still diverge. Neither most civil servants nor politicians believe that the bureaucracy should provide the overall goals and ideals for policymaking; that is the predominant preserve of the politician. Furthermore, politicians and bureaucrats differ greatly in their social backgrounds and general attitudes toward politics and society. Indeed, we have found a deeper cleavage between bureaucrats and politicians on these dimensions than in most Western European democracies except for Italy. Japanese bureaucrats constitute a very homogeneous and prestigious elite compared to politicians and hold elitist attitudes toward politicians and pluralist democratic politics. Resenting interference in what they perceive as bureaucratic prerogatives in policymaking, they approach policymaking with the classical administrative style of bureaucratic manager, believing that social harmony is primary and that technocratic and accommodative decisions made by experts such as themselves can best guarantee good policy. When it comes to their conception of their institutional roles, therefore, we find much evidence for latent conflict between the two elites, despite their convergence in some respects.

Yet this potential institutional conflict is greatly

mitigated by other cleavages that cut across it. One of these is the organizational cleavage within the ranks of the bureaucracy itself: we have found consistent evidence that top bureaucrats are more likely to acknowledge the power of politicians and parliament in policymaking and to perceive the salience of policy issues more like LDP politicians, but are less likely to conceive of the bureaucracy's role as managing social interests than middle-level bureaucrats. We believe there are several explanations for this pattern of cleavage between highest- and middle-ranking civil servants.

One explanation is the difference in their organizational tasks. The finer distinctions we have made between types of bureaucrats and the results of our factor analysis (Figure 1) indicate strongly the importance of the role norms of a particular level of post in the bureaucratic hierarchy in determining perspectives on the policymaking process. It would not be an exaggeration to use the old adage that where one stands depends on where one sits. The perspective of the higher bureaucrat (vice-minister, bureau chief) is political in the sense that he is the civil servant who must work most closely with LDP politicians and the Diet. He therefore recognizes most clearly the infuence of parties and parliament on the policies ultimately produced, and the realistic constraints that such factors place on the power of the bureaucracy. Consequently, among all the types of civil servants, he is most likely to see the bureaucracy's role as one of laving the groundwork for the major decisions to be made by politicians and to recognize the actual power of politicians and parliament in policymaking.

The ordinary section chief is the lowest middle-level civil servant. Closest to the daily operations of the Ministry, he is most likely to feel the pressures from the interest groups from politicians' constituencies who desire changes in policy or dispensation in its implementation that favor their group. He therefore sees the role of bureaucracy primarily as coordinating pluralist interest politics and recognizes the importance of party and politicians in satisfying those interests. But he is also furthest from the high politics of the party and parliamentary leadership and thus has much less of a conception of the constraints and power of the Diet and politician in formulating and deciding on policy.

The mid-middle bureaucrats (councillors and supervising section chiefs) are in-between in more than just formal position. They are somewhat insulated both from the grassroots political pressures of interest groups and the higher bureaucrats' problems of reconciling party and parliamentary constraints with rational policy. In stage of career, they literally are organization men,

primarily concerned with problems of organizational coordination and efficiency. Especially, councillors are often called upon to participate in the Chief Cabinet Secretary's attempts to bring about inter-ministerial consensus on policy, a task in which a national viewpoint on policy is emphasized, but at the same time the councillors usually are expected to represent the interests of their own ministries (Campbell, in press). Involved most actively in bureaucratic politics per se, they (perhaps naively) come to believe that administrative leadership in the national interest is both reality and preferable.

Reinforcing differences in role perspectives is one simple fact of political life in Japan: the Liberal Democratic Party has been the sole party in power for about twenty-seven years. As Pempel (1978, p. 67) has argued, the consequences of having a dominant party for more than a quarter of a century has been an institutionalization of the relationship between the LDP and the organs of government and between the LDP parliamentarians and the senior ranks of the civil service. Particularly in matters concerning the influence of party in policymaking, satisfaction with the status quo, and the definition of important policy issues. we would expect that this progressive integration of top civil servants with dominant party would produce party and senior bureaucratic elites with similar views, views more similar than between senior and lower level bureaucrats. We have found that this is indeed the case. Thus, the perpetual hegemony of one ruling party also may have contributed to the organizational cleavage within the bureaucracy. With a single party perpetually in power, there is no need for the LDP to penetrate the bureaucracy further than the very top ranks to manage it. There has not been the need for the LDP to "colonize" the bureaucracy to maintain its control in a situation of coalition government and constant cabinet crises, as in Italy. Nor has there been the need to purge bureaucrats whose style and policy perceptions agree too strongly with the rival party previously in power, as has happened in West Germany (Putnam, 1975).

Finally, there is the ideological or political cleavage that also cuts across the politician-bureaucrat institutional cleavage. Here the main lines of divergence ideologically are between the LDP politicians and civil servants on the one side and opposition party politicians on the other, with the latter manifesting deep-rooted alienation from the present political and social arrangements. Even in this case, however, there also is a very complicated pattern because there also exists a consensus on the salience of policy issues including LDP politicians, top bureaucrats, and opposition politicians. Furthermore, LDP and opposition

tion politicians tend to see the political process (e.g., the role of bureaucracy, the influence of the bureaucracy and Diet in policymaking) similarly in contrast to the somewhat different views of bureaucrats.

One of the most interesting implications of our data on views of the salience of policy issues (Table 6) is what it tells us about the current state of partisan polarization. Opposition party politicians do not differ as greatly from LDP politicians and higher bureaucrats in choice of issues. nor does either side attribute as much salience to such issues as defense and education as we might have expected given the polarization of the earlier decades. In general, there is evidence that the extreme polarization of earlier decades has declined, and there may be an emerging consensus among both LDP and opposition politicians and the higher civil servants (and to a lesser extent with the middle-level bureaucrats as well) over the definition of salient policy issues facing Japan.

In part this depolarization can be explained by the decline of the two major parties in ideological conflict, the LDP and the Socialists, and the rise of center parties within the opposition camp. During the 1970s, the LDP obtained less than a majority of the popular vote (and a bare majority of seats), while its chief ideological opponent, the Socialist Party (JSP) also declined from one-third of the votes to approximately one-fifth. Meanwhile, middle-of-the-road opposition parties like the Democratic Socialists and the Clean Government Party, which had not even existed in the mid-1950s, had come to obtain nearly a fifth of the vote by the late 1970s. The Communist Party had also moderated its ideology and converted to a strategy of the "Parliamentary Path to Revolution," thus also contributing to an ideological depolarization in the party system.

The new multipolar power distribution and ideological moderation also led to a new relationship between conservative and opposition politicians in parliament. At the time of our survey (1978), the LDP's seats in parliament had declined to a bare majority. Because of the peculiar norms and procedures of the system of committee voting in the Diet, this meant that for the first time in postwar Japan the opposition parties actually controlled a number of parliamentary committees, and there were signs of an increasing institutionalization of conflict management among the parties in the Diet (see Krauss, in press; Mochizuki, 1982).

Thus, we find several major trends that have developed in parallel to produce institutional, organizational, and political cleavages crosscutting each other in complicated ways. Background, recruitment, and elitist bureaucratic norms derived from a historical tradition of bureaucratic

dominance have produced an institutional cleavage between politicians and bureaucrats in their basic views of society, decision making, and the political process. Organizational role differences and the long-term effects of generational change and the institutionalization of a dominant party, however, have led top bureaucrats at least into close collaboration and attitudinal consensus on basic role and policy issues with LDP politicians. Further, changes in parties and the party system and the greater institutionalization of the Diet has helped to mitigate the ideological polarization between government and the opposition, thus bringing opposition politicians also into the consensus with the LDP at least in such areas as political dominance over bureaucracy and the definition of major policy needs.

Our pattern of crosscutting attitudinal cleavages among Japanese political elites helps to explain actual patterns of policy conflicts in Japan. Despite having a homogeneous, elitist, and to some extent antipluralist bureaucracy, Japan has experienced few straight bureaucraticpolitician policy conflicts. Rather, as Campbell (in press) has persuasively argued, the most salient conflicts tend to be among "subgovernments," the relatively permanent coalitions of LDP politicians, specific ministries, and interest groups that coalesce around a common issue area and shared vested interests. And, although governmentopposition conflict has continued, in recent years it has been less intense and confrontational than in the past.

## The Surprising Power of Politicians

Perhaps our most surprising finding is that politicians, parties, and the Diet are perceived by the elites themselves to play a much greater role in policymaking than most models of Japanese politics have described. Instead of a bureaucratic-dominant model of influence in the policymaking process, we have seen that a model of shared and equal influence between bureaucrats and politicians or even of party superiority is more appropriate.

Probably the most important explanation of our results is found in several major factors that have contributed to the increasing influence of politicians in the political process, but which most prior research has underestimated. A brief discussion of these factors, each a counterweight to the arguments for bureaucratic dominance we discussed in our introduction, may make our unexpected results on the power of politicians in policymaking more comprehensible.

First, although the bureaucracy escaped relatively unscathed from the Occupation reforms, it was not the only political institution of the post-

war period to emerge strong after the Occupation. Thus, the Prime Minister's office was vastly strengthened under the new political structure; he has the complete power of appointment and removal of all Cabinet ministers without the approval of the Diet. The Diet itself was strengthened too. Unlike in prewar Japan, the parliament has an extensive committee system organized along functional lines and the power of investigation. Thus, the potential for politician's influence to rival bureaucratic influence was established.

More important, the formation of a single, majority ruling party after 1955 vastly strengthened the hand of the professional politician over the career civil servant. Although the bureaucracy may formulate legislation, it is the LDP that decides which bills are to be taken up, which are to be modified and how, and which are to be introduced into the Diet with what priority. There is an extensive and powerful apparatus composed of Diet members within the party structure (especially the Policy Affairs Research Council) which debates and ultimately shapes legislation and legislative priorities. One can argue that although the Diet was merely a ratifier of government policy for much of the earlier postwar period, it was the dominance and pre-Diet control of policy by the LDP and not bureaucratic dominance that caused this situation. Especially in areas of extreme political sensitivity and public interest, such as defense policy, or where the political fallout from key supporting interest groups may result, as in agriculture, the top leaders of the LDP are careful not to leave decisions solely to the bureaucracy (Campbell, in press; Donnelly, in press; Otake, 1981).

Third, the top party leadership has very substantial leverage and influence over the bureaucracy to ensure that its views on policy prevail. No bureaucrat can expect to be elevated to the higher reaches of the civil service (e.g., to bureau chief or administrative vice-minister) without careful scruting by the LDP to ensure that he will be politically compatible (Pempel, 1974, p. 653). And the fact that some top bureaucrats have longrange aspirations to run for the Diet as LDP candidates also gives additional leverage to the party leadership. These ambitions ensure that bureaucrats will play ball on crucial matters, lest they risk their post-retirement political futures in the LDP, the only alternative if they wish to join a party in power. Even civil servants who desire to join the top corporate echelons after retirement rather than enter politics must be careful lest a top Party leader ruin the opportunity with a few well-placed words in the business community, a close supporting interest group of the LDP. Ultimately, of course, the overt use of such leverage usually remains unnecessary, since the long-term control over government by the LDP and thirty years of deciding on policy together undoubtedly have made bureaucrats sensitive to the desires and aims of LDP politicians, helping to bring about a relatively smooth working relationship and compatible views on both sides, as our data indicate.

To the power of the LDP must be added the rise of the power of the Diet in the 1970s. As we have indicated, from 1976-1980, LDP seats in both houses of the Diet declined to a bare majority, and the opposition for the first time gained control over some of the committees in the lower house. Because the conservatives needed to compromise with this newfound opposition legislative power, Diet deliberations during this period came to exert a greater influence on the policymaking process than ever before (Krauss, 1982), which is undoubtedly, reflected in our respondents' high evaluations of Diet influence.

Finally, the bureaucracy's near-monopoly control over information and expertise, one of the major sources of its influence in policy, is being challenged of late by politicians. With the long duration of LDP governance and thus with many politicians gaining cabinet level and Diet committee experience, an increasing number of LDP members have developed the skills and knowledge necessary to understand and deal with complex policy issues (Otake, 1981, p. 2). Further, in recent years, LDP Diet members have increasingly formed policy study groups to share information and expertise and to discuss key questions. There has thus been a tendency toward the development of policy "tribes" (zoku) within the Party who take a keen interest in, and have great knowledge of, specific policy areas (Otake, 1982; Pempel, 1981, pp. 47-50). Thus, this tendency too buttresses the growing influence of the "pure party politician" vis-à-vis the ex-bureaucrat politician.

To argue that politicians are much more influential in policymaking than they are usually given credit for is not to argue that the bureaucracy is uninfluential. Our data confirm that it is. Further. the bureaucracy undoubtedly was the most influential actor in policymaking in the first decade and probably also the second of the postwar era. It is from this period that the stereotype of bureaucratic dominance emerged and remained unchallenged. We would argue, however, that after approximately 1965, the LDP increased its control over both policy and bureaucracy to the point that it rivals the civil service in its influence. In 1965, for example, the LDP succeeded in intervening in the all-important budget process which until then had been the almost exclusive prerogative of the powerful Ministry of Finance. LDP control over the budget and other crucial policy matters increased subsequently. By 1968 it was even able to implement an "administrative reform" program to inhibit the growth of the national bureaucracy. Unlike other nations where bureaucratic resistance either prevents the adoption of such programs or torpedoes them in practice, the LDP not only put the program into effect, it also succeeded in its aim: Japan today has the smallest national government bureaucracy and the only of all the advanced industrial democracies that has decreased in size over the past fifteen years (Pempel, 1982, pp. 268-269; Rinji Gyōsei Chōsakai Jimukyoku, 1982).

Thus, it took ten years from its formation for the LDP to acquire the information control and expertise necessary to compete with the bureaucracy in policymaking, to gain control over the process of recruitment to top bureaucratic positions, and to force the bureaucracy to realize that it would have to share power with a party likely to be perpetually in power. In the conditions and tradition of bureaucratic dominance in Japan, it seems to have taken a long tenure of single majority-party rule to institutionalize the party's role to the point where it today has at least as great an influence on policymaking as the bureaucracy. During this process, LDP politicians and top bureaucrats have come to share similar perspectives on the process and contents of policy.

The convergence of LDP politicians and top bureaucrats, however, does not mean a confirmation of the ruling triad model either. Our data indicate that, as with the bureaucracy-dominant model, the reality of postwar Japanese politics may be far more complicated than the model suggests. The ruling triad model implies at least three conditions that our data do not confirm. First, it implies something of a unique Japanese elite especially cohesive in social background. We have found that Japanese politicians are not as socially elite as bureaucrats, and that this difference between the two groups is common in most industrialized democracies.

Second, it posits the influence of business in policymaking as equal to LDP politicians and bureaucrats. The latter two elites, however, do not perceive businessmen as their equal in policymaking. To put it another way, if business, bureaucracy, and the LDP are the three legs of a tripod supporting the Japanese state, then one leg is shorter than the other two. Other studies also confirm that the influence of big business on policymaking, especially on issues outside the economic ones of direct concern to them, may be exaggerated, and that when business does exercise influence, it is hardly as a monolithic bloc (Curtis, 1975; Otake, 1979).

Along similar lines, the ruling triad model also suggests that both the whole and the parts of the trio are cohesive and well integrated and that policy is made exclusively by informal consensus among these actors. Not only may business not be cohesive, but our survey finds important divisions in the bureaucracy between upper- and middle-level ranks in their perceptions of roles and policy. Inter-ministry conflict, which is often severe in Japan, would provide another important line of cleavage within the bureaucracy (Campbell, in press; Craig, 1975, pp. 15-17). And, our survey shows that decision making may not be limited to the behind-the-scenes consensus of LDP, bureaucracy, and big business; the Diet process, including the participation of the opposition parties, also may play some role in policy-making. (See also Mochizuki, 1982; Otake et al., 1982.)

# Japanese Politicians and Bureaucrats in Comparative Perspective

We have found Japan to share in the trend toward partial convergence of politicians and bureaucrats in policymaking among the advanced industrialized democracies. Both elites have recognized roles and influence in the policymaking process, although there are still some differences in those roles and a rather large difference in the styles in which they approach and perform those roles. In terms of those differences, Japan is closer to Italy in having a highly elite, homogeneous bureaucracy with strong classical bureaucratic attitudes toward their role and some negative attitudes toward a pluralist political process. These aspects of Japanese civil service political culture undoubtedly spring from bureaucracy's powerful role in Japan's late modernization in the nineteenth century and in Japan's recent experience with prewar authoritarian rule.

Yet what might be a troublesome institutional cleavage or paralysis of policymaking owing to these differences is, in the case of Japan, mitigated by a consensus especially between top bureaucrats and LDP politicians (a consensus in which opposition politicians increasingly are participating) about the role bureaucracy plays, the influence of political agencies in policymaking, and definitions of significant policy issues. One of the most important factors making for this crosscutting consensus, we have argued, has been the long-term majority dominance of the LDP as a ruling party. The extent to which latent conflicts between bureaucrats and politicians could remain in the background should the LDP be forced to alternate or share power with another political party, as all the other governing parties in all advanced industrial democracies have had to do, must remain an open question at this time.

The Liberal Democratic Party tenure as a longterm dominant party has also contributed to the increasing influence of politicians in policymaking, a surprising finding given the usual bureaucracy-dominant model of Japanese policymaking. There is nothing contradictory nor unique about a modern democratic policymaking process in which both politicians and bureaucrats exercise great influence, or in which a majority party steadily increases its power even in a system with an elitist and powerful bureaucracy. After discussing the influence and elitism of the French bureaucracy, Suleiman (1974, pp. 352-371) nevertheless concludes that under the Fifth Republic the emergence of a majority Gaullist party led to greater political control over the bureaucracy and over policy. We would argue, on the basis of our data and the factors discussed above, a similar process has been occurring in Japan.

Finally, the Japanese variant of the universal trend toward partial convergence of politicians and bureaucrats in the advanced industrialized democracies leads to a hypothesis about Weber's prediction that the inheritors of the modern state would be the professional politician and the professional bureaucrat. We have confirmed that this trend exists in Japan as well as in Europe and the United States. The timing and pace of that ascent to power of each elite may vary, however. In the Anglo-American democracies especially, it is the bureaucracy's role that in the mid-twentieth century has appeared to expand most rapidly. This expansion of bureaucratic power, resulting from the ever-growing complexities of the modern state and the ever-increasing number and legitimacy of organized interst group demands, thus has come to impinge on the established dominance of politicians by giving the bureaucracy a role in the formulation of policy and the management of interest group conflict.

Elsewhere in modern democratic states a similar phenomenon has occurred. But in nations such as Japan, and further study would probably demonstrate in such states as Italy, Germany, and probably France, that expansion is built on an already solid base of bureaucratic influence. In those nations, where the bureaucracy played a major role both in modernization and in an authoritarian interlude, and full-fledged democracy was a post-World War II phenomenon, the process of partial convergence was reversed. Bureaucratic power and policymaking influence always existed, and bureaucrats have always been more than mere implementors of policies decided upon by politicians. Rather, the two elites partially resemble each other today and share in influence in the political process primarily because politicians in the postwar era have rapidly come to take on the major roles in policymaking that they have always had in the Anglo-American democracies. In other words, the case of Japan suggests that politicianbureaucrat roles in policymaking have converged to a roughly similar pattern in all advanced industrial democracies, but there have been not one, but two roads to that contemporary endproduct: a more rapid expansion of the bureaucratic role to converge with a previously dominant political elite and a more rapid expansion of the politicians' role to converge with a previously dominant bureaucratic elite. All roads may lead to Rome, or Tokyo, Paris, London, and Washington, but those roads may have been paved at different times and in different ways.

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# Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors?

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Standard prisoners' dilemma games offer players the binary choice between cooperating and defecting, but in a related game there is the third possibility of leaving the game altogether. We conceptualize exiting as taking the individual beyond the reach of externalities generated in the original group, and on that basis—together with the assumption of self-interested (dollar-maximizing) behavior on the part of all players—we derive the prediction that the exit option will drain the community or group more of cooperators than of defectors.

But experimental data do not support this prediction; cooperators do not leave more frequently than defectors and, in fact, there is evidence that defectors are more prone to leave than cooperators. We consider and reject the possibility that this failure of prediction results from the (admitted) greater optimism of cooperators about the incidence of cooperation "here," and present data supporting the hypothesis that cooperators often stay when their personal interest is with exiting because of the same ethical or group-regarding impulse that (presumably) led them to cooperate in the first place. Cooperation can be produced for a group or community either by inducing people to cooperate or by inducing those who are going to cooperate to stay in the game, and ethical considerations seem to underlie the decision to stay as well as the decision to cooperate while staying.

In prisoners' dilemma games, as in the real world situations that they model, cooperators can expect lower payoffs than defectors. This is a clear consequence of the dominance of the defect alternative; no matter what others do, defect always pays more than cooperate. But of course it is cooperators who, by their personally costly action, produce the collective gain. Thus, what promotes cooperation becomes an important question. Reasonably enough, it has been the focus of much theoretical and experimental work.

The rate of cooperation can be influenced in two ways: by persuading people who are locked into the game to cooperate, and by persuading people who are going to cooperate to stay in the game when they have the option of leaving. This article is an experimental investigation of what happens when players in an n-prisoners' dilemma game are offered a possibly attractive exit option. There are a priori reasons associated with the lower cooperator's payoff "here" to predict that cooperators will be more attracted to this option than defectors, but in our experiments they do not take it any more than defectors; to the contrary, defectors appear somewhat more prone to leave than cooperators. In what follows, we first derive our theoretical expectations and then describe our experimental test. Granted our predictions are not met, the interesting question becomes: Why? We will present data relevant to several possible explanations. Our conclusion, to anticipate, is that the exit-stay decision—like the cooperate-defect one—is underlain by normative considerations that produce behavior contrary to the assumption that subjects are maximizing their "game" or "dollar" self-interest.

In its standard binary choice definition, the prisoners' dilemma offers no escape from the externalities that are the crux of the problem. The game assumes a fixed population, and its unfortunate players have no alternative but to stay and accept the payoff that is dictated by their personal cooperate-defect choice and the concurrent

This article is based on work funded by the National Science Foundation, grant SES-810-2818 to Randy Simmons. Opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Alphons van de Kragt was of great help in all phases of research, and Robyn Dawes was as usual generous with his criticism and encouragement.

cooperate-defect choices of others. By suggesting a game in which there is an exit opportunity, we are suggesting a trinary choice game that is no longer classically prisoners' dilemma. But the usefulness of formulations such as the prisoners' dilemma consists in their capacity to capture the essentials of naturally occurring situations of theoretical interest, and, we suggest, there are many such situations which players have, in addition to the standard prisoners' dilemma choice between cooperation and defection, a third exiting opportunity. Consider the following illustrations.

- 1. Members of an organization (such as a university) must choose between investing time, energy, and money in actions to improve the quality of the organization (generally "voice") and not doing so. Suppose that the invest decision is more costly to the individual regardless of what others do, but that the costs to the individual from investing are less than the benefit to the organization from each invest decision. The organization will be in better shape if everyone invests than if nobody does, but there is a dominant incentive coupled with a suboptimal equilibrium, the defining characteristics of a prisoners' dilemma as well as several related games (Dawes, 1975). In addition to investing and not investing, however, individuals can often move to a different organization.
- 2. Downtown businesspeople often must decide between contributing money toward amenities designed to improve the business climate of the downtown area (parking buildings, a mall, and other conveniences) and not contributing. Suppose a situation in which all will be substantially better off if all contribute than if nobody does (total benefit from a contribution exceeds total cost), but in which not contributing is dominant. The game is again prisoners' dilemma, and the a priori prediction is that nobody will contribute. But businesspeople confronted with such dilemmas can move to attractive suburban locations quite independent of the downtown area.
- 3. Workers in an industry can be faced with the choice between pulling together in union activities and not doing so. In the classic formulation (Olson, 1965), all will be better off if all do so

'Equally, the absence of an escape opportunity is part of the standard definition of public goods. This fact is normally clouded somewhat by the ambiguity of the word "goods," but, as Barry and Hardin (1982, p. 184) point out, the criterion "impossibility of exclusion" implies the criterion "impossibility of rejection" in the case of public bads. A public product is a product from which one cannot (at reasonable expense) be excluded and from which one cannot (at reasonable expense) escape—as well, of course, as being one involving "jointness of supply."

than if none do so, but individual workers will be better off personally by free riding on the successful action of others. Except in highly controlled economies, however, they do not have to stay in the industry or unit in which the organizing effort is being made.

4. Members of a military alliance can choose to contribute a large part of their gross national product (GNP) toward the common defense, or they can choose to free ride on the contributions of others by contributing relatively little. Suppose a situation in which the security of all will be assured if all contribute at some given level of GNP, but in which that security will decline as the level of contributions declines. As Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) have argued, there will be an incentive for nations to free ride by undercontributing—particularly for the smaller ones whose absolute contributions will not be critical. and who can rely on the larger ones to contribute at or above the required level. But nations can also leave the alliance and attend to their security on their own.

Notice that an exit option is not necessarily available in games that are prisoners' dilemma or, more accurately, that exit might be prohibitively costly or unavailable in technological terms. Members of a cartel such as OPEC cannot escape the price effects of a decision to break with the cartel policies restricting production or maintaining price (although, no doubt, they could decide to go into some other line of business). And nations locked in an arms race might decide to disarm unilaterally rather than continue to compete, but they cannot stop the world and escape. The binary choice prisoners' dilemma clearly is, therefore, a reasonable representation of at least some naturally occurring situations, and the appropriateness of the trinary model to the particular situation must be decided case by case. Our point is simply that many natural situations involve the trinary choice (cooperation, defection, or exiting) and should be modeled as such.

Are certain kinds of players more prone than others to take the exit option? Is there any difference between cooperators and defectors in this respect? The answer is of some consequence to the successful resolution of such dilemmas. If defectors are more prone to leave than cooperators. then the proportion of cooperators remaining in the group will be higher than without a viable exit option, and the success of the group (albeit now a smaller group) will be greater than without such an option. Conversely, if cooperators are more prone to leave, the availability of the exit option will have made things worse. Short of some mechanism that prevents one population or the other from leaving, defectors and cooperators are just as capable of taking the exit option, and the

issue becomes an empirical one: Will defectors or cooperators select themselves out disproportionately in the presence of an exit option?

The prisoners' dilemma is of fundamental importance to political theory, whether we are concerned with the justification for collective action and the state itself (Buchanan, 1975, for example), the logic of collective action (Hardin, 1982; Olson, 1965), the structure of normative systems (Campbell, 1975; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977), or the preservation of natural resources (Hardin, 1968: Hardin & Baden, 1977). We propose that much is to be gained by thinking about the consequences of adding an exit option to the standard binary choice prisoners' dilemma. In 1956 Tlebout pointed out the significance of "voting with your feet" to the provision of public goods in metropolitan areas, and in 1970 Hirschman alerted us to the general importance of the exit option to what happens in a community or group. What, then, of prisoners' dilemma games in which an exit alternative is possible?

# Reasons for Expecting Cooperators to Leave More Readily

In the standard binary n-prisoners' dilemma, payoffs to cooperators and defectors alike are a function of the number of people cooperating. Specifically, the addition of marginal cooperators (or the deletion of marginal defectors in the "bads" version of the game) adds a constant increment, more than the incentive to defect, to the payoffs of all.2 All players in this standard (symmetrical) game consume whatever externalities are produced so that, in a real sense, "group member" is defined by this consumption of externalities. Thinking in these terms has led Head (1973) to suggest that appropriate boundaries for political units might be defined by the "reach" of externalities and, indeed, we might attempt a definition of the elusive notion of community in a similar way.3

'A necessary characteristic of the prisoners' dilemma is that the social cost of defection is greater than the private benefit going to the defector. If it were not, of course, net cost would be less than net benefit, and the action would be socially efficient; in the prisoners' dilemma, social inefficiency results from the individual's (privately efficient) choices.

The problem gets more complicated, of course, when we recognize that there will often be a decay effect in externalities as one moves further from their source. In the present article we overlook such niceties and develop our model simply in terms of a step function; to do anything else would have complicated our design problems far beyond their already considerable difficulty. Notice, however, that the problem of such decay effects has a

By the same token, the idea of externalities lets us define a person who exits as one who, in some way, moves beyond the reach of whatever external effects are generated by group members. This might be accomplished, of course, by various tactics short of geographic movement (one can sometimes withdraw from a group while remaining in the same location), but geographic movement is the classic form of exiting, and we will talk about it in those terms. Thus, in the context of the prisoners' dilemma, a person who exits is one whose payoff is not dependent on the number of group members cooperating and defecting. The exiting person is freed from group dependency, either beneficial or harmful.

Let us now make three important assumptions.

- 1. Exit payoffs available to cooperators and defectors are the same or are believed by them to be the same. It might be, of course, that cooperators—persons who have already accepted a lower payoff here—expect, and should expect, a lower payoff there. Having taken group-regarding action in one place, cooperators might well anticipate doing the same in another, and anticipate correspondingly lower payoffs there than the defectors. But this is somewhat ad hoc and, assuming equal exit opportunities is at least a good place to start.
- 2. Cooperators and defectors have the same expectations about the number here who will cooperate. In the standard prisoners' dilemma game, where the defect alternative is unambiguously dominant, expectations about what other group members will do are irrelevant to the individual's choice; whatever others are expected to do, the defect alternative always pays more. But, as we will see, adding the exit option to the stan-

parallel in the problem of imperfect public goods. As we pointed out in note 1, the criterion "impossibility of rejection" is at least implied in the definition of public goods. But many authors (Goldin, 1977, for example) have argued persuasively that examples of pure public goods are very hard to find and that the externalities involved in most alleged cases are consumed unequally by individuals constituting the group in question.

The exit alternative might sometimes plausibly be conceptualized as the defect one (or perhaps even the cooperate one), but it is important to remember that externalities are the central fact of the prisoners' dilemma and that the standard game has all players both consuming and generating such externalities. If exiting is to be so conceptualized, then—to keep the game prisoners' dilemma—exiting players would have to continue such consumption and generation of externalities. This leads to messy argumentation, and it seems far cleaner simply to acknowledge that there is often the alternative of leaving the game altogether and to build that possibility into the analysis.

dard binary choice can make the behavior of others here highly relevant to the choices of dollar or game utility-maximizing individuals and, like the first, this assumption is a useful one for deriving initial predictions.

3. When it comes to the choice between exiting and staying, all players are motivated in the same dollar or game utility-maximizing manner. Although we have defined an exiting person as one who moves beyond the reach of external effects generated within the sphere, it is apparent that the act of exiting itself does have consequences for group members. If a person who would otherwise have cooperated leaves, the group is deprived of the benefit his or her presence would have involved. And, conversely, if a person who would otherwise have defected leaves, the group is spared the cost his or her presence would have involved. We term such effects "second order" externalities. Their presence might well trouble an ethically inclined person. and it is possible that cooperators—people who have (presumably) been constrained from defecting by the presence of first order externalities might be constrained from exit by the fact of their presence. But before we examine that possibility we will derive and test predictions from the more simple assumption that external effects are not a consideration for players making the exit-stay

The predictions follow readily. Cooperators stand to get less here than defectors in the prisoners' dilemma (by definition) and therefore will find the exit alternative (constant for cooperators and defectors by assumption 1) relatively more attractive. Alternatively-stated in terms of what happens here—cooperators will need to expect more group members to cooperate (something precluded by assumption 2) in order for their cooperate payoff to exceed the exitpayoff than will defectors in order for their defect payoff to exceed that same exit payoff.

The graphics in Figure 1 should make the point clear. Consistent with Schelling (1973) and others, the number cooperating here is measured from left to right on the horizontal. The functions DEFECT and COOPERATE indicate, respectively, game utility or dollar payoffs to those choosing to defect or cooperate; these have positive slopes because of the constant increment going to all from successive cooperating decisions. The function EXIT, constant with respect to the number cooperating, indicates payoffs to those exiting. Clearly, in order for cooperators to see staying (and accepting the cooperate payoff) as more attractive than exiting, they will have to expect y group members to cooperate, a number substantially more than the equivalent number, x. for defectors. There will be, of course, some exit

functions by which staying will be more attractive for both cooperators and defectors, just as there will be some by which staying will be less attractive for both. But where that is not the case, and within the specified assumptions, cooperators will leave more readily than defectors.

## **Experimental Design**

Groups of nine subjects, recruited by advertisements in the local daily and student newspapers, were offered the choice between O (cooperate) and X (defect) in the context of the payoff matrix in Table 1.5 (It will be noted that this is a standard

The number nine was a compromise between logistics and theoretical interest. Because our ultimate interest (in common, no doubt, with the interest of most n-prisoners' dilemma researchers) is with naturally occurring groups that are large, and because there is considerable theory relating behavior in prisoners' dilemma games to the size of groups, we would have liked to deal with groups of substantially larger size. But logistical constraints meant that groups of nine subjects were about as large as we could handle. The decision was supported by financial considerations: running the number of groups that was necessary for confidence in our results would have been prohibitively expensive, had we been able to overcome the logistical problems associated with groups larger than nine.

Subjects were signed up for particular experimental sessions on the basis of their convenience and the availability of positions. Care was taken to prevent groups of friends from participating in the same sessions—although, of course, there is something to be said for the security of having friends around in such psychology experiments and subjects might have lied to us. Similarly, we screened subjects as carefully as we were able in order to prevent their signing up in more than one session for this particular sequence. About half of our sessions were run in Logan, Utah, and half in Eugene, Oregon. We cannot detect any difference in the behavior of subjects drawn from these two subject pools in terms of the incidence of cooperation and defection, or the incidence of exiting. Although we did not keep any formal record of such things, our impression is that perhaps one-third of all subjects were nonstudents in Eugene and somewhat less than that in Logan. Because of our strict anonymity requirements, we have no way of knowing whether behavior differed between students and non-students, or indeed among students of different kinds. (Marwell & Ames, 1980, provide evidence that students with certain majorsnotably economics majors—are more prone to free ride than others.) We point out, however, that our interest is less in the absoute incidence of cooperation and defection, or of staying and leaving, than it is in the relative incidence of such things between our various experimental conditions. Although there are plenty of intuitive reasons for hypothesizing different marginal rates of cooperation in different groups (different patterns of student socialization would seem to make Marwell and

Ames's findings not too surprising), reasons for hypothesizing that different subject populations will respond differently to our particular experimental variables are less apparent.

On arrival, subjects read and signed an informedconsent form promising them, among other things, that their choices would be strictly anonymous. Upon conclusion of the experiment, subjects were released one by one from the experiment room and sent to a "payoff room" where they were told the result and paid accordingly. Prior subjects were in the elevator and well clear of the area before subsequent ones were sent to the payoff room. n-prisoners' dilemma matrix, with the defect payoff dominating the cooperate one and the all-cooperate payoff superior to the all-defect one; defectors get a constant \$5.00 more than cooperators.) Once their decisions had been recorded, subjects were told that they had a further choice to make—between E and Not E. If they chose E (to exit), their payoff would "not be dependent on the choices of any others in the group." Instead, they would have an equal chance of making any one of the payoffs in the original O/X Matrix (Table 1); they would select (blind) one poker chip with a dollar value on it from among

Figure 1 DEFECT COOPERATE PAYOFF INDIVIDUALS

NUMBER COOPERATING

Table 1. Nine-Person Payoff Matrix

Number Choosing 0	Number Choosing X	Payoffs to Those Choosing 0	Payoffs to Those Choosing X
0 .	9		\$ 5.00
1	. 8	\$ 1.00	6.00
2	7	2,25	7.25
3	6	3.25	8.25
4	. 5	4.50	9.50
5	4	5.50	10.50
6	, <b>3</b> ,	6.75	11.75
7 -	2	7.75	12.75
8	1	9.00	14.00
9	• 0	10.00	

eighteen in a paper bag. If they chose Not E (to stay), their payoff would be determined by their original choice between Q and X, taking account of others' choices.

We decided to use this lottery device for those who chose the E alternative in recognition of the fact that most real-world exit alternatives would involve at least a measure of uncertainty. Although people who exit will normally have a rough idea of what to expect in a new location, they will rarely have certain knowledge. Knowing that all the O/X payoffs were included with an equal probability would make the expected value of \$7.50 easy to recognize.

Deciding what payoffs to offer those who did not choose E—those who stayed—proved somewhat more complex. A rational player trying to decide between E and Not E would have an easy enough time figuring the expected value of leaving, but the expected value of staying, granted the prior choice between O and X, would have to take account of the fact that some players would be choosing E and that some of those would be O choosers—with the number of staying O choosers determining payoffs for staying cooperators and defectors. At this point, we came to recognize that any change in the number of players in an n-prisoners' dilemma game would inevitably change some of the critical parameters of the game and, therefore, would change the incentive structure for players in the game. Accordingly, we had to make some decisions about what parameters would be held constant and were obliged to present subjects with a set of matrices, each specifying the consequences of an O and an X choice for a different number of players staying in the game—and with the set embodying our decision about which parameters were most important.6

This problem in the reduction (or increase) of group size has the important consequence that one cannot

The matrices we used are given in Appendix 1. It will be seen that we have kept the all-choose-O payoff constant at \$10.00; the all-choose-X payoff constant at \$5.00; and that X choosers always make a constant \$5.00 more than cooperators. A cost of these decisions, however, was that the incentive to X (the difference between an O payoff for the nth cooperator and the X payoff for the outcome with one less cooperator) got progressively less with the smaller numbers involved so that, by the case of the two-person matrix, the game was not prisoners' dilemma. A further cost was that the payoffs for lone X choosers and lone O choosers (lone free riders and lone suckers, respectively) varied between matrices. Some such costs were inevitable, however, and in our judgment these were less likely to bias the exiting rates of cooperators and defectors than the alterna-

Although the logic behind this set of matrices is

analyze the effects of a change in numbers by itself; with any change in numbers, some other parameters must change with many of the parameters in question being relevant to the incentive structure of the game. A considerable literature is concerned with the consequences. of varying n in prisoners' dilemmas and related games, but variation of n cannot be isolated from other parametric changes. Accordingly, theorizing about what happens in groups of different sizes must take account of necessary parametric changes before conclusions are drawn about the consequences of size per se. Or, alternatively put, although effects of n per se are certainly imaginable, those effects should not be confused with the effects of parametric changes associated with changes in n. The logic of this problem, together with a specification of the parametric trade-offs that are involved, is spelled out in van de Kragt (1983). Bonacich et al. (1976) recognize the problem.

Instructions read to subjects are available, on request, from any of the authors.

relatively complex, our subjects appeared to have little trouble recognizing how to use the set when they were making their choices between E and Not-E. We were, of course, at pains to make sure that subjects understood what was involved and asked repeated test questions to convince ourselves of that before continuing.<sup>7</sup>

Within these broad terms, we crossed a nodiscussion/discussion variable with a variation in the magnitude of the exit payoff. In the nodiscussion condition, no verbal communication of any kind was permitted (we could not, of course, prevent nonverbal communication and other messages from flowing among our subjects), but in the discussion condition we gave subjects ten minutes of free discussion before making the choice between O and X. A standard finding of experimental research into behavior in nprisoners' dilemmas is that a period of group discussion substantially increases the incidence of cooperation (Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee, 1977, for example), and it seemed quite plausible that discussion could also influence exiting rates, perhaps differently for cooperators and defectors.

The low exit incentive involved the lottery among the payoffs specified in Table 1 with the expected value of \$7.50. The exit function portrayed in Figure 1 is this low value; the expected value of exiting here is superior to the defect or X payoff when fewer than 25% cooperate and is superior to the cooperate or O payoff when fewer than 75% cooperate. A high exit incentive was offered by a similar lottery, but one in which \$3.00 was added to all these low values. For this condition, therefore, the expected value of exiting was \$10.50, superior to the defect payoff when fewer than 50% cooperated, but superior to all cooperate payoffs that were available; cooperators could expect to make more by leaving than they could by staying, regardless of what happened here.

This variation in the attractiveness of the exit alternative was introduced in order to allow for

"Permitting discussion in one condition and not in the other meant that other things, concomitant with the discussion period, also varied—most notably, the time between being instructed about the choice alternatives and actual decision making. Such "thinking time" might, plausibly enough, influence the outcome of a normatively loaded decision such as the one between O and X. To the extent that cooperation is produced by normative constraint (Campbell, 1975), for example, thinking time could serve to alert subjects to the normative implications of the alternative choices. But Dawes and Orbell (1982) show that thinking time per se has no apparent effect on decision making, so we can comfortably ignore this difference between the two conditions.

the possibility that behavior would differ at different incentive levels. In particular, we were interested in how cooperators would respond when what they could make here was less than what they could reasonably expect there and when, therefore, not even the most optimistic expectations about what would happen here could justify a stay decision in dollar terms. We therefore ran the following four conditions:

Low exit payoff, discussion (seven groups)
Low exit payoff, no discussion (seven groups)
High exit payoff, discussion (eight groups)
High exit payoff, no discussion (seven groups)

# **Simultaneous Choice Conditions**

Because of our need to know about the X v. O choices that would have been made by subjects choosing E (had they stayed), we were obliged, in our basic design, to offer the cooperate v. defect choice first and then the exit v. stay decision subsequently, but real-world decision making is often more messy than this, with players deciding between staying and leaving and between cooperating and defecting at the same time. Accordingly, we ran a few discussion and no-discussion sessions with the lower expected value for exiting and with subjects making a simultaneous choice between O, X and E.

Table 2 presents our results for all the sequential choice conditions. As will be seen, in the low exit incentive-discussion condition only a single subject exited—one who had previously chosen to defect—and 49/62 (79%) of those remaining cooperated. By comparison, in the equivalent version of the simultaneous choice condition nobody exited and 15/18 (83%) cooperated. In the sequential choice, low exit incentive condition without discussion, 16/63 (25%) exited, with 11/47 (23%) of those remaining cooperating. By comparison, in the equivalent version of the simultaneous choice condition 11/45 (24%) chose to exit with 6/34 (18%) of those staying choosing to cooperate. The differences are not significant,

°Our objective was to run eight groups n each of these four conditions, but in three cases insufficient subjects kept their appointments (even allowing for the two extras we normally signed up) to make it possible to proceed.

10We terminated the simultaneous choice-and-discussion series at two sessions only when it became apparent that staying would be essentially universal and that cooperation rates would not differ significantly from those in the simultaneous choice condition. We conducted five simultaneous choice-and-no-discussion sessions.

and we can proceed without undue concern that our sequencing of the cooperate-defect choice before the stay-exit choice altered our findings substantially.<sup>11</sup>

# Is the Exit Option More Attractive to Cooperators?

From the data in Table 2 it appears that it is not; if anything, it appears that it is more attractive to defectors, in direct contrast to our prediction. In the low-exit-incentive-with-discussion condition the absence of any exiting cooperators and the presence of only one exiting defector precludes test of significance. In the low-exit-incentive-with-discussion and the high-exit-incentive-with-discussion conditions there is no significant association between cooperation v. defection and exiting v. staying, but in the high-exit-incentive-with-discussion condition, there is a significant association with exiting more frequent among defectors.

This greater propensity of defectors to exit in one of the four conditions—coupled with some suggestion of that (albeit not significant) in two others—is provocative. Collapsing across the four subtables does produce a significant association

"The low incidence of exiting in the discussion conditions makes tests of significance there inappropriate. Comparing the incidence of exiting in the two versions of the no discussion condition: chi square = .013, p = .91. Comparing the incidence of cooperation and defection after exit in these two versions: chi square = .394, p = .53.

(chi square = 16.31; p = .0002), but is a procedure subject to Simpson's paradox (simple base rate differences without contingencies may, when collapsed, indicate a contingency). The four phi values that can be calculated on the subtables can be converted to Fisher Z score since a phi is simply a Pearson product moment correlation between 0 and 1. A sufficient condition for testing the null hypothesis concerning linear combinations of the Z scores is that the variables themselves be normally distributed, but clearly the variables, consisting of 0s and 1s, are not. Nevertheless, to test the null hypothesis that a particular Z score is derived from a population where rho = 0, the normal distribution assumption is not necessary. Here, in lieu of a better test, we compute the critical ratio—the average Fisher Z score divided by the square root of the sum of the variances, each equal to 1/16 (n-3) where n is the sample size of the subtable. The value is 2.33—again compatible with the existence of an effect in the direction opposite to that hypothesized. Neither of these manipulations is fully satisfactory, however, and the more conservative interpretation of the data is that the general propensity of defectors to leave more readily than cooperators is not proved.

Notice three other things from Table 2. First, the period of group discussion is associated with a drastic increase in cooperation in both the high and low exit conditions. <sup>12</sup> This potency of group

<sup>13</sup>In the low exit-incentive condition before exit, chi square = 38.89, p = .000; in the low exit incentive condition after exit, chi square = 33.43, p = .000. In the

Table 2. The Frequency of Cooperation and Defection by Exit or Stay Decision, Sequential Choice Conditions

		Low Exit Incentive				High Exi	t Incentive	•
	Discus	Discussion		No Discussion		Discussion		ission
	Cooperate	Defect .	Cooperate	Defect	Cooperate	Defect	Cooperate	Defect
Exit Stay	0 49	1 13	3 11	13 36	14 48	3 7	4 12	25 22
	8		Chi Squar	re = .1,50	Chi Squar	e = .263	Chi Squar	e = 3.819
			· p =	.70	p = 0	.61	· p = .	.05
			,				Corre Chi Square	
							p = .	.10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Because of the very low expected cell frequency in the exit row, the chi square computation is not possible.

bAll statistics are computed with SPSS. The corrected chi square is a correction for violation of the continuity assumption of the chi square-distribution in 2 × 2 tables. Loether and McTavish (1976) suggest making this correction for 2 × 2 tables when "the computed [chi square] is in the critical region but near the boundary of that critical region. . ." (p. 549). The correction formula can be found in Norusis (1979, p. 13).

discussion is a standard observation in experimental research on dilemma behavior (e.g., Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Edney & Harper, 1978; Jerdee & Rosen, 1974; Rapoport, T., 1976, for example) and not directly relevant to the point being made here, but we will return to it later.

Second, notice that the number of players taking the exit option is significantly higher with the higher exit incentive, which is comforting to the idea that players are responding in a systematic manner to the game incentives offered them.<sup>13</sup> Finally, notice that the incidence of exiting is significantly lower under discussion than under no discussion.<sup>14</sup> This latter point we will also return to shortly.

But why are our initial predictions in error?

# Why Do the Cooperators Stay?

It might be argued that the results come from a failure of our particular experimental method rather than from a failure of our theorizing. Thus, if our subjects were indifferent to the payoffs being offered them—if those payoffs were trivial or small relative to the wealth or income of the subjects—then, perhaps, they would be prepared to ignore the niceties of costs and benefits associated with the exit option, and simply toss a coin in deciding whether to stay or to leave. If they did that, the argument would go, we could expect no difference between cooperators and defectors in exiting rates, assuming their coins were equally weighted.

We do not accept this argument. It depends on the assertion that our payoff incentives are not taken seriously by subjects—at least not seriously enough to merit a more calculated response—and this assertion runs quite contrary to our impressions (albeit informal) of the experiments. High levels of involvement and affect were characteristically expressed during the group discussion periods and to the experimenters in the payoff room after the results were made known to the

high exit incentive condition before exit, chi square = 50.77, p = .000; in the high exit incentive condition after exit, chi square = 25.84, p = .000.

<sup>13</sup>Appropriately collapsing the information in Table 2 shows that in the low exit-incentive conditions 17 subjects (13.5%) of a total of 126 exited, whereas in the high exit-incentive conditions 46 subjects (34.1%) out of 135 chose to exit. Chi square is 15.08 with 1 df, p = .0001.

<sup>14</sup>Rewriting the information in Table 2 shows that in the discussion conditions 18 subjects (13.3%) of a total of 135 exited, whereas in the no-discussion conditions 45 subjects (35.7%) out of 126 chose to exit. Chi square is 17.83 with 1 df, p = .0000.

subjects. (Perhaps this was faked, but we see no reason for faking here.) Comparable impressions, together with anecdotal evidence, are reported by Dawes et al. (1977). Short of evidence that the dollar differences involved were not meaningful to our subjects, we feel that the explanation for our finding must be sought in the shortcomings of the model from which we derived our initial predictions.

In naturally occurring situations, it is possible that cooperators do anticipate lower payoffs there than do defectors (projecting from their anticipation here, for example). Such pessimism about farther fields, contrary to assumption 1, might then serve to compensate for pessimism about the likely payoffs here from which our predictions are derived, and might be sufficient to keep the cooperators here in greater numbers than would otherwise be the case. Such a possibility cannot be verified without appropriate field research, but it is not particularly relevant to explaining the present experimental results. Here cooperators and defectors have been presented with the same exit incentive and—unless cooperators are more pessimistic about the outcome of the lottery than the defectors (and we see no reason for that being the case)—the formal prediction still stands. How can we account for the fact that cooperators do not leave more readily when their anticipated payoff there is the same as for defectors?

Re-examining assumption 2 we can propose: Cooperators do not leave more readily than defectors because (contrary to assumption 2), they are more optimistic than defectors about the number here who will cooperate, such optimism compensating for the fact that they can expect less here than defectors with constant expectations.

The general argument can be seen readily from the low exit parameters portrayed in Figure 1. As dollar maximizers, defectors who expect more than 25% cooperation should stay (the exit function is below the defect one to the right of x), and those who expect less cooperation than that should leave, whereas cooperators who expect more than 75% cooperation should stay (the exit function is below the cooperate one to the right of y), and those who expect less cooperation than that should leave. (Cooperators and defectors who expect exactly 25% and 75%, respectively, will, presumably, toss a coin.) But if the distribution of cooperators' expectations were substantially higher than that of defectors-if they expected substantially more cooperation here than defectors—then the basis for the prediction could vanish; in fact, some levels of optimism could leave them staying more than defectors. The hypothesis is provocative if for no other reason than the implication that it is cooperators' optimism about their fellows' behavior that is

Table 3. Mean Expectations about Cooperation, by Condition and Behavior

	Low exit	incentive	High exit	incentive
	Discussion	No discussion	Discussion	No discussion
Cooperators	8.22	6.69	8.59	6.91
n	49	13	<b>61</b>	11
Defectors	6.46	3.13	5.60	3.07
n	13	48	10	41
T = .	5.76	5.99	9.80	6.86
df ==	60	59	69	50
p ==	.000	.000	.000	.000

keeping them from leaving—a classic self-fulfilling prophecy.

Consistent with Dawes et al. (1977) and others, our data show that cooperators are more optimistic about their fellows' behavior than defectors. Table 3 gives the mean number of cooperators expected in the four basic conditions by the subject's own behavior. (Notice that the cooperators' expectations of their own behavior are included in these data. The model has it that players make their stay-v.-leave decisions on the basis of the total expected incidence of cooperation in the group, so their own intended behavior should be included as a contribution to that total.) Although both cooperators and defectors are more optimistic in the discussion conditions than in the no discussion ones, cooperators are consistently and significantly more optimistic than defectors, and it is worth noting, they are generally more unrealistic than defectors, too.15 We can compare these data

<sup>19</sup>The latter is shown by the T and p values in Table 3. The former is shown here. For cooperators in discussion conditions the average is 8.43 (N=110) and in no discussion conditions the average is 6.79 (N=24). The corresponding T value is 6.38 with df=132 and a p=.000. For defectors in discussion conditions the average

with the fact that an average of 7.00, 2.00, 7.75, and 2.29 players actually did cooperate in the respective conditions and see that in only one (the third) were the cooperators closer to the mark than defectors. If the hypothesis is correct, then we might add the further implication that it is cooperators' unrealistic optimism about their fellows that is maintaining the proportion of cooperators in the group.

Unfortunately, the small number of exiting subjects in the low exit incentive conditions means that holding expectations constant and looking for any difference in the incidence of exit is not very satisfactory in that condition. In Table 4, however, we present such data for the discussion and no-discussion versions of the high-exit incentive condition where exiting was more frequent. We have grouped expectations into the two broad orderings of the three payoffs in that condition (E > D > C and D > E > C), because behavioral predictions for cooperators and for defectors are defined by those two orderings. If

is 6.09 (N = 23) and in no discussion conditions the average is 3.10 (N = 89). The T value is 7.73 with df = 110 and a p = .000.

Table 4. The Incidence of Exiting, by Choice and Condition with Expectations Constant,
High Exit Incentive

	Condition							
	Discus	sion	No Dis	cussion				
Expectations	Cooperators	Defectors	Cooperators	Defectors				
0-49.9%		1/3 (33%)	0	15/33 (45%)				
+50%	13/61 (21%)	2/7 (29%)	4/10 (40%)	4/8 (50%)				

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>We omit the choices of subjects whose expectations left them indifferent between the exit option and staying—for this condition, only those defectors who expected exactly 50% to cooperate.

cooperators and defectors are acting in a dollarrational manner with respect to exit, and if differentially skewed expectations account for our findings, then we should see greater exiting among cooperators within expectation categories. But we do not; in fact, the differences that exist are in the opposite direction, with more defectors exiting within expectation categories than cooperators. There is nothing here to support the hypothesis that different expectations about what will happen in the group account for the failure of cooperators to exit in greater proportions than defectors.

Looking, then, at assumption 3 we can hypothesize:

Cooperators are not acting wholely on the basis of dollar rationality when it comes to making their decision between staying and exiting. They are (contrary to assumption 3) motivated to some extent at least by a concern for the welfare of the group.

Cooperators have, after all, made one decision -to cooperate—that is readily interpreted as based on a willingness to accept some personal cost in the interests of group welfare. If, as we have suggested above, there are second order externalities associated with the staying and leaving alternatives, then it seems plausible that a concern for such effects will also constrain their exiting behavior. We can speculate, of course, about the power of such a constraining influence compared to the power of concern over first order externalities, but it is clearly possible that what power does exist could account for the behavioral patterns we have reported. The exit-vs.-stay decision might not be free of ethical implications, at least for cooperators.

But how can we observe the values that underlie decisions such as this? There are problems with inferring motivations from behavior because, obviously, a given behavior might be prompted by a variety of motivations. And there are problems with inferring motivations from subjects' own explanations for that behavior because, just as obviously, such explanations might be distorted by rationalization, projection, misunderstanding of self, and a variety of similar processes.

But in the present case it is possible to get some reasonably strong inferences from a combination of behavioral observation and simply asking subjects the reason for what they did. 16 We are testing

<sup>16</sup>Barry (1970, p. 90) quotes with approval the following from Blake and Davis (1964):

the difficulty of proving the existence of a norm is great. As a consequence there is a tendency to take regularities in behavior as evidence of the

the hypothesis that the staying behavior of some cooperators, at least, is knowingly against their personal dollar interest and is motivated instead by a concern for the welfare of the group. Although we have no direct way of telling whether subjects believed their staying decisions were against their personal dollar interest—we did not ask them that directly—we can categorize them according to whether their expectations about what others would do made their observed behavior rational or irrational in dollar-maximizing terms, 17 and then examine the explanations for behavior given by subjects who were dollarrational and dollar-irrational. Any substantial difference between behavioral categories in the explanations given for behavior ought to be accorded at least prima facie credibility.

Unfortunately, there are again too few exiting subjects in the low-exit-incentive conditions to permit confident inferences, but numbers are not a problem in the high-exit-incentive conditions, and we will confine ourselves to them. Thus, for the high-exit-incentive games, defecting subjects are making dollar-rational exit-stay decisions if they exit when fewer than 50% are expected to cooperate or if they stay when more than 50% are expected to cooperate; and they are making dollar-irrational exit-stay decisions if they stay when fewer than 50% are expected to cooperate or if they exit when more than 50% are expected to cooperate. Cooperating subjects are making dollar-rational decisions whenever they leave, regardless of their expectations; and they are making dollar-irrational decisions whenever they stay, regardless of their expectations. (This latter is, of course, a consequence of the fact that the expected value of exiting is greater than any available cooperate payoffs for these games.18)

norm. When this is done, to explain behavior in terms of the norm is a redundancy. Seen in this light, statements such as the following are redundant: "Knowledge of a culture makes it possible to predict a good many of the actions of any person who shares that culture." Why not simply say: "Knowledge of behavior in a society makes it possible to predict behavior in that society."

But, as Barry goes on to argue, there is nothing logically wrong with inferring the existence of values or norms from the behavior of responding to a questionnaire.

"The decision form on which subjects recorded their cooperate v. defect choice asked them about their expectations about the choice of each other subject in the experiment. (Subjects were identified by letters from A through G.)

"We are not directly concerned with the important problem of just how players come to hold their expecta-

Table 5. Dollar Rationality among Cooperators and Defectors, High Exit-Incentive Conditions<sup>a</sup>

	Discussion		No Discussion		
	Cooperate	Defect	Cooperate	Defect	
Dollar-rational	10	6	4	15	
Dollar-irrational	48			16	
· , · ·	Chi square			e = .214	
	p = .	001	p = .6	54	

These data exclude respondents whose responses to the expectations questions did not permit categorization in terms of dollar rationality or dollar irrationality. In this case dollar-rational cooperators always left, and dollar-irrational ones always stayed. Notice that the figures here vary somewhat from those in Table 1 for the incidence of staying and leaving. This is because of our decision to define dollar-rationality and dollar-irrationality on the basis of subjects' estimates of others' behavior rather than on their own behavior. Not all subjects gave usable estimates, which may reflect on their own capacity to act in a dollar-rational manner.

tions about the behavior of others in the game. The standard assumption in economic theorizing is that expectations are explained exogenously, or perhaps as a consequence of structural variables of one kind or another. But Dawes et al. (1977) present data suggesting that expectations are, at least in part, a consequence of the player's own cooperate-defect choice—they can be explained as projections from one's own decision. Their finding was made in the context of a standard binary prisoners' dilemma game in which the defect alternative was unambiguously dominant and for which, therefore, expectations about others' behavior would be not formally relevant to the choices of dollar-maximizing players—meaning that it should be generalized to the expectations-behavior problem in other games only with caution. It does, however, constitute a caution for the standard assumption. In the present case, a behavioral discontinuity with expectations is sufficient to categorize a subject as dollar-irrational, regardless of the direction of causality.

As Table 5 shows, dollar-irrationality is not the particular preserve of either cooperators or defectors in the absence of group discussion, but it is significantly associated with cooperation in the presence of group discussion. When group members have an opportunity to talk among themselves about the decision problem they face, cooperation substantially increases even though no expectations about others' behavior could make that behavior dollar-rational.

To the point of the hypothesis, in Table 6 we present the explanations for staying and leaving that were given by cooperators and defectors who were, respectively, dollar-rational and dollar-irrational. Explanations were recorded in an open-ended manner, and initial coding categories were developed according to responses given. For the present purposes, these initial categories were re-grouped with an eye to our theoretical interest

Table 6. Explanations for Staying and Leaving, by Choice and Condition,
High Exit Incentive Conditions

		Discu	ssion		. ,	No Dis	cussion	
	Coop	erate	De	fect	Coop	erate	Defect	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Ia	Rb	Ī	· R.	Ī.	R	Ī	R
Stay								
Dollar-maximizing	. 5			- 4	1	<del></del>	4	3
Risk related	15		****	1	1	· <u>-</u>	6	_
Group regarding	24	-			3	-		
Other	3	-	-	1	1	<u>-</u>	3	1
Leave								
Dollar-maximizing	_	7	1	_	-	1	1	3
Mistrusts group	-	3	ī		_	î	ī	7
Other	_		1		_	2	ī	i

a Dollar-irrational.

bDollar-rational.

in the difference between dollar-rational and dollar-irrational behavior.19 Of greatest interest are the responses given by dollar-irrational cooperators (all of whom, by definition in this high-exit-incentive game, were stayers) in the discussion condition where numbers are sufficient to accord some stability to estimates. Notably, 24 of 47 (51%) offered explanations categorizable as group-regarding, whereas only 5 (11%) offered explanations categorizable as dollar-maximizing. Even if the 15 (32%) who indicated that they stayed for risk-related reasons are conservatively interpreted as being concerned to capture more dollars from a relatively predictable group than from a risky exit option, this does represent a substantial expression of group-regarding motives. The credibility of such expressions is increased in addition by the happy expressions of dollarmaximizing concern that came from the relatively few cooperators and defectors whose decision to exit was, in fact, categorizable as dollar-rational. In this condition—where a cooperator's decision to stay was never dollar-rational—the cooperators who stayed appear to have been, very often, motivated by a concern for the welfare of the group rather than by a concern for their personal dollar welfare.

## A Revised Model of Exiting

On the basis of the above data, therefore, we can reject the model of exiting behavior that is based on the assumption of universal dollar-maximizing behavior and argue as follows.

"Thus, of the reasons for staying, "higher expected payoff," "strategic maximizing, granted expectations," and "simple dominance of the 'stay' payoff" were grouped under dollar-maximizing; "too difficult to calculate; transaction costs," "stays because does not understand what's happening," "rejects risk involved in exiting" and "satisficing-what I can get from my 'stay' strategy is good enough" were grouped under risk-related; and "rejects money incentive; cooperators will stay," "trusts group; wants cooperator-group solidarity in staying," "trusts group-but also recognizes self-interest," "prefers group dependency to lottery; confident in the group's decision," "you have to trust, have faith," "responds to group pressure to stay," "the group decided this way and I am going to do it accordingly" (discussion conditions only) and "cites 'fairness' and other values" were grouped under group regarding.

Of the reasons for leaving, "higher expected payoff," "strategic maximizing, given expectations," and "responds to dollar amounts in the matrix" were grouped under dollar-maximizing; "prefers lottery to group dependency," "prefers lottery in general" and "mistrusts group in general" were grouped under mistrusts group.

Prisoners' dilemma games exist-must exist-in a context of normative concern about right and wrong behavior, and that concern will produce some measure of cooperation at the time of the binary choice between cooperation and defection: just how much, of course, will depend on such things as the dollar incentives against cooperation (the price of group-regarding behavior), the strength of group-regarding values, and the game circumstances that support them. Some part of the population will be prepared to include firstorder externalities in their personal calculus when making the decision between cooperation and defection. But that group-regarding concern will also be reflected, to some extent, in the decision between staying and leaving, and we can expect that those who made a group-regarding decision on the first occasion will be more prone to make one on the second occasion as well.

Not all those who cooperated will stay, of course; the normative implications of the decision to leave are likely to be less pressing than the normative implications of the decision to defect, and some who had been willing to constrain their private maximizing behavior on the one occasion will not do so on the other. In fact, the availability of an exit option might be used by some cooperators as a normatively acceptable device for escaping the costs that their normative scruples would otherwise impose on them. But enough will stay to negate the prediction derived from the assumption of dollar-maximizing behavior.

In these terms, then, defectors are those whose group-regarding concern, if present at all, is not sufficient to promote cooperation. They are more concerned with the private costs associated with cooperation than with the group benefits and, by extension, will be likely to approach the choice between exiting and staying in the same way. Whether or not they decide to stay will depend on what they expect to reap, in dollar or game terms, from staying—which, in turn, will depend on their expectations about the behavior of others (no doubt influenced, to some extent, by their own behavioral dispositions). Remembering that nobody is immune to normative pressures, it is possible that some defectors see the exit option as a way of avoiding the guilt feelings associated with their defect choice; the exit option might thus serve as a reasonable compromise in the tug-ofwar between individual interest and group interest for both cooperators and defectors.

Notice that the centrality of normative constraint to this model means, in naturally occurring situations as in experimental ones, that a prior understanding about the structure of normative systems and their strength will be necessary before accurate predictions can be made about the incidence of cooperation among those remaining in

the group after the exit option has been exercised. In our experiments we found that cooperators did not leave any more readily than defectors, and we found some evidence, too, that defectors were leaving more readily than cooperators. But this result could be a unique reflection of the normative patterns existing among our particular subject population and cannot be taken as necessarily indicating what would happen with a different population or with different game parameters. The experimental result is significant, we believe, for emphasizing the importance of normative constraint as a factor behind the exit-stay decision as well as the cooperate-defect one and should be taken as showing the need for greater understanding of normative systems rather than as predicting general outcomes. Without an understanding of the constraint emerging from such systems, behavioral predictions cannot be made with confidence.

What implications can be drawn from the considerable power of group discussion in promoting not only cooperation, but also staying behavior among cooperators? Prominent in our discussion sessions were assertions and promises that individuals would cooperate and, with due allowance for normal skepticism about such things, that would seem to predict an increase in dollarrational staying behavior among both cooperators and defectors: the more cooperation is expected. the higher are the dollar payoffs to both cooperators and defectors. But the interesting finding has to do with the apparent capacity of group discussion to promote dollar-irrational staying behavior among cooperators, and the best explanation for that seems to be in terms of discussion's capacity to promote normative constraint and group-regardingness. We did not hear much explicit invoking of cooperation norms such as fairness and right behavior, but we did hear considerable effort to clarify the consequences for oneself and for other members of the group of cooperating or defecting, as well as of staying or exiting, and such clarification would seem to be a necessary condition (albeit, not a sufficient one) for normative constraint to work. If subjects were concerned about the consequences of their actions for others, then group discussion could well have served to promote that understanding and to demonstrate the relevance of their normative scruples to the choices at hand. Generally, however, anything that serves to increase normative constraint seems likely, not only to increase cooperation, but also to increase the propensity of cooperators to stay in the game.

#### Conclusions

In 1970, Albert Hirschman alerted political scientists to the importance of the exit option to what happened in a community or group (economists, as he suggests, were already aware of that and needed to be reminded about the importance of voice), but he did not talk explicitly in terms of the prisoners' dilemma. Similarly, prisoners' dilemma research (both formal and empirical) has been conducted almost exclusively in terms of a binary model in which players are confronted only with the cooperate and defect choice and are, effectively, locked in the game. In this article we have attempted to bring these two traditions together. Although there are, clearly, some prisoners' dilemmas in which (effectively) there is no exit opportunity for the players, there are many others in which there is, and we believe those situations should be modeled in trinarychoice terms. In this article we have developed predictions for the trinary case based on the assumption of dollar-maximizing behavior from players, and we have tested those predictions with small-group experimental data. Those predictions were not met, and we have advanced a further model by which normative constraint (or groupregardingness) serves not only to produce cooperation, but also to keep it in the game once it has been produced.

The opposite side of the exit problem is, of course, the entrance or joining problem. What kind of people will most likely be attracted to group membership? Perhaps the logic of the present model can be extended to address that matter, but the issue seems likely to become an empirical one in relatively short order. Is it possible that cooperators will be selected in by the availability of an entrance option? How important will expectations about what is likely to happen in the group be to the decision to join or not to join? Will potential group members use their current choices to predict their likely payoffs in new groups? We have argued that normative constraint inhibits the exiting decisions of cooperators, but what role—if any-will normative constraint play when people are not yet members of a group?

Appendix 1

	Number choosing 0	Number choosing X	Payoffs to those choosing 0	Payoffs to those choosing X
Eight person matrix	. 0	8		\$ 5.00
•	1	7 6	\$ 1.25	6.25
•	2	6	2.50	7.50
·	3	5 4	3.75	8.75
•	• 4	· 4	5.00	10.00
	5	3	6.25	11.25
•	6 `	2	7.50	12.50
	7	1	8.75	13.75
	, <b>8</b>	0 .	10.00	-
Seven person matrix	0	7	-	\$ 5.00
	1 '	6	\$ 1.50	6.50
	2	5	3.00	8.00
	<b>3</b> .	4	4.25	9.25
	4 .	3	5.75	10.75
	5	2	7.00	12.00
	` 6	ī	8.50	13.50
	7	õ	10.00	
Six person matrix	0 .	6	_	\$ 5.00
-	1	5	\$ 1.75	6.75
	2	. 4	3.25	8.25
	3	3.	5.00	10.00
	3 4	2	6.75	11.75
	5	$\bar{1}$	. 8.25	13.25
	6	ō	10.00	•
Five person matrix	0	5	_	\$ 5.00
-	1 '	4	\$ 2.00	7.00
	2 3 4	3 2	4.00	9.00
	3	2	6.00	11.00
	4	1	8.00	13.00
	5	. 0	10.00	-
Four person matrix	0 .	4	<del>-</del>	\$ 5.00
	1	` 3	\$ 2.50	7.50
	2	2	<b>5.</b> 00	10.00
	3	1	7.50	12.50
	. 4	0	10.00	_
Three person matrix	0	3	<del>-</del>	\$ 5.00
	1	· <b>2</b>	\$ 3.25	8.25
•	2	1	6.75	11.75
•	3	. 0	10.00	-
Two person matrix	0	2		\$ 5.00
	1	1 -	\$ 5.00	10.00
	2	0	10.00	-
One person matrix	0	1	 *10.00	\$ 5.00
•	1	0	\$10.00	· <b>-</b> ,

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# A Method of Estimating the Personal Ideology of Political Representatives

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We suggest a method for estimating a political representative's personal ideology and its effect on his or her voting decisions. The current practice of using the ratings of a pressure group such as Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) as a proxy for personal ideology is shown to have a number of theoretical and interpretive flaws. Our technique uses the residuals from two regression equations to provide answers to two questions: Is there a systematic ideological component to the voting behavior of political representatives after taking account of other political determinants, and if a systematic ideological component exists, is it possible to determine its role in voting on particular issues? The technique developed and the currently accepted practice are compared using votes on labor issues as an empirical example.

Legislative voting has long been a subject central to modern American political science. Recently, economists have also become active in this field of study. Over the years a number of alternative models have been proposed to explain legislative voting, and a rough consensus has developed on the identity of the major determinants of voting (Kingdon, 1977). In most models ideology plays a role in determining the legislator's voting pattern. The ensuing pages attempt to convince the reader both that there is something wrong with the way ideology has usually been measured and that our procedure constitutes a substantially improved measure for ideology. The argument of this article is consistent with virtually any theoretical model of legislative behavior which gives ideology a place.

To illustrate and test our procedure, it will be

Received: March 7, 1983

Accepted for Publication: June 23, 1983

Our appreciation is given to Resources for the Future for its continued support for this research and to the Alfred P. Sloane Foundation, which generously funded our work on marketable permits through a grant made to Resources for the Future for the study of "Alternatives to Direct Regulation." This work grew directly out of research on that project. We are indebted to Robert Mitchell who ably critiqued and helped us with the development of these ideas. Laura Quinn is responsible for excellent research assistance. Our gratitude is also extended to Peggy Conway, Norman Frohlich, John Mullahy, Charles Phillips, Warren Phillips, Cliff Russell, and Eric Uslaner for their extensive and helpful comments.

necessary to apply our argument within the context of a specific theoretical approach to legislative voting. Our applications are to models that picture the representative's voting act as a political act in which a career politician attempts to further his security, and his stature, by strategically choosing how to vote. Such a model assumes that the individual legislator is motivated by whatever gives electoral, or more broadly, political, security. But such a political view of the legislator is incomplete, for legislators also have personal views and values which enter into their voting decisions (cf. Wittman, 1977).

Normally legislative voting is seen as a function of the representative's political and ideological constraints, i.e., the representative's party, the

'One can point to some of the alternative models put forward in the congressional voting literature. For example, it has been suggested that representatives vote by taking cues from their colleagues, and in particular it has been shown that representatives tend to vote with both their state colleagues and others with whom they find themselves in ideological agreement (Kingdon, 1977; Weisberg, 1978). Other variables that are often considered stem from the Washington, or more specifically, the legislative environment and characteristics of the legislator's electoral coalition (Kushner, 1975; Markus, 1974). Such analyses may indeed be correct and not inconsistent with what we are proposing. Quite the contrary, some shall be shown merely to require a more complex system of equations for tests.

A number of analysts have argued this position with varying degrees of dissent from its assumptions. See, for example, Chappell (1981a, b), Kau and Rubin (1979a, b), Mayhew (1974), and Silberman and Durden (1976).

socioeconomic (or political) characteristics of the legislator's constituents and other supporters, and the legislator's own ideology. In many of these studies, there appears to be considerable agreement on how to measure ideology. Ideology is usually operationalized by the use of one or another of a number of "ratings" by pressure groups. (See, for example, Bernstein & Horn, 1981; Chappell, 1981a, b; Kalt, 1981, 1982; Kenski & Kenski, 1980; Lopreato & Smoller, 1978; MacRae, 1970; Matthews, 1960.) Our argument is not for or against any one particular paradigm, nor with the inclusion of ideology as a determinant of the incumbent's voting patterns, but rather with the method used to measure ideology.

Pressure group "ratings" are usually calculated simply as the percentage of the time the legislator voted "with" the pressure group on a specific subset of roll call votes during a particular session. Thus, part of the incumbent's voting record is used as an indicator of ideology. Ideology is then used to explain voting on some other matters. This method creates difficulties of interpretation because we are explaining a set of votes (e.g., on labor issues) by a (perhaps disjoint) second set of votes which are taking place over the same period of time and are theoretically simultaneously determined by the same factors. More generally, the measure of the independent variable, ideology, is itself explained by the same variables as is the dependent variable. For example, if one were interested in explaining voting behavior

There is, however, a tradition, especially in the public choice school, to discount (totally) the personal values of the politicians (e.g., Downs, 1957). The results reported in the fourth part of this article can be seen as a (disconfirming) test of this hypothesis.

"The factors that are indicated are usually part of the explanatory variables utilized in legislative voting studies. See, for example, Lopreato and Smoller (1978). Note that it could be that voting is not determined by district characteristics, but rather only by those elements (of or beyond the district) which are selected to be in the legislator's coalition. Note that the coalition would filter both the voters and the interest groups which support the legislator. This is the implication of the work of Markus (1974) and Kushner (1975) and is supported by various public choice models such as that by Oppenheimer (1975).

Jusually the personal ideology of a legislator is taken to be reflected in the ratings of that legislator by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). But the indices of various groups are highly correlated with each other (which they should be, theoretically, if there is an overall model governing voting behavior) (Poole, 1981). We accept the usual convention of ideology along the liberal—conservative dimension. There are, of course, other dimensions which could be defined. The arguments presented in this article are adaptive.

on, let's say, labor issues, one could estimate COPE<sup>6</sup> scores as a function of the individual's party  $(P_i)$ , district  $(D_i)$ , personal position within the legislature  $(LP_i)$ , and ideology  $(I_i)$ .

Now COPE scores are highly correlated with such standard measures of ideology as the ratings bestowed on members of Congress by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and by the conservative pressure group, the Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA).7 Further, since the ADA score, or another proxy for ideology, is simultaneously determined with the dependent variable (COPE), other problems may follow. For example, using ADA as a measure for ideology could cause the other variables to be counted twice—once directly and once through their role in determining ADA. Thus, it is obvious that while the ADA rating (ADA) is correlated with I (and hence a possible proxy for I), it is also correlated with everything else in the equation, giving rise to problems of extreme multicollinearity (and its associated problems—large standard errors in parameter estimates and unreliable tests of significance). Thus, Fiorina (1979) noted, in a critique of an article that used this practice:

The explanatory variable, liberalism, is measured by the Americans for Democratic Action index. Since the roll call votes that compose the latter are presumably functions of party and constituency as well as ideological influences, it is difficult to treat the summed score as a measure of liberalism alone but . . . (the authors) show no great concern over this (p. 50).

Therefore, when the researcher correlates (for example) an individual's ADA rating with his or her voting on some other issues and reports that correlation as indicating the role of ideology in the incumbent's voting, the ideology is given weights which, at least, are noninterpretable and probably are vastly overstated. Other variables are also assigned peculiar weights.

"Here COPE is the AFL-CIO's rating of the legislator. These scores indicate the percentage of the time that the legislator voted "with" the interests of the AFL-CIO on issues selected by the unions.

For example, Kau and Rubin (1979a, p. 369) report the correlations as follows for 1973: r(COPE,ADA) = .85, r(COPE,ACA) = -.89, and r(ACA,ADA) = -.90. Similarly, in our data (see the third and fourth sections below), r(COPE,ADA) = .86.

"Ridker and Henning's (1967) problem was that one of their independent variables incorporated the effects of air pollution on property values, the item they wished to measure. Johannes and McAdams develop a residualized ADA variable to measure the representative's deviation from the district's ideological position, as measured by its pro-McGovern vote in 1972.

Indeed, researchers have noticed in their studies that personal ideology was "weighing in" heavily, and that their findings did not reflect normally perceived wisdom (e.g., Bernstein & Horn, 1981; Dunlop & Allen, 1976; Kenski & Kenski, 1980). Theoretically, utilizing ADA as a direct measure of personal ideology double-enters all the district characteristics (once indirectly, via ADA) and consequently makes all the other coefficients less significant than expected. Thus, such a measure poses a number of difficulties of interpretation for the researcher.

Recently, Kalt (1982) grappled with the problem quite directly. In trying to explain "a variable PROCRUDE [which] reflect[s] the frequencies ... with which [a] senator casts a vote favorable to crude oil producers" (p. 149), he utilizes both the senator's ADA score (as an indicator of ideology), and a few energy related characteristics of the state's economy. Kalt begins the discussion of his results with a warning: "PROADA [the ADA scorel might be thought of as the outcome of a stochastic process of the general type that produced PROCRUDE" (p. 155). He probes this possibility as follows: "If there were a systematic relationship between PROCRUDE and the stochastic element in PROADA, a two-stage simultaneous equations technique would be warranted. . . . [But] none of the results at any step of the analysis proved to be at all sensitive to this adjustment. Thus, two-stage results are not reported here" (p. 155).

Kalt was on to the problem. Indeed, he found ideology to be by far the most important variable in the determination of PROCRUDE (1981, pp. 265-268). The problem is not, however, a simultaneous determination of PROCRUDE and PRO-ADA with PROADA being a determinant of PROCRUDE. Rather we conjecture there are underlying factors which are the major determinants of both PROCRUDE and PROADA. Kalt can be defended for his procedure since he regressed PROADA on party and the socioeconomic characteristics of the district and realized that PROADA was largely determined by those factors (1981, p. 266). Kalt, who did not conceptualize PROADA as personal ideology (1981, p. 260) did not probe the linkage further.

Matthews (1960, pp. 133-135) may have been the first to have sophisticated thoughts about how to rectify these sorts of problems, although he did so with an eye to party loyalty, not ideology. As MacRae (1970, p. 253) puts it:

Matthews, wishing to measure the party effort of individual senators independently of their general liberalism or conservatism, used the method of residuals from a regression line to make this separation. He first plotted the party

unity index values, for the senators of a given party, against their conservatism-liberalism scores. . . . He then used the residuals of party unity, after the contributions of liberalism had been controlled or removed by a regression equation, as a purer index of partisanship (emphasis added).

This leads MacRae to conclude (p. 253), "Matthews's reasoning suggests a line of investigation which still remains promising."

Most recently, Kau and Rubin (1979a) and Johannes and McAdams (1981) have built on Ridker and Henning (1967) to "residualize" the traditional (ADA) index of ideology. As Kau and Rubin put it, in their study of how economic influence determines congressional voting:

To the extent that ADA does measure economic influence, including it in equations where the economic variables are already present may result in multicollinearity. Leaving ADA out would lead to the improper exclusion of ideology. A solution of this problem is to replace ADA with another variable, RADA, that is orthogonal to the economic variables. This new variable is obtained by subtracting from the actual values of ADA the computed values obtained from the ratings equations. The observations on RADA are the residuals. . . . This procedure eliminates multicollinearity between ADA and the economic variables. The coefficients of the economic variables are the same as they would have been had ADA not been included. The coefficient of RADA is unaffected by this procedure. It is of course possible that we have omitted variables from the specification; . . . this problem always exists in empirical work. However, the residualization technique does not amplify this problem. (pp. 370-372)

We shall argue below that with some changes the residualization technique is a useful, standardizable, approach to the problem. We shall apply it to a study of labor votes in the Senate to illustrate its general properties. Note that part of the difficulty with the original measures stems from the non-observable (directly) nature of the personally held values segment of the representative's ideology. What is needed is a proxy for this nonobservable segment of ideology, i.e., personal ideology. To understand how personal ideology

"The problem of unobserved variables has long been recognized as a problem of identification in the econometrics literature (see Goldberger, 1964). For a discussion of treatment of unobserved variables and other statistical procedures used in this article, such as probit analysis and simultaneous equations, from a readable social science perspective, the reader is referred to Haunshek and Jackson (1977).

can be measured by the residualization technique, we need to see how using the "residualized" ADA works.

# A Residualized Measure of Ideology

To develop our analysis, consider a representative's vote (V) on any issue (i) or group of indexed issues and represent it as a function of party membership (P), district interests (D), legislative position (LP), campaign contributions (C), and personal ideology (I):10

$$V_i = f(P, D, LP, C, I)$$
 (1)

Since I is inherently unobservable, researchers have typically used a proxy variable—frequently the representative's ADA rating. <sup>11</sup> ADA is, however, based on a set of votes and hence is a special case of equation (1). Let us represent that set of votes contained in ADA as  $V_A$ ; now the typical estimated determinants of the voting equation is

$$V_i = f(P, D, LP, C, f_A(P, D, LP, C, I))$$
 (2)

The problem with this representation is obvious. Trying to estimate a vote as a function of another vote produces a situation where none of the coefficients obtained is interpretable. This problem is not solved by using the ADA rating from another year, nor by purging the ADA index of certain votes, since membership, district interests, and personal ideology should be fairly stable over time.<sup>12</sup>

If we grant that an incumbent politico cannot be expected to answer ideological questions in any but a strategic manner, and hence a manner that reflects the political constraints that (s)he is

<sup>16</sup>Campaign contributions consist of more than money; they include goods, services, and time, all of which are substitutes over some relevant range.

<sup>11</sup>Again, recall how closely related are all the scores of these "ideological" groups (see note 7).

<sup>12</sup>Normally, the use of ADA scores in these studies is modified so as to take out of the votes used in constructing the ADA index those elements that are also part of the votes being explained (so that one is not explaining something by itself). Researchers have in general been careful to take out those votes that they are trying to explain from those that are used by the group in the construction of the ratings. See, for example, Lopreato and Smoller (1978) and Bernstein and Horn (1981). Kau and Rubin (1979a) carry this one step further. They use ADA (residualized) of one year to explain voting in a second year. This practice does nothing to solve the problem we discuss here, unless the following assumption holds: the error terms between years are uncorrelated. We make this assumption explicit.

under, there is no independent way to estimate the effect of personal ideology on  $V_h$ . However, if we are willing to accept a "stricter" definition of personal ideology, it is possible to derive an acceptable proxy. To see this, consider the redefined relationship

$$V_i = f(P^*, D^*, LP^*, C^*, I^*)$$
 (3)

where P\* is now party membership plus that part of the personal ideological structure of the individual representative which is correlated with P. D\* is the district interests plus that part of I which was correlated with D; LP\* are the constraints from legislative position, plus that part of I which was correlated with LP: C\* is the direct effect of campaign contributions plus the effect of campaign contributions through I: and I\* is that part of I which was uncorrelated (or orthogonal) with party, legislative position, campaign contributions, and district interests. This new definition of I\* can be said to be equivalent to the representative's ideological deviation from those ideological interests of party, legislature, campaign contributions, and district.13

That is, to estimate  $I^*$  we "residualize" ADA. Ignoring LP and C (so as to minimize confusion) for the remainder of this section, let us define a particular linear specification of equation (3) as:

$$V_i = a_0 + a_1 P^* + a_2 D^* + a_3 I^* + e_i \tag{4}$$

where  $e_i$  is a pure white noise term distributed with zero mean and a scalar covariance matrix. Now, if we were to estimate this equation without  $I^*$ , we would get

$$V_{l} = \hat{a}^{*}_{0} + \hat{a}^{*}_{1}P^{*} + \hat{a}^{*}_{2}D^{*} + \hat{U}_{l}$$
 (5)

where  $O_i = a_3 I^* + e_1$ . Note that when  $I^*$  is omitted  $a_0^*$  absorbs the mean value of  $I^*$ . There is a problem, since  $P^*$  and  $D^*$  are unobservable. Equation (5) is, however, equivalent to

$$V_{l} = \partial_{0}^{*} + \partial_{1}^{*} P + \partial_{2}^{*} D + \hat{U}_{l}$$
 (6)

because of the orthogonality conditions imposed between  $I^*$  and P, D and  $e_I$ . As Kau and Rubin (1979a) put it, "The coefficients... are the same

<sup>13</sup>The tie between this notion and that developed by Kau and Rubin (1979a, pp. 368-372) and Johannes and McAdams (1981) should be obvious.

<sup>14</sup>The argument is considerably more complex in detail, but not substance, for many common nonlinear specifications of the equations.

13Thus, I\* can be redefined as being centered around 0.

as they would have been had ADA not been included" (p. 370).

Taking the expectation of the observed residual term  $\hat{U}_i$  in equation (6):

$$E(U) = E(a_3I^* + e_i) = E(a_3I^*) + E(e_i)$$
  
=  $E(a_3I^*) + E(0) = a_3I^*$  (7)

Thus, the residuals from equation (6) contain an unbiased estimate of  $I^*$  scaled by  $a_3$ . (Since the scale of  $I^*$  is unknown, it is of no consequence that  $a_3$  is unknown.)

Our three newly defined variables have new interpretations, as indicated above. For  $a^*_1P^*$  and  $a^*_2D^*$  incorporate the direct effects of party and the indirect effects of ideology (I) which work through P and D respectively, whereas  $a_3I^*$  represents only the direct effects of personal ideology: independent of P and D.<sup>17</sup> The reader should be careful to note that since  $a_1$  and  $a_2$  are estimates of the direct plus the indirect effects, they are biased estimates of the direct effects.<sup>16</sup>

But there still are problems with using the residuals from equation (6) as a proxy for  $I^*$ . First, even though the expectation of every  $e_{ij}$  is zero, it gives us little comfort that this is true on average. There is no reason to believe that the error term associated with any particular representative, in any particular year, will be zero. If we take just one measurement of our residualized ADA, we cannot tell what is being measured: noise or ideology!

We ought to develop a means of estimating the relative magnitude of  $I^*$  to  $e_l$  in  $\mathcal{O}_l$ . To understand this problem, recall that we wish to extract a measure of the representative's personal ideology which we can utilize as an explanatory variable concerning other issues. Imagine that we extract our measure, enter it into a second equation (to explain some other votes), and discover that the coefficients on the residuals from equation (6), suggested here as our proxy for personal ideology, is not significant in the second equation. There are two possible reasons: the residuals from equation (6) did not contain a systematic component (i.e.,  $I^*$ ), or  $I^*$  was not a determinate of the particular issue. Now of course it is preferable to be

"In essence, this is what lay behind the Kau and Rubin (1979a) "residualized" variable, RADA.

<sup>17</sup>Note the analogy between these interpretations and path analysis.

<sup>13</sup>It is not possible to solve for the coefficients of the direct effects without making assumptions about the covariance between *I*, *P*, and *D*.

"Note that this is a real possibility. Consider, for example, the findings of Chappell (1981a) that ideology did not effect voting on cargo bills.

able to identify which of these two things is going on in the data. If one does not do this, it is difficult to identify in which of the issues ideology does play a part.<sup>20</sup> Thus, our first problem is to find a method to tell us if we have a systematic component in our residuals. To do this, we must discover what is in the residual. We then may be able to use this information to understand better the behavior of representatives.<sup>21</sup>

To sketch the justification of our solutions to these questions, we shall expose the technical roots of our argument. These roots permit identifying the assumptions necessary to justify using the residuals to measure the nonobservable variable. The discussion shall also permit us to interpret our results.<sup>22</sup>

# \*Matrix Algebraic Analysis of the Approach

Chamberlain (1977) has developed a sophisticated analysis of the "residualization" method of dealing with unobserved variables in a simultaneous equation framework. His model, "assumes that the common left out variable is the only thing connecting the residuals from these equations, making it possible to extract this common factor and control for it" (p. 241). Quite clearly, this is our problem. We estimate a restricted version of Chamberlain's "model 1" and develop our technique within his framework (cf. Chamberlain's model 1, 1977, pp. 243-245, 248-250). Here we shall be careful to distinguish between restrictions we make to identify and apply Chamberlain's model and to simplify our presentation.

To begin, consider three variants of equation (4):

$$V_1 = a_0 + a_1P + a_2D + a_3I + e_1$$

$$V_2 = b_0 + b_1P + b_2D + b_3I + e_2$$

$$V_3 = g_0 + g_1P + g_2D + g_3I + e_3$$
(8)

<sup>20</sup>Of course if a significant coefficient is obtained as in most of Kau and Rubin's (1979a) cases, it is safe to assume that the residuals contained  $I^*$  and that  $I^*$  was a determinant of the issue being examined.

<sup>21</sup>Assume, for the moment, that we solve this problem. It could still be that in  $\mathcal{O}_I$ ,  $e_I$  is very large relative to  $I^*$ . Then,  $\mathcal{O}_I$  would be primarily random noise. In such an extreme, a representative may either have no personal ideology or may have one which does not deviate from the ideological interests of party and district. We shall not be able to differentiate well between these two possibilities, in part because of our utilization of a measure of ideology which is "purged" of indirect effects.

<sup>22</sup>Those who are not interested in the technicalities may skip this and other subsection(s) marked with asterisks.

It will greatly simplify the exposition without affecting the analysis or results if we assume that the constant terms  $(a_0, b_0, and g_0)$  and the coefficients of  $P(a_1, b_1, g_1)$ , are zero. Now let us write equation (8) in the standard simultaneous equation framework, TY = BX + W. Here,

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} V_1 \\ V_2 \\ V_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a_2 & a_3 \\ b_2 & b_3 \\ g_2 & g_3 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} D \\ I \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} e_1 \\ e_2 \\ e_3 \end{bmatrix}$$
(9)

For Chamberlain's model 1, it is necessary to make restrictions on the T matrix and the error covariance matrix, W, which we shall define shortly. Chamberlain requires T to be upper triangular (or equivalently, lower triangular) and to make enough restrictions on the other elements of T and W to identify the system of equations. Here, we make the most restrictive assumption about T, that it is a diagonal matrix (i.e., all of the nondiagonal elements are zero). This is equivalent to saying that the vote on one issue does not affect a vote on another issue and implies that a vote on an issue does not affect district interests or personal ideology. These restrictions are unnecessary and they are testable.

Next, we turn to the B matrix and the X vector. Note again, I is not observable. Rewriting equation (9) to take I's nonobservable nature into account we have:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} V_1 \\ V_2 \\ V_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a_2 \\ b_2 \\ g_2 \end{bmatrix} [D] + \begin{bmatrix} a_3 \\ b_3 \\ g_3 \end{bmatrix} [I] + \begin{bmatrix} e_1 \\ e_2 \\ e_3 \end{bmatrix}$$
(10)

As noted earlier, however, this is equivalent to

<sup>13</sup>Chamberlain's other models are developed for cases where alternative types of assumptions might be more appropriate. His model 2 requires restrictions on B and W. His model 3 requires restrictions on T and B as well as W.

<sup>24</sup>One could utilize a simultaneous equation model, similar to those of Kau, Keenan, and Rubin (1982) and Chappell (1981a) to test these assumptions, within our framework. We shall not do this here, however.

 $^{23}I = I^1 + I^*$  where the orthogonal decomposition desired is such that  $cov(I^1, D) \neq 0$  and  $cov(I^*, D) = 0$ . Either  $I^1$  or  $I^*$  or both may be zero vectors. We make the further standard assumption that I is nonstochastic and hence uncorrelated with the stochastic error terms  $e_1$ ,  $e_2$ , and  $e_3$ .

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_2 \\ b_2 \\ g_2 \end{bmatrix} [D] + \begin{bmatrix} U_1 \\ U_2 \\ U_3 \end{bmatrix}$$
where  $U = \begin{bmatrix} a_3 \\ b_3 \\ g_3 \end{bmatrix} [I^*] + \begin{bmatrix} e_1 \\ e_2 \\ e_3 \end{bmatrix}$ 

$$(11)$$

and  $d^*_2$ ,  $b^*_2$ ,  $g^*_2$  are the estimated coefficients which would exist if  $D^*$  were the only independent variable. The formulas given by Chamberlain (1977, p. 245) may be used to solve for  $a_3$ ,  $b_3$ , and  $g_3$ . In our case, we are only interested in one coefficient for  $I^*$ , say  $g_3$ . With the restriction we have imposed on the T and W matrices, we no longer have a truly simultaneous equation system, although it does no harm to estimate it as one.

# Stage 1. Obtaining $I^*$ from the Residuals to Apply to a Second Stage

A shortcut allows us to answer the questions we posed earlier about using the residuals as an estimator for  $I^*$ : "What is in the residuals?" If two or more equations are available, a simple test of the relative magnitudes of the variance of the random error terms is available." To see this, we must first estimate the equations and obtain the residuals,  $O_I$ . Do this for two equations so that  $O_1 = \partial_3 I^* + e_1$  and  $O_2 = \partial_3 I^* + e_2$ .

What happens if we calculate the correlation coefficient between  $\hat{U}_1$  and  $\hat{U}_2$ ?<sup>28</sup> At the extremes, obviously if r=0,  $I^*$  is a constant (and hence does not explain differences in voting patterns), and if r=1,  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  have zero variances, and the observed residuals are composed of only  $I^{*,29}$  How large r must be in order for the residuals to

<sup>16</sup>Recall that  $D^* = (D + I^1)$ . Note also that equation (11) is now estimatable as a system of Zellner seemingly unrelated regression equations, and no additional restrictions (given our T) are needed. It makes our situation much easier, however, if we restrict the covariances of  $e_1e_2$ ,  $e_1e_3$ , and  $e_2e_3$  to be zero. Given these assumptions, the expectation of stror covariance matrix can be calculated, as can the coefficients of  $I^*$  when regressed against ADA.

<sup>27</sup>This test depends on our assumption that the error terms are not correlated across equations (see note 12).  $\mathcal{O}_1$  and  $\mathcal{O}_2$  may be seen as instrumental variables for  $I^*$ .

<sup>23</sup>Note that if there are more than two equations, it is possible to add the residuals together and average them first in order to perform the test.

<sup>39</sup>This approach also could be applied to calculate the correlation of the coefficients of  $I^*$  in the observed residuals (if they were to be used as an independent variable in a second stage of a multi-stage model) and also to an estimate of the ratio of  $a_3$  to  $b_3$ .

be a useful proxy is a decision for the individual researcher.<sup>10</sup>

Now we have two different residuals, each of which contains  $I^*$ . How do we maximize the validity of our measure? If we average these residuals, we get  $1/2.(a_3 + b_3)I^* + e_1 + e_2$ , and this average minimizes the effects of a large (or peculiar) outlier in any one observation (see Chamberlain, 1977, pp. 249-250). If we had a large number of equations from which to take the observed residuals, it would be reasonable to assume that the sum of the error terms would be zero for all representatives. This is analogous to the test-retest concept familiar in the psychological literature where the observed test score is equal to the true test score plus a random error term that cancels out in repeated testing. Thus, the more equations from which the residuals are obtained, the more reasonable the assumption that the error sum equals zero. We shall later measure the personal ideological variable (over the decade of the 1970s) and, assuming it to remain stable, utilize an averaging process to get a measure which minimizes the effects of single outliers and increases the likelihood of the error terms as summing to zero for all observations.

# Summary of Stage 1

Thus, we can again summarize the assumptions that are required for this approach to make sense:

- 1. "The common left-out variable is the only thing connecting the residuals from these equations, making it possible to extract this common factor and control for it." (p. 241, Chamberlain)."
- 2. T is upper triangular (or, equivalently, lower triangular), and T and W are restricted enough to identify the system of equations.

Here, we made the most restrictive assumption about T: that it is a diagonal matrix (i.e., all of the nondiagonal elements are zero). This is

<sup>10</sup>In our discussion above, regarding r, we implicitly assumed that  $a_3$  and  $b_3$  were nonzero and that their sum was nonzero. The necessity of making these assumptions suggests that we need two or more equations where the absolute values of  $a_3$  and  $b_3$  are as large as possible, relative to their standard errors, and that it is better if  $a_3$  and  $b_3$  be of the same sign so there is no chance of their cancelling out.

<sup>31</sup>Of course, any variable which is not explicitly entered into the equations to explain ADA could account for the statistical results we report here. It is our belief that any critic's suggestion that the residual really represents another variable must be taken seriously. It is also our belief that the burden of proof is the critic's.

equivalent to saying that a vote on one issue does not affect a vote on another issue and implies that a vote on an issue does not affect district interests or personal ideology.

Now how are we to proceed? We wanted to estimate I, an unobservable. The best we can do is to estimate  $I^*$ , which is the ideological variable, stripped of its "indirect" effects. To find I\* we residualize ADA. Beyond this, we must estimate the relative contents of the residual term: How much is noise and how much is  $I^*$ ? To do this we: First, choose two or more equations where the absolute values of  $a_3$  and  $b_3$  are likely to be large. The most likely candidates are those equations where  $V_i$  is an ideological vote or group of votes. Second, we choose two or more equations with similar dependent and independent variables. If most variables are stable over time, estimating the same equation in two or more different time periods immediately suggests itself. We will shortly utilize both of these criteria in developing our research design to probe I\*, but we first summarize the procedure.

- 1. Take two or more iterations of the same theoretical model such that I is the only unobserved variable.
- 2. Perform r, or  $\mathbb{R}^2$ , test to identify the relative magnitude of the variance that one can ascribe to  $I^*$  and to the random error terms.
- 3. Obtain the observed residuals from these equations and average them.
- Use the average of the observed residuals as a measure of I\* in stage 2.

In what follows, it is important to recall a few important points made earlier.

The constant term absorbs the mean value of  $I^*$ .

The coefficients of other independent variables are the unbiased estimates of the direct effects plus the indirect effects of *I*, but are biased estimators of the direct effects. Therefore, the estimated variances of the coefficients are positively biased estimates of the true variance of the direct plus indirect effects of *I*, which implies that the *t*-test is more conservative than the indicated level of significance. The estimated variances of the coefficients are biased (in an unknown direction) estimates of the true variance of the direct effect coefficients.

If  $I^*$  has a significant coefficient, then personal ideology has an effect. The opposite result is more difficult to interpret since it may occur because I has no direct effect after being purged of its correlation with other included variables. Hence our test is extremely strict and will have a low power in rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e., that personal

ideology is *not* a determinant of voting on a particular issue).

# An Illustrative Application of the Residualization Technique

Let us apply our method for the extraction of a measure of the direct effects of personal ideology, I\*. To identify I\* we select a set of votes and identify what is left unexplained by the legislator's party, district, and legislative position. Using ADA votes as a simple indicator for overall manifest ideology, we "explain" those votes by a set of political constraints and personal political values. Consider a simple expansion of our linear specification of the model (equation 3) above<sup>32</sup>

$$ADA = B_0 + B_1^*P^* + B_2^*D^* + B_3^*LP^* + (B_4^*P^* + e_1)$$
 (12)

If our hypothesis is correct, the observed residual term (in the brackets) contains personal ideology as well as a random error term. As indicated above, that term does not readily permit interpretation because it does not provide a means of separating out the two components and because the error term can not be expected to be zero for any single observation. So now let us specify the same equation for two different (perhaps multiyear) time periods (see equations 13a and b), t and t-1.

<sup>12</sup>Note that we have dropped campaign contributions from our specification of equation (12), owing to the unavailability of detailed campaign contribution data necessary for much of the time period covered by the data we utilize in the next sections. For later years it is available (see Kau et al., 1982, for a sophisticated treatment of 1979 votes and 1978 campaign contributions by groups). Our omission of campaign contributions is mitigated to some extent by the large number of district characteristics we include in our empirical specification. To the extent that campaign contributions are proportional to the strength of included variables, their effects will be absorbed by those coefficients. We would hypothesize two routes for the effects of campaign contributions on ideology: first, a general indirect "purchase" of ideology and second, a general "purchase" of particular votes. The first route is testable by calculating the correlation coefficient between our estimated measure of ideology and contributions, and the second route by entering contributions directly as an independent variable in a regression on the determinants of those votes. Not surprisingly, preliminary research with campaign contributions from later years indicates the second route to be much more important than the first.

"In practice, two-year periods are congressional sessions and represent the longest time period that the researcher can be assured of the same representatives

Our measure,  $I^*$ , can now be developed as follows. We have two equations where  $I^*$  appears in the residual term. From equation (12) and the above discussion, consider the following equations:

$$ADA_1 = A_0 + A_1P^* + A_2D^* + A_3LP^* + (A_4I^* + e_0)$$
 (13a)

$$ADA_{t-1} = B_0 + B_1P^* + B_2D^* + B_3LP^* + (B_4I^*_2 + e_{t-1})$$
 (13b)

where t and t-1 will represent even and odd years respectively for our purposes. This is a recursive simultaneous equation system which can be estimated with OLS or GLS, as appropriate.<sup>14</sup>

 $I^*$  can now be consistently estimated by regressing  $(A_4I^* + e_i)$  on  $(B_4I^* + e_{i-1})$  which becomes:

$$B_4 I^*_2 = C_1 (A_4 I^*_1 + e_{t-1}) + e_t \tag{14a}$$

or alternatively:

$$A_4 I^*_1 = C_2 (B_4 I^*_2 + e_t) - e_{t-1}$$
 (14b)

Note that we have now defined two measures of I\*:

$$\hat{I}^*_2 = (\hat{C}_1/B_4)(A_4I^*_1 + e_{t-1})$$
 (15a)

and

$$I_{1}^{*} = (C_{2}/A_{4})(B_{4}I_{2}^{*} + e_{t})$$
 (15b)

both of which are consistent estimators of  $I^*$ . Since we have no knowledge of which one is the most efficient consistent estimator of  $I^*$ , we minimize the risk of a wrong choice and allow for counterbalancing error terms by averaging  $I^*_1$  and  $I^*_2$ :

$$\hat{I}^* = (\hat{I}^*_1 + \hat{I}^*_2)/2. \tag{16}$$

Now let us turn to an empirical estimation of the model we proposed above. Estimation of voting models requires the use of qualitative

serving together. If the coefficients across different congressional sessions are assumed to be stable, different sessions may be "stacked," exploiting the large number of degrees of freedom. We have made this assumption; it is not necessary.

"Although we have assumed the independent variables in both equations to be the same, this is not necessary for our argument. Indeed, one could imagine that in the United States the functional relationship would be different even (election) years and odd (off) years.

limited dependent variable techniques, maximum likelihood probit or logit for single votes and for voting indices, generalized least squares (GLS) with a probit or logit transformation of the dependent variable to correct for known statistical problems with ordinary least squares regression model (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977). We have used the GLS probit (Judge et al., 1980, 1982) because of the desirability of probit's normal error term assumption.35 The necessary GLS weights, however, create a problem that has not been dealt with earlier: the unweighted residuals from equations (13a) and (13b) need not have a zero mean and may be correlated with the independent variables in those equations. We need to insure the zero mean and the lack of correlation between I\* and the original set of independent variables so as to allow future weighting of these variables (via probit, etc.) to be interpretable; that is, the unweighted form (rather than the form generated after a probit transform and weights) of the residualized variables must be uncorrelated with the other independent variables. Thus, to use I\* in equation (16), it is necessary to regress the unweighted residuals of equations (13a) and (13b) against the unweighted independent variables in those equations. (Table 1 reports the regression equations for equations (13a) and (13b).) One can then use the resulting residuals as the measures in equations (15a) and (15b).36

Tables 1, 2, and 3 report the results of an application of the proposed technique to the measurement of the ideology of U.S. senators during the 1970s. In Table 1 we have regressed many state characteristics against each senator's annual ADA rating, to identify the residual. (This is in direct contrast with Johannes and McAdams, 1981, p. 517, who regress ADA only with the 1972 McGovern vote.) Personal ideology, by hypothesis, is in this residual. In this procedure we have taken what could be described as a kitchen-sink approach to estimating the ADA equation. In general this is an unacceptable practice because the multicollinearity can be so high that little or nothing can be said about the influence and significance of any of the coefficients. However, our purpose here is simply to minimize the sum of squares of the residuals and to guard against leav-

<sup>33</sup>The choice between probit and logit is, however, arbitrary for most applications. In either case it is necessary to use a correction factor to prevent exact zeros and ones which are undefined. We used the one suggested by Lindgren and McElrath (1969).

"The result of these two auxiliary regressions are not reported here but are available from the authors. The correlation between the two versions of the residuals is approximately .9 for even, and .8 for odd, years.

ing out any significant systematic factors which would otherwise become a part of our estimated  $I^*$ . Therefore, in this case, no harm is done by this eclectic approach.

We ask the reader to forgive us: we feel that we must indulge ourselves with an interpretation of the above results which has nothing to do with the main thrust of this article. Consider the coefficients on the DELECT and RELECT variables. They appear to be indicating something quite important. It appears, from their sign and size and significance that we can conclude that first, pressures for reelection affect primarily voting in the odd calendar years. Thus it appears that the incumbent campaigns on his previous year's record. Further, and this is of some theoretical importance, the Democrats are pushed to the right, and the Republicans to the left, by the elections. If you wish, during odd years they seem to converge (toward some median voter?) whereas during even years (when their votes are perhaps too close in time to be fully digested and considered by the interested public for the election), the parties are further apart and driven more by their natural coalition members. This observation would indicate that any model of party-behavior should combine the median voter analysis of Downs along with the coalitional analysis of those cited in note 4 above.

The above regressions leave residuals that (after correcting for the GLS weights), we conjecture to be personal ideology. If our conjecture is correct, these residuals should be related, and we can check the validity of our measure by regressing the residuals of the odd years against the residuals of the even years. Doing this would lead us to expect a sizable correlation between the two sets of years (the larger the correlation, the more stable, and the larger the I\* component in the residuals). We report this test in Table 2. These results show that the observed unweighted, corrected, residuals share a common variance of 36% of their variance.

Yet another test suggests itself, if  $B_4I^*_1 = 0$ , or the average of the two residuals (i.e., if people have no personal ideology as measured or if  $I^*$ 

<sup>37</sup>One could emphasize further the coalitional aspects of the relationship between constituents and voting in the legislature. To do this, one could enter each of the district characteristics twice: once modified by a dummy variable representing party. Such a model would perhaps better represent the works indicated in note 4 above.

"The formula for the correlation coefficient clearly shows what is happening, given our assumptions:

 $r = (\text{var}(I^*)/\{\text{var}(I^*) + [\text{var}(e_1)]^{1/2} + [\text{var}(e_2)]^{1/2}\}.$ 

Table 1. Estimation of Personal Ideology (U.S. Senate, 1970-1980)

	Dependent variable					
	ADA <sup>b</sup> (ev	en years)	ADA <sup>b</sup> (odd years)			
Independent variables <sup>a</sup>	Coefficient	t-Statistic	Coefficient	t-Statistic		
Intercept	-0.029	-0.0	-2.091	-0.8		
Party	0.724	9.7	0.802	9.4		
New England	0.157	0.7	-0.392	-1.7		
East North Central	0.028	0.2	0.601	. 4.1		
West North Central	-0.708	-4.7	-0.130	-0.8		
South Atlantic	-0.759	-4.3	-0.695	-3.6		
East South Central	-0.534	-2.1	-0.646	-2.2		
West South Central	-0.744	-3.2	-0.163	-0.7		
Mountain	-0.932	-4.5	-0.244	-1.1		
Pacific	-0.511	-2.5	-0.486	-2.2		
DElect	-0.086	-1.7	-0.143	-2.7		
RElect	0.031	0.3	0.424	4.1		
PMcGov	0.029	4.5	0.035	5.2		
PCarter	0.029	3.3	0.009	1.0		
SREP	0.107	0.7	0.142	0.8		
PAFLCIO	0.107	1.6	-0.019	-2.1		
PMAN	-0.072	-4.8	0.019	2.5		
		-4.8 -0.5				
YOFF	-0.002		-0.007	-1.8		
PBLACK	0.008	1.1	-0.007	-0.9		
MVAGE	0.029	1.1	0.094	3.5		
MFINC	-0.000	-0.7	0.000	2.2		
MEDUC	0.512	3.7	-0.032	-0.2		
PWC	-0.034	-1.5	-0.035	-1.3		
PSERV	0.250	6.7	0.136	-3.6		
PFARM	0.004	-0.2	-0.028	1.6		
PCC	-0.007	-1.7	0.000	0.0		
PSUB	0.015	3.9	0.002	0.6		
PFEDS	0.000	2.9	0.000	1.5		
PCOIL	-3.659	-3.3	-2.594	2.0		
PCNGAS	0.229	1.3	-0.123	-0.7		
PCCOAL	2.682	0.2	-4.452	-1.3		
PENGROUP	0.924	6.0	0.521	3.4		
PCCAUSE	-5.120	-3.7	0.205	-0.1		
		= .57		54		
		n=4				

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Some of the variables are self-evident; those that aren't are: a dummy variable indicating the year a Democrat (Republican) faces reelection: DElect (RElect); SREP: a dummy variable indicating a southern Republican; the percent of the vote for McGovern and Carter (1976): PMcGov, PCarter; percent of the labor force in the AFL-CIO: PAFLCIO; the percent of the labor force in manufacturing: PMAN and farming: PFARM; the incumbent's years in office: YOFF; the median voter's age in the district: MVAGE; median family income: MFINC; median education: MEDUC; percent white collar: PWC; and percent service worker in the labor force: PSERV; percentage of the federal budget received by the state; PFED; the percentage of the state population belonging to 7 national environmental groups: PENGRP; the percent of the population belonging to 7 national environmental groups: PENGRP; the percent of the population belonging to Common Cause: PCCAUSE; the production of oil, natural gas, and coal: PCOIL, PCNGAS, & PCCOAL respectfully. All of the data are taken from Barone, et al., Almanac of American Politics, 1970-1982, except (1) the figures on the membership in the interest groups (Common Cause, the environmental groups, and the AFL-CIO) which were obtained directly from the groups involved and (2) the energy production figures which came from Shreck (1977), pp. 940, 1081, and 397.

bHere the actual dependent variable is the PROBIT transformation of the ADA evaluation. See note 35.

Table 2. Regressing the Odd Years and the Even Years Residuals

Dependent variable Unweighted even y			Dependent variabl Unweighted odd y	e $e_t + A_4 I_1^* =$ ear residuals	;
Independent variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic	Independent variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic
Intercept	5.55 × E-14	0.0	Intercept	-4.44 × E-14	0.0
$e_t + A_4 I_1$	.567	16.6	$e_t + B_4 I_1$	.642	16.6
			n = 483		
• ,			$\overline{R}^2 = .36$	•	

plays no role in determining ADA), then adding the observed residual to the equation for the t-1 time period as an independent variable should not greatly effect the explanatory power of the equation. After all, adding the residual would merely be adding a random error term. On the other hand, if it does contain personal ideology, then it will significantly increase the overall explanatory power of the time period t regression.

Performing this test supports our conjecture. We considered the set of senators and their ADA ratings in even and odd years.<sup>39</sup> We found that we could explain 54% ( $R^2$ ) of the variance of ADA in odd years using D, LP, and P, and 64% ( $R^2$ ) of the variance when augmenting those variables with the even years' residuals. Similarly, in even years, the figures are 57% and 68%, for gains in both data sets of a bit more than 10%.

With these strong results, we continue with our investigation. Are the residuals a sensible indicator of the senators' ideologies? To see this we transform the residuals onto a scale from -1 (conservative) to +1 (liberal). These techniques are utilized to calculate  $I^*$  for members of the Senate in 1979 and 1980, and the results are reported in the next table (Table 3). Although here we perform no statistical checks on these results, one is able to ask whether the results are intuitively plausible.

Our intuition is not fully satisfied with these results. A close examination shows, for example, there are a number of peculiar rankings that must be mentioned. But first, note that we are not accustomed to think of the representative's ideology in this fashion, and hence there are bound to be some seemingly anomalous results. The causes for these anomalies should perhaps be discussed. Putting this aside as nontrivial, and yet not quite to the point, other obvious causes for anomalies

"By beginning with an odd year, the ADA rating is not affected by the defeat of an incumbent in an election during the period examined. come to mind. First, unlike the results given at other points in this article, the scores are calculated only over a two-year period. Hence all the vagaries of small numbers of observations for each person come into play. Consider the case of Williams (D, N.J.) for example. His ADA ratings in 1979 and 1980 were uncharacteristically low. For the years from 1972 to 1978, he averaged an 86 ADA, and had no score below 80. His average would have yielded him a I\* of about - .46 (note, still in the most conservative quartile). Second, as indicated at various points above, there is no attempt to take into account the specifically coalitional constraints upon the representatives; that is, we have not tried to develop a model that takes into account the specific local array of interest groups supporting each of the senators. The only time we even approximated this, by considering southern Republicans as separate from other Republicans, we found that they tended to differ from other Republicans. Southern Republicanism was tied (weakly, to be sure) to a more liberal record. Presumably, some of the variance would be explained by such a variable. Finally, there has been no attempt to introduce the financial constituents, or backers, of the representatives, as a further constraint to their voting behavior. Were we to follow up on these last two points, the ratings could change quite substantially. But there would still be an unexplained pattern to the anomalies: southern Democrats who were not very conservative now appear, by our measure, to be quite liberal. (See, for example, Hollings of South Carolina.) On the other hand, liberal Republicans are given quite a boost for their bucking of the (negative) ideological correlation between Republicanism and the ADA. For examples, note Leahy of Vermont and Weicker of Connecticut. By permitting a coalitional variable to be included, some of the anomalous weightings for nonconservative southern Democrats and liberal northern Republicans could well be mitigated, but probably not all. Recall that we are not used to thinking about ideology this way, partially

Table 3. Ideological Scores: U.S. Senators, 1979-1980<sup>a</sup>

			ΑI	)A		•		Al	DA
State	Senator	I∗p	1980	1979	State	Senator	I*p	1980	1979
N.J.	*Bradley	-1.03	72	68	N.C.	*Morgan	-0.00	22	26
Vt.	*Stafford	-1.01	61	47	Colo.	*Hart	0.01	61	58
N.Y.	*Moynihan	-0.89	72	47	Ohio	*Metzenbaum	0.02	83	84
Pa.	Schweiker	-0.89	17	16	111.	Percy	0.02	39	47
N.J.	*Williams	-0.82	72	74	W. Va.	*Randolph	0.04	72	32
Iowa	Jepsen	0.80	22	0	Kans.	Dole	0.04	22	21
Conn.	*Ribicoff	-0.75	56	53	Hawaii	*Inouye	0.05	67	37
Nebr.	*Zorninsky	-0.66	22	21	N.M.	Domenici	0.08	17	5
Mass.	*Tsongas	-0.64	89	74	Nev.	Laxalt	0.08	11	5
Minn.	- Boschwitz	-0.63	28	21	W. Va.	*Byrd	0.09	56	53
111.	*Stevenson	-0.60	61	68	Miss.	*Reigle	0.11	83	84
N.D.	Young	-0.58	11	5	Ala.	*Helfin	0.12	39	26
Alaska	*Gravel	-0.56	39	47	N.C.	Helms	0.12	11	5
Calif.	Hayakawa	-0.54	22	ii	Calif.	*Cranston	0.13	83	79
Wis.	*Proxmire	-0.51	56	42	Tex.	*Bentsen	0.14	39	26
Ohio	*Glenn	-0.46	67	53	Md.	*Sarbanes	0.15	83	· 79
Nebr.	*Exon	-0.46	39	21	N.D.	*Burdick	0.16	78	63
Mont.	*Melcher	-0.44	50	58	Hawaii	*Matsunaga	0.16	78	53
Wash.	*Magnuson	-0.42	72	53	Mich.	*Levin	0.16	76 94	74
Ariz.	Goldwater	-0.42	0	5	Fla.	*Chiles		50	42
Okla.	*Boren		-	16			0.18		
N.H.		-0.40	28		Tex.	Tower	0.20	6	11
	Humphrey	-0.37	6	5	N.Y.	Javits	0.20	61	63
Idaho	McClure	-0.32	17	0	Oreg.	Hatfield	0.22	50	58
R.I.	*Pell	-0.32	78	68	Alaska	Stevens	0.22	39	21
N.H.	*Durkin	-0.27	50	37	Utah	Garn	0.25	17	11
Nev.	*Cannon	-0.25	33	21	Okla.	Bellmon	0.26	· 28	16
Idaho	*Church	-0.24	50	42	S.D.	*McGovern	0.27	56	100
Fla.	*Stone	-0.23	33	21	N. Mex.	Schmitt	0.28	17	16
Ind.	Lugar	-0.22	17	11	Tenn.	Baker	0.28	17	21
S.D.	Pressler	-0.22	17	32	Ky.	*Ford	0.28	78	32
Del.	Roth	-0.20	22	21	Tenn.	*Sasser	0.29	67	37
Ky.	*Huddleston	-0.17	44	37	Mo.	*Eagleton	0.30	78	58
Wash.	*Jackson	-0.17	72	68	Utah	Hatch	0.30	17	11
Colo.	Armstrong	-0.15	17	11	Wyo.	Simpson	0.32	17	11
Ga.	*Talmadge	-0.15	33	16	R.L	Chaffee	0.39	72	47
Ariz.	*Deconcini	-0.13	67	26	Ark.	*Bumpers	0.40	56	53
Mont.	*Baucus	-0.13	72	63	Mo.	Danforth	0.40	50	16
La.	*Johnston	-0.13	33	16	₩yo.	Wallop	0.41	22	11
Oreg.	Packwood	-0.10	56	32	Miss.	*Stennis	0.42	17	11
Maine	Cohen	0.09	33	42	Wis.	*Nelson	0.43	. 89	84
Va.	Warner	-0.08	22	5	Md.	Mathias	0.51	72	63
Ind.	*Bayh	0.06	61	63	Kans.	Kassenbaum	0.53	44	37
Minn.	Durenberger	-0.05	44	53	S.C.	Thurmond	0.59	17	5
Ga.	*Nunn	-0.04	56	11	S.C.	*Hollings	0.64	39	32
Iowa	*Culver	-0.03	78	74	Ala.	*Stewart	0.67	61	42
Pa.	Heinz	0.03	50	42	Conn.	Weicker	0.71	72	68
Del.	*Biden	-0.03	67	53	Vt.	Leahy	0.89	83	89
Ariz.	*Pryor	-0.01	44	42	Miss.	Cochran	0.89	22	69 5.
* ****	*Long	O'OT	28	T.€	14T122*	COCILIAII	U.07	44	٠.

<sup>\*</sup>Democrat.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Kennedy (Mass.) was omitted owing to excessive absence resulting from campaign activities, Muskie (Maine) because he resigned to become Secretary of State, and Byrd (Va.) because he is an independent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>b</sup>The larger the score, the more liberal the ideology. Note that in these "normalized" scores, we have centered the scores around zero (by subtracting the mean). The scores reflect the average for the two years.




Figure 1. The Current Paradigmatic Model to Explain Voting Patterns of Legislators

because I\* is that segment of ideology which is independent of party. A reexamination of Table 1 helps to illuminate the issue. Not surprisingly, party and region are extremely important constraints of ADA. Hence bucking these political constraints yields large residuals or  $I^*$ . Typically, then, our measure puts strong liberal labels on Republicans who are liberal, and southerners who are not extreme conservatives. Conservative labels go to Democrats who are less liberal than their party-region nexus might lead one to believe. Hence, Leahy, the Vermont Republican, has very little pressure to vote liberal. Both his party and his state push him to the right. An ADA score of 83 reveals him as a great liberal bucking these constraints. Williams, on the other hand, is from a state with demographic, political, and economic characteristics which push him to the left, and he is a Democrat. Thus, his ADA scores in the 70s disappoint a liberal's statistical expectation, and he is labelled a conservative.40

<sup>40</sup>Note that the (earlier) very liberal record of the Republican, Case, from the same state, merely reinforces this impression.

Another aspect of our measure of ideology also of interest is its correlation with other standard voting indices. These correlations are: .475 with ADA; .343 with the League of Conservation Voters score; and .327 with COPE.

# Stage 2: Explaining Observed Legislative Voting Patterns

Recall the problem: we wish to explain a subset (other than ADA) of the  $i^{th}$  legislator's voting record. The general paradigm for the analysis of legislative voting is illustrated in Figure 1. There, party (P), ideology (I), legislative position (LP), campaign contributions (C), and district characteristics (D) are seen as together determining legislative voting patterns. A subset of these votes (call it S) is of interest to us. More specifically, note that  $V_I$  can be thought of as follows:

 $V_i = Y_j/n$  (j = 1 ... n) (where  $Y_j = 1$  for a yes/positive single vote and  $Y_j = 0$  for a no/negative vote; N = the number of votes).  $V_i$  can be a single vote or group of votes (for a single vote  $Y_j = 1$  or 0 and n = 1).

In other words, elaborating on equation 1 we want to estimate (dropping the i subscript)

$$V(S) = f(P, D, LP, C, I)$$
 (17)

As indicated above, although this is generally estimated as V = g(P, D, LP, C, ADA), where ADA is used a proxy for the hard to measure I, we have developed an alternative residualized  $I^*$ . Thus, we conjecture:

$$V(S) = h(P^*, D^*, LP^*, C^*, I^*)$$
(18)

Now the structure of equation (18) is not quite the same as the equations in stage 1. Here the residualization of ideology need *not* be orthogonal to the other explanatory variables if they were not included in the equations used to estimate *I*\* which allows *I*\* potentially to have indirect effects, Further, recall that we have a measure of ideology which is "purged" of indirect effects (on ADA).

## An Application to Illustrate Stage 2

Finally, let us see the effect of utilizing both our measure of ideology and the "standard" measure. To do this, we report the findings of a preliminary attempt to explain (or predict) voting on issues of concern to organized labor. "Here we utilize the evaluation, or rating, of the senators by the AFL-CIO (i.e., their COPE scores) as the dependent variable and develop two models (see Table 4). In one we utilize our measure of ideology (I\*) and in the other we utilize the traditional ADA measure.

<sup>41</sup>The reader may be interested in contrasting our model with two previous studies which used the standard ADA approach to explain voting on minimum wage legislation (Kau & Rubin, 1978; Silberman & Durden, 1976). Interested readers may also wish to obtain ideological ratings which take into account some coalitional characteristics as well as ratings for members of the House. These can be obtained from the authors.

Table 4. Comparing the Models Applied to Labor Issues: ADA vs. I\* as Independent Variables Explaining Cope Scores (n=967)<sup>a</sup>

Independent variable	Coefficient	t-Statistic	PROB >  T	Standardized Coefficients
Independent variable: I*				
Intercept	-0.086	- 1.2	0.2219	-7.25 x E-10
Party	0.475	11.3	0.0001	.343
YOR	011	- 6.0	0.0001	173
PMan .	0.003	1.7	0.0863	.052
PAFLCIO '	0.029	13.4	0.0001	.420
I*	0.174	4.9	0.0001	.148
$R^2 = .25$		•		
Independent variable: ADA				
Intercept	-0.458	- 6.9	0.0001	-3.88 × E-09
Party	0.273	7.6	0.0001	0.20
YOff	-0.008	- 5.0	0.0001	-0.13
PMan	-0.001	<b></b> 0.9	0.3640	-0.02
PAFLCIO	0.025	12.8	0.0001	0.36
ADA	0.010	16.1	0.0001	. 0.43
$R^2 = .40$				
Without ideology				· ·
Intercept	0.028	0.4	0.6748	2.38 x E-10
Party	0.400	10.1	0.0001	0.29
YOff	-0.011	5.9	0.0001	-0.17
PMan .	0.003	1.6	0.1019	0.05
PAFLCIO	0.027	12.6	0.0001	0.39
$R^2 = .23$	3.			

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Here the actual dependent variable is the probit transformation of the COPE scores.

Now the effect of the operationalization is made clear. When ADA is used, party's effect is decreased considerably, as are the effects of all of the other variables, which can be seen by comparing the standardized weights in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. This result occurs because of the strong correlations between ADA ratings and the other included variables. On the other hand, because ADA ratings are a surrogate for many of the characteristics of the state, replacing ADA by  $I^*$  decreases the explained variance. Note that one could reintroduce these demographic and economic characteristics of the state now without fear of their correlation with the residualized measure of ideology.

Along with Robert Cameron Mitchell, we have applied the technique to a second substantive question: legislators' voting on environmental issues (Oppenheimer, Mitchell, & Carson, in press). The parallel results there form an interesting contrast. I\* there is far more effective as an explanatory variable than it is in explaining COPE scores. Using party and the percentage of the state population who are members of environmental groups along with ideology, we found  $I^*$  increased  $R^2$  from .16 to .24. Further, it yielded an equation which quite sensibly indicated that all three variables were highly significant (with 479 degrees of freedom, t was above 7 for all coefficients). This was in contrast to the results when ADA was used instead of I\*. ADA, as a surrogate for all the socioeconomic and political characteristics of the state yielded a very improved  $R^2$  (.51). But it so distorted the weights that party's coefficient was significant only at a .07 level. Here again, one can reintroduce the demographic and economic characteristics of the state, with  $I^*$ , and without fear that the correlation with I\* will lead to difficulties of interpretation.

#### Conclusions

We have developed a procedure for extracting a politician's ideological leaning, relative to his or her political environment, which may be interpreted in various ways. If the electoral environment is defined strictly as the politician's electorate, it can be thought of as a deviation from the electoral unit from which he or she is elected, as conceived of by Johannes and McAdams (1981). But if we define the political environment more broadly, there are many possible interpretations of this variable. It could be personal ideology, or purchased positions by forces outside of the incumbent's electorate, or positions taken for national political considerations (e.g., to go along with the presidency), depending upon which variables are brought to bear. All of these interpretations can be tested in their own right. But that would constitute a further article (see Oppenheimer, Mitchell, & Carson, in press). Any of these interpretations would make some politicians who have liberal records look conservative, namely those politicians who score high on ADA ratings, but come from even more liberal electorates. Similarly, some politicians from conservative districts, with less conservative records, will appear liberal. Hence, this method is likely to stretch the theoretical understanding and conceptualization of ideology which we hold.

Let us review the assumptions underlying this technique. First, we assume that the residuals (for example, as calculated in Table 1 above) contain only a random error term and our I\* variable. This is a rebuttable presumption. But at this point in time, the burden of proof seems to be on the critic. After all, any variable conjectured to be contained in the residual can be tested for, and the new residual calculated to examine its nature. Thus, the general technique does not require that we have correctly isolated I\* at this point. Second. we assume that each individual's personal ideology is stable. This requirement is endemic to the procedure, as is the assumption that the actual error terms are uncorrelated over time (and therefore that their correlation is an artifact of the other variable, I\*, contained in the residual). These assumptions permit the developmment of an alternative measure for ideology which yields a number of benefits including an ability to assess, realistically, the relative importance of the various factors determining a legislator's vote.

The technique has other practical significance. It would permit, for example, interest groups to assess which incumbents are "friendly" and ought to be supported. Rather than identifying those with the highest ADA rating as the most liberal, we now identify those who go furthest to the left of their constituents as the most liberal. This permits us to relativize the voting of the legislators to their constituency and their pressures. Hence we see who is most likely to go out on a limb because of personal political feelings. Similar work could be done for other interest group scores.

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# The Particulars of a Universal Politics: Hegel's Adaptation of Montesquieu's Typology

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This article explores both the influence that Montesquieu's typology of regimes exerted on Hegel's thought and Hegel's ultimate rejection of Montesquieu's monarchical order, especially its cult of honor, as a plausible candidate for containing and expressing the citizen's "claims for private judgment, private willing, and private caprice." Can Hegel provide a substitute model of a polity, neither republican nor despotic, which corrects the particularism of Montesquieu's monarchical society? Marx did not think so. His criticism of Hegel exactly parallels Hegel's criticism of Montesquieu. Hegel's dilemma may be expressed in more contemporary terms as the difficulty in reconciling the goals of "neutrality" and "communicative competence." The latter reflects the concerns of Montesquieu's moral geography, whereas the former reflects the rather different preoccupations of the social contract tradition.

Across the barriers posed by the consequences of Kantian thought and the French Revolution, G. W. F. Hegel found in the Baron de Montesquieu a significant predecessor to his synthetic ambitions. To be sure, Montesquieu's ambitions appear more modest than Hegel's, since they were apparently restricted to the political and social. Within this domain, these philosophers sought comparable goals: to describe a polity suitable to the circumstances of complex and highly differentiated societies, and a polity that might reconcile self-conscious and easily distracted individuals to their political fate. This goal had been accomplished, or so these authors thought, more harmoniously in the politics of antiquity.

As Hegel stated the problem, "In the state of antiquity, the subjective end simply coincided with the state's will. In modern times, however, we make claims for private judgment, private willing, and private caprice" (Hegel, 1952, p. 280, Addition to par. 261). Hegel was not at all persuaded, however, that private men and women could judge well in the absence of those institutional arrangements that lend support to their distracted rationality. Although he believed that his *Philosophy of Right* adequately described those institutional arrangements likely to support the errant rationality (i.e., subjective ends) of dis-

sociated citizens, he also seemed persuaded that the advocates of private judgment would not heed him (Hegel, 1952, pars. 124, 126, 140, 162; 1977, pp. 221-228, 383-409).

Montesquieu's famous typology of regimes can be read as expressing a similar judgment about the circumstances in which subjective temperaments collide in modern polities, although not the same appreciation of the political dangers.

In his typology, Montesquieu combines the structural features of a type of social order (as defined by its legal and social circumstances) with a historical psychology suitable to each structure. Republics (both the democratic and the aristocratic variants) are animated by a range of communitarian sentiments that Montesquieu identifies as simply "virtue." Monarchies are infused with the more dissociative sentiments he calls "honor"; and despotisms are permeated with a climate of "fear" (Laws 2-7).

These claims have an epistemological dimen--sion in that each association is structured in accordance with the types and range of understandings between agents it permits or encourages. These settings become in turn the locus for the generation of notions of value and social identity. Against this background the society discovers a suitable politics to frame and sustain these understandings. Montesquieu's imagery of distance suggests the differences among associations. Republics, monarchies, and despotisms are appropriate to small, larger, and excessively large societies (Laws 8.20). The "distances" correspond to the degree and type of communicativeness permitted among associated members and not necessarily to the literal size of the polity. Republics permit, if you will, a public life of close encounter. Monarchies encourage only a limited public life but foster at the same time other, more

Received: April 15, 1982 Revision received: January 3, 1983 Accepted for publication: March 28, 1983

'Citations to Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1952) will sometimes include references to paragraphs abbreviated as follows: par. 261. Similarly, references to The Spirit of the Laws (Montesquieu, 1966a) will generally be indicated by the abbreviation Laws followed by a book and chapter heading, as in Laws 4.2.

privatized relationships among relatively detached and dispersed agents. In despotisms, agents are required to live at vast psychic and political distances from one another. Here the public life has become wholly privatized. Private fearfulness replaces public discourse.

Hegel utilizes these potentially idealist themes in his early works (e.g., in the essay on "natural law"), in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977) and in the Philosophy of Right (1952). Montesquieu's typology implicitly frames Hegel's review of specific types of association in the Phenomenology. Montesquieu's understanding of a historically evolving community as a relationship of universal and particular and his views upon the requirements of a decentralized structure of decisionmaking are commended by Hegel in the Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 1952, pp. 16, 20, 161, 177-178). Hegel's use of Montesquieu's description of modes of human association suggests agreement with its basic epistemological claims, although the politics that Hegel settles upon these claims is significantly different from that of Montesquieu. Although Hegel is not known for his gratitude toward predecessors, his acknowledgments of Montesquieu nevertheless exhibit this virtue; there are fifteen references by name to Montesquieu in Hegel's corpus.2 Only one reference suggests criticism.

In this article I explore the implications both of Hegel's intellectual debt to Montesquieu and of Hegel's ultimate rejection of Montesquieu's politics. Hegel's adaptation of Montesquieu's claims concerning the "individuality" of peoples is assessed against the background of Hegel's Kantian project. Then Montesquieu's typology of regimes, identified as his "moral geography," is described from the perspective of an idealist interpretation. Hegel adapts Montesquieu's typology, selectively, to the systems of governments whose evolution and dissolution he analyzes in the Phenomenology. Thus, the republic is exemplified as Sophoclean Athens, monarchy is expressed (as it was also for Montesquieu) in the French ancien régime, and despotism is demonstrated in the French revolutionary state and, as a significant precursor, in imperial Rome (Hegel, 1977, pp. 266-289, 290-328, 355-363). Hegel's criticism of Montesquieu is then assessed. Hègel's departure from Montesquieu's understanding focuses upon the character of the monarchical order. Hegel seems to agree that its structure captures the dilemmas of dispersed individualists not fortunate

'Hegel (1952, pp. 16, 20, 161, 177-178; 1955, III, p. 399; 1956, p. 251; 1964, p. 297; 1966, pp. 39-40, 389; 1971a, p. 156; 1971b, p. 49; 1975a, pp. 128-129; 1975b, pp. 22, 101, 102, 149; 1979, I, pp. 263, 440).

enough to live in a republican polity but lucky enough to have avoided despotic politics. Nevertheless, Hegel condemns Montesquieu's description of this society. Its cult of honor is openly rebellious toward authority, and no society, Hegel thought, could survive such anarchism.

Yet the question may be posed: if the monarchical structure is suitable to the "particulars" of a society neither republican nor despotic, can Hegel provide his readers with a substitute for the psychology of honor that does not recreate the 'particularism' he evidently abhors? Karl Marx did not think so. His criticism of Hegel's universal class focused precisely on its fraudulent claims to having a universal appeal. This class was also mired in particularity. After discussing Marx's and Hegel's parallel criticism of their predecessors, I assess in a concluding section the kinds of theoretical dilemmas which emerge from these disagreements. I suggest with allusions to Habermas, Oakeshott, Ackerman, and Dworkin, that the goals of "communicative competence" and the "neutral" state form a tempting but uneasy alliance, and that Hegel's problem, expressed in this contemporary vocabulary, follows from his inability to harmonize the demands of both goals.

My predecessors in recording this lineage of ideas have been numerous. Hildegaard Trescher (1918) argued that Montesquieu was a half-way house on the way to Hegel's historicism. Friedrich Meinecke (1972, p. 106), Ernst Cassirer (1955, pp. 209-216), and recently Thomas Pangle (1973, pp. 9, 314) have continued this line of argument. Mark Hulliung (1976, p. 137) and Marshall Berman (1970, pp. 16n, 28n) suggest congruities between themes found in Persian Letters and the development of Hegel's account of self-consciousness as the consequence of a struggle for domination. George Kelly (1969, pp. 43-44) suggests a similar congruity between the master-slave doctrine and ideas found in Montesquieu's Pensées.

Georg Lukacs (1966, pp. 371, 492) suggested a methodological affinity between Hegel and Montesquieu. In turn, Louis Althusser (1969, p. 49) argued Montesquieu had discovered the concept of a "social totality," and concluded that "Hegel... well knew who his master [maître] was when he thanked Montesquieu for this discovery." Mercier-Josa (1980, pp. 76-89) traced the influence upon Hegel, and in turn Marx, of Montesquieu's notion of the spirit of a people. Similarly, Paul Thomas (1980, p. 29ff) in his study of Marx discussed the influence on Hegel of Montesquieu's historical psychology.

In addition, Johannes Hoffmeister (1936, p. 464) exclaimed: "Hegel's guide throughout is Montesquieu, not Rousseau." Citing him, H. S. Harris (1972, p. 424n) added, "There can, of

course, be no question of the enormous influence of Montesquieu upon Hegel's political and social thought from 1794 onwards." Shlomo Avineri (1972, pp. 4, 6, 185-187) noted the Philosophy of Right's "heavy indebtedness to Montesquieu." Jacques D'Hondt (1968, pp. 154-182) devoted a chapter to Hegel's most obscure reference to Montesquieu. Guy Planty-Bonjour (1974, pp. 7-24) and J.-F. Suter (1971, p. 60n) offered studies on the connection between Montesquieu's "esprit" and Hegel's "Geist." More recently, Charles Taylor (1975, p. 416; 1979, p. 125), George Kelly (1978, pp. 15, 142), and Steven Smith (1982, pp. 9-11) have hinted at Hegel's responsiveness to themes from Montesquieu. In her study of Hegel, Judith Shklar (1976, pp. 157-158) discussed the bearing of the Spirit of the Laws on the formation of the Phenomenology of Spirit.

Finally, Michael Oakeshott (1975, p. 251) has argued for the significant affinity of these two authors in terms of their having both theorized a mode of association suitable to "the dominant" moral disposition of the inhabitants of modern Europe: the historic disposition to be distinct." He sees the conditions of what he identifies as "civil association" outlined in both Montesquieu's discussion of monarchy and Hegel's discussion (in the Philosophy of Right) of the juridical state (Oakeshott, 1975, p. 263; also pp. 245-251, 256-263). These remarks are partially congruent with my argument for an affinity between the two models ("monarchical" and "juridical") suitable to a peculiarly modern mode of association, although I emphasize Hegel's criticism of Montesquieu and consequently his different understanding of both state and mode of association.

### Hegel's Debt to Montesquieu-

Hegel acknowledges his debt to Montesquieu at the beginning of the *Philosophy of Right*. Paragraph 3 discusses the concept of the whole in which reason "appears" as a particular, and not only as a universal, phenomenon:

Right acquires a positive element in its content through the particular national character of a people, its stage of historical development, and the whole complex of relations connected with the necessities of nature. . . . Montesquieu proclaimed the true historical view, the genuinely philosophical position, namely that legislation both in general and in its particular provisions is to be treated not as something isolated and abstract, but rather as a subordinate moment in a whole (Hegel, 1952, par. 3, p. 16).

To explain the reasons for Hegel's warm em-

brace of Montesquieu, we must say something about the nature of the task Hegel set for himself in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel accepts Kant's ethical project to depict the state as the rationally purposive setting for the potentially harmonious self-determination of free, equal, and rational beings (Kant, 1963b, pp. 10-30). Hegel's criticism of this project is in part directed against Kant's seemingly unbridgeable dichotomies, which establish reason and freedom as regulative ideals against the actuality of nature and historical circumstance (Kant, 1963a, pp. 11-12, 21). Hegel agrees with Kant's aim—an institutional life characterized as both free and rational-but believes that the two sides of this dichotomy must be more intimately and less hypothetically integrated in order to exhibit the place of rationality and the moral law in human lives.

Hegel subtly shifts, however, the context for the exhibition of freedom and rationality. For Kant, a state's worth lies in its laws reflecting the absolute value of each (rational) being in it. For Hegel, a state's worth follows from the manner in which its juridical structure gives expression to the self-determining "spirit" or mind of its people (Charvet, 1981, pp. 117-135; Hegel, 1952, Preface, pp. 6-7, pars. 4, 33). Through history the spirit of peoples had been variously expressed, but now the occasion has at last arrived for the spirit of a particular people to become the bearer of the Kantian project. The spirit of a people as expressed in the juridical arrangements and understandings of its dispersed members proves to be the only form in which free and rational selfdetermination can be exhibited. The citizen who understands this relationship to the whole comes to accept that his subjective and individual selfdetermination is best expressed through conformity with and acceptance of the substantial selfdetermining collective will as that is constituted by the decisions made through the juridical structure of the state (Hegel, 1952, par. 261-268).

With this conception of the modern state, we are a long way from Montesquieu's defense of "intermediary powers" presided over by a relatively weak although recognizably juridical central state (Laws 2.4). Hegel has shifted not only the balance of power but also the locus for the generation of value and worth away from intermediary bodies (which he is yet very insistent have their place) toward the central state institutions.

Nevertheless, to accomplish his Kantian task, Hegel turns to Montesquieu who, he thought, showed him that rational purposiveness could be exhibited in the "particulars" of natural circumstances and historically evolving practices, however much these circumstances and practices, regarded in isolation, seem only capricious and irrational. Hegel seeks "to apprehend and portray

the state as something inherently rational? (Hegel, 1952, pp. 11-12). The apparently irrational and often freedom-denying circumstances of actual social practices are to be conceptualized along lines suggested by Montesquieu as the vehicles for the ultimate display of reason.

The model Hegel adopts for displaying rationality emerging from apparently irrational circumstances is evidently Montesquieu's monarchical society in which the decaying ethos of the feudal aristocracy—honor—is seen to serve the purposes of integrating a society of individualists. It is, however, just such a society whose decay Hegel contemplates in the *Phenomenology*. Consequently, in the *Philosophy of Right*, the state is not held together through honor, even though the social circumstances recreate the conditions of Montesquieu's monarchy.

#### The Spirit of a People

The longest of Hegel's early passages in praise of Montesquieu is from his essay on Natural Law, where he depicts Montesquieu as a foil to an overly rationalistic Kant on the one side and an overly empirical Locke on the other. Empiricism, Hegel argues, isolates experience when experience should be understood in its relationship to the whole. Empiricists ignore the structured condition of each people that gives them coherence, or an "individuality" as a people. These philosophers "have been shown by Montesquieu" that their reflections on politics are not owed to "experience a priori," but are shaped "wholly and solely by the living individuality of a nation" (Hegel, 1975a, pp. 59-70, 128-129).

The counterpoint to empiricist particularity is idealist universality as articulated by Kant and Fichte. But the idealist conception of the whole is "abstract" both in the sense that it lacks empirical content and in the sense that its point of view is the isolated individual, not men and women considered as members of an ethical order (Hegel, 1975a, pp. 70-76). Hegel intensely disapproves of these features in the thought of his predecessors and rivals. Already he has developed the criticism of Kantian ethics which would show up again in the *Phenomenology* (Hegel, 1975a, pp. 76-80; 1977, pp. 252-261, 365-372). Here, too, Montesquieu is a heuristic example because he did "not merely deduce individual institutions and laws from so-called reason." On the contrary, against both empiricists and idealists, Montesquieu "comprehended both the higher relations for the universal aims] . . . and the lower specifications [particulars] . . . entirely from the character of the whole and its individuality" (Hegel, 1975a, pp. 128-129).

Hegel's reputation notwithstanding, he offers a

partial defense of the empiricist insight, which, along with his damning indictment of "abstraction" in the German idealist tradition suggests as well as anything might why it would be a mistake to read the later Phenomenology as a purely conceptual work. It is both conceptual and empirical, both a history of ideas and a history of peoples whose thoughts and experiences are interlocked. Empiricism that claims to be a science is thoroughly condemned, it is true. He ridicules empirical psychology, which attempts to draw up lists "of the capacities found in man." Such endeavors suggest only a "chaos" into which anything can be put and anything can be drawn out. But he praises another kind of empiricism, which although "old and thoroughly inconsistent" is often capable of "a great and pure intuition (Hegel, 1975a, pp. 61-67). Sophocles was such an empiricist of the ethical life of the polis. But empiricism is also the work of theorists. Aristotle is the ancient and Montesquieu is the modern master of this form of thought.

The picture of the social whole which emerges in Hegel's thought is not unfavorable to the empiricist's particulars. The particulars could be said to control the universal in the sense that the universal can only be expressed through its embodiment in the empirical (and particular) world. Hegel found in Montesquieu a system of ordering thoughts about society that demonstrates not only the claim of universal ideals to frame an understanding of particulars, but the reciprocal and parallel claim of the particular as the expressive vehicle of the universal.

This accommodation of idealism to the empirical claim has a moral analogue. In his early writings on Christianity, Hegel inquired into the relationship of the historical Jesus to the Jewish community. Hegel underwent a remarkable change of mind across the space of several years. In the "Positivity of Christianity," the community of ancient Jews is blamed for not being responsive to the high-mindedness of Jesus' intentions. In a subsequent project, "The Spirit of Christianity," instead it is Jesus who is blamed for withholding himself from his community (Hegel, 1971a, pp. 69-74, 205-214, 284-288, 301). In the earlier essay the purity of Jesus' rather Kant-like intentions is portrayed as tragically compromised by the "positive" (meaning historical but also and specifically irrational and authoritarian) circumstances of his culture. By the lights of the later essay, Jesus' isolation from his people, his slighting of their customs for the sake of his good intentions, was tragic. Hegel had shifted ground to argue that only through the medium of "positive" features of a society can abstract good intentions have an effect upon history. Universal reason can win no victories if it is contemptuous of the "positivity."

i.e., of the actual historical possessions, of a people, for "all the determinants of ethical relations . . . are determined by the whole." A society or a people have an "individuality." They are "structured" or "constituted" in a certain manner. Hegel identifies Montesquieu as his predecessor in articulating how each particular can become what it is by means of and through the whole.

#### Montesquieu's Moral Geography

The core idea of Montesquieu's moral geography is succinctly expressed in the *Laws* 8.20:

It is natural that small states be governed as republics; those of moderate size as monarchies; and that great empires be dominated by despots.

The moral theme underlying this physical criterion is that as states increase in size, the claims that men make upon one another change. In small states, men confront one another as friends or as enemies; in larger states they confront one another as strangers, or sometimes they are largely successful in avoiding the claims of membership altogether. The reasons men increasingly become strangers in their relationships may be more varied than is implied by the imagery of distance. Larger states have more heterogeneous populations. The linkages between various groups and individuals become less immediate. Men have fewer shared presumptions about family background. Finally, they do not have or are not able to conceive of a setting in which each may represent himself in terms comprehensible to all. This is an analysis that looks at larger states from the vantage point of describing what of republican life is absent in them, but this orientation of the theory does not mean Montesquieu is unaware of the advantages of living outside republican polities.

Republics require a people to be more strongly motivated by public friendships and hostilities than they are by any temptation to withdraw into the pursuit of private interest: "One has friends and enemies in the republic; neither one nor the other in monarchies" (Montesquieu, 1951, vol. 1, p. 1063). As a consequence of the more direct presence to one another provided under republican conditions, it is far more important that the citizenry be predisposed to share values than would be the case where the absence of appropriate settings mutes the conflict between values. In a republic, the educative family extends its influence directly over the whole polity, and "it is in republican government that the whole power of education is required. . ." (Laws 4.5). The dividing line between republican and monarchical circumstances is the point at which the influence of the family is attenuated: "In monarchies, education begins... when children... enter the world. This is the school called honor" (Laws 4.4).

The differences between a republic and a monarchy are partly a question of government and partly a question of social structure and sentiment. Even when Montesquieu refers to a state's constitution, he often includes aspects we would identify as belonging to the social life of a people. The dominant passions that animate the regime, the "principle," are meant to be a powerful motif in a people's feelings and not simply a style restricted to officers of the government. Because of this ambiguity of reference, it is possible to speak of monarchical social circumstances without pointing to a monarchical state. Monarchical circumstances are those in which humans adopt social arrangements which represent a middle range between communicative closeness and communicative distance. People in this middle range are threatened, on the one hand, with despotic arrangements and are sometimes offered opportunities, on the other hand, to engage in republican experiments, like the English system of parliamentary representation (Montesquieu, 1966b, letter 102, Laws 11.6, 19.27). Monarchical society is amenable to a variety of constitutions ranging from those that teeter on the brink of despotism to those that flirt with republicanism. The threat of despotism comes in a variety of forms. Usually Montesquieu's picture of it is connected with the absolutist claims of princes, but sometimes, as in several cautionary remarks about England, he implies that too much republican flirtation under social circumstances more suitable to monarchical order can run the risk of turning in a despotic direction (Laws 2.4, 5.11).

An idealist vocabulary makes explicit some of the less available of Montesquieu's theoretical intentions. Thus, human relations in Montesquieu's republican setting could to an idealist observer be characterized by the visibility of others, their direct presence in the schemes of living by which citizens find out who they are. Here one's particular identity is directly implicated in, although even here not completely expressed through, the social presence that the public setting exerts on each. This is "the simple substance of Spirit . . . the immediate certainty of a real ethical situation" (Hegel, 1977, p. 267). Despotic human relations express, on the other hand, the inability to find oneself in a publicly available world except as a being who fearfully responds to commands. The republic animated by virtue is, so to speak, the moral equivalent of a philosophical idealist's hope: to see human reason everywhere, to find oneself in the world, as a constituting part of its texture of mutually informing understandings.

And despotism is simply the epistemological denial of this reflection of self in the world.

The most interesting case, once again, is the monarchical society. It puts in question both the citizen's ability to be *present* to others and the citizen's need of that presence. In such a social order the question is raised to what extent we may be what Michael Oakeshott tells us we are, purely self-defining beings whose adventures in self-discovery depend only upon observances of "civility" from others, of whom, unlike the ancient citizen, we do not stand in need (Oakeshott, 1975, pp. 70-78, 234-236, 240-245).

And yet the issue of "need" has not quite disappeared. Two rather general ways of needing one another can be identified. First, each pursues selfdiscovery partially in responsiveness to the spirit of one's associations, definable as the context and manner of the politically organized availability of others to oneself. Second, each is, however, so subjectively situated as not to have on every occasion the means for knowing of the connections between one's particular role and the commonality of roles in which all may be situated. Each needs that knowledge on occasion, or less democratically, some need it, in order that the whole may possess direction and that the parts may have an understanding of their strategy and of the role in which they want to cast themselves, given the nature of the plot. Despotism is the model for the failure of these two ways of knowing one another; it is always, Montesquieu might be taken as claiming, the implicit threat within any monarchical society.

#### Hegel's Criticism of Montesquieu

Although both thinkers offer descriptions of the constitution appropriate to modern circumstances, Hegel believed Montesquieu had failed to describe a suitably public life. It was not sufficiently "objective" and lapsed into a "feudal" outlook (Hegel, 1952, p. 178). Curiously, Marx thought Hegel had failed in the same task. Hegel's celebration of the "universal class" was yet another accommodation to particularism (Marx, 1967, pp. 177-190). The two critiques—Marx's critique of Hegel, and Hegel's of Montesquieu—resemble one another. Both critiques focus upon the inability of the predecessor to see how those who participate are likely to distort the universal claims of the state to their private and particular ends.

Did Hegel miss in his own work what he perceived as an error in the work of others? What Hegel learned from Montesquieu inclined him to view politics in a way which, despite specific criticisms of his predecessor, opened him to this sort of challenge from successors like Marx.

For Hegel a modern mass society of detached individualists could create an unhealthy polity. As a corrective, Hegel turns to decentralized corporations or communities as a means of encouraging participation rooted in concrete and particular existence. Like Montesquieu's "intermediary bodies," these try to preserve a sense of place, of local, and possibly of religious, ethnic, and class identity (Hegel, 1952, pars. 250-256, 302, 308). The preservation of such identities is important because, as Hegel suggested in the Phenomenology, contemporary societies are more and more constituted by individuals released from every purpose but the pursuit of wealth and power. The search for "abstract" wealth and power estranges people from any contest that could supply them with a sense of membership with others (Hegel, 1977, pp. 313-314). Nevertheless, by redressing these problems with a push toward a more decentralized polity, another problem emerges. It was a problem Hegel attributed to Montesquieu's monarchical order, but not evidently to his own model. Montesquieu's constitution gives too much reign, Hegel believes, to the "subjective" and dissociated prejudice of each; it gives too great a play to particularity and hence undermines a conception of authority to which objective duty could be owed. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel claims:

The fact that Montesquieu discerns 'honor' as the principle of monarchy makes it clear that by monarchy he understands not . . . the type organized into an objective constitution, but only feudal monarchy.... This type of constitution rests on privileged persons.... The result is that their services are the objects not of duty but only of ideas and opinions (Hegel, 1952, p. 178).

Carving out spheres of partial autonomy, even as a means of avoiding the anomic of a mass society, is to confer privileges that effectively inhibit the creation of a public life to which duty is owed

Here, of course, is a striking irony. Marx's complaint about Hegel's "universal" class (especially equipped to attend to "objective" duties, Hegel thought), is that its members are too particularized, too concretely embodied to participate on behalf of universal interests. This complaint merely echoes Hegel's views on Montesquieu. Indeed, one may assert that the history of political thought since the eighteenth century has consisted largely in endlessly repeated challenges to predecessors and rivals either that one has gotten to the state but left the citizens behind as shadowy abstractions, or that one has never escaped the presence of privileged citizens who obscure the state and its legitimate purposes altogether.

Thus, the political problem of the modern state has been envisaged by many thinkers as one of finding a sufficiently neutral definition of the uses of state power so that no particular agent may suspect that when he defers to the state he is only obeying the commands of another particular agent (see Ackerman, 1980; Dworkin, 1978). As a result (and not inappropriately), a style of accusatory politics has emerged in which each accuses the other of having captured the public authority to private advantage. Marx's and Hegel's complaints about their predecessors' views are a part of this politics.

Behind an application of impersonal rules, one often finds the rule of persons, as well as of classes, interests, factions, and parties. Each of these specific entities has been at one time or another partially rehabilitated by political theory, but what has often remained untouched is the background belief that an unalterable tension and antagonism must exist between particular agent and general purpose. It is settled belief that the general ideals and universal aims are inevitably tainted by the particular agents of their construction.

In the neutral state, or in one that upholds ideals whose universality stretches to every agent, the main participants in the construction of this form of purity will sooner or later be recognized as the central obstacles to its achievement. This complaint arises again almost by definition: particular actors with general goals are viewed as if they were in contradiction with themselves, for their particularity is understood to be in necessary conflict with, and a source of corruption of, general ideals. The citizen of the neutral state is a divided consciousness who cannot integrate the universal and particular features of his life.

Montesquieu did not choose to search, significantly, for untainted purity in politics. His first book, Persian Letters, is a satire on men and leaders who claim to embody universal ideals. Neither Usbek nor the King can succeed. Montesquieu seems to dissent from a tradition whose concern is to define and defend a politics of neutrality. In its place, Montesquieu offers the reader of the Laws states in which privilege frankly plays a role. Privilege is necessary to the articulation of the general good. In his monarchical constitution, privileged orders are defended on the grounds that their very resistance to officially defined public purposes forms an essential ingredient in assuring that those official purposes retain their public character (Montesquieu, 1966b, letters 2, 6, 8, 16-18, 155; Laws 2.4, 3.5-7, 4.2).

Montesquieu does not say that every form of privileged participation or privileged dissent is justified. Indeed, in a society held together by laws as well as by the cult of honor, whatever sense of distinctiveness, and hence privilege, the latter generates must not be inconsistent with the purposes of a rule-oriented polity.

### Communicative Competence and Neutrality

Montesquieu's concerns can be expressed in terms of the contemporary notion of "communicative competence." For Montesquieu, particularity is respected to the extent that it contributes to the "communicative competencies" required on behalf of the universal goals of a polity. Hegel does not reject this criterion for a well-ordered polity. But Hegel, unlike Montesquieu, is more preoccupied with the intellectual inheritance of the social contract tradition. His conceptualization of the state as the result of "wills" striving to establish an order responsive to "freedom" represents his effort to preserve the central intentions of this tradition (although abandoning what he regarded as the contractualist's insensitivity to the Montesquian history of peoples). Contractualist metaphors and assumptions push the theorist in the direction of legitimizing only "neutral" states, i.e., states that preserve the "freedom" of every "will," thus setting up the kind of debate cited above which is the inevitable result of specifying universal goals (of "neutrality") impossible for particular agents to realize (see also Ackerman, 1980; Dworkin, 1978; Riley, 1982, ch. 6).

It may be true that "communicative competence" is a notion wholly compatible with the neutrality or "ideal speech" requirement (Ackerman, 1980; Dworkin, 1978; Habermas, 1979).3 Then, citizens equally free because not discriminated against or dominated by unneutral institutions will be those most likely to establish relations of communicative competence. Hegel's criticism of Montesquieu suggests an alternative, however. Communicative competence is the criterion for measuring the contributions of different classes of particular agents, whereas neutrality is a separate criterion not readily harmonized with the demand for communicative competence. Montesquieu adopted the former but not the latter criterion, because there is no conceptual reason to suppose that a free and equal citizenry (as established by the demand for a neutral state) will be the only or the best citizenry communicatively competent enough to sustain itself over time. Nevertheless, competence does

'This is not the occasion for a close examination of Habermas's ideas, nor of the ideas of the Anglo-American defenders of liberalism. Here I am suggesting an affinity between these ideas (of communicative competence and of neutrality) as a means of exhibiting the significance of Hegel's critique of Montesquieu. For a similar view of Habermas, see Skinner (1982).

not create "objective" duties. Only the just state, as measured by "neutrality," can do this. Hegel had to synthesize competence and neutrality.

Hegel adopts a part of Montesquieu's politics, while believing he can reject its costs. Marx's criticism of Hegel suggests that the costs must be acknowledged. Thus, Hegel's "universal class" is rooted in a particular culture, class, and outlook. This rootedness serves the same purposes that the "family" and "corporation" do. These "intermediary bodies," to use Montesquieu's term, remind men and women of limits, which the pursuit of the "abstract" goals of wealth and power do not, and school and sustain them in becoming communicatively competent. Montesquieu understood that by sponsoring the flourishing of intermediary bodies he was commending a society where power was effectively decentralized and the ordinary conduct of these competing groups would work to the establishment of inequality and the unneutral preference of certain elites over others. Hegel stresses the first, the role of decentralizing institutions, without requiring that the state yield its power to groups that would tend to sanction the second, privileges of one group over those of another. To be sure, Hegel advocated elite rule, but only when it serves the defensible criterion of the social contract theorists (as reformulated by Kant). Marx's criticism, to the extent that it is true, can be taken as a reminder that Hegel never offers his reader good arguments for his presumption that this "particular" universal class would in fact serve these goals. Marx's indictments cannot, by the same token, be taken as a claim that there could ever be a universal class without particular interests.

To review and conclude, it is by looking at the common problem linking Montesquieu and Hegel that we can understand these political dilemmas that question the proper balance between centralizing and decentralizing social practices as well as suggest the uneasy alliance between communicative competence and neutrality. Both theorists believed that societies or "peoples" could be conceptualized as "individuals" whose distinctive identities survive temporal changes. But as societies increased in scale, the sense in which a given people could be so connected as to constitute an "individuality" became more problematic. There would come a point in which the communicative competence so visibly apparent in the small-scale republic would be undermined by the conditions isolating persons from one another. These conditions tend towards despotism. The more interesting case then concerned those societies not visibly united (as in the small-scale republic) and not spiritually and communicatively exhausted (as in a despotism) but hovering between and on occasion flirting with either extreme. But here the agree-

ment between Montesquieu and Hegel ends. The "spirit" of such associations, and the manner of their flirtation with individualistic isolation, on the one hand, and communitarian expressiveness, on the other, turns out for these theorists, as for us, to be matters of unending dispute. Oakeshott's asserted affinity between Montesquieu's and Hegel's description of an appropriate mode of association (expressed as a release from devotion to a common enterprise but in subscription to terms of less restrictive "practice") covers a variety of disagreements over the precise shape of the polity. It leaves the reader with no practical advice, as might be suggested in another way by his (and my) claim that two such differently committed authors could have begun their engagements with politics from such similar premises.

Montesquieu's and Hegel's typologies record the differences made by expanding scale. These are registered in two contrary claims: cohesiveness dissipates, but at the same time the occasions for confrontation diminish. The first predicts instability because it understands decreasing involvement in common projects as a process for dissociating persons from social matrices through which they achieve meaning and a social identity. The second predicts greater potential stability upon the grounds that there is opportunity as well. as danger in the process of dissociation: the decreasing need of intense communicativeness as support for the polity means that men and women may possess a "personal" identity partially separable from their social identity. Intensely communicative polities were in effect sensitive barometers of change because every change or withdrawal of energy from the common project seemed to threaten political stability and hence to require the approval of political gatekeepers. Larger societies create spheres of indifference, where, as Montesquieu once put it, even "public crimes" are "more private" (Laws 3.5). Hegel echoes these sentiments with his remark that in the sphere called "civil society," i.e., in a country's economic practices, one contemplates "ethical society split into its extremes and lost" (Hegel, 1952, par. 184).

Does then this sphere of indifference promote what I identify as the uneasy alliance between communicative competence and neutrality, or does it mask the subtler facts of domination? Curlously, Hegel's intentions in the *Philosophy of Right* discourage this line of inquiry. Patrick Riley has astutely noted that Kojeve and his disciples are wrong in supposing that the key to Hegel's philosophy, lies in his description of self-consciousness as constituted by a struggle for recognition between masters and slaves. The *Phenomenology* is structured, true, in accordance with the concept of an evolving consciousness

unreleased from this struggle. But the Philosophy of Right is premised upon a concept of a rational will for which the problems of this consciousness. i.e., of the enslaved will, are identified as a "comparatively primitive phenomenon" (Hegel, 1952, par. 57; Riley, 1982, pp. 189-190). Riley's observation is a valuable corrective to the Kojèvian tradition, but at the same time it suggests something about the presumption of Hegel's text. The problems of a will enslaved by whatever means to another may be "primitive," but its absence as a informing assumption from the Philosophy of Right should be taken as a sign of Hegel's utopian intentions, whatever he may have claimed on behalf of his concept of the will being also the emergent history of modern European nation states. Put another way, to the extent that this text abstracts from the central concerns of the Phenomenology to capture the character of enslaved and hence non-autonomous wills, to that extent Hegel is presupposing a society in which none of the subtler forms of domination and coercion analyzed in the Phenomenology is present. Hegel explores the statecraft permitted to uncoerced wills, but one should not suppose that this statecraft is possible in a society where Hegel's earlier description of consciousness is still relevant. Here Habermas's preoccupation with the subtler circumstances of domination suggests a return to the Phenomenology, even if Habermas's ideal of communicative competence and, implicitly, neutrality speaks more to the traditions established by the Philosophy of Right.

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# The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought

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Drawing upon a comprehensive list of political writings by Americans published between 1760 and 1805, the study uses a citation count drawn from these 916 items as a surrogate measure of the relative influence of European writers upon American political thought during the era. Contrary to the general tendencies in the recent literature, the results here indicate that there was no one European writer, or one tradition of writers, that dominated American political thought. There is evidence for moving beyond the Whig-Enlightenment dichotomy as the basis for textual analysis, and for expanding the set of individual European authors considered to have had an important effect on American thinking. Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Hume are most in need of upgrading in this regard. The patterns of influence apparently varied over the time period from 1760 to 1805, and future research on the relative influence of European thinkers must be more sensitive to this possibility.

The bicentennial of the American founding era has led to renewed interest in the origins and nature of American political thought. One aspect of this interest has been heightened concern with a thorny question that has exercised historians and political scientists for a good number of years—the relative influence of European thinkers on the American founders as they designed their political institutions at the state and national levels.

Shalhope (1972, 1982) has summarized the debate in two historiographical essays. What he calls the "orthodox" view held that John Locke's ideas dominated American political thought until Thomas Jefferson introduced the republican thought of the English Civil War authors during the post-Confederation period. Two writers frequently cited as prominent among the many holding to the orthodox view are Hartz (1955) and Becker (1958).

On the other hand, Robbins (1947), Rossiter (1953), and Adair (1956) were prominent in dissenting from the orthodox view and in pointing out the non-Lockean roots of our political tradition. In her book, *The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman* (1959), Robbins argued for the importance of the English libertarian heritage to colonial and revolutionary Americans. Men such as Harrington, Milton, Sidney, Neville, Moles-

Received: March 1, 1983 Revision received: May 10, 1983 Accepted for publication: July 3, 1983

An earlier version of this article was presented at a Covenant Workshop sponsored by the Center for the Study of Federalism at Temple University, May, 1982. worth, and Trenchard and Gordon, she argued, had a central and continuing influence on early American political thought. The quickening interest in the topic on the part of historians produced many important contributions that did not directly support Robbins's work, but the work of others, including Main (1961), Levy (1960), Elkins and McKitrick (1961), Handlin and Handlin (1961), Miller (1961) and Pocock (1965, 1975) fleshed out the importance of English Whig thought.

Just when a new synthesis seemed needed, it was provided by Bailyn (1965, 1967; but see Pocock, 1981). Bailyn identified five major sources from which American colonists drew their political thinking—the writings of classical antiquity, the writings of Enlightenment rationalism, the tradition of English common law, the political and social theories of New England Puritanism (especially covenant theory), and the writers identifled by Robbins as being associated with the English Civil War and Commonwealth period. According to Bailyn, this last group, the radical English Whigs, generated the perspective that brought order and synthesis to the other strands of writing, and more than any other source "shaped the mind of the American Revolutionary generation." Wood (1969) wrote a monumental study describing how this synthesis of ideas informed the events surrounding the writing of the constitutions between 1776 and 1789, and a new orthodoxy seemed firmly in place.

However, this new orthodoxy was soon subjected to methodological modifications that have called into question the supposed monolithic character of the republican synthesis stressed by Bailyn and Wood. The post-Bailyn tendency to

use categories of European writers, sometimes referred to as "traditions," has continued to breed confusion as new categories are "discovered" or assembled. For example, Wills (1978) adds the Scottish Enlightenment as distinct from Bailyn's more general use of Enlightenment. Lundberg and May (1976) correctly note that the term Enlightenment is too broad and hides a great deal of variance in the authors subsumed by the category. They are led to break it into the First Enlightenment (with the likes of Montesquieu, Locke, and Pufendorf), the more radical Second Enlightenment (which includes Voltaire, Diderot, and Helvetius among others), and the Third Enlightenment (typified by Beccaria, Rousseau, Mably, and Raynal). Wills's Scottish Enlightenment becomes the category "Scottish Common Sense" in their schema, and they add the categories Deists and Near-Deists, Devotional and Apologetic, and Romantic. Lundberg and May, on the other hand, do not mention the categories of Common Law, Puritanism, or classical antiquity.

Nor does the use of general categories solve the problem of where many of the major European thinkers belong. Wills places Hume within the Scottish Common Sense tradition, Lundberg and May place him within the Second Enlightenment, and it is not entirely clear where Bailyn places him. Lundberg and May place Hobbes among the English Deists and Near-Deists, whereas Bailyn never clearly places him. Bailyn makes Locke an Enlightenment figure, Lundberg and May place Locke in the First Enlightenment, yet Wills correctly notes that Locke was very often linked by American readers with Algernon Sidney, the great Whig theorist. Without agreement on either a stable set of categories, or the placement of major writers in them, analysis of the relative influence of such "traditions" is problematic.

The prominent alternative of using close textual analysis on major American political writers still generally eschews arguing in terms of broad categories and focuses instead upon specific European writers. The unfortunate tendency here is to identify a single source as dominant. For example, investigations of the texts by Thomas Jefferson have variously concluded that he reflects the dominant influence of the Scottish Enlightenment (Wills, 1979), John Locke (Mahowy, 1979), or the negative influence of Montesquieu (Appleby, 1982). Madison either borrowed many of his ideas from Hume (Adair, 1956-1957), Locke (Devine, 1975), republicanism (Morgan, 1974), or, like Jefferson, wrote in reaction to Montesquieu (Morgan, 1974). We can even still be treated to close textual analysis that completely denies the influence of Whig political ideas on early American political thought (Schmitt & Webking, 1979).

#### Method of Analysis

If we are to make significant progress toward unravelling this matter of relative influence, it is essential that we move beyond close textual analysis that assumes discipleship on the part of the person whose text is under examination. It will no longer do to examine a text from the American founding era without considering the possibility of multiple influences. This requires more comprehensive identification of those who are candidates for having influenced American political writing. Otherwise we are left with the relatively fruitless debates between those who find one dominant influence as opposed to another, when there is a reasonable probability that the pattern of influence will be multiple and vary from text to text-even in those written by the same author. The purpose of this essay is to advance such a systematic identification of European writers who need to be taken into account.

Contrary to the general tendencies in the recent scholarly literature, the results here indicate that there was no one European writer, or one tradition of thought, that dominated American political reading and writing during the late 1700s. If there was one man read and reacted to by American political writers of all factions during all the stages of the founding era, it was probably not Locke but Montesquieu. As for the relative influence of the various intellectual traditions, the method used here cannot support either the radical English Whigs or the Enlightenment writers as more important—they look about equal in influence. However, there is strong evidence for moving beyond a Whig-Enlightenment dichotomy as the basis for debate on this issue. Debate in the future should include biblical and common law sources as well, just as the number of individual authors deemed important should probably be enlarged and their relative importance reassessed.

Several surrogate measures of influence have already been attempted. One was to examine the educational background of prominent American political writers such as Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson (Myers, 1981; Wills, 1978). These attempts are limited to a few men, only a few texts, and marred by the assumption that exposure to one or two college instructors was decisive. Another surrogate measure was the examination of the library holdings of a few dozen prominent Americans (Colbourn, 1965). This approach suffered from the assumption that the critical men have been identified and was seriously marred by the assumption that all books in a person's collection were equally valuable to him. A more ambitious approach was to examine all of the booksellers' catalogues from the era, plus the institutional libraries (mainly colleges),

library companies, and private libraries (Lundberg & May, 1976). Although a major advance, this expanded effort had the one major problem of not being able to tell us how widely a given volume was actually read. A more useful surrogate measure would be a count of how many times a given volume or author was cited, quoted, or paraphrased, since this would not only help to answer how widely a book was read but also how highly regarded it was.

Approximately ten years ago this author set out with Charles S. Hyneman to read comprehensively the political writings of Americans published between 1760 and 1805. This period was defined as the "founding era" during which the theory and institutions informing the state and national constitutions took final form. Reviewing an estimated 15,000 items, and reading closely some 2,200 items with explicitly political content, we identified and rated those with the most significant and coherent theoretical content. Included were all books, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and monographs printed for public consumption. Excluded was anything that remained private and so did not enter public consciousness. such as letters and notes. Essentially we exhausted all those items reproduced in collections published by historians, the newspapers available in the Library of Congress, the early American imprints held by the Lilly Library at Indiana University. the Huntington Library in San Marino, California, and the Library of Congress. Finally, we examined the two volumes of Shipton and Mooney, National Index of American Imprints, for items in the Evans collection of early American imprints on microcard.

The resulting sample has 916 items, which include 3.154 references to 224 different individuals. The sample includes all of the Anti-Federalist pieces identified by Storing (1981) plus 33 more, for a total of 197 Anti-Federalist pieces. It also includes 190 items written by Federalists. Most of these items are identified in Storing (1976); the rest can be found in Hyneman and Lutz (1983), which lists 515 pieces. Although not exhaustive, the sample is by far the largest ever assembled. and neither excludes nor emphasizes any point of view. Excluding the proceedings of legislatures and conventions, upon which the sample does not draw, the sample represents approximately onethird of all public political writings longer than 2,000 words published between 1760 and 1805. Also, the distribution of published writings during the era is roughly proportional to the number of citations for each decade.

A citation for purposes of the study is defined as any footnote, direct quote, attributed paraphrasing, or use of a name in exemplifying a concept or position. The primary assumption is that a citation indicates familiarity with the author being cited. Furthermore, it is assumed that the citation is made because potential readers are also likely to be so familiar. Thus, a citation count indirectly provides a sense of the relative frequency with which European authors were read.

Bailyn (1967) has pointed out that such citations and references in the political literature of the founding era often give the appearance of being more window dressing and that often they betray an incomplete understanding of the author or work being cited. Even in those instances where this is true, there must be some familiarity with the cited text on the part of the person writing the pamphlet, as well as some assumed familiarity on the part of potential readers of the pamphlet, if the window dressing is to make any sense. In short, using a citation count has an advantage over close textual analysis in that we can assume familiarity with the text being cited, whether or not the citation is theoretically serious, or whether or not the author has complete command of the text he is citing.

Another advantage is that a citation count need not distinguish between positive and negative citations; to cite another author in order to attack him still shows that the work has been read, and it also shows influence insofar as the cited author's categories of thought are being used. Locke responded negatively to Filmer. Hume responded negatively to Locke. Madison responded positively to certain aspects of Locke and Hume, and negatively to certain aspects of Montesquieu. In each case it is reasonable to assume that a negative citation represents as much familiarity as a positive citation with a cited work, and it is this familiarity we are seeking to establish.

Thus, "influence" is used here in a broad sense. Only close textual analysis can establish the presence of specific ideas in a text, and comparative textual analysis the probable source of the ideas. A weakness of the citation-count method is that it cannot distinguish among citations that represent the borrowing of an idea, the adapting of an idea, the approval of an idea, the opposition to an idea, or an appeal to authority. An advantage of a citation count is that this inability to distinguish the nature of a citation does not matter if all one is trying to do is systematically establish which European writers were consulted and with what frequency. The overview that results provides a good basis for guiding those engaged in close textual analysis to look for influences that might otherwise be missed. A citation count is also a good way of testing the adequacy of the various schemes that have been developed for categorizing European writers by those interested in the relative influence of various intellectual traditions on American political theory.

The basic categorization scheme used is that developed by Bailyn (1967). Although Bailyn's is one of the most prominent categorization schemes and is relatively noncontroversial, there is still room for argument. Where should Locke and Hume be placed? We might view them in one way today, but early American writers emphasized different works by them than we do, and thus viewed them in a way that might be difficult for us to appreciate. To minimize controversy, a citation count both by category and by major individual authors is provided.

### The Pattern of Citations for the Entire Founding Era

If we ask what book was most frequently cited by Americans during the founding era, the answer somewhat surprisingly is: the Book of Deuteronomy. From Table 1 we can see that the biblical tradition is most prominent among the citations. Anyone familiar with the literature will know that most of these citations come from sermons reprinted as pamphlets; hundreds of sermons were reprinted during the era, amounting to at least 10% of all pamphlets published. These reprinted sermons accounted for almost three-fourths of the biblical citations, making this nonsermon source of biblical citations roughly as important as the Classical or Common Law categories. Since our concern in this essay is with sorting out the relative influence of European thinkers, the problem of how to count biblical citations is not important. It is relevant, nonetheless, to note the prominence of biblical sources for American political thought, since it was highly influential in our political tradition, and is not always given the attention it deserves (Lutz, 1980).

References to writers identified with the European Enlightenment are fairly constant throughout the 45-year founding era, but the mix of writers within this category changes significantly over the years. One major conclusion suggested by this study is that the relative prominence of a writer usually varies over time, and when discussing relative influence, we should, for example, distinguish the Revolutionary era from the era surrounding the writing of the United States Constitution.

For example, Montesquieu and Locke are very prominent during the 1760s, when the percentage of Enlightenment citations is highest. Together they account for over 60% of all references to Enlightenment thinkers. During the 1770s these two account for over 75% of all references to Enlightenment thinkers. However, the references to the two are structured in an interesting manner. References to Locke in the 1770s are found heavily in pieces justifying the break with England, whereas Montesquieu is cited heavily in pieces dealing with constitutional design. As the writing of state and national constitutions continues in the 1780s, Montesquieu increases in importance to the point where he accounts for almost 60% of all Enlightenment references. Meanwhile, Locke's rate of citation falls off drastically, never to return to prominence. After the writing of the national Constitution, references to Montesquieu also fall off and are limited primarily to pieces related to the writing of state constitutions during the 1790s. This pattern should not surprise us at all upon reflection. Locke is profound when it comes to the bases for establishing a government and for opposing tyranny, but has little to say about institutional design. Therefore his influence most properly lies in justifying the revolution and the right of Americans to write their own constitu-

Table 1. Distribution of Citations by Decade (%)

	1760s	1770s	1780s	1790s	1800-05	% of Total Number
Bible	24	44	34	29	38	34
Enlightenment	32	18	24	21	18	22*
Whig	10	20	19	17	15	18
Common Law	12	4	9	14	20	· 11
Classical	8	11	10	11	2	9
Peers	6.	2	3	6	5	4
Other	8	1	1	2	2	. 2
,	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	216	<b>544</b>	1306	674	414	3154

<sup>\*</sup>If we break Bailyn's Enlightenment category into the three sub-categories described by Lundberg and May, the results are not significantly altered. The "First Enlightenment," dominated by Montesquieu, Locke, and Pufendorf, comprises 16% of all citations. The more radical writers of the "Second Enlightenment," men like Voltaire, Diderot, and Helvethus, garner 2% of the citations. The "Third Enlightenment," typified by Beccaria, Rousseau, Mably, and Raynal, receives 4% of the citations, to bring the total back to the 22% listed here.

	1760s	1770s	1780s	1790s	1800-05	% of Total Number
Montesquieu	8	7	14	4	1	8.3
Blackstone	1	3	7	11	15	7.9
Locke	11	7	1	1	1	2.9
Hume	1	1	1	6	5	2.7
Plutarch	1	. 3	1	2	Ō	1.5
Beccaria	0	1	3	0	0	1.5
Trenchard & Gordon	1	1	3	0	0	1.4
Delolme	0	0	3	1	0	1.4
Pufendorf	4	0	1	0	5	1.3
Coke	5	0	1	2	4	1.3
Cicero	1	1	1	2	1	1.2
Hobbes	0	1	1	0	0	1.0
	33	25	37	29	32	32.4
Others	67	75	63	71	68	67.6
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%
N	216	544	1306	674	414	3154

Table 2. Most Cited Thinkers by Decade<sup>8</sup>

tions rather than in the design of any constitution, state or national. Locke's influence has been exaggerated in the latter regard, and finding him hidden in passages of the U.S. Constitution is an exercise that requires more evidence than has hitherto ever been provided.

Montesquieu's prominence during the period of constitution writing is supplemented by the relative prominence of two other Enlightenment writers-Beccaria and deLolme (usually written Delolme). It is also during this period of constitution writing that a host of English Whig writers becomes prominent. "Cato" (Trenchard and Gordon), Hoadley, Bolingbroke, Price, Burgh, Milton, Rollin, Molesworth, Priestly, Macaulay, Sidney, Somers, Harrington, and Rapin were most heavily cited during the late 1770s and the 1780s. They are joined by other Enlightenment writers including Robertson, Grotius, Rousseau, Pope, Raynal, Mably, Burlamaqui, and Vattel. All in all, during the period of constitution writing the Enlightenment and Whig authors were cited about equally as a group, with the references to the Whigs spread over about three times as many authors. There is no Whig author to compare with Montesquieu for sheer volume or dominance of the category. Indeed, Montesquieu is almost without peer during the founding era for prominence, except for Blackstone.

Blackstone is the second most prominent secular writer during the founding era. He is cited well over two and a half times as often as Locke. Whereas Locke's pattern is toward relative prominence early during the founding era, falling off after the 1770s, Blackstone's pattern is that of increasing frequency of citation after the 1770s to achieve prominence late in the founding era. Hume follows a similar pattern. Both Blackstone and Hume are strong on governmental process and the operation and interaction of institutions. There is a certain logic, then, in their becoming prominent during the portion of the founding era when the operation, adjustment, and evolution of political institutions becomes of greater concern than their design. This is not to say that the matters of foundation and institutional design are never discussed by Blackstone and Hume, since they are. And the two are cited in this regard during the early years of the founding era. These two also become vehicles for extending Locke's visibility indirectly. Blackstone himself cites Locke a number of times, and certain of his institutional and procedural concepts seem to be grounded in Locke insofar as they are congruent with Locke's principles, or logically implied by Locke. Hume, on the other hand, was one of Locke's most severe critics. To a certain extent his work is in opposition to Locke and can be viewed as running contrary to some of the implications contained in Locke's writing.

There does not seem to be at this time any basis for explaining the pattern followed by citations to

This table is limited to those who were cited at least 32 times, which is 1% of the total of 3,154 citations. The extra decimal point in the last column is to allow more precise recovery of the number of citations over the era, whereas all other percentages are rounded off to the nearest whole number to ease the viewing of the table. The use of 0% indicates fewer than .5% of the citations for a given decade.

Table 3. Ordering of Most Cited Thinkers, 1760-1805

	· · · · (%)		(%)
1. Montesquieu	8.3	19. Shakespeare	.8
2. Blackstone	7.9	20. Livy	.8
3. Locke	2.9	21. Pope	.7
4. Hume	2.7	22. Milton	.7
5. Plutarch	1.5	23. Tacitus	.6
6. Beccaria	. 1.5	24. Coxe	.6
7. Trenchard & Gordon	1.4	25. Plato	.5
8. Delolme	1.4	26. Abbé Raynal	.5
9. Pufendorf	1.3	27. Mably	.5
10. Coke	1.3	28. Machiavelli	.5
11. Cicero	1.2	29. Vattell	.5
12. Hobbes	1.0	30. Petyt	.5
13. Robertson	. 9	31. Voltaire	.5
14. Grotius	.9	32. Robison	.5
15. Rousseau	.9	33. Sidney	.5
16. Bolingbroke	.9	34. Somers	.5
17. Bacon	.8	35. Harrington	.5
18. Price	.8	36. Rapin	.5

<sup>\*</sup>Includes all thinkers cited at least sixteen times (.5% out of the total number of 3,154 citations). These 36 names account for 47.8% of all citations.

Pufendorf and Coke during the era. The classics are cited rather consistently, although there is a sharp drop toward the end of the founding era. The category "Peers" is a bit of a misnomer; about a fifth of these citations concern Americans dead by the time they were cited, although all but a few wrote during the 1700s. The term "Peers" is used instead of "Americans" because during the 1760s almost all of the citations in this category are to members of the English Parliament or to articles and essays written by men in England. After 1770, about a third of the references are to documents such as a state constitution or a resolution passed by a state legislature. There is not one of prominence among those cited, in the sense that no one is cited very often. Benjamin Franklin gets a few references, as do Thomas Paine and

Thomas Jefferson, but it is a very diverse category.

### The Pattern of Citations from 1787 to 1788

Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the pattern of citations surrounding the debate on the U.S. Constitution. The items from which the citations for these two tables are drawn come close to exhausting the literature written by both sides. The Bible's prominence disappears, which is not surprising since the debate centered upon specific institutions about which the Bible had little to say. The Anti-Federalists do drag it in with respect to basic principles of government, but the Federalists' inclination to Enlightenment rationalism is most evident here in their failure to consider the Bible

Table 4. Distribution of Citations: Federalist Versus Antifederalist

, .	Federalist (%)	Antii	federalist (%)		Total for 1780s (%)
Bible	0	-	9		34
Enlightenment	34		38		24
Whig	23	•	29		19
Common Law	8	· C	12		/ ġ
Classical .	33	,	`9 `	Ţ 1 -	10
Peers	1 .		2	, .	3.
Other	1	*	1		1
•	100	ī	100		100
N	164	3	364	-	1306

Table 5. Twenty Most Cited Thinkers: Federalist Versus Antifederalist

	Federalist (%)	Antifederalist (%)	Total for 1780s (%)
Montesquieu	29	25	14
Blackstone	7	9	7
Locke	0	3	` 1
Hume	, <b>3</b>	· 1	1
Phytarch	7	0	1
Beccaria	<b>o</b> .	4	3
Trenchard & Gordon	2 .	2	3
Delolme	0	<sup>-</sup> 6	· 3
Pufendorf	0	1	1
Coke	0	1	1
Cicero	. 0	1	1
Robertson	0	0 .	1
Licurgus	6	1	1
Mably	7 .	2	` 2
Grotius	5	0	1
Temple	· 5	1	ī
Price '	0	2	1
Addison	0	2	.5
Vattel	Ö	1	.5
Sidney	1	Ō	.5 .5 5 _
	72	62	44.5
Other	28	38	55.5
•	100	100	100.0
N	164	364	1306

relevant. Surprisingly, both sides use Enlightenment and Whig authors in about the same proportion.

Montesquieu is almost twice as prominent during the debate over the national Constitution as he is for the decade as a whole, and three to threeand-a-half times as prominent as he is for the entire era. Grotius and Mably are the only other Enlightenment figures mentioned prominently by the Federalists, whereas the Anti-Federalists use Delolme, Beccaria, Mably, Price, Vattel, Pufendorf, and Locke to their advantage. Among Whig writers, the Federalists favor Trenchard and Gordon, Temple, and Sidney, whereas the Anti-Federalists favor Price, Addison, and Trenchard and Gordon about equally. Despite these differences, the most interesting finding is how similar the Federalists and Anti-Federalists are in their citation patterns. Not only do we not find the Federalists inclined toward Enlightenment writers and the Anti-Federalists away from them. the Federalists sometimes cite Enlightenment writers while attacking them. For example, there is a lot of arguing against Montesquieu's dictum that republics must be small and homogeneous if they are to survive, while the Anti-Federalists cite Montesquieu with approval on this point.

The debate surrounding the adoption of the

Constitution was fought out mainly in the context of Montesquieu, Blackstone, the English Whigs, and major writers of the Enlightenment. The Federalists also have a third of their references to classical thinkers, while the Anti-Federalists have an average level of such citations. The classical thinkers provided exemplars of practices, leaders, and behavior—often negative ones—but generally were not drawn upon for concepts, terms, and institutional analyses that are most appropriate to such a debate. Hence the Federalists cited most heavily Plutarch, not Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero.

#### Conclusions

There is hardly an historian or political scientist working in this area who would be surprised by the presence of Montesquieu in the citations, but his prominence turns out to be so great, and his appeal so wide across all factions, it is surprising that so little beyond Spurlin (1940) has been written about him in the American context. It is time to consider as carefully the influence of Montesquieu on specific political texts as we have sought the influence of Locke.

The prominence of Blackstone would come as a surprise to many, and he is the prime candidate for the writer most likely to be left out in any list of influential European thinkers. His work is not readily available in inexpensive form, but like Montesquieu he was cited frequently by all sides. A trenchant reference to Blackstone could quickly end an argument. Such a respected writer deserves a much closer look by those studying American political thought.

There is good reason to treat Locke's influence with greater care. Even though the motto Locke et praeterea nihil as it applies to eighteenth-century American political thought has been thoroughly discredited by historians, there is probably still a tendency to overestimate his importance. Furthermore, the Locke we read today was not the Locke generally read then. Today we are likely to read his Second Treatise, whereas during the founding era Americans were much more likely to read An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. References to Locke's Second Treatise often indicate a relative lack of understanding—as if they are relying more upon general hearsay that upon a direct reading. Indeed, Lundberg and May (1976) demonstrate that the two treatises had only about one-third the availability of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding from the libraries and booksellers of the era. The availability of the Second Treatise about matches that of Addison's Evidences of the Christian Religion, Pope's Essay on Man, or Wollaston's The Religion of Nature Delineated. There is no question that Locke was important for American political thought, but he needs to be placed in context and his influence more carefully assessed.

There is evidence that Hume should be considered about equal in influence to Locke, and that Hume is more important for theory surrounding the writing of constitutions when it comes to content. The Hume read then is also not the Hume we are likely to read today. Citations to his work come overwhelmingly from The History of England rather than from his Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects or his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. There is no doubt that his Essays and Treatises was highly influential on some Federalist minds, however, such as Madison's and Hamilton's, and the availability of this work precisely matched that of Locke's two treatises. Hume deserves a much more careful look. Beyond this, we need to pay more attention to a whole host of Enlightenment, Whig, and Common Law theorists. The 36 names listed in Table 3 are all possible candidates.

It is interesting that the writers of the so-called Scottish Enlightenment—Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and Adam Ferguson—are, with only one exception, not very prominent among the citations. In the case of Hume, we may today read him as a member of such a category, but Bailyn and others are

probably correct when they say that Americans during the founding era often saw him as an exponent of Whig republicanism, or else as a covert Tory.

Finally, the patterns of influence apparently varied over time. The current literature is not sensitive to this possibility, and too often a close textual analysis of one or two documents written in, say, 1776 or 1788, allows the establishment of one European author's influence to stand for the entire era. We need to consider the extent to which the debate surrounding the adoption of the U.S. Constitution reflected different patterns of influence than did the debates surrounding the writing and adoption of the state constitutions, or the Revolutionary writing surrounding the Declaration of Independence. Examining more carefully the differences and similarities in such patterns should lead us to a firmer understanding of the intellectual divisions within American political thought at the time, divisions that increasingly appear to be more complex than is usually credited in recent political science literature.

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# Communications

# Updating Political Periods and Political Participation

TO THE EDITOR:

We demonstrated in a recent article (Beck & Jennings, 1979) that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the relationships between age and participation and between ideology and participation varied considerably over time. Part of the supporting data used in our analysis came from the election studies series collected by the SRC/CPS of the University of Michigan. In this note we update this analysis to include the results from the 1980 election study.

We turn first to the association between age and campaign activities. The campaign participation index was constructed in the same fashion as previously and is based on the sum of five different types of activities. A comparison with previous years (Figure 1) demonstrates three significant points. First, our contention that the age-participation nexus is a variable one receives further confirmation. The 1980 results depart considerably from the 1976 and 1972 patterns, especially with respect to the relative ordering of the three youngest cohorts and the distances separating them. The overall 1980 results are much more in accord with those from 1968 and before.

A second, related point is that the 1980 results highlight even more the exceptional character of the 1972 campaign. Whereas the participation rate for the youngest cohort in 1980 trails that of the second youngest—as was the case for all of the pre-1972 distributions—the young cohort in 1972 had an extraordinarily high activity rate. This is highlighted by its slump in 1976 to near-normal levels.

A third interesting facet of the 1980 results is the upsurge in participation by the aged. Their absolute participation is fluid over time, although in all years they have the lowest absolute rate. But the nadir of their exertions came in 1972, concomitant with the zenith achieved by the very young. The forces that attracted and mobilized the young may have been the same ones that repelled and immobilized the old. By 1976 the elderly had regained their lost ground, moving to the absolute participation levels they attained in 1956 and 1964. The 1980 rate for the old is exceeded only by the level reached in 1960. Moreover, although the national average in 1980 fell below that of 1972 and barely exceeded that of

1976, the average gain for the elderly was approximately 50%.


It is tempting to attribute the gain among the old to a "Reagan effect." The presence of an aged, attractive candidate in 1980 could have supplied an extra incentive for the older voters. The fact that the elderly gave a disproportionate share of their vote to Reagan compared with other cohorts and with the 1976 GOP vote is at the least suggestive. In addition, whereas 67% of the aged fell on the conservative side of our ideology index (see below), the same was true of only 46% of the 21-to-30-year-olds. Finally, it is probably no coincidence that the 1980 activity level of the youngest cohort was their lowest in absolute terms since 1956—a year of abnormally low activity overall. Inferentially, the presence of candidates with personal qualities and campaign appeals to different segments of the age structure appears to affect their campaign mobilization.

The second argument advanced in our earlier report was that the linkage between political ideology and campaign activity is also variable. Before 1968, conservatives campaigned more intensively than did liberals, thus giving rise to the conventional wisdom about the conservative bias of participation in America. Beginning in 1968, however, the old pattern was disturbed. By 1972 ideological liberals outcampaigned conservatives by far. To assess the relationship in 1980 we recreated the liberal-conservative issue index used for previous years, although the mix of issues is somewhat different from that used in 1976 (Beck & Jennings, 1979, pp. 745-746).

As Figure 2 shows, strong liberals continued to be the most active ideological stratum, increasing their advantage over conservatives from the slim lead held in 1976, although falling far short of their spectacular lead in 1972. The 1980 configuration confirms our argument that the ideology-campaign activity link is not invariant and that the presumed conservative bias was a function of the particular nature of the 1956-1964 era.

However, we might have expected somewhat different outcomes in accordance with our secondary argument about the connection between the ideological fervor of the candidates' campaigns and the participation levels of the candidates' supporters. On its surface, the 1980 campaign appears to have been one in which the "right pole" of the participation opportunity structure was the more highly charged. Reagan was clearly the more

Figure 1. Campaign Activity by Age, 1956-1980



Source: Presidential Election Series, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.

glamorous and inspirational candidate (Kinder & Abelson, 1981). The excitement of the campaign lay in his camp rather than in the defensive and often dispirited Carter camp. Thus we might have expected to see an upsurge in the activity levels of conservatives and perhaps a diminution on the part of liberals. All the more so because extraparty organizations on the right claimed to be mobilizing great hordes of heretofore inactive citizens.

Perhaps the special brand of conservatism espoused in 1980 needs to be considered. A peculiar feature of the 1980 campaign was the outspoken efforts on the part of such groups as the Moral Majority and the National Conservative Political Action Committee to mobilize conservative voters. Morality was often stressed, as in the instances of the abortion, welfare, and defense (anti-Russian) issues. We concentrate here on the possibility that the religious right was exceptionally successful in activating citizens with

conservative, fundamentalist religious beliefs. Two questions in the 1980 interview schedule dealt directly with religious fundamentalism: 1) whether one has had a "born-again" experience; and 2) whether one believes in the inerrancy of the Bible. In the analysis the responses were scored, as appropriate, from non-fundamentalist to fundamentalist in direction.

If the claims of the religious right are correct that there was a special sort of conservative upsurge in 1980, then the more fundamentalist individuals should have been more active than the less fundamentalist, other things being equal. The latter condition was met by examining the relationship between fundamentalism and campaign activity according to educational level among blacks and whites separately. Education was used

'These are questions U8 and U9 in the postelection survey.

as a control because it is the best and most reliably measured social predictor of participation and because it is also related (inversely) to fundamentalism. Race was selected because it is related to fundamentalism (blacks higher), and because the corollaries of participation are somewhat different for blacks and whites. Campaign activity was gauged by the standard activity index, which excludes voting; because of the emphasis placed on turnout by the extra-party groups, vote turnout was used as a second indicator.

Altogether there are 24 comparisons to be made—two indicators of political activity × two measures of fundamentalism × three educational categories × two races. In only one of these comparisons did fundamentalism have a statistically significant effect on activity (at the .05 level).<sup>2</sup> Paradoxically, fundamentalism tended to have a


more positive impact, modest though it was, on blacks than on whites. Given the overwhelming tendency of blacks to support the usually more liberal Democratic candidates, the higher participation rates inspired by appeals to their religious fundamentalism can scarcely have been considered a blessing by the Moral Majority. Based only on our examination of the 1980 results, it is difficult to argue that the religious right was exceptionally activated in 1980.

In sum, our primary contention about the variable nature of the relationships between age and participation and ideology and participation is supported by the 1980 results. Our secondary contention that differential mobilization is based on the seeming discrepancies in ideological fervor offered by presidential contenders is not sup-

<sup>2</sup>Among blacks with a high school education, 76% of those who viewed the Bible as "God's word and all it

says is true" reported voting in the election as compared with 54% in the next category.

Figure 2. Campaign Activity by Political Ideology, 1956-1980



Source Presidential Election Series, Conter for Political Studies, University of Michigae,

ported. Based on the analysis of the *direction* of the 1980 vote (Markus, 1982), it seems possible that candidate evaluations may have played a key role in mobilization.

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# Comment on Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder (Vol. 76, December 1982, pp. 848-858)

#### TO THE EDITOR:

I applaud the intent of Shanto Iyengar, Mark D. Peters, and Donald R. Kinder's December 1982 article, "Experimental Demonstrations of the 'Not-so-Minimal' Consequences of Television News Programs." I agree that political communication research has too long neglected the unique ability of experimental methods to isolate and probe specific hypotheses about behavior. Nevertheless, conclusions reached in controlled experimental settings should be extrapolated to the world outside the laboratory only with the greatest caution. I fear that Iyengar and his colleagues may be interpreting their results with too much enthusiasm.

Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder report that subjects who viewed four network newscasts reedited to "provide sustained coverage of a certain national problem" were more likely than unexposed subjects to identify the problem as an important national issue (1982, p. 850). These findings, they proclaim, "decisively sustain Lippmann's suspicion that media provide compelling descriptions of a public world that people cannot directly experience. We have shown that . . . television news programs profoundly affect which problems viewers take seriously" (p. 855).

The design they use to come to these conclusions is elegant in its simplicity. Subjects visited

their laboratory on six consecutive days. On the first and sixth days, the subjects completed questionnaires measuring various political attitudes. On the days in between, they watched the modified network newscasts—basically the preceding day's broadcast, with the addition of one or more stories from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive emphasizing a particular problem. The investigators report the substantial differences between attitudes on day 1 and day 6 as effects of viewing the altered news programs.

These experiments are forceful evidence that television can significantly influence public opinion. But do they "decisively sustain" a "profound" effect outside the laboratory? I'm not convinced.

The problem with this elegant simplicity is that it is too simple. The Iyengar group's subjects received a much more powerful stimulus than the typical viewer at home—a stimulus with unusually concentrated viewing time and focused subject matter. Iyengar and his colleagues have shown that hitting the public over the head with a two-by-four changes attitudes, at least in the short term. They haven't shown that significant, enduring change occurs when the catalyst is as diffuse as it often really is.

In the first place, most people don't catch the network news faithfully night after night, as these subjects did. Only 38% of the 1980 National Election Study's traditional time-series sample said they watched network newscasts every evening (Table 1), and these responders were disproportionately older and black. Six out of 10 Americans do watch at least three network news programs weekly, but 20% see the network news less than once a week.

Second, few real-life stories receive as much attention as these investigators devoted to their experimental stimulus—three to six minutes four nights running, including at least two pieces four minutes or longer (about one-sixth of an average

Table 1. Frequency of Network News Viewing

How often do you watch the national network news on TV?

Every evening	38%
Three or four times a week	24
Once or twice a week	18
Less often or never	20
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	100%
N	1363
Missing cases	45
Sample size	1408

Source: 1980 National Election Study (C<sub>3</sub>C<sub>3PO</sub>).

network newscast, minus commercials). It is worth noting that Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder apparently had to ransack several months of broadcasts to collect the segments they telescoped into four days.

With such extraordinary parameters, it is possible that Iyengar and his colleagues are talking about exceptions, not the rule of how television news affects public opinion. Consequently, I feel uncomfortable projecting their findings beyond the very short term. One wonders if their results might have been quite different if the viewings had been more widely dispersed in time and if attitude change hadn't been measured so soon after the final session.

Only the lunatic fringe of believers in "minimal consequences" ever argued that the media have no impact at all on what the public thinks about; even Lazarsfeld and Merton recognized that the media can confer status on (read "add to the agenda") individuals and ideas. The issue, it seems to me, is not whether or not television news contributes to the political agenda, but under what conditions it does so. Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder have identified one way we can work to answer that question, but haven't supplied an answer that we should take as definitive—at least not yet.

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CBS Inc.1

#### Reference

Iyengar, S., Peters, M. D., & Kinder, D. R. Experimental demonstrations of the "not-so-minimal" consequences of television news programs. American Political Science Review, 1982, 76, 848-858.

'The views expressed here are solely my own.

Comment on Russett (Vol. 76, December 1982, pp. 767-777)

TO THE EDITOR:

Bruce Russett's "Defense Expenditures and National Well-Being" examined the effect that changes in military spending have had on federal expenditures for health and education. He "could find no regular pattern of trade-offs in the data for the last four decades of American history" (1982, pp. 775-776). Russett's conclusion is based solely on the hypothesized statement of a specific relationship between military expenditures and expenditures for health and education. Why does the perception of trade-offs exist, given his persuasive findings?

Russett focuses on federal outlays. However, the political process directs relatively little attention to outlays per se; the bulk of political capital is invested in the budgetary process, which is in essence a conflict between Congress' and the president's budget priorities. Ensuing outlays more often than not represent compromises (trade-offs) between the president and Congress.

Therefore, to examine merely the endproduct of the debate, federal outlays, may obscure real trade-offs between Congress and the executive. I suggest that the trade-offs occur during the budgetary process where, given the constraint of limited available resources, the president proposes spending levels, based on his policy priorities, and Congress adjusts the numbers based on their priorities. Republican presidents seek to enlarge defense spending at the expense of social programs; Democratic presidents attempt to increase social spending at the expense of military outlays. Congress, in the absence of drastic changes in its political complexion (both houses majority democratic, 1955-1980) will attempt to maintain existing programs and federal levels. Therefore, Republican presidents are likely to be continually frustrated in their defense budget requests, getting less than asked for, whereas Democratic presidents are likely to lose on social spending. Conversely, Congress is likely to appropriate more money for social programs than republican presidents request and higher levels of defense spending than Democrats want. It is this pattern of adjustment-readjustment in the budgetary process that leads to the general perception that to increase social spending, defense outlays must be reduced, and vice versa. Some additional data examined here offer an alternative perspective on the trade-off question.

Table 1 shows the relationship between the president's budget estimates of expenditures and the subsequent federal outlays for both military spending and HEW expenditures for the federal fiscal years 1954-1980. Estimates represent the difference between what the president hopes to get (estimates) and what he actually does get (outlays), expressed as a percentage of outlays. Negative numbers indicate that a president received more money than he asked for; positive numbers mean less money than estimated.

For 19 of the 27 years in question, defense and HEW relative estimates had opposite signs; when a president underestimated defense expenditures, he overestimated HEW expenditures, and vice versa. Thus, slightly more than 70% of the time, the hypothesized trade-off between military and civilian expenditures occurs, not in the actual expenditures, but in the relationship between the estimates and the expenditures. Moreover, from 1973 to 1979 a consistent pattern of overestimat-

Table 1. Presidential Budget Estimate Errors<sup>a</sup>

Fiscal Year	Pr <del>esi</del> dent	Defense	Social Security, Health, Education, Welfar
1954	Eisenhower	-0.4	14.7
1955		9.1	-29.0
1956		-0.9	-16.9
1957	•	-0.4	. 0.7
1958		-1.2	2.6
1959		-1.3	<b>-17.6</b>
1960		0.4	-6.5
1961		4.0	7.7
1962	Kennedy	<b>-7.3</b>	5.8
1963	-	-0.2	6.5
1964		2.2	1.8
1965	Johnson	7.6	-1.7
1966		-10.6	3.3
1967	•	-12.4	-2.0
1968		-4.6	7.1
1969		-1.7	<b>4.9</b>
1970	Nixon	1.5	-3.2
1971		-5.3	-6.9
1972		-1.0	<b>-6.5</b>
1973		3.0	-11.1
1974	•	3.2	-2.6
1975	Ford	1.3	-7.3
1976		4.4	-8.8
1977		3.7	-2.4
1978	Carter	6.7	-1.4
1979		0.1	-0.1
1980		<b>-7.</b> 5	<b>−7.4</b>

<sup>\*</sup>Error = (estimate-actual)/(actual).

ing defense expenditures and underestimating civilian expenditures occurs. Given the general lack of historical memory in American politics, this seven-year run may have provided the basis for the Reagan administration's claims that tradeoffs in actual expenditures were required.

Table 2 gives us a second perspective on the question of trade-offs by showing the average direction of the presidential budget estimate

errors by political party. Only the second, third, and fourth years of presidency are examined. (The first year often represents a transition year that might mask underlying relationships.) The second fiscal year of a presidency is the first year in which the executive estimates fully reflect the current president's priorities. It is the year in which the largest differences between Congress and the presidency are likely to be seen as presidents

Table 2. Average Direction of Presidential Budget Estimate Errors by Party (1954-1980)

	Defense	Social Security, Health, Education, Welfare
Second Year		
Democrats	-11.5	4.9
Republicans	1.3	-15.2
Third Year		•
Democrats	-1.4	1.7
Republicans	0.7	-9.7
Fourth Year		,
Democrats	-0.8	9.9
Republicans	0.6	-1.3

attempt, but largely fail, to redirect national priorities. In subsequent years, presidents tend to moderate their positions somewhat, creating slightly more convergent behavior. The results in Table 2 lend support to this perspective. Republican presidents have had a tendency to overestimate defense spending and underestimate civilian spending; the Democratic presidents have on average done just the opposite. It appears the executive, regardless of party, perceives that attempts to enhance one type of spending are made at the expense of the other. Which type of spending is underestimated depends on the party affiliation of the president, which I presume, to some extent reflects ideology.

Why does the perception of trade-offs exist? Presidents in their estimates of expenditures have fairly consistently overestimated the need for one type of spending and underestimated the need for the other. Congress, maintaining an incremental approach, has adjusted these priorities, acting as a moderating force. I have only dealt here with relative directions of change which in the strictest sense is what trade-offs concern. Trade-off magnitudes vary considerably and may be influenced by many of the factors Russett suggests. Although the precise nature of this relationship has yet to be fully delineated (and subsequent models examined) this, in part, may account for the widely held view that to increase social spending, reductions in defense spending must occur.

LANCE BROUTHERS

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Comment on Searing (Vol. 76, June 1982, pp. 239-258)

TO THE EDITOR:

Although Donald D. Searing reports an excellent and significant study of "British politicians' thinking about constitutional topics" (p. 239), the article stresses the weakest findings. As Searing says, the unwritten British Constitution consists of "rules of the game," such as the supremacy of Parliament. Searing investigated support among members of Parliament for the "rules of the game," for example, agreement that "there should be no limitations on Parliament's power to make or unmake any law whatsoever."

As Searing briefly states, the major findings are that there was a consensus on "rules of the game," that no group consistently opposed constitutional norms, and that absence of support was largely unpatterned (p. 243). Such solid empirical support for our prior expectations is most welcome. Curiously, the article stresses another,

weaker finding of differences between Labour and Conservative MPs. As shown by Searing's Table 5, party differences of 19% or more occur for 7 of the 26 questions (one difference of 17% is misprinted as 27%). A glance at the questionnaire and coding procedure (Appendix) suggests that the party differences are tied to invalid measurements.

For four of the seven questions with party differences, support for "rules of the game" is measured by support for *changes* in current practices.

The Opposition should have better resources for factual briefing and information. (Support is "agree.")

The concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister has gone too far. (Support is "agree.")

There should be greater opportunities for Members to question Ministers publicly on the affairs of their Departments. (Support is "agree.")

In a world as complicated as the modern one, it doesn't make sense to speak of increased control by ordinary citizens over Governmental affairs. (Support is "disagree.")

The measurements cannot be valid. Searing equates support for "rules of the game" with the perception that the Conservative Government was violating the Constitution. Most Conservative MPs supported change on two of the items (54%, 75%), yet continued to support the Government. Either they did not see the rules as a higher law above partisanship or they did not see the changes as involving the "rules of the game"—in either case, their apparent support is misleading. Similar problems occur in the interpretation of responses of other Members. Support for these changes cannot be equated to support for the "rules of the game."

Additionally, these questions are ambiguous. They do not state a clear rule, relying instead on direction and comparison: "better," "too far," "greater," and "increased." Support for a direction of change is not the same as support for a specific standard. Ambiguity plagues the other questions as well.

Ministers should be prepared to reveal to Parliament virtually all information on their Department's affairs. (Support is "agree.")

The question text itself demonstrates the difficulty of posing the constitutional issue, as it relies on "virtually," "affairs," and "prepared" in lieu of a standard. Two MPs with the same attitude might provide different responses: "Agree (although of course not in situation X): and "Disagree (not in situation X)."

The strength and efficiency of a Government are more important than its specific policies. (Support is "disagree.")

No action or arrangement is even mentioned in the question, so no rule can be inferred. Searing subsumes this question under norms for the "role of the electorate," which in turn is identified with "majority rule" and "responsiveness to public opinion" (p. 241). Perhaps the argument is that the British electorate is indifferent to weakness, ineptitude, and scandal in Government, hence these characteristics should not affect its power. Regardless of the argument, the question ambiguity precludes reliable inferences about support for "rules of the game."

When questions are ambiguous, respondents rely on attitudes to one of the objects mentioned in the question text to cue their responses. As Searing points out, party differences on these items correspond both to a difference in "partisan advantage" and to a difference in "political values." Labour members benefit from "greater" opportunities to question Conservative Ministers and might also support corresponding opportunities for Conservatives, if Labour were in power. Hence we would expect party differences on these questions if no "rules of the game" were involved. When ideals and self-interest converge, attitudes correspond. As the questions are ambiguous on the rules and as the assumption that support for the rules is directly tapped is logically or empirically insupportable, the party differences appear to reflect the perceived absence of a constitutional issue.

The final difference is the largest one, between Searing, on the one hand, and considerable maiorities of both Labour and Conservative MPs, on the other hand. The Members agreed that "it is not dangerous, but essential that the Government reach its policy decisions in private." However, to Searing, support for the British Constitution requires a "disagree." If it were a constitutional rule, the standard of public decision making would have to cover all cases, rendering superfluous some of the other rules, briefings, and questions, for examples. Even a "disagree" response does not indicate support for such a rule, indicating merely that there may be situations in which privacy is not "essential." All we know is that Labour members were somewhat more likely than Conservative members to have such situations in mind in answering the question; we do not know how many of these would support a rule of publicized decision making (although I think that zero would be a fairly accurate prediction). Note that what Searing had in mind—which may be eminently defensible—is irrelevant: interpretation depends on what the members were thinking.

None of the questions showing sizable party differences validly measures support for the "rules of the game." These questions, after a "final step" of adding "item values within sets in order to construct the new variables" (p. 242), provide the basis for the article's analysis of party differences. Correlations, principal components, value and subgroup analyses are merely ways of restating and rearranging the percentages, hence are no more valid than the underlying percentages. When the questions are clearly valid, as in the case of "supremacy of Parliament," party differences are negligible. The stress on the weaker findings based on the error-prone measures obscures the more significant and trustworthy confirmation of our prior expectations.

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#### Forthcoming in June

Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, "The Political Reliability of Italian Governments: An Exponential Survival Model"

Harold D. Clarke, Allan Kornberg, and Marrianne C. Stewart, "Parliament and Political Support in Canada"

Michael D. Cohen, "Conflict and Complexity: Goal Diversity and Organizational Search Effectiveness"

Richard L. Cole and David A. Caputo, "The Public Hearing as an Effective Citizen Participation Mechanism: A Case Study of the General Revenue Sharing Program"

Gregory W. Fischer and Mark S. Kamlet, "Explaining Presidential Priorities: The Competing Aspiration Levels Model of Macrobudgetary Decision Making"

Lawrence LeDuc, Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, and Jon H. Pammett, "Partisan Instability in Canada: Evidence from a New Panel Study"

Russell J. Leng, "Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record"

Michael MacKuen, "Exposure to Information, Belief Integration, and Individual Responsiveness to Agenda Change"

Kenneth J. Meier and Robert E. England, "Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?"

Clifford Orwin, "The Just and the Advantageous in Thucydides: The Case of the Mytilenaian Debate"


Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, "Political Solutions to Market Problems"

Michael Don Ward, "Differential Paths to Parity: A Study of the Contemporary Arms Race"

## Erratum

In "Pluralism and Social Choice" by Nicholas R. Miller (Vol. 77, pp. 734-747), the correct labelling was inadvertently omitted from Figure 1. The correct figure appears below.

Figure 1.



## **BOOK REVIEWS**

## American Government and Politics

Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change. By Paul R. Abramson. (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983. Pp. xxiv + 353. \$14.95, paper.)

This book is an attempt to bridge the gap between a text and a research monograph reporting on personal research. Much of the material deals with somewhat arcane issues, such as whether lifecycle or generational changes best account for noted changes in attitudes and behavior and the Citrin-Miller debate, couched here as a debate over the Eastonian community, regime, and authorities distinctions. Students would be more attracted to the several chapters devoted to survey research and problems of question wording.

This is a current and thorough compilation of Abramson's work, with extensive citation from this perspective on what is happening to the American electorate in presidential elections since 1960. Three variables are treated exhaustively: participation in voting for president, identification with a polical party, and the trust/efficacy attitudinal complex. Three chapters are devoted to each concept: one on the development of the concept with extensive literature citation, one on its formation in youth, and one on changes among adults. Finally, there are chapters on tolerance, issue conceptualization, and the interrelationship between party identification and trust/efficacy changes and change in voting for president. Less ardent identification with political parties and the growing convictions that "officials don't care" and that people "don't have any say" are seen to largely account for the decline of voting for president. Although further implications of these views are discussed in the introduction and conclusion, no empirical evidence is offered.

Abramson limits his generalizations in the conclusion to the datedness of the findings in *The American Voter* (Wiley, 1960) and the importance of studying generational change. In the introduction, however, he quotes others, such as Curtis Gans, who in the *Washington Monthly* (October, 1978) wrote of Americans withdrawing consent from their leaders and the implications to democracy of such withdrawal. Certainly the case is not made in this book that the implications are particularly serious.

There are a number of problems even with the conclusion that less enthusiastic identification with political parties and increasing distrust efficacy account for participation decline. Many researchers have noted that the American electorate of the 1980s is much better educated than that in the 1960s, which given the strong tendency for the better educated to vote, should have greatly expanded participation. Introducing education change into consideration greatly complicates explanations. An additional complication comes from the fact that participation decline is neither much different between gubernatorial elections and national elections nor constant across states. Some states have shown very rapidly declining participation across elections and others, especially southern states, have shown increased participation. The orderliness of patterns shown by Abramson thus seemingly distort the actuality of our understanding of events.

NORMAN R. LUTTBEG

Texas A&M University

Television Coverage of the 1980 Presidential Campaign. Edited by William C. Adams. (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing, 1983. Pp. x + 197. \$24.50.)

Like Adams's other volumes on media content research, this collection contains suggestive and thought-provoking observations about media coverage of political affairs. While focusing largely on familiar subjects, most of the 10 studies contribute new interpretations or new insight based on the campaign of 1980.

Anthony Broh's perceptive essay emphasizes the media's interpretive responsibilities in communicating results of opinion polls within a political system that highlights the role of public opinion in the nominating process. The media "commission and create, as well as report, poll findings" (p. 34). These polls reinforce candidate images as well as respond to them.

Michael Robinson and Margaret Shehan illustrate concretely with well-defined examples their contention that the wire service "reports," but television "mediates," analyzes, and evaluates.

Robert Sahr terms energy a "non-issue" in 1980 because it was used mainly as a campaign vehicle or a measure of candidate consistency over time. Joe Foote and Tony Rimmer observe that interviews and network anchor reports comprise one-half the national convention coverage.

Thomas Marshall establishes that three television networks and two national newspapers gave similar media attention to a key group of primaries, the results being a "homogeneous" picture of the nominating process. He develops a quantitative measure for "the verdict" of the media on each candidate. Diagrams show the verdict's relation to public opinion during the primary season.

Adams also expresses media effect in quantitative terms. He expands our understanding of elections since 1960 by discussing seven elements of media content; these help determine differences in media messages from television or newspaper. Then, using individual-level data from the Survey Research Center (SRC) in conjunction with his content analyses, Adams attempts to establish a comparative measure of media effect. He crosstabulates voting behavior with answers to the SRC question, "What source do you rely on most for information about the campaign?"

Curiously, Adams's method violates his own warning that "confusing unique power with shared power can distort the entire subject of media impacts" (p. 163). He assumes that the respondents' answers to the media-reliance question can be used to measure the distinctive effect of television or print. The SRC surveys contain a second question, "Does the respondent watch news about the campaign on television or read about it in the newspaper?" In 1980, 90% of the voting respondents (85% of the total) reported watching campaign news on television: 79% reported reading campaign news in the newspaper. Adams must recognize that a large proportion of voting respondents are both television watchers and newspaper readers, despite their choices in the media-reliance question. His effort to separate the impact of one medium is less satisfying than other parts of the volume.

Robert Meadow's incisive analysis of the Carter-Reagan debate centers on its unspontaneous, rehearsed nature. He accuses the media of being "co-conspirators in the debate ritual" (p. 93) which is no more than an opportunity for candidates to offer "prepared remarks of the whistlestop variety under the guise of a debate" (p. 91).

In the following essay Thomas Benson analyzes references to the candidates' hidden motivations in Bruce Morton's story of the debates. He thus explains television's implicit communication theory which "may or may not be a source of wisdom" (p. 113). Meadow, from another per-

spective, cites this televised story as the only report to mention the repetition of themes in the debate which Meadow located by word processor.

Describing solutions proposed in the early election-night projection controversy, Paul Wilson illustrates its almost unsolvable nature. Changing forms of election machinery have made the networks dependent on exit polls, a super-fast method for projection of winners.

The bibliographical information at the end of each chapter will be useful to scholars in this interdisciplinary field. The book is a distinct contribution to the growing body of literature on the media and American elections.

MARGARET K. LATIMER

Auburn University

The Individual vs. The Public Interest: Political Ideology and National Forest Policy: By Richard M. Alston. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 250. \$20.00.)

Alston asserts that the goal of his book is "to stimulate readers to challenge existing policy prescriptions, and to engage in productive debate on the role of public and private forestry in the nation's forest management policy" (p. xii). I believe the author will stimulate those who read this book; however, the real challenge embodied in this book is directed at everyone who analyzes public policies and public policymaking.

The design of Alston's book implicitly challenges all public policy analysts to go beyond abstract normative theories and narrow technical approaches to policy studies. The book avoids these two extremes by combining an interpretation of the history of national forest policy, a discussion of recent legislation in this policy area. and a survey of social, political and economic philosophies that relate to forest policy. As the title of the book foreshadows, almost two-thirds of the book is devoted to the philosophic context of forest policy. Alston ranges over Plato, the Stoics, Martin Luther, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Hobbes, Hegel, Pareto, and many other philosophers in the Western tradition to delineate the beginnings of the ideological cleavage that he believes exists among those who debate, formulate, and implement forest policy. He sees a fundamental clash between those who emphasize individualism and those who emphasize the community (the public interest) in developing forest policy. The general theme of his philosophic overview is that we must realize that this dichotomy is traditional and inevitable, but we must avoid developing ideological ruts based on individualistic and communitarian impulses. Alston

believes the richness of the philosophizing that has preceded our era provides us with a resource for extricating ourselves from the current ideological routines.

In the current forest policy debates, Alston sees a continuation of the clash between private regarding and public regarding approaches. He identifies the three main interest groups stemming from this fundamental clash as the economists, the foresters, and the preservationists. The economists stress individual freedom in a market economy, the foresters demand professional management of the forest as a natural resource, and preservationists assert that nature's interest is an integral part of the public interest of human society.

Alston sees these three conflicting viewpoints converging on the question of the role of the state (the federal government) in forest policy. Although there is no method available to reconcile the philosophical differences between these groups, Alston believes the forest planning process contained in the Resources Planning Act of 1976 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 provides a policymaking structure that will integrate the biological, social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions of forest policies and allow policymakers to transcend ideological postures while at the same time providing a forum for the ideological positions staked out by the three groups mentioned above. He believes the new integrated multiple use resource planning process will satisfy neither the individualists nor the communitarians but rather will recognize and accommodate the large bureaucratic organizations, public and private, that are needed to manage the forest policy process in the late twentieth century. Such large-scale organizations usher in a policymaking era in which the old shibboleths of individualism and communitarianism are more and more obsolete or irrelevant.

Alston is certainly not the first analyst to plot this line of analysis. However, I believe his book serves as a refreshing antidote for all of the atheoretical and ahistorical policy analyses that have been written. The primary weaknesses of the book are insufficient integration of the overview of philosophic traditions with contemporary forest policy dilemmas and the timidity of Alston's prescriptions for forest policy in the United States. The latter criticism may stem from my own desire for the comfort of the clashing of competing ideological ruts.

**CRAIG RAMSAY** 

Ohio Wesleyan University

The Logic and Limits of Trust. By Bernard Barber. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983. Pp. 190. \$27.50, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

In examining the concept of trust as a social phenomenon Bernard Barber has focused on a relationship of fundamental theoretical and practical importance to democracy. Barber, a sociologist by training, argues that trust results from individual expectations in a wide variety of social contexts and "has the general function of social ordering, of providing cognitive and moral expectational maps for actors and systems as they continuously interact" (p. 19). Barber is interested primarily in two specific forms of trust. These are the expectations, where the social system anticipates such behavior, that another will provide technically competent performance and that the other with which one interacts will perform the duties of fiduciary responsibility, i.e., place broader social interests above his or her narrow interests. Barber uses these definitions of trust to explain the expectations that appear to be developing regarding marriage, philanthropic foundations, public office, business, and the professions of medicine, law, accounting, science, and helping services.

With his discussion of political life, rational, or realistic, distrust becomes an important variable in Barber's approach. He argues that the portion of the public often seen as anathetic and alienated is instead expressing rational distrust of both the technical competence and fiduciary performance of their public leaders. Unfortunately Barber never convincingly presents a case for the existence of rational distrust among the politically inactive public. His major effort in this respect occurs in the chapter on politics where, without a single specific reference to any statement of theirs, Robert Dahl, David Easton, and Gabriel Almond are labelled "democratic elitists" who see the nonpolitical masses as "ignorant, alienated . . . or anomic" (p. 72, also pp. 88, 92, and 169). By so characterizing these political scientists without supporting evidence of any kind, Barber gives the appearance that he is erecting a straw man as a means of giving more credence to his realistic, or rational, distrust view of the masses, an impression that is reinforced by his failure to show that the segment of the public that appears disinterested in politics is anything more than that. His data, as presented here, are attenuated at best. One of the two studies that he utilizes heavily draws extensively on a comparison of populism in Kansas and reform in Birmingham, England, during the 1890s (p. 72). The other is an interpretation of survey research data that seems so general as to be of little value to Barber, as when

he quotes the "conclusion" that "the level of political alienation in the United States probably falls somewhere between 25% and 75%" (pp. 78-79). At another point he draws on an interpretation of an earlier interpretation of field research on teenagers (pp. 82, 84). It may be possible to show a widespread sense of realistic distrust of institutions among the masses, but Barber does not do so. And, given his treatment of political scientists and the importance of distrust to his perspective, it seems only fair to insist that he produce more convincing arguments and data on this point.

Despite these problems, Barber's book remains worth reading. He writes exceptionally well and makes consistent use of his definitions of trust to provide fresh perspectives on the social relationships that he examines. Political scientists interested in investigating such concepts as political obligation and legitimacy should find this book a useful beginning point for broadening their perspective and organizing their thoughts.

ROBERT A. HEINEMAN

Alfred University

Science Policy from Ford to Reagan: Change and Continuity. By Claude E. Barfield. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982. Pp. xvi + 142. \$13.95, cloth; \$5.95, paper.)

Federal expenditures for scientific research and technological development have been on the increase since the end of the Nixon White House years, a trend which the Reagan administration has continued. However, federal science policy has changed much since 1974. Claude E. Barfield chronicles the shifting priorities and spending patterns for science and technology in the past three administrations. Although the book does little to critique the Ford, Carter, or Reagan approaches to science policy, it is valuable nevertheless as a coherent report of emerging federal policies in four areas: basic research, space, defense, and energy.

Barfield's organizational and evaluative thesis is that Reagan administration policies for science and technology originated with President Ford's Issues '78, a document which set down a "thorough rationale for federal R&D policy in his last month in office" (p. 1). This rationale for increased expenditure for scientific research and development was also embodied by the Carter

administration, argues Barfield, thus providing the "continuity" in science policy referred to in the title.

But Reagan's campaign promises of decreased federal spending and regulation in all but defense matters have brought many changes in federal support for science. For instance, although the Reagan administration has increased expenditures for basic research, a greater proportion of that research is now done under the auspices of the Defense Department, rather than under the traditional aegis of the National Science Foundation or National Institute of Health. Barfield notes the obvious dangers of a defense-dominated basic research program, but concludes that there is "nothing sinister" about such a "strong role for the DOD in R&D" (p. 119). Many scientists and lay citizens would disagree strenuously with this assessment, particularly in light of the concomitant lessening of federal support for health-related research and science education programs.

What Barfield clearly admires in the Reagan science policy is its consistent adherence to the larger ideology of the administration concerning the role of government in American society and economics. The Reagan administration has replaced federal funding in many areas of research and development with incentives such as tax credits to industries that increase their role in research and development. This is in keeping with overall taxing and spending policies of the administration. But as Barfield points out, some administration actions, such as continued support for the Clinch River breeder reactor project, seem to contradict the fundamental administration bias against using federal money for large-scale technological demonstration and commercialization projects (pp. 114-115).

Continued support for the breeder is due largely to politics, as the project is sited in the home state of the Senate Majority Leader. Presidential politics being what they are, this is hardly surprising. What is surprising is how little Barfield discusses the political side of science policy decisions. This book treats such decision making as if the only relevant actors in science policymaking were the president and a few agency heads in the executive branch. One need only to pick up a newspaper and read about the latest controversy regarding nuclear power, the freeze, the disposal of hazardous waste, or any of a host of other issues, to realize that today most of politics is centered on science policy questions and vice versa. Ignoring the politics of science policy is not unique to Barfield's work of course; indeed, doing so has become something of an addiction for many who have made science policy their field of study. Unfortunately, Barfield's book does little to lessen the addictive power of the proposition

that policy for scientific research and development can be made outside of the realm of politics.

RICHARD P. HISKES

University of Connecticut

Being Governor: The View from the Office. Edited by Thad L. Beyle and Lynn R. Muchmore. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983. Pp. 234. \$29.75.)

The editors, who are also the principal contributors, rely heavily on questionnaire data, complemented primarily by interviews with 15 former governors, to characterize the several roles of the contemporary American governor. There are 18 chapters; many are less than 10 pages. The book is divided into assessments of the political, managerial, legislative, and structural roles of the governor.

Much of the narrative addresses the 39 tables that display questionnaire data. Thus, there is less texture to the writing style than in, for example, Alan Rosenthal's description of contemporary American state legislatures (Legislative Life, Harper & Row, 1981).

Being Governor should prove useful to teachers of state government. It should also be available in college libraries, for there are several chapters such as "A Day in the Life of a Governor," that would make good reserve desk assignments for state governments courses. In addition, candidates for governor and their prospective staffs would benefit from perusing the book, especially the several chapters that offer pithy lessons learned from former governors and their staff members. For example, staff members provide a list of "Thou shalt nots" for the appointment process: "Do not consult too widely: Do not delay, thereby letting pressures and expectations build; Do not let applicants or their supporters see the governor personally; ... " (p. 117).

There are excellent chapters in this uneven book. Robert Dalton's chapter, "Governors and Ethics," is valuable. It helps us to appreciate the ethical ambiguities of gubernatorial and staff decisions in a setting where varied favor exchanges provide a useful way to facilitate action.

Perhaps the most illuminating chapter is by Muchmore on the topic of science advice to governors. In addressing the question of where a science advisor or science advice should be located in the executive branch, Muchmore makes broader observations. The governor's office should be viewed as "a separate organization that is distinct from the bulk of the executive branch" (p. 183). The heavy and conflicting demands

placed on a governor cause most to become satisficers who will "expend time and effort to find an acceptable decision, but having done so will not commit additional resources to find an optimal decision" (p. 184).

The book displays the deficiencies associated with heavy reliance on questionnaire data. Did the governors respond for themselves, or did staff handle this assignment as well? And perceptions do not always represent reality. While two-thirds of the planning directors and budget officers indicated they would be involved in some way with decisions in reaction to a disaster, only 15% of governors' office staffs thought the planning and budgeting people would be involved (p. 178). This tells us much, but not who would be involved.

Nevertheless, *Being Governor* enhances our understanding of operations in the offices of American governors. The publisher is to be commended for yet another title in its policy studies series on state and local issues.

Beyle and Muchmore have a wealth of participant-observation experience with governors. One would hope they would now move from process to outcome questions critical to our beleagured governors and to the evolving federal system. Does executive reorganization really make a difference? Has the increase in executive branch capacity kept pace with increases in demands on governors? Can gubernatorial performance justify the increases in responsibilities imposed on the states in recent years?

JAMES D. NOWLAN

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Beyond the Wasteland: A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline. By Samuel Bowles, David M. Gordon, and Thomas E. Weisskopf. (New York: Doubleday, 1983. Pp. 465. \$17.95.)

This is an ambitious and formidable book. It attempts a comprehensive analysis of the current economic crisis in the U.S. which, the authors claim, can account for the productivity slowdown that has puzzled so many conventional economists. The authors go much further. They also develop, in considerable detail, a coherent set of proposals designed to show that "the trade-off between material security and a decent society is not a law of economics . . . [but] a veil of privilege" (p. 15). They contend that a democratic alternative is the "key to moving beyond the wasteland" (p. 15). In my view, the bold and ambitious project largely succeeds. Readers will

be rewarded with a multitude of insights and new directions to explore.

One of the strongest aspects of the book is the authors' sustained development of a social model of the economy that is grounded in these simple but often forgotten (by conventional and Marxist economists) truths: the "economy is people [and] its basic relationships are social relationships" (p. 5). The rejection of a mechanistic view of the economy is accomplished without sacrificing intellectual rigor or technical sophistication. One should in particular commend the authors for constructing novel measures that reflect the social categories they employ in their analysis. And while one can quibble with the inclusion of one or another factor in the measures, one has to appreciate their determination to not allow conventional accounting procedures to either limit their analysis or condemn them to abstract theorizing.

Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf begin their analysis by arguing that U.S. economic growth from 1948 to 1966 was built on three institutionalized power relations between U.S. capital and (1) foreign competitors and suppliers: (2) a large segment of the labor force; and (3) citizens, as mediated by the state. These potentially conflictridden relationships permitted profit-led growth because capital was either strong enough to suppress challengers (for example, internationally) or because it bought off certain groups (for example, unionized labor). Beginning in the mid-1960s, the contradictions inherent within each of these three social relationships began to erupt into overt challenges to U.S. corporate dominance. For example, foreign competitors began to penetrate the U.S. market, which, when combined with other developments, began to undermine corporate profitability. Labor, emboldened by historically low levels of unemployment and the cushioning effects of social programs, pushed hard for increased wages, improved working conditions, and lowered intensities of work. Multiple coalitions of citizens achieved legislative victories that constrained the actions of corporations. According to the authors, these challenges to corporate dominance explain the decline in productivity and profitability in the mid and late sixties.

The next 15 or more years have witnessed a twostage counterattack by capital. In the first stage (1973 to 1979) the primary objective was to weaken the power of labor. To that end management attempted to reassert control in the workplace by increasing supervision, speeding the work process, and by trying to frighten workers by actual and threatened capital mobility. At the societal level, the government engineered a deep recession to assist capital in their attack on labor.

However, while there were signs that labor was weakening, the forces of opposition had achieved

such strength in the postwar years that only a further, intensified attack on worker and citizen power could reestablish the conditions for corporate dominance (hence, the Reagan program). But, the authors point out, these kinds of solutions impose immense social costs, built as they are on rules favorable to business and full of so many contradictions. For example, the deep recession of the mid-seventies worked at the same time to increase productivity by frightening workers into intensified work effort and to decrease productivity by reducing capital investment because of the unutilized capacity. According to their estimates, the U.S. economy wasted some \$1.2 trillion in useful output in 1980.

Their solution builds on this simple premise: "it costs less to put people in charge than it does to keep them down" (p. 262). Hence, the authors propose a 24-point economic bill of rights and numerous policy proposals to empower citizens and eliminate demand- and supply-side waste. Although some will dismiss the proposals as utopian or too radical, they seem to me to be pragmatic, conceivably workable, and undogmatic. The authors detail the steps needed to get from here to there and are sensitive to the dangers of bureaucratic centralization. Indeed, the book is likely to be controversial not because it is too radical (although it is in the true sense of the word), but because among all the current blueprints for economic restructuring it is the only one unambiguously advocating more democracy as the essential ingredient of the solution.

LEON GRUNBERG

University of Puget Sound

The Limits and Possibilities of Congress. By Philip Brenner. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 206. \$15.95, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

The primary theme of Brenner's book is that Congress has fewer limits and greater possibilities than commonly assumed, although several other themes are also explored. Brenner takes a political economy approach to Congress and posits that environment (especially the ideology of the nation and its productive forces) is more important than member characteristics. Here he is on shakier ground; virtually no evidence is provided for such an assertion. There may be good reason why, as Brenner states, these "Marxist assumptions . . . do not enter traditional studies of Congress" (p. 17)

Brenner debunks constituency and other external and internal influences on legislative behavior and tries to discredit five assertions that he believes have dominated the literature: that con-

gressmen are parochial, primarily seek reelection, focus on personal interests, are concerned with internal power, and in some cases have public policy concerns. As Brenner states, some of these alleged traits are paradoxical.

The arguments in this book are provocative. but the analysis is flawed. The study contains many statements left uncited and unconfirmed by references to nonscholarly interpretations. Brenner relies upon three case studies that he feels illustrate the dominance of the Marxist interpretation. Two cases deal with substantive policy issues (relations with Cuba and restructuring higher education), while the third concerns general congressional reform. Although the cases do show Congress playing a major role in both domestic and foreign policy, little other rationale exists for their selection. Neither the Cuba nor the higher education case produces clear evidence of the dominance of international or external contexts. In fact, the opposite arguments could be made, and Brenner himself states that "in the case of a non-crisis issue . . . legislators tend to act only to serve personal and institutional as well as national interests" (p. 88). The discussion on reforms is a good overview of the literature and the nature of internal changes, but Brenner admits that reforms have had both centralizing (presumably external) and decentralizing (internal) features. He concludes from this very mixed bag that "self-interest does not explain the pattern of reforms" (p. 166).

Most of the data that form the bases of the case studies come from interviews. However, the procedure is very loose; no mention is made of an interview schedule or sampling procedures. Regarding the latter, Brenner has confused response rate with sample size (p. 52). The sample of 61 House members on the higher education case seems more representative.

The presentation of data is also perplexing. Frequently it is unclear why particular variables are examined (for example, class and member ideology in Table 5-3). While the data do not warrant sophisticated empirical tests, no assessment is made of the relative impact of any of the variables. Aggregate data on the economy and the nation's beliefs are notably missing; after all, these external explanations are supposed to be superior to member characteristics such as ideology. For example, does the public share Brenner's assertion that Congress "often equates the common interest with the interests of those who own property [particularly] . . . corporations" (p. 33)? Periodically a poll is cited as evidence, but none are discussed over time, and some appear to contain flawed questions.

The Limits and Possibilities of Congress is a unique but limited book. With its policy, reformist, and philosophical treatment of Congress, it

does make a contribution in emphasizing that Congress must be looked at in the context of its larger environment, but Brenner has not done justice to that environment. Further, the book's economic interpretation is of limited utility, with wavering arguments and logical gaps. In short, the book lacks credibility in viewing Congress either as an institution or as a participant in its larger milieu. It is reasonable to expect that important books, even though based on case studies, will at least build a framework for subsequent analysis; Brenner's book supplies no such structure.

STEVEN A. SHULL

University of New Orleans

Politics and Health Care Organization: HMOs as Federal Policy. By Lawrence D. Brown. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983. Pp. xv + 540. \$33.95, cloth; \$16.95, paper.)

Politics and Health Care Organization is a wellwritten and detailed analysis of the interplay between politics and policy during the federal government's attempt to stimulate the development of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) during the 1970s. Brown establishes a very clear objective for his scholarly analysis by stating that the small federal HMO program was examined because it is "singularly revealing about the emergence of rationalizing politics in the 1970s" and the current quest of the federal government "for control over programs it had earlier and hopefully brought into being, a quest earnestly pursued today in health care and in other policy fields" (p. 16). The book is divided into three parts, each of which is thorough and well-documented enough to stand alone. Together the three sections are an excellent case study that clearly demonstrates the dynamics of the policymaking process and the difficulties of translating good policy analysis into effective public policy.

Part 1 examines HMOs as organizational entities. Brown analyzes the background of prepaid group practices or HMOs, their development in the U.S., their management problems, and the empirical evidence on their performance. He discovers that HMOs "run sharply counter to deep and fundamental trends in the organization and financing of care in this country" (p. 73). The discussion of the organizational and managerial problems of HMOs concludes that their management "is an inherently fragile enterprise" (p. 127). In chapter 4, Brown reviews the empirical studies assessing the performance of HMOs in balancing the three objectives of quality, access,

and cost. He concludes that the decision to promote HMOs was based more on political factors than on the empirical evidence.

In Part 2, Brown provides a detailed account of the politics that produced the HMO development program in 1973 and subsequent amendments to the law in 1976 and 1978. The three chapters in this section are an excellent and interesting examination of the conflict, confusion, and compromise inherent in the public policy process. In this case, the interest group that allegedly was the beneficiary of the new program, the HMO lobby, considered the new law to be a "millstone around their collective necks," while President Nixon called it a "milestone" in the "administration's health strategy" (p. 267). Brown's review of the attempts of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to implement the HMO law demonstrates that "the administrative process was lengthy, cumbersome, and complex." Both the law and its implementation were plagued by the same problem: "no agreement existed among politicians and affected interests on what the federal HMO program was or should be, or indeed on what an HMO was or should be" (p. 344). Brown concludes this section by discussing the attempts to reform the HMO program and thereby enable it to expand into a viable alternative to the traditional system. His "reasonable inference" is that the HMO development program had "always been a highly implausible policy strategy" (p. 398).

The last section of the book is a well-reasoned explanation of why the program had very limited accomplishments. Chapter 8 solidly supports the hypothesis stated earlier: "the source of both the policy attractions and the political vicissitudes of the HMO program lies in its character as an organization-building strategy" (p. 26). Ironically our decentralized political system made the HMO strategy politically appealing, however it also made it unlikely that the strategy would be successful. Chapter 9 is an excellent examination of the major difficulty of policy analysis-translating a good idea into a good policy strategy. The concluding chapter looks toward the future of federal health policy by drawing upon the lessons of the HMO experience. Brown reviews the four general strategies used by the federal government to intervene in the health care system and then analyzes future policy options with an assessment of their likelihood of successfully containing health care costs. He concludes on a pessimistic, but possibly realistic, note: "No simple solution is in the cards; no tolerable strategy will end soaring medical costs" (p. 531).

Overall, Brown has produced an excellent, wellbalanced analysis of the HMO development strategy. Furthermore, he uses a broad theoretical

framework that provides many useful insights into the policymaking and administrative processes on the federal level in general, not just in health policy. There are some places where Brown has overstated his case, but they are not serious and add fuel to the debate over health care cost containment. In all fairness, his focus on the federal level repeatedly acknowledges the decentralization in the system, but his analysis does not adequately explore the option of state governments containing health care costs through the competition strategy. His pessimistic conclusion seems valid on the federal level, but perhaps it is time that we recognize that in some policy areas the state and local governments might be able to pursue reform and reorganization strategies successfully when the federal government can not.

RICHARD D. WILLIS

Ohio University, Athens

Shutdown in Youngstown: Public Policy for Mass Unemployment. By Terry F. Buss and F. Stevens Redburn. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 219. \$39.50, cloth; \$10.95, paper.)

This multidisciplinary study examines the 1977 steel shutdown in Youngstown, Ohio. The authors first consider background. In 1969, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company was merged with Lykes Corporation, a conglomerate headquartered in New Orleans. Lacking experience in managing steel production, Lykes did little to prevent an accelerated decline of the Youngstown operation. It diverted resources away from steel production and, shortly after the merger, Youngstown Sheet and Tube began to accumulate huge losses. Eight years after acquisition, Lykes announced a permanent shutdown of a major steel facility and laid off 4,100 workers. When closure came, Lykes offered little help or even information. Except for meeting long-standing contractual obligations on such matters as early retirement, it simply abandoned its employees and the community. Unemployment compensation and related forms of government assistance cushioned what would otherwise have been a devastating financial blow for most families.

Because much of the book concerns mental health and human service issues, the researchers apparently expected to find that mass unemployment induced a high level of personal stress and social dislocation. Instead, they found only moderate stress, no signs of community upheaval, and little immediate impact on general social conditions. Unemployed steel workers behaved

accordingly. Far from being radicalized, they displayed strong attachment to the conservative rhetoric of individualism and self-reliance. Beyond voting out of office their local union officials, they made few protests.

Context is important. The 1977 shutdown occurred in times of growth, both for the nation and the region. The local labor market proved to be "remarkably elastic or absorbent" (p. 94). Youngstown was a socially stable community, with extensive informal networks that the laid-off steel workers used to reenter the job market. An estimated 95% either got new jobs or took early retirement. The authors note that area employers appeared to "skim off" the more experienced and skilled workers, thus displacing unemployment onto others. From all indications, the inexperienced and unskilled, not former steelworkers, were the principal victims of a shrinking job market. As the full picture is painted, the absence of community upheaval becomes understandable. The impact of the steel shutdown was muffled by the general context of economic growth; its consequences were delayed and dispersed. Indeed, these circumstances leave the Youngstown case with limited comparability to current experiences of deep unemployment in the Midwest.

The book has the strengths and weaknesses of a multidisciplinary approach. It covers many facets of the situation but lacks sharp focus and theoretical depth. For that reason many of its policy recommendations are unconvincing. Indeed, the policy problem itself is never defined clearly. The authors describe the total ineffectiveness of social services, but fail to look for underlying causes of that ineffectiveness. For services that are irrelevant, the remedy must be stronger than a call for less fragmentation and better outreach. Put another way, the search for adequate counseling appears not to offer a solution to the problem of declining industrial base.

The main dog that doesn't bark in this story is collective political action. To be sure, there was an Ecumenical Coalition formed, and local governments heightened their organizational attention to economic development programs. But no one was able to mobilize mass support. The book, I regret to report, gives only an abbreviated account of these efforts. Buss and Redburn conclude with some tantalizing discussion of the connection between atrophying political life and absentee-owned corporations, but the politics of aging industrialism remains a story largely untold.

CLARENCE N. STONE

University of Maryland

Policymaking and Politics in the Federal District Courts. By Robert A. Carp and C. K. Rowland. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 203. \$17.95.)

For several years Robert Carp and Claude Rowland have been two of the most astute students of judicial behavior on the federal district courts. and this book presents their most important and systematic findings to date. The time period considered is 1933 through 1977 for district court appointees from the Wilson through the Ford administrations. The data base is a staggering 27,772 sample decisions. These data are disaggregated into five categories: criminal justice, government and the economy, support for labor, class discrimination, and First Amendment rights, with 20 subcategories used for analysis at various points in the book. The research design is sound, the approach to data collection and classification is solid, relatively simple models are employed to generate meaningful hypotheses, and the statistics applied (ranging from simple percentages to regression analysis) are explained clearly.

The fundamental purpose of the book is to determine, even if somewhat tentatively at times, the relationship between liberal-conservative voting tendencies of federal district court judges and their party affiliations, the appointing presidents, geographical variances, and levels of urbanization. Individual chapters examine each of these independent variables after an overview of related literature. The basic findings may be summarized as being, for the most part, what one would expect.

Carp and Rowland find that Democrat judges on the district courts have been more liberal than their Republican counterparts in all but one of the 20 issue subcategories. Partisan voting differences varied over time but were the greatest between 1968 and 1977. Carp and Rowland thus conclude that party identification is now a stronger independent variable than has been suggested by prior studies of district court voting. The ideological impact of appointing presidents on district court decision making has also fluctuated longitudinally. Johnson appointees have been the most liberal since the Wilson administration based on the aggregate data, whereas the Nixon and Eisenhower appointees have voted most conservatively. The ideological impact of Truman and Kennedy on district court decision making has been relatively minor by contrast. Federal trial court judges in the North and South have also differed in their voting behavior. For example, since 1968 northern district court judges have been generally more liberal than their southern counterparts in cases involving criminal justice, civil rights, and civil liberties. As one would anticipate, there are exceptions to these trends, and variations exist within circuits and states. Regarding the urbanization variable, the greater the number of judges assigned to a district court, the greater the tendency toward liberal voting. However, broadly speaking, the relationship is stronger for urban judges in the South as opposed to those in the North.

Overall, the Carp and Rowland volume constitutes an excellent piece of behavioral research that also emphasizes politics on federal district courts and the judges' policymaking environments. Beyond voting patterns, the authors occasionally rely on quotations from judges interviewed, thereby adding color to the book and insights into judicial perceptions. The book will enlighten many who tend to believe that behavioral research is rather boring and many who think that the exploration of appellate court behavior is more interesting than that on trial courts. In taking the discipline beyond earlier studies and laying a foundation for future research, Carp and Rowland have carefully shaped a book that should be read by all those interested in American judicial behavior and process.

CHARLES M. LAMB

State University of New York, Buffalo

Interest Group Politics. Edited by Alian J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 373. \$10.25, paper.)

This is an era of vigorous activity on the part of interest groups in American politics. In the past two decades, we have witnessed a tremendous expansion in the volume of demands upon Washington made by pressure groups. While the media have made much of this development, political scientists in the past decade have paid it less heed, largely neglecting the subjects of lobbying and pressure group politics. To their credit, the editors of this volume have gathered together a selection of essays from the thin body of contemporary work on the subject.

The articles assembled here are varied and timely. Among the subjects these chapters cover are: the efforts of pro-life groups in the 1980 Senate campaigns; the political impact of the Christian Right; the evolution of the American Agriculture Movement from an ad hoc protest movement into a formal interest group; the transformation of the women's movement into a formidable lobbying force; the role of PACs in congressional campaigns; the nature of contemporary grass-roots lobbying campaigns; the litigation strategies of civil rights organizations; the importance of con-

gressional caucuses as in-house lobbying forces; and the nature of interest group politicking in the executive branch. It is no particular slight to the other contributors' talents to say that the most interesting selection in the book is Elizabeth Drew's fascinating portrait of Washington superlobbyist Charls E. Walker.

Unfortunately, when taken together, the essays are largely disappointing. There are two principal problems here. First, the volume is imbalanced in terms of the kinds of individual groups it examines. Its chapters focus largely on membership organizations of one sort or another, even though the world of Washington representation is increasingly dominated by corporate and institutional interests that face very different kinds of organizational maintenance problems and constitute a very different kind of lobbying force. Second, what at first appears to be a promising smorgasbord of selections turns out to contain little food for thought. The editors' own introductory chapter nicely sketches some of the major changes in interest group politics in recent years, but it does little to alert students to the intellectually interesting questions about the subject. And of the other three chapters meant to provide an overview of interest group trends and theory, only Robert Salisbury's speculative closing essay is especially thought-provoking. In fact, Salisbury is among those who insist that if we are to improve our understanding of organized interests in American politics, we must "systematically distinguish institution-based interest activity from that deriving support from individual citizens" in order to see "the former's greater staying power and long-term effectiveness in Washington" (p. 365).

The beauty of this book is that it exists at all. Any new literature on the role of organized interests in contemporary American politics is a welcome addition today. If the selections in this volume present a picture that is imbalanced and incomplete, it is because this is a field of inquiry that for so long has been neglected. It is a field ripe for new empirical and theoretical investigations.

JOHN T. TIERNEY

Boston College

Covering Campaigns: Journalism in Congressinal Elections. By Peter Clarke and Susan H. Evans. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 151. \$17.50.)

What does campaign reporting have to do with the rise of PACs, the decline of parties, the perpetuation of the incumbency advantage, and the growth in the number of turned-off voters? Clarke and Evans provide some answers in this compact volume and raise some important new questions in the process. The 1978 National Election Study included a collection of newspaper clippings about the House races in sample districts. This book is the most substantial presentation of findings to date about how American newspapers cover congressional campaigns, and with what consequences. Clarke and Evans report on the amount and nature of coverage upon voter perceptions of candidates. An important component of the research is a set of preelection interviews with 82 House campaign reporters.

Clarke and Evans find a pattern of coverage that serves to enhance the advantages of incumbents over challengers. For example, when reporters cover incumbents they tend to make more extensive use of the information they gather than when they cover challengers. They also exhibit a fascination with "political attributes" (experience, achievements) and an indifference toward issues. Challengers usually have little to offer in the way of experience, but a lot to say about issues. On the whole, campaign coverage of all types of House candidates is routine and unimaginative.

The extent of the incumbents' advantage in volume of coverage is impressive. One especially striking discovery is that the incumbent edge is largest in the most competitive races, precisely the settings where evenhanded press treatment might make a real difference in the outcomes. Open-seat races, even some lavishly funded ones, are given modest coverage. Incumbent walkovers are typically accorded next to no coverage. Although the data on amount of coverage is valuable, the authors might have strengthened the analysis with additional discussion of the nature of the coverage. How favorably or unfavorably are candidates portrayed?

Editorial endorsements are found to be typically thin and uninformative, and virtually all endorsements go to incumbents (even when editors and publishers have reservations). Coincidentally, endorsed incumbents tend to enjoy an enormous coverage advantage over their challengers. The endorsement process itself is depicted here as all too often an exercise in thoughtless ratification of the status quo.

Clarke and Evans devote an ambitious chapter to analyzing the 1978 survey data in order to ascertain the effects of press coverage on voter understanding. They tell us that the amount of coverage is positively associated with voter awareness, and that more favorable perceptions stem from frequent exposure to mentions of the incumbent. One reason that this chapter is a bit disappointing is that Clarke and Evans are unable to

shed much light on the nature of the candidates' campaign efforts, other than as the papers report them

The final chapter synthesizes the responses to the empirical findings of a group of inadequately identified media and political professionals. The result is a series of recommendations about how to improve House campaign coverage. One especially important suggestion is that issues need to be covered more extensively and more attractively if voter interest is to be revived and if the excessive incumbency advantage is to be checked.

This is a valuable book that should attract the serious attention of, among others, congressional elections scholars, who sometimes underestimate the role of the press in the electoral process. Certainly Clarke and Evans could have given us a richer brew of detail, example, and anecdote when describing the content of coverage, but the book is eminently readable and even entertaining. Perhaps, as Clarke and evans acknowledge, the 1978 House elections are an insufficient base for appraising subpresidential campaign journalism. Future work should certainly include analysis of Senate and gubernatorial races. We now have a benchmark from which to proceed.

CHARLES M. TIDMARCH

Union College

Feminism and the New Right: Conflict over the American Family. By Pamela Johnston Conover and Virginia Gray. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xv + 253. \$29.95.)

It has become an adage of political science that "organization begets counter-organization." Nowhere is this principle better illustrated than in the emergence of the New Right to challenge the feminist movement on the Equal Rights Amendment and legalized abortion. Not for the first time, a split has developed between scholars and practitioners concerning the strengths of this new political force in American politics. Elected officials and activists, as well as the mass media, have viewed the New Right as a movement with a large following and significant power in the electoral and policy arenas. In contrast, political science studies have concluded that the impact of the New Right in elections and in general is highly overrated. Conover and Gray attempt to determine which perspective is the more accurate and, in doing so, provide a number of insights into the origins, mobilization, organization, and impact of these two movements, as well as non-class-based political movements generally.

The authors creatively use an eclectic data base—national and state opinion polls, aggregate state

data, and interviews conducted with delegates to the White House Conference on Families (WHCF)—to look at the relationships between the key issues of abortion and the ERA and the opposing movements that have emerged to contest them. In general, their findings concerning the balance of political power between the two movements support those of earlier, more limited. scholarly studies. They find that the New Right is not as mobilized as feminists on the state level. Further, this new conservative movement has thus far had only a modest impact on state policy decisions. And, contrary to popular perceptions, single-issue voting is shown to be far more difficult, rarer, and a potentially stronger weapon in the hands of feminists, given the present distribution of opinion.

A second focus of the study is on the role issues and their attached symbols have played in the feminist and New Right movements. Conover and Gray extend the concept of "symbolic politics" by incorporating public opinion and interview data to support the thesis that feminists, by using the condensational symbols of equality and personal autonomy on behalf of the ERA and legalized abortion, not only successfully built their own movement, but also sparked the emergence and defensive mobilization of the pro-family sector of the New Right.

Conover and Gray also provide succinct analyses of both movements from the resource mobilization perspective of social movement theory. In addition to the ideological and organizational differences delineating an offensive (feminist) movement from a defensive (conservative) one, theoretically important commonalities in political tactics and basis of mobilization also exist.

Despite its title and broad scope, this will not be the definitive comparative study of feminism and the New Right. It is a well-executed and imaginative piece of research using existing or readily accessible data. And as the first book-length treatment of the New Right using survey and other statistical techniques, it should, and undoubtedly will, be widely read. Specialists may quibble with some aspects of the study. Historians would argue that, contrary to the assertions of the authors, the debate over woman suffrage was fraught with much religious and moral symbolism. Feminist. theorists may feel that Conover and Gray overstate the tensions between the individual and the family in feminist thought. While acknowledging the constraints surrounding data collection, there are still some puzzling or weak choices of indicators (for example, the use of two very different groups of feminist organizations-those registered in 1980 as lobbyists or organized into PACs and those, including apolitical local feminist

groups, listed in an almanac in 1974—as base points for measuring changes in feminist mobilization). Conover and Gray may also place too much credence in their correlates of pro-family mobilization in the states, given the low variance and small number of such groups (on average, less than five per state). More seriously, those WHCF delegates who supported both the ERA and abortion were drawn primarily from the ranks of the "helping professions," and only infrequently were members of liberal, much less feminist, groups. This greatly reduces the usefulness of the interview data, upon which a significant portion of the study relies, for analyzing activists within the feminist movement, a weakness of which the authors are fully aware. But aside from these few problem areas, Conover and Gray have produced a fascinating study that provides some much-needed, solidly based information on the New Right, its impact, and its opponents.

JANET K. BOLES

Marquette University

National Conventions in an Age of Party Reform. By James W. Davis. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xxi + 304. \$35.00.)

James Davis follows a long line of supporters of the prereform political parties and national conventions in attempting to argue the merits of the old presidential nominating process and disclose the flaws of two waves of party reform: progressivism and the efforts of "participatory Democrats and political amateurs." To accomplish this task. Davis provides a listing of the functions performed by the national convention (chap. 1), a history of the national convention (chap. 2), a description of the structure and process of the convention (chaps. 3-6), an analysis of the effects of television on the nominating process (chap. 7). and a discussion of national convention reforms (chaps. 8-9). There is little that is new in this effort, and the book is almost wholly descriptive rather than explanatory. It thus reflects the state of research on nominating conventions and stands primarily as an update of other encyclopedic treatments such as The Politics of National Party Conventions by Paul David et al., (Brookings Institution, 1960).

Unfortunately, much of the research on national conventions is filled with anecdotes about past conventions and campaigns, with minor attempts at theory-building. Davis continues in this vein with interesting anecdotes, the significance of which is often unstated. For example, the Ripon Society's challenge to the Republicans' victory

bonus is chronicled through a series of court decisions, but the importance of the final decision of the full appeals court ("that courts should be 'slow to interfere with the internal processes of political parties. . . " (pp. 55-56)) is neglected.

Davis provides a list of manifest and latent functions performed by the national conventions that could have helped him move beyond mere description and detail. With respect to one of the major concerns of the book, he could have shown how changes in the nominating convention produced changes in the performance of these functions. Also, the succeeding chapters on structure and process and the media could have been used to demonstrate how these factors facilitate or hinder the performance of the nominating convention's functions. Instead, the functions are utilized primarily to distinguish between the preand postreform periods. Thus, Davis neglects a major structuring (and theory-building) device.

Furthermore, given the state of scholarship in the area of nominating conventions, it would have been interesting if Davis could have integrated recent related research into the study. Since the decline of the traditional party is one of Davis's primary concerns, and one of the major concomitants of that decline is the proliferation of single-interest pressure groups, he might have utilized some of the recent research on interest groups.

The chapter "The National Convention in the Age of Television" indicates a glaring gap in political science research on the role of the mass media. There is very little direct research on the impact of television on opinion formation toward the candidates during the nominating process or television's impact on citizens' orientations toward the national convention. Davis uses the available research fairly well, but he could again cite and utilize a growing body of related research on the topic of the mass media and public opinion.

The final object of the book is to defend national conventions in the face of proposed reforms like national primaries, regional primaries, and other various delegate selection plans. The treatment of this topic is better than the previous chapters on the structure and process of the convention. Davis considers most of the proposed reforms and provides some insightful analysis of the reforms and their possible consequences. He is most perceptive when noting some of the conflicts between elected officials and party organization members that could be produced by some of these reforms attempting to institute. party responsibility. Unfortunately, he fails to note that a similar division would occur between committed and uncommitted delegates as a result of his suggested reforms. Davis's discussion of the

reforms omits recognition of the past abuses of the more "closed" system of delegate selection. Representativeness is used in extremely narrow terms, and the earlier virtual exclusion of blacks, women, and other groups receives short shrift.

In sum, National Conventions in an Age of Reform combines the best and worst attributes of the literature on nominating conventions. There are lucid descriptions of the nominating apparatus and procedures, but little explanation or development of hypothetical propositions. Without research that develops and tests such hypotheses, it will be difficult to evaluate intelligently the effects of the reforms discussed by Davis.

PATRICK A. PIERCE

Saint Mary's College

Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970. By John D'Emilio. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 257. \$20.00.)

In order to understand the gay movement—and indeed any political movement—one must examine the larger social, cultural, religious, economic, and demographic context. The context socially constructs the reality of homosexuality and the gay movement in America. There were no homosexuals but only homoerotic acts prior to the late nineteenth century. Industrialization and urbanization weakened the social system, providing the space for homosexuality to develop.

World War II furnished a crucial catalyst in that development. The massive mobilization, the disruption of the traditional social patterns, the predominately single-sex emotional attachments formed by the war; and, especially for women, the strict sexual segregation and the popular stereotype of WACS provided what D'Emilio terms as "something of a nation-wide coming out experience" (p. 24).

Although the changes were liberating, they also made gays more vulnerable to attacks. The cold warriors linked homosexuality with the communist threat. Although these attacks fostered a negative self-image for gays, the publicity and the labeling of homosexuality conferred meaning to unrecognized feelings.

In those repressive times, the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis were founded and grew ever so slightly. The Communist party experience of the Mattachine founders influenced both the ideology and organization of the Society. Homosexuals were a minority with a false consciousness. Therefore, the first steps toward liberation were educational, fostering a positive

self-awareness and a group consciousness. The Mattachine Society reflected both its roots and a reaction to the repression with a centralized and hierarchical structure and a secret leadership body. Relatively early, the radical founders were overthrown. The new leaders created a democratic structure; supported professionals in their study of homosexuality; pushed accommodation; encouraged good citizenship as defined by heterosexuals; and established discussion groups, not for consciousness raising, but for therapy. The Daughers of Bilitis developed a self-help orientation with an emphasis on respectability and a hostility towards butch lesbians and bars. This emphasis on respectability, however, accomplished little attitudinal change. It was a futile attempt to make that which society "defined as beyond respectability" (p. 125) respectable.

In the 1960s the black civil rights movement stimulated a new gay militancy on the East Coast. Meanwhile in San Francisco, the worlds of the gay bar and gay political movement began to coincide. The harassment of gays, a drag entertainer's candidacy for city supervisor, and the Tavern Guild—a political organization of gay bar owners and employees—broke the barrier that existed between the bars and the political organizations. Sexual community and sexual politics supported each other.

By the end of the 1960s, gay groups were successful in repealing antisodomy laws in some states, limiting police harassment in some cities, creating positive publicity, and gaining new allies. But they could not mobilize a large proportion of the gays.

D'Emilio has written the history of the American gay movement. He has collected and presented significant information on that movement, and he has neatly utilized the concept of a socially constructed reality. It is unfortunate that he ignores the scholarly literature on social movements, because his factual evidence conveys a serious but unstated challenge to the standard view of political movements. That view states that when strains occur in the normal functioning of society, people become discontent. If discontent breaks a threshold, then a political movement is born. The alternative view, resource or mobilization theory, is strongly supported by D'Emilio's study. A political movement begins when there is a sufficient accumulation of resources. Gay participation in other movements furnished political experience and leadership training. The civil rights and new left movements provided an ideology and a model of tactics. The gay bar fashioned the solidarity and the community in which the mobilization occurred. The gay movement developed when the resource level broke a critical threshold. Thus, it is important for political scientists to read

D'Emilio's book both for its insights about the gay movement and also for its insights on political movements in general.

DAVID C. COLBY

Williams College

Technologies of Freedom. By Ithiel de Sola Pool. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. 299. \$20.00.)

Ithiel de Sola Pool, Ruth and Arthur Sloan Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, views the electronic communications revolution as one of potential promise for freedom of speech but offers both historical and current caveats to that possibility. Perhaps the book's genesis—it consists of work originally prepared and presented as Phi Beta Kappa lectures, as an article in *Daedalus*, and as coauthored Project '87 research as well as some material first presented here—can account for its uneven presentation of the historical development of freedom of speech.

The early chapters vary in quality, especially those which deal with the history of print media and the various collisions between print and the First Amendment. The specialist may find unnecessary detail; the generalist not enough. The discussions of electronic media and the First Amendment also move in and out of historical focus, sometimes so often that de Sola Pool's point is missed entirely.

Perhaps the major difficulty with the work is that de Sola Pool sets out to prove what might be unprovable. He states that "civil liberty functions today in a changing technological context. For five hundred years a struggle was fought, and in a few countries won, for the right of people to speak and print freely, unlicensed, uncensored, and uncontrolled" (p. 1). New technologies, he argues, might remove or otherwise endanger those freedoms, because what may masquerade as regulatory traffic control may, in fact, be a form of censorship. Without doubt, such charges can and will be cogently made regarding various electronic media including radio, television, and the new cable systems. Yet if regulatory agencies are to act in the public interest, there must be some kind of qualitative decision about what best serves the public interest. Too, it is the public's right not to receive unsolicited material. De Sola Pool does not seem to agree with the postal laws that forbid the delivery of unsolicited obscene material, calling them instead a form of censorship. By analogy, then, he sees regulatory efforts to remove or restrict that which does not approach

community standards as a restriction of free speech.

Yet if the individual's rights not to receive obscene materials are absolute, then the regulatory agencies must protect those rights without restricting the ability of purveyors of pornography to sell their wares to those who find them of interest. In many respects, radio and video here become more like billboards and less like the pamphlets and papers that de Sola Pool cites for his argument. Therefore, what he calls "the preferred print model" (p. 245) does not apply.

One might quarrel with de Sola Pool's individual "Guidelines for Freedom" (pp. 245 and following): First, the First Amendment applies equally to all media; second, anyone may publish as he wishes; third, law enforcement cannot be brought about by prior restraint; fourth, regulation must be the last recourse; fifth, eventually there may need to be interconnection among or between common carriers; sixth, "recipients of privilege may be subject to disclosure" (p. 248), that is, private corporations may be required to give up information presently withheld in return for licensing privilege; seventh, such privileges should be of limited duration; eighth, regulatory agencies should not get involved with what a circuit is used for, merely with the fact that it is used; ninth, traffic controlling regulations may not be used where unnecessary, as with cable systems; and, tenth, copyright enforcement and understanding must be reworked to allow for the potentials of electronic publishing.

PHYLLIS ZAGANO

Fordham University

Restructuring the City: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment. Edited by Susan S. Fainstein et al. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. viii + 296. \$27.50, cloth; \$14.95, paper.)

This comparative analysis of the political economy of urban redevelopment builds on case studies of five U.S. cities: New Haven, Detroit, New Orleans, Denver, and San Francisco. More than one-half of the book is written by Susan and Norman Fainstein, who have included chapters by Richard Child Hill, Michael P. Smith, and Dennis Judd. Its focus is the transformation in the politics of land use, economic growth, and housing accompanying the social and economic restructuring of U.S. cities and the extent to which successive urban regimes and their policies benefit or disadvantage lower-income residents.

The case studies treat a variety of urban redevelopment issues: the politics of urban

renewal and the Community Development Block Grant program in New Haven, the impact of the automobile industry on the political and spatial economy of Detroit, uneven development and the political struggles between pro-growth and preservationist forces in New Orleans, central business district redevelopment and urban sprawl in Denver, and the changing role of the local state in the politics of urban redevelopment in response to community mobilization in San Francisco.

The volume is not explicitly directed toward urban policymakers, but it has direct policy relevance. The Fainsteins claim that the local state does not necessarily play an active role in urban redevelopment efforts. The requirements for such action include national programs, administrative structures, and funding for redevelopment; substantial economic and racial change in the urban population; and a pro-growth political force (organized by the mayor, business community, or both) which has considerable popular support. It seems, then, that urban redevelopment policy is not independent, but rather is significantly shaped by national political alignments, investment patterns, and economic and urban policies, as well as by international political-economic forces. Further, the broad similarity in urban redevelopment strategies in U.S. cities suggests either that (1) structural limits severely constrain urban redevelopment policies, (2) innovative redevelopment programs face legal and institutional (as well as obvious political) obstacles, and/or (3) urban policymakers tend to lack sufficient imagination.

It also appears that urban redevelopment policies have been a qualified failure. Generally, the contributors hold that these policies have (1) not reversed dominant trends in the national urban system nor exempted any city from those trends; (2) consistently generated substantial political opposition and conflict; (3) heightened and displaced class and racial inequalities; and (4) built upon joint public-private coalitions which have served the accumulation needs of capital, socialized the costs of urban redevelopment, and reduced the democratic accountability of city governments and redevelopment policymakers. Indeed, market forces have redeveloped some city downtown and neighborhood areas in the absence of state initiatives. A case could be made that urban redevelopment policies tend, especially in the absence of working-class influence, to support probable marketplace "winners" and, thus, accentuate uneven development.

This book is unusual in that it remains uniformly good throughout, in spite of the large number of contributors. Nonetheless, the most significant contribution to the literature in urban political economy is clearly the Fainsteins' concluding essay. They characterize urban regimes as direc-

tive, concessionary, and conserving. This corresponds roughly to (1) state-planned urban renewal with little opposition, (2) renewal with community mobilization winning greater responsiveness to lower-class interests, and (3) private redevelopment facilitated and subsidized by a local state which reduces but does not eliminate lower-class representation. They also analyze the terms of conflict which distinguish redevelopment policy: (1) divisions within the middle and business classes (such as uncontrolled growth versus historic preservation), (2) the allocation of public investment between the downtown and residential neighborhoods, and (3) the allocation of state expenditures for capital accumulation or social consumption. They conclude that lower- and working-class interests, when mobilized, can achieve better representation in, and more benefits from, urban redevelopment policies. However, the structural bias of the local state is toward programs that enhance capital accumulation, reestablish middle-class and business control over strategic and desirable urban territory, and insulate city politics and urban development policy from popular influence. This, finally, suggests key principles in a socialist program for urban America: redistribution, social integration, and democratic participation.

CHARLES E. ELLISON

University of Cincinnati

Ideology and Abortion Policy Politics. By Marilyn Falik. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. viii + 228. \$27.95.)

The Abortion Dispute and the American System. Edited by Gilbert Y. Steiner. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983. Pp. x + 103. \$6.95, paper.)

The abortion question continues to attract considerable scholarly attention because it does not fit neatly into conventional theories of politics. The unequal distribution of economic goods and the resulting have/have-not cleavages are assumed to be the basis of political conflict in the standard treatises on politics, an assumption which contemporary national politics have, for the most part, supported. Occasionally, though, national issues emerge that seem to reflect more competing concepts of morality than competing property interests. The emergence of issues such as abortion raises questions about what forces bring these noneconomic conflicts to the forefront and the effect such conflicts have on the political process.

Ideology and Abortion Policy Politics represents an effort to identify those forces that have made abortion a national political issue. Falik's

introductory chapter criticizes standard treatments of American politics for denigrating the importance of ideology as a motivating force. Her central thesis is that activists on both sides of the abortion question are ideologically motivated. "Pro-life" activists derive their positions from a "conservative-traditional-sacred" ideology, and "pro-choice" activists from a "liberal-modernsecular" ideology. These two ideologies, according to Falik, provide "hypothetical constructs that provide a means for organizing the several facets of the abortion controversy with a view to the underlying normative motivations for collective social and political action" (p. 39). Using data collected from interviews with 50 nonrandomly selected pro- and antiabortion activists, Falik shows the relationship between views on abortion and other policy positions and discusses the underlying motivational forces that cause the activists to take the positions they do. That abortion activists are ideologically motivated is undoubtedly true, but the evidence presented by Falik hardly constitutes the devastating indictment of the "end of ideology" thesis that she suggests. Curiously, Falik calls into question the integrity of the ideological belief system of the pro-life activists by characterizing them as exhibiting the "paranold style in American politics" (p. 51), a style based on exaggerated fears of conspiracy and reflecting personal status uncertainty more than an objective assessment of real prob-

This study, which is being published in Praeger's Landmark Dissertations in Women's Studies series, was completed in 1975, so there is nothing in its analysis that examines recent survey and voting behavior studies, studies which have shed considerable light on the ideological dimensions of the abortion controversy. Falik's summaries of her interviews with abortion leaders provide some interesting insights into their thinking, but the data base she uses is too limited and too dated for this study to constitute a major contribution to the literature on abortion politics.

A more valuable volume is the collection of essays in *The Abortion Dispute and the American System*. The essays, originally presented in November, 1982, at a Brookings Institution symposium, address the question of what effect the abortion controversy is having on the political process. The general conclusion of the symposium's participants is reassuring. There is little in the abortion controversy that is without precedent or that is particularly threatening to the political process.

Lawrence M. Friedman, in his chapter on the Supreme Court's handling of the abortion question, argues that the Roe decision was legitimate in the sense that it built upon a preexisting legal

foundation, but that efforts to overturn it by law or constitutional amendment are also legitimate. Since it was the Court that put the question into the Constitution (in an unsuccessful effort to get it out of the political arena), "opponents have no choice but to fight on the battleground imposed on them" (p. 27).

Roger H. Davidson examines the charge that the introduction of the abortion issue has diverted congressional attention from pressing socio-economic problems and is threatening to undermine norms of political civility and respect for "rules of the game." Davidson finds that surrisingly little time has been devoted to hearings and debate on abortion and argues that, while both sides have acted in ways that were not completely fair, "the tactics that have been employed are well within the bounds of the usual practices and so-called rules of the game" (p. 85).

G. Calvin Mackenzie examines the use of abortion attitudes as "A Test of Fitness for Presidential Appointment." Questions on abortion began to be raised during the Carter administration, but it was not until the Republicans took control of the Senate that some legislators declared their intention to judge nominees solely on their position on abortion. Mackenzie is concerned about this trend, but believes that guidelines can be established that recognize the legitimacy of the abortion issue but that would give it heavy weight only for those positions directly responsible for abortion policy. Since most abortion policies "are about as unambiguous as a policy can be" (p. 60), leaving little latitude to those administrators interpreting the law, Mackenzie is hopeful that as both sides come to understand the limited opportunities the appointment process affords them in shaping policy, "the number of battles that will be fought on this ground can be limited to those few that hold out some hope of a meaningful victory" (p. 63).

The final essay by John Mackson and Maris Vinovski assesses the effect of single issue proand antiabortion groups in the electoral process. They argue that most voters have mixed views on abortion, and that relatively few place heavy weight on a candidate's abortion views when casting their vote. The success of pro-life and prochoice forces depends largely on the fortunes of the larger political coalitions of which they are a part. Pro-choice groups lost strength in 1978 and 1980 "by virtue of their identification with the liberal agenda and with the Carter administration" (p. 80). While the antiabortionists gained influence as a result of the Reagan victory, their gains have been limited. Jackson and Vinovski contend that "pro-life groups have not been able to impart their previous sense of urgency since adoption of the Hyde amendment and inclusion of pro-life partisans in the Reagan administration... Paradoxical as it may appear, partial victories seem to strengthen the losers while simultaneously weakening the winners" (p. 80).

The essays in this volume offer clear, well-written analyses of the impact of the abortion controversy on the political system. All the contributors accepted the legitimacy of the abortion issue and were scrupulously evenhanded in discussing the activities of the two sides. No better overview of the topic is available.

JAMES DAVID FAIRBANKS

University of Houston-Downtown

The Politics of Public Utility Regulation. By William T. Gormley, Jr. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 271. \$26.95, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

The title of Gormley's book implies two areas of interest, regulation and energy. The content also includes, with almost equal prominence, the politics of public participation, state policy determinants analysis, and interest group theory. The unifying element is an effort to sort out the roles of varied policy influencers—public utility commissioners, commission staffs, and utility firms—and two types of public advocates—proxy and grass roots. Proxy advocates are officials (state attorneys general offices or consumers' counsels) charged with representing rate-payer interests; grass-roots advocates include consumer, antinuclear, environmental, and low-income groups.

Within the scope indicated, Gormley has given us a highly competent study of a policy arena of great current political salience, one that is also enjoying something of a scholarly renaissance. Data published in recent journal articles is incorporated into the book, but accounts for less than one-half of it. The articles focus more directly on an attempt to measure public advocacy in utility commission proceedings. The book places that material in the broader framework, topically and conceptually, of the totality of utility regulation as a political phenomenon. In the process, the data reported earlier have enhanced meaning, and Gormley has the intellectual and physical space needed to develop his policy-relevant interpretations, plus some advocacy of regulatory reform proposals aimed toward simultaneous enhancement of the values of democratization and professionalism.

Substantial funding from the National Science Foundation enabled Gormley to develop a strong information base, from which he presents data that will prove helpful to those who share one or more of his interests. His book draws on responses to a questionnaire sent to 188 state utility commissioners in all 50 states, interviews with 284 respondents representing each of the posited categories of influential actors, and several hundred utility commission documents. The documents and interviews were concentrated in 12 states, three each representing the four categories of Gormley's public participation focus: grassroots emphasis, proxy emphasis, high levels of both, low levels of both. Appendixes explain the approach and include the questionnaire.

Drawing on an unusually wide range of literature for relevant hypotheses and comparisons, Gormley is able to comment on a number of frequently discussed analytic issues regarding formative factors in public policy analysis. The "capture theory" proposition, that the regulatees capture the regulators, is supported in his findings only to the extent that utility companies are perceived to "wield more power than any other outside participants" (p. 140). The cumulative weight of proxy and grass-roots advocates "may be considerable," however (pp. 140-141). In three states, proxy advocates were actually assessed as more influential, or nearly so, than utilities. As James Q. Wilson suggests in his writings, Gormley finds that capture is least likely when other interests are represented explicitly, hence the advocacy groups and proxies do have policy significance. However, perhaps a more basic finding is that the cleavages are issue-dependent and so diverse and complex as to belie such simple categorizations as conservative or liberal. They include not only consumers and utilities, but also residential versus business consumers, middle-class rate payers and those who seek to aid the poor, and conservationists whose concerns are sometimes less for rates than for encouragement of alternative approaches to energy.

In the end, Gormley synthesizes his material into what strikes me as a useful framework of complexity and "conflictuality" as the distinctive variables in the politics of public utility regulation. He then relates these to the posited goals of professionalism and democratization and describes the crucial dilemma (p. 217):

When issues are complex, participation without expertise can be useless; when issues are conflictual, professionalism without accountability can be manipulative; when issues are complex and conflictual, there is a special need for institutions that promote expertise and accountability simultaneously.

While I would wish that this were a longer book so that Gormley could have developed further the relationship of his data to the burgeoning propositions of public policy theory, perhaps he will do that in future writings. Meanwhile, we have a major addition to the disciplinary literatures of regulation and public participation and a substantial contribution to our understanding of how things operate in energy and communications regulation.

MICHAEL D. REAGAN

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The President and the Public. Edited by Doris A. Graber. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982. Pp. v + 310. \$17.50, cloth; \$7.95, paper.)

One problem with democratic elections is that the people may not have a choice between candidates that they would most prefer. Another problem is that in the twentieth century, media shapes the information people receive about the candidates, which could hinder the free choice of candidates. Doris Graber's edited book deals with these problems.

What do people want in a president? Are they able to get the kind of person they would like? In the second chapter, based on 1979 Gallup poll data, Stephen J. Wayne finds that the people want a strong president before any policy concerns. This finding fits well with Survey Research Center data that show that the public viewed Reagan as a potentially strong president although they disagreed with him on most policy issues. In addition, data in the chapter by Lee Sigelman indicate that, contrary to all the evidence of a dramatic decline in public confidence in government, people are satisfied with the government. Sigelman argues that there has been no recent crisis of confidence when one looks at other poll findings as well as data from the 1930s. In contrast, in his chapter on the electoral college, Lawrence D. Longley argues that the way Americans elect a president works against the oneperson-one-vote ideal democratic rule. And, the commonly viewed assumption that the electoral college enhances the power of blacks is wholly untrue and actually works against this subgroup's voting strength.

The Gallup poll presidential rating question is the most commonly cited indicator of the public satisfaction with the person who leads them. Studies have shown that every modern president experiences a decline in support after inauguration, and that foreign "rally around the flag" events increase a president's support. Cliff Zukin and J. Robert Carter's fine chapter on using such Gallup data makes one think twice about taking the data at face value. They raise problems with, among other things, the Gallup's wording of the question so our interpretations of the public's

satisfaction with the president could be distorted. While their Eagleton poll data do not really support their methodological points, Zukin and Carter's chapter is important reading for all scholars who deal with presidential public ratings.

Another of the book's themes is the issue of media distortion of political information. A special case of media influence can be made for the coverage of a president seeking reelection. Once in office, no one can please all groups, and, as President Reagan has reminded us, bad news is good news for the media. A chapter by Martha Joynt Kumar and Michael Baruch Grossman in the "Media Portrayals" section presents a content analysis of The New York Times and Time between 1953 and 1978 and the CBS evening news from 1968 to 1978. Two coders classified White House stories into positive, negative, and neutral categories as well as by subject of story, such as personal or policy. Kumar and Grossman found that the number of negative stories have increased, although they still are outweighed by positive stories. The extent to which these stories shape public opinion is left unexplored. It would have been helpful to have seen Gallup poll data rating the presidents on the same chart depicting the percent negative stories over time.

William C. Adams also speaks to the media influence issue when he makes the case that in every election since 1960, excepting 1980 and 1972, one candidate had the edge in favorable television coverage while the other had the edge in favorable newspaper coverage. Barry Goldwater was the only television favorite to lose the election, but he was also the only losing candidate with the television advantage to run against an incumbent president.

I recommend this edited book not as an integrative, major work, but rather as a collection of recent research on the president and the public, useful for political scientists and graduate students.

ALANA NORTHROP

California State University, Fullerton

Influence, Change, and the Legislative Process. By Janet Miller Grenzke. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 193. \$35.00.)

The central question of this volume is whether state legislators change their attitudes and behavior while in office. This concern has become a widely discussed and interesting new direction in the study of representation and legislative politics. Grenzke argues convincingly that we must begin to study incumbent change in state legislatures

because turnover rates in most states are decreasing. For a legislature to be democratic, its members must be responsive to the wishes and the interests of the people; they must alter their beliefs and behavior to conform with the wishes of their constituents. Grenzke is not interested in the type of representation exhibited as response to individualistic services such as baby books and social security checks. Issue responsiveness is the key to representation, since such responsiveness is the mission of a legislature in its role as a democratic institution. At the end of the extensive analysis, Grenzke concludes, "At the state level, democracy is not a charade" (p. 158).

This work is based on a 10-year longitudinal study of the Michigan House of Representatives. The research design for the study entailed an extensive amount of personal interviews, content analysis of legislation, and voting analysis. As always, one can quibble with the selection of issue areas, the way in which bills were selected, and with some of the indicators; however, for a work which requires operationalization of so many concepts, the degree to which Grenzke is able to measure what she intends to measure is quite impressive and separates this book from others that attempt to include a variety of indicators of determinants of legislative behavior. At the same time, she does fill in the substantive details of her cases in order to flesh out the explanation.

The book is concerned with three policy areas: education, business, and racial policies (a fourth, the budget, emerges in some of the attitudinal analysis). The issue domains were selected because of their conflictual nature and lasting salience as well as for their differences as political bargaining arenas. Grenzke finds that in two of the areas, race and education, the leglislature was quite responsive. Both issue domains are highly visible ones on the state level, and the result is not unexpected. That the business domain, and presumably most of the less visible issue areas (retirement, criminal procedures, health and safety, local and municipal affairs) that were not selected because of their lack of prominence, are not as responsive suggests that Grenzke's enthusiasm over the state of democracy in Michigan is perhaps overstated.

Of her many insights, perhaps the most fascinating is the notion that incumbents change their information gathering patterns of interaction over time, and that it is incumbent change and not just turnover that makes legislative representation so viable. She finds that especially during the civil rights crisis, legislative incumbents led the way in responding to their constituents, and low turnover legislatures could be just as responsive as legislative sessions marked by high turnover.

Influence, Change, and the Legislative Process reads almost like a general legislative politics text-book in that it draws from every part of the literature. Those who are familiar with the standard works on legislative politics will find the book highly integrative; those who are not might be overwhelmed by the degree to which several disparate theses are woven together into one set of hypotheses and conclusions. While the results of the analysis are not striking, the book is a welcome, well-executed addition to our understanding of the nature of representation in the legislatures.

T. WAYNE PARENT

Louisiana State University

Crime in City Politics. Edited by Anne Heinz, Herbert Jacob, and Robert L. Lineberry. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. xii + 288. \$25.00, cloth; \$10.50, paper.)

Crime in City Politics is part of a larger study of crime, criminal justice, and urban politics in 10 cities that Anne Heinz, Herbert Jacob, and Robert Lineberry started in 1978. Looking at governmental responses to crime from 1948 to 1978, the editors supervised a vast research project that yielded a tremendous amount of data on city residents, newspaper coverage of crime, the character and substance of city policy, and interviews with public and private authorities. Three technical reports already published by the National Institute of Justice offer data summaries and analyses, while future monographs promise more expansive consideration of the "crime-politics-policy connection" (p. xi).

Crime in City Politics offers another cut from this research project, but with a decidedly distinctive perspective. The editors offer summary essays on crime, politics, and urban affairs, and provide five case studies gleaned from the 10-city project. The anthology consists of an introductory essay and conclusion by Jacob and Lineberry and case studies by the site directors in five of the 10 cities. The case studies offer detailed, contextual analyses of the relationship between crime policy and city politics. Together with the introductory and concluding essays, they are welcome additions to the study of urban politics, criminal justice, policy analysis, and state and local government.

While Crime in City Politics is instructive because it offers the kind of case study not prominent in many political science journals, its substantive merit rests on the lessons that the editors draw from the case studies and on the way these analyses illustrate some established points about

crime and our efforts to deal with it. In the introductory and concluding essays, Jacob and Lineberry argue that there is a deep and longstanding connection between criminal justice policy and city politics. They emphasize that this relationship predates the heralded, national politicalization of crime in the 1960s. In addition, Jacob and Lineberry point out that governmental responses to crime haven't changed much—in fact, there is not much variation from city to city. While they do not pretend to have examined governmental responses to crime in every major American city, their in-depth study of 10 major and distinctive cities provides persuasive evidence. To be sure, the statistical evidence is largely aggregate and the contextual documentation somewhat interpretative. But the similarity in patterns of city policy and the communalities observed make for a compelling argument and demonstrate the importance of a variety of research strategies in political science.

In each of the five case studies and in the initial and concluding essays, several substantive points about criminal justice policy and the problem of crime are illustrated or emphasized. The studies of Newark, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Phoenix, and San Jose demonstrate several things: that police expenditures don't have much of an effect on crime, that crime rates can be and sometimes are manipulated by local police and political authorities, that the fear of crime is frequently grounded in apprehension about its unpredictability and not the actual probability of victimization, that crime is related to other social problems, that the political debate on crime is often couched in symbolic terms, that police dominated the early LEAA grant process, that the expenditure of federal funds did have some positive effects on criminal justice if not on the problem of crime. that there is a close relationship between city hall and the police, and that the police are more professionalized than in earlier eras.

Although the authors of the five case studies and the editors have done a fine job of providing the rich contextual analysis so central to the larger research project, the anthology does have some limitations. Substantively, some connections should have been drawn with related studies that focused on the same cities. Additionally, it would have made for a more coherent collection if the authors of the five case studies had explicitly focused on the themes that Jacob and Lineberry drew at the beginning and had organized their respective chapters around them. Finally, an index would be helpful.

The merits of the collection, however, far outweigh the shortcomings. The anthology provides a good illustration of contextual political analysis. As such, it demonstrates the range of research

strategies that can be applied with considerable benefit to our understanding of politics. It also demonstrates how closely crime and criminal justice are tied to the political arena. More compelling, perhaps, than these strengths is an assumption implicit throughout Crime in City Politics. The editors and authors suggest that crime is a problem that can't be solved. While they do not explicitly focus on the limitations of criminal law, they implicitly direct the reader's attention to the social, legal, and political institutions that share responsibility for society's moral and social problems. In this fashion, the book serves as a useful resource, not only for students of criminal justice but also for the contemporary politicians who persist in promising easy solutions to the vexatious problem of crime.

SUSETTE M. TALARICO

University of Georgia

The Hardest Drug: Heroin and Public Policy. By John Kaplan. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. x + 247. \$20.00.)

John Kaplan is concerned with what the criminal justice system should do about the problem of heroin in our society. Finding major flaws in the present national policy of total prohibition, Kaplan examines the costs and benefits of alternative policies toward heroin. His objectives seem overly ambitious: "to solve the particular social problem" and "to get those in power to undertake appropriate remedies" (p. 2). For Kaplan, the preferred solution involves requiring treatment programs for heroin addicts and ending reliance on the criminal law to control the behavior of otherwise law-abiding drug users.

Much of the argument in this provocative volume is based on Kaplan's perception of heroin as a social problem. In his view, policymakers make decisions on false assumptions; for example, users of heroin inevitably become addicted, "once an addict, always an addict," and addiction is a disease. Heroin addiction, says Kaplan, is nothing more than a "bad habit" much like alcohol consumption or cigarette smoking. Addicts use heroin, for the most part, "because they like it" (p. 49). What troubles Kaplan most, however, is the assumption that most heroin users commit property crimes. Although he makes too much of inconclusive data, Kaplan may be right when he asserts that "an increasing percentage" of contemporary heroin users are otherwise socially responsible and law-abiding. A beneficial and humane policy, therefore, would differentiate between casual users and addicts who commit crimes to support their habits.

Current national policy, of course, does not make a distinction between the noncriminal user and the addicted criminal. It is based on the Harrison Act of 1914, which made illegal the sale, importation, and possession of opiates in the United States. Kaplan maintains that this approach has produced many unacceptable consequences ("costs") including an increase in crime, the creation of a black market in drugs, an erosion of civil liberties, overcrowded dockets and prisons, and pain suffered by addicts, users, and their families. In Kaplan's view, these "costs" outweigh any benefits that might be gained by using the criminal justice apparatus against both addicts and noncriminal users of heroin.

Although Kaplan is skillful in his use of interdisciplinary materials, there are several methodological problems. We are told, for example, that the costs and benefits of alternative policies will be examined. However, no rigorous cost-benefit analysis is undertaken. Rather, Kaplan tends to focus on the advantages and disadvantages of each policy. Nor are we offered a statement of the criteria to be used in evaluating the alternatives. Also, even Kaplan concedes that much of his analysis is made on the basis of insufficient data.

Kaplan's solution to the heroin problem is presented in the last chapter. He argues that a program of "coerced treatment" using methadone would be more economical and effective than imprisonment for the use offender. Under this program, the violator of a heroin offense would either be required to enter a treatment center as a condition of probation or be imprisoned. There is some evidence, moreover, that "coerced treatment" would reduce both the amount of heroin use and the crime associated with use. Given the high costs of isolation and deterrence, Kaplan recommends extending this program to addict criminals. Crimes committed by nonaddicted users would not be handled under the treatment program, since there is no causal connection between drug use and criminality. Finally, Kaplan argues that a cost-effective and humane policy would remove all governmental intrusion into the lives of law-abiding nonaddicted users of heroin.

In the final analysis, Kaplan's solution to the heroin problem is not convincing. He concedes, for example, that "we cannot be sure whether we would be better off ignoring all use offenses and coercing into treatment only those addicts who have been caught committing crimes" (p. 233). Also, as Kaplan admits, no attention has been given to the political obstacles that might prevent adoption of his proposal.

RODNEY A. GRUNES

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State Government Influence in U.S. International Economic Policy. By John M. Kline. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. xiii + 266. \$27.95.)

During the past decade, state governments probably have become more influential in domestic issues. A main assertion of this book is that state governments also have emerged as a significant force in affecting U.S. international economic policies. Despite our recognition that the U.S. is an intergovernmental structure, this premise is sure to provoke skepticism.

Assume momentarily that the assertion is correct. Why have states become important actors in international economic issues? According to Kline, two primary changes have occurred. First, global economic interdependence has penetrated to a level where state government interests are affected and where states possess significant legal or regulatory authority. Second, state governments have more organizational capabilities within their states and on an interstate basis, they have improved their lobbying campaigns, and they have become more successful in achieving their aims. Put differently, international economic forces have "provided the states with the economic interest and, through overlapping jurisdictional authorities, the operational levers, to become involved . . . [while] concomitant organizational improvements in state lobbying and support mechanisms provided the access channels to project state influence to the national policymaking level" (p. 3).

Overall, the major arguments and the case study data are convincing, with several notable exceptions. The most glaring deficiency is the absence of an answer, or a model for deriving an answer, to the question of how influential have states become. Are states now more influential on most issues than international banks or the State Department? Kline does not claim states now play a dominant role, but readers are left with little idea of the relative influence of states in comparison with other actors across a range of economic issues.

A second major weakness is the evidence presented on the organizational capability argument. States are more organized than they were a decade ago, but so are all the other players. While the case studies present instances where success has been achieved, most state government leaders still subscribe to the "helpless executive thesis" on their ability to control matters within their own states. Governors as a group have even less influence on national economic issues and on international economic policies; most governors would see their influence as infinitesimal despite a stronger lobbying presence in Washington. State

legislators are practically ignored as a relevant group, an omission which would be hard to defend in the numerous states where the legislature is at least as strong as the governor.

There are other problems with the study. It is too long and the intended audience is unclear. Few timely recommendations are made, so the book would be marginal for practitioners. Although more appropriate for the academic community, the focus on states will inhibit its attractiveness to international relations scholars and researchers. A final problem is one of perspective. While there has been growth of state trade and investment promotion activities over the past 15 years as shown by Kline's data, on a relative basis the percent of state budgets and state economic development budgets allocated to foreign promotion in all cases is very small-less than 5% of states' economic development budgets. Even as economic development has been building toward a crescendo on states' agendas. and as some states are establishing specific export trade financing vehicles, state governments simply are not devoting many resources to international economic matters.

For all its limitations, this book has identified and documented the presence of a new group of actors in some international economic issues. In addition, there are excellent cases presented on states' investment restrictions, the unitary tax approach, and suggestions for redefining appropriate roles for states and the relevant federal agencies.

Kline believes his research is "field defining" rather than "field refining." It is. Yet it is also essentially a book on the power of state governments. Unfortunately, that brings all the attendant problems that empirical power research has had over the past 25 years. Some readers will be disturbed by the imprecise methodology and by the imprecise conclusion that states are more important than they were previously; others will overlook this problem and view the study as a pioneering one.

JAMES E. JARRETT

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Environmental Regulation: The Political Effects of Implementation. By Laura M. Lake. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. 153. \$20.95.)

This is an overly ambitious work that covers a plethora of environmental law cases and political science theories. Although primarily useful as a bibliographical reference, it does present some interesting ideas, for example, that congressional

exemption from environmental regulations of major energy projects such as the Alaska Pipeline has violated the "legal rights of due process and state sovereignty" (p. 22), and that the increasing use of the courts for environmental litigation is undermining the judiciary's legitimacy and emasculating the power of Congress. Unfortunately, the ideas are not systematically developed within a theoretical framework. There are even the beginnings of some worthwhile case studies in this work that are not adequately developed.

The thesis of Environmental Regulation is that "in the process of attempting to implement federal laws, political relations and institutions are changed in profound ways" (p. 1). This is particularly true of post-1969 environmental protection and pollution control laws, which mandated specific standards and deadlines and granted citizens the right to sue the national government and state governments to force compliance. Hence, state sovereignty is undermined, and citizens and public interest groups increasingly engage in litigation rather than in the lobbying of legislators.

We are told that the flood of environmental legislation came about because presidential contenders such as Senators Muskie and Jackson and President Nixon were eager to be identified with environmental protection. However, Lake ignores, for example, that Edmund Muskie had a pro-environmental record that dated back to his governorship of Maine in the fifties. She also neglects the implications of partisanship. Riley Dunlap, who is cited in Lake's excellent Political Science Ouarterly article on mass environmental attitudes (1983, 98, 215-233), has demonstrated through roll call analysis that Democrats are significantly more supportive than Republicans of environmental proposals at both the congressional and legislative levels just as they are generally more supportive of regulatory pro-

A peculiar aspect of the work is Lake's criticism of environmentalists for their exploitation of the judiciary because they perceive its members to be more sympathetic to environmental goals than members of the executive or legislative branches. Yet, she admits that legislative monitoring of environmental regulation is inadequate and that the Carter and Reagan administrations have been insensitive to environmental goals. One reason she considers environmental reliance on the courts a mistake is that surveys have shown members of the bench to be economic conservatives, and hence, if they acquire the habit of engaging in substantive judicial review in environmental cases, they may also do so in economic ones, but in those cases decide in a conservative manner. Why should that concern an environmentalist? It is well known that ideological constraint is low in the United States. Additionally, Lake finds in her *Political Science Quarterly* article that environmentalists are mainly centrists and so not necessarily liberal on economic issues. She is concerned that in the long run the legitimacy of the judiciary itself, not to mention that of the other branches of government, will be undermined. It seems unrealistic to expect environmentalists with shortrange political goals in mind to be concerned about the legitimacy of the judiciary.

Environmental Regulation makes only a modest contribution to our knowledge of the political effects of implementation. One hopes that Lake more fully develops a selected few of its themes in later writings.

HENRY B. SIRGO

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The Reluctant Patron: The United States Government and the Arts, 1943-1965. By Gary O. Larson. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 314. \$30.00, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

The Reluctant Patron is an account of the years between the demise of the New Deal art programs and the establishment of the National Endowments for the Arts and Humanities during the Great Society era. Contrary to the common perception that little happened regarding arts policy during this period, Larson demonstrates that a great deal transpired, and that it was related both to what preceded and to what followed. Essentially, The Reluctant Patron implies that the policies of the New Deal era failed to establish the arts as an item on the federal policy agenda. It then proceeds to recount how arts policy reappeared on the public agenda, as well as what attitudes, activities, and events influenced the eventual formulation and enactment of a new federal arts policy in the mid-1960s.

Larson is best at detailing the long debate over a public role in the arts. The arguments that developed during this period, both for and against governmental involvement, clearly resound into the present. The chief objections as voiced then (pp. 78-92) are amazingly similar to the initial positions of the Reagan administration. These included the belief that federal involvement in the arts represented an "invasion" of the proper authority of the states, that it would result in centralized censorship and encourage mediocrity rather than excellence, that there were more urgent and important ways to spend federal money (particularly when confronted by large federal deficits and an increasing public debt),

and, finally, that the arts were historically an area where private initiative and local support were paramount.

Similarly, proponents of a supportive federal policy toward the arts, both then and now, argue that the arts are an element of national prestige, are a useful tool of cultural diplomacy and enhance the quality of life domestically. Furthermore, they observe that the precarious economic condition of the arts seems to require an infusion of public funds if they are to continue to flourish. (See chaps. 6 and 7.)

This book is well-reasoned and well-documented. Larson has made extensive use of primary sources, including both government documents and individual interviews. Indeed, he presents a very useful guide and summary of many of the relevant congressional hearings, public documents, and arts community activities of the period.

Despite its merits, however, The Reluctant Patron is flawed and incomplete as an exercise in policy analysis. In many ways the book is too narrow. For example, the events of the period are seen primarily from the perspective of the visual arts. Relatively little is said about the performing arts. While there are similarities between the two. there are also important differences in the course of governmental-artistic relations in each area. Even within the visual arts, Larson overemphasizes the importance and political impact of abstract expressionism. Although probably the most dynamic artistic movement of the late 1940s and the 1950s, surely it was not the only artistic activity exerting an influence upon public, especially congressional, opinion regarding the arts.

The book focuses, perhaps too heavily, on congressional actors, attitudes, proposals, and actions. The changing social and economic context and its impact on the arts is not fully articulated. Although alluded to briefly, the appearance and relevance of various state or foreign bureaucratic models such as the New York State Arts Council or the British and Canadian arts councils are neither described nor discussed adequately. Finally, Larson presumes that his readers are intimately familiar with key events and actors in this policy area. As a result, his narrative is occasionally cryptic, and his sense of time is sometimes vague and uncertain.

In short, The Reluctant Patron is an excellent effort to gather and present significant information about what happened regarding federal arts policy from 1943 to 1965. It fails, however, to explain why these developments occurred. Thus, instead of analyzing the roots of current public policy on the arts, The Reluctant Patron merely collects, summarizes, and distills much of the raw

material that will be necessary to undertake such an analysis.

MARGARET JANE WYSZOMIRSKI

Rutgers University

Urban Land Policy for the 1980s: The Message for State and Local Government. Edited by George Lefcoe. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. xix + 211. \$28.95.)

This book is a compendium of 10 papers, with comments and discussion, presented at a conference, sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, to assess the implications of the Reagan new federalism for state-local urban land policy. The papers are uniformly excellent, typically presenting the latest research of the mostly academic authors. The central thread is the role of urban land as a public resource.

The compendium is organized into six topical sections. In section 1, Larry Kimbell and David Shulman's paper forecasts the implications of Reaganomics for California governments. They anticipate a one-third drop in public infrastructure investment. In 1982, California lost \$1.5 billion in federal funds. While tax relief should spur business growth, this growth will demand infrastructure investment limited by tax ceilings. In section 2, Donald Hicks (author of the Carter administration's urban policy report) argues that the purpose of a national urban land policy should not be to channel urbanization into declining areas or away from growing areas. Continuing suburbanization results from basic economic trends generated by irreversible evolution from an industrial to a service economy.

Section 3 examines the British national land planning system. The U.K. has a very different approach to housing, land use, property taxation, and financing of local services involving a large public housing sector and major central government subventions. Peter Hall concludes that British policies established in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, which nationalized the right to develop land and provided compensation for private losses, have been significantly reversed by the Thatcher government. The new approach —involving efforts to reduce spending growth by local authorities, accelerate sale of public housing to tenants, and develop a private building industry-would have been forced by economic conditions regardless of party. Donald Denman criticizes British policies as lacking a defined mission. The inevitable result has been ambiguity and conflict over land use decisions. He draws the basic lesson that public land planning will necessarily

fail unless private incentives coincide with welldefined public goals.

In the next section, Dale Keyes evaluates the Reagan energy and environmental programs, with interesting comments by Richard D. Lamm, governor of Colorado. Keyes concludes that rising fuel prices will not reshape location preferences. Better insulation, smaller homes, and fuel-efficient cars should permit continued suburbanization. He foresees conflict between polluting and amenity-conscious industries over suburban locations. Lamm is critical of changing federal policies that might endanger the environment. The federal government has an enormous influence over land use, economic development, and environmental quality in the Western states.

The fifth section focuses on state-local financing with papers by George Peterson on public infrastructure, E. Gareth Hoachlander on education, and Patrick Coughlan on innovative alternatives. Capital spending has dropped to one-half its share of state-local budgets since 1960. However, federal standards may bear no necessary relationship to minimum-service levels. School finance in California has declined by 15% since Proposition 13, but federal aid is only 2 or 3\% of district budgets. Hoachlander recommends tuition tax credits, vouchers, and smaller districts to promote community participation. State assumption of school financing frees district structure from the local property tax base. Coughlan evaluates user charges, special assessments, and special taxes; California governments are particularly looking to developers and businesses.

The final section concerns national housing policy. Wallace Smith recommends replacement of the thrift industry by a government lender. The industry has collapsed trying to compete for nonmortgage financial services. Ira Lowry finds a surplus, not a shortage, of rental housing measured in terms of returns to investors, who are going bankrupt from rising real costs and falling real rents. He recommends rent supplements for the truly needy rather than rent control or construction subsidy.

**DUANE WINDSOR** 

Rice University

Wall-to-Wall America: A Cultural History of Post-Office Murals in the Great Depression. By Karal Ann Marling. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 348. \$35.00, cloth; \$14.95, paper.)

If Wall-to-Wall America were only the careful study that it is of the mural art commissioned by the Treasury Department's Section on Fine Arts during the New Deal, it would deserve the attention of students of American politics. Between 1933 and 1942 about 1,200 murals were competitively selected to embellish post offices around the country. The mural program was part of a much larger federal cultural effort and is not to be confused with the better-known WPA arts projects. The WPA existed primarily to give work to unemployed artists. The Section, however, sought foremost to produce art of good quality that would both satisfy and elevate popular taste and would be suitable for a public facility. This was no easy set of goals and that many murals were highly controversial should not be surprising.

Marling's book, however, recommends itself for more than its evaluation of the artistic properties of the murals and of the Section's administrative history. Wall-to-Wall America provides an analysis of the political and ideological contexts in which decisions were made about which murals to commission. Politically, mural selection involved the interaction of an "iron triangle" of patron, painter, and public. As patrons the Section's cultural bureaucrats were painstaking in their scrutiny of mural production from design to execution. They were particularly vigilant to safeguard against any thematic or stylistic deviations from what they deemed to be high quality. Artists had wide freedom in executing murals on acceptable themes. Despite a tendency to "paint Section," murals encompassed a fair variety of artistic styles although the juried selection process favored the conventional. The public could be understanding on stylistic matters, but it was insistent that the murals be accurate in depicting local geography, traditional in the depiction of historical incidents, and unconcerned with the harsher realities of the Great Depression.

This description of the process of cultural policymaking is fascinating, but more illuminating is what this public art says about the intersection of art and ideology. Marling argues that the subject matter and to a lesser degree the artistic style of the murals (such as the avoidance of modernism) tells us what Depression-era Americans thought about themselves, their present, and the past. Marling describes the iconography of "murals as murals should be" accordingly:

Work was the fiber of the past and the key to the future; it was the steady, business-as-usual heartbeat of Mural America. Grim or sad expressions, even pleasant ones, are hard to find there. The visages of the American workers are, at their emotional extreme, merely preoccupied; they hold their breath at the thrill of a job. Most of the time, they are sublimely contented and content to let their faces register the homely, humdrum routine of a welcome day's work, well and truly done. (p. 174)

Murals that deviated from the accepted ideology risked rejection, revision, ridicule, or (as happened in Aiken, South Carolina) being hidden from public view.

Wall-to-Wall America crosses the boundaries of history, art history, and political science. These largely forgotten and poorly judged post office murals could become an essential element for our understanding of popular attitudes in the 1930s. It is an impressive undertaking in interdisciplinary conceptualization; equally impressive is the archival and field research that was involved. While this book will be of greatest interest to those who specialize in cultural policymaking, it should also be required reading for field seminars in American politics. The question of whether these works are good or bad art is largely incidental to their political value for what they tell us about the style of mass belief systems.

KEVIN V. MULCAHY

Louisiana State University

Political Parties and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970. By Doug McAdam. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. viii + 304. \$25.00.)

Doug McAdam provides strikingly logical reviews and analyses of the "classical model" of mass movemnts (variously titled relative deprivation, rising expectations, status inconsistency) and the resource mobilization model and proposes a third, the political process model. Unfortunately, that ambitious and impressive beginning stalls midway through the book as McAdam compares various aspects of the three models to the civil rights movement.

First, McAdam seeks to unite the political science and sociological literatures which, he states, have developed in isolation of each other. Second, he rejects the assumptions of the classical model, that the significant actor in mass movements is the isolated anomic individual in search of social-psychological security, and that social strain is the primary variable which gives rise to mass movements. He disassembles the components of the models grouped under the broad title classical theory and hypothesizes that a mass movement is likely to occur when variations arise in factors other than social strain.

Third, McAdam argues that the resource mobilization model focuses on the role of elites in providing dissatisfied groups with the means to challenge the status quo but points out the logical fallacy involved; in all probability elites seek to contain mass movements rather than to goad them into political conflict. McAdam notes that even disadvantaged groups experiencing social strain have resources that can be mobilized effectively under certain circumstances into an organized political movement.

McAdam's political process model is thus based on the assumption that social or political movements arise from variations in indigenous organizational strength, the structure of political opportunities in the larger community, and the degree of cognitive liberation in the group. The model identifies and successfully resolves a number of anomalies left unsettled by the social strain theory through McAdam's excellent analysis.

Finally, McAdam examines the context for the rise of black insurgency, and its generation, peak, and decline. Here I found his treatment of the historical context of the civil rights movement most convincing, with the successive chapters decreasingly satisfactory. The empirical sections of the book are weak on two counts. Most of the data, on demonstrations, organizations, and issue areas are based on The New York Times Index. It strains credulity to think that the *Index* is more than a rough indication of events; some types of protest and some protesting organizations may have been underreported relative to others. Since McAdam rightly notes it is difficult (although I would argue not impossible) to find alternative sources, I now turn to his inconsistent use of data.

In one example, McAdam identifies several types of groups: churches, colleges, and formal movement organizations. He also creates a separate category for local NAACP chapters, but places the national NAACP office with formal movements without explanation (p. 126). Next. McAdam provides no definition of insurgency. Political protest, demonstrations, and marches might, from the text, seem to be a good working definition, except that the NAACP's legal actions are also counted as insurgent. Since the NAACP has been active in legal areas for decades, should its earlier activity be considered insurgent? If so, what provoked it? These are important issues because they strain McAdam's attempts at creating a theoretically consistent model.

Finally, McAdam presents two tables which summarize movement initiated events from 1955 to 1960 and from 1955 to 1965. In the first, he argues that black colleges, churches, and the NAACP initiated the majority of movement events from 1955 to 1960. In the second, he argues that formal movement organizations dominated the initiation of events from 1961 to 1965. The number of movement incidents in the 1955 to 1960 period doubles without explanation from the first table to the second (pp. 126, 147). Secondly, what does it mean for his model if McAdam emphasizes the shift from indigenous (presumably church,

college, and NAACP), to formal organizations over time, but the NAACP has been categorized as both indigenous and formal? Since the NAACP disappears from the second table even in local form, I presume McAdam has converted it into an entirely formal group, thereby making his point through, at best, confusing procedures.

These and other data application and interpretation problems are particularly unfortunate. Despite my criticism of his handling of the civil rights movement, McAdam's theoretical analysis and his political process model disentangle a great many previously unsatisfactory explanations of these events.

DIANNE M. PINDERHUGHES

Dartmouth College

Fiscal Federalism and the Taxation of Natural Resources. Edited by Charles E. McLure, Jr. and Peter Mieszkowski. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. v + 260. \$35.95.)

The chapters of this book were presented originally as papers at a conference of the Committee on Taxation, Resources and Economic Development (TRED) under the auspices of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. The majority of the authors are economists by profession, but the issues addressed make this book of considerable appeal and usefulness to political scientists who are resource and fiscal policy specialists as well as those concerned with intergovernmental relations and constitutional law.

Two major themes recur throughout the book. One basic set of issues concerns the legal and constitutional aspects of tax jurisdiction in the federal systems of the United States and Canada where natural resources, particularly energy resources, are involved. The provincial governments of Canada have broad and explicit constitutional powers to tax as well as to control resource. development and revenue stemming from ownership of crown land and from their ability to play an entrepreneurial role in the production and marketing of provincial resources. By contrast, the states have more limited powers and have been subjected to litigation and congressional scrutiny regarding the rate of severance taxes levied by energy producing states. Constitutional provisions contained in the commerce clause and in the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment have proved to be insufficient bases for Supreme Court adjudication of tax controversies, thus placing the major responsibility for federal intervention in state taxation policies with the Congress.

The other major focus of the book is upon the

disparities among the states and provinces in fiscal capacity. Because of the dramatic increase in energy prices following the actions of the OPEC cartel, states with substantial coal and oil deposits have had available unprecedented revenue sources flowing from energy production. Severance taxes, royalties, property taxes, and corporate income taxes are some of the mechanisms available for capture of profits in the private sector. Comparisons among states' fiscal capacities either by examination of revenues by source or by use of the representative tax system (RTS) method lead to the conclusion that there is a notable gap and "have not" between "have" producing states due to an uneven distribution of natural resources. This gives rise to a host of equity and efficiency issues regarding the consequences of taxation upon investment and production decisions as well as upon regional migration patterns and the provision of public goods. The Provincial Fiscal Equalization Program of the Canadian government demonstrates one approach to these issues whereby resource-poor provinces (as determined by deficiencies in fiscal capacity relative to the national average) receive transfers of federal revenue to compensate for differential revenue sources.

This book is a timely one and deals with a subject area that will continue to grow in importance as a theoretical and applied field. The format of the book includes comments upon each chapter by one or more scholars, and these are instructive critiques as well as sources of additional analysis. One deficiency of the book is its inattention to the costs of social and environmental externalities associated with the exploitation of natural resources as, for example, are discussed by John V. Krutilla and Anthony C. Fisher in Economic and Fiscal Impacts of Coal Development (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). Further, there is only a cursory treatment of the options for distribution of energy revenues received by states and provinces such as tax reductions, enhanced public services, or creation of trust funds for future and/or present investment purposes.

KATHLEEN O. JACKSON

University of Montana

Uncle Sam's Private, Profitseeking Corporations. By Lloyd Musolf. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982. Pp. vii + 126. \$18.95.)

There is an important debate that is ongoing among students of public organizations. It concerns the ways in which public organizations are different than private organizations and how some public organizations are different than other public organizations. This thin volume has something to say on both counts.

The book examines a unique type of organization—the private, profitseeking corporation that has been created by an act of Congress rather than a stock issue. This type of organization is clearly close to the line where public becomes private, assuming this is a dichotomy. It may be well to remember Amitai Etzioni's admonition that dichotomies are the curse of the thinking person. Private, profit-seeking, and public seem more like a contradiction rather than a point on a public-private continuum.

The four organizations that Musolf examines—Comsat, Fannie Mae, Amtrak, and Conrail—come close to a census of this type of organization, as there are only six in existence in the U.S. All are quite different than the average bureau that is the standard fare of most studies of public organizations.

One of the most intriguing points made is that the source of funding is a critical variable in explaining behavior of Comsat and Fannie Mae versus Conrail and Amtrak. Both Conrail and Amtrak rely heavily on direct government subsidy. Each suffers from political interference, decisions based on political rather than an economic rationale, and an unending concern with maintaining the subsidy. It has been said of Amtrak that politics is the only reason it exists, and it would be far cheaper to close it and give everyone who called for reservations a bus ticket and \$10.

Comsat and Fannie Mae, while in vastly different "businesses" (satellite communication and the secondary mortgage market), both display behavior usually associated with for-profit firms. If source of funding is the key ingredient in defining "publicness," then it supports the view expressed in Gary L. Wamsley and Mayer N. Zald's The Political Economy of Public Organizations (D.C. Heath, 1973) that organizations dependent on public funding exhibit characteristics associated with bureaus in the subsystem politics literature. Others have suggested that the key to the distinction is whether the good produced is collective or divisible in nature.

Musolf suggests another explanation that certainly accounts for some of the variance between the four organizations. Comsat was new, innovative, and aided by technological breakthroughs that brought down the projected costs of operation. Fannie Mae had a successful history before it geared up to handle the increased volume of federally guaranteed mortgages in the 1960s and 1970s. By contrast, Amtrak and Conrail became public institutions because of bankruptcy, decline, and neglect.

Interesting as the question of "publicness" is, it is not Musolf's intention to directly add to our knowledge on this score. His task is to trace the development of the government-created, private, profit-seeking corporation through an examination of the legislative histories surrounding each of the four corporations.

On this score the book could serve as an introduction to any one of the organizations, however, it cannot stand as either a detailed examination of any one or as a comparative study of one type of organization. The book is short on the kind of analysis that would make it a comparative case study. However, the book is like a good appetizer that satisfies one's initial hunger and whets the appetite for more substantial fare.

H. BRINTON MILWARD

University of Kentucky

The Social Constraints on Energy-Policy Implementation. Edited by Max Neiman and Barbara J. Burt. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. vii + 213. \$28.95.)

Virtually all books concerned with energy policy begin by noting the lack of a national comprehensive energy plan and end by recommending that the federal government adopt one of two energy strategies-either government-encouraged conservation or a free market, the choice depending on the author's ideological bent. Neiman and Burt are to be commended for their selection of articles, which illustrate well the scope, the complexity, and the major political and social obstacles to the development of rational energy policies at all levels of government. The articles range from an economic analysis of the federal government's oil and gas leasing program to a case study of the impact of transit station location upon energy use.

Of particular note are the articles by Michael D. Reagan and Michael F. Sheehan. Reagan's article traces many of the barriers to the formation of a national energy policy to the federal system and the attending problems of intergovernmental relations. According to Reagan, the lack of a national consensus on an appropriate energy strategy is exacerbated by the federal system and the necessary reliance of the national government on the states for policy implementation. Sheehan focuses upon the recent state and federal regulation of the electric utility industry and the resulting problems of policy implementation. His argument that government policy encouraged the electric power companies to embark upon a disastrous excessive capacity building during the 1970s is quite persuasive. Sheehan's proposed rate reforms concomitent with his suggestion that the industry be permitted diversification is equally convincing.

Several of the other selections report attempts by local governments to implement energy conserving legislation. Although the various authors lament the general ineffectiveness of these policies, they overlook one of the most significant reason for this failure. Despite the rising costs of energy in recent years, for most governments the proportion of their budgets devoted to energy remains relatively small. Thus the incentives for conservation for most units are lacking.

The serious researcher in energy policy implementation and assessment would do well to examine the selections of Neiman and Burt. They would also find the proposition inventory in the article by Gerry Riposa to be extremely helpful. In addition, those policymakers involved in policy formulation could benefit from the research reported here.

The rather terse introduction by the editors to each of the selections detracts from the book as a whole. It would have been most helpful to the lay reader, or the scholar just beginning to research this significant policy issue, had the editors provided a more thorough literature review in their introduction, followed by comments explaining how the included articles extend our knowledge of policy implementation. Except for this limitation, the book is a significant addition to the substantive issue of energy policy and the more general problem of policy implementation.

DAVID D. DABELKO

Ohio University

The Reagan Experiment. Edited by John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill. (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1982. Pp. vii + 530. \$29.95, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

In The Reagan Experiment John Palmer, Isabel Sawhill, and their Urban Institute colleagues set forth the Reagan administration's domestic policy goals, outline the specific policies designed to achieve them, and examine the evidence to determine whether the policies have produced the desired results.

As Palmer and Sawhill state in the initial chapter, the administration's goals are clear: to generate economic recovery, to provide a stronger national defense, and "to transfer significant powers and responsibilities to state and local government, state and local governments and the authors' careful analysis of the policies aimed at reaching these goals begins with an examination of the tax and regulatory policies that are the essential elements of President Reagan's program

for economic recovery. The focus then shifts to the changing relationships between the national government, state and local governments, and the nonprofit sector. The administration social policies in a number of areas such as health and education are examined. The concluding chapters are devoted to an assessment of the overall impact of the Reagan program on both regions of the country and on individuals.

This is a thorough and scholarly piece of work. Each of the authors studiously avoids partisan comments, although occasionally, as in the section on "Income Security" by James R. Storey, one has the distinct sensation of indignation on the part of an author as he/she describes the effects of policies like the "Safety Net."

In some areas, one finds the results of administration policies in keeping with the stated goals. For example, the authors find some real gains in both savings and productivity as a result of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, although the tax cuts under this act will clearly never be self-financing as true supply-siders had predicted them to be (chap. 4). Also, some small savings for business have probably resulted from a decrease in new government regulatory activity (chap. 5).

Some obvious failures of policy also appear. Although the administration desperately wanted to achieve a balanced budget, the tax and budget policies have interacted in such a way as to make the goal unreachable. The research indeed confirms the widely held opinion that it is impossible to enact nondefense spending cuts large enough to offset the revenues lost from the tax cut and required by the defense buildup (chap. 1).

In some places administration actions conflict with stated policy goals. A major effort, for example, has been made to provide "regulatory relief" for both public and private sectors through such measures as strict cost-benefit accounting, staff cuts, and suspension of regulations. Yet the number of rules and regulations applied to welfare programs has actually increased. And proposed deregulation of the trucking industry has been shelved as a result of industry pressure (chap. 5).

One result of Reagan policies is certainly clear. In the matter of tax cuts, employment training, social service, health, education, income security, and housing, the neediest recipients are those who will suffer most from program changes. Indeed, the much-advertised "safety net" for the "truly needy" does not include many on the edges of poverty such as employed welfare recipients and the long-term unemployed. As Storey states, the net has "proved to be a term that categorized people not by their degree of current financial need nor by their vulnerability to future economic insecurity. Rather, it appears to have been used

primarily to delineate and protect the benefits of those for whom cutbacks would likely have aroused the strongest reaction in Congress' (p. 383).

Finally, it is obvious from the analyses found in *The Reagan Experiment* that the American political system has undergone profound social and economic changes since 1980, and that the legacy of the Reagan administration will shape governmental policy for many years to come.

MARGARET V. MOODY

Auburn University at Montgomery

Energy and the Western United States: Politics and Development. Edited by James L. Regens, Robert W. Rycroft, and Gregory A. Daneke. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. viii + 195. \$24.95.)

This book includes 10 chapters contributed by 14 authors or coauthors as well as a short eleventh summary chapter by the three editors. Morris Udall, in a very brief preface, sets the tone of the work. Most of the authors are political scientists, but other disciplines also are represented.

The major factors relating to energy and the American West are discussed: the potential for energy production (James Regens), land use (Timothy Hall), water and its scarcity (Steven Ballard), town planning and growth (David Hill and Daniel Schler, also Gregory Daneke), Indian tribes (David Schaller), federal versus state versus private control of land (Hanna Cortner and Helen Ingram), policies to mitigate energy development impacts (Allyn Brosz), and voting patterns of western state representatives and senators in Washington on energy issues (Henry Kenski and Michael Bowers).

Many chapters in *Energy and the Western United States* were originally papers given at various conferences; several were written under contract for government agencies. They are based primarily on research and data from the late 1970s and 1980 through 1981. Some limited rewriting and updating with 1982 information and trends was added when the papers were collected for the book.

Uncertainty and rapidly changing events create difficulties for this collection of readings. In many ways circumstances in 1983 and for the near future differ markedly from the environment of just a few years earlier. The emphasis of many of these chapters is that great energy developments are imminent, but these predictions of several years ago now seem postponed indefinitely. The changing times have particularly outdated the chapter "National Security: Synfuels and the MX

System" by Robert Rycroft and James Monaghan. It focuses on the Carter administration MX proposals for a massive, wide-ranging missile system in Nevada and Utah. Now these proposals seem like ancient history and have been superseded by two quite different proposed configurations from the Reagan administration. Also, a huge synfuels program discussed in the chapter is today basically dead.

Several of the chapters could have been tied somewhat more explicitly to the theme of energy by relatively minor rewriting. For example, one of most interesting chapters is "The Case of the Sagebrush Rebellion" by Hanna Cortner and Helen Ingram, but the reader (at least this reviewer) is left to guess how the chapter relates directly to energy. A simple explanation probably could have integrated this chapter more successfully with energy development.

In their short summary the editors do note that "the conventional wisdom of the 1980s as an energy decade increasingly appears to have been a mirage" (p. 183). And they concede that the "concerns that prompted this volume may not present themselves in the precise context and configuration we initially envisioned" (p. 185), that is, huge, fast-paced energy developments causing enormous dislocations in the region.

They plead correctly, however, that the "long-range prospects for energy policy remain much the same" (p. 186). The Western states have been granted a reprieve: "the current hiatus provides a unique opportunity for cooperative planning" (p. 187). They suggest, too, that not a great deal of future preparation by either public or private sectors will be done until another future burst of energy development has inevasible momentum. The problems of handling the topic of energy development plainly reveal the frustration and confusion of attempting to analyze and plan for unpredictable and rapid political, economic, and technological changes.

DANIEL SLOAN

University of Colorado at Boulder

Public Administration and Law: Bench v. Bureau in the United States. By David H. Rosenbloom. (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1983. Pp. x + 236. \$27.50.)

This is a good book and an important one. It is good because it meets its stated goals; important because its goals are important. These goals are stated in the Preface, where Rosenbloom tells us "the task of this book" is to meet a threefold need in the field of public administration. "What

is needed is an approach that places the study of law squarely within the context of public administration, focuses on constitutional law and values, and also explains the radical expansion of the judicial role in public administration" (p. v). The author succeeds in meeting each of these needs.

He "places the study of law squarely within the context of public administration" by integrating law and administration rather than simply juxtaposing them. The first two chapters examine administrative history and the federal judiciary; but each of these topics is examined in terms of its relationship to the other. For example, the traditional counter-majoritarian problem associated with judicial review of acts of Congress is modified skillfully when applied to judicial review of administrative regulations. This integrating pattern is followed throughout the book. Each of the four chapters that treat topics of public law begins by establishing the inherent connection between the legal issue at hand and familiar administrative practices.

Rosenbloom's second task is to focus on "constitutional law and values." This is done by contrasting the bureaucratic values of the administrative state ("hierarchy, seniority, command, unity, and differentiated expertise") with the constitutional and democratic values of "equality, rotation-in-office, freedom, pluralism, and the presumption that all citizens are sufficiently competent (i.e., expert) to take part in elections and politics" (p. 19). This contrast is the major theme of the book. It is sustained convincingly throughout four thoughtful chapters that examine the administrative state in its relationship to its clients, its employees, its captives, and its antagonists in litigation. What unifies these chapters is a strong normative argument that administrators should accommodate their traditional values of economy and efficiency to the constitutional imperatives of diversity and personal liberty.

Rosenbloom's third task is to explain the "radical expansion of the judicial role in public administration." Here he presents a fascinating argument. It is the judiciary's traditional concern with individual rights that grounds its claim to join with Congress and the president in controlling the administrative state and thereby to preserve its coequal constitutional position. To do this, the courts have created new constitutional rights for clients, employees, and captives of the administrative state. These substantive rights have been supplemented with a new and considerably relaxed doctrine of official immunity that enables the recipients of these rights to make them effective in litigation. In a brilliant concluding section, Rosenbloom argues that the link between the courts' efforts in creating new rights and remedies explains "the fundamental coherence of the judicial response to the rise of the administrative state" (p. 213).

The only serious flaw in this book is that Rosenbloom's view of constitutional values is too narrow. He approaches the Constitution as though its purpose were simply to limit a government rather than create one and sustain it in being. This is understandable given Rosenbloom's strong interest in the courts, but it has the disadvantage of emphasizing the amendments to the Constitution at the expense of the Constitution itself. At times Rosenbloom tends to collapse constitutional values into judicial values and this, in turn, leads him to overstate the conflict between administration and the Constitution. The conflict is genuine: the author is absolutely convincing on this point. He goes too far, however, when he says the framers of the Constitution established a government that was "highly inefficient by design," and that a "governmental capability to act quickly and to implement forcefully was precisely what the founders hoped to avoid" (p. 77). Rosenbloom gives too little attention to the salience within the constitutional tradition of Publius' powerful argument that it is only a government that is vigorous, firm, efficient, and energetic that will be able to protect individual rights.

JOHN A. ROHR

Virginia Polytechnic Institute

Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs. By Peter H. Schuck. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. xxi + 262. \$25.00.)

"Lawbreaking is endemic to government" (p. xi). With these sobering introductory words Peter Schuck matter-of-factly sets the proper tone for his book about society's efforts to mitigate the harsh reality of official misconduct. Schuck argues that remedies for governmental lawlessness should promote four values: vigorous decision making, compensation, moral exemplification, and deterrence. In his view, the current piecemeal system of holding officials personally liable for government lawbreaking serves all these objectives quite poorly. Risk-averse bureaucrats dread the ordeal of personally responding to a civil suit. Vigorous decision making suffers as they become overly formal in the performance of their duties. Compensation and moral exemplification falter as plaintiffs succumb to a bewildering array of substantive and procedural barriers protecting official miscreants. Agency supervisors, moreover,

have little incentive to deter future wrongdoing. The government itself, save for a few niggardly exceptions, is as immune from civil suit as the most despotic Tudor or Stuart.

At this point in the book, disturbing quantitative questions arise: How widespread is official lawbreaking? How much does official liability undermine each of the four criteria? Schuck attempts answers to questions of this sort, burying crude statistics in appendixes, in footnotes, and between parentheses. He effectively invites the reader to improve upon a shoddy data base, then continues a largely hypothetical analysis. For all its trenchant clarity and thoroughness, the case presented may be a "best" or "worst" case. The reader cannot tell.

Schuck follows his critiques with a prescription: Replace official liability with a new system of governmental liability. Bureaucrats, under this new regime, would no longer face the daunting prospect of a personal lawsuit. Plaintiffs, rid of the barriers currently protecting lawbreaking officials, would receive compensation from the deep pockets of government. Society would enjoy seeing justice done. Finally, agency heads, responding to budgetary pressures, would implement programs to deter expensive future misconduct. Schuck would accomplish this final trick by having the offending agency, rather than the general treasury, bear the burden of satisfying judgments for damages.

All this may sound a bit idyllic, but Schuck anticipates this charge. The final third of the book deals with practical implementation strategies. Once again, the argument displays a rigorous thoroughness that the fainthearted, overlooking the clarity of Schuck's prose, will mistake for tedium. But academic reformers seem fated to critique and prescribe with more cogency than they can muster later when they turn to implementation. Schuck ignores the fact that self-appointed fiscal watchdogs are already protesting the expense of the extremely modest forms of government liability currently in place. He accepts as inevitable practical accommodations with judicial and prosecutorial immunity that will offend civil libertarians. Finally, he urges "specific deterrence" (by means of rules, injunctions, and other coercive interventions) of the agency that comes to regard damages as a routine cost of doing business. This final discussion assumes a "judicial restraintist" posture of such Bickelian purity that the reader closes the book feeling defeated. Perhaps we cannot control official lawlessness after all; maybe the system is too fragmented and too much subject to unbridled discretion at isolated

This is a difficult and sobering book, one richly suggestive of specific policy recommendations

and possible research projects. Anyone interested in the interplay of politics and law should read it.

BERT C. BUZAN

California State University, Fullerton

Congressional Realignment, 1925-1978. By Barbara Sinclair. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 201. \$25.00.)

Barbara Sinclair has written a timely study of congressional realignment from 1925 to 1978. With President Reagan's efforts to remake the country's political agenda, her book provides a backdrop for discussing recent congressional actions.

Sinclair poses three questions in her research: What are the sources of agenda change? What determines congressional voting alignments? Under what conditions are the barriers to major policy changes overcome? Using roll call analysis, she explores the cohesiveness and durability of House voting patterns by party and region. Briefly, she finds that most instances of major agenda change come from strong and discrete environmental stimuli, that is, the Depression, war, electoral landslide, or social movements. Given the structure of the American political process, major external forces are necessary to overcome institutional fragmentation. However, legislators, the congressional process, and reelection constituencies can mediate the flow of events by influencing how environmental forces are interpreted and how party alignments are developed.

The strengths of this book are twofold. First, Sinclair deserves credit for putting her work in a theoretical framework. By using an agendasetting approach, she has written a book that should interest scholars beyond the congressional roll call area. Second, unlike many congressional studies which are static in their orientation, she explicitly incorporates a change component in her analysis.

However, this book suffers from some of the limitations commonly associated with roll call analysis. Although the breadth of her coverage is impressive, Sinclair does not have any direct measure of constituency opinion (despite the fact that the notion of constituency plays an important role in her argument). In addition, the distinction between agenda, policy, and voting alignment changes sometimes becomes murky, since Sinclair uses roll calls to define all of them.

But these problems aside, Sinclair's analysis can be used to put recent congressional actions in an historical context. Although the book ends in 1978, before Reagan's efforts to redefine the national political agenda, her research offers some relevant ideas. By emphasizing the environmental stimulus of the 1980 elections and the important role that legislators played in interpreting Reagan's "mandate" for policy changes, one can put the policy actions of 1981 in a broader framework.

Because of its insight into past policy actions and its applicability to contemporary policy developments, I recommend Sinclair's book to scholars interested in congressional policymaking, agendasetting, and roll call analysis. The study is well-written and clearly organized, and it deserves careful attention.

DARRELL M. WEST

Brown University

The Political Economy of Public Policy. Edited by Alan Stone and Edward J. Harpham. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982. Pp. 272. \$25.00, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

This volume consists of an editors' introduction, 10 essays on themes related to political economy (generously defined in several instances), with subject and name indexes. The essays are uniformly well-edited, and several have considerable substantive merit. Part 1, "Ideology and the Political Economy" with chapters by Robert D. Holsworth and Raymond M. Seidelman, is the only really regrettable lapse in the generally informative anthology. Holsworth excoriates liberals for their incorrigible tendency at pragmatic compromise with the forces of reaction. Seidelman soundly thrashes the "corporatists" (a curious amalgam of institutions and personalities including, among others, Business Week, Lester Thurow, Felix Rohatyn, and Walter Mondale) for their unprogressive propensities. Since neither author takes alternative views seriously, their essays are more in the nature of journalistic scoldings than useful delineations of contending ideologies bearing on political economy.

More intreresting is Charles Noble's discussion of what he takes to be the failure of OSHA to fulfill its promise given the alleged dependence of the state on the capitalist system. Unfortunately, a data analysis of health and accidents trends in industry, either in the U.S. over time or between capitalist and socialist systems, is not presented, perhaps for reasons of space, making it impossible to assess whatever degree of failure may be involved. In his subtle essay, Alfred A. Marcus updates the position of the "new class" in American politics. He makes a strong, if not entirely convincing, case that the putative power of this privileged but adversarial "class," whose

existence has been given popular form by a number of prominent writers, has been greatly exaggerated and scattered and defeated by far more coherent and organized business forces in recent years. Elizabeth Sanders seeks to explain the development of the New Deal's social welfare and regulatory institutions. Although insights and leads are offered, the subject is far too complicated for such cursory, restricted treatment. It is useful, however, to note the discussion as a point of view worth further examination.

Kenneth J. Meier criticizes cost-benefit analysis for familiar deficiencies and makes the plea that politics is a superior form of policymaking. One can agree somewhat without rejecting altogether, as Meier appears to do, such technical aids to analysis. Markets, as an alternative to both politics and cost-benefit analysis, are not mentioned.

The book's most sophisticated essay on both empirical and analytic planes is Richard P. Barke's study of railroad abandonment decisions by the ICC. Barke avoids entirely the fallacy of confusing consequence with sequence that intrudes in several of the other essays and is common these days in much radical or critical scholarship. Genuinely new information is generated and a plausible political and administrative account is given for the decisions taken. Gerald Epstein advances an innovative if preliminary theory of Federal Reserve Board behavior that contrasts its formal role as an "independent" stabilizing agent with its alleged control by the banking industry. Kenneth Woodside writes on the corporation tax in Canada and Britain as symbolic politics. Gary Freeman and Paul Adams's essay is an excellent source for those interested in the growth, difficulties, and justifications of the Social Security system.

Most chapters are rich with references to related literature, a great help for those who would like to explore particular themes at greater length.

L. L. WADE

University of California, Davis

The War-Making Powers of the President: Constitutional and International Law Aspects. By Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. (Dallas: SMU Press, 1982. Pp. v + 177. \$15.00.)

In almost every administration, questions arise over who has the authority to commit U.S. forces to armed conflict (military action short of a declared war). In this relatively short work, the Thomases attempt to sort out the constitutional and international law aspects of the war powers.

In the first five chapters the authors present a good, but very sketchy (the first five chapters take only 33 pages), historical review of the war powers of the president as conceived by the Founders and as practiced through history. The brevity of these chapters makes them of only limited utility.

The book's substance is in chapter 6, "Constitutional and International Law Bases," in which the Thomases discuss the distinction between a formally declared war (war in the "legal sense"), a war in practice but undeclared (war in the "material sense"), and more limited hostilities. They conclude that "all theories permit some use of force by the President without congressional declaration. They differ on the degree of force which might permit the unilateral use or on the purpose of the force" (p. 49).

Given that there is no agreement on the amount of force a president may legally use in the absence of a declaration of war, what of the various components of the president's war powers? Here, there is some agreement. First, all parties agree that the congress has the power to "declare" war, and that once a war is declared, the president, as Commander-in-Chief, is responsible for conducting the war. Can Congress grant war-making power to the president without a declaration of war? Yes, "a formal congressional declaration of war is not necessary to express the consent of Congress to military action of a warlike nature" (p. 87).

What of "self-defense?" Has the president the power to repel sudden attacks? Again, the answer is yes (on practical if not Constitutional grounds). Can the president use the military to "suppress insurrection?" Yes, say the Thomases (p. 70). What of indirect threats to the nation's sovereignty? Here the problem becomes clouded.

Could, for example, the president use military force to protect the lives of U.S. citizens abroad? The Thomases say that in international law the answer is a clear yes, and in constitutional law the answer is a probable yes. What of the use of force to protect U.S. property abroad? Only, say the Thomases, if the "security of the state" were also endangered. Then, both international and constitutional law would permit the use of force by the president. Do American commitments based on mutual defense treaties with other countries allow the president to use military force? In international law, yes, but such a use of force might be unacceptable from a constitutional perspective. Treaties and executive agreements would seem to allow for the use of force in international law, but in constitutional law, it is not clear whether the president may use such force.

Does the president have independent war-making powers deriving from his role as Commander-in-Chief? The Thomases say that the president

"may" (p. 71) have some powers here, but it is also unclear.

The final chapter, "Congressional Attempts to Curb Presidential Power," focuses on one of the most important parts of the war-making problem: conflict and/or cooperation between the president and Congress. Unfortunately, the authors devote almost all of their attention to the conflict in Southeast Asia, and, while they do an excellent job of describing president-curbing efforts by the Congress in this period, a more historical perspective or review is needed to get a fuller picture of this problem.

In chapter 7, the Thomases look at the impact of the "War Powers Resolution of 1973." Citing the fact that since its passage, presidents have complied with the Resolution while claiming to do so only as a courtesy, the authors contend that "future Presidents could presumably bypass the resolution by claiming they are acting under other constitutional grants than that to the Commander-in-Chief" (p. 133).

In looking at the constitutional and international law restraints on the president's warmaking power, the authors beg certain questions. To what extent are presidents constrained by the Constitution or by international law? To what extent does the Constitution really matter when dealing with a resolute president determined to act?

Since there is no conclusion in the book, we are not given the benefit of a summation of just what power the president has in war making, but since the Thomases present no clear view on what the proper limits of presidential power might be, I think that we can assume that "the power of the President to commit forces abroad remains a dark continent of American jurisprudence" (p. 146).

MICHAEL A. GENOVESE

Loyola Marymount University

The Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of the War of American Independence. By Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. viii + 450. \$24.00.)

The Fall of the First British Empire covers the period from the peace settlement of 1763 following the Seven Years' War to the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington and Concord in the spring of 1775. The central concern of the authors is to explain how the First British Empire, at its zenith in 1763 with victory over the French in North America, broke up just over a decade later with the American colonies in armed revolt. In the course of this investigation Tucker and Hendrick-

son challenge the analysis and interpretation of nineteenth- and twentieth-century historical scholarship.

The major criticism made by the authors of this historiography is that it accepted the colonists' position of the conflict. Both colonists and later historians accepted the position that the crisis between the colonists and Britain was due to British imperial policy, post-1763, which trampled upon the rights and autonomy the colonies had enjoyed previously. It was thus the British attempt to embark upon a policy of imperial reform which, by violating long-established colonial-imperial relationships, destroyed the status quo and precipitated colonial reaction and resistance.

The error in this interpretation, according to Tucker and Hendrickson, is the failure of historians to recognize that "there were two very different understandings of the status quo" (p. 74). The colonial view of the status quo resisted "almost any imperial reform, however limited and discrete its character," while in the British "understanding of the status quo, there were no formally acknowleded limitations to the authority it [Britain] claimed to exercise as of right over the colonies" (p. 73). The fault of "a long-established tradition of historical scholarship" was to identify "the colonial version of the status quo with the status quo. . ." (p. 74).

As the status quo issue is the focus of the first one-half of the book, the second half is devoted to the British reaction to colonial protest of British imperial policy. This reaction is characterized as "The Diplomacy of Appeasement," the title of Part 3 of the book. The authors contend that each British ministry from 1765 to 1773 (Rockingham, Chatham, Graften, North) is guilty of the policy of appeasement. Throughout this period, successive British ministries are described as exhibiting "passivity," "conciliation," "inconstancy," "drift," "steady retreat," "giving way," and having "lack of will" in the face of colonial resistance.

What accounts for this policy of appearement by successive British governments spanning a decade of colonial-imperial relationships? The answer, according to the authors, is the existence in Britain of a "twofold consensus-to avoid the armed coercion of America and to maintain the supremacy of Parliament. . ." (p. 255). It was the obtuseness of British ministries that prevented them from recognizing that this "twofold consensus" comprised irreconcilable goals. It was not until 1775 that the British realized the impossibility of maintaining the supremacy of Parliament without forceful coercion of the colonies. Tucker and Hendrickson are unsparing in their indictment of the British policy of appeasement that prevailed for more than a decade after 1763.

Implicit in this indictment is the impression that the authors convey that the fall of the First British Empire could have been prevented if, at some point during the decade, Britain had summoned the resolve to bring the colonists to heel by armed force, if necessary. But even if this resolve could have been mustered, did Britain have the muscle to implement it?

What is frustratingly missing in Tucker and Hendrickson's provocative analysis of the fall of the Empire is any attempt to suggest how, even if Britain had the "will" to preserve it, the British could have found a "way" (resources) to do it. The authors say that appeasement failed to preserve the Empire. Could the application of force before 1774 have saved it? If so, Tucker and Hendrickson do not say how.

JOHN S. VANDEROEF

The Florida State University

The Vice President as Policy Maker: Rockefeller in the Ford White House. By Michael Turner. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xvii + 252. \$29.95.)

Nelson Rockefeller's attempt to bring the office of vice-president into the mainstream of policy-making is the subject of this short book. Turner concludes that Rockefeller was admirably successful in involving himself in the policymaking process. The reader, however, is impressed by how remarkably little was achieved by such involvement.

Using both extensive documentary resources and interviews with the Ford-Rockefeller staffs, Turner examines Rockefeller's involvement in four policy areas: the creation of a White House science advisory unit (approved by both the president and Congress), the 1976 domestic program policy options list (totally ignored), the creation of an energy development finance corporation (killed by Congress, approved in the Carter administration), and aid to New York City during its fiscal crisis (publicly repudiated by President Ford but eventually implemented). Rockefeller was actively involved in the development of these policies. His positions were, however, so compromised, resisted, or fought that at one point he threatened to quit unless he started getting cooperation.

Turner does an excellent job of delineating the factors that may impede any vice-president's policy involvement efforts. It is possible to group these factors (although Turner doesn't) into three groups: peculiar, situational, and personal. The first involves Rockefeller's confirmation, as required by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which

took four months. In the interim, Ford's staff had developed their own procedures and were unwilling to adapt when Rockefeller assumed office. Turner believes (p. 157) that the domestic policy options list and the energy corporation may have been more successful if Rockefeller had had more time to push for them.

The second, situational, group of factors refers to the nature of the president, the "normal" selection process, and the office of the vicepresidency itself. Ford is repeatedly characterized as imprecise, ambivalent, and indecisive. As a result. Rockefeller's role was never clearly articulated or communicated to the staff with whom Rockefeller was to work. And, as the vicepresident's relations with the staff deteriorated, Ford would not intervene until Rockefeller personally appealed for help. In this case the president's nature undercut the vice-president's role and authority. Furthermore, says Turner, by the time the vice-president is selected at the convention, the future president has been working with his staff for approximately a year. Finally, the office of the vice-president is not provided with sufficient resources for independent policymaking activity. Rather, the vice-president must rely upon already installed, and probably hostile, mechanisms.

Finally, in Rockefeller's case, personal factors contributed to his difficulties. He simply could not act like a subordinate, a staff member. Having served as a four-term governor, he was used to acting as a chief executive. Such was not appreciated by Ford's staff.

Turner makes essentially two concluding recommendations. First, the president and vice-president must agree on and publish the vice-president's role. Second, they should hold weekly meetings, the agenda of which would be controlled by the vice-president.

RAYMOND L. CHAMBERS

Bainbridge Junior College

The House and Foreign Policy. By Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. x + 207. \$18.95, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

Charles Whalen examines the reassertion of the congressional role in the conduct of American foreign policy. He concentrates on the House of Representatives' procedural reforms implemented during the seventies and their impact on the substance of policy.

Whalen finds that there were three major, mutually reinforcing institutional changes: decentralization of power, greater openness in procedures, and a strengthened capacity to deal with the executive branch (for example, the War Powers Act). Although Whalen finds most of these reforms well-intentioned, he believes that they have "led to actions that ill-served our nation's interests abroad" (p. 48).

Whalen argues that the House has become too decentralized, too open, and, consequently, too responsive to the public. "The capacity of House officials to lead has been constricted, the executive branch's ability to 'persuade' has diminished, and members have become more vulnerable to the often uninformed judgement of the public they serve" (p. 77). In other words, the electoral connection has become the dominant day-to-day concern of most congressmen. Unfortunately, Whalen addresses, but does not attempt to resolve, one of the perennial problems of an open society: the reconciliation of representation with a concern for good public policy.

Whalen describes major instances in which the House has become actively involved in the making of foreign policy. He concludes that while successfully "diminishing potential misadventures by the executive branch, the House's new operational methods have often bred legislative excesses and contributed to House actions that have repudiated long-standing global obligations, threatened the continued existence of several international organizations, and offended many friendly nations in both hemispheres" (p. 172).

Whalen, himself a former congressman, rejects as impractical most of the "reforms of the reforms" that have been suggested. He offers three modest proposals which he acknowledges, at best, would only "diminish the opportunity for irresponsibility."

Overall, the book provides a fine overview of the congressional role in foreign policy, although it does not break new ground. It seems to me that a focus on the role of procedural matters, although important, misses the crucial factor responsible for the continued activism of Congress. Vietnam destroyed whatever foreign policy consensus that had previously existed in American society. It is the breakdown of consensus that has catapulted congressional members into becoming involved in the foreign policy process. Reforming the institution once again will not alter this basic fact, although it may diminish some of the excesses. As long as a foreign policy belief system fails to become dominant and consensus is not regained throughout American society, congressional attention and involvement will remain high as the Reagan administration has experienced in its Central American policy.

JEREL A. ROSATI

University of South Carolina

Managing Crisis Cities: The New Black Leadership and the Politics of Resource Allocation. By Bette Woody. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xviii + 228. \$27.50.)

Much of the urban literature over the past decade can be categorized into one of two classes: that which deals with urban phenomena generally and contains broad assessments of evolutionary/devolutionary trends, and that which focuses on the problems of a specific city or group of cities with homogeneous characteristics. The collection has been disappointing. The generalized approach invariably explains little in attempting to explain everything, while the narrowly focused studies are riddled with caveats cautioning against inducing broad findings from the restricted research foci.

Managing Crisis Cities struggles with this levels of analysis problem and enjoys a fair measure of success in overcoming it. Specifically, Woody surveys various urban policies and reforms during the 1970s and early 80s in an effort to explain their failure in resolving the urban fiscal crisis and its attendant problems. Particular attention is devoted to those cities that have experienced a change in leadership from ethnic-dominated political machinery to black coalitions. Bette Woody argues that the developmental trends in such cities are illustrative, because much of the success in urban governance and leadership in the future will be dependent upon "mediating black demands" (p. 20).

From this initial thesis, Woody turns to an indepth analysis of five cities during the administration of black mayors: Los Angeles, New Orleans, Oakland, Detroit, and Newark. Reform strategies in each of these cities are examined, along with some of the political, economic, and structural constraints that have hindered reformism. The issues of service cost and cost distribution provide a recurring theme as well as a basis for comparison.

Finally, Woody considers the implication of black-run cities from the perspective of developing a successful national urban policy. Her observation that U.S. cities generally have suffered from a lack of "institutional status and legitimacy in the national system" (p. 207) is hardly novel. Yet her reasoning, which incorporates a criticism of the self-reliance ethic historically plaguing cities, is persuasive.

On the whole, Managing Crisis Cities is carefully researched and well written. The book presents a number of empirical and analytical findings derived from primary source documents as well as secondary literature. The discussion of contemporary urban reform initiatives is both comprehensive and insightful. Moreover, Woody's style is fluid enough to permit a shift in

orientation from the past to the present to the future without disrupting the continuity in the theme.

Unfortunately, there are two shortcomings that serve to undermine the effectiveness of the book. First, a reader is compelled to accept Woody's assumptions regarding the benchmark nature of black-run cities in order for the subsequent analysis and conclusions to be broadly applicable to the urban fiscal crisis. It is evident that she is cognizant of this concern. In chapter 2 in particular she discusses at length her selection of black-run cities and their importance in explaining allocative decisions. Second, the book's scope of inquiry is perhaps overly ambitious. In attempting to explain the causes of fiscal crisis and proffer remedies, Woody discusses leadership styles, budgetary strategies, service delivery mechanisms, administrative control techniques, and a variety of other topics. Granted, each of these is a critical factor in both causing and controlling fiscal stress. However, the book at points stretches its purview so broad that the depth of analysis necessarily suffers. Still, this approach is vastly superior to those which have offered simplistic and trite explanations for the urban fiscal crisis.

Despite these shortcomings, *Managing Crisis Cities* warrants attention. Both urban and financial specialists will appreciate its focus and its arguments.

LUTHER F. CARTER

College of Charleston

The Limits of Law Enforcement. By Hans Zeisel. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 245. \$20.00.)

Conservative ideology dominates contemporary criminal justice policy. It seeks to repress crime through the efficient apprehension and conviction of criminals and their swift, certain, and severe punishment. The Limits of Law Enforcement by Hans Zeisel, professor emeritus at the University of Chicago Law School, provides strong evidence that this approach to crime is flawed for two reasons. First, little can be done to increase arrest and conviction rates. Second, the incapacitation and deterrent effects of more severe punishments are at best limited. "The truth is," writes Zeisel, "that law enforcement, important and essential as it is, cannot by itself significantly reduce crime" (p. xv).

The Limits of Law Enforcement has two objectives: the presentation of data regarding the disposition of felony arrests made by the New York

City Policy Department, and the identification of variables affecting the disposition of these felonv arrests. The disposition data is derived from two probability samples of felony arrests disposed of without jury or bench trials. Zeisel follows these cases from arrest to disposition. He presents the data in lucid prose and easily understood graphs. His interpretation of the data is incisive. One general conclusion emerges from Zeisel's analysis of arrest rates, dismissal rates, and plea bargaining: It is erroneous to blame the police and the courts for the high rate of crime. Three general findings presented in The Limits of Law Enforcement support this conclusion. First, police operations have a limited impact on crime primarily because many crimes are not reported to the police. And when arrests occur, many are dismissed at the preliminary hearing because the complaining witnesses either withdraw or lack credibility. Second, the judicial system is efficient in securing convictions. Of those cases not dismissed, 96% end in guilty pleas. The key inducement to plead guilty is a reduction in sentence. For inmates sentenced to prison, the average reduction between the sentence offered and refused during plea negotiations and the sentence finally imposed is 42%. Third, the reduction in sentence has only a small impact on crime rates. The incapacitation effect of doubling the current length of prison sentences is modest; selective incapacitation is hobbled by our inability to identify habitual criminals early in their careers in crime. Similarly, the deterrent effect of longer sentences is marginal.

Zeisel correctly grasps the policy implications of his findings: "Crime control, to become effective, must look beyond [law] enforcement" (p. 84). Recent research supports his conclusion. The formal instruments of criminal justice are relatively powerless to reduce the overall level of crime. Solutions outside the criminal justice system must be sought. Zeisel advocates renewed efforts to eradicate the social roots of crime. Regrettably, The Limits of Law Enforcement adds little to our knowledge of the origins of criminal behavior. His identifying the ghetto as the "core of the problem" (p. 75) is based more upon its correlation with high crime rates than with existing knowledge of its causal relationship with crime. Nevertheless, The Limits of Law Enforcement indicates that much has been learned about crime prevention since the outset of the "war on crime": Faster police cars and tougher punishments have limited impact on crime rates. Central to a successful strategy of crime control is a strengthening of the informal mechanisms of social control. In an era marked by overcrowded prisons, longer prison terms, and a lessening of constitutional restraints on the police, The Limits

of Law Enforcement is worthy of study and reflection.

JAMES E. ROBERTSON

Mankato State University

State-Local Relations: A Partnership Approach. By Joseph F. Zimmerman. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. viii + 240. \$28.95.)

Students of American intergovernmental relations have long neglected the area of state-local relationships. With a few notable exceptions, there has been little systematic research attention to the subject. Textbooks and courses give state-local relations cursory treatment. Perhaps the scholarly neglect stems from the difficulty of the research task, with remarkable diversity found among and within the 50 states. With this admirable volume, Zimmerman steps bravely into this void. Some of the material stems from studies Zimmerman conducted for the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR).

Issues of state-local relations raise classic questions of centralization versus decentralization in American democracy. Typically, we are ambivalent on these issues. On the one hand, we want the state government to have sufficient power to accomplish necessary tasks. On the other, we cling to revered notions of grass-roots democracy. Zimmerman begins with a delineation of formal power distribution and a discussion of state-local tensions and problems.

Chapter 2 sets out the dimensions of the legal relationship between states and localities. Zimmerman contrasts two broad approaches in granting discretionary authority to local governments: the *Imperium in Imperio* (or state within a state) approach, which partially insulates local government from state interference, and the devolution of powers approach, which delegates many powers to general purpose local governments. Zimmerman also constructs interesting indexes of local discretionary authority.

The third chapter outlines state-local fiscal relations, with particular attention to state mandates and state grants-in-aid. The chapter includes discussions of constitutional and statutory fiscal provisions and the property tax. In brief, Zimmerman's research finds that state mandates are the major irritant in state-local relations, and that local governments have organized in reaction to increased mandated costs.

Chapter 4 is a fascinating presentation of state responses to local problems. Zimmerman notes three major state roles in response to urban problems: inhibitor, facilitator, and initiator. Perhaps we are most familiar with the states' inhibiting role in regard to area-wide government and fiscal restraints. States have made the solution of metropolitan problems easy in numerous ways, including the creation of regional planning commissions and the establishment of municipal bond banks and investment and insurance pools. States have also initiated many actions to solve local government problems, including the establishment of public authorities and incorporation and boundary changes.

In the fifth chapter, Zimmerman discusses increased federal influence in the state-local relations. The expansion of national powers and the impact of federal preemption in recent decades are reviewed. Naturally, federal financial assistance receives substantial attention. Zimmerman proposes a national tax credit program as a substitute for conditional grants-in-aid.

Zimmerman concludes with a model of statelocal relations that is reformist and visionary. It includes proposals that would maximize local discretionary authority, such as devolution of all powers capable of devolution, state reimbursement of mandated costs, removal of debt and tax limits on local governments, and the creation of state boundary commissions.

One outstanding feature of the book is the extensive bibliography. Zimmerman provides a 44-page bibliography with more than 600 references, including books and monographs, government reports and documents, articles, and unpublished material. The appendixes set out Zimmerman's indexes of local discretionary authority.

Overall, Zimmerman's book is an excellent description of existing state-local relationships. Some may not like the prescriptive sections, while others may yearn for more extensive empirical work. The book would be highly suitable for classroom use in courses in intergovernmental relations and state-local government if the publisher issues a classroom edition. For the foreseeable future, this book undoubtedly will serve as a standard reference.

ROBERT K. WHELAN

University of New Orleans

## Comparative and Other Area Studies

Local Government Finance in the Third World: A Case Study of the Philippines. Edited by Roy Bahl and Barbara D. Miller. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xvi + 269. \$22.95.)

American theories of political and economic development usually affirm the value of decentralization so that rural areas are brought into national life and dangerously destabilizing socioeconomic gaps are mitigated. For their own reasons, political leaders of third-world nations also give rhetorical support to a devolution of money and power to the poorest of their people, usually those who live in small towns and remote areas. Filipino politicians from the days of the Commonwealth to President Marcos's "New Republic" have proposed and proclaimed numerous legal and fiscal measures to invigorate local governments. This carefully written and detailed book, edited by Bahl and Miller, reports on the present financial status of Philippine provinces, cities, and towns and proffers a number of reasonable suggestions for ways in which the system could be tinkered with and improved upon. In doing so, however, it ignores most of the real reasons for the financial and political impotence of local governments in the Philippines.

Within the scope of the problem that Roy Bahl, the principal author, has defined, his study is scholarly and objective. It analyzes local government structure, the real property tax, the business license tax, intergovernmental fiscal relations, local government private enterprise, and local government credit financing. The final chapter makes specific recommendations, most of which seem sound. Filipino leaders genuinely interested in strengthening local governments would be welladvised to follow Bahl's advice. The problem is, of course, that national Filipino leaders don't want decentralization, and neither do leaders in other third-world countries. Unfortunately, such "political" questions are not addressed in the book under review.

Bahl and his coauthors recognize that, despite

the national government's oft-repeated commitment to strengthening local governments, the trend is in the opposite direction. Perhaps because this study was sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development, it refrains from stating the obvious: Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos has radically centralized political and economic power in his country. It is understandable, the island nation is geographically and culturally fragmented. Since multiethnicity is the rule rather than the exception in developing countries, we should not expect many modernizers to grant substantive powers to local governments.

Nonetheless, to maintain their base of support national leaders will undertake programs that give the appearance of conferring financial responsibility and autonomy on various levels of regional and local government. This is precisely what has happened in the Philippines, except that instead of utilizing existing governmental agencies, President and Mrs. Marcos have embarked on a new program, the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran, which will put up to \$300 million in the hands of local government officials this year. But rather than infusing renewed vigor in local governments, this gigantic pork barrel project is aimed at cementing the pyramid of personalized power over which Marcos and his wife preside.

Bahl has prescribed effective medicine, but it is for symptomatic relief only.

ROSS MARLAY

Arkansas State University

Liberal Party Politics. Edited by Vernon Bogdanor. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 302. \$37.50.)

The Politics of the Labour Party. Edited by Dennis Kavanagh. (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1982. Pp. xi + 228. \$27.50, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

The difficulty of offering a meaningful analysis of British party politics in this present era of change is rather neatly illustrated by the photos chosen for the cover of *The Politics of the Labour Party:* Michael Foot is accorded pride of place, flanked on the right by Denis Healey and on the left by Tony Benn. In the last year, however, Foot has been replaced as party leader by Neil Kinnock, Healey as deputy leader by Roy Hattersley, while Benn, although still the most prominent leader of the Labour left, has lost his seat in Westminster. Yet despite the present British political flux, the editors of both of these collections have managed

to bring together a number of valuable essays which, although timely, seem not at all constrained by the passage of recent events. Liberal Party Politics is essentially a stock-taking exercise on the present state of the Liberal party on the eve of what may yet prove to be its major breakthrough to majority party status, while The Politics of the Labour Party is consciously less concerned with Labour's contemporary problems and is oriented more towards themes of a longerterm significance, many of which relate to Labour's steady and seemingly inexorable electoral decline.

Of the two collections, that edited by Kavanagh is clearly the more rigorous, particularly thanks to the excellent chapters by Ivor Crewe ("The Labour Party and the Electorate") and L. J. Sharpe ("Labour and the Geography of Inequality"), but also because of Kavanagh's own chapters on "elite recruitment" and "representation" and Colin Crouch's assessment of relations between the party and the unions. Other contributors include Philip Williams on changing styles of Labour leadership, Hugh Berrington on the increasing left-wing orientation of the party in Parliament, Paul Whiteley on the decline of local party membership, and the late Robert McKenzie on intraparty democracy.

The contributions to Liberal Party Politics are more uneven, the most valuable being those by Philip Norton on the party in Parliament and Andrew Gamble on "Liberals and the Economy," while other useful chapters come from Michael Brock and Peter Clarke on Liberal historical traditions, William Wallace on the party's postwar history, and John Curtice on sources of Liberal electoral support. The remaining chapters include Dennis Kavanagh on party organization, Michael Steed on electoral strategy, Alan Butt Philip on the Liberals and Europe, Bryan Keith-Lucas and Stuart Mole on local government and community politics, and Bogdanor himself on the Liberals and constitutional reform.

Both collections offer useful insights into the dilemmas of contemporary British party politics, and insofar as both identify similar reasons for the decline of Labour in the one case and the potential for a Liberal breakthrough in the other, they complement one another quite effectively. Nor is it surprising that common ground should be found, in that the crucial watershed in both cases seems to be the breakaway from Labour of the Social Democratic party and its alliance with the Liberals in an attempt to jointly win the center stage in British politics. But if the formation of the SDP was or is to prove the crucial watershed for British politics, it is the gradual erosion of a Labour support that is the most evident long-term trend. Both of these books were completed before

the June, 1983 election, but already Labour's decline was quite evident: from 48% of the votes and 41% of the electorate in 1951 to just 37% of the votes and 28% of the electorate in 1979. (The respective figures for 1983 are 28% and 20%.)

The most telling analysis of Labour's decline is that by Crewe in The Politics of the Labour Party in which he identifies a dual process of demographic contraction and declining levels of Labour identification within the party's "natural" working-class constituency such that, in the 1980s, the party "faces a working-class electorate with only a minimal sense of class interest" (p. 23). If, at the same time, we accept Crouch's argument that "there is no social cleavage within the society to support a major degree of party competition other than that which is represented by the conflict between organised labour and capital" (p. 173), then the imputed decline of class politics is likely to create an essentially "destructured" electorate which, in turn, is seen to favor the Liberal party and the SPD.

Curtice points out in *Liberal Party Politics* that Liberal support is not now organized on class lines, while attempts to explain Liberal voting in terms of other social cleavages have proved either "indeterminate" or "fruitless": "Liberal support has a socially 'rootless' character" (p. 102). In such circumstances, the potential freeing of British politics from its traditional social bases could assist the growth of the Liberal party. In a similar vein, both Bogdanor and Wallace refer to Jo Grimond's original strategy for the Liberals in the early 1960s, which emphasized the need for a realignment of British politics into an opposition of the progressive or radical elements in all parties against conservatism, with possibly a small leftleaning Labour party on the fringes of the system. The emergence of the SDP and the growth in electoral support for the Liberal-SDP Alliance would now seem to have revived the chances for such a realignment. But Bogdanor sounds a warning note when he suggests (pp. 8-9) that the weakening of the ties that bind class to party may not lead to a realignment of British politics as such, but rather to a process of dealignment which may be of long-term benefit to none of the parties.

In the last analysis, none of the contributors to either collection is really willing to forecast future trends in British politics; all are more or less content to account for the present state of play and, indeed, both collections are very useful in this sense. Referring in *The Politics of the Labour Party* to the "glacially slow rate at which a major party in Britain is finally abandoned by the electorate," Crewe cautions that "prophecies of doom are clearly premature" (p. 17). Notwithstanding the June, 1983 election results, even the most ardent Liberal-SDP supporter must surely

agree that all other prophecies in British politics are also clearly premature.

PETER MAIR

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Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics. By George W. Breslauer. (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1982. Pp. xiii + 318. \$28.50, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

Whereas most observers of Soviet elite politics focus primarily on power struggles and patronage, George Breslauer in this book takes a more sophisticated approach, looking instead at the dimension of authority building. He argues that the relaxation of terror following Stalin's death reduced the support that Soviet leaders could expect to gain from patronage and has led them to concentrate more on increasing and maintaining their political authority. Soviet leaders therefore have become more like their Western counterparts, having to prove their worth as effective politicians and problem solvers. Breslauer seeks to probe the different methods Khrushchev and Brezhnev used to build up their authority as leaders and to show how these approaches evolved over time.

Breslauer identifies the authority-building strategy of the post-Stalin leadership by carrying out an informal content analysis of their speeches. Each leader is examined independently to determine his position on the "grand issues" of Soviet domestic policy: investment priorities, incentive policy, administrative reform, and political participation. Breslauer traces how the policy priorities and leadership styles of Khrushchev and Brezhnev evolved as they struggled for succession, rose to ascendancy, and finally found their policy programs frustrated. In addition, he attempts to ascertain how much power each leader actually had over policy. The book concludes with an examination of the pattern of leadership since Stalin, which compares the two leaders and discusses the concept of leadership cycles.

This book fills a void in the literature by taking a long view of both Soviet administrations. It illustrates that each leader benefited from a broad elite consensus in favor of breaking with Stalinism, expanding political participation, and improving the system of public administration. Khrushchev and Brezhnev both emerge from this analysis as "party men" who defended the primacy of the Party and promoted programs designed around party activism. Each combined the goals of the new consensus with traditional Soviet values in formulating his program. In spite

of these similarities, both men adopted distinctly different leadership strategies. Khrushchev is generally seen as a dedicated decentralizer who continually confronted major institutional interests in Soviet society, while Brezhnev is regarded as a conservative consensus-builder. While these general characterizations are widely held by Kremlinologists, Breslauer argues that they obscure or neglect important aspects of each leader's policies. He also challenges some of the more specific images of Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's leadership. This study contends that far from being an embattled consumer advocate. Khrushchev was inconsistent in his support of light industry. Looking at Brezhnev, the book shows that in addition to being a broker between major interests, he was also an important policy initiator. Breslauer's authority-building approach demonstrates that many of our images of these leaders need substantial revision or qualification.

What is missing from this study is a thorough analysis of foreign policy and an assessment of how it related to each leader's domestic policy program and authority-building strategy. Without examining the nexus between domestic and foreign policy it is impossible to obtain a complete picture of how both men acted as leaders. While Breslauer is sensitive to this issue, the book does not go far enough in addressing it.

This is an excellent study that demands the attention of students of Soviet politics. Breslauer's approach leads to some notable insights into Soviet leadership strategies. He presents a cogent and fresh analysis of Khrushchev and one of the more thoroughgoing studies of Brezhnev to date. Soviet scholars will find much of the nittygritty detail in this highly documented study to be both interesting and useful. The book makes a strong case that many changes in policy advocacy by Khrushchev and Brezhnev can only be understood when looked at as products of an authority-building strategy.

**CAREY CAVANAUGH** 

Youngstown State University

Political Leadership in Africa. By John Cartwright. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. 299. \$27.50, paper.)

The substance of political leadership in Africa can be categorized in a number of ways. Cartwright offers two such schema, persuasion versus coercion and accommodation versus transformation. He uses seven case studies to illustrate the distinctions between these approaches.

The persuasive approach to political leadership is, according to Cartwright, more effective in the long term because it affects changes in people's attitudes, whereas coercive tactics create a passive restraint. It was the fate of the newly independent African states of the 1960s, however, that the temptations toward the use of coercion were great, and the weaknesses of governmental and economic institutions further contributed to such inclinations. In fact, Cartwright asserts, the sole restraint to the use of force is the leader's own, internalized faith in his leadership ability.

The distinction between the accommodationist and transformationist approaches relates to the means employed to seek long-term political and economic development. The accommodationist seeks to maintain order while domestic or foreign entrepreneurs seek profits which, in turn, provide some benefits to the polity and the indigenous population. The transformationist espouses a vision of a better future and attempts to inspire changes in the attitudes of his followers in order to pursue that vision of the future. In the former approach, accommodation has tended to leave the impression of a sellout to foreign interests, hardly a popular impression to give in postindependence Africa. The latter approach, transformation, requires not only the changing of peoples' attitudes but also the sacrifice of short-term comforts in favor of long-term potential benefits.

The central question for this research is whether any of the leaders studied could have been more effective had they pursued strategies other than those they selected. This may suggest a greater freedom to choose than was the case, however. It could be argued that to have selected alternate approaches would have required these leaders to pursue strategies not entirely consistent with the leaders' central needs and philosophies. Could Nyerere have abandoned his pursuit of a sustained charismatic image, or could Toure seek to reach an accommodation with the French?

Cartwright argues that the very newness of the African states and the lack of formal institutions gave postindependence leaders a wide latitude to select from among these alternatives. If, then, one assumes that such conscious decisions could have been made at the outset, the question becomes whether other approaches would have been more or less effective. Cartwright notes that each of these approaches has limitations, and each can lead to the decline of both the leader and the led, although he recognizes the need for a leader to obtain popular support for long-term change and that to do so requires persuasive leadership.

Persuasion or coercion notwithstanding, the point must be noted, perhaps with greater emphasis than provided in this work, that the independence struggle was relatively easy compared to the subsequent pursuit of political and economic development. There was a common goal and a

common enemy. With independence in hand, the leaders lost their rallying cry. In short, to retain power in Africa in the period of 10 to 15 years after independence was achieved was either to produce results in terms of improved standards of living, or to convince the people to be satisfied with a vision of a better future. As Cartwright points out, some leaders developed comprehensive strategies, although most simply "drifted with events, responding to crises on an ad hoc basis" (p. 53). It is clear, then, that the method used to accomplish these ends is far less crucial than the ends themselves.

GERALD L. GORDON

Burke, Virginia

The Administrative State in Canada: Essays for J. E. Hodgetts. Edited by O. P. Dwivedi. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 258. \$30.00, cloth; \$10.95, paper.)

J. E. Hodgetts has published eight books and more than 50 major papers on the public service in Canada. For most of his distinguished career he has centered his attention on the Ottawa bureaucracy, both analyzing its contemporary effectiveness and practice and describing its history. He has written major studies of the Civil Service Commission and has interpreted the findings of several royal commissions to his less attentive or persevering colleagues. Unlike in the U.S., in Canada there is relatively little intercourse between the government and the universities. Generally, when professors leave, it is for good. J. E. Hodgetts is unusual inasmuch as he has, in John Meisel's words, complemented his academic work and university preoccupations with sorties into the government orbit. More recently, Hodgetts has turned his attention to intergovernmental affairs and provincial bureaucracies.

The essays collected to honor this man reflect the scope of his interest and the focus of his enduring concerns. The first five deal with the question of administrative power. Kenneth Kernaghan and T.; H. McLeod provide a sympathetic account of 1930 to 1960, the golden age of the Ottawa mandarins. 1960 was also a significant year in the history of the Ouebec civil service. Roche Bolduc and James Iain Gow show that after that date the state began actively to influence the outside world instead of simply responding to external business, party, and ecclesiastical pressures. John W. Langford and Neil A. Swainson analyze clearly the complex and ambiguous phenomenon of public and quasi-public corporations in British Columbia. Richard Schultz considers one of the most awkward administrative forms, the quasi-departmental regulatory agency, a topic thoroughly familiar to U.S. students of public policy but free of much critical comment in Canada. Particularly significant are the agencies created by Ottawa to increase its control over wheat and petroleum production and over rail transport, all matters of great regional importance in Western Canada. In the best-written and most imaginative piece, "Space, Function, and Interest," A. Paul Pross speculates on the importance of what he calls the special-interest state. Administrative centralization has altered the process of policy formation along sectoral lines, which has thereby helped ensure the decline of political parties as means of communication with, and of legitimization of, government. In this respect, interest groups have partially but badly replaced parties, since, unlike parties, they do not act as brokers for competing interests and are not territorial. One of the responses has been a resurgence of provincebuilding and regionalism.

The next three chapters deal with the problem of bureaucratic accountability. J. R. Mallory offers a thorough analysis of the recent, always difficult, and often futile attempts by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments to reformulate the rules governing delegated legislation. O. P. Dwivedi surveys the problem of accountable management within the public service in light of the conflicting doctrine of Ministerial responsibility and the tradition of bureaucratic anonymity. Donald C. Rowat discusses the modest legislative challenges to discretionary secrecy and the degree to which the practice continues in conflict with the democratic expectation that taxpayers have access to official documents they have paid for. The final three essays are not thematically unified. J. W. Grove discusses the dilemmas and impossibilities of attempting to administer that highest, most dangerous, aggressive, and unforgiving of high-tech industries, atomic energy. D. C. Corbett reflects on the similarities of, and differences between, Canadian and Australian administrative practice in the context provided by Taylor Cole's 1949 study of the Canadian bureaucracy and his subsequent work in comparative administration. And finally, R. W. Phidd concludes this worthy tribute to Hodgetts with some pertinent remarks on the lasting conflict of rational, uniform, administrative efficiency with democratic responsiveness, and of participation with governmental responsibility and regional particularism.

American readers may well be surprised at the complacency with which their Canadian colleagues view governmental intrusion into society. This difference in attitude reflects the different orders of size of the two governments as well as a more widespread Canadian sympathy with Fabian

views on using the state to enhance social equity rather than seeing it as a threat to liberty. The reason for this, as is hinted throughout this excellent collection, is that in Canada the state has been used less for ensuring market competition along U.S. lines than in maintaining the political integrity of the country. This state-sponsored emphasis on national unity has as often as not been translated into regional resistance to central control, It is a pity this aspect of the administrative state in Canada was ignored.

BARRY COOPER

University of Calgary

Geography and the State: An Essay in Political Geography. By R. J. Johnston. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 283. \$27.50.)

Both political geography and geopolitics are again drawing some attention, an undoubtedly welcome development because ignorance of geography—of geographical facts, perspectives, and interpretations—has reigned supreme among political scientists for too long. Political geography tends to be regional geography in which the focus is on the state and the impress of political decisions on the landscape. In other words, while in human geography the geographer investigates what humankind has done to its physical geographical environment-how it has been transformed-in political geography the geographer looks specifically at the political person's contribution to the transformation and organization of the earth.

Geopolitics, on the other hand, is not geography, and it may not be even political science (especially if we insist on the science aspect of it). Rather, it is what the etymology of the word suggests: geographical politics. It is neither real geography nor real political science, but rather politics with a geographical perspective (and some consideration of geographical facts). Consequently, geopolitics tends to be prescriptive (and more subjective, ideological, and controversial), while political geography is more descriptive (and acceptable to the academic fraternity).

Although Geography and the State is called "an essay in political geography," it is not really that. In fact, Johnston himself says as much when at the very beginning of the Preface he first quotes, obviously approvingly, a statement by P. J. Taylor to the effect that "there can be no distinctive political geographical theory" and "no subdiscipline of political geography," and then goes on to clarify that what he has written "is a contribution to the political geography perspective, not a political geography." If the book is not

political geography, neither is it geopolitics, although there is a good dose of politics in it. A closer reading reveals an intention to educate on the part of the author. Political scientists may be ignorant of geography, but what bothers Johnston is that his fraternity of geographers is ignorant of politics, the Marxist perspective in politics in particular. His aim is, in the short run, to promote among geographers an understanding of basic political science knowledge and concepts, especially as they concern the state and its subdivisions, and, in the long run, to contribute to the enrichment of the (Marxist) political economy by adding to it a sophisticated political geographical perspective.

As a whole, the book is not of great use to our discipline. Several of its chapters are almost straight political science of a quite elementary character, presumably because it is intended for geographers who have never studied politics. Other chapters focus on the economy, specifically the capitalist economy and its consequences, but here too the facts and the Marxist interpretation are not novel. Even the bibliography, although lengthy, is not helpful because it is neither a basic bibliography in political geography nor a focused specialized one. Probably only the very few political scientists who specialize in the more theoretical aspects of geopolitics will find this book of interest. It is certainly well written, ranges in an informed way over a wide range of topics, and, above all, is a good example of the kind of ferment that goes on in the sister discipline of geography. If we are interested in the geographical perspective in politics, we obviously must know what geography is and what geographers do and think.

LADIS K. D. KRISTOF

Portland State University

Socialism and Abundance: Radical Socialism in the Danish Welfare State. By John Logue. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982. Pp. xxii + 353. \$35.00.)

Scandinavian societies represent to many material abundance and social harmony achieved through the welfare state under the direction of the Social Democratic party. A recent history of material prosperity and a distributive system that aims to minimize economic and social inequality makes an enigma of the "appeal of radical socialism in the democratic welfare state" (p. 6) at the expense of its chief architect.

Perusing the literature for theoretical explanations that might illuminate increased Scandinavian support of radical socialism since the 1960s. Logue identifies and discusses three sets of hypotheses. The first group, "radicalism as rational action," is "based on self-interest in the narrow economic sense" (p. 7), and includes hypotheses on relative deprivation, state of economic development, and the postwelfare socicty. Logue suggests, with the postwelfare hypothesis, that "though the reduction of economic insecurity has allowed individuals to become increasingly concerned about other issues, the means used to reduce economic insecurity have exacerbated inequality in authority" (p. 12). One would, therefore, expect radical socialism to focus strongly on a redistribution of authority as a political goal. A second group of hypotheses focuses on radicalism as a psychological response (for example, simplicity, authoritarianism, community isolation, and neurosis), while the third group attributes radicalism to political culture.

Armed with potential explanatory variables, Logue chooses the Danish Socialist People's party (SPP) as a "crucial case study," well aware of the limitations and dangers of a single case, but suggests that the results, if not conclusive, are certainly suggestive.

Aware that many readers may not possess expertise on Danish politics, Logue provides a succinct review of the political and economic environment of Denmark. He follows with a synopsis of the history of the Danish Left, from which the SPP emerged in 1958 when a minority of "revisionists" under the leadership of Aksel Larsen was expelled from the Danish Communist party.

Defining the research problem as the determination of "what sort of people voted for the Socialist People's party and why, or, more broadly, asking what sort of voters turned left during the prosperous 1960s and the stagnating 1970s" (p. 153), Logue presents a detailed profile and analysis of the Danish leftist voter in general and the SPP voter in particular.

The study finds no evidence suggesting that the Danish radical socialist voter suffers from absolute or relative deprivation, is geographically, culturally, or socially isolated from the mainstream, is more authoritarian than the average voter, or has a simplistic conceptual framework. Nor is there any indication that radical socialist voting correlates with stages of economic development.

The data do indicate a linkage between radical socialist support and the postwelfare hypothesis, which, as Logue points out, may be spurious due to "a particular pattern of political socialization, or growing up in a working-class, socialist environment with an adulthood characterized by upward mobility through education" (p. 203).

To achieve a more complete picture, Logue eliminates possible "noise of random voting" by focusing only on party members and activists. Analysis of the more limited data set supports the conclusions generated from the analysis of party voters. Among party activists and members, political socialization to radicalism does have impact, but is limited to a relatively small number (approximately 20%) of the party's membership. It appears, however, that class and issue identity rather than party identity is transmitted across generations. The evidence further supports the postwelfare goal of a redistribution of authority as a principle explanation of increased radicalism. Logue concludes, "the Socialist People's Party's relative success has been a product of its ability to combine the traditional socialist appeal for economic equality with a new emphasis on redistributing authority" (p. 301).

This is a carefully designed, well executed, and well-written study on Danish radical socialism that has significance beyond Denmark. It will certainly become reference material for students of Scandinavian politics.

ROGER WALL

University of Wisconsin Center/Fond du Lac

The Territorial Dimension in United Kingdom Politics. Edited by Peter Madgwick and Richard Rose. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982. Pp. vi + 256. \$37.50.)

In the wake of the United Kingdom's voyage(s) to the brink of devolution and back, Peter Madgwick and Richard Rose have gathered eight essays for a volume intended "to examine collectively the network of institutions that constitutes the United Kingdom" (p. vi) and to assess the U.K.'s capacity to act as a unitary state despite the antics of mischievous nationalists in Scotland and Wales as well as some murderous ones in Northern Ireland. Further, the collected essays purport to illuminate the "territorial dimension" of public policies formulated at Westminster, that is, which aggrieved member of the multinational British state gets what material benefits when and how. This the essays ably do, but not from the perspectives of the "periphery." While Northern Ireland is viewed with ambivalence, the authors otherwise tend to celebrate a centralized government that is "extra good at adaptability, contrivance, elastoplast and improvisation" (p. 98) in the task of keeping the U.K. united via "reform without commitment to fundamental change" (p. 4).

In Part 1, "The Policy Process," the chapters / by James G. Kellas and Peter Madgwick on the

Scottish and Welsh Offices in Westminster and by Brian W. Hogwood on the regional dimension of industrial policy both provide useful descriptive excursions into the hearts of administrative darkness within and across the constitutive members of the U.K. These maps of institutional interrelations are most welcome, since Westminister, in response to discontent among the provincials. has confused, if not appeased, them through creating new agencies that intersect with modified older institutions to form a maze of overlapping functions and duplicated efforts. The Scots and Welsh may get their own development agencies, but the purse strings and ultimate policy authority remain in London in the Treasury and in the Department of Industry. In another contribution. Madgwick and Phillip Rawkins reduce the "Welsh Language in the Policy Process" to sentimental sign-post politics. This derisive dismissal may be warranted. However, the only things that do not thematically overlap in these articles are the professed concerns with both the territorial and the functional dimensions of policy. Nowhere in this volume are the economic performances of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland charted in relation to that of England (whose Northern regions are nearly as direly situated in terms of the declining industries and rising unemployment endemic in the "periphery"). What about the possibility of a researchable link between relative regional economic distress and the rise of a language movement? The authors laudably resist single-factor (that is, economic) explanations, but isn't sentimentality (or cultural conceit) likewise a single-factor explanation of nationalism? Since these inquiries are explicitly Westminister-centric, the authors slight questions about the nature of the stimuli to which British governments are responding. In this respect, however, Richard Rose fares better in his analysis of Northern Ireland's anomalous place—the only region with the right to unilateral secession if the citizens so choose-in the U.K.

The four essays comprising Part 2, "Mobilising Popular Support," deserve only scholarly plaudits. In his incisive and insightful article, Jim Bulpitt elucidates Conservative party strategies since 1867 to appease the regions, maintain mainparty power, and keep "high politics" as the preserve of the very wealthy. J. Barry Jones and Michael J. Keating explore the effect of regional demands upon the centralist and the decentralist traditions uneasily harbored within the Labour party. They cite the significant implications of devolutionist activity for Labour's electoral strategy, economic policies, and ideology. Ian McAllister compares the Scottish National party, Plaid Cymru, and the Social Democratic and Labour party in terms of their respective capacities to devise plausible short-term transitional policies while awaiting the arrival of their national Godots. Viewed as pressure groups, these nationalist parties are judged to be ironically successful. William L. Miller concludes the volume with an interesting article on the variations in electoral behavior across the U.K.

Although the articles vary in scope and explanatory ambition, the volume is certainly worth perusing.

JOHN KURT JACOBSEN

Rutgers University

The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered. Edited by Cynthia McClintock and Abraham F. Lowenthal. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xxi + 442. \$45.00, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

The Peruvian military that stepped confidently into power in 1968 confounded many skeptics by its aggressive steps toward a more independent foreign policy and a stronger state, as well as its sweeping decrees in land reform, management-labor relations, education, the media, and other areas. Yet seven years later, when *The Peruvian Experiment* edited by Abraham Lowenthal (Princeton, 1975) appeared, serious doubts were growing about the regime's viability and the impact of its reforms. In 1980 the military withdrew ignominiously, handing the government back to the same civilian they had overthrown.

In this new book, the result of a workshop held in 1978, aspects of Peru's "Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces" are analyzed. The quality of the articles is high, and the book provides much useful information. Many of the articles have an analytical basis in international political economy, and some emphasize the impact of more traditional national security concerns (in this case, the possibility of war with Chile after 1973) on government, the economy, and the armed forces as an institution. The corporatist literature, employed extensively in previous analyses of Peru, is almost invisible.

Several debates underlie a general consensus that the revolutionary efforts of the Peruvian armed forces, measured by their actual achievements, largely failed. One divergence is between "structural pessimists" and "policy pessimists"; a second is between "reform pessimists" and "military pessimists." Julio Cotler, Barbara Stallings, Susan Eckstein, and the economists E. V. K. Fitzgerald and Rosemary Thorp consider complications arising from specific policies, pro-

grams, and concerns of the military government, yet they stress essentially how historically imposed structural constraints limited the viability of the military's effort from the beginning. Cotler, both a structural and reform pessimist, provides a useful although gloomy overview analysis and summary. In a thought provoking article, Stallings applies various useful analytical distinctions to emphasize that the main influence of foreign capital on Peru was historical—suggesting both the goals of the new government and accounting for many of its constraints—and thus that specific steps by foreign sector actors did not play a major role in determining the fate of the military regime. Eckstein contrasts the results of the military government's efforts from above in different social welfare areas with Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba's revolutionary experience from below.

Policy pessimists in the book focus on poor national economic policy choices as the primary cause of the government's debacle. Economists > Daniel Schydlowsky and Juan Wicht, and John Sheahan, suggest that a focus on industrial export promotion rather than statist import-substituting industrialization could have had a dramatic impact. Sheahan's article is especially interesting. drawing upon the other articles in the book and contrasting the Peruvian case to other Latin American examples. Laura Guasti argues the increased influence gained by international manufacturers and the requirements imposed by the economic model on a poorly prepared government more than offset the declining influence of extractive corporations.

The authors that focus more on the internal political and social dynamics of the attempted reforms diverge over how much importance to place on the military nature of the government in explaining its failure. Cynthia McClintock, Peter S. Cleaves and Henry Pease García, and Liisa North concur that certain characteristics were due to the government's military nature, but emphasize in their essays problems common to all reform efforts in Latin America. Luis Pásara, in an informed article, is a military pessimist who argues that one of the key failures of the regime, its inability to generate popular political support, stemmed in large part from its military character.

Lowenthal, "a counter-vailing optimist," argues the military were in fact largely successful; the country has changed as a result of their rule, in ways they intended and otherwise. In spite of remarkable continuities, "lack of national integration, economic backwardness, badly exploited natural resources, and dependence" (p. 425), power has shifted permanently from the landed oligarchy to new entrepreneurs, to the growing technocracy within the state and outside of it, and to newly mobilized elements of the population,

even as the country's economic structure, public administration, and even value structure all have been altered.

The topics Lowenthal's article reviews highlight the fact that overall the book's treatment of issues is imbalanced and incomplete. Notwithstanding variations in nuance and perspective. many articles overlap, while other topics are not covered. Most frustrating is the fact the book barely treats the dynamics of the process of military withdrawal from, and civilian restoration to, government. Indeed, the editors' own assessment that this collection is neither "exhaustive" nor "definitive" is certainly correct (p. xvii). Notwithstanding its disappointments, this book is the best single current overview in English of this critical period. It belongs on the shelf of Latin American and other comparative scholars and could be employed as a supplementary text in certain courses.

JONATHAN HARTLYN

Vanderbilt University

Japan's Economy: Coping with Change in the International Environment. Edited by Daniel I. Okimoto. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xv + 304. \$30.00, cloth; \$13.50, paper.)

Japan's international role in the 1950s and 1960s was determined largely by its axiomatic relations with the United States. Within the U.S.-dominated and relatively stable environment, the once militarist nation was able to concentrate almost exclusively on economic development. Since the 1970s, however, Japan's economic success, the weakening of U.S. political influence, and disturbances in the global economic system have forced this economic giant to search for a more active role in international politics. Japan's Economy examines major economic sources of Japan's search for a new identity.

In chapter 1, "Changes in the International Economic Environment," Hideo Kanemitsu points out that current frictions among the major market economies stem from the tension between free trade and protectionist pressures, the clash between international rules and national policy priorities, and the fundamental conflict between the economic principle of comparative advantage and the political protection of "merit industry." Kanemitsu, an economist, argues that Japan should continue to support the free-trade system because it promotes stable world peace, which in turn best serves Japan's own economic interests. He sees little need for Japan's militarization.

Chapter 2, "Japan and the World Energy

Problem" by Herbert I. Goodman, describes Japan's efforts to diversify sources and types of its energy supplies and concludes that despite such efforts, Japan's and other countries' dependence on the Middle East oil will continue for quite some time. Goodman does not make clear how Japan should or can generate the necessary political influence in creating a stable international environment and controlling energy supply disturbances. Limitations of purely economic analysis also become apparent in chapter 3, "Internationalizing Japan's Financial System" by Eric W. Hayden, an economist, describes the trends since the 1970s toward liberalization of Japan's domestic financial system and internationalization of the yen. He sees in those trends Tokyo's potential as a major international financial center. But does Japan have the will and ability to carry the political burdens usually associated with a major international financial power? The question remains unanswered.

Chapters 4 through 7, titled respectively "Cyclical and Macrostructural Issues in U.S.-Japan Economic Relations" (by Gary R. Saxonhouse); "The Economic Dimensions of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Overview" (by Hugh T. Patrick); "The U.S.-Japan Trade Conflict: An Economist's View from Japan" (by Ryutaro Komiya); and "The Economics of National Defense" (by Okimoto), focus on U.S.-Japanese relations and explain the economic sources of recent and current bilateral frictions.

Saxonhouse and Komiva warn that the commonly held assumption that synchronization of U.S. and Japanese economic policies will serve their mutual interests ignores the fact that such "coordination," even if possible, may destabilize other parts of the international economic system. Patrick and Komiya share the view that U.S. preoccupation with bilateral trade disequilibria is not only ineffective in managing the long-term bilateral economic relations, but also harmful because what matters are not merchandise trade imbalances but current account deficits that result from multilateral trade and monetary transactions and which are to a large extent beyond the control of the two governments involved. The three economists agree that greater political tolerance must be cultivated toward short-term trade imbalances and fiscal and monetary policy differences between the two governments. Clearly more dialogue is urgently needed between political science and economics.

This need is clearly demonstrated in the last substantive chapter in the present book. Citing the results of a simulation by Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky ("Japan's Economic Performance," in Patrick and Rosovsky (eds.), Asia's

New Giant, Brookings Institution, 1976) and reporting his own simulation results, Okimoto points out that a major transfer of capital from private and public investments to defense programs in Japan, constituting an increase of defense spending from less than 1% to 2% of GNP, would result in only temporary, short-term declines in economic performance indicators and produce substantial improvements thereafter. surpassing levels achievable without such capital transfer. Okimoto concludes from this that while in the earlier decades the "free-rider" criticism against Japan may have been accurate, such no longer appears to be the case. Okimoto does recognize the political costs involved in substantial increases in defense spending.

In short, despite the limitations of the economic analyses reviewed here, *Japan's Economy* poses a serious challenge to political scientists who are concerned about the management of future political problems caused by economic developments in Japan and elsewhere.

TSUNEO AKAHA

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Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence. By G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp. 279. \$25.00.)

"Why does the political process work more successfuly in some democracies than in others?" (p. 1). Analysts of the public choice tradition assume that democracy is an abstract mechanism of social choice. They achieve theoretical elegance by conducting a micro-level examination of alternative voting schemes on such well-defined desirable traits as transitivity of group preferences. The narrow questions, however, often beget acontextual and ahistorical analyses. Analysts of the aggregate data tradition, on the other hand, assume that democracy is a concrete system of governing. They achieve contextual richness by conducting a macro-level examination of such broad desired traits as institutional performance. The broad concerns, however, often beget empirical eclecticism.

Powell's work is one of the very best examples of the aggregate data approach. Arguments from the literature about democratic political performance are summarized and explored, with measures aggregated at the nation-state level for a cross-section of 29 contemporary democracies between 1958 and 1976. Powell's organization is a model for such studies. He first examines the impact of sets of independent variables, the social and economic environment, the constitutional set-

ting and party systems, on all performance (dependent) variables. He then proposes process models for each dependent variable: citizen electoral participation, executive and governmental stability, and political violence.

The substantive and theoretical sophistication of the data analysis makes Powell's work one of the very best exercises in the field. Powell collected much of the data himself, and his work paid off. He is sensitive to the nuances of theoretical arguments, aggregate data, and specific cases. For example, his exploration of ethnic rioting (pp. 46-47) shows great insight. His arguments about the role that political parties play in violence and regime change (p. 168) are interesting and informative. Even when cross-national data is not directly adduced to probe arguments, Powell offers fascinating insights into some of the following key issues in Western politics: abortion laws, civil liberties, registration laws, agricultural minorities, income inequality, manipulation of the economic cycle, openness of the economy to internal trade, federalism, coups, and capitalism.

There is thus one problem with the work: Many seemingly unrelated arguments are tested. Powell's models are a complex mix of positive and negative, intervening and controlling, direct and indirect, as well as cost and benefit variables. The sample consists of 29 countries, but the tables list approximately 66 different variables and 460 different correlation/regression/factor analysis coefficients. The number of other data analytic comparisons (for example, percentages, medians) is almost as great. Moreover, the number of variables discussed but not explored empirically is also great. If the advantage of comparative over case studies is to reduce the ratio of variables to cases, then such an exercise cannot be considered progress. Powell provides descriptive models, not parsimonious explanations.

The real problem is that Powell does not consistently pursue a unifying theme that integrates the analysis. There is a focus on the central role of political parties as linkages between the social and economic environment, the constitutional setting and political performance. But this is the book's broad topic rather than its central argument. At bottom, Powell tests theories of why coalitions coalesce, protesters protest, and voters vote. Thus, the concluding discussion of "leadership and political creativity" is again fascinating, but Powell's strength is really his undoing: He achieves contextual richness at the cost of some empirical eclecticism.

In summary, Powell's work is of great breadth and depth and will become the standard of a certain genre of research. It is undoubtedly the best empirical collation and test of partial, middlerange theories of macro-level performance in democracies yet done. All students of Westernstyle democracies and of political performance will benefit from reading Powell's work more than once. The problems with his analysis are really limitations of the genre of research. Aggregate data studies of political performance do not have the theoretical boldness of many verbal theories of performance. Nor do such studies have the deductive elegance of the public choice theorists' analyses of democracy. Rather, such studies, when well done, offer theoretical comprehensiveness and contextual richness. In this sense, I have not criticized the artist so much as the state of the art.

MARK LICHBACH

University of Illinois at Chicago

Women and Politics. By Vicky Randall. (New York: St. Martin's Press. Pp. 227. \$25.00.)

As an introduction to basic issues involved in a study of women and politics, this book provides a well-written survey of the growing body of literature and theories. Randall attributes the subordinate place of women in the political structure and, until recently, relative lack of involvement in politics as consequences of prior definitions (developed by men) of women's innate physical inferiority and/or submissive social roles. The combination of concern with a problem—women's lack of involvement in the political sphere—and concern with the cause—male domination—results in a "feminist perspective" seeking to both understand the cause and correction of the problem.

Indeed, in the Introduction Randall discusses "What is Feminism?' and in chapter 1, "Women's Place in Society," reviews theories documenting the fact of "male dominance and patriarchy" even while asking if such arrangements between the sexes are "inevitable." What follows is an assessment of women's participation in fundamental types of political involvementsuch as participation as citizens, participation as office-holding political elites, participation as members and leaders of political and social movements—as well as the policy consequences accruing to women from each type of political activity. This scope includes a useful cross-national and comparative perspective in the context of discussions about "How Politics Affects Women" (chap. 4) and "The Politics of the Women's Movement" (chap. 5).

It is refreshing to find a treatment of such a wide range of topics from the perspective of a single author versus the more usual edited anthologies. Furthermore, Randall attentively cites contributions to what is the developing

canon of literature on women and politics. In addition, Randall's style is lucid and careful; she is aware of the complex arguments and divergent points of view entailed in the subjects that she discusses, making this book both a good introduction and a guide for further study.

If there are exceptions to the book's merits, they are the other side of its strengths. The commendable breadth of topics included almost necessitates that some subjects either will be omitted or gone over too lightly. So, for example, "woman suffrage" is missing from the index and treated summarily in the text. However, many would point to this battle-staged internationally and with particular intensity in the United States and Britain—as the focal point for women's rights movements seeking redress for male-induced subordination identified at the book's outset as the cause of women's political problems. Similarly, "constitutional law" is not indexed. Rather, "law" is subsumed under "policy" concerns, despite the unusually rich opportunities afforded by this topic to document the "intellectual mentality" rationalizing male-dominated institutions as well as the rate and way in which this mentality slowly changed.

Although Randall is candid about presenting no "single, unified interpretation of the relationship between women and politics" (p. 199), nevertheless, an implicit utilitarianism runs throughout. It is perhaps most evident in such statements: "It only really makes sense to emphasize women's participation in public policies if it can be shown that policy outcomes do affect women" (p. 107). Randall's passive theoretical orientation may account for the failure to explicitly develop either the conceptualization of women as individuals possessing natural rights demanding democratic recognition or as group members joining pluralistic frays in democratic competition for political goods. Both premises are integral to democratic theory and practice; the book's theoretical focus could have been enriched by reference to classic democratic formulations as applied to the analysis of women's increasing integration into the political sphere.

With these reservations aside, Women and Politics is recommended as a thoughtful starting point for students interested in reckoning with the issue of women and politics.

EILEEN L. MCDONAGH

Northeastern University

Political Legitimation in Communist States. Edited by T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 177. \$22.50.)

More and more, students of the Soviet-type communist states are joining the mainstream of comparative politics by discussing the "legitimacy crisis" in these political systems. In an effort to go beyond commonsense observations, a group of scholars was assembled in mid-1979 at the Australian National University to analyze the topic in a more serious way. This volume, the first on the subject, resulted from that meeting. Whether it contributes to, rather than dissipates, the confusion in the current discussion of legitimacy is a question wisely left open by the editors themselves in their preface.

Despite the good intentions of its nine authors to bring the study of communist countries closer to the heart of the discipline and to break new ground, the book is a disappointment. Perhaps it is too early in the exploration of the topic for a symposium such as this.

The disappointment derives from the uneven quality of this book's contributions. Rigby provides an excellent introduction, the most thoroughly documented chapter of all. It is really the basis of a monograph in its own right which one wishes had been developed. Unfortunately, this good beginning is not followed through by the other authors. Only Robert F. Miller's chapter on the Eurocommunist parties' search for legitimacy and that of R. N. Berki on the philosophical basis for legitimation (or rather the lack of it) in Marxist-Leninist states are cogent, interesting, and pertinent. Of the remainder, the most common weakness is the failure to define terms and to articulate clearly at the outset a theoretically relevant problem. This, together with what in several instances appears to be rather skimpy research (one chapter has 10 end-notes in which are cited only two actual sources), results in unfocused discussion consisting of generalizations as seemingly endless as they are groundless. This equation of political science with sweeping historical generalization apparently stems from the East European training of some of the authors. Readers of this journal may wish for a bit more of the rigor associated with the discipline in its predominantly American mode.

It is regrettable that, apart from quality of research, none of his fellow authors follows Rigby's conceptual lead either. None takes up his definition of "legitimacy," nor his approach to legitimation as a process, nor any of the hypotheses derivable from his careful exegesis of Max Weber's writing on the subject. Therefore, this is not a collective enterprise, but rather, with the ex-

ceptions noted, a collection of individual discussions of various aspects of legitimacy and legitimation. It tantalizes without satisfying. Nevertheless, it will be useful in graduate seminars where new directions of research on communist countries of the Soviet type are being probed, because it does at least clear the underbrush so that further research can proceed.

BOHDAN HARASYMIW

University of Calgary

Latin American Prospects for the 1980s: Equity, Democratization, and Development. Edited by Archibald R. M. Ritter and David H. Pollock. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. ix + 330. \$29.95.)

This is a Canadian product, based on the proceedings of a conference held in 1980 in Ottawa. The authors include six Canadians and six Latin Americans, mostly academics, economists, and political scientists, and three either with, or formerly with, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and one Minister of External Relations (Trinidad/Tobago). No Canadian officials participated, and although much is made of the interplay between U.S. policy and Latin American internal affairs, Canadian policy is not discussed.

The conference and the volume came 10 years after an earlier effort that focused on revolutionary change. The central word in the present volume is "equity." Although there is no attempt to fit the separate chapters into a rigorous analytic scheme, there seems to be a largely shared outlook. Inequality in Latin America is both a historical given that helps account for contemporary dialectics and a continuing, indeed worsening, moral and policy failure. Cuba is not placed on a pedestal, but only Trinidad/Tobago's External Minister criticizes Nicaragua and Grenada. There is no contributor who describes any Latin American country as "merely authoritarian." As one contributor puts it, the Kennedy approach to Latin America was dead by the end of the Carter presidency, and the election of Reagan is a relapse to Eisenhower and before.

While the conference was held in 1980, the resulting papers do not seem dated. Some of them were apparently finished in 1981, and events in Latin America since then have not been marked by sharp change. The authors were not sanguine about the military's yielding power in Brazil or Chile or the dismantling of their repressive apparatuses. If the world recession has been worse

than foreseen, then the repression needed to make orthodox economic policies stick in the face of worsening unemployment and greater inequity can hardly be less. Of the various contributions, only Claudio Orrego Vicuna's on human rights is optimistic. He feels that the authoritarian regimes are not mellowing, but that human rights is a movement gathering moral force among individuals and organizations.

This is the most explicitly normative of the 13 contributions—hopeful of a broad coalition from Christian to Marxist and mindful of the need "to define an institutional role for the armed forces that is compatible with democracy and humanism" (p. 52). The other contributions are more descriptive or analytical. The Canadian contributions tend toward the general and analytic, the Latin American toward description and interpretation of their countries of expertise.

Among the general, Albert Berry, in "Predicting Income Distribution in Latin America during the 1980s," does not foresee that labor will become sufficiently scarce to overcome the greater inequality produced by education differentials. Inequality enters Alan B. Simmon's contribution more obliquely. He writes on the need to modify the classical view of the demographic transition accompanying development to fit Latin American (and perhaps Asian and African) realities. Pre-existing inequality in land, income, and influence, along with public health measures unrelated to level of development, lead to policies that push excess rural labor into the cities at low levels of industrialization.

Myron J. Frankman looks at the postindustrial service sector in the advanced countries and concludes that there are advantages in being a late-comer. He recommends that "we relieve industrial expansion of the principal responsibility for resolving the employment problem" and create jobs to "increase the enjoyment of life" in education, health, and nutrition, but notes that "advice from the IMF" is at "cross-purposes" with government-budget growth (p. 143).

Among the country-specific chapters, Archibald R. M. Ritter examines Cuba's new, ostensibly democratic, state institutions and finds the Party still dominant. Maria Helena Moreira Alves gives a detailed account of the "Mechanisms of Social Control of Military Governments in Brazil, 1964-80," and Jorge Nef connects "Economic Liberalism and Political Repression in Chile." The chapters on Peru and Ecuador, relative success stories for democracy, display only guarded optimism.

We're not in for an easy decade. As one of the editors concludes, the central question is whether "distributional equity" will be effected by a "strategy of rapid growth cum incrementalism or

by a political strategy of violent paroxism" (p. 20).

**ELISHA GREIFER** 

Northern Michigan University

Fiscal Stress in Cities. Edited by Richard Rose and Edward Page. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 245. \$29.95.)

Fiscal Stress in Cittes is a collection of papers presented at a conference on urban fiscal problems in Great Britain. Since the book is about a country with a very different structure of local government than ours and contains very little explicit comparative material, I feared that I would have no framework with which to interpret it. However, the book is highly readable, it translates well, the essays are of high quality, and are well selected. More importantly, the book offers some new concepts, deals with important theoretical issues, and poses some interesting policy issues. It deserves a wide reading.

The essays are well laid out, moving from descriptions of the problem in Great Britain to analysis and theoretical conclusions. Thus the essays describe the effects of national economic policy on urban finance, the central government role in creating local fiscal problems, school finance, and labor problems, and then move on to discuss the issues of reduction of local autonomy and the demise of incremental budgeting. The reader will be struck by the similarity of problems facing British and American cities. It is fascinating to watch another nation wrestle with many of the same problems in a different structure and culture.

One theme moves through the essays, giving them a unity usually lacking in published symposia. The theme is that national economic policy and local fiscal problems are interdependent. The national government has determined to reduce the proportion of the economy absorbed by the public sector, in an effort to increase productivity, reduce debt, and reduce interest rates. As part of this policy, the national government has created a policy of reducing local expenditures and in the process has curtailed local autonomy. (This part is quite different from policy in the United States.) As different instruments were deployed to curtail local expenditures, the result has been an exacerbation of uncertainty at the local level. Local budgets have varied from year to year over the past decade in a manner that Richard Rose and Edward Page compare to a "random walk."

The theoretical conclusions of the book can be summarized in two phrases: Governments cannot control themselves, and the cutback process creates continuing financial instability. Governments cannot control themselves because they are open to international economic and monetary systems that bring about continuing changes to which national economic policy must respond. These policy changes in turn bring about chronic financial uncertainty at the local level, which results in local level coping strategies instead of management and planning strategies.

The national-level policies have markedly reduced local autonomy, an issue that has been hotly debated in Britain, and which is reflected in the book. The authors agree that local autonomy has been reduced but disagree as to the cause and the importance of this change. While these key questions are not satisfactorily answered in this book, they are raised in a most provocative way.

IRENE RUBIN

Northern Illinois University

From Hitler to Ulbricht: The Communist Reconstruction of East Germany 1945-46. By Gregory W. Sandford. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 313. \$25.00.)

The collapse of Hitler's Third Reich in 1945 left Germany divided into four zones of occupation (plus Berlin) and deprived of its eastern provinces. Subsequent disputes among the wartime Allies rigidified the country's division, and by 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had been created in the West and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East.

Western scholarship outside the Federal Republic has by and large slighted the emergence and development of the GDR. In part this is due to the West's commitment to and fascination with the FRG. The very nature of the ideological struggle between East and West made it difficult for writers to avoid polemics; and "scholarship" all too frequently ranged between expressions of sympathy for East Germans caught under the Soviet thumb and condemnation of the GDR's illiberal regime. In part, too, the closed nature of East German society made it difficult for scholars to obtain the information required for balanced judgments.

Although one can point to earlier landmarks, many of them translations of West German books, it is only recently that English-language studies of the GDR have begun to appear in sufficient number to give us a clear idea of what has happened and is now happening in East Germany. It is in this sense that Sandford's account of the country's earliest days makes its most important contribution.

The first third of the book provides an excellent summary of developments leading up to and including the Potsdam Conference of July and August 1945. Sandford details the love-hate relationship between social democrats and communists during the 1930s and early 1940s, wartime efforts by the Soviet Union to position itself and its German emigrés for the eventual occupation of Germany, and early postwar activity on the part of Soviet officials to restore order while at the same time ensuring that their vision of a democratized Germany would prevail throughout the land.

Subsequent chapters, focusing on land reform, institution building, and expropriation of major industries, comprise the heart of the volume. Although readers thoroughly familiar with the German-language literature will find in them no startlingly new information or interpretations, these chapters are distinguished by cogent presentations based in part on interviews conducted in the GDR and material (such as doctoral dissertations prepared for East German universities) that is not generally available in the West. Sandford is thus able to provide rich detail to enhance our understanding of how the future GDR's leaders, men such as Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, worked together with Soviet officials to transform that portion of German society and economics under their control. By summer 1946, he concludes, the Soviet zone of Germany "was already the 'democratic people's republic' of prewar Communist theory."

The volume belongs on the shelf of anyone seriously interested in postwar Germany or the emergence of the Soviet bloc. This is not to say that it is without problems. Sandford tends to slight relevant developments in the West, denigrate the genuine accomplishments of the Western Allies in "democratizing" their zones of Germany, and underplay the awe-inspiring influence of the Red Army in persuading East Germans to go along with Ulbricht's plans; he slips too easily into a descriptive mode, substituting sequences of events for analyses of how they came about; and one might wish that he had devoted more attention to the creation of party and governmental institutions (which, it must be added, have been solidly treated elsewhere, e.g., Henry Krisch's German Politics Under Soviet Occupation [Columbia University Press, 1974]). It is nonetheless a vivid and valuable account of how a part of Germany was put on the path toward the Soviet brand of socialism.

RICHARD L. MERRITT

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Managing Public Enterprises. Edited by W. T. Stanbury and Fred Thompson. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xii + 301. \$29.95.)

The 13 articles comprising this book were selected from papers presented in 1981 at two conferences. Although a majority of the authors are economists, the papers vary widely in focus and approach. Some of the articles are narrowly focused or highly technical, while others take a broader perspective that is more likely to be of interest to political scientists in this area. The volume is divided into three parts: "The Purposes of Public Enterprises," "The Performance of Public Enterprises," and "Management Strategy of Public Enterprises."

The first section, on the purposes of public enterprises, contains two useful essays. Arie Y. Lewin briefly examines the significance and performance of state-owned enterprises in the countries of Western Europe, where such enterprises commonly dominate strategic sectors such as banking, communications, airlines, and oil. Lewin emphasizes that most state-owned enterprises are torn between the economic goal of profit maximization and the often conflicting social goals that initially prompted national control of the enterprise. Larry Pratt's "Oil and State Enterprises: Assessing Petro-Canada" is one of the few selections in the book that explicitly addresses political questions. Pratt argues that a national oil company can serve a number of important political purposes, including securing energy supplies, securing control over the economy, securing governmental revenue, and securing opportunities for domestic capital. Using Petro-Canada as an example, Pratt finds the losses of economic efficiency that are involved in establishing a national oil company to be minor and well worth the political gains. This is the most explicitly political of all the essays in the book and provides a useful counterweight to the exclusive focus on economic efficiency that underlies many of the other writings.

Part 2 considers the performance of public enterprises. Several of the essays in this section carefully compare the economic efficiency of public versus private enterprises by examining longitudinal data on the performance of Canadian, American, and Australian railroads and airlines. These studies indicate that the form of ownership has little effect on organizational efficiency (as measured, for example, by full factor productivity). The major determinant of efficiency is not mode of ownership, but degree of regulation. A publicly owned enterprise that is able to respond to competitive market forces with

little regulatory intervention is likely to be far more efficient than a private enterprise that is heavily regulated. Two other essays in this section are of interest. George W. Hilton briefly discusses the conflicting demands that have impaired the performance of Amtrak. In the only theoretical essay in this section, Catherine Eckel and Aidan Vining use public choice theory to suggest the advantages of joint private-government ownership of some enterprises.

Part 3, on strategic planning by public enterprises, is composed of generally uncritical case studies. Accordingly, it lacks the broader relevance of the other two sections. An exception is an article by Christopher H. Lovelock and Charles B. Weinberg that examines the marketing strategy of U.S. Postal Service. The authors argue that the Postal Service's neglect of marketing has had substantial costs. They suggest political and other causes for the neglect of marketing and advocate remedial steps. Although a case study. the article's analysis can be generalized to the marketing (and strategic planning) problems of many public enterprises.

In sum, political scientists concerned with such topics as government corporations, regulatory reform, or public versus private organizational efficiency are likely to find several interesting articles in this volume.

JAMES E. SWISS

North Carolina State University

South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia. By Robert W. Stookey. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 124. \$16.50.)

This very short and disappointing book is the only one available in English on contemporary South Yemen, officially the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The book has two declared goals: (1) to provide the general reader with a succinct description and balanced general introduction to the history and culture as well as the contemporary politics and economics of South Yemen; and (2) to explain how and why an authentically Marxist regime, rather than a more conventionally heterogeneous nationalist one. emerged immediately out of the colonial experience in this small country on a far corner of Arabia.

Stookey achieves the first goal far more successfully than the second. The book is a well-written, interesting, and informative introduction. Chapter 1 provides a good sketch of the land and people and is notable for a succinct discussion of the traditional social structure and its origins. Chapter 2 ably leads the reader through South Arabia's rich and complex history from antiquity until the British occupation of Aden in 1839, and chapter 3 does the same for the century-and-aquarter of colonial rule that ended with independence in 1967. Chapters 4 through 6, dealing with the society and economy, political system, and international relations of the PDRY since 1967, present a balanced and at times sympathetic treatment of the PDRY's Marxist experiment. The regime is given credit for its dedication to its chosen path and for its achievements in political organization and in creating a more egalitarian society through education, income distribution, and women's rights.

I have only a few criticisms of this book as a general introduction. A good short book requires the rigorous application of a standard of inclusion and exclusion, and Stookey sometimes fails this test. For example, he lists some 32 birds and animals found in South Yemen but neglects to give its human population. More important, his information on, and analyses of, politics, public policy, and international relations becomes extremely thin as he moves from 1967 through 1980-much thinner than the available materials warrant. Unfortunately, this is probably the period of greatest interest to this book's potential

readership.

Stookey's attempt to explain the how and why of a Marxist regime emerging immediately out of colonialism falls far short of the goal. His answer to this intriguing question is too sketchy and fragmentary to be convincing. The core of his explanation is that the colonial rulers unwittingly disrupted the traditional social system and dispossessed a large part of the population, thereby creating fertile soil for social revolution instead of merely national liberation. As a consequence, the ideology of the Arab Nationalist Movement, which in the 1960s migrated south from Beirut to Arabia and left from nationalism to Marxism, took root and flourished in this unlikely place. Stookey may have most of the answer right, but for me to be convinced, this answer would have to be elaborated and supported with factual detail. He does not tell me what made South Yemen's experience with colonialism so different from that of the many third-world nations that began independence with a more conventional nationalist phase.

Stookey, a former foreign service officer who served in North Yemen in the early 1960s and the author of by far the best scholarly study of the politics of North Yemen, is well qualified to undertake an analysis of the politics of the PDRY and this just adds to my disappointment. It would seem likely that there are far fewer general readers eager for an introduction to South Yemen than there are area specialists and political scientists interested in a detailed and well-reasoned analysis of the how and why of the PDRY.

ROBERT BURROWES

New York City

Administrative Systems Abroad. Edited by Krishna K. Tummala. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982. Pp. viii + 378. \$25.50, cloth; \$14.00, paper.)

This is primarily a collection of case studies of national public bureaucracies in the Third World that is weighted toward Asia. Its strength lies in the authors' detailed knowledge of individual countries. Its weakness lies in the relative absence of systematic comparisons and in the extent to which the literature of related fields is ignored.

In the one African case, Peter Koehn examines Nigerian public administration. It is a story of progressive deviations from the British model in the context of a regionally based federal system. David Rosenbloom and Gregory Mahler survey the multiple problems of Israeli administration and tangentially discuss the distribution of ministries in coalition governments. Anne Freedman and Maria Chan Morgan contribute a cogent analysis of the political and "rational" means employed to control bureaucracy in the People's Republic of China from 1949 to 1980. Atilla Dicle paints an interesting but primarily historical picture of administrative arrangements in Turkey.

In the first of three essays on the Indian subcontinent, Krishna Tummala writes, rather opaquely, on the "Higher Civil Service" in India. Robert LaPorte, Jr. provides a successful account of unsuccessful administrative reforms in the context of military rule in Pakistan. Mohammad Mohabbat Kahn and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah complete the trilogy with their description of a "denounced, demoralized and demotivated" postindependence bureaucracy in Bangladesh.

Jon Quah's clearly written study of public administration and national development in Singapore is refreshingly upbeat. It is a success story of a bureaucracy that has managed to maintain high personnel standards, control corruption, and implement substantial socioeconomic development programs. Linda Richter has less good news to report in writing of "bureaucracy by, decree" in the Philippines. It is an account of intelligent people being coopted into a corrupt system. In a study of Indonesia, Garth Jones describes the interesting practice of appointing junior cabinet ministers to oversee task-oriented programs requiring extensive coordination, although we are not told how successful this arrangement has been.

Latin America is left to John Sloan, who contributes a stimulating comparative analysis based upon the premise that Latin policymakers have generally stressed bureaucracy over social mobilization, leading to the bureaucratic authoritarian option. However, more could be said about the relevance of international bureaucracies, the impact of economic developments, and the socialist experience of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Allende's Chile.

The book also contains a short prologue by Tummala, a very general article on comparative bureaucracy by Gerald Caiden, and best of all, a review article by Fred Riggs. In the absence of a general organizational framework, the Riggs article pulls the book together. With one or two exceptions, the authors of the case studies consider only one country each and fail to incorporate relevant materials from the voluminous literatures of comparative politics, organization theory, contemporary development administration, or from the general works on the military in politics. They are thus unable to account for administrative variations between countries. Riggs demonstrates a broader perspective in arguing that the difference between Bangladesh and Singapore is largely that an extrabureaucratic political structure is dominant in Singapore. The fundamental determinants of bureaucratic behavior are thus political, although one must understand that civilian/military bureaucracles are inseparable parts of political systems. Some of Riggs's arguments are debatable, for example the claim that presidential systems of government tend to lead to military dictatorships and autocracy (p. 366). Nevertheless, he ranges beyond the other authors in stressing the importance of technological and world-system contexts and concludes with a discussion of the fate of comparative administration, the field he was instrumental in founding.

RICHARD E. HARTWIG

Illinois State University

Tanzania: An African Experiment. By Rodger Yeager. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 136. \$18.50.)

Tanzania is the second country report in the new Westview Press "Profiles" series, "Nations of Contemporary Africa." Despite its remoteness and poverty, the politics of Tanzania remain a growth industry, reflected in more than 20 years of commentary, including secondhand case histories in introductory comparative politics text books. At the very least, Rodger Yeager's short but informative case study provides a balanced

and yet challenging introduction to a new generation of students who may be puzzled over what the fuss has been about.

Yeager, who now teaches at West Virginia, has been intimately involved in Tanzanian affairs since the mid-1960s, having worked there as researcher and Tanzanian government adviser. His approach focuses on the political economy of development, combining historical description with a concern for macropolicy questions. While clearly sympathetic to the Tanzanian "experiment," Yeager does not eschew criticism of policy errors. Readers will probably conclude that Tanzania is neither "a model of modernizing achievement" nor "a lesson in development failure" (the evaluative theme of the study, first noted on page 3); but they undoubtedly will be fascinated by the efforts of the country's leadership to create a society of justice and well-being in a hostile environment.

The analytical thread of choice and the cost of alternatives runs through the whole volume. In the early 1960s it was nonracialism rather than partnership or racism, confederation with Zanzibar rather than rejection or take-over, one party rule with participative institutions rather than personalismo, and a nonaligned foreign policy. In company with other observers Yeager emphasizes the key role of Nyerere as an ideological guide and as political tactician. The major policy choice of the country centers on the Arusha Declaration and the politics of more centralized socialism of the late 1960s and 1970s. Nyerere himself summarized the price paid in economic declines traced to bureaucratized administration and failures of collectivized agriculture—essentially the cost of a more equitable society that has achieved a certain minimum welfare standard.

Despite internal crises of production and administration, Tanzania has continued to choose, almost perversely, an active and independent foreign policy in the last decade in the face of international opposition. "Self-Reliance" as a development policy has meant the unravelling of older skeins of economic cooperation in East Africa. Yet the leadership pursues new attempts in southern Africa, at great risk, related to Tanzania's position as a front-line state in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Assuming great economic and logistical burdens, Tanzania undertook the overthrow of the Amin regime in Uganda and played an important role in the restoration of President Obote. Although accepting military assistance from Communist governments, Tanzania still receives most of its economic aid from the West. To deal with the present crisis of finance and possible famine, the country must negotiate major readjustments in the economy to satisfy international lending agencies.

Yeager concludes by summarizing the criticism Tanzania has incurred from scholars of the Right and the Left. Consonant with the continuing debate over socialist policies the world over, Tanzania is cited as typical of the inherent problems of a socialist development program, while it is also castigated as weakly populist in its socialism, not radical (class-war prone) enough. Nevertheless, as Yeager makes clear, the final choice may not be between forms of socialism. It is between some form of bureaucratic-patrimonial authoritarianism and a participant and humane system that survives the departure of Nyerere as leader.

Replete with evocative photographs and a useful bibliography, the book is an auspicious beginning of what ought to be a valuable series. It deserves a paperback edition to make it more widely available.

HARVEY GLICKMAN

Haverford College

The Political Economy of Nigeria. Edited by I. William Zartman. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. vi + 283. \$30.95, cloth; \$13.95, paper.)

This collection of seven essays deals with the political economy of the second Nigerian republic. Although all the essays are of high quality, they differ in voice, methodology, and focus. What unites them is a shared concern for a common set of problems: the interrelationship between modernization or capitalism, the formation of classes and ethnic groups, and the role of politics and the state.

Zartman and Sayre Schatz write the Introduction. Larry Diamond has an intriguing chapter relating ethnic and class formation to political competition in the Second Republic. Henry Bienen writes on income distribution and politics and disagrees with Diamond that class has replaced ethnicity as the major line of cleavage in Nigerian politics. Michael Watts and Paul Lubeck explore the economic and political effects of the oil boom. Adeoye A. Akinsanya examines government policies toward Nigerian and foreign business. Thomas Bierstekker follows on Akinsanya's efforts by focusing more closely on the policy of indigenization and the government's attempt to control transnational corporations. Timothy M. Shaw discusses Nigeria in the international system. By this he means to include not only the conventional issue of inter-state relations, but also her economic relations as a country on the "semi-periphery" of the world capitalist system. This set of essays is complemented by an annotated bibliography compiled by Robert Mandersheid.

Although neither Diamond nor Watts and Lubeck make the elementary error of confusing ethnicity with traditional precolonial solidarities, and they do suggest that ethnicity still plays a role in certain cases, the thrust of their argument is that ethnicity and class are at odds with each other and that, at least in Nigeria, class is winning. They cite the realignment of the ethnic basis of the major national parties and the class struggle in the North, which has at times taken violent if not millenerian aspects.

Reexamining the evidence, however, it would seem that final rites over ethnicity in Nigeria and elsewhere are somewhat premature. Although it is true that the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) has been able to create an electoral coalition cutting across ethnic segments, other parties such as Awolowo's United Party of Nigeria (UPN) have been less successful. Indeed, the very success of the NPN may demonstrate neither the increased significance of class issues nor the relative insignificance of ethnic issues. It does demonstrate that constitutional engineering, namely the creation of more states, has produced opportunities for cross-ethnic alliances. Indeed, it could be argued that the pattern of alignments in the NPN is testimony to the endurance not only of ethnicity but also of old ethnicity deriving from the First Republic. As to class struggle in the North, that too is not a new phenomenon. It was said in the First Republic that if a class-based revolution ever manifested itself, it would commence in the North.

The point of these comments is not to minimize class as a significant cleavage in Nigeria. What is suggested is that class and ethnicity not be viewed as polar opposites with the one "ineluctably" replacing the other. In culturally plural societies such as Nigeria, India, Canada, and the Netherlands, class and ethnicity can be complementary orientations.

Beyond addressing themselves to the ethnicclass controversy, these essays do raise genuinely new and interesting problems. In particular, Diamond calls attention to political intolerance as a worrisome and persistent feature of Nigerian democratic politics. It is this intolerance, a mixture of chicanery, ruthlessness, and refusal to play by the rules, which even more than ethnicity and class conflict constitutes a great danger to Nigerian democracy. Diamond suggests that this unwelcome side of Nigerian politics is not a product of political culture, but is a byproduct of a dominant and centralizing state, swollen with oil revenues. He proposes that in the absence of an active and indigenous capitalist sector, state power becomes the "only game in town." Thus, a fundamental problem in Nigeria today is that a free and plural politics leads to a mad scramble for the resources of a directed and centralized economy. It may be that to make democracy work In Nigeria, what is needed is not only more states but also more centers of economic opportunity and power.

ROBERT MELSON

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## International Relations

The Nuclear Arms Race: Control or Catastrophe? Edited by Frank Barnaby and Geoffrey Thomas. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 250, \$25.00.)

Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s: Perspectives and Proposals. Edited by William H. Kincade and Christoph Bertram. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 272. \$27.50.)

It is one of the ironies of history that the Reagan administration may well be remembered as the one that stimulated the antinuclear weapons movement more than any other American administration since World War II. By intensifying the cold war, by presenting a view of the world that sees the forces of good arrayed against

the forces of evil, and by surrounding himself with advisors who have talked about fighting and winning a nuclear war, Ronald Reagan has succeeded in moving the nuclear issue to the top of the public agenda. This increased awareness is reflected in the substantial number of books appearing recently that address different dimensions of the nuclear issue. The two books reviewed here should be welcomed for keeping this issue before the public, but, unfortunately, they are not both of the same quality and usefulness.

The Barnaby and Thomas book, *The Nuclear Arms Race*, is a first-rate collection of papers given in September, 1981 at the annual meeting of the General Section of the British Association for

the Advancement of Science. The contributors are a distinguished group of scientists, physicians, political scientists, and historians including Frank Barnaby, John Erickson, John Humphrey, George Rathjens, Joseph Rotblat, and E. P. Thompson. As with most books of collected conference papers, there are the usual problems of unevenness and repetition, but on the whole this book suffers less from those problems than most.

The opening selection by Frank Barnaby offers a comparison of American and Soviet nuclear capability based on data provided by the 1981 SIPRI Yearbook. New here is Barnaby's emphasis on the point that policy is changing from deterrence to war-fighting primarily as a result of technological innovations by military scientists. A minor point, but one wonders about his assertion that Pershing II, with a range of 1,500 kilometers or twice that of Pershing I, can reach Moscow from the Federal Republic of Germany (p. 28). David Owen's call for increased conventional armament for NATO permitting acceptance of a no-first-strike-agreement is unexceptional, but the chapter by E. P. Thompson is worth the price of the book. His observation that some American defense experts suffer from an infantile political view of the world derived probably "from too much early reading of Tolkein's Lord of the Rings' (p. 57) is summarized in the following sentence: "The evil kingdom of Mordor lies there, and there it ever will lie, while on our side lies the nice republic of Eriador, inhabited by confused liberal hobbits who are rescued from time to time by the genial white wizardry of Gandaf-like figures such as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew, Brzezinski, or Richard Allen" (p. 57).

John Erickson's survey of the Soviet view of deterrence is especially useful as a rebuttal to those who have used several Soviet sources to suggest that the Russians are planning on fighting and winning a nuclear war. Pointing out the difference between statements of ideological rectitude and the much more cautious line found in professional military writing, Erickson suggests that "Soviet opinion seems to hold that nuclear war is not a rational instrument of policy, for means and ends lose any significance when the cost of destroying the enemy amounts to self annihilation" (p. 78). Egbert Boeker's call for the denuclearization of Europe and the conversion of NATO forces into a nonaggressive defense is worth considering as a way out of the seemingly endless confrontational posture of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Joseph Rotblat's discussion of the physical and medical effects of nuclear weapons is worth reading for someone who has not yet read Jonathan Schell's more detailed and chilling account; Sidney Butler's essay covers some of the same ground. George Rathjens points out that mutual assured destruction is not a doctrine, but rather a description of the physical reality of the contemporary world for the last 20 years. Stressing the uncertainty of the outcome once nuclear weapons are used, Rathjens questions the possibility of keeping a nuclear war limited either at the strategic counter force level or at the NATO battlefield level. Nicholas Sims is very cautious about the possibilities of diplomatic negotiations leading to nuclear weapons limitation or reduction, but he does not see what other alternative there is to the slow and tedious bargaining process. Nigel Young's concluding essay would have followed more logically after Thompson's, since both men are convinced that progress toward a more sane world will have to occur at a level below governments because political and military leaders on both sides are locked into a confrontational orientation that offers hope of nothing but continual arms racing or worse. Overall, this book of highly readable essays is worth the time of the general reader with an interest in the fate of this world.

The same cannot be said of Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s, a collection of essays by younger scholars who won an international competition to participate in a conference on nuclear proliferation. The editors claim that one of the values of the book is that they have made a deliberate effort to include the views of people from the Third World. However, six of the 12 contributors are students in American schools, two teach at American universities, one works for an American consulting firm, one is a student in West Germany, and one is a student in Switzerland. Only one is a student in India.

The principal problem with the book is that all of the papers are dated. The sources cited indicate that the papers were written in 1978 or 1979, and yet no explanation is offered for why it took so long to bring these papers into print. In some fields being slightly out of date is not a serious problem; in the field of nuclear development, it is critical.

The papers are organized into four parts, the first of which attempts to explain why nations have gone nuclear. The second section considers the pressure to go nuclear experienced by the "garrison states" of Israel, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Pakistan, and the "prestige states" of Argentina and Brazil. In the third section that considers limitations on attempts to prevent proliferation, Cynthia Cannizzo's criticism of the technical approach is noteworthy. The fourth section, offering alternatives to the present Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is primarily speculative and sometimes filled with observations such as: "A sense of responsibility will also be required from other nations" (p. 228). It is

hard to tell after reading all of these diligent efforts precisely what one has learned. Perhaps because almost 10 years have gone by since the Indian explosion and no new country has given tangible evidence of having developed nuclear weapons, the issue of horizontal proliferation does not seem anywhere near as important as the vertical proliferation practiced and planned by the two superpowers.

PHILIP W. DYER

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Mimicking Sisyphys: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy. By Louis Rene Beres. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. xiii + 142. \$19.95, cloth; \$7.95, paper.)

Mimicking Sisyphus: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy is an articulate, polemical analysis of how this country's nuclear warfighting strategy undermines our national security. Suitable for undergraduates as well as graduate students, the book helps fill the vacuum of accessible books in the arcane realm of strategic theory.

In this concise volume, Beres reviews the fundamental tenets of U.S. nuclear doctrine, devoting a chapter to each of five core assumptions:

The Soviet Union might decide to launch a *limited* first strike against the U.S. and its allies;

the Soviets are more likely to be deterred by limited U.S. counterforce reprisals than by total retaliation;

the United States can survive a nuclear war with the Soviet Union;

a major arms buildup can be maintained without compromising the prospects for arms control;

peace can be maintained indefinitely through nuclear deterrence.

Beres is especially persuasive in examining the first two assumptions. Analyzing the United States' declared intention to "prevail" during a nuclear conflict, Beres captures the countervailing strategy's central flaw: "The Soviet Union is no more likely to be deterred by an adversary that has announced its intention to dominate escalation processes during a nuclear war than by one that remains content with the capacity for assured destruction" (p. 23). In fact, Beres argues cogently, an American counterforce capability would be perceived by Moscow as a declaration of U.S.

intent to launch a first strike, thus creating incentives for any rational adversary to launch its own missiles in a preemptive strike.

Throughout the book, Beres does well to emphasize the overriding importance of how the Soviets view American nuclear strategy. However, in his readiness to assess Soviet perceptions, Beres tends to accept at face value Soviet rhetoric regarding their own nuclear doctrine, neglecting to question sufficiently the professed Soviet strategy of all-out nuclear retaliation. Moscow is also pursuing a counterforce capability in developing its new MIRVed ICBM, which means the Soviets' no-first-use pledge must be viewed with some skepticism.

Looking into the future, Beres presents persuasive arguments for abandoning the current doctrine of flexible/incremental nuclear response in favor of a more stabilizing policy of minimum deterrence. His near-term agenda for improving U.S. national security is both desirable and politically realistic: a comprehensive test ban, a more extensive U.S. nonproliferation commitment, and a higher nuclear threshold in Europe (achieved through a withdrawal of battlefield and theater nuclear forces coupled with a strengthening of NATO conventional forces). Beres's analysis is weakened somewhat, however, by an overly detailed philosophical discussion of the imperative of creating a new world order.

Overall, Mimicking Sisyphys is a timely critique of American national security policy, notable for its accessibility and provocativeness. In unpacking the hidden assumptions behind such misguided operational concepts as "limited nuclear war" and "escalatory ladders," Beres forces students of U.S. military doctrine to examine critically their own paradigms of national security.

ANNE H. CAHN

Committee for National Security

The Modern International Law of Outer Space. By Carl Q. Christol. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 932. \$85.00.)

Studies on emerging substantive areas of international law, such as communications, interstate pollution, and outer space, usually fall into one of three categories: historical surveys that trace the evolution of legal policies, reports and analyses of current developments, and detailed treatises that attempt to distill legal principles and policies. Christol's sprawling book embraces all three categories, with varying emphasis in each.

The book is organized along the lines commonly found in studies of the first category, historical surveys that trace the evolution of legal policies. Introductory and concluding chapters are separated by individual chapters devoted to a series of substantive topics. Christol concentrates his efforts on these topics by either analyzing the evolution of a particular convention, specific article, declaratory instrument, or issue area. The range of topics includes the 1967 outer space treaty, the 1972 liabilities caused by space objects convention, protection of space from contamination, the 1968 rescue and return of astronauts agreement, the 1979 moon treaty, exploitation of national resources, delimination of outer space and use of the geostationary orbit/spectrum, direct television broadcasting, remote sensing, use of nuclear power sources, and the implications of the space shuttle.

Christol has succeeded in assembling a primarily historical survey that is a detailed account of the legal and political debates and is derived from primary documentary sources. Each chapter is formidably footnoted with excellent references to the appropriate preparatory works and conventions with secondary source material included. Without a bibliography, one must search through the notes for this material, however.

The result is an analysis of evolutionary developments in outer space law as seen through successive exercises in multilateral conference diplomacy. Successive proposals and compromises by the various participants are evaluated, intertwining both claims and decisions. Christol does not employ a grand legal framework of inquiry to order the vast array of facts within each major topic. Instead, he organizes the material around events and outcomes, a framework not necessary to the achievement of reasonably good results in his historical surveys, especially since outer space law has little in the way of custom or judicial decision to place in the context of a comprehensive legal approach.

The Modern International Law of Outer Space is also an excellent reference source for current developments in space and space communications law. Even though the book carries a 1982 copyright, events up to and including the UNI-SPACE-82 conference are described and evaluated. There is no better one-volume source for this material, including a valuable appendix that reprints the texts of the major agreements with their status of ratification. Thus, Christol succeeds admirably in the category of reports and analyses of current developments.

It is in the third category, detailed treatises that attempt to distill legal principles and policies, that more work needs to be done. However, it is clear that Christol does not intend this volume as an authoritative legal analysis. His view is that international law must identify values and perspectives

if it is asked to govern activities in outer space, and that an understanding of substantive principles is advanced by detailing the negotiating history of the major agreements. Evaluated from his own premises, Christol has fulfilled his promise in what will surely be an enduring contribution to the field. What is lacking, and what could serve as a second volume to the present study, is a detailed interpretation of this negotiating history and a thorough search for community policies.

For example, Christol is cognizant that varied interpretations of principles such as "equity" and the "common heritage of mankind" have been the source of much misunderstanding and conflict, but consideration of such principles is scattered throughout his book. It would be valuable for a companion volume to emphasize the central principles that divide East and West, North and South.

I would recommend that any institution of higher learning with a program in international relations, law, or organization possess a copy of *The Modern International Law of Outer Space*. Certainly individual students of international law and policy would find it valuable, although the price will probably limit its utility as a text for a course, as will its intimidating length and somewhat dry style. However, policymakers and serious students of space, communications, and international law should not overlook this volume.

ERIC J. NOVOTNY.

Communications Satellite Corporation

United States International Economic Policy in Action: Diversity of Decision Making. By Stephen D. Cohen and Ronald I. Meltzer. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xii + 214. \$28.95, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

Cohen and Meltzer's purpose is to show how the process of international economic policy-making works in the U.S. by discussing the issues of trade, financial, and industrial policies. They report analyses of five recent decisions, which led respectively to tariff preferences for developing countries in 1975, a 1977 program to boost the shoe industry, measures to halt the dollar's decline in 1978, an unfulfilled promise of modest debt relief for poor countries, and the 1981 restraints on Japanese auto exports.

One of the book's two central arguments is that "U.S. government decisions in this area are reached through an accommodation of competing economic and political perspectives within the context of diverse policy issues, changing cir-

cumstances, and unexpected exigencies" (p. ix). The five episodes picture a pluralist polity normally producing internal compromises. For example, strong interests lobbied against as well as for import protection for shoe and car manufacturers.

The work's originality springs from Cohen's and Meltzer's interviews with Washington officials. Their accounts give an interesting an informative record of the political events in each episode and a strong flavor of what U.S. bureaucrats and others were thinking at the time, while also filling in needed background. To some extent the case studies also open windows for viewing the American policymaking process in general.

A substantial weakness is that Cohen and Meltzer do not generally provide comprehensive economic data on trends in the respective markets, making it difficult to see the full picture that policymakers were facing. Also, they shun microeconomic analysis, or generally the use of economic theory as a tool for explaining policy.

Unfortunately, the book's original contributions beyond this are thin. Cohen and Meltzer explicitly disclaim any effort to improve theories for explaining policy. Their second central argument is that the inherent complexity and imprecision of policymaking in this area preclude establishing a single, universally applicable model to explain it; "all available models are appropriate in specific circumstances" (p. 8).

The case studies are actually not organized to support the latter or any other general thesis. They do leave an impression of enormous complexity, but then there is never a sustained effort to spell out and use any particular simplifying model. The closest approximation is a superficial eight-page section that covers no fewer than 17 different concepts, merely asserting that all are useful but all are inadequate. None is stated precisely enough to allow it to fail empirically.

Cohen and Meltzer have chosen a familiar conception and method that maximize the difficulty of developing valid theories about this subject. They focus on the policymaking process, rather than on policy content itself, as the primary phenomenon to be analyzed. Very often this path leads off into a thicket of unique domestic details that prevents the analyst from seeing the forest, as has nearly happened here. And their method evidently did not include careful attention to research design. The cases were chosen "basically at random" (p. 8).

The value of the case studies is also reduced by analytical narrowness. They largely ignore lasting international and domestic structures that other scholars see as crucial influences on state policies toward industry, finance, and trade. This book sets aside "broad forces and historical developments," with the odd implication that only radi-

cals write about such things (p. 193). The text is heavy with U.S. officials' own reasoning, but rarely asks what structural elements or shifts could have narrowed the options even considered.

All this leads Cohen and Meltzer into an excessively voluntaristic interpretation, exaggerating the range of likely outcomes and the difficulty of predicting or explaining. Other students have confirmed generalizations such as the hypothesis that the chances of protection are strongly associated with the size of the industry requesting it. Still other recent works have been making analytical progress by integrating the global level with the national. These alternative approaches take policy content itself to be the key question.

The case studies can be used profitably if allowance is made for these omissions. But progress in theory development will have to be sought elsewhere.

JOHN S. ODELL

University of Southern California

The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role and Future. By Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 446. \$35.00, cloth; \$14.95, paper.)

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. has singled out what he considers to be a unique characteristic of American diplomacy: reliance on doctrines to guide foreign affairs. Crabb views this tendency as somewhat peculiar in that American domestic politics is relatively pragmatic and nondoctrinaire. Eight principle elaborations of principles are covered: Monroe; the Open Door and Stimpson; Truman; Eisenhower, Johnson, first (Vietnam) and second (Dominican Republic); Nixon; and Carter. Each is dissected according to its genesis, the impact of public opinion, influences of executive agencies and Congress, and the application of the doctrine in world politics including the reactions of other nations, especially those upon whom the doctrines impact. Crabb concludes with a lengthy treatment of the role of doctrines in American foreign relations.

While the analysis of each doctrine is thorough, the overall effect is uneven. The journey through American diplomatic history using the doctrines as a focus creates such disconcerting chronological leaps as, for example, the jumps from the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 to the first Johnson Doctrine (the Tonkin Gulf Resolution) in 1964.

Since some doctrines do not outlive the crisis that provokes them, such a treatment is appropriate. However, in the case of the Truman Doctrine—a vision of the international system and the U.S. role within it that has structured much of world politics since the end of World War II—such a treatment tends to give it equal weight with, say, the Stimpson Doctrine. The specialist would also find that limiting the discussion the program of aid to Greece and Turkey does not convey the full impact of NSC-68 and the Korean War of June, 1950 in giving the Truman Doctrine its comprehensive and compelling impact on U.S.-USSR relations, alliances, and the present-day arms race and U.S. relationships with the developing nations.

Crabb's views toward the various doctrines slides from praise to criticism within a mainstream interpretation of American foreign policy. He is certainly no cold war revisionist and occasionally makes an effort to specifically refute such interpretations. The doctrines under consideration vary in their content, their specificity, and their impact. Crabb makes clear that while the label doctrine implies uniformity, the doctrines under consideration range from wide-ranging visions of international order, such as the Nixon Doctrine, to rationales for specific policies, such as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam.

The most valuable part of the book is the conclusion, in which Crabb relates the issuance of doctrines to traditional themes in American diplomacy. The American perception of itself as "the city on a hill," untarnished by the tawdry power politics of the Old World, finds concrete form in these doctrines. The American propensity to issue unilateral declarations of enduring principles reflecting the unique role of the U.S., its belief in self government, its millennial mission, is contrasted with the actual origins of presidential doctrines that are often idiosyncratic, hurried overreactions to specific crises. Often such pronouncements are expected to have an effect merely because they are stated and reflect a lack of convergence between eternal principles and specific national interests and between those interests and the economic, political, or military means to achieve them.

Crabb sees no end to the practice of issuing doctrines, in part due to the American approach to foreign affairs, in part because they have served the nation well in some respects, and in part because presidents seem to like the word doctrine associated with their names.

The book could have been edited more tightly to avoid repetition, and Crabb tends to depend on standard secondary sources for his material. These are carping criticisms, however. The book, especially its conclusion, provides rich fare for those seeking to explore the American propensity

to clothe the pursuit of national interests in the garb of enduring doctrines.

RICHARD B. FINNEGAN

Stonehill College

Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s. By Shai Feldman. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 310. \$25.00, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

Rejecting Israel's policy of calculated ambiguity governing its nuclear bomb status, this study argues that Israel's deterrent capacity would be served by the country's open adoption of strategic nuclear deterrence based on first and second strike capabilities. Avoiding any admission that Israel has had nuclear bombs since the late 1960s. Feldman, an Israeli, contends that if Israel does not already have nuclear arms, it should develop them and introduce them overtly later on. According to Feldman, "nuclear weapons would provide Israel for the first time with the ability to threaten unacceptable punishment in retaliation to an Arab challenge to Israel's survival" (p. 54). How such a challenge could be mounted in view of Israel's military hegemony is not clear. Frightening Arab leaders is an essential purpose of disclosure. Countervalue city targets are discussed. but not the possibility of radioactive dust returning to Israel.

Important preconditions are attached to open Israeli proliferation. First, Israel should persuade Moscow that Israel's atomic bombs would not threaten the USSR. It is not clear why the Kremlin might fear 30 to 40 Israeli nuclear bombs. Second, "Israel should attempt to postpone the adoption of overt nuclear deterrence until a few more states have gone nuclear" (p. 242). Feldman believes that it would be desirable for an Arab or Moslem state to take the public step (and the onus) ahead of Israel. The book overestimates Arab nuclear bomb potentialities. Israel might have to wait a long time for another regional state to proliferate. Feldman holds that if adversaries gain a conventional edge, Israel should go public first.

Third, Israel's public adoption of a nuclearbomb strategy must be accompanied by a "flexible political posture" (p. 243) towards Arab lands taken in 1967. Nothing is said about Israeli settlements promoted by Menachem Begin, who is mentioned only in a footnote. If a Palestinian state acquired nuclear arms, deterrence would keep it responsible. Feldman offers interesting evidence deflating perceptions of Arab leaders as irrational.

Feldman is probably right in estimating that the U.S. would not penalize Israel if its nuclear

arsenal surfaced. Clearly, the U.S. has not exploited opportunities to try to denuclearize Israel. Postdisclosure, the U.S. would be apt to provide increasing amounts of aid in response to interest group and congressional efforts to relieve Israel's budget and to associate Israel's nuclear forces with U.S. Mideast defense. Such measures would crode U.S. nonproliferation policy world-wide.

The book's thesis is indebted to a Mideast balance of terror argument made by Steven Rosen in the American Political Science Review (1977, 71, 1367-1383). Rosen is credited, but not Moshe Dayan, who recommended an Israeli bomb-onthe-table linked to Palestinian land concessions to safeguard Israel's security and its Jewish character. Diverging from Dayan's ideas respecting Palestinian self-determination and Arab nuclear bombs, Feldman's thesis conflicts with Likud and Labor satisfaction with the basement-bomb policy and the 1981 Iraqi raid, which presumably protected Israel's regional nuclear bomb monopoly. The Iraqi reactor assault is noted. No mention is made of Begin's preventive strike doctrine aimed at any adversary gaining even nuclear bombmaking capability, let alone possession of nuclear

Intended to stir Israeli nuclear discussions, the book faces obstacles in a country where the topic of Israel's nuclear weapons is virtually never discussed in public. With notable exceptions such as George H. Quester, U.S. antiproliferationists have glossed over Israel and have focused on worrisome states like Argentina, the spectre of an Islamic bomb having a current potential only in Pakistan and Reagan relaxations of U.S. nuclear export practices. Whatever judgments might be made of Feldman's policy-oriented analysis, this study may draw U.S. attention to Israel's unacknowledged nuclear bomb status. The condition overshadows free-zone and other nonproliferation issues of the Mideast and enters into strategic nuclear calculations involving the region.

PAUL F. POWER

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The Crisis in Western Security. Edited by Lawrence S. Hagen. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 246. \$27.50.)

The essays in this volume stem from an April, 1980 conference at the London School of Economics. They were revised by the authors before publication and reflect the state of nuclear concerns at the time of the very early Reagan administration. Even if the tone of the debate has switched to problems with armament from problems with arms control, the essays have not lost

their usefulness. The central theme of the book is that arms control has been divorced from the military and political developments that give it meaning and that are necessary for its success. Although the analyses are diverse, the book is, in many ways, an autopsy of arms control.

The first two essays, Lawrence Hagen's and Philip Windsor's, give an overview of the failings of détente and arms control. While reflective, they point out a number of inconsistencies in détente and the SALT process. The following two chapters are more forward looking with respect to the prospects for arms control. Lawrence Freedman, in drawing out the lessons of the 1970s, suggests that "talking shops" replace the ongoing negotiations for agreements. This would more easily permit political conditions to lead to viable. although more limited, military agreements. Richard Burt also reviews the failure of arms control; what otherwise might be viewed as a redundancy in this volume might better be seen as a consensus. Burt's analysis leads to the recommendation that unilateral force improvements offer greater possibilities for stability. Arms control can only contribute a certain degree of predictability.

Colin Gray takes this a bit further and asserts that arms control may have a net negative impact on Western security. Defense policy or strategy should have a primacy over arms control efforts, which are just as likely to destabilize as control the right weapons.

Although a bit out of the arms control focus of this volume, Desmond Ball presents a short review of recent technological developments and their relation to changing nuclear strategies. Technological change has led to counterforce possibilities, and these have been incorporated into targeting doctrines. However, complex counterforce and controlled-response operations remain unfeasible.

Three essays deal with theater nuclear weapons in Europe (now INF). Lothar Ruehl provides a concise statement of the need for force modernization. Paul Buteux places INF in a more general light and questions whether the planned modernization will solve the deterrence problems associated with flexible response. Robin Ranger's prescient analysis details the near impossibility of progress in either strategic or European arms control.

The three concluding pieces examine the shifting underpinnings of arms control. In a balanced analysis, Pierre Hassner points out the differing U.S. and European perspectives and their implications for alliance cohesion and arms control. His notion of "comparative vulnerability" is a useful insight, if a bit underdeveloped here. Helmut Sonnenfeldt discusses the elements of East-West relations that are critical to arms control. Finally, Hugh Macdonald places the state of arms control in the context of changing attitudes towards the use of force.

An integrating essay would have improved this volume. All contributors agree that stability is the central objective of arms control and that previous efforts have not protected it. All seem to believe that a principle of parity is necessary to produce agreements, but that this is impractical and that it tends to erode the agreements once signed. These two concepts play large roles in the analyses, and differing views of stability and parity lead to quite different assessments of arms control. Interestingly, deterrence is mentioned only in passing and seems to have been replaced by stability. A major task remains to tidy these ambiguous concepts.

One wonders what a similar conference would produce today. Domestic politics and alliance consensus would no doubt figure more prominently. Perhaps the preoccupation with stability would be replaced by Michael Howard's notion of reassurance.

WILLIAM K. DOMKE

University of California, Davis

The Soviet Union and the Arms Race. By David Holloway. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 211. \$14.95.)

The nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union has, since World War II, been based theoretically upon a consociation of American superiority. Since the days of the Cuban missile crisis the Soviet Union—via an impressive incorporation of quantitative and qualitative increases in nuclear capabilities—has, according to Western estimates, moved from strategic nuclear inferiority, to parity in the 1970s, to superiority in the early 1980s.

According to David Holloway, a leading authority on Soviet defense policy, there are three elements of Soviet military policy that have heightened concern in the West. The first, often referred to as the Soviet military buildup, involves the "steady accumulation of military power over the last twenty years or so." The second is concerned with the nature of Soviet thinking about nuclear war and, most importantly, "its stress on the need to prepare to fight and win such a war." The third, often called Soviet expansionism, deals with "the increasing use of military power to expand Soviet influence throughout the world" (p. 1).

Yet, as is often asked in the West, what is it that drives Soviet military policy? In helping to answer this question Holloway examines three aspects of Soviet military power: the role of the military in the formulation of the Soviet state, Soviet views about the uses of military power in the nuclear age, and the role of economic and political institutions in complementing the Soviet military effort. By concentrating on the historical experiences, policy objectives, and institutions that "sustain" the Soviet military commitment, Holloway, unlike many of his contemporaries who explore esoteric paradigms and worst-case analyses, shows persuasively that Soviet military policy is a "product of specific decisions taken in a distinctive institutional setting, under the influence of a particular historical experience" (p. 178).

Holloway artfully handles the often-asked question of whether there is a Soviet military-industrial complex—by noting that the mere existence of a large defense industry and powerful armed forces does not mean that they can dictate Soviet defense policy (p. 159). Likewise, within the system of economic planning and management, in many ways a parallel system of military and civilian interaction and cooperation, "the priority of defense has been built into the economic system" (p. 176).

The Soviet leadership, comprehending the utility of treating nuclear weapons as instruments of military power and political influence, "has built up powerful nuclear forces not only in preparation for a possible nuclear war, but also to deprive the United States of any political advantage that superiority might bring" (p. 179). According to Holloway:

Perhaps the most important conclusion is that the Soviet Union does not have satisfactory answers to the problems posed by nuclear war and nuclear weapons. The answers the Soviet leaders have arrived at are not very different from those given by Western governments: nuclear weapons are both instruments of power and influence, and the potential agents of catastrophic devastation. Nor are Soviet answers much better than Western answers. The Soviet Union has not been able to escape from the threat of nuclear annihilation. Its leaders and its people share our predicament. We have a common interest in preventing nuclear war. (p. 182)

Lastly, Holloway recognizes clearly that arms control, in many ways the cornerstone of the East-West political and strategic relationship, will be unlikely to lead to anything better than a regulated arms race (p. 180). Nonetheless, Holloway's prescription is sound: Negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race should be pursued as vigorously and seriously as possible. As for an American attitude towards the post-Brezhnev leadership, it seems, "at the very least, extremely ill-advised for the United States to pursue a policy that makes

any Soviet move towards accommodation and cooperation less likely" (p. 182).

In conclusion, David Holloway's analysis of the Soviet Union's role within the nuclear arms race is, without question, a definite contribution to the growing body of Western literature dealing with the Soviet-American nuclear relationship. Objectively written and well documented, this work should appeal to the scholar and student interested in strategic and security studies, arms control, Soviet and East European studies, and Soviet-American relations in the nuclear age.

JOHN M. CARFORA

University of New Haven

Biopolitics, Political Psychology and International Politics: Towards a New Discipline. Edited by Gerald W. Hopple. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 195. \$22.50.)

In reading through the diverse selections of this book, one is reminded of Tocqueville's observation about the different ways in which historians in aristocracies and democracies attempt to explain events in the world. The former tend to attribute causation to one or a few great men, while the latter, seeing no truly great individuals in their midst, seek to place causation in general forces beyond the control of mere men. In ways befitting Tocquevillian democrats, the authors of this book present their fledgling attempts to uncover certain nonrational "internal determinants" that would explain the decisions and actions of leaders in the area of international politics. The authors do not openly address the possibility of "great men" (they would never use such a phrase) acting in rational ways to influence events; rather, they are concerned with the forces that might influence the reason of these and lesser beings.

Both the boldness of the enterprise, and the authors' own uncertainty about it, are captured in the book's subtitle (which, curiously, is found only on the book-jacket and not on the title page): "Towards a New Discipline." The etymology of "discipline" nicely embraces the prospect of imparting useful advice to disciples (and rulers). while "towards" conveys the appropriate hesitancy attending the current embryonic state of their search for the controlling "forces." To the authors' credit, they are not at all loathe to confess the limitations of their respective fields of study. As Hopple notes, they "have no comprehensive, nomothetic theories of political psychology and international politics, our methodologies are fallible and in need of refinement, and progress on the policy relevance front is quite clearly limited" (p. ix). In fact, he ultimately concedes that "we can point to the relative—but not absolute—irrelevance of biopolitics and political psychology in the study of international politics" (p. xii).

The true reasons for this irrelevance—and the explanation as to why neither biology nor psychology are ever likely to have much importance for the practice of international politics—go beyond fundamental questions of whether "internal determinants" actually exist and, if so, how influential they really are. In point of fact, information about leaders' "cognitive processes," "memory-related factors," "values," "beliefs," and "biological processes" is available, if at all, almost exclusively in democracies. Since even democratic leaders are unlikely to submit knowingly to the requisite physiological examinations, researchers are restricted to such things as informants' (possibly biased) revelations and content analyses of speeches. But since even in democracies leaders' speeches are routinely written by professional speech writers, how reliable are psychological assessments of their public utterances? When we then turn to leaders in nondemocratic regimes (the category into which the majority of nations fall), one who wishes to analyze leaders from a discreet (and safe) distance is confronted by awesome difficulties. Hopple briefly discusses this form of "remote assessment," but his mention of largely unspecified "innovative techniques" lacks credibility.

To judge by the authors' almost unanimous expressions of hope and commitment, they are undeterred by their singular and collective lack of success to date in locating reliable indicators of "internal determinants." Whatever limited promise some of their research may have for other areas of human activity, in international politics it is most unlikely that they will ever be able to provide much of the practical guidance they boldly set out after in this book.

WILLIAM D. RICHARDSON

Georgia State University

Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third-World Conflicts. By Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. xviii + 318. \$31.95.)

The Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 together with Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa and Angola have renewed attention on Soviet policy toward the Third World as well as on her power projection capabilities to intervene in conflicts arising there. While not the pioneering work of this renewed attention, Soviet Policy and Practice toward

Third-World Conflicts is a significant contribu-

Hosmer and Wolfe have divided their book into two parts. Part 1 is a historical survey. In this part the authors trace Soviet third-world policy to the Stalin era and the evolution and expansion of Soviet aid, both economic and military, to the Third World; discuss the shifts in priority among the various regions of the Third World; and survey the third-world conflicts in which the Soviet Union has intervened or threatened to intervene militarily.

The more analytical Part 2 begins with a summary of what Hosmer and Wolfe see as the main Soviet third-world policy objectives followed by a discussion of patterns of pre-Afghanistan third-world Soviet military involvement. Logically, Hosmer and Wolfe end with projections concerning future Soviet military intervention in the Third World and the implications that these have for future U.S. policies and practices.

This book has many clear strengths but also a few weaknesses. Hosmer and Wolfe present an excellent discussion of the evolution of Soviet military involvement policy in the Third World. The discussion is placed carefully in the context of doctrinal premises and justifications of Soviet theoreticians. Thus, changes in actual policy as pursued by Soviet leaders reflect corresponding shifts in doctrinal discourse and vice versa. A second strength is the excellent discussion of the evolution of Soviet military aid and involvement; appropriate and comprehensive data as well as instances accompany the discussion.

A third strength in the book lies in the analysis in Part 2, especially in the discussion of the patterns of third-world, military involvements and projections concerning the future of such involvements. Two of Hosmer and Wolfe's arguments will surprise some readers. One is that "Soviet military involvements in the Third World... have come largely in response to indigenous developments not of Moscow's making or to the action or inaction of other outsiders" (p. 135). Many observers contend that the Soviet Union is actively seeking to expand its influence in order to create opportunities for themselves or "stir up trouble" in the fluid Third World.

The other surprising contention is that the Soviets have tended to intervene only in low-risk situations and have avoided the risk of a military confrontation with the U.S. Again, the cautious Soviet posture indicated in these two arguments would be disputed by those who hold that the Soviet Union is a warmonger with a proclivity toward adventurism.

A final strength of the book is the extensive 33-page bibliography. This will provide a convenient source of references for those interested in the subject matter of the book.

As noted, there are a few minor weaknesses in the book. First, it is "spread thin," thus denying the reader an in-depth analysis of some issues. Second, the analytical section, Part 2, is a bit short and consequently too brief in some instances. Third, in chapter 6, it is not entirely clear how the following relate to the subheading Soviet Intervention in the Middle East and Africa: (1) the two paragraphs on the construction of naval support facilities at Cienfuegos, Cuba (p. 48); (2) the paragraph on the two airlifts to Peru and Bangladesh (p. 48); and (3) the paragraph on the second Indo-Pakistani war (pp. 49-50). Finally, in the absence of a discussion of the structure of Soviet power-projection assets or of defense systems in general, the following terms, which are not in the glossary, might be distracting to the uninitiated reader: Antonov transports, LSMs, LST, Kyanda-class missile cruisers, Alligator-class LSTs, and Def Con 3 alert.

In conclusion, although somewhat spread-thin, this book by two Rand Corporation scholars is serious, lucid, and thoroughly documented. Hosmer and Wolfe are intimately familiar with third-world Soviet military involvement policy and practice, and their book will be useful reading to a wide and varied audience.

HARRY ODODA

Russell Sage College

The United Nations and the Control of International Violence: A Legal and Political Analysis. By John F. Murphy. (Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun Publishers, 1983. Pp. xii + 212. \$32.50.)

Murphy is a lawyer; he was an attorney with the Office of the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State and is now an academic professor of law. Thus, in spite of some explicitly stated social science ambitions, his book is a lawyer's book. It is primarily a descriptive and evaluative analysis of the historical record and future prospects of United Nations' efforts to deal with acts or threats of international violence. As such, for the most part, it is modest, informative, reasonable, and fair.

For a book of the analytical intentions that this one has, however, moderation is not enough. Murphy tries to evaluate overall United Nations' experience in the peace and security area, based on the evidence of the U.N.'s entire record. Certainly, the whole range of that record is covered, from the presence of Soviet troops in Iran in 1946

to the Falklands/Malvinas conflict in 1982. But it is covered selectively. Although the selection is admitted freely, it is nowhere explained. No analysis is offered, and sometimes no mention made, of Greece, the Balkans, Indonesia, Hungary, Algeria, Bizerte, the Bay of Pigs, the Dominican Republic, Goa, India-Pakistan, Chile, and Afghanistan. Not addressed are the issues of why these cases were excluded and how, if at all, their possible inclusion would have affected the interpretive or prescriptive conclusions that this study reaches.

More importantly, Murphy divides the otherwise quite numerous and fairly representative cases that he does consider into two separately analyzed groups: the "traditional" and the "nontraditional" uses of international violence. Within the traditional group but not the nontraditional, he further subdivides his analysis of U.N. behaviors by institution of agency: The Security Council did these, the General Assembly did those, etc. It is never clear why. In any event, all of these divisions are almost pointless and often distorting. The Suez crisis of 1956 thus is considered as a problem addressed by the Security Council, although most of the work and all of the inventiveness of handling it are later correctly ascribed to the General Assembly and, especially, to the Secretary-General. The larger traditional/ nontraditional distinction likewise comes to no useful end when it is admitted (p. 165) that all of Oscar Schacter's listed "ten ways in which the United Nations may play a role in . . . internal [i.e., 'nontraditional'] conflicts" have been employed by the U.N. "in a variety of other circumstances as well." One looks in vain for analytical rigor, at least from a social science perspective, anywhere in this study.

The United Nations and the Control of International Violence has its uses, however, and its pleasures. With the exception only of his confusing and sometimes inaccurate account of the Korean issue (the Uniting for Peace Resolution was never, as such, used in Korea), Murphy's descriptions of a great variety of U.N. activities in respect to sometimes quite complex issues are models of graceful concision. His earlier summaries of pre-U.N. and pre-League of Nations developments in international organization, although admittedly heavily dependent on Inis Claude, are informative and spare. His judgments, again, are modest and fair. Persons wanting an interesting, current, moderate, and almost always reliable summary of most of the U.N.'s most important peace and security efforts will find one here.

Students of international relations should read The United Nations and the Control of International Violence. Murphy's fellow legalists may want to do likewise. Social science research scholars will not need to.

KEITH S. PETERSEN

North Carolina State University

The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1. By D. P. O'Connell. Edited by I. A. Shearer. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. xxxii + 634. \$74.00.)

In December, 1982 delegates from 151 countries to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met in Montego Bay, Jamaica, to sign a treaty forged over nearly 15 years of negotiation. The 439 articles of the text reflected agreement on complex issues including ocean boundaries, fisheries, deep seabed mining, navigation and shipping, pollution control, and scientific research. Despite this formidable achievement in modern conference diplomacy, continued conflicts over ocean use and resources—highlighted by the United States refusal to sign the treaty—insure that a stable legal order for the oceans will remain an elusive goal for the international community.

The philosophical, intellectual, and juridical evolution of the doctrines and principles fundamental to this legal order are the subject of this monumental work by D. P. O'Connell. O'Connell, Chicele Professor of International Law at Oxford, had completed the chapters for this two-volume book before his death in 1979. I. A. Shearer, Professor of Law, University of New South Wales, assumed the task of preparing the text for publication and incorporating pertinent developments between 1978 and 1981.

In many respects, "the history of international law is the history of the law of the sea and vice versa, for the intellectual character of international law, its techniques, and its philosophy, have been largely determined by the accommodations reached among nations respecting the use of the sea" (p. 29). Much of this has been determined by pragmatic decisions, determinations of interest rather than philosophical concepts. Consequently, "it was the facts of power and the pragmatic needs of commerce and strategy that eventually endowed the rules of the law of the sea with whatever stability they came to possess" (p. 29). But the proliferation of states and unilateral maritime claims since the end of World War II make questionable the prospect of a stable rule of law discernible in state actions. In fact, state actions, such as the United States' unilateral proclamation of an exclusive economic zone.

reflect a desire to establish new rules quickly rather than any commitment to old rules.

Competition between the exercise of governmental authority over the oceans and freedom of the seas has recurred for nearly 400 years. O'Connell argues persuasively that the historical method is the only one with the power to illuminate the origins of the rules and doctrines that have shaped the law of the sea, to describe the historical and political context that formed them, to determine how they have changed with experience, and to assess their intellectual integrity. This historical perspective provides a framework for O'Connell's comprehensive and detailed analysis of the major topics in ocean law: the juridical nature, extent, and measurement of the territorial sea; archipelagoes; innocent passage in the territorial sea; passage in international straits; internal waters (bays, ports, straits); the legal regime of the seabed; the continental shelf; fisheries zones; and the recently created exclusive economic zone. (Volume 2 will analyze jurisdictional issues affecting pollution, scientific research, shipping, navigation, and port access, as well as expand discussion of maritime boundaries, and the delimitation of the territorial sea, the continental shelf. and the exclusive economic zone.)

O'Connell traces each topic from its origins, its evolution in the treaties and opinions of jurists such as Grotius, Bynkershoek, Vattel, and Galiani; debates within the academic community; and through efforts at codification at the Institut De Droit International during the 1880s and 1890s; the Hague Codification Conference of 1930; the International Law Commission (1950 to 1956); and First (1958) and Second (1960) Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea; and the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (1974 to 1982).

Throughout this detailed and extensively documented work, O'Connell provides an erudite and intricate exegesis of the doctrines and principles of the law of the sea. The book's intellectual contributions are further enriched by its extensive documentation, bibliography, list of national legal cases and international incidents, as well as indexes of topics, authors, and conventions. It is a work of prodigious scholarship destined to find a prominent place in the literature of international law.

LAURISTON R. KING

Texas A&M University

Arms Control and East-West Relations. By Philip Towle. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. 187. \$30.00.)

Believing that arms control has a constructive role to play "in the intermediate band of relationships" (p. 2), Philip Towle, Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge, and Deputy Director for International Studies at the University of Cambridge, argues that hopes for arms control were too high in the 1960s and 1970s. He seeks to describe the conditions under which arms control may again play an important role in East-West relations.

In the first part of the book, Towle describes a number of different approaches to controlling war. The first of these, disarmament, has little appeal for him, for unlike "disarmers" who blame wars on armaments, he believes that war is caused by "politics, by the desire of revisionist states... to change the status quo" (p. 3). Towle illustrates most of his points with historical examples. Although he makes one caustic remark about quantitative studies of arms races (p. 15), there is little evidence in text or footnotes that he has read any of the relevant quantitative literature.

Towle next discusses arms control. Dealing with both pre- and post-World War II cases, Towle inexplicably makes no mention of the standard works on SALT-I and SALT-II. He reaches the pessimistic conclusion that "efforts to negotiate any important arms control agreements will only be effective if detente can be restored. ..." (p. 31).

The third approach Towle considers is the "political," by which he means attacking a problem more directly than the way arms control addresses the East-West conflict. He illustrates this by discussing the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) on the ground that this negotiation has sought "to tackle the causes of fear and suspicion" (p. 41).

A fourth approach, the "humanitarian," leads Towle to discuss the laws of war, while a fifth, the "pragmatic," moves him to illustrate techniques the superpowers have used to limit their involvement in third-world conflicts.

Following the chapters on the five approaches, Towle discusses the contrasting views on arms control and disarmament of the Soviet Union, the Western democracies, and the Third World. Concluding that the Soviet Union has good reason to avoid a nuclear war, Towle asserts that "within... limitations [the Soviets] are prepared to negotiate measures designed to reduce the possibility of war with NATO" (p. 97). After a final section on verification, Towle concludes his argument with a call for "a wide-ranging politico-

military agreement with the Soviet Union." As Towle phrases it,

If the arms control agreements included in such a wide-ranging rapport were properly verified, the whole package could help to reduce the swings between detente and cold war, which have characterized the post-1945 period and circumscribe ideological competition between the two blocs. In the foreseeable future that is the most we can hope for. (p. 178)

While this vision is one which many readers might share, the key question is whether the previous 177 pages are necessary to reach this destination. To this reviewer, the answer is negative.

Towle's book contains some interesting historical examples ranging over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and he draws extensively on primary documents from the United Nations and the British Foreign Office. In the final analysis, however, the argument does not hold together. It would, perhaps, have been better if the scope of the work were less ambitious. In that case Towle might have used his talents to write a long essay on a focused thesis rather than a short book that has insufficient central direction.

ROBERT C. GRAY

Franklin and Marshall College

Two Hungry Giants: The United States and Japan in the Quest for Oil and Ores. By Raymond Vernon. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 161. \$16.00.)

The urge of industrialized nations to secure reliable sources of basic raw materials is hardly a new theme in modern international relations. The ensuing competition for these materials provides opportunities for both cooperation and conflict. While these clashes do not make for major political crises, they are the essential backdrop of bilateral relations between nations. Two Hungry Glants is the first book of its kind to explore systematically the relationship between Japan and the United States in terms of the competition for industrial raw materials under a variety of market conditions (glut and shortage) and each country's respective long-term and short-term policy responses.

A few figures indicate the importance of raw materials for Japan and the U.S. In 1979, Japan and the U.S. consumed 46% of the world's crude oil outside the Communist bloc, 53% of its iron ore, 36% of its copper, and 46% of its coal. Ver-

non chooses to focus his analysis on crude oil and oil products, iron ore, bauxite, and copper ore, fully cognizant of the risk that problems arising in other key commodities might be overlooked. He posits that generalizations can be drawn from these commodities to others like uranium, chromite, and manganese. This is not necessarily so.

Vernon's thesis is that the two countries could not have responded more differently to similar problems and that their responses to a similar problem (that is, securing raw materials sources) stem largely from each country's distinct history, culture, and geography. He posits that, at least in this field of policy, national policymakers are the "prisoners of their national environment," through war and peace, gluts and shortages. This type of broad "environmental" determinism is an explanatory construct that has been downplayed by the historical school in recent years, but which has a long tradition in international relations (see, for example, the work of Harold and Margaret Sprout).

The first chapter defines the broader U.S.-Japanese economic and security relations that are characterized respectively as "an endless string of capitulation (by Japan) under (U.S.) pressures" and the "passing of the ward-guardian relation." Chapters 2 and 3 examine, in turn, the world markets in oil and minerals and metals, concluding in both cases that the likelihood of continued market instability in the 1980s is fairly high. Chapters 4 and 5 consider respectively U.S. and Japanese principles and practices governing raw materials policy and detail how each is a prisoner of its history, institutions, and ideologies. Vernon shows clearly how Japan has learned to cope with its have-not status through flexible and inventive national policies implemented through close government-industry cooperation. Vernon considers that Japan has been remarkably successful in procuring its basic needs through a highly rational approach of careful diversification of sources, strategic stockpiling, and taking equity ownership overseas gradually. In Vernon's view, the U.S., on the other hand, lacks an explicit and consistent set of policies and has been divided consequently between protecting its domestic producers and securing reliable overseas suppliers. The upshot has been an unstable and wholly unreliable raw materials policy in which the U.S. has cast itself in "the role of the country bumpkin -unheeding before the fact, unprepared after it, and unable to learn from experience" (p. 124). The last chapter maps the political and economic imponderables within which future scenarios may be painted. Vernon concedes that forecasting and modeling of commodity markets in past years has been highly unreliable and, therefore, takes a less

quantitative but more creative approach in considering the future.

Two Hungry Giants clearly defines the challenge for the two countries as the management of possible conflict over industrial materials in such a way that it does not disrupt the broader bilateral and regional security and trade relationships. Vernon concludes that while the postwar relations between the two countries on this subject have been relatively smooth when compared to auto trade, for example, the past is no guide to the future considering the looming supply, demand, price, and production uncertainties for the raw materials markets. Against this background, Vernon considers that "cooperation between the two countries on any sustained and significant scale is unlikely" (p. 123), but feels that the two are "doomed to continue as the odd couple" (p. 128).

Two Hungry Giants is an incisive, concise, and insightful treatment of an important international economic policy and problem. Its findings and approach have applications much beyond the specific policies and problems analyzed. This first-rate text has the additional virtue of combining an elegant use of both political and economic analysis. It should be useful to international relations scholars and nonscholars alike and essential to anyone focusing on international resource policy.

JOHN R. MCINTYRE

Georgia Institute of Technology

The Practical Negotiator. By I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 250. \$20.00, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

In the words of the authors, this volume is an attempt to tell negotiators how to negotiate. And it is an attempt that succeeds brilliantly. But the book will appeal to scholars as well as to policy-makers and negotiators. Zartman and Berman use three types of evidence—the historical record, "scientific" studies, and (of most interest to this reviewer) interviews with senior negotiators—to develop a model of successful negotiations that is at once intellectually compelling and useful as a practical guide for negotiators. The model identifies three stages in the process of negotiation—diagnostic, formula, and detail—and associates different problems and behaviors with each stage.

During the diagnostic phase, actors define the situation and decide to try negotiations. The possibility of a solution must be recognized by all

parties for the negotiating process to begin. Negotiations are appropriate when the parties recognize the problem requires joint resolution, when they possess the political will to end a situation they consider unacceptable, and when they are willing to admit other parties' claims to participate in the solution. Appropriate behaviors during the prenegotiating period include: understanding the facts of the problem, examining precedents and referents, understanding the context and perceptions that define the situation, understanding the stakes and interests of all parties, becoming aware of the affective dimension, and beginning preliminary talks to persuade the other party about the negotiability of the problem.

The formula phase consists of reaching agreement on a formula or common definition of the conflict that facilitates solution. Zartman and Berman conclude that a deductive approach characterizes successful negotiations. Agreement on a framework for solution gives coherence and structure to subsequent agreements on details, helps facilitate the search for solutions on component items, and fosters a creative, positive image of the negotiations, rather than an image of concession and compromise. The authors recognize. however, that a deductive approach may not be possible in all situations. If not, they suggest the parties begin with an initial agreement on some details in order to create a positive atmosphere of progress that can lead to the emergence of a formula at a later stage. Appropriate behaviors during the formula phase include: maintaining a flexible mind set, focusing on the problem not the opponent as the "enemy" to be overcome, not being deterred by unfriendly behavior, adopting a "keep talking" posture, and thinking of detailed applications while considering the broad formula.

During the detail phase, parties negotiate the details required to implement the formula. It is in this phase that the art of concession-making plays a critical role. Zartman and Berman conclude that it is better to group, package, or exchange concessions rather than fight it out on separate issues considered individually. This "package" approach is consistent with the authors' underlying view of successful negotiations as creative rather than concession/compromise enterprises. Appropriate behaviors here include: not losing the big picture, being clear from the beginning about objectives and not confusing means with ends, and maintaining sufficient perspective on the negotiations to be willing to do without an agreement if agreement is not possible on your minimum

The Practical Negotiator does not pretend to be a cookbook for aspiring negotiators. There is no one recipe for a successful negotiation. However,

the experiences of successful negotiators do fit into a pattern, and negotiating skills can be taught. Zartman and Berman have made a significant contribution to the literature on negotiation. This book should be read by negotiators and Annandale, Virginia

scholars alike for valuable insights into the negotiating process.

LINDA P. BRADY

## Normative Theory

Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. By Hannah Arendt. Edited by Ronald Beiner. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. viii + 174. \$15.00.)

Kant's Political Philosophy. By Patrick Riley. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983. Pp. ix + 213. \$28.95.)

These two studies of Kant are part of a remarkable revival of interest in the work of that philosopher whose thought has so deeply shaped what we mean by the modern outlook. Much of contemporary social science emerged from one or another school of "neo-Kantian" thought, although the connection is, unfortunately, rarely made an object of direct study today. Now, as Patrick Riley notes, John Rawls has done much to bring Kant back into currency (Riley calls the Theory of Justice a "neo-Kantian" work [p. ix]), although Rawls obviously also subjects Kant's thought to very serious modification (succinctly noted by Riley, p. 53 ff.; n. 104, p. 187). But the return to Kant is not exclusively shaped by Rawls; in a fine chapter, Riley examines recent works on Kant by Alexander Kojeve, Lucien Goldmann, Robert Paul Wolff, Susan Shell, Hans Saner, and John Charvet, reminding us of a significant recent literature and developing his own position toward

Riley's own study of Kant is a major contribution to the discussion. With exemplary tenacity and open-mindedness, he examines the familiar thesis that Kant's approach to politics is onesidedly formalistic. This view goes back to Kant's earliest critics and remains a staple. It is perhaps most deeply argued by Hegel, who made it a point of departure for his own effort to build a modern political philosophy adequate to the historical and the concrete (see pp. 38-42; 174). In our own framework, it is Rawls and Lewis White Beck who have recently defined the meaning of Kant's work. Riley argues that they have overemphasized

the procedural formalism of Kant's teaching and. further, have presented him as a "deepened Rousseau" who teaches that law cannot be law unless a product of conscious will (pp. 53-58). This view makes human ends the product of will or construction, as if nothing can be an end unless some act of agreement establishes it.

It is the main goal of Riley's analysis to show that Kant advocates a critical teleology of objective ends, not of will legislating for itself. There are necessary ends for which we must act; this is ultimately a more important thesis for Kant than is the process of giving the law to oneself; the moral law is not constructed but somehow simply "there" (p. 56; cf. pp. 171-172). Riley must, of course, rely above all on Kant's late Critique of Judgment to support this thesis, but he possesses an extraordinary command of all of the texts and tracks down every source usable in defense of this uncommon reading of Kant's thought. Certainly he succeeds in showing that there is much to be found in Kant that will bear this interpretation. After this study, no one will be able to assert without further ado that Kant is either an unqualified formalist or a Rousseauian constructivist. Riley. however, admits that his pursuit of Kant's doctrine of objective ends establishes at best an "arguably" stronger reading than the usual one (p. 170), hence not a categorically stronger interpretation. He does not artificially minimize the formalist and constructionist strain, but would hold that he has succeeded in showing that Kant qualified or limited it.

A genuine dedication to the Kantian outlook underlies Riley's argument. The book gets its heart from this adherence. Noting a witty remark of Oakeshott that Kant is "important but not attractive" (n. 43, p. 206), Riley hopes to overcome this deprecation and eventually puts Kant very high. He is "the philosopher of freedom," who also knew how to see freedom in the light of the "moral law" considered as a "fact of reason"

(p. 5). In a passage at the end of the book, he steps out of his concentration on the texts and sources to suggest that Kant is "both the most important and the most attractive of political philosophers" (p. 176). Contrasting Kant with other moderns, he holds that Kant avoided the extremism to be found in Hobbes, Hegel, Machiavelli, Mill, Marx, Locke, Burke, Hume, Freud, and Nietzsche. Elsewhere, he does not deny a "Jacobin" strain and even a radical "humanism" in Kant's thought, however (pp. 132-133; 58-63). On the whole, the case for Kant's moderation would also need to be assessed through a thorough evaluation of the content he prescribes for the ostensibly objective ends (Riley's theme in the illuminating chapters 4-6).

Occasional flashes of humor in this book aid the argument for Kant's attractiveness by showing that moral earnestness is not totally fatal to wit.

Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy is a collection drawing together the Postscriptum to her Life of the Mind, a set of lectures on Kantian political philosophy given as early as 1964, then revised and presented on other occasions during the following decade, and some notes for a 1970 lecture on imagination. The compilation of these materials is quite useful, although readers will quickly discover that the lectures were never turned into finished compositions. Ronald Beiner, the editor, argues that they provide some important clues to the work on the faculty of judging that Arendt intended but did not live to write. The texts reflect many of the well-known mannerisms of her style. On the positive side, they also reflect her ability to cast an interesting, sometimes novel, light on familiar and unfamiliar issues. The whole collection does not add up to a complete account of the theme of judgment, or of Kant's political philosophy, as Beiner is the first to admit, but it does give some insight into the basis of Arendt's life-long interest in Kant, her interpretation of his political works and comments, and the faculty of judgment as she saw it after her extensive earlier reflections on thinking and willing in the Life of the Mind.

Like Riley's work, these studies of Kant focus on the Critique of Judgment. Arendt's interest is less on the doctrine of ends or telos than on the type of thinking that Kant calls judging and that is the way for "thinking the particular" (p. 119). This mode of thought, she holds, is that by which we combine the general and the particular to grasp politics. Ronald Beiner's extended interpretive essay, occupying about one-half of this volume, offers an illuminating study of Arendt's uncompleted work on judgment. Significant in its own right, the essay is perhaps most interesting in expounding and weighing some of the limitations in Arendt's work on this theme. An example

would be the comments on the relative neglect of 'prudence' in both Kant and Arendt. Beiner shows the need for a "confrontation of Aristotle with Kant" and directs us to work by Gadamer and others that explores this confrontation (p. 134 ff.). Ultimately Beiner seems to question not the importance but the sufficiency of both Kant and Arendt in their elucidation of this aspect of thought.

DONALD J. MALETZ

University of Oklahoma

Legitimacy of the Modern Age. By Hans Blumenberg. Translated by Robert Wallace. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. Pp. xxxi + 677. \$35.50.)

Modern science buried centuries of theological controversy. Hans Blumenberg has unearthed these controversies again, rethinking the dilemmas and dead ends of Christian dogma that provided the intellectual provocations for the scientific revolution. Especially striking are his accounts of the deep strains between Biblical premises and Aristotelian and Stoic ideas within Scholasticism and of the emergence of voluntaristic nominalism, whose God was so thoroughly unfathomable as to be reasonably ignored. But Blumenberg has not merely written a scholarly, nuanced, and illuminating study of the religious background to modern science. He has also written a philosophical book, a combative response to the dim Romantic suggestion more common in Germany than America, that the modern age "as a whole' is somehow illegitimate. Tracing the many reasons why "the modern age is unthinkable without Christianity" (p. 30), Blumenberg sheds light on the legitimate claims of modern science and also reveals the historical poverty of all pre-staged duels between "the ancients" and "the moderns" that leave Christianity out of account.

Concerned to defend the Enlightenment against its enemies, Blumenberg is also aware that modern theorists have often defended indefensible claims. The fundamental error of the great modern philosophers, however, lay not in their wanton break with the past, but rather in their failure to make a sufficiently radical break. Christianity accustomed people to great questions such as, What is the purpose of human existence? and What is the meaning of history? Although Christian answers ceased to be credible, Christian questions lingered on, a disorienting legacy to the future. Rather than dismissing such questions by declaring them unanswerable in the positivist manner, modern theorists tried, unwisely but perhaps inevitably, to answer them. Thus, for instance, an initially modest idea of progress was

overextended in a hearty but unfortunate attempt to answer the otiose question, What is the overall pattern of history?

Blumenberg fondly contrasts his concept of inherited questions with the widespread idea of secularization, for example, with Karl Lowith's notion that "progress" is a secularized version of Christian eschatology. Lowith's thesis is implausible, Blumenberg argues, if only because eschatology requires an external intervention for which people passively wait, while progress is an indigenous process driven by human effort. Indeed, far from being a secularization of the Christian idea of history, "progress" is a counteroffer, asserted against eschatology and its devaluation of the world. The needs of polemic may also explain some of the self-discrediting exaggerations of Enlightenment thought. A massive provocation will incite an exorbitant response. But when provocations recede from the cultural scene, as they have in the case of Christian dogma, historians must control their impulse to interpret, say, Hobbes's theoretical bravado as sheer willfulness or a sign of reprehensible hubris.

STEPHEN HOLMES

Harvard University

Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation. By Sissela Bok. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982. Pp. xviii + 332. \$16.95.)

Sissela Bok has ably complemented her analysis of lying (Lying, Pantheon Books, 1978) with further theoretical exploration of the moral and political underworld. This time it is secrecy that comes under Bok's scrutiny. As in her earlier work, the practice is treated in a wide range of personal, social, economic, and political contexts: personal secrecy, secret societies, confessions, trade and corporate secrecy, professional and scientific secrecy, secrets of state, whistleblowing and leaking, military secrecy, investigative journalism, intrusive social science research, and undercover police operations. Even gossip is discussed and, at last, defended (well, almost).

Bok's recognition of the wide scope of the practice of secrecy is complemented by the care with which she attempts to provide counsel in the face of this complexity. Neither secrecy nor total openness is advocated; disclosure of secrets may unleash the power of Pandora's box as well as topple the Sphinx. Further, secrecy both reaffirms a personal sense of self and separates us from others. Thus, unlike others who have inveighed against secrecy in a wholesale fashion, Bok offers a balanced view, recognizing secrecy's advantages as well as disadvantages.

Bok, however, attempts to do more than make a general case about secrecy; she aims to provide guidance about its numerous vexing dilemmas. Here the merits of the book become more mixed. In confronting practices of secrecy, we are advised to follow two moral "presumptions": (1) equality whatever control over secrecy is legitimate for some should be legitimate for all, other things being equal; and (2) autonomy—partial individual control about personal matters. These are, however, only presumptions, and they still leave open the matter both of what secrecy is legitimate and what kind and degree of individual autonomy we wish to secure. They certainly are not principles, since they do not consistently structure or inform subsequent analysis. Bok resolves these omissions by appealing to particular cases and ascertaining what arguments for secrecy or disclosure might be made. For example, professional secrecy rests on three claims in addition to autonomy: the need to share with others, the weight of agreement between client and provider, and the general utility of professional confidentiality. Trade secrets rest on five claims: personal autonomy, property rights, incentives to invest, national security, and confidentiality. The merits of secret societies turn on their consequences for politics, other groups, the group itself, and its members. Bok then weighs the arguments of each of these claims.

It is not clear, however, that this approach can always provide acceptable moral or political counsel. Simply considering a range of arguments neglects to analyze what principles ought to be employed in ordering and discriminating among them. Bok's presumptions could perform this function, yet sometimes they are simply other arguments, not ways of discriminating among arguments. Even if we grant that they are the latter, problems arise. We should take seriously not only the need for principles but also how we derive them. What kinds of arguments we consider and how we weigh them may differ if we begin, not with a list of claims or arguments and then proceed to our intuitions about their merits. but rather first consider the needs and requisites of the particular institution, setting, or role, and deduce the principles they value. These mediating steps may both shade what kinds of arguments we discern and what principles we use in evaluating them. This approach is helpful where the practice we are examining occurs in a number of very different contexts, as with secrecy or lying. It seems especially important in those areas of secrecy of most interest to political scientists: secrets of state, leaking, whistleblowing, military secrecy, and law enforcement deception. Here political and institutional obligations and considerations ought to weigh more heavily, yet if we begin with our intuitions, we are likely to undervalue these

constraints in favor of the personal and the individual.

To be fair to Bok, she does not wholly neglect institutions. She frequently acknowledges that structural, contextual, and organizational considerations influence the recognition of moral choice and the consequences we consider in making choices. This relationship of the normative and empirical is an important one and ought to be of particular interest to those who seek to separate political philosophy and political science. Moreover, constraints of role, institution, and setting do sometimes emerge in the arguments she considers and in the balancing of their merits. Their place in normative evaluation and institutional reform, however, needs to be both more centrally addressed and given proper weight.

JOHN P. BURKE

Williams College

The Concept of Class: An Historical Introduction. By Peter Calvert. (London: Hutchinson Publishing Group, 1982. Pp. 254. \$18.24, cloth; \$8.36, paper.)

Calvert has a clear thesis: that the concept of class is now muddled in theory, useless in scholarly application, and dangerous in politics. His work follows in the mold of a series on key concepts in political science for which he served as executive editor and as a contributor (Revolution [Praeger Publishers]).

Francois Quesnay made class an important economic term in 1759 when he distinguished between the "productive expenditure class" and the "sterile expenditure class," a distinction that became political particularly as the English associated class with rank (p. 25). On the other hand, Plato and Aristotle and their Christian interpreters had used the concept to investigate "class as balance" (chap. 2) between groups divided by ability, function, and natural attributes, an enterprise which led to consideration of class conflict. It remained for Marx to make of class the agent of history.

Calvert argues that Marx's work on class was incomplete, inconsistent in definition (p. 69), and contradictory (p. 83). Empirically, Marx confused class with estate (p. 100) and was wrong about capitalism's tendency to reduce all classes into the bourgeoisie and proletariat (pp. 135-136). Neo-Marxists are dismissed as whittlers who, in their attempt to sharpen bad wood, leave nothing of the stick (chap. 5). Capitalism, whether "advanced" or "late," has outlasted the rationalizations of Marx's position on class (pp. 142-143). Attempts by theorists such as Max

Weber, Talcott Parsons, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Rinehard Bendix to give it more systematic meaning have foundered on the problems of objectivity/subjectivity and confusion of class with status, stratification, party, power, and relative deprivation. Operationalization becomes impossible where it isn't arbitrary and subjective as in Centers's upper-upper, lower-upper, etc., formulation (p. 114).

In the second, less scholarly half of the book, Calvert points to the homicidal uses of class in the hands of Mao, Stalin, and the Pol Pot regime. In analyzing Western democracies, Calvert concludes that what divides Britain "is not, in fact, a class structure at all" (p. 183), that class ill fits the American experience and, in fact, wasn't really introduced until the Great Depression, and that the 1981 election in France only demonstrates the achievement of a sense of continuity such that the French were "at last able to accommodate to a Socialist Government" (p. 199). Calvert concludes that class is one of W. B. Gallie's "essentially contested concepts" (pp. 214-215), where agreement on a definition is unlikely because of the motives of its users.

In a similar argument about the concept of community, Raymond Plant suggested that definitional consensus is not essential to the productive use of a concept (Politics and Society, 1978, 8, (1), 79-107). Calvert, by contrast, proposes that social scientists dispense with class. Were we to do so, scholars would certainly find themselves more removed from a world in which, as Calvert admits, there is plenty of "classism" (p. 216). That murder has been committed in its name does not distinguish class from race, power, or even, after Machiavelli, politics itself. Do we have so many tools for understanding discontinuities in power and the dynamism of political life that we can abandon class?

The book has intellectual value as a stimulus to the argument about class. The value would be greater if Calvert had gone beyond the familiar positivist critique of Marx and, for example, explored the territory opened up by Bertell Ollman's analysis of Marx's method of defining key concepts in the dynamic terms of "internal relations" with associated phenomena (Alienation, Cambridge University Press, 1972). The substantial bibliography is helpful, though there are surprising omissions: Ollman, C. B. Macpherson, Sidney Hook, Alfred Meyer, G. William Domhoff, and Paul Blumberg. The book is engagingly written; the lexicographic analysis and the summaries of different concepts of class are the most useful parts of the book.

KENNETH R. HOOVER

University of Wisconsin-Parkside

The Ethical Dimension of Political Life: Essays in Honor of John H. Hallowell. Edited by Francis Canavan. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983. Pp. vix + 275. \$27.75.)

This volume, 17 essays written by friends and former students of John Hallowell, was published upon the occasion of his retirement from Duke University. Sixteen of the essays appear in print for the first time. The volume also includes a list of Hallowell's publications.

As is the case with many commemorative anthologies, these essays do not have the unity of theme that the collection's title implies. While the issue of ethics and politics does surface throughout this collection, in most cases it arises in a secondary fashion, only tangentially related to the more immediate concerns of the various authors. Anyone turning to this book for a comprehensive or systematic treatment of the relationship of ethics to politics will be disappointed.

This is not to say that the essays in this collection are of no merit. A number of them are extremely perceptive and well written. The essays by Kenneth W. Thompson (on foreign policy), Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. (on David Hume), and Mulford Q. Sibley (on coercion) are well worth reading, as are the essays discussed below.

James L. Wiser's "The Force of Reason: On Reading Plato's Gorgias" provides an exceptionally clear and concise discussion of the structure of the Gorgias and presents a thoughtful argument concerning the relation of intellectual activity to personal life. Wiser argues that "before there can be a true exchange at the level of ideas, there must first be a real encounter at the level of existence . . . intellectual persuasion presupposes an existential conversion" (p. 56).

Claes G. Ryn presents a provocative analysis of Leo Strauss's understanding of natural right and the possibility of a "value-centered historicism" in "History and the Moral Order." He argues that Strauss's understanding of natural right contains a tension between natural right, seen as a set of eternal and universal rules of conduct, and natural right, seen as something mutable because it exists only in concrete decisions. Ryn argues for a position that recognizes the historical context of moral decisions, but that also acknowledges the common experiences of human existence which make moral knowledge possible.

In "The Radical Gospel and Christian Prudence," Clarke E. Cochran deals with the personal and political dimensions of the Christian gospel. The gospel is politically radical because of Christ's identification with the poor and because of his lack of concern for how his message affects political stability. The danger of the radical gospel, according to Cochran, is that it calls

humans into a life of continual tension, and a retreat into the security of political ideology becomes an easy way to eliminate the stress of radical Christian living. Cochran sees prudence as an antidote to ideology and argues that the Christian concept of stewardship as the embodiment of prudence provides the proper framework for the radical gospel.

The book's essays move in divergent directions. To the extent that there is a structure to this collection, it is built around the concerns that have occupied John Hallowell in his teaching and writing. Thus there are essays on liberalism, democracy, Christianity and politics, ethics, and a number of detailed explications of individual political philosophers. Unfortunately, most of the essays are little more than preliminary sketches that require more space for adequate development.

As an expression of affection, and as a tribute to the wide-ranging intersts of an outstanding teacher, this volume succeeds. As a contribution to the important area of ethics and politics, however, it is much less successful.

STEVEN D. EALY

Armstrong State College

Feminism. By John Charvet. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1982. Pp. 159. \$15.95, cloth; \$7.95, paper.)

In this slim, closely written volume Charvet examines theories of the past two centuries of feminist thought. Three sections discuss the major feminist works in the individualist, socialist, and radical feminist traditions. Within severe space constraints, Charvet searches each writer's distinctive contributions, internal inconsistencies, and relationship to the thought of others. A substantial effort is made to be objective, but the approach is analytical, rather than reportorial. The book fills a need and provides a useful framework to debate on feminist issues. Crucial to the approach is the understanding that feminist thought not only arises out of an ethical tradition, but it also becomes subject to the theoretical inadequacies there entailed.

The individualist ethical tradition is based on rights of individuals to freedom from interference. One would expect Locke and Rousseau, advocates of individualism and freedom, to be advocates of women's rights as well. But Locke's theory only softened the previous absolutism of paternal rule, and Rousseau's scheme for the education of women involved a deliberate creation of female dependence. It was left for Wollstonecraft, Fuller, and J. S. Mill to apply in-

dividualist concepts to the status of women. All assumed that most women would continue life in the home, although with a new status.

Dissatisfaction with the results of gained legal rights led some individualist feminists in the 1960s to call for societal intervention to equalize resources and status. Such intervention, however, contradicts for Charvet the premise of individual freedom. Friedan's call for child-care facilities indicates to Charvet an unresolved issue. Society must support women as women to make it possible for them to develop as human beings, not as women.

Socialist writers have less trouble than individualists in espousing feminist views of equality, Charvet claims, because the elimination of private property releases women from their bondage to the private family. Both Thompson and Fourier, however, were forced to draw on individualist notions to portray the individual in society. Marx advanced by recognition the unity of individual and society. Feminist consequences of Marxism, developed by Engels and Bebel, and later Gilman, would release women from family responsibilities to find individual/social fulfillment as equal workers and in marriages of unfettered love. Socialists maintained women's distinctive sexual character even in a worker's society.

Radical feminists, in contrast, deny the sexual nature of human beings. Gender characteristics are the creation of society, indeed of man, to protect patriarchal rule. Drawing on a variety of existentialist, historical, Freudian, and New Left themes, such thinkers as de Beauvoir. Figes. Reich, Marcuse, and Greer are proto-radical feminists, pointing to forms of sexual liberation beyond the legal realm of individualists and the economic realm of socialists. In the full development of the radical position, women are seen as an oppressed class. Millett, Firestone, and Mitchell argue that women must become not only economically free, but also sexually free to bring into being an androgynous world. Sexual anatomy will become irrelevant to behavioral characteristics and to the choices of love.

The principle of androgyny does not fit the pattern Charvet has described of feminist theories arising from general ethical systems. Androgyny seems to be a new idea. But, Charvet argues, it cannot stand alone. It requires an ethical theory, individualist, socialist, or some other, to explain the relations of free persons.

In the concluding section Charvet sketches what may be a preliminary to his own position. He appears to reject androgyny, relying on human biological research that points to some biologically determined sexual differentiations. If such differences exist, what is their meaning for socialist or individualist feminists? Perhaps

feminine cooperative primacy for the former, or permanent reverse discrimination for women for the latter. Each raises difficulties. It may be, Charvet says, that we must decide how much society needs and values the nuclear family. If it is still valued, it would then have to be shown that some inequality is unavoidable to preserve the family system, and that women have as much public freedom as possible without undermining family values. Is this a return to "Life is not fair"?

MARY ANNE CAVICCHI

John Carroll University

The Feast: Meditations on Politics and Time. By Tom Darby. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 234. \$30.00.)

The title of this book requires some explanation. "The Feast" is the title of a poem written by the author in Greece in 1969 that serves as the frontispiece of the volume. The title refers to the vision of an age of Arcadian innocence before the emergence of history, a potent symbol throughout Western thought. The subtitle refers to the interruption of that golden age by the advent of politics, history, and alienation. The connecting thread of the work is a rumination on the meaning of history for "post-modern men" attempting to come to terms with the "temporal character" of life in order to restore some semblance of wholeness and unity to their "shattered" and "dismembered" souls.

The substantive chapters of the book follow the contours of modern historicist philosophy beginning with Rousseau and then Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, and Kojève. Rousseau is credited with being the first to place the problem of history or time at the center of political philosophy. For Rousseau, history was the source of both the grandeur and the misery of the human species. But this essentially ambivalent attitude toward the meaning of history did not appear satisfactory to Rousseau's less cautious heirs, notably Hegel, who was to put it in the service of a confident and progressivist historicism. History could create the community that nature had failed to provide. But the modern state turns out to be highly problematical. For if we are, as Hegel assures us, historical by nature, then the advent of the fully rational social order could only mean the "end of history." Darby seems to agree with Hegel and his interpreter, Kojève, that the famous "end of history" or "post-history" is no longer simply a possibility that might come, but a certainty already present.

Darby's book suffers from a number of flaws.

First, while the problem of time is important, he rarely succeeds in advancing the discussion beyond its present form. Even where his observations are just, he relies on translations and secondary studies that will be familiar to everyone in the field. The treatments of Kant, Fichte, Feuerbach, and Marx in particular are so brief as to be almost negligible.

Second, the book is far too ambitious to complete what it sets out to do. Darby has an admirable love of the big ideas, but he expounds on a variety of subjects—music, painting, literature—that far exceeds the scope of political philosophy even generously understood. A brief glance at a single page (p. 212) brings to light the names of Kafka, Orwell, Mary Shelley, Flaubert, Stendahl, Sartre, Pirandello, Chagall, Richard Strauss, Mozart, Blake, Milton, Thomas Mann, and the Pink Floyd. It is possible that a more skillful writer might have succeeded in tying together all of these diverse strands of the Zeitgeist, but as it stands the list appears merely silly.

Finally, having identified the problem—time, history, alienation—it is by no means clear what, if anything, we can or should do about it. Unlike other theorists of contemporary moral disorder (Solzhenitsyn, Strauss, MacIntyre), Darby offers us no clear alternative or way out of the current impasse. Following Kojève's gloomy prognosis, the only prospect he sees is the elevation of a "Japanized" cult of snobbery as a way of asserting human distinction in an essentially "posthistorical" age. The solution that Darby offers amounts to nothing short of an admission of political irresponsibility. To speak of "post-history" as indicating the triumph of the "Russo-American way of life" can only mean that Darby finds the principles of liberal democracy indistinguishable from those of Marxian communism. No attempt is ever made to prove this. To imply, as he does, that both are based on the "principle of self-preservation" that reduces politics to a form of "collective housekeeping" is to engage in a species of reductionism that obscures important political differences between East and West. It is just this type of blindness or indifference to political distinctions that I find the most troubling aspect of The Feast. At the very least, this book illustrates the dangers of separating the claims of speculation from prudence.

STEVEN B. SMITH

The University of Texas at Austin

Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family. By James S. Fishkin. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 200. \$18.95.)

What is to be distributed? How is it to be distributed? These questions of value and structure. respectively, have dominated the recent study of justice. In a welcome change of pace, James S. Fishkin examines the question, "To whom is to be distributed?" This is the question of assignment. Fishkin's procedure is to dissect three central and essential principles of liberalism: merit, equality of life chances, and autonomy of the family. He argues that these principles form a three-cornered dilemma, a "trilemma." Conformance to any two of the three rules out the other. The trilemma results from the nature of the principles themselves and not from the deficiencies of practice. At its most general level, it is conflict of liberty and equality.

The book consists of a systematic exploration of the inconsistencies of the trilemma and an evaluation of possible means of resolution. The discussion ranges over reverse discrimination, Project Headstart, the Coleman Report, the Defunis and Bakke cases, group compensation, and more. Fishkin shows that the trilemma withstands all known solutions. The possibility of relaxing one of the principles to produce a compromise is likewise found wanting. Particularly telling is Fishkin's argument that group compensation sacrifices merit without insuring a gain in equal life chances.

Near the end of the book Fishkin notes Lyndon Johnson's Great Society speech and John Rawls's theory of justice as outstanding examples of the practice and theory of liberalism. Admiring Johnson's vision, Fishkin faults Rawls for accepting the autonomy of the family without spelling out its implications for his theory of justice. Moreover, Fishkin opposes Rawls's rejection of metaethical intuitionism, pleading for the toleration of theoretical inconclusiveness where it purchases a grasp on hard choices of political practice. This is a particularly perceptive part of the book.

This is a lucid, informed, and engaging book. Unlike so many others, Fishkin is not content to condemn or praise liberalism but is determined to test its grasp on those hard choices. Not only will the book enlighten its readers, but it will also provoke discussion. In pressing his arguments, Fishkin makes many assumptions that others will delight in questioning. Three instances are worthy of note for their general implications. The first occurs in Fishkin's discussion of Joseph Carens's utoplan proposal to socialize into us a concept of social duty rather than consumption as an incentive to earn income. Fishkin opposes this proposal on sensible empirical grounds, but surely the theo-

kind of inequality for another. In Fishkin's terms the scheme represents a change in value not in structure. It is now duty and not consumption that is the source of pleasure, but there is no guarantee that it will be any more equally distributed than consumption is now. Second, Fishkin refuses to take a step outside liberalism's cosmology. Aristotle would say that its theoretical problems are the inevitable result of the misguided attempt to treat all persons alike. Recognizing that people are different, he would say that it would be better to treat them differently according to their individual nature. Now the best theories do not make the best politics, and so one might prefer liberalism regardless of Aristotle, but there is no denying that it is an important point. Finally, Fishkin is satisfied to conceive of the family as an intimate and consensual relationship for child rearing and nothing more. To some this will seem an arbitrary restriction, for one reason because the advantages of a family that interfere with equal life chances are not only intergeneration, but also intragenerational. There is this much—and a great deal more—to talk about in this excellent book.

M. W. JACKSON

Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study

Marxism and Democracy. By Arthur Kiss. Translated by Peter Tamasi and Ivan Sellei. (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1982. Pp. 320. \$12.50.)

As the title of this work suggests, the author's primary purpose is the elucidation of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of democracy. Marxism and Democracy is a skillfully reasoned and thoughtfully researched polemic.

The principal merit of the book is Kiss's careful historical exegesis of the democratic concept. The result is a consistently clear contribution to the time-worn debate concerning the definition of democracy, a debate often characterized by terminological confusion and transparent propaganda.

Kiss argues that there are three essentially different interpretations of democracy. Chronologically, the first interpretation, discussed by both Plato and Aristotle, focuses on democracy as a "form of rule." The primary emphasis is on "which social stratum is ruling within the society" (p. 19). Contrasted with an oligarchy, in which the exercise of power is limited to a propertied elite, democracy implies governance by the propertyless majority. Appropriated centuries later by the Jacobinic dictatorship, this philosophy also

retical point is that the scheme substitutes one underlies the Marxist-Leninist concept of kind of inequality for another. In Fishkin's terms democracy.

A second interpretation, whose historical antecedents can also be traced to the time of Pericles, was given its modern form by such writers as Spinoza, Alexis de Tocqueville, and the ideological representatives of the bourgeois class. This interpretation of democracy focuses on forms of government, limiting "the meaning of democracy to a way of choosing a government and holding it responsible to the people for its actions" (p. 28).

Yet a third interpretation (and from Kiss's point of view the least significant) broadens the concept of democracy beyond the sphere of politics per se. From this point of view democracy becomes synonomous with a way of life: "democracy = humanism," 'democracy = civilization," 'democracy = freedom,' etc." (p. 31). "This interpretation started to spread during the First World War and in the period immediately following the war. It figured primarily as the propaganda slogan of the Entente powers who 'in defense of democracy' attacked the 'tyranny' and 'barbarism' of the Central Powers' (p. 31).

Not only is this last interpretration of democracy the least widespread, according to Kiss, it is also the interpretation fraught with the most inconsistencies and vagaries. For Kiss therefore, the most fundamental theoretical controversies concerning the meaning of democracy involve the differences between the class relations characteristic of socialist versus bourgeois democracy. The balance of *Marxism and Democracy* is devoted to an iconoclastic analysis of the limitations inherent in the bourgeois understanding of democracy.

In Part 1, Kiss endeavors to expose the hollowness of the most revered bourgeois-democratic verities by revealing the hidden class biases on which they are based. In particular, he assails the antimony between democracy and dictatorship and the corresponding identification of democracy with freedom so prevalent in Western democratic thinking. In Part 2, a discussion of the "criteria of democracy," Kiss argues similarly that it would be foolish to maintain that any general criteria of democracy exist that transcend the determinations of class structure. He argues throughout for the superiority of Marxist-Leninist analysis and socialist practice.

Unfortunately, Kiss's analysis of socialist democracy lacks the critical insight evident in his discussion of bourgeois democracy. He accepts without question the fundamental principles, not only of Marxism-Leninism, but also of the C.P.S.U. This tendency is most pronounced in Part 3, "On the Essential Features of the Democratic Exercise of Power." Not only does Kiss fail to question the democratic structure of C.P.S.U., but he also accepts, without apparent reservation,

pronouncements of the Party as descriptions of fact. Kiss's ideological biases, which fuel his provocative critique of bourgeois democratic formalism, limit his insight into the weaknesses of socialist democracy.

RONALD J. HUNT

Ohlo University

Rousseau after Two Hundred Years: Proceedings of the Cambridge Bicentennial Colloquium (1978). Edited by R. A. Leigh. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. xv + 299. \$59.95.)

No imaginable collection of commemorative essays could do full justice to Jean-Jacques Rousseau: the greatest of all critics of inequality, the purest social contract theorist of the eighteenth century (and simultaneously the deepest critic of contractarianism after Hume), the greatest writer on civic education after Plato, the most perceptive understander of mastery and slavery after Aristotle and before Hegel, the finest critic of Hobbes, the most important predecessor of Kant, the most accomplished didactic novelist between Richardson and Tolstoy, the greatest confessor since St. Augustine, the author of paradoxes ("the general will is always right" but "not enlightened") that continue to fascinate or infuriate. Nonetheless, the present group of 14 articles edited by R. A. Leigh, the distinguished editor of Rousseau's Correspondance Générale, contains at least three essays that successfully illuminate Rousseau's greatness and several others that are worth reading.

Although it is controversial, the finest of the essays is John Charvet's "The Idea of Love in La Nouvelle Héloise." Extending the argument of his brilliant The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau (Cambridge University Press, 1974), in which he insisted that Rousseau's obsession with généralité led him to the "absurd" neglect of real persons in their "particularity," Charvet now urges (p. 140) that "the ideal of pure love [in Héloise] is an abstraction from the particular natures of the lovers. . . . Since men and women have particular natures . . . it is obvious that the ideal as such as unrealisable" and necessarily yields unhappiness. But for Charvet, Rousseau's misconception of "ideal" or nonsexual love in his novel merely reflects a larger Rousseauean problem: "his abstract idea of the citizen is as repressive and destructive of particular life as is his idea of the pure lover" (p. 145). Whatever one makes of this, it ingeniously pulls the (otherwise somewhat isolated) Nouvelle Héloise into the very heart of Rousseau's politics.

Equally successful are two French essays: Bronislaw Baczko's La Cité et ses languages and Jean Starobinski's Rousseau et l'eloquence. Baczko carefully shows the paradoxical place of language in Rousseau's political thought: The Great Legislator of Du Contrat Social who must transform particular and particularistic men into citizens with a "general will" can resort only to persuasive language, since force is illegitimate; but a people, having arrived at civic généralité and perfect unity, will manifst what Rousseau calls a "silence universelle" in which language withers owing to perfect harmony. In Baczko's Rousseau, language is at once supreme and negligible. Starobinski's essay divides Rousseau's celebrated eloquence into an "indignant" part and a constructive part, into the accusation négative of Inequality and the "systematic" Contrat Social and Émile. But even in Émile, as Starobinski rightly says, "between the accusation that culpabilizes the reader, and the affecting word that aims to gain his heart and his faith, the alternation is often rapid."

Less valuable but interesting is Stephen Ellenburg's essay "Rousseau and Kant," in which he accuses Rousseau of abandoning an anarchistic self-government of "radical" equals in favor of a Great Legislator whose educative activities Rousseau rationalizes through "specious reasoning." Since Ellenburg insists on reading Rousseau as an anarchist, he can hardly fail to see the Legislator as an intolerable lapse; may it not be, however, that the Legislator brings the people to ultimate "enlightenment," so that morally autonomous citizens can finally (at the end of civic time) say, with Émile, "I have decided to be what you have made me''? And Ellenburg's constant insistence on "compulsion" and "coercion" in Kant's political thought-seven times in one page—utterly neglects Kant's central political concerns: universal republicanism and infinite approximation "towards eternal peace" (zum ewigen Frieden). (Jean-Louis Lecercle's Rousseau et Marx alternates between accusing Rousseau of "idealism," "ideology" and prescientific "utopianism," and praising him as a pre-Kantian who treats men as ends, never as means only.)

Limited space rules out any discussion of good (but not centrally political) essays by Bernard Gagnebin, Michel Launay, and Ronald Grimsley. However one cannot fail to mention the reappearance, in the shape of an essay called "Rousseau et la morale du sentiment, (lexicologie, idéologie)," of the venerable J. S. Spink, who gave us the first publication of the original manuscript of the Lettres écrites de la montagne more than a half-century ago.

PATRICK RILEY

University of Wisconsin (Madison)

Social Theory and Political Practice. Edited by Christopher Lloyd. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 182. \$33.00.)

In his introduction to this collection of the 1981 Wolfson College lectures. Christopher Lloyd states that the essays represent a new examination of the old question of the relationship between social theory and political practice in the wake of the demise of both positivism and functionalism. He informs the reader that the collection will deal with the question of whether shared objective social knowledge is a possibility. To illustrate the way in which philosophical ideas about the nature of social understanding can have a significant effect on the perceptions of the political process, he recapitulates the Popper-Habermas debate that took place at the 1961 German Sociological Association meeting. Bringing in the view of Gadamer as well, Lloyd argues that the philosophical positions of the three theorists dictate distinctly different political practices.

Lloyd's introduction is problematic in two respects. First, issues debated in the Popper-Habermas dispute are no longer central to contemporary discussions in social theory. Second, issues actually discussed in the majority of the essays deal with the relationship between classical social theories (for example, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim) and contemporary political practice. Epistemological issues, so much in the forefront of contemporary discussions in social theory, are rarely mentioned. And in the two essays that do deal explicitly with current issues in social theory, those of Charles Taylor and Amartya Sen, there is little relationship between these discussions and political practice.

These reservations aside, however, the collection offers some valuable, if not entirely innovative, discussions of the topic. The perspectives of the authors is varied: David Marquand and John Dunn discuss issues central to a liberal perspective; Wlodzimierz Brus examines the relationship between Marxism and contemporary communist societies; Ralf Dahrendorf and Tom Bottomore explore the implications for political practice of the theories of the founding fathers of social theory. A number of noteworthy insights arise from these discussions. First, both Dahrendorf and Bottomore reevaluate the commonly held assessment of the positions of Marx and Weber. While Marx is usually interpreted as attempting to unify theory and practice, Weber is commonly seen as rigidly separating the two. The authors argue that these assessments both distort the thought of Marx and Weber and present an unworkable approach to the relationship between theory and practice. A second virtue of the collection is the evenhanded assessment of the relevance

of Marxism for contemporary communist systems offered by Wlodzimierz Brus. Avoiding the dogmatism of many Marxist discussions of this issue, Brus argues that, with some necessary alterations, Marxist theory can offer concrete guidance for the current problems of communist societies.

Perhaps the weakest essays in the collection, ironically, are those that deal explicitly with contemporary problems in social theory. Although Charles Taylor offers a well-argued defense of the civic humanist position, he falters when he attempts to offer a criterion for the "rightness" of social theories. The criterion he proposes is vague and ill-defined: It involves asking to what extent theories transform political practice. In contrast, Amartya Sen offers what appears to be a neopositivist account of social theory and political practice resting on a dubious distinction between actions and accounts. His chapter reveals the weakness of even a modified version of the positivist approach to this issue.

This collection is worthwhile reading for those who are interested in the broad issue of social theory and political practice, although not for those concerned with the details of contemporary social theory. Unlike many collections of its kind, the essays remain fairly close to the stated topic. And, although it does not fulfill Lloyd's promise of providing a truly new examination of the topic, it does represent a contribution to the ongoing discussion of the issue.

SUSAN HEKMAN

University of Texas at Arlington

Prejudices: A Philosophical Dictionary. By Robert Nisbet. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp. 318. \$17.50.)

Robert Nisbet ranks among the chief figures in the postwar revival of conservative thought. During the past three decades, Nisbet has written with a nearly Cassandra-like foreboding that the moral and social prerequisites of a genuinely pluralistic community are gravely endangered by the encroachments of modern collectivism. Employing a seldom-utilized literary form, he succinctly summarizes here the positions and principles with which he has long been associated.

While the form of *Prejudices* makes comparison with Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary* or Mencken's *Prejudices* series unavoidable, the principles of Burke and de Tocqueville, not those of Voltaire and Mencken, loom large in these pages. As Nisbet observes in his brief Preface, *Prejudices* is intended to be "neither philosophical nor a dictionary," but rather as a vehicle to express mordant social, moral, cultural,

political, and economic criticism. In a collection of brief essays on 71 topics arranged alphabetically, ranging from abortion, golden ages, and old age, to authoritarianism, ideology, judicial activism, progress, reification, war, and wit, Nisbet expresses his "personal observations, likes, and animadversions." Nisbet's personal tastes apparently determined the selection of topics.

"Prejudice" here does not imply arbitrary judgment, but rather is used in the Burkean sense to signify a prejudgment that incorporates the collective and immemorial wisdom of a race. Good traditions, and hence beneficial prejudices, will check the selfish and turbulent passions of a people. "Prejudice" also suggests a distrust of a certain type of narrow reasoning inspired by the eighteenth-century Rationalists, which challenges the moral authority of traditional institutions, mores, and customs.

Nisbet strongly prefers those principles associated with the conservative tradition to those of its ideological adversaries. The conservatives stress "family, neighborhood, local community, and region" against the demands of the centralized state (p. 55). By contrast, Nisbet condemns liberals as "ardent advocates of the kind of power that is resident in the national state." Furthermore, as a "lover of political power," the liberal is "the knee-jerk adversary of all moral authority" (p. 211). In spite of the recent political successes of conservatism, Nisbet is not at all sanguine about its future in the United States. He predicts that the conservative momentum soon will be shattered by (1) internecine factionalism; (2) some "self-styled conservatives," oblivious to the traditional conservative defense of the social order against the infringements of the state, "more interested in capturing the state, or part of it at least, as the means of imposing a given moral value upon the entire nation"; (3) a "rising tide of militarism"; and (4) "the sheer mass of the liberal provider-state" which dwarfs all efforts to reduce it (pp. 59-61). The future of liberalism, hence, he concludes, "is very bright, at least in the short run" (p. 216).

Nisbet's animosity to Rousseau and the modern manifestations of his principles parallels that formerly felt by Irving Babbitt, who had charged that Rousseauistic humanitarian morality was nearly single-handedly responsible for the decay of all that was best in Western civilization. The cult of the noble savage and the growing hostility to traditional institutions, inspired by Rousseauistic notions, have done much in Nisbet's opinion to shake the moral moorings to which people cling in community and thus have opened the way to the total political community into which the individual is immersed (p. 54).

On many social and political issues, Nisbet's

opinions will clearly outrage many readers. He vigorously challenges some of the most cherished contemporary convictions held by many in the academic community. He describes environmentalism as "the third great wave of redemptive struggle in Western history," the other two being Christianity and modern socialism (p. 101). Because they have accepted the erroneous Rousseauistic belief that nature is benign, Nisbet accuses the environmentalists of seeking to annihilate all the benefits of modern technology (p. 105). Futurology represents "one of the more pretentious of the pseudo-sciences of the twentieth century" (p. 131), while psychohistory is dismissed as an "offensive practice in the contemporary writing of history" (p. 246).

Like Mencken's *Prejudices*, Nisbet's opinions on the more pressing problems of our times will entertain, provoke, annoy, and please. Frequently witty and controversial, Nisbet's insights never fail to stimulate and inform. *Prejudices* should be placed on a shelf in easy reach near such great essayists as Montaigne, Twain, Mencken, Emerson and others to whose insights and wisdom we often feel the need to repair.

W. WESLEY McDonald

Elizabethtown College

Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory. By Robert Samuel Summers. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982. Pp. 295. \$24.50.)

Robert Samuel Summers's Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory is a detailed summary of and critical commentary on the leading tenets and "general directions of thought" that characterize the American jurisprudential movement labeled. by Summers "pragmatic instrumentalism." The object of his study is the product of the coalescence of philosophical pragmatism, sociological jurisprudence, and legal realism as manifested in the pre-1940 work of legal theorists such as Holmes, Pound, Gray, and Llewellyn. Summers states that his purpose is not primarily historical, but is rather "the exploration of the instrumental and pragmatic facets of legal phenomena as such" (p. 12). By choosing to accomplish this by means of an examination of American writers, Summers pays tribute to the central role played by Americans in the development of pragmatic instrumentalism and hopes to establish their work as a "fourth great tradition" of Western jurisprudence, alongside the traditions of natural law, analytical positivism, and historical jurisprudence (p. 13; cf. pp. 19, 268).

The largest portion of the book is devoted to a characterization of pragmatic instrumentalism,

the chief features of which are: (1) a "theory of value" that is "utilitarian, quantitative, conventionalist, and majoritarian in tenor" (p. 42); (2) a "technological" view of law that sees it as "a set of means to be used in the service of social goals (which, in turn, derive from conventional wants and interests)" (p. 61); (3) a commitment to the methods of the natural sciences, with law as a "technology" and legal personnel as "social engineers" who, when armed with scientific method, could "resort to laws of social causation and to laws of legal causation to predict the efficacy of alternative legal means, to determine costs and benefits, to choose the preferred meansgoal hypothesis, and to implement it" (p. 89). This approach was prescribed not only for legislators, but also for courts; (4) a "source-based theory of validity" that measured the "validity" (legitimacy?) of a law entirely on the basis of its having an authoritative positive source. Indeed, law is seen as "a set of predictions" of what authorized officials (usually judges) will do. As Holmes put it, "the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law" (p. 117); (5) a rejection of "formalistic" modes of legal interpretation with their emphasis on "coherence, harmony, and consistency with existing law" (p. 157), and a corresponding emphasis on particulars ("rule skepticism"), legal (including judicial) creativity, and, in general, "law in action" as opposed to "law in books"; (6) a radical separation of law and morals; and (7) an elevation of "personnel" over rules and structure as the primary determinants of a legal order, accompanied by an emphasis on coercion and force.

The remainder of the book consists of an exposure of the shortcomings of the views of the pragmatic instrumentalists and suggestions of how to supply those defects so as to make instrumentalism "somewhat more intelligible and coherent than it has been previously" (p. 13). It cannot be said that Summers succeeds in providing "a comprehensive framework" for the continuance of his project (p. 13). Instead, what he has accomplished is the disclosure of the dubious and often self-contradictory character of most of the doctrines and assumptions held sacred by the pragmatic instrumentalists. (It must be noted that much of Summers's argument in this regard retreads ground already covered in Gary J. Jacobsohn's Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court (Cornell, 1977). Summers's book is interesting, then, primarily for its destructive, not its constructive, aspects.

Summers's critique is most telling in the realm of constitutional adjudication. The experimentalist strain of pragmatism strikes at the very foundation of American constitutionalism, grounded as the latter is on certain substantive conceptions of justice and dedicated to the rule of law, both of which imply a degree of fixity and continuity in the law unacceptable to the pragmatists. The incompatibility of American constitutionalism with pragmatic instrumentalism appears starkly when one compares the natural rights jurisprudence of the Founders with Holmes's standard of legal justice: "I am so sceptical as to our knowledge about the goodness or badness of laws that I have no practical criterion except what the crowd wants" (p. 46). Summers's weak denial that "extreme skepticism about value" is intrinsic to "any of the general directions of instrumentalist thought" (p. 52) is akin to an assertion that Hobbes's relativism is unrelated to his strong conventionalism, and indeed, his authoritarianism.

Despite his intention of saving pragmatic instrumentalism from itself, Summers has written a persuasive brief against its continued existence. His search for an alternative American jurisprudence, however, will most likely end in futility unless he jettisons the parochialism of the law schools that continue to teach that the work of Pound, Holmes, et al. "qualifies as America's only indigenous legal theory" (p. 12). The startling narrowness of that teaching is manifest in light of Marshall's outline in Marbury v. Madison of a "theory" that is "essentially attached to a written constitution," which constitution "we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions." Summers's book gives us every reason to believe we have much to learn from a reconsideration of the Framers's intent.

BRADFORD WILSON

California State College, San Bernardino

Political Reasoning. By Evert Vedung. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982. Pp. ix + 232. \$21.25.)

Vedung states that, although there used to be rational analysis (p. 16), it is currently by definition incorrect in view of our latest findings in epistemology. He continues that form of argument as he attempts to classify analyses as functional and content-oriented, descriptions that represent strict Aristotelian categories. Vedung does, however, conclude that the categories' boundaries are fuzzy and not demarcated, a conclusion that does not totally rectify the matter, since no alternative is suggested.

For those interested in strict categories and static language, this book may prove to be a significant contribution, but for those who seek a more fluid kind of process, the book may seem restricting and stifling. It is a good representation of Aristotelian thinking, which promotes rigidity and nonflexibility in our thinking. The book could be classed as part of the second conceptual revolution, which gave rise to most of our present common-sense thinking. However, since it was not meant to be a book on innovative thinking and new paradigms, it compares favorably to books that represent categorical thinking.

Topics covered in the book include: concept formation, mutual exclusiveness, schemes of classification, kinds of interpretations, the principles of clarity, Rawls's theory of justice, unconscious and conscious obscurity, first-order and second-order disagreement, the essentialist view, relevance, testing truth, and appraising values.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 introduce psychological, philosophical, and epistemological concerns focusing on the ideas of Fichte, Popper, Marcuse, Bentley, and Truman.

The discussion of intension and extension (pp. 70-71) would be helpful if they were treated in greater detail. To put too much emphasis on the differences between "vagueness" and "ambiguity" (pp. 72-78) does a disservice to an important discussion.

The chapter on topic selection, problem formulation, and concept formation is somewhat different; the subject matter is rather sophisticated. On page 60 there is an important focus on language, although not much innovative is said. In other words, there is no examination of symbols, which would be necessary to give the topic depth.

Since language symbols provide a microscope for the social sciences, a more intense concentration on such symbols would have unified the book. While this was alluded to on page 14, the approach has been confined to words and their obscureness, definitions as a technique, and making distinctions between such things as stipulative definitions and reportative definitions. On a superficial level of analysis, this might satisfy the need for analytic reporting in order to keep things simplified and within the realm of common sense. In order to communicate a theoretical model that would enable us to understand complex situations, a method of inquiry is necessary that would raise questions about the development of symbols, promote an understanding of language as a conceptual tool for formulating theories, enable us to analyze the differences between static and nonstatic terminology, and equip us to develop the nonstatic differences that produce the best results. Unless this approach is taken, an overriding thesis for examining holistically cannot be provided. Instead, we are confined to a reductionist approach.

Vedung's book is about how to apply the

language to understanding political affairs, using "splices" of epistemological background data to give meaning to mechanical methods of inquiry. The theme is largely of an either-or nature, which provides for a limited understanding of complex political questions.

WILLIAM J. WILLIAMS

University of Southern California

Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Phiralism and Equality. By Michael Walzer. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983. Pp. xviii + 345. \$19.95.)

Michael Walzer has written a subtle, literate, and at times brilliant book. His purpose is to describe an ideal society organized on the principle of what he calls "complex equality": The distributive rule is that no social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y, without regard to the meaning of x. Walzer rejects utilitarian and rights based distributive theories of justice. He believes that the distribution criteria should be contingent upon social conventions found in a society.

Through the brilliant use of historical and comparative examples Walzer describes what American pluralism might be like if the 11 spheres of justice and their distribution criteria, which he identifies, were autonomous of each other: (1) "Membership" determined by the political community consisting, at least, of all those who live and work in its territory; (2) "Security and Welfare" determined on the basis of need with level of welfare chosen by the community; (3) "Money and Commodities" distributed by the economic system on the basis of the skill and luck of those active in it; (4) "Office" (bureaucracy) filled or regulated by public officials to be distributed on the basis of talent for the task to be performed, unskilled work on the basis of other criteria; (5) the distribution of "Hard Work" to be the basis of redefined criteria such as worker participation and management, higher wages, or national conscription to add to societal respect for such tasks; (6) "Free Time," (7) "Kinship and Love," and (8) "Divine Grace" distributed, respectively, on the basis of individual choice, loving and familial ties, and respect for God as decided by the individual, the family, and ecclesiastical bodies, with minimal interference by the political community; (9) "Recognition" distributed by juries on the basis of objective review of performance or behavior; (10) basic "Education" at a level high enough to prepare all for citizenship distributed on the basis of "simple

equality," higher education, broadly defined, available to all on the basis of talent and interest; and (11) "Political Power," the most significant sphere of justice, to be distributed through election of those with debating and coalition building skills.

Walzer argues that tyranny and injustice occur when criteria of distribution are used in spheres to which these criteria do not properly pertain as determined by the social conventions and political community. He feels that autonomy of sphere will lead to individual self-respect, legitimacy for the society, and greater social harmony, in part because individual deserts will mirror individual performance, and the political community will have a means to decide the nature of the deserts.

The sphere of political power will be the forum to decide the distributive criteria in all spheres, although it will be limited by constitutional principles and social convention calling for public private distinctions in such spheres as Divine Grace and kinship and love. Elections would be on a one-person-one-vote basis. However, degree of political power would be based on influence within a party system in focused policy discussions. That influence is to be based on rhetorical and leadership qualities, not economic resources, recognition, office, or divine grace. "Complex equality" requires equal opportunity to be active in politics after direct use of social goods gained in other spheres is blocked.

Walzer's concern for freedom (and noncoercive government) and his failure to offer detailed analyses of the connections between the political sphere and the other spheres and among institutions in the political sphere make his argument unconvincing. I question whether sphere autonomy alone, as described in this book, will produce both the equality and pluralism that he desires for American society. Moreover, there is no way to prevent an unequal distribution of "debators" from particular spheres from dominating the political sphere. There is a good chance that the political system will continue unequal reproduction of spheres, perhaps to a somewhat lesser degree than today. However, the rules against reiteration of the class or racial makeup in distribution in such spheres as recognition, welfare, and office will make it more difficult to change the nature of stratification systems. This reality will not lead to the social harmony that Walzer desires.

Furthermore, Walzer offers us no help in establishing process norms by which to choose the social criteria for viewing a problem even if we assume the sovereignty of the political community. There is not even a ranking of spheres other than political power with regard to when one sphere should be chosen over another. Nor is

there any help with the question of the role of participatory bodies versus federal courts in deciding issues in light of his goal of sphere autonomy.

Finally, in arguing for localism when the national community cannot agree on social norms and for as much decentralization of authority as constitutional values allow, Walzer fails to consider the effect of size of political unit and its make-up on how issues are debated and on the manifestations of equality as a social criteria. At a minimum, these issues should be addressed in this process view of distributive justice. They would have to be considered irrespective of the nature of the social norms in a society and its contingent spheres of justice, for they are at the center of the question of whether equality, not merely pluralism, will be realized.

RONALD KAHN

Oberlin College

The Wilderness and the City: American Classical Philosophy as a Moral Quest. By Michael A. Weinstein. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982. Pp. x + 162. \$17.50.)

The theme of this slim volume is straightforward: Does American classical philosophy provide contemporary people with an adequate guide to action in the public world?

The question is rather ambiguously answered in The Wilderness and the City. On the one hand, Weinstein is convinced that Josiah Royce, C. S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Santayana accepted the challenge of Nietzsche's "death of God" thesis. On the other, he is unhappy with the shallowness of their response to that encounter.

Common to the classical American philosophers, Weinstein argues, was their attempt to wallpaper over the philosophical and psychological implications of acedia, a "sense of loneliness, forlornless, and solitude that crushes the will to strive" (p. 7). For the most part, he notes, these philosophers substituted a new faith in the possibility of creating a moral human community for an earlier faith in an individualism denied the comfort of a universe of fixed and settled meanings.

"The severest criticism that can be leveled against American classical philosophy," Weinstein observes, is that when confronted with the consequences of the death of God, "no substitutes for God, whether cultural, social or psychological are acceptable" (pp. 135-136). More acceptable, apparently, is William James's acknowledgement that the encounter with nothingness is "the gateway to empiricism" and

inner tolerance (p. 136), that is, that self-control is an adequate surrogate for social action.

Weinstein's analysis of the limits of the American classical philosophical tradition proceeds with surety and careful scholarship, reaching its most incisive moments in his discussion of James's and Dewey's thoughts.

When faced with the void, he suggests, James's great contribution to American life-philosophy was his insistence that being itself is good (p. 85), and that faith in life is an aid to living in the present. According to Weinstein, however, James's weakness was his very optimism that was never quite able to cover over the terror of a purposeless universe.

As for Dewey, Weinstein holds "his effort to determine how control over nature could be used well" (p. 101) was marred by his misplaced confidence that culturally and philosophically demeaned individuals were capable of acting morally on the basis of shared emotions.

While The Wilderness and the City frequently sparkles with striking images and elegant insights into the ideas of America's early twentieth-century philosophical greats, Weinstein is less successful in offering a remedy for today's encounter

with the abyss. On a planet where all centers of meaning are now exposed to extinction, it is doubtful that the development of self-control (individualism) to the point where it is "not eccentric to live with world-sickness and still be free for commitment to limited tasks within the public domain" (p. 155) is a sufficient balm to both a philosophical and empirical threat to existence.

In such a setting, it seems much more sensible to combine conservative philosopher Irving Babbitt's call for individuals to restrain themselves in amassing and using power with Dylan Thomas's advice to his dying father: "Do not go gentle into that good night, . . . Rage, rage against the dying of the light."

The final strength of the classical American philosophers, particularly James and Dewey, was and is their understanding that without philosophical risk and active commitment to the continuance of the moral community, purposeful life and world survival are impossible and, perhaps, undesirable.

MARK READER

Arizona State University

#### Empirical Theory and Methodology

The Anatomy of Racial Attitudes. By Richard A. Apostle et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. x + 331. \$27.50.)

It is fitting that Richard Apostle, Charles Glock, Thomas Piazza, and Marijean Suelzle's study of whites' racial attitudes should be published in 1983, 20 years after Martin Luther King challenged us to share his dream of racial equality. Readers will naturally ask to what extent the study contributes to the achievement of Dr. King's dream. They will find that this book has virtually no relationship to that dream. Instead, it is a narrow contribution to the social indicator movement that was important in social science two decades ago.

The Anatomy of Racial Attitudes reports the results of a project in social indicator construction. The object of the project, which is based mainly upon data collected in 1973, was to develop empirical indicators that could be used to describe white Americans' attitudes about their black countrymen. This limited purpose justifies

the use of a sample design that was limited geographically to the San Francisco Bay area, but was not truly representative of even that population.

The authors reject "prejudice" as a useful concept because it narrows the scope of any inquiry into "racial attitudes." The latter, more neutral, term is used throughout the book.

Similarly, the authors reject the standard description of the components of attitudes along cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions. Instead, they set out to describe racial attitudes along three other dimensions: perceptions of differences between racial groups, explanatory modes of racial attitudes, and prescriptions for change.

The major part of this study is devoted to developing and applying what the authors refer to as the explanatory modes of racial attitudes. They wisely choose to focus upon prescriptions for change rather than behaviors. This permits them to observe how different perceptions and explanations lead to support or lack of support for various governmental programs aimed at achiev-

ing true racial equality. However, the chapter dealing with the relationship between prescriptions and explanations is the weakest in the book.

The study's strength lies in its conceptualization of racial attitudes. According to the authors, the most significant finding of the study is the conceptual and empirical development of the typological explanatory-mode variable. Racial differences tend to be explained by reference either (1) to individual responsibility-Afro-Americans' lives are different than whites' because the Afro-Americans choose to live differently; (2) to genetic differences between races-implying that any action to achieve equality is futile; (3) to supernatural forces or "God's will"-implying that action to achieve equality is probably blasphemous as well as futile; (4) to social or environmental forces—which are clearly subject to manipulation by policy; (5) to elite or other manipulation which the authors describe as a radical explanation for racial differences; or (6) to some combination of two or more of the pure modes of explanation. About 50% of the Bay Area residents surveyed employ one of the five pure types of explanation. The rest use some combination of modes to explain racial differences.

Parts of the book may be valuable in graduate research methodology courses as a source of examples of indicator development. However, the limited findings of the study are mostly in the conceptual area—the idea that racial attitudes can be explained with a typological instead of a continuous variable.

The book is based upon extensive data analyses. However, any conclusions drawn from those data can apply only to the Bay Area and, given the research procedures, their application to that population is questionable. (In fairness, I must add that an exercise in concept development does not require the same sort of sample design that one would look for in a descriptive study.) There is virtually no reference to crucial public policy issues in this study which is obviously fitting here given the authors' focus on development of social indicators.

The conceptual conclusions from the study along with their empirical support could easily be reported in one or two articles instead of more than 200 pages of often-redundant text followed by about 100 pages of appendixes. Chapters 1, 4, and 5 are the most valuable; however the book is an exercise in concept development, based upon a geographically unique and somewhat questionable sample design. A report based upon decade-old data cannot be thought of as especially timely.

JAMES W. HOTTOIS

Eastern Oregon State College

The Foundations of Policy Analysis. By Garry D. Brewer and Peter deLeon. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 476. \$24.00.)

The Logic of Policy Inquiry. By David C. Paris and James F. Reynolds. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. xii + 276. \$25.00, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

Political science's most rapidly growing subdiscipline surely must be the one concerned with public policy studies. Yet it also appears to be the discipline's most ill-defined undertaking. The virtue of these important new books by Brewer and deLeon and by Paris and Reynolds is that they provide valuable perspectives on the fundamental enterprise involved in the cross-disciplinary as well as sub-disciplinary policy studies movement. Stated most simply, these books should be required reading for anyone interested in the study of public policy, whether that interest is captured by the label public administration, policy studies, policy analysis, policy science, comparative public policy, or some other term.

Paris and Reynolds deal effectively with the topic of the logic of inquiry for policy analysis. Most of the book is devoted to characterization, analysis, and criticism of three major traditions of social inquiry and examination of their relevance for policy analyses, although much of what is said is relevant for the examination of how policy is made and implemented. The tradition of behavioralism is portrayed as having a close association with logical positivism and as involving the use of the scientific approach to the study of public policy, with the emphasis on theory development, hypothesis testing, observation, and measurement. The economic tradition is characterized as emphasizing analyses based upon a model of human rationality as well as stressing theoretical assumptions, utilitarian principles, Pareto optimality, and analytical strategies such as cost-benefit analysis. Interpretive policy inquiry is seen as emphasizing the purposes and intentions that motivate policy actions and involves use of various methodological orientations based upon phenomenology, critical theory, Marxian, and neo-Marxian ideas. Paris and Reynolds provide thoughtful discussions of the advantages and limitations of each of these traditions in public policy analysis. They also offertheir own approach, which emphasizes the logic of a "rational ideology" and builds upon certain elements of the behavioral, economic, and interpretive traditions.

Brewer and deLeon provide an impressive overview of the development and current status of an approach to the study of public policy that most readers will identify as the policy science approach. They build explicitly on the ideas of

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Harold D. Lasswell (even dedicating the book to him) and organize the material around six phases in the policy process. The initiation phase focuses on problem recognition and context and on the generation of policy alternatives. The estimation phase emphasizes the estimation of consequences of policy alternatives, and the presentation is excellent in providing interesting perspectives on complexity, models, methods, and data. The selection phase involves choice among alternatives, and the discussion appropriately focuses upon matters such as the role of information. knowledge, and compromise. The implementation phase comes next, and the presentation emphasizes theoretical paradigms as well as case studies. Evaluation and termination comprise the last two phases in the policy process, and the discussion focuses upon goals and criteria and also emphasizes the need for further development of these activities. A very impressive list of suggested readings is presented by the authors.

There are, to be sure, things to quarrel with in each of the books. For example, it seems to me that Paris and Reynolds present a narrow conception of the behavioral approach to policy analysis, and the Brewer and deLeon statement regarding evaluation strikes me as being somewhat incomplete. However, inadequacies do not mar seriously the contributions of the authors in focusing attention on various important aspects of the study of public policy. In general, the authors of both books are systematic, perceptive, and, above all, provocative in making stimulating presentations. These books clearly represent steps in the right direction and make contributions toward bringing coherence to the chaotic enterprise of the study of public policy. If you choose to read only two books this year that deal with the study of public policy then you will not go far wrong in choosing these two books.

FRANCIS W. HOOLE

Indiana University

A General Theory of Exploitation and Class. By John E. Roemer. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp. 298 + xiii. \$27.50.)

This extremely ambitious and important book is as controversial as any work in contemporary political economy. It is a book that should be read, discussed, and argued about. Roemer provides an alternative to the traditional—and tired—ways of thinking about such significant issues as exploitation and class. Even those who ultimately detest his approach will benefit from considering it.

My claims for the book's importance rest primarily on Roemer's formalization of Marxian political economy. He brings Marxism into the second half of the twentieth century, no longer permitting its easy dismissal as the radical critique of the world before the Russian Revolution. Roemer argues that the underlying premise of historical materialism is the understanding of economic inequality and surplus appropriation; from these factors can be deduced political behavior and superstructural phenomena. His approach is to focus on the variation in institutions that produce exploitation. Marx wanted to account for the existence of exploitation once labor exchange was no longer coercive. Roemer wants to account for the existence of exploitation when the means of production are no longer privately owned. First, he offers a model derived from the labor theory of value. Later, he puts forward a game-theoretic model that relies on counterfactual alternatives to the property relations of the society under investigation. It is this model, derived from a property rights approach, that he claims as his general theory.

Roemer gives that over-used, much-abused term exploitation concrete meaning. In the process he makes clear that gains from trade and exploitation are not mutually exclusive. His formulation of exploitation also enables him to demonstrate that class position is determined endogenously in the model, if one assumes—as he does—that individuals optimize in the face of wealth constraints.

Despite its grandeur of vision and its brilliance of argument and insight, A General Theory of Exploitation and Class has some serious failings. Most of these have been discussed fairly thoroughly by a range of critical admirers in an issue of Politics & Society (1982, 11, 3) devoted to Roemer's ideas, Adam Przeworski (pp. 298 and 313) and Erik Olin Wright (pp. 321-341) find inadequate Roemer's account of politics and especially of class struggle. Indeed, Przeworski goes so far as to argue that Roemer makes socialism an unlikely, even unattractive, alternative to capitalism despite his desire to make just the opposite case. Andrew Levine (pp. 343-362) picks at his treatment of justice although arguing that Roemer makes a major contribution to the development of a Marxian theory of justice. Jon Elster (pp. 363-373) claims that Roemer's two definitions of exploitation are "radically different" (p. 362) and defends the first, exploitation as unequal exchange, against the second gametheoretic model. Finally, Douglass C. North and I (pp. 315-320) argue that Roemer's most critical shortcoming is his cursory and off-hand treatment of the state. Although Roemer claims that he has a property rights theory and argues that coercion

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at the point of maintaining property relations underlies his model, he lacks an actual theory of the state. Thus, ultimately, he fails to account for most exploitation.

All of these critics took Roemer's theory as a building block. There is no doubt Roemer is wrong in many ways, but his mistakes are of the kind from which we learn. At the same time, he has offered as compelling an account of exploitation as yet exists in print. Roemer enables us to understand more about society than we did before, and that is no small contribution.

**MARGARET LEVI** 

University of Washington

Methods in Futures Studies: Problems and Applications. By Brita Schwarz, Uno Svedin, and Bjorn Wittrock. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 175. \$16.00.)

Futures studies have found an increasing prominence in the scientific community. Some studies point to the inevitable doom of mankind, while others forecast an unparalleled growth in human potentialities. Popular interest in futurés studies has been aroused by the recent deaths of two distinguished futurists, R. Buckminster Fuller and Herman Kahn. Despite the prominence of and popular interest in future studies, potential futures researchers must contend with a dearth of published material dealing with the problems and applications of futures research within a public policy perspective. Although there exists an abundance of policy analysis and social science methodology textbooks, potential futures researchers cannot rely on such texts alone. First, the goal of futures studies is unique: clarifying the range of possible futures and creating images of attainable and desirable futures. Second, the methodological instruments of futures research are many and varied: for example, survey research, forecasting, scenario writing, and mathematical modeling. The authors of Methods in Futures Studies fill a vacuum in futures research by providing students of futures studies with a text that addresses the distinctive methodological issues and approaches of this field.

In an early chapter, the authors first address how futures research is distinctive from other scientific research. They next discuss particular methodological approaches characteristic of futures studies such as the Delphi technique, trend extrapolation, scenario writing, and mathematical modeling. Perhaps the most important chapter, though, discusses the problems and practical applications of futures research through the presentation of three cases of futures research

through the presentation of three cases of future studies. The first two cases, the Energy and Society and the Resources and Raw Material projects. were commissioned in 1974 by the Swedish Secretariat for Futures Studies. The third case, the Transportation Study, was commissioned by an agency of the Swedish Ministry of Transport. In all three cases, the authors discuss the policy environment, problem formulation, research design, and analytical methods of each project. Especially enlightening is a thorough discussion of the interactive dynamics of the research team in confronting the questions and pitfalls of futures research. In the final chapters, the authors reflect upon their experiences in futures research and comment upon a wide range of topics including the nature of prediction, the role of futures studies and decision making, the importance of the organizational setting, the problems of synthesizing knowledge from different fields, and the value of futures studies.

Overall, this book makes an important contribution to futures research by providing a well-written description of the practical applications and methods of futures studies. It would be an appropriate text for beginning or advanced students of future studies and policy analysis.

MARK R. DANIELS

University of Connecticut

The Civic Tongue: Political Consequences of Language Choices. By Brian Weinstein. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. ix + 213, \$22.50.)

This book deals most definitely with language rather than speech. However language is not understood in Saussurian terms as a structure beyond human choice and control. In fact, Weinstein's thesis is that the fruitful study of language in political life involves exposing and exploring the many choices that are made about languages, and the consequences that these choices have elsewhere in the social, economic, and political systems. The distribution of languages and their variations can have important consequences by affecting the distribution of a whole range of other burdens and benefits of political life. The primary consequences are in the areas of participation, education, conflict, nation-building, and world politics. Each of these consequences of the distribution of language resources is dealt with in a separate chapter.

The second chapter reviews and rejects the Whorfian thesis that language can shape perception and cognition. Interesting but somewhat unsystematic parallels are drawn between "linguistic determinism" and the political views that underlie

some attempts to affect the distribution of language resources in society. The third chapter constructs an ideal model of the language-planning process and reviews the case of French-speaking Quebec to illustrate the language planning process. The fourth chapter deals with the ways in which language may become a political symbol and the various strategies that have been pursued by language strategists in the political process.

The core of the book is Part 3, in which the consequences of language choices are treated. In chapter 5, on participation, cases are detailed that show how language can operate as both an instrument for depriving other groups access to values, both tangible and symbolic, and as an instrument for gaining access to those same values. Next, the dilemmas of education in multilingual communities—particularly in the former colonial areas are explored. It is concluded that while bilingual education, bridging a minority language and an official language, may have many drawbacks, no other policy seems to be able to reconcile the conflicting interests involved. The next chapter presents and illustrates a taxonomy of the sources of conflict in which language can play a central role. It provides the richest insight of any of the chapters into the interaction between language issues and the social, economic, and other factors that condition political life.

The chapter on nation-building presents an interesting look at the factors that have made the use of language in nation-building an important issue in American political life. The sediment of this unresolved issue is an ambivalence toward bilingual education and the maintenance of distinct ethnic communities. This section is concluded with a discussion of world politics. Recognition is given here that language choices can reinforce cultural, economic, and political relations between states, as well as disrupt or alter them. Aside from the ad hoc theory of the Esperantists that a non-national language will promote peace and cooperation among nations, there has been little successful theorizing that would provide a basis for predicting the consequences of various policies in international communication on the patterns of interaction among nations and the institutions that make it possible.

In his conclusion, Weinstein rounds out the

edges of his survey of the literature relevant to the construction of a study of the politics of language. He intimates several of the areas that should be further developed if the study of the politics of languages is to generate the types of problems which make it a vital area of study. He asserts that the study of the politics of language sheds light particularly on elite behavior, but that the masses have the last word. Too little attention is given. however, to the masses' "last word"—and to the social, political and economic factors that condition language choices and mediate the consequences for political life. Finally, Weinstein sets out a rather interesting hypothesis. In speculating on why it is relatively rare to conceive language as subject to political choice, he suggests that perhaps politicians have an advantage in understanding that the choice of one variety of language rather than another for official or other community purposes is an important political weapon. because politicians have a greater sensitivity to the manipulation of individual words to win and hold power. This is an interesting thesis, pointing to a fertile area in the investigation of the intersection of the politics of language and the language of politics—or a core problem of political linguistics.

The strengths of this book are first, that it deals systematically with a large segment of the subarea of political studies we can refer to as political linguistics. And second, this relatively systematic review of the literature related to a topic of concern shows a crystalizing of attention to the complex of problems surrounding the politics of language. One noteworthy weakness is the failure to forge links with other approaches to the study of language and politics, particularly those which can be collected under the label the language of politics. One such possible link—the Whorfian thesis that perception and cognition are shaped in important ways by language—is rather summarily dismissed. Beyond that, much work remains to be done to develop interesting and non-obvious theses about the politics of language and relate this work to the study of the language of politics, and this book provides an important background for that task.

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#### Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation

Required by Act of October 23, 1962: Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code

1. Date of Filing: November 15, 1983

2. Title of Publication: The American Political Science Review

3. Frequency of Issue: Quarterly in March, June, September, December.

Location of Known Office of Publication:
 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

5. Location of the Headquarters or General Business Office of the Publishers: 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

#### 6. Names and Addresses of Publisher and Managing Editor:

Publisher: American Political Science Association,

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Managing Editor: Dina A. Zinnes,

Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801

#### 7. Owner:

American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

- 8. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, etc.: None
- 9. The purpose, function and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.

#### 10. Extent and Nature of Circulation:


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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#### Differential Paths to Parity: A Study of the Contemporary Arms Race

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This article presents a model of arms expenditures and arms accumulation for the Soviet Union and United States from 1952 through 1978. It argues that contemporary superpowers do not react solely to the military budgets of one another in assessing the potential threat against which they must allocate military resources, i.e., in deciding upon the military budget. Rather, they respond primarily to the relative balance of strategic and conventional military forces. A continuous time model of this process is developed and estimated. If one examines only the budgets of these two nations, it would appear that no race is occurring; rather, the Soviets are simply increasing their arms expenditures irrespective of what the United States does. However, when one examines the relative stocks of military capabilities, it appears that the USSR is racing to catch up to the United States. Finally, the dynamics governing arms competition between the United States and the USSR appear to be undergoing marked change.

Richardson's pioneering work on arms races (1919/1960) has been the basis for analytical and quantitative studies of how nations spend money on the military. Richardson's perspective is not only well known, but is also quite compelling; he argues that nations increase arms expenditures when they perceive that a rival nation is in a position to pose a significant military threat to their security. The vicious "we are arming because they are arming" cycle was expressed by Richardson as a set of differential equations to describe the growth of arms expenditures which led to World War I.

Today, some 60 years later, we are presented with a situation in which both the United States and the Soviet Union are involved in significant programs to increase their military capabilities. The expressed motivation of each set of decision makers has been to counter the threat posed by

non? Although Richardson's efforts have had a

marked effect on how arms expenditures are viewed as well as studied, the subsequent theoretical development, although significant, has been concerned largely with relatively minor modifications to the original Richardson equations. Many of those who followed Richardson have

the increasing arms expenditures and accumula-

tions of the other. Two recent documents, one

prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense (1981) and the other by the Soviet Defense

Ministry (1982), underscore the official doctrines.

Among Europeans in particular, the arms race

doctrine frequently provides the framework for

understanding, as well as either supporting or

attacking, the current armaments policies of the

tributed to the understanding of this phenome-

What has scholarship in the past 60 years con-

United States and the USSR.

done so with an empirical bent. Notable examples include Abolfathi (1978), Chatterji (1969), Gillespie et al. (1977), Gregory (1974), Hamblin et al. (1977), Hollist (1977a, b), Hollist and Guetzkow (1978), Lambelet (1973), Luterbacher (1974, 1975), Lambelet and Luterbacher with Allan (1979), Majeski and Jones (1980), Milstein (1972), Rattinger (1976), Saris and Middendorp (1980), Shisko (1977), Strauss (1972, 1978), Taagepera et al. (1975), Wagner et al. (1973), Wallace (1979, 1980a, b), and Zinnes and Gillespie (1973). (See Luterbacher, 1975, and Moll & Luebbert, 1980, for more systematic surveys.) What is striking about most arms-race studies is that although they often find evidence for an arms race in some pairs of nations (e.g., Israel and Egypt or Pakistan and India), there is rarely any evidence to suggest that the United States and the USSR are involved in

Received: July 23, 1982 Revision received: April 6, 1983 Accepted for publication: September 13, 1983

This article is a substantially revised version of a manuscript prepared while the author was a member of the Science Center Berlin. The stimulation, advice, help, and encouragement of S. L. Ward and G. Kirkpatrick is especially appreciated. Several individuals provided useful feedback during the revision process. Notable among them are S. L. Ward, H. Guetzkow, J. Kugler, U. Luterbacher, and, more recently, reviewers of this journal. I would also like to thank Dr. Bassermann-Jordan for his stimulating inputs. In Colorado, the statistical advice of R. Schnabel and the cooperation of J. Donaldson and J. Koontz of the Statistical Engineering Laboratory of the National Bureau of Standards is much appreciated.

what analytically and empirically can be termed an escalatory arms process.

Cusack and Ward (1981, p. 429) concluded "the arms race formulation is empirically deficient in accounting for the spending patterns of the United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China in the period from 1949 to 1978."

Another group of scholars studying the same problem from a slightly different perspective cited even stronger conclusions against the existence of an arms race:

According to our data, then, the presence of a nuclear arms race, far from constituting a given of international politics, proves to be a chimera. We have tried again and again to test for the presence of arms competition or arms racing, and we have failed to find anything each time. It is obvious that the United States and the USSR are building nuclear arms, but are not doing so, as they allege, because they are racing or competing with one another (Kugler, Organski, & Fox, 1980, p. 238).

In spite of such strong published conclusions, the arms-race notion nevertheless persists. One leading scholar of Soviet defense expenditures has remarked "[W]e don't need an econometric study to prove that U.S. defense expenditures are geared to Soviet expenditures—our Congressional debates are sufficient evidence" (Holzman, 1980, p. 103). With the conventional wisdom so firmly entrenched, why are the results often so contradictory and so frequently at odds with the arms-race argument?

Taagepera (1979-1980) has recently argued that the Richardson arms-race framework suffers from a basic conceptual inadequacy; namely, materiel as well as budgets should be included as influences in determining how nations decide upon arms spending and accumulation. Taagepera notes that "[t]he conceptual problem [with the arms race formulation] deals with the confusion between total accumulated arms stockpile and the current military budget" (1979/1980, p. 67). He further posits that differential equations can "easily" be formulated to include these oftignored, but rather obvious components of military competition among and between nations -stocks of weapons and the military budgets with which they are purchased. To date there are only two empirically based studies which make use of stocks and budgets: Kugler, Organski, and Fox (1980; see also Organski & Kugler, 1980) and Luterbacher, Allan, and Imhoff (1979).

This study, which builds upon the conceptual and substantive framework proposed by Taagepera, demonstrates that continuous stock-flow models can be implemented and statistically estimated in order to analyze the arms race paradigm. The coupling of a simulation language with a general estimation package, a constellation pioneered by Luterbacher, Allan, and Imhoff (1979), provides an intriguing vehicle for examining the stock-flow problem in a continuous time framework. In stark contrast to the earlier work in modeling arms expenditures, this study concludes that the empirical evidence supports the presence of a competitive arms accumulation process between the United States and the USSR.

#### Theory

It is fundamental to the stock-flow interaction formulation that during an escalatory arms buildup, one or both parties will be interested not only in what the other is spending, but also in what their opponent is buying. This idea bears considerable merit, although it has received little attention in the literature.1 A recent publication (U.S. Department of Defense, 1981) depicted the Soviet threat by looking not only at military expenditure patterns and manpower requirements, but also at the scope and structure of both conventional and strategic weaponry. Simply put, weapon stockpiles are too important to be ignored in evaluating a rival's potential threat and should be included in any attempt to understand arms races. The Soviet rejoinder (Soviet Ministry of Defense, 1982) also evaluated stocks of weapons, although from a recognizably different perspective on the source of the threat. Both documents. however, seek to justify increased military acquisitions and expenditures in terms of the implicit and explicit threat posed to national security by the military expansion of the opponent. The U.S. document, for example, was initially used to persuade the NATO Defense Ministers of the importance of increased defense spending.

One oft-cited study of U.S. and British defense budgeting processes stresses the role of force levels in the United States in terms of continuously informing the planning of the U.S. budget decisions:

Since 1962 . . . military requirements and the resources necessary to support them have been considered within the framework of a five-year programme for defense spending—known appropriately enough, as the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). . . . [This] "masterplan" contains the approved programmes and manpower levels

For analyses of the accumulation of weapons stocks see Lambelet and Luterbacher with Allan (1979), Lambelet (1973), Luterbacher et al. (1979), and Allan and Luterbacher (1981), McGuire (1977), Desai and Blake (1981), and Squires (1982).

of the department [of defense] with their estimated annual costs projected five years in advance (equipment levels are now projected eight years in advance). It is therefore a rolling programme, and the point of departure for each new budgeting cycle is the [FYDP] programme inherited from the previous year (Burt, 1975, p. 9).

Thus it would appear that a realistic model of U.S. defense spending would focus on changes, be brought up to date continuously, and stem from the estimated force requirements developed by those involved in the planning process. The recent debate in the United States on equivalent megatonage levels held by the U.S. and Soviet military establishments underscores the impact of strategic stockpile levels on defense policymaking; this supports using the evolution of weapons stocks as one major causal mechanism of the model being developed.

The framework in this article builds explicitly upon both Richardson and Taagepera, as well as much other previous work. The model is expressed in a system of four differential equations:

$$dx/dt = \alpha_{11}(Y - X) - \alpha_{12}X' + \alpha_{13}ATP + \alpha_{14}KOR + \alpha_{15}VN$$
 (1)

$$dy/dt = \alpha_{21}(X - Y) - \alpha_{22}ySOVPL + \alpha_{23}RPT$$
 (2)

$$d\ln X/dt = \alpha_{33}(\ln X^* - \ln X)$$
where  $\ln X^* = -\alpha_{31}X + \alpha_{32}\ln x$  (3)

$$d\ln Y/dt = \alpha_{43}(\ln Y^* - \ln Y)$$
where  $\ln Y^* = -\alpha_{41}\ln Y + \alpha_{42}\ln y$ . (4)

In these equations,

- x and y are respective defense expenditures of the United States and USSR in 1970 constant U.S. dollars.
- x' is that portion of the defense budget not spent on war, i.e., x' = x VN KOR.
- $\dot{X}$  and Y are the respective military stocks of the United States and USSR defined in terms of an index of conventional and strategic forces.
- APT is the perceived tension of the United States with respect to the USSR, indicated in event-interaction flows and measured as the log of

<sup>2</sup>See Science (1982, p. 32) for a discussion of several of the issues in the recent controversy and thought about this problem. Richelson (1980, 1982) provides an excellent analysis of the substantive and measurement issues involved.

cooperation minus the log of conflict received from the USSR.

RPT is the perceived tension of the USSR in relation to the United States defined similarly to the above index.

VN is the Department of Defense estimate of the yearly cost of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, measured in 1970 constant U.S. dollars.

KOR is an estimate of the yearly costs of the U.S. defense effort in the Korean conflict.

SOVPL is an index of the state of completion of the Soviet economic plan.

d/dt is the differential operator. In is the natural log function.

(See Appendix 1 for further definitions.)

These four equations encompass the basic argument of Richardson and clarify the interaction of flows (budgets) with stocks. The reactive components of this framework are several. First, nations react to the perceived difference between their stocks of military goods and those being accumulated by their rival. This stock-flow interaction argues that if the perceived difference is either too large or too small, a nation will alter its decisions accordingly. This adaptation and the budget constraint or bureaucratic momentum are portrayed in parameters  $\alpha_{11}$  and  $\alpha_{21}$ . A nation that is behind in the race will attempt to allocate more resources to the defense budget in an effort to accumulate more weapon stocks and thus reduce, if not totally eliminate, its disadvantage. Such stock-flow interactions work for both nations, capturing the essence of the circular escalation patterns predicted by the Richardson framework.

Nations also react to the threat posed by other nations; this is reflected in the flows of information about the cooperative and conflictual interactions between them. High levels of conflict in the absence of correspondingly high levels of cooperation would, on the surface, suggest an increased as opposed to decreased level of potential threat or hostility from the rival nation. Coefficients  $\alpha_{13}$  and  $\alpha_{23}$  represent this linkage.

Earlier work (Cusack & Ward, 1981; Nincic & Cusack, 1979) demonstrate that the U.S. involvement in Korea and in Vietnam is significant to the explanations of the evolution of U.S. defense expenditures after World War II. Although in previous studies these components have been measured simply by dummy variables constructed to capture statistically the escalation and deescalation of the military during and after these international conflicts, the wartime expenditures are included explicitly in the equations, as are coefficients to measure the strength of these associations ( $\alpha_{14}$  and  $\alpha_{15}$ ).

The two other terms in the budget equations (1)

and (2) relay information about the budget constraints as do coefficients  $\alpha_{12}$  and  $\alpha_{22}$ . That is, what is the general trend in expenditures? In some situations this may be seen as budget constraint when high levels of expenditures in one period tend to drive down the tendency to increase expenditures in subsequent ones. On the other hand, high levels of expenditures may actually accelerate arms expenditures as many in the framework of incremental budgeting have argued (e.g., Fischer & Crecine, 1979, as well as Ostrom, 1977, 1978).

For the Soviet Union, the budget constraint is modified by a variable that captures the evolution of economic plans in the Soviet economy. Following Green and Higgins (1977), Hutchings (1973), and Nincic (1982), it is hypothesized that at the end of an official plan period (i.e., the last two years of each five-year plan) there is an additional constraint placed upon the allocation of the total budget, namely, the military suffers in order to allow a greater investment in the nonmilitary industrial sectors so as to help ensure the achievement of the stated goals of the five-year plans. Further, the first year of a new plan is argued to constrain the military versus nonmilitary split in favor of the industrial and consumption sectors insofar as there is an emphasis on getting the new plan off to a good start. The first year of a new plan is also often a catch-up year, important in meeting the goals of the previous plan. For these reasons, the so-called completion years provide an additional constraint on growth in the Soviet defense budget. In other years, the military may be expected to make up their foregone investments, thus introducing a cycle into the evolution of Soviet military spending.

In recapitulating the general ideas behind the two equations for the evolution of military expenditures, two aspects merit mention. First, the major causal component is a monitoring of the absolute difference of force structures between the superpowers to which the decision makers of concern react. Budgets are driven, in part, by an attempt to maintain a rough parity in military force structures. Under such logic, nations will attempt to catch up with their main rival. This is the crux of the race. Nations also alter their military budgets in relation to involvements in hostile conflict, the perceived level of tension between them and their principal rival, and the internal constraints that may be in effect.

An examination of stock equations (3) and (4) underscores two components fundamental to any evaluation of the evolution of capital stocks, be it military or nonmilitary: depreciation and investment. Depreciation results in a decrease in the value of stocks over time owing to normal wear and tear as well as obsolescence. As such, depreciation is itself proportional to the level of

stocks. Investment comes through the mechanism of the budget, usually with some lag. Defense expenditures are made to maintain the weapon stockpile as well as to extend it.

Equations (3) and (4) portray four aspects of the evolution of military stockpiles. First, the expected or desired changes in the level of stocks are specified to influence the actual change in the proportional rate at which the stocks are evolving in time.3 Stated differently, the actual change in stocks adapts to the desired change. The speed of this adjustment process (Koyck, 1954), a Koycktype of lag structure, is given by parameters  $\alpha_{33}$ and  $\alpha_{43}$ . The desired proportional change in the stocks is tied to depreciation in that it is proportional to the level of stocks (in logs). It is also directly related to investment via the budget expenditures (also in logs). The parameters  $\alpha_{31}$  and  $\alpha_{41}$  represent the elasticities of stock changes in relation to the level of stocks, whereas  $\alpha_{12}$  and  $\alpha_{42}$  are the elasticities of stock changes with respect to the budgets. Thus, stocks evolve with a declining geometric lag to the desired proportional change in stocks.4 These desired rate changes are themselves affected by the decision maker's evaluation of how depreciation and investment rates will affect the stock levels.

Such equations are designed to capture the continuous evolution of the process being modeled; this implies that the competition applies, if at all, at every point in time. Most empirical work within the Richardsonian tradition has adopted a discrete approximation for analysis which uses a relatively coarse temporal granule: one year. Both the discreteness and the granularity are problematic. International competition in terms of military security between the major powers is not likely to be portrayed accurately in terms of yearly time slices. Thus, a smaller and more continuous perspective is required; difference equation systems with yearly dt's are a poor approximation to dynamic systems such as the one expressed above.

The crucial distinction between stock and flow

'The change in the natural logarithm of a variable is the change in the variable itself proportional to its level. Mathematically,  $d\ln y/dt = (1/y)(dy/dt)$ .

'As shown in Gandolfo (1981, pp. 10-14) the partial adjustment equation is equivalent to a Koyck-type distributed lag. In continuous form it is given by:

$$y(t) = \int_{0}^{\infty} (f(\tau)x(t-\tau))d\tau, \text{ s.t. } \int_{0}^{\infty} (\tau)d\tau = 1.0$$

$$\lim_{\tau \to \infty} f(\tau) = 0.0$$

where  $f(\tau)$  is the time form of the weighting factor.

variables is often obscured in difference equation models (Turnovsky, 1977, pp. 43-44). Discrete formulations also assume that all decisions and changes in variables are synchronized. This is not the case, for although decisions may be made in discrete time, they overlap in some (probably stochastic) fashion. This fact implies a continuous lag, which is better approximated in the continuous as opposed to discrete time framework. Further, there is no natural time interval to use for discrete time representations.

Unlike their discrete counterparts, continuous models do not assume independence of errors in the time domain that is synchronized. As Wymer (1975, p. 173) points out, in discrete models the distinction between lagged endogenous and exogenous variables is largely a matter of degree. This fact leads directly to several theoretical advantages for the continuous framework. The ideas behind the model can be expressed independently from the interval at which relevant data are available. Since models are continuous, response occurs instantaneously, which allows such models to be recursive, a major advantage in that it permits a straightforward causal interpretation. More important, as the quotation from Burt (1975) illustrates, political decisions are made and revised continuously. Laws and statutes may be issued discontinuously, but they are amended, interpreted, implemented, and revised without respect to a fixed, discrete time domain.

Two additional advantages of continuous time models may exist in the policy realm, apart from their advantages in the methodological and theoretical arenas. First and foremost, it may be that we can derive better models of the world and consequently enhance our understanding. More certainly, these models will be able to generate dynamic forecasts for shorter time intervals than were necessarily used in their empirical estimation and evaluation. A macropolitical or macroeconomic model based on yearly difference equations, for example, can show little about the dynamics operating within any single year; a continuous model, however, can in principle generate monthly or weekly forecasts. Such an advantage in the policy realm where short time horizons are legion may ultimately enhance the utility of models in the planning and policy process as well as sharpen the need for less aggregated, better quality data.5

<sup>3</sup>Those who remained unconvinced of the important differences between discrete and continuous representations of the same ideas should consult Kohfeld and Salert (1982) for an excellent tutorial discussion which provides several examples, including the Richardson arms race equations.

Recent methodological developments have promoted the exploration of dynamic, continuous models which can be estimated through numerical techniques. Such techniques have been creatively fostered in political science by Luterbacher et al. (1979). In economics theory there has been considerable promotion of the use of continuous time techniques (e.g., Bergstrom, 1966, 1976, 1983, as well as Gandolfo, 1980, 1981, and for an especially thorough treatment, Aoki, 1981). However, to date Wymer (1972, 1975) and Phillips (1973, 1975) have most extensively explored the practical problems of how one estimates econometrically the coefficients of a dynamic model written in a continuous framework. The technique used here is called dynamic, nonlinear, trajectory fitting and is discussed in some detail in Appendix 2.

#### **Data: Elaborating the Choices**

Cusack and Ward (1981) have described and analyzed some of the important differences among various measurements of military expenditures. The problems are well known and will not be repeated here (Holzman, 1980, 1982). Of note is that the indicators of defense expenditures chosen here are those widely employed. For the United States, U.S. national defense expenditures given in constant 1970 U.S. dollars were taken from the U.S. Defense Budget for Fiscal Year, 1979. These data were originally presented in current prices per fiscal year, but have been converted into calendar year approximations with price fluctuations removed via a GNP deflator taken from the 1979 Report of the Council of Economic Advisors.6 They are available in the Appendix to Cusack and Ward (1981).

The debate over using constant versus current dollar amounts in studying arms expenditures is long standing and will not be resolved here. However, the decision to utilize constant dollar amounts was based on several factors. In his Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1984 (1983, p. 20) Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has emphasized that "no serious observer can dispute the widely documented evidence on the size and scope of the Soviet [military] buildup [during the last two decades]. In his argument about the comparison of U.S. and Soviet investment levels (i.e., military spending), he emphasizes that Soviet figures were nearly double those of the United States by the early 1980s. This assertion is documented (1983, Chart I.B.1)

<sup>6</sup>Alternative models may, and often have, assumed the contrary; namely, that comparative evaluations are most commonly made in terms of current, not constant, dollars. by comparing military spending from 1960 to 1981 in terms of 1984 constant dollars. Thus it would appear that constant dollars are one salient metric for comparison, especially vis-à-vis the U.S. Congress and public. However, Ostrom (1977, p. 252) notes that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was reprimanded by a congressman for not presenting comparisons in terms of current dollars, the type of dollars that the Congress is empowered to allocate.

It is interesting to note further that nowhere in the report to the Congress (1983) does Weinberger compare U.S. and Soviet expenditure levels in current dollars. However, when looking at the relative position of defense within the total U.S. federal budget, current and constant dollar figures are highlighted, presumably to show how the defense budget was actually going down during the 1970s, owing to inflation (see pp. 66 and Chart II.A.1 and Chart II.A.2). Thus, regarding the relative "bang for the buck," inflation is very important in the calculations of U.S. national security decision makers. One can only speculate that a similar dynamic may be at work in the Soviet decision-making process.

The data for Soviet expenditures are even more problematic. There are three main sources for information on Soviet expenditures: Lee (1977), a noted defense analyst; IISS estimates; and SIPRI estimates. In recent years, these as well as the CIA estimates have undergone considerable (upward) revision. The IISS series is used here because these data exist for the longest running series and are likely to continue to be available in the future. Second, these estimates for Soviet spending generally fall between the lower estimates of the SIPRI group and the higher estimates of Lee or of the CIA and thus are a medium ground on which to assess Soviet expenditures. Finally, the IISS has a quasi-official status in both the Western and Eastern blocs.7

Data on military stockpiles are more difficult to acquire and describe. The present procedure has been to construct a multiplicative index of both conventional and strategic weapons stocks. With regard to the U.S. and USSR, it is almost meaningless to evaluate conventional military capabilities without assessing nuclear and strategic capabilities. On the other hand, despite the long-standing mutual assured destruction-type policies, assessments of strategic capabilities without evaluating conventional forces, also portray incompletely the strengths of one's adversaries and allies. A multiplicative index not only answers the

'However, it should be pointed out that the choice of data series will affect the results (Cusack & Ward, 1981).

argument that both elements of the force structure are important, but also stresses that strategic and conventional forces are at some level substitutes for one another.

The assessment of conventional stocks uses measures that build upon the work of Lambelet (1973), who developed a two-theater model of the East-West arms race. Lambelet's conventional indexes were structured as manpower × firepower x mobility. Manpower in the East was determined by the number of Soviet troops, whereas the figure for the West represented the combined forces of the United States and West Germany. U.S. forces stationed in Europe were given a mobility score of 1.0 to account for their relative ease of deployment in response to a confrontation in the European theater, whereas those U.S. forces stationed elsewhere received a mobility score of 0.5. Lambelet's third component, firepower, was simply indexed by assuming that firepower had increased linearly by a factor of three over the period of his initial study, 1950-1971. Lambelet's data themselves were taken from the IISS's annual The Military Balance volumes.

In this study Lambelet's indexes were replicated and then extended in order to foster comparability of this study with others. The manpower measure for the East was modified to include the forces of both the Soviets and the East Germans. To accommodate the longer time period of concern, a 1.5 increase in firepower was assumed for 1971-1979.

The strategic forces stock index was not taken from the early work of Lambelet (1973), but was adapted from recent developments promoted by Tsipis (1975) and built upon by Allan and Luterbacher (1981). Conceptually, the strategic forces index is constructed by aggregating the total numbers of strategic weapons weighted by their lethality (measured in terms of their precision in reaching and destroying targets). The final score measuring the stock of military capabilities is then given by the product of the conventional and strategic indexes divided by 1000 (for scaling purposes).8 It must be stressed that such an aggregation of conventional and strategic weapons stocks merely approximates a more complicated and elaborate mix of weapons. This study concen-

\*It is possible to find fault with almost any index construction procedure concerned with military weaponry. There is no simple, widely agreed upon metric for comparison. Arguments for and against every measurement attempt can be made. The decisions involved in the stockpile index rests upon the cumulation of the efforts of others. Where they have been added to, the decision rules for so doing are made explicit in order to foster discussion as well as subsequent investigation and replication.

trates on a (one good) defense product that includes both conventional and strategic components. Accordingly, it is not possible to discuss the relative mix of weapons purchased either by the United States or Soviet Union nor the possible variety of interactions, such as a purely strategic race.

U.S. military expenditures are measured in current dollars spent during the U.S. military involvement in Korea and Vietnam. For Vietnam, U.S. Defense Department estimates of actual costs are used. The yearly costs of the Korean war were estimated by the author based upon a total cost figure of \$54 billion. (See Appendix 1 for a description of estimation technique.)

Two additional indicators required by this model should reflect the flows of conflictual and cooperative events between the United States and the USSR. The two major sources of this information are the event-interaction data from the World Event Interaction Study (WEIS) beginning in 1966, and those from the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), beginning in 1948 (Azar, 1980a, b). The longer period and easier accessibility favored use of the COPDAB data bank. Four indicators were constructed to reflect bilateral flows of conflict and cooperation (Ward, 1982):

U.S. verbal conflict → USSR
U.S. verbal cooperation → USSR
USSR verbal conflict → United States
USSR verbal cooperation → United States

For the present study it is important to note that conflictual and cooperative interactions were included as distinct bilateral flows. Moreover, only verbal as opposed to nonverbal events were considered. This decision was based upon the finding of Hopple, Rossa, and Wilkenfeld (1980) that force and nonforce related events contribute to quite distinct dimensions of international behavior. From these indicators, summary scores were calculated to reflect the balance (or net flow) of conflict and cooperation during a given period (in this case a year).

\*Explicit force events are likely to increase the threat as well, although this is a separate component of the arms acquisition process not included in this study. Were the United States and USSR actually at war with one another, for example, a very different model from the one posed here would be required. The model investigated here presumes the existence of tension, but the absence of force-related hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union.

#### **Empirical Results**

Table 1 presents the empirical estimations for the four stock-flow equations for the United States and the USSR, based upon data from 1952 through 1978. A brief overview of the logic of estimation and the procedure used in its implementation is given in Appendix 2. In general, the model portrays accurately the evolution of U.S. and Soviet military budgets as well as their aggregate weapons stockpiles. Given that the  $R^2$  for each equation is greater than .80, it is not surprising that the overall variance in the linked system approaches unity, not that the chi square statistic is highly significant ( $\chi^2 = 982.9$  with 18 degrees of freedom). O Additionally, the variance

1°There are two generally available descriptors of the amount of total variance explained in a system of simultaneous equations. One of these is the Carter-Nagar R<sup>1</sup><sub>w</sub> (Carter & Nagar, 1977) which is given by the following formula:

$$1.0 - R_W^2 = 1.0/[(1.0/G)tr[Y'Y(^{-1}(E'E)^{-1}],$$

where G is the number of equations, Y is a matrix of observations on the G endogenous variables, E is a matrix of  $G \times N$  errors, and tr is the trace operator. This measure is bounded by 0.0 and 1.0 and has an interpretation similar to the standard coefficient of determination,  $R^2$ . It does, however, take into account the over identifying restrictions which may exist on coefficients, and under full information maximum likelihood assumptions is distributed chi-square. Thus, a  $\chi^2$  may be calculated which allows one to test the null hypothesis that the model and the data are inconsistent with one another:

$$\chi^2 = NGR_W^2/(1.0 - R_W^2)$$
 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated parameters.

An alternative system descriptor is available, which unlike the Carter-Nagar  $R^2_{\mathcal{W}}$  does not ignore the off diagonal elements of the matrices representing the systematic and random components of the variance. This measure,  $R^2_{Sys}$ , is based on the generalized variance matrix (i.e., on the multivariate analogue to the univariate variance). A general treatment of this may be found in Anderson (1958, pp. 166-169). This generalized variance matrix is given by the det(Y'Y) for the total variance in the system and by det(E'E) for the random variance not explained by the model. Thus:

$$R_{SVX}^2 = 1.0 - det(E'E)/det(Y'Y).$$

Note that these system descriptors are not averages of the individual system  $R^{1}s$ . It should also be pointed out that the standard parabolic errors are reported for this nonlinear model, even though it is not statistically clear against what underlying distributions they should be tested. What they do tend to indicate is what type of surface surrounds the minimum (which is what they in-

Table 1. Estimated Coefficients of United States-Soviet Union Stock-Budget Interactions, 1951-1978

Equation	Right-hand side variables		Estimated coefficients	Standard parabolic error
U.S. Budget (1)	Stock-budget effect	(α <sub>11</sub> )	0004076	.00001323
$R^2 = .824$ SER = 3.6	Budget constraint Perceived hostility	$(\alpha_{12})$	7.7514 8.4694	.00013330
DEK - 3.0	Korea	$(\alpha_{13})$ $(\alpha_{14})$	27176	.00013230
	Vietnam Initial value	$(\alpha_{15})$	29716 76.865	.00016538
USSR Budget (2)	Stock-budget effect	$(\alpha_{21})$	.0001957	.00000343
$R^2 = .900$	Budget constraint	$(\alpha_{22})$	.023003	.00036599
SER = 5.08	Perceived hostility Initial value	(α <sub>23</sub> )	-2.0878 45.82	.00039435
U.S. Stocks (3)	Depreciation	$(\alpha_{31})$	31692	.00401320
$R^2 = .983$	Investment	$(\alpha_{32})$	1.6987	.00301420
SER = .176	Adjustment speed Initial value, in logs	$(\alpha_{33})$	.15877 5.6351	.00661520
USSR Stocks (4)	Depreciation	(\alpha_{41})	25204	.00330760
$R^2 = .970$	Investment	$(\alpha_{42})$	1.9180	.01653800
SER = .388	Adjustment speed Initial value, in logs	(\alpha_{43})	.13142 2.1726	.00132300

Carter-Nagar  $R_w^2 = .901$ System descriptor  $R_{sys}^2 = .999$  $\chi^2 = .982.9$  with 18 degrees of freedom

Note: All data are described in Appendix 1; estimation technique is described in Appendix 2. Note 11 describes the two systems  $R^2$  statistics. The standard error of the residual (SER) and the initial values for equations (3) and (4) are given in log form, i.e., the estimated form.

explained in the entire system is high for both the Carter-Nagar and System Descriptor (respectively, .901 and .999). Not only do these results allow the null hypothesis that the data are inconsistent with the model to be rejected, but more important, they show that the estimated differential equation system is a robust representation of the arms processes being modeled.

In Equation (1), the U.S. budget equation, all estimated parameters are highly significant and, in the main, in the predicted direction. The exception is the stock-budget interaction term  $\alpha_{11}$ , which indicates that the reaction of the United States to the stock differences is slight and negative. By way of explanation it can be noted that during the entire period of observation, U.S. stocks were greater than Soviet stocks. The nega-

tive coefficient may indicate something about U.S. strategic doctrine, discounting stock comparisons if the United States is ahead or roughly at parity. One could further argue that the United States does not seek decreased stock levels, even when it has a relative advantage over the USSR. Rather, it could be interpreted that the United States is striving to maintain some proportion of its lead over the USSR.


Also in equation (1), the coefficient ( $\alpha_{13}$ ) for the perceived hostility variable APT is positive and statistically significant. A net flow of cooperative over conflictual interaction from the Soviet Union will in general lead to a reduction in defense spending. The estimated budget constraint ( $\alpha_{12}$ ) describes the general trend in U.S. defense expenditures. It indicates a decline of approximately 8% per annum in defense spending over the 1952-1978 period, holding other factors constant.

dicate for a linear model as well). That they are so small indicates that only slight perturbations of the estimated parameters would move the model away from the minimum error point, i.e., would decrease the explained variance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Russett has suggested an alternative explanation for this formulation. Organizational momentum, he

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Figure 1. Actual and Estimated U.S. Military Budget



Note: Values are billion 1970 U.S. dollars, solid line is actual data and dashed line is the estimated budget.


The variables included to capture the effect of the Korean and Vietnamese wars illustrate that each has played an influential role in the evolution of U.S. defense spending. If the two war involvements had no independent effects, their respective coefficients ( $\alpha_{14}$  and  $\alpha_{15}$ ) would be equal, since they are measured in equal units. The estimated coefficients show roughly equal negative impacts on the overall trend to reduce defense expenditures. Figure 1 presents the fit of the actual data on U.S. defense expenditures and the comparable output from the estimated equation. In addition to the close fit suggested in Table 1, the visual congruence between the actual and predicted data is quite striking.

military spending. Although as formulated it contains no variables to capture war involvement, a logical extension of this work might include a variable that captured the cost of protracted troop deployments, such as that experienced by the USSR in post-1980 Afghanistan. The overall fit of this equation is quite good—greater than that for the U.S. budget equation. The adaptation coefficient  $(\alpha_{21})$  represents the speed at which the Soviets attempt to make up the perceived difference in their stock of weapons and those held by the United States. Table 1 shows this parameter to be highly significant and, as predicted by the model, positive, suggesting that the perceived position of inferiority in terms of weapons stocks plays an important role in the Soviet budgeting process. Unlike the U.S. case, the budget constraint ( $\alpha_{22}$ ) is relatively small (2%), indicating that high levels of spending do not necessarily work to reduce defense expenditures, especially when the ebb and flow of economic plans are taken into account. It would appear that the Soviets evidence no strong, immediate budget constraint apart from that dictated by the plan-

Equation (2) describes the evolution of Soviet

argues, is captured in the coefficients  $\alpha_{12}$  and  $\alpha_{22}$ . Under this interpretation there has been a bureaucratic force operating in the post-World War II American government to drive down military expenditures.

Figure 2. Actual and Estimated Soviet Military Budget



Note: Values are 1970 billion U.S. dollars, solid line is actual data and dashed line is the estimated budget.


ning cycles. This cyclical variation appears strong in the Soviet case (Figure 2). One would nevertheless argue that a constraint exists, and although it may not have been felt during the historical period of concern, it may be quite strong in the future.

As in the case of the United States, the level of amicability or hostility between the United States and Soviet Union that is perceived by the Soviets (RPT), is important in the evolution of USSR expenditures. The sign of the coefficient  $\alpha_{23}$ , however, indicates that increased amicability tends to be associated with growth rather than decline in Soviet military expenditures, in contrast to the U.S. case, this finding implies that increased cooperation does little to reduce the rate at which the Soviets are arming, demonstrating an interesting asymmetrical response. Figure 2 illustrates that the estimated equation captures the general trend in Soviet military expenditures, but a considerable number of cyclical movements away from the trend are not captured by this formulation. One might postulate that since the data themselves are of notoriously bad quality (see Cusack & Ward, 1981) and are frequently revised (Holzman, 1982), the estimated expenditures may be as reliable as the data. At a more substantive level, the weapons stocks of the People's Republic of China should probably appear in addition to those of the United States, when ascertaining the gap in Soviet stocks. Moreover, there is a need to incorporate a more dynamic formulation of the Soviet planning process.

Equations (3) and (4), which describe the evolution of U.S. and USSR stocks of conventional and strategic weapons, also present strong and intriguing results. First, all parameters are statistically significant, and most are in the expected direction. Depreciation of military capital, however, does not appear to be captured in equations (3) and (4). On the contrary, quite apart from what else is occurring, military stocks appear to be appreciating in value in both the USSR and United States, which indicates that, most probably, the stock indicators should be disaggregated into strategic, conventional, and personal components. The elasticity of the stock depreciation is approximately -.32 for the United States ( $\alpha_{31}$ ) and approximately -.25 for the Soviet Union

₫.

Figure 3. Actual and Estimated U.S. Military Stocks



Note: Values are the Conventional and Strategic Index, solid line is the actual data and dashed line is the estimated military stocks.

 $(\alpha_{41})$ , which indicates that Soviet weapon stocks do not appreciate as rapidly as U.S. stocks. This finding is consistent with the observation that in the USSR old weapon systems are maintained, not phased out. The Soviet elasticity of investment ( $\alpha_{42}$ ) is approximately 1.9 compared to 1.7 for the United States ( $\alpha_{32}$ ), indicating a slightly greater Soviet efficiency of investment in regard to producing increments in military stocks. Finally, the speed with which stocks adjust to their desired levels ( $\alpha_{33}$ ) and ( $\alpha_{43}$ ) is slightly faster for the United States than for the USSR. Were the United States behind in a race, it could catch up more quickly to differences in weapons stocks than could the Soviets in a similar position; i.e., Soviet investments in building their military force structure are slightly more efficient than those in the United States, but are more slowly realized.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the military stock variables as they evolve both in the estimated and actual data series from 1952 through 1979. The visual fit is quite good, although the buildup and

subsequent demobilization attendant to the Vietnamese war is not captured particularly well.

The simulated U.S. and USSR defense expenditures based upon equations (1) through (4) and the estimated parameters of Table 1, are shown in Figure 5. It is noteworthy that the general movement of these two series is virtually isomorphic to the actual data. This graph suggests a striking conclusion: It is apparent that no simple, Richardson reaction process is controlling the evolution of defense spending. The Soviet expenditures grow without much reaction to or from the U.S. expenditures, which themselves show periods of both growth and decline. Scholarly and policy studies of these data and their evolution over time have concluded repeatedly that there is no arms race.

When one examines the evolution of military stockpiles, however, as shown in Figure 6, the apparent finding of no arms race seems questionable. The Soviet Union has been increasing its military stockpiles either to bring them into rough parity with the U.S. stockpiles or to surpass them.

The USSR had military stocks which were below those of the United States throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The increases in their defense budget may properly be viewed as an effort to catch up to or to surpass the leader in this race.

Returning to the estimated coefficients from Table 1, it should be reemphasized that the Soviets have more rapid appreciation but slightly more efficient investment with respect to military stocks. They also have an investment lag that is greater than that of the United States. Thus, in attempting to match U.S. stocks, Soviet decision makers would have to invest quite intensively within the defense sector, most likely to the detriment of other sectors of production. These investments would tend to be efficient in increasing the stock of military goods, but the goods themselves would come on line with a much greater lag. The United States, on the other hand, has continued to have a growing level of military stocks owing to a high level of efficiency in terms of investment and a small investment lag. Tables 2 and 3 present the actual and predicted values for the U.S. and USSR military expenditures and weapons stockpiles.

#### Conclusions

This article began with a simple question: Is there an arms race between the United States and USSR? In part, this question was suggested by Taagepera's assertion that much of the arms race literature had neglected or confused the role of expenditures and weapons, and by the long, accumulating stream of statistical evidence that such an arms race does not exist. The persistence of the myth of the arms race in spite of impressive evidence to the contrary presented an intriguing puzzle. Both the United States and the USSR are involved in massive arms buildup programs. Can it be that these programs are unrelated to one another, when each nation would appear to view the other as its major threat?

I formulated and empirically tested a model of the theoretical argument that the United States and the Soviet Union do react to one another





Figure 4. Actual and Estimated Soviet Military Stocks

Note: Values are the Conventional and Strategic Index, solid line is the actual data and dashed line is the estimated military stocks.

Figure 5. Simulated U.S. and Soviet Military Budgets



Note: Values are 1970 billion U.S. dollars, solid line is the United States and dashed line is the Soviet Union.

when formulating policy on military spending and arms stockpiles. The empirical results show that the model specified has considerable validity and interpretability. The United States and the USSR do appear to be reactive to one another, yet not through budgets alone. Rather they each try to achieve or maintain a lead over the other in terms of the stocks of weapons, both strategic and conventional, for which the budget is spent. Additionally, the United States seems able to increase its military stockpiles more efficiently and more quickly than the USSR. However, the model does not adequately capture the important depreciation that occurs, albeit differently, in both the U.S. and Soviet weapon stockpiles. Moreover, whereas the United States decreases its expenditures in relation to a friendlier diplomatic climate with the USSR, the reaction of the USSR is in the opposite direction: increased investment in the face of a more cooperative international political climate.

The results presented here point toward the importance of both external and internal influences upon arms spending patterns. The threat that is

posed by a rival's weapons stockpiles and aggressive posturing are two recognizable international components which exert pressure upon the growth of military expenditures and stockpiles. Beyond that, actual involvement in armed hostilities accelerates the perceived need for increased military spending.<sup>12</sup>

Internal constraints upon the dynamics of arms races also play an important role. Notably, the budget constraint generally means that the pressure for incremental increases in spending patterns is played down and that a large increase in one year will offset the tendencies for another large increase in subsequent years. Such a constraint is strongly evident in the United States but is absent in the Soviet Union. Further, the efficiency with which investment decisions lead to weapon systems actually coming on-line, as well as the general capital-output ratio, regulates how

<sup>12</sup>At present there is no dynamic feedback between either the weapon stockpiles or the budget and the level of tension.

stockpiles may increase or decrease in relation to the internal economic and political constraints. Depreciation and investment are both related to the domestic political-economic environment. Finally, a set of internally formulated economic and social goals related to consumption and industrial productivity provides an internal economic cycle to Soviet military spending patterns.

In summary, the theory expounded and tested here is neither an external nor an internal model of the arms acquisition process, but rather incorporates internal and external elements that are the primary influences upon national decisions about military spending.

The regime that is modeled in this article and that has governed the arms acquisition behavior of the two major powers for the last three decades is one in which the United States has enjoyed a relatively sizable lead vis-à-vis the Soviets' overall military capabilities. The findings of this study suggest, however, that the present and near-term future is not likely to be so characterized. In the face of relative parity, can we rely on the behavior of the old regime as a good predictor of the new?

Although the catchup speed of the United States is quite fast, won't this acceleration lead to additional pressures on the USSR for increased military spending? The Soviets are likely to encounter some severe difficulties in maintaining consumption levels in the face of even greater military expenditures. Given the general level of discontent within Eastern Europe, these difficulties may carry quite high political costs domestically as well as internationally. The United States, on the other hand, also faces considerable difficulties in convincing the relevant mass and elite groups that in the face of both high inflation and unemployment social programs must be pared down to allow for increased defense budgets to finance an arms buildup. Having built a foreign policy upon being in a position of relative superiority, the United States seems unlikely to view the approaching parity sanguinely. This view serves not only to aggravate relations within the Western Alliance, but is also likely to further fuel the Soviet thrust toward establishing parity with or surpassing U.S. military capabilities.

The regime through which the arms race has




Figure 6. Simulated U.S. and Soviet Military Stocks

Note: Values are the Conventional and Strategic Index, solid line is the United States and dashed line the Soviet Union.

Table 2. Estimated and Actual Military Expenditures of the United States and USSR in Constant 1970 Billion U.S. Dollars, 1951-1978

	United States			Soviet Union		
	Estimated	Actual	%Error	Estimated	Actual	%Erro
1951	77	52	48	46	44	3
1952	74	73	1	45	49	8
1953	69	75	7	46	49	7
1954	68	66	2	46	44	4
1955	64	60	8	45	49	7
1956	59	60	0	44	43	2
1957	62	61	2	42	39	7
1958	62	62	0	42	37	12
1959	60	62	3	43	38	15
1960	62	61	1	44	36	21
1961	64	64	0	42	47	10
1962	64	66	3	42	50	16
1963	64	67	5	44	51	14
1964	65	64	2	47	48	. 3
1965	71	64	10	48	45	6
1966	77	74	3	49 ~	46	7
1967	80	86	7	50	48	4
1968	83	88	6	52	53	3
1969	82	84	3	54	54	1
1970	78	78	0	59	54	9
1971	77	74	4	63	52	20
1972	75	70	8	68	77	12
1973	69	66	5	72	77	7
1974	63	65	4	75	76	1
1975	58	63		81	75	8
1976	61	63	8	85	87	2
1977	65	64	2	88	86	3
1978	66	66	0	88	89	1

Note. Percent error is defined as the absolute value of the actual minus the predicted, divided by the actual. Entries in the table have been rounded to either the nearest billion 1970 U.S. dollars or to the nearest percent.

been occurring is undergoing marked change as a consequence of the arms race itself. The dynamic of arms competition illustrated in this study ultimately leads to a necessary change in the mechanisms that generate the dynamic. Unfortunately, the most probable change would accentuate the arms race, which in all probability will lead the U.S. to increased spending and military stocks. The enacted and proposed budgets of the Reagan administration certainly do not refute this speculation.

Although adjustment speeds and the mechanisms generating desired levels of military stocks are likely to be different in the 1980s from what they were during the last 30 years, they are nonetheless likely to involve a high degree of reactivity of one superpower to another, if the results of this study may be extended into the near future. What is required, but difficult to achieve, are models and frameworks that allow the investigation of changing regimes of behavior, i.e., governmental learning, in which the adjustment mechanism and

the desired stock levels are themselves endogenous.

Having followed different paths, the United States and the USSR have arrived at a position of relative parity. The irony is that reaching that goal may well bring about an increase rather than a decrease in the perceived threat. New paths must be chosen; the old paths are unlikely to serve well in the terrain of the future.

#### Appendix 1. Data Definitions<sup>13</sup>

Incremental, yearly war costs for the United States vis-à-vis the Korean and Vietnam wars were taken from U.S. Defense Department estimates. Data on the total incremental costs of the Korean war were not available in yearly form. Rather, the total cost of 54 billion U.S. current dollars is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>All data not available elsewhere may be obtained directly from the author.

reported in the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979: 100th Edition (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1979, Table 593, p. 368). This total cost figure was factored out into yearly increments under the assumption that the time profile followed the form proposed in Cusack and Ward (1981, p. 463). This profile captured a general upthen-down swing which begins with the start of the conflict and lasts one year beyond its duration (i.e., 1950-1953). The specific formula is  $.5^{(t-2)}$ . where t is an increment of the duration of the conflict. The sum of this increment over the four years in question was assumed to be equal to the total of 54 billion dollars; this implies yearly expenditures of 3.6, 14.4, 28.8, and 7.2 billion dollars for the four years. The yearly increments for the Vietnam war, fortunately, were available directly from Defense Department estimates which were reported in China: U.S. Policy since 1945 (Congressional Quarterly, 1980, p. 217). Both series were assumed to be dated at the end of the calendar year, as they are cumulative yearly expenditures, and have been transformed into 1970 U.S. constant dollars with the standard deflator for Gross National Income reported widely and taken from the U.S. Council of Economic Advisor's Economic Report of the President, 1979.

United States Military Expenditures (USDX), are taken from the U.S. Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 1979. The data were originally presented in current prices on a fiscal year basis. They were converted to calendar year approximations and deflated with the GNP deflator. These data, as well as the Soviet military spending data, are analyzed and reported in Cusack and Ward (1981).

Soviet Union Military Expenditures (SUDX) were taken from the International Institute for Strategic Studies' annual publications, *The Military Balance*, 1972-1973, 1975-1976, 1978-1979, and 1979-1980. The least discontinuous series of data from these sources were collated and transformed into constant 1970 dollar estimatess via the GNP deflator.

United States Strategic Index (USST) was taken

Table 3. Estimated and Actual Military Stockpiles of the United States and USSR

	United States				Soviet Union	
	Estimated	Actual	%Error	Estimated	Actual	%Error
1951	280	352	4	9	15	19
1952	472	525	2	18	16	4
1953	741	663	2 2	34	18	22
1954	1,102	808	5	62	20	38
1955	1,553	1,154	4	105	162	9
1956	2,074	1,709	3	168	309	11
1957	2,711	2,805	0	255	432	9
1958	3,453	3,787	1	372	533	6
1959	4,255	4,845	2	528	650	3
1960	5,172	5,041	0	727	824	2
1961	6,223	7,452	2	965	1,002	1
1962	7,337	9,317	3	1,245	1,037	2 1 3 6 7
1963	8,492	9,904	2	1,586	1,072	6
1964	9,731	11,480	2	2,001	1,252	7
1965	11,253	12,730	1	2,493	2,014	3 3 0
1966	13,098	15,490	2	3,054	2,439	3
1967	15,162	17,228	1	3,691	3,838	0
1968	17,446	19,263	1	4,410	4,790	1
1969	19,692	19,726	0	5,244	5,857	1
1970	21,695	17,492	2	6,248	7,028	1
1971	23,599	17,950	3	7,453	8,471	1
1972	25,304	19,774	2	8,913	9,200	0
1973	26,371	23,418	1	10,608	9,851	1
1974	26,662	26,467	0	12,572	10,976	1
1975	26,412	27,352	0	14,905	13,235	1
1976	26,499	27,685	0	17,603	16,494	1
1977	27,079	29,102	1	20,677	20,317	0
1978	27,711	30,076	1	23,916	26,594	1

Note. Percent error is defined as the absolute value of the actual minus the predicted, divided by the actual. The % error in this table refers to the logs of stocks, i.e., to the dependent variable in the estimation of equations (3) and (4). All entries have been rounded to the nearest integer.

directly from Allan and Luterbacher (1981) and provides an estimate of the diversity, lethality, and precision of U.S. strategic weapons systems.

Soviet Union Strategic Index (SUST) was taken directly from Allan and Luterbacher (1981) and provides an estimate of the diversity, lethality, and precision of Soviet strategic weapons systems.

United States Conventional Index (USCN) was taken directly from Lambelet (1973) for the years 1950-1970. The basic index represents a multiplicative combination of firepower, manpower, and mobility. These data were replicated and extended for the period from 1971 to 1981, using Lambelet's methodology and assuming a 1.5 increase in firepower over the 1971-1981 period. Data on manpower and mobility were taken from *The Military Balance*, various years.

Soviet Conventional Index (SUCN) was taken from Lambelet (1973) for the years 1950-1970. The basic index represents a multiplicative combination of firepower, manpower, and mobility. These data were replicated and extended for the 1971-1981 period, using Lambelet's methodology and assuming a 1.5 increase in firepower over the 1971-1981 period. Data on manpower and mobility were taken from *The Military Balance*, various years. Unlike Lambelet, the manpower of East Germany was included in the manpower estimates of the Soviet Union, to preserve rough comparability with the U.S. case wherein the forces of the *Bundeswehr* are included.

The conflict and cooperation variables, from which the tension scores APT (U.S. perceived tension) and RPT (USSR perceived tension) are calculated have been taken from event interaction collected and made available by Azar (1980a, b) as part of the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB). The specific coding rules are described in detail in Ward (1982). Both conflict and cooperation between the United States and USSR in terms of yearly aggregations (i.e., number of events per year), are included separately. Based on Hopple, Rossa, and Wilkenfeld (1980). however, verbal and nonverbal events were separately coded and collated. Four basic variable kernels are collated: verbal and nonverbal conflict and verbal and nonverbal cooperation. Nonverbal conflict includes event interactions ranging from extensive war acts causing deaths (Azar's event type 15), limited war acts (type 14), small scale military acts (type 13), political-military hostile actions (type 12), to diplomatic-economic hostile actions (type 11). Verbal conflict encompasses strong verbal expressions of hostility (type 10) and mild verbal expressions of hostility (type 9). Event type 8, reserved for neutral or nonsignificant acts, was excluded. Verbal cooperation was indexed by event types 7, 6, and 5, which included minor official exchanges and expressions of mild verbal support, official verbal support of goals, values and regimes, and cultural and scientific agreement and support in non-strategic realms. Nonverbal cooperation was indicated by event types 4, 3, 2 and 1. These events range from nonmilitary economic, technological and industrial agreement such as economic loans, through military economic and strategic support, and major strategic alliance actions such as fighting a war jointly, to the voluntary unification into a single nation-state. The final indexes of perceived tension (APT and RPT) are calculated as the natural log of cooperation received from the rival minus the natural log of conflict received from the rival.

The Price Deflator for GNP (USGNPD) was taken from the *Economic Report of the President*, 1979 and has a value of 1.0 in 1972.

The dominant five-year plan pattern for the Soviet Union (SOVPLN) was coded after Green and Higgins (1977, Appendix A). It is a dummy variable set equal to -1.0 during the last two years of each successive plan and also set to -1.0 during the first (carryover) year of the subsequent plan. The Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965) has a value of -1.0 in 1962-1964. Otherwise, the variable is coded 1.0. This dummy variable coding is given to reflect the relative priority given to nonmilitary investments during the periods in which planned project completions are expected vis-à-vis the national economic plan of the Soviet Union.

#### Appendix 2. Dynamic Trajectory Fitting

Given that the model developed is expressed explicitly in terms of a system of differential equations having a nonlinear solution, the method used to estimate it should seek to take advantage of that form. Linearization and transformation into difference equations, although common practice, is not a highly desirable approach. When faced with a system of differential equations, one is required by the nature of the problem to solve them. In general, this is done analytically as, for example, in Richardson's original work. The major difficulty with this approach is that once there are more than a few equations with a few variables, analytical solution becomes difficult if not intractible. Nonlinearity further complicates the issue.

Numerical analysis techniques have been used to provide the trajectory of the system described in equations (1) through (4). The interested reader is referred to Korn and Wait (1977) for a relatively up-to-date survey of the characteristics and behaviors of such techniques. A currently available software package, known as DAREP 5.0, created by Wait and Clarke (1979) at the Univer-

sity of Arizona permits the convenient solution of such systems.

It then remains to estimate the initial conditions and parameters. Ordinary regression techniques will not necessarily be appropriate for the estimation of systems such as those studied here. A growing literature is available on this topic, and the interested reader is referred to Wymer (1975) and Bergstrom (1976), and more recently Bailey, Hall, and Phillips (1980), for some of the seminal ideas on econometric estimation of such systems. The approach pursued here is different from this line of attack, although it does build upon the econometric tradition.

Estimation is a three-step conceptual problem. First, one must determine the criteria that one chooses to meet. Ordinary least squares, for example, has a simple, straightforward, wellknown, and ignored criterion, or goal function: minimizing the sum of the squared standardized residuals. A discussion of alternative single equation goal functions is found in Schrodt, Gillespie, and Zinnes (1978). Some obvious examples of alternative criteria include, for example, minimizing the absolute difference between the actual and the estimated, or minimizing the percentage error. The second conceptual step in estimation is deriving a set of preliminary parameter estimates and calculating the predictions of the model with them. The third step is to perturb the preliminary parameter guesses and to return to step one. When conceptualized in such a fashion, this strategy is an unconstrained, nonlinear optimization problem.

In a sense, optimal control is being turned on its head in order to derive—through iteration—the best estimates of the parameter vector (a process called optimal identification), given some specified goal function. This was accomplished through a generalized triplet of programs, available through the Center for European Nuclear Research (CERN) in Geneva, known as MINUIT (James & Roos, 1975), designed to solve problems where one is estimating the value of a set of unknown parameters in order to minimize the difference between the predictions of theory (i.e., the model) and some available experimental or nonexperimental data. Programs are available which use the simplex method based on a switching version of the Davidon (1959), Fletcher (1965), Powell (1964) technique. The basic strategy assumes that the goal function is interpretationally similar to a classic chi-square function. Thus, to the above conceptual strategy MINUIT provides the optimal controller, or optimizer.

Specifically, the DAREP/MINUIT constellation provides the opportunity to estimate directly coefficients of a differential equation system by utilizing a powerful simulation framework to express a system of recursive differential equations which are solved by numerical analysis. Powell (1981) provides a useful and current survey of recent advances in numerical integration techniques. Once initial guesses of parameters and initial conditions are made, the solution trajectory for the system of equations is generated. The interface of these solution trajectories with the MINUIT package offers the possibility of specifying a goal function and comparing the predicted solution trajectories with actual data. Based upon these comparisons, the parameters are modified until the goal criteria are met.

The Dennis, Gay, and Welsh (1981a, b) algorithms have been designed to be more reliable than either Gauss-Newton or Levenberg-Marquardt methods, and more efficient than the variable metric algorithms such as the Fletcher-Powell-Davidon methods. In particular they are designed to be powerful on problems which may have large residuals, such as often characterize social as opposed to physical sciences. In addition to the MINUIT interface, parameters were also estimated via the NL2SOL algorithms available through a preliminary version of STARPAC (Donaldson & Tryon, 1983a, b). Both efforts converged to the same minimum and yielded identical parameter estimates, as have runs that utilize a variety of initial values for the parameters. Although the results reported here appear robust, given the nature of the problem, one cannot guarantee the presence of a global minimum.

Several caveats are in order. Systems such as equations (1) through (4) should, of course, be estimated simultaneously. However, it may be that the single equation estimates are good (or even perfect) approximations of the system estimates. The present approach has been to use an ordinary least squares criterion on each separate equation in order to derive initial estimates for the system estimation procedure. The estimates reported here are system estimates derived with a system criterion which is the minimum variance for the entire system of equations. Second, although the model and its solution trajectories are expressed in continuous time, data are not so abundant. It is possible to compare the trajectory (fitted values) and real data at every time point, providing one is willing to make a number of strong assumptions, the strongest of which is that one can validly interpolate in some fashion from one observed data point to the next. In stock-flow models this seems especially suspect, given that a linear interpolation rule will tend to distort the series against which the trajectory is being compared. Thus, although it is possible to evaluate the criteria at every point in time (by writing a differential equation for it), it makes little statistical sense to do so, for it involves a great deal of (linear) interpolation, exaggerates the fit of the model, and renders difficult if not impossible the statistical testing of the parameter estimates. The technique adopted here only evaluates the criteria at the points at which actual empirical data exist.

Since the model contains both stock and flow variables, care must be given to their representation in the evaluation function as well as in the interpretation of the predictions of the model. Stock variables are a measured stock level at a given point in time. Flow variables are the flow or rate of a variable at an instant in time. The budget figures observed for the United States or USSR in 1960, for example, for which data may be found in the appropriate sources, are integrals (summations) of the flow of defense spending over the year in question. Thus, flow variables in stockflow models must be integrated over the comparison period(s) in order to permit comparison to actual data.

Since completion of the analysis in this article, it has come to my attention that similar strategies for estimating the coefficients of differential equation models have also been developed in other disciplines. Ralston et al. (1979) report the results of a simplified version of the strategy implemented herein. Their application was initially stimulated by pharmacological research questions and has been incorporated into the BMDP (Dixon et al., 1981) statistical package.

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# The Political Reliability of Italian Governments: An Exponential Survival Model

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Italian cabinets (governi) fall from power in a seemingly haphazard pattern, thus defying most deterministic analyses of their durability. This analysis views Italian government longevity as essentially indeterminate, or stochastic, and it applies the theory of "political reliability" to explain the probability that an Italian government will be in power at time t after it was formed. An exponential survival model  $R = e^{-kt}$ , with constant government breakdown rate k = .021 per week, is developed, estimated, tested, and discussed. It is shown that Italian governments have a half-life  $(\tau)$  of approximately 32.8 weeks, after which their political reliability drops below .50, and their mean duration is 47.7 weeks, so the probability that an Italian government will survive as long as the average is only 36.8%. Theoretical aspects of the model are also discussed, together with characteristic features of exponential political reliability, such as lifetime density, political mortality, and government downfall rate, as well as the systems reliability and crisis process characteristic of Italian governments.

Italian cabinet governments (governi) seem to fall from power in a haphazard, unpredictable manner, rendering almost impossible any attempt to examine the process systematically. Although recent comparative research on the causes of government durability in modern parliamentary systems yields new insights and theories, the political dynamics of cabinet decay in the Italian system are still largely incomprehensible.

This article reports findings of research aimed at discovering a well-defined, systematic pattern in the downfall process of Italian government. It approaches the problem from the perspective of political reliability theory, previously developed and applied in international relations (Cioffi-Revilla, 1983a, b). One salient feature of this approach is that, unlike most other previous research in this area, it approaches government durability from a probabilistic and dynamic perspective.

In the first section some significant aspects of government durability, the role of government in the Italian system, and the "causes" of cabinet collapse will be briefly reviewed. The second sec-

Received: September 24, 1981 Revision received: February 17, 1983 Accepted for publication: August 11, 1983

I wish to thank C. Currin, D. Napolitano, and D. Haynes for their assistance. Support for this study was partially provided to the author as a George A. Miller Visiting Scholar from The Center for Advanced Study of the University of Illinois. I am grateful to the Editor, three anonymous referees, and M. Midlarsky for their comments, and to M. Levy and the typesetter for their careful editing and work.

tion describes the political reliability approach used here, with an emphasis on model-building, data, and analysis. The third section reports basic findings supportive of the proposed model, and the fourth section discusses the model.

#### Background

Government durability has been recognized as a central variable in the analysis of democratic party systems (Riker, 1962). It not only relates to the theory of cabinet government formation (Blondel, 1968; de Swaan, 1973; Dodd, 1976; Laver, 1974), but it also plays a central role in the analysis of political stability (Hurwitz, 1971, 1972; Taylor & Laver, 1973). In this latter case, Taylor and Herman (1971) first used the duration of cabinet governments as an indicator of political stability, and Hurwitz (1971, p. 64) reported a strong positive relationships ( $\varrho = .82, N = 17$ ) between durability and his index of "democratic political stability." Recently, Warwick (1979, pp. 465-466) has even argued that "what matters most in terms of these polities [multiparty democratic systems] is not predicting which coalitions will form, but predicting which coalitions will last long enough to implement policies." Naturally, government durability also relates to the "governability" of advanced, modern polities (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975; Rose, 1980). In this study, government durability plays a fundamental role in an empirical theory of political reliability.

Among contemporary multiparty democratic systems, Italy's government duration process is probably best known for its high downfall rate. After a national referendum on 2 June 1946, the Italian political system adopted a republican parliamentary form of constitution with a cabinet executive. Since then, an extraordinary succession of governments has been a distinctive feature of the Italian political system. In Blondel's (1968, pp. 190-191) classification of 17 Western democracies, Italy is in the highest turnover category, with a rate of 0.9 governments per year (gpy), between Finland (1.0 gpy) and France (0.7 gpy).1 Similarly, in Hurwitz's (1971, p. 56) study of 20 democracies, Italy ranks 18th in "raw government persistence score," a direct consequence of its high cabinet turnover rate. However, in spite of this well-established empirical feature, to date the pattern of Italy's extraordinary turnover remains largely unscrutinized. In particular, the high turnover rate raises two sets of questions: What is the political reliability of Italian governments? And, more generally, what is the reliability of the Italian political system as a whole, given the key role played by the cabinet? This study provides an answer to the first question, while contributing a framework for answering the second.

As in other parliamentary cabinet systems, at any given time Italy's cabinet government (Consiglio dei ministri) is either enjoying political support in Parliament, or it is not. However, whereas in most other similar political systems (e.g., United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, or Canada) the duration of governments in power is fairly long relative to the prescribed length of time between elections, in Italy cabinet governments seem to manifest a much higher and variable turnover pattern. In Italy some government is always in charge, even if only as caretaker, but after a prime minister (Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri) has resigned, his government is politically dead until the next government is inaugurated.2

It should be noted that the analysis of government reliability is of interest not only on its own merits; but it is also important for an improved understanding of the Italian political system as a whole. Sartori (1966, p. 153) has described this system as suffering from "extreme polarization," and de Swaan (1973, p. 192) has observed that "among Sartori's [extremely] polarized pluralist systems, Italy is the only one that has survived to the present." More recently, a transformation of

'The higher French turnover rate should be interpreted with caution, since it includes governments of the extinct Fourth Republic, and unlike the Italian case, the French executive rests primarily on the presidency, rather than on the government.

<sup>2</sup>The next government, of course, can in turn be headed by the same PM, so long as the necessary political support exists in Parliament.

the system as a result of persistent, multisector crises has been suggested (Pridham, 1981; Tarrow, 1980), but Italy's high government turnover remains salient.

From a comparative perspective, in the Italian system the cabinet is far more important than in other democratic systems of the same type. Germino and Passigli (1968, pp. 70-71) note that "one of the shortest sections of the Italian Constitution (Title III, Articles 92-96) concerns the Government. [However,] the importance of this organ in the actual operation of the Italian political system varies inversely with the amount of space devoted to it." As they explain:

The Government . . . performs three major functions: arbitration, initiation, and coordination. Arbitration refers to the settling of disputes . . . between conflicting social forces.

[In] its innovative capacity it can, if it chooses, . . . initiate programs that ultimately affect this very balance of social forces.

Finally, [as a coordinator,] the Government is the directing committee of a vast administrative empire and is inevitably preoccupied with settling jurisdictional disputes that occur within that empire. Persistent conflicts between ministries are ultimately resolved by the Cabinet or through machinery such as a system of interministerial committees which it has established.

Quite clearly, in the Italian political system the reliability of the cabinet affects not only the executive function of political power in the system, but several other major processes as well.

Finally, as will be shown in the discussion of the proposed model, analysis of the Italian case can also advance the broader theory of government durability and governability in multiparty democratic systems. The type of model developed in this study lends itself naturally to comparative analysis.

By taking the political reliability approach, this study departs in two important ways from previous analyses of multiparty cabinet systems in general, and of the Italian cabinet process in particular. First, from a theoretical perspective, it develops a set of concepts, models, and hypotheses from the theory of political reliability not previously applied to internal political phenomena. As explained in greater detail below, in this application of political reliability theory, the political reliability of Italian governments refers to the probability that a government will be in power as a function of time. Since in the Italian system the government is much more than an executive, it follows that the political reliability of the cabinet duration process is essential to the reliability of the entire political system. In the Italian case, cabinet longevity affects the political reliability of the system as a whole. Although other governing processes are also quite essential for the entire system to function, the cabinet process acts like a "bottleneck," such that in the absence of a cabinet (i.e., during a crisi di governo), the Italian political system loses a significant amount of governability.

Second, from a methodological perspective, this study departs from previous analyses by taking a probabilistic, or stochastic approach to explaining the causes of government duration. Taylor and Herman (1971, pp. 28-29) noted that "a lot of variation in cabinet stability is due to 'random disturbances from the environment.' " However, in spite of this insight, research on the causes of government durability has generated only deterministic theories. Taylor and Herman took the a priori view that such "random disturbances" would be "very difficult to account for in a systematic way," and their ontological position, together with the methods in use at that time, probably contributed to the identification of the deterministic approach as the only one available. In this area of political research, systematic inquiry as a whole has been equated with determinism. Both approaches, deterministic and stochastic, are causally oriented, but whereas previous studies have taken the a priori ontological view that such causes are deterministic, the political reliability approach views the causes of duration in power as essentially indeterminate or random, in the specific sense specified below. This does not mean ruling out a pattern in the durability of Italian governments. In spite of the seemingly haphazard nature customarily ascribed to the turnover of Italian governments, the political reliability approach demonstrates the existence of a well-defined underlying order. However, such a pattern, or regularity, is probabilistic rather than deterministic. In sum, the political reliability approach provides a systematic mode of inquiry for the analysis of intrinsically indeterminate processes, such as the duration of a government in power, where the "causes" of breakdown (or "downfall" in this case) can be many and varied. Rather than trying to impose a set of determinant causes, this approach views the durability of cabinets as a probabilistic variable, i.e. dependent upon the aggregate effect of numerous political factors, each acting with different intensity and from different directions, some increasing, others decreasing its duration.

Using the concepts, models, and methods of political reliability theory, this article presents an analysis of the government duration process in the Italian political system. Although by no means definitive, an "exponential" model for the political reliability of Italian governments is first built and then found to be empirically well supported.

Subsequent models, some of which are suggested, can then be developed, and the theory advanced. The proposed theory assumes that Italian governments collapse with a constant downfall rate and, it is estimated, with a half-life of approximately 33 weeks.

#### Method

A political reliability model of the Italian government process is proposed, the necessary data for testing this model will be described, and the required analytic procedures will be explained. Technical aspects of previously developed methods and results are omitted, and the reader is referred to the standard political; mathematical, or statistical sources cited in the pertinent sections.

#### Theory and Model

The thrust of this section is to introduce some necessary definitions and assumptions of theory in order to build a model from which a testable deduction is derived. After the results of testing have been presented and discussed, subsequent discussion (see *Discussion*) expands the theoretical model.

At any given time during its stay in power an Italian cabinet is subject to political stress and pressure, both from within and without the cabinet coalition. As a result, governments can therefore be in only one of two possible states: either in power (al potere), or fallen. Viewed from this perspective, the Italian government resembles a binary (Bernoulli) system, in which a government is either ruling or in crist. A model for the reliability of Italian governments in power is now developed.

Suppose a coalition begins to rule at time  $t_0 = 0$ , and it is observed until it falls. The duration T, or lifetime of a government, can be considered a random variable. As such, T has a probability density function (pdf) f(t) and a cumulative density function  $(cdf) \Phi(t)$ .

Viewing T as a stochastic variable assumes that the value of T cannot be exactly predicted by any known deterministic model; it supposes that the same governments, subject to the same political stress and system pressure, would probably fall at different and unpredictable times. Some cabinets seem to last longer than others; moreover, the process leading to their fall may vary from case to case, and such a process may originate either in-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>For model-building purposes, and without loss of essential detail, the present analysis ignores the interim period of *crist di governo*.

side or outside the cabinet. Further, a large multitude of causes can bring about the loss of pivotal votes in Parliament: for example, support may vanish as a result of anticipated gains from an upcoming election, calculations based on pure political expediency may render it advantageous to defect the coalition, or defection may ensue from failure to reach consensus on the next stage of government policy.

If T, the duration-in-power or lifetime of a cabinet, is a random variable, then the political reliability R(t) of an Italian government at time t can be defined as the probability that a cabinet will be in power at time t. More precisely,

Definition 1. The political reliability R(t) of an Italian government at time t is

$$R(t) = p(T > t) \tag{1}$$

$$= 1 - p(T \le t) = 1 - \Phi(t). \tag{2}$$

R(t) can also be interpreted as a survival function, or survival law, since it describes the probability of a government surviving in power until time t; alternatively, R(t) also describes the probability that the government will not collapse during the interval (0, t]. Conversely,  $\Phi(t)$  describes the "mortality" M(t) of cabinets, an important aspect which is discussed below.

Related to R(t), a government downfall rate D(t) can also be defined, as the ratio between T's pdf and R(t).

Definition 2. The (instantaneous) downfall rate D(t) of governments is

$$D(t) = f(t)/[1 - \Phi(t)]$$
 (3)

$$= f(t)/R(t). (4)$$

D(t) can be interpreted as the propensity of governments to fall at time t, or the political stress acting on government at time t. This important interpretation is discussed below. In addition, from a systems perspective, D(t) can be more generally interpreted as a political breakdown rate.

The downfall rate D(t) plays a central role in this model, because it can be shown (e.g., Meyer, 1970, pp. 226-227) that such a function uniquely determines the pdf f(t) of T, and therefore it uniquely determines R(t) as well. Specifically,

$$f(t) = D(t) \exp\left[-\int D(s)ds\right], \tag{5}$$

\*The notation  $(t_i, t_j]$  denotes the interval  $t_i < t < t_j$ . A complete list of symbols appears in the Appendix.

where D can have various forms, such as constant, increasing, decreasing, or fluctuating.<sup>5</sup> Equation (5) is an important theoretical principle, since specific forms of f(t) can be derived from different assumptions about the form of the downfall rate D(t).

This political reliability model assumes that, throughout its lifetime, the net result of political forces acting on an Italian government remains constant or stationary (i.e., the net of forces acting to bring down a government and forces that regenerate the government's longevity neither build up nor decline, but remain constant throughout the government's lifetime). Formally, this means that the breakdown rate or downfall rate of Italian governments is constant, or

$$D(t) = k. ag{6}$$

The consequences of this central assumption, as well as several important deductions from it, will be tested and discussed below. A testable deduction from this theory is now needed.

Assuming their downfall rate is constant (equation 6), what can be expected about the political reliability R(t) of Italian governments? Two steps are necessary to answer this question. Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) yields

$$f(t) = ke^{-kt} (7)$$

as the pdf of T; solving equation (4) for R(t) and substituting equation (7), it then follows that

$$R(t) = e^{-kt} (8)$$

describes the political reliability of Italian governments. This last result (which is a hypothesis that can be tested directly) is very important because it says that, if the downfall rate of Italian governments is constant, then their predicted political reliability must be exponential.

Significant properties of this model, as well as a number of other interesting derivations, are discussed later on.

#### Data

The main observational variable of a political reliability model (equation 8) is the duration T in power, or lifetime of governments. The process of government collapse and reconstitution is well documented for the Italian political system, and duration data were compiled from Mammarella (1972), Presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri

Mixed modes of political pressure are also of interest. (1951-1980), and Corriere della Sera (1980).

Operationally, the time frame of this study extends from the first dopoguerra government of F. Parri (21 June 1945) to the second Cossiga government (4 April 1980), which lasted until 27 September 1980, for a total of 39 governments. This group excludes only the two Badoglio governments (27 July 1944 to 18 June 1944) and the two Bonomi governments (18 June 1944 to 21 June 1945), which ruled Italy during the period of Allied military occupation. Since these four governments existed under extreme political conditions, the Consulta not having even been elected yet, their durations cannot be regarded as genuine observations on systems performance and political reliability.<sup>6</sup>

The initial time  $t_0$  was operationally defined as the day in which the *Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri* (Premier) designate obtains, by vote of Parliament, a vote of confidence. The final day of his rule was operationally defined as that in which he presents his resignation to the President of the Republic (which in the Italian system is the Head of State), and the President accepts it.

Several inconsistencies were found to exist in the basic data sources (Mammarella, 1972; Corriere della Sera, 1980), corrections were made, and from the corrected basic sources a master list (1945-1980) of cabinet durations,  $t_1$ ,  $t_2$ ,  $t_3$ , ...,  $t_{39}$ , was then compiled.

This study includes both types of government cabinets: coalizioni and monocolori (DC-only governments). The decision to include both types was made on the basis of the following important feature of the Italian cabinet process. In the Italian system the same process of multi-actor support which maintains a coalition in power is also necessary in order for a monocolore government to survive; the only difference between the two situations is that in the case of a monocolore, the political support comes from groups within the DC itself (e.g., fanfaniani, dorotei), as well as from parliamentary groups outside government. Because of the size and internal diversity of the DC, a monocolore government remains in power only when there exists a political agreement between the various groups within the DC. (See,

"The September 1945 Consulta represents a landmark event because, as Germino and Passigli (1968, p. 44) point out, "It was the Consulta that decreed that Italy's first free elections since the March on Rome were to be by the method of proportional representation (PR) and multi-member districts," a structural arrangement of significant consequence for voting patterns and cabinet support.

<sup>7</sup>A list of these corrections is available from the author.

e.g., Pasquino, 1975, 1980; Zuckerman, 1979.) This political situation is not very different from that which maintains a regular multiparty coalition government in power, an important theoretical aspect discussed below.

In addition, *monocolori* still require non-DC support in Parliament. As Germino and Passigli (1968, p. 72) point out, "even with regard to monocolor governments the support of other parties is essential; it is simply the difference between a parliamentary and a governmental alliance." The concept of political reliability is therefore applicable to both types.

#### **Analysis**

Analytic procedures employed in this study are standard for lifetime data. More generally, these methods are useful for the estimation of stochastic models of political lifetime, survival, or duration data.

Data on durations of Italian governments were transformed from days into weeks (wk) and rounded off to the nearest figure because in the Italian system a week is a more meaningful unit of measurement, given that political consulations, which either bring down or generate a new government, generally take more than one day, but usually less than a week. By describing the process in weeks it is therefore possible to give a clear-cut binary description, whereas if days are used as units, many durations are "fuzzy" (Cioffi-Revilla, 1981), because either collapse or formation take more than one day. However, the use of a week as the basic unit of measurement in no way affects the theoretical aspects of this analysis nor the validity of the empirical test.

Two preliminary graphic tests were used for assessing the advisability of fitting an exponential model (equation 8) to the data. In the first test (Gross & Clark, 1975, pp. 80-84), the statistic  $-\ln[(n-i+1)/(n+1)]$ , with n=39,  $i=1,2,3,\ldots,39$ , was calculated and plotted versus the durations  $t_i$ .9 If the central portion of the distribution ( $\sim$  80%) falls approximately on a straight line, then the exponential distribution is probably a good model of the data and should be tested.

In the second graphic test (Nelson, 1972), the durations were first ranked from smallest (Andreotti I and V, or  $t_{29} = t_{37} = 1$  wk, respectively) to largest (Moro III, or  $t_{23} = 119$  wk). The downfall rate of each individual government was then cal-

<sup>8</sup>Mann, Shafer, and Singpurwalla (1974, pp. 350-352), Elandt-Johnson & Johnson (1980, pp. 181-222), and Gross & Clark (1975, pp. 49-96).

<sup>9</sup>An equivalent test consists of plotting the quantity between brackets on semi-log axes.

culated as  $100/i^*$ , where  $i^*$  is the reverse rank. Downfall rates were then cumulated and plotted versus durations  $t_i$ . Again, as in the Gross-Clark test, if the central portion of the distribution (80%) falls close to a straight line, it is reasonable to proceed with a statistical test of the exponential model. Standard graphic examples of when the central portion of the distribution is accepted as falling "close to a straight line" are provided in Gross and Clark (1975, pp. 83-84) and Nelson (1972).

Statistical estimation and testing of the stochastic model proceeded by fitting the predicted exponential reliability function (equation 8) to the observed data on Italian government durations. The maximum likelihood estimate of the constant k in the exponential distribution is the inverse of the mean  $\bar{t}$  of the observed durations  $t_i$ , or  $\hat{k}=1/\bar{t}$ . Since the mean can be calculated in two ways (Mann et al., 1974, p. 351), either from interval frequencies or from raw frequencies, this procedure yields two MLEs of k, or  $\hat{k}_1=1/\bar{t}_1$  and  $\hat{k}_2=1/\bar{t}_2$ , respectively. Both estimates are used to test the model, so as not to depend on the method of calculating  $\hat{t}$  for the empirical validity of the theory being tested.

From each estimate of k, a set of theoretical values of R(t) was then calculated. Each set was then compared with the observed cdf and tested for goodness of fit. As a measure of goodness of fit between theoretically expected  $E_i$  (equation 8) and observed  $O_i$  data, the statistic w = 1

 $\sum_{i=1}^{n} [(O_i - E_i)^2 / E_i], \text{ asymptotic to } \chi^2, \text{ was cal-}$ 

culated for each set of theoretical data (n = 6 for  $\hat{k}_1$  and n = 39 for  $\hat{k}_2$ ).

The following statistical test was used (Mann, Shaefer, & Singpurwalla, 1974, p. 351): The hypothesis that R(t) is exponential is rejected at the  $\alpha$  level of significance, if  $\hat{w}$ , as calculated from the observed data and the exponential distribution, exceeds the  $100(1 - \alpha)$ th percentile of the  $\chi^2$  distribution. Conversely, if  $\hat{w} < \chi^2_{.05}$ , then the hypothesis that the distribution is exponential will be accepted.

Since the two estimates  $\hat{k}_1$  and  $\hat{k}_2$  yield two different statistical situations, the respective degrees of freedom were established as follows. In the first case, data were sorted into six intervals, and

<sup>10</sup>For the former estimate the set of durations was sorted into six intervals  $a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots, a_6$ , the range of each chosen so as to contain at least six observations.

<sup>11</sup>As is discussed below, this does not imply that other models are *ipso facto* excluded (Elandt-Johnson, 1980, p. 220); it simply means that the exponential model is acceptable. See footnote 24.

one parameter was estimated. Hence,  $df(\hat{k}_1) = 6 - 1 - 1 = 4$ . In the second case, following Mann et al. (1974, p. 351),  $df(\hat{k}_2) = 4 + \delta$ , and  $0 < \delta < 1$ . Hence,  $4 < df(\hat{k}_2) < 5$ .

#### **Findings**

Results from both graphic analyses are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.12 Figure 1 shows the durations versus Nelson's statistic, whereas Figure 2 shows the Gross-Clark statistic versus the durations. In both plots a line passing through the origin and the central portion of the distribution gives an approximate fit. (This "visual fit" is comparable to standard examples of visual acceptability reported in Gross and Clark (1975, pp. 83-84) and Nelson (1972).) Therefore both graphic tests provide a basis for proceeding with the statistical test of the exponential model.

The central empirical findings of this study are reported in Tables 1 and 2 and in Figure 3. Table 1 reports the two estimates of k. The first,  $\hat{k}_1$ , obtains from interval data, as described in the previous section. The second,  $\hat{k}_2$ , obtains from raw frequencies. Both are valid MLEs of k, and they are expressed in wk<sup>-1</sup> units.

Both estimates were substituted into equation (8) to obtain predicted, theoretical values  $E_i$  of R(t). The results are illustrated in Table 2, which contains both observed and theoretical values of political reliability. Figure 3 shows the two estimated political reliability curves and the empirical durations. For both curves the fit is good.


The results of the goodness-of-fit test are summarized in Table 3. Since for both estimates  $\hat{w} < \chi^2_{.95}$ , the hypothesis that R(t) is an exponential reliability function is not rejected, and the model is therefore supported by the findings.

For practical purposes, a single value of the government downfall rate can be obtained from the two estimates of k. Viewing the two estimates as if each were an independent measurement of k, a single value can be obtained as  $k \cong \vec{k} = \frac{1}{2}(\hat{k}_1 + \hat{k}_2) = .021 \ 107 \ wk^{-1} \cong .021 \ wk^{-1}$ . All subsequent discussion will use this single value of k

In sum, both graphic analyses and both statistical analyses of the observed durations of Italian governments support the exponential model of their political reliability. The residual of fit is not significant at the .05 level, which is the customary level of acceptance for this type of analysis.

<sup>12</sup>Basic and derived data used for both graphic analyses are available from the author.

Figure 1. Nelson's Cumulative Hazard Plot for Italian Government Durations



Source: Computer-drawn by the author.

Figure 2. Gross-Clark Statistic Plot for Italian Government Durations





Figure 3. Exponential Political Reliability of Italian Governments



Source: Computer-drawn by the author.

Key: ◊= observations.

Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates (MLE) of the Downfall Rate k of Italian Governments, 1945-1980

Data Base	$\hat{k}$ (wks <sup>-1</sup> )
Interval data $(\hat{k_1})$ Raw frequencies $(\hat{k_2})$	0.019 231
Raw frequencies (k <sub>2</sub> )	0.022 983

Source: Compiled by the author.

Table 2. Observed and (MLE) Predicted Political Reliability of Italian Governments (1945-1980), Using an Exponential Model  $R(t) = e^{-kt}$ 

		Political Reliability $R(t)$	
Duration	Observed	Predicted <sup>a</sup>	
(wks)		$\hat{k_1} = .019$	$\hat{k_2} = .023$
0- 12	0.871795	0.793923	0.758966
12- 24	0.692308	0.630313	0.576029
24- 40	0.435897	0.463369	0.398787
40- 58 0.307692		0.327789	0.263678
58- 77	0.179487	0.227463	0.170383
77-200	0.000000	0.021362	0.010086
		Normalized Values of Rb	
0- 12	.35	.32	.35
12- 24	.28	.26	.26
24- 40	.18	.19	.18
40- 58	.12	.13	.12
58- 77	.07	.09	.08
77-200	.00	.01	.00

Source: Compiled by the author.

Table 3. Goodness of Fit Between Observed and Exponential Political Reliability of Italian Governments, 1945-1980

MLE	ŵ	df	$\chi^{2}_{.95}$
$\hat{k_1}$	3.539 401	4	9.487 73
$\hat{k_2}$	4.054 256	4 < df < 5	11.070 50

Source: Compiled by the author.

#### Discussion

The exponential reliability model of Italian governments has a number of interesting properties, consequences, and deductions. The first two parts of the following discussion focus on several important measures and properties characteristic of exponential political reliability. The third part discusses a theoretical support structure and a political mechanism governing the downfall process. Several remarks pertinent to stochastic models, the political reliability approach, and their contrast with deterministic models of political behavior are discussed in the fourth part. Finally, some aspects of further research are outlined. It should be stressed that the present discussion provides a theoretical analysis of an empirically supported model. Having built the theory from first assumptions and developed an empirically grounded model, a theoretical analysis is now presented, thereby providing further deductions.

Aside from the preceding empirical tests, analysis of the theory is interesting because it demonstrates aspects of the Italian government process which are not apparent from plain observation. However, it must be stressed that the exponential model of political reliability is an approximation useful for describing the aggregate, statistical behavior of the set of governments. One cannot expect to derive from this, nor from any other model, exactly when a specific government will fall. Such a prediction is impossible to make, given the indeterminate nature of government lifetime. Nonetheless, as will be shown, a remarkably large number of features and information about Italian governments and their collapse can still be learned from this exponential theory of their political reliability.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Units of  $\hat{k}$  are in wk<sup>-1</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>b</sup>I am grateful to M. Midlarsky for suggesting the inclusion of normalized values of R in this table. Values were normalized by multiplying each by the reciprocal of the sum of each respective column. These normalized values should not be confused with the political lifetime density  $ke^{-kt}$ .

#### **Characteristic Survival Times**

Several indices related to the form of the exponential model are useful for a better understanding of Italian government reliability. These will be called "mean time to downfall," "median time to downfall," and "government half-life," denoted by  $\bar{t}$ ,  $\bar{t}$  and  $\tau$ , respectively, as shown in Figure 4. To last for as long as each of these characteristic survival times is an important landmark for the duration of governments, as well as for the deterioration of their political reliability.

#### Median and Mean Lifetimes

The survival time, time-to-downfall, or lifetime of Italian governments can be described by both the mean and the median of the observed durations  $t_i$ . Accordingly,  $\bar{t} = 47.619 \text{ wk} = .913 \text{ yr}$ ,  $\bar{t} = 30.000 \text{ wk} = .575 \text{ yr.}^{13}$  These quantities can be called "mean-time-to-downfall" and "median-time-to-downfall," respectively.

That  $\tilde{t} \gg \tilde{t}$  is not entirely surprising, owing to the three long-term surviving governments of Segni, De Gasperi VII, and Moro III, lasting 97, 101, and 119 wk, respectively; this implies that  $\tilde{t}$  is not as good an estimate of the central tendency of lifetime as is the case for normal distributions. In fact,  $\tilde{t}$  is closer to the point in time when R=.5, because the distribution is exponential. However, in the interest of clarity, the discussion will use  $\tilde{t}$ . (See Figure 4 for the comparative location of these estimates of government lifetime.)

The survival time of Italian governments is relevant both on its own terms, as well as in relation to other measures and functions characteristic of the exponential survival model. For example, Maki and Thompson (1973, p. 325) have shown that

$$\hat{t} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} [\exp(-kt_j)] \cdot [t_j - t_{j-1}],$$
 (9)

the  $t_j$  having been ordered increasing size. Now, from equation (9), it follows that

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} t = \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-kt} dt = 1/k.$$

Hence, 1/k is a reasonable approximation of  $\overline{i}$ , the mean-time-to-downfall for Italian governments with downfall constant k.

<sup>13</sup>Gross and Clark (1975, pp. 41-48) discuss special procedures for estimating  $\tilde{t}$  and  $\tilde{t}$ , including the Kaplan-Meier (1958) product-limit approach. However, for the present purpose the standard estimates are sufficient.

In addition, an important result from the exponential model of political reliability is that the probability R(t) of governments surviving up to the mean lifetime  $\tilde{t}$  is *not* .50, as in a normal distribution model, but only about .37. More generally,

**Theorem 1. Hyporeliability.** In political systems with breakdown, durability or survival governed by an exponential law of the form  $R(t) = e^{-kt}$ , the political reliability R(t) of the system at average duration  $\bar{t}$ , or at average lifetime, is always 0.368, or less than 0.500. Formally, if  $R(t) = e^{-kt}$ , then  $R(\bar{t}) = .368 < .5$  always.

[Proof: Let 
$$R(t) = e^{-kt}$$
. Then  $R(\bar{t}) = e^{-\hat{k}\bar{t}} = \exp[-(1/\hat{t}) \cdot (\hat{t})] = 1/e = .368 < .5$ . Q.E.D.]

In the specific case of Italian governments, from observation  $\tilde{t}=47.619$  wk, but nonetheless  $R(\tilde{t})=.368$ . In other words, by the time an Italian government gets to be as old as the average government, its political reliability has already dropped to less than half, or about 37%. This less-than-50% level in political reliability at the average time-to-downfall means that the average Italian government is hyporeliable when it falls, or that Italian governments are already hyporeliable at their average age. Theorem 1 in fact guarantees that all governments having exponential reliability are politically hyporeliable.

By extension, political reliability at time  $t = 2\overline{t}$ , or the probability of surviving for twice as long as the average, is only .159. In general, political reliability to a time  $t = m\overline{t}$  (m = 1, 2, 3, ...) is


$$R(m\tilde{t}) = \exp(-\tilde{t}m) = (.401)^m.$$
 (10)

Equation (10) is the formula for the probability of a government surviving m times as long as the average government. Clearly, as m grows, R(mt) quickly approaches zero.

With respect to the median survival time, the situation is different. In this case,  $R(\tilde{t}) = .533$ , and therefore the probability of governments surviving up to the median time  $\tilde{t}$  is slightly better than 50%.

Finally, suppose an interval of time l passes by before a new cabinet assumes power after one has fallen. A measure of the availability of government A in the political system can be defined as  $A = \overline{l}/(\overline{l} + l)$ . Suppose l = 2 wk as a reasonable estimate. Then A = .959 for the Italian system, or about 96%. For the sake of rough comparison, consider the American system with a new government starting every 4 yr, or  $\overline{l} + l = 4$  yr = 208.57 wk. Here l = 2.68 wk, since 10.71 wk are lost every four years between election day (4 November) and Inauguration Day (20 January); hence, A = .987, or less than a 3% difference with respect

Figure 4. Characteristic Survival Times of Italian Governments



Source: Drawn by the author.

to the Italian system. This result disproves the popular belief ascribing to Italian governments a very low availability.

#### Government Half-Life

Important properties of exponential political reliability also follow from a study of its half-life, defined as follows.

**Definition 3.** The *half-life* of a government is the length of time  $\tau$  at which its political reliability, or probability of staying in power, is .50. Formally,  $\tau$ 

 $\epsilon$  T such that R(t) = .50 and  $R(t > \tau) < .50$ . From equation (8), solving first for t, letting R = .50, and simplifying the result, it follows that

$$\tau = (\ln 2)/k,\tag{11}$$

or, in the Italian case,  $\tau = 33.007$  wk  $\approx 33$  wk. Hence, after approximately 33 wk, the political reliability of Italian governments is worse than 2 in 1. Anytime thereafter their political reliability drops below .50 (at a rate to be analyzed below).

Note that this is a different property from that which is derived for the mean lifetime  $\tilde{t}_{r}$  and  $\tau$ 

Table 4. Half-life  $\tau$  of Italian Governments, 1945-1980

τ	Weeks	R( au)	Frequency
1	33.01	.5000	21
2	66.01	.250	8
3	99.02	.125	8
4	132.03	.063	2

Source: Compiled by author.

arrives well ahead (10 wk) of  $\bar{t}$ , and as a result,  $\bar{t}$  can be a poor estimate of government reliability. In particular,  $\tau$  has a "dynamic probability" dimension that the other survival times lack.

From a statistical perspective,  $\tau$  refers to the time during which, on the average, one half of a given sample of governments will have fallen and one half will have not. ("Statistical" here means associated with large numbers, as the term is used in probability theory.) Note that  $\bar{t}$  does not have this property (Maki & Thompson, 1973, p. 324). In addition, two significant aspects of  $\tau$  should be noted. First, like k, the value of  $\tau$  is also a unique constant of Italian governments; as argued below, other political systems probably have a different value of  $\tau$ , to be determined empirically. Second, by knowing either k or  $\tau$  the other can be computed (equation 11).

It is possible to transform the observed durations  $t_i$  from weeks into units multiple of  $\tau$ . The result is a reinterpretation of the government survival process in terms of half-lives, as in Table 4 and Figure 4. Using 33 wk as a practical estimate of  $\tau$ , this means that every 33 wk the political reliability of an Italian government drops by half of what it was. From Table 4 it can be seen that slightly over half the governments (or 21) have fallen within one half-life of duration. Of the remaining, 41% have survived up to  $3\tau$ , but only two governments (De Gasperi VII and Moro III) ever lasted more than  $3\tau$ . None has ever reached  $4\tau$ .

Because of its theoretical basis,  $\tau$  is a useful characteristic for the classification and study of past governments. In this sense, the half-life characteristic is more meaningful than either of the two previous measures. In particular,  $\tau$  is characteristic of exponential political reliability.<sup>14</sup>

In spite of the general nature of this theory, something can be said about specific govern-

<sup>14</sup>A table of characteristic survival times for Italian governments ( $k = .021 \text{ wk}^{-1}$ ) is available from the author upon request. It can be used to evaluate the political reliability characteristics of governments at their specific downfall time.

ments. For example, Italy's fortieth government, Forlani's quadripartite coalition (Dc-Psi-Pri-Psdi), fell on 26 May 1981. (The "cause" of its downfall, the so-called P2 scandal, is probably an excellent example of indeterminacy and evidence of the stochastic nature of government lifetime!) Having been formed on 18 November 1980, Forlani's government would have reached one half-life in the week of 1 June 1981, at which time R = .50. It therefore fell one week earlier than its half-life, at R(T = 32) = .511, having survived until  $.969\tau$ , or approximately one half-life. 15

#### **Characteristic Survival Functions**

In addition to the preceding statistics of survival time, there are also five complementary theoretical aspects, or characteristic functions, of exponential political reliability.16 These characteristic functions, of which political reliability R(t)is the first, are the following: political reliability "lifetime density" L(t), political mortality M(t), downfall rate D(t), and its cumulative C(t). Both M(t) and D(t) were already briefly mentioned visà-vis model-building; L(t) and C(t) are now introduced. Any one of the five characteristic survival functions uniquely defines the exponential model of political reliability, and all five are consistent with each other. However, each should be considered separately, since each in its own way provides a unique and different view of the model. Table 5 illustrates these five functions. Finally, several important remarks on the systems reliability of Italian governments are also made with a view toward expanding the theory.

<sup>13</sup>The recent Spadolini government, inaugurated the third week of July 1981, reached its half-life the week of 31 March 1982, after which its political reliability dropped below 50%. It could, of course, have fallen earlier.

<sup>16</sup>Excellent technical discussions include Elandt-Johnson & Johnson (1980), Gross & Clark (1975), Meyer (1970), Kaufman, Grouchko & Cruon (1977), and Mann et al. (1974).

### Political Reliability R(t) and Lifetime Density L(t)

The basic political reliability function  $R(t) = e^{-kt}$  has already been defined (see Definition 1). Together with the lifetime density function L(t), the two have significant theoretical importance and are now analyzed.

R(t) decreases as time passes and tends to zero, passing by  $\tilde{t}$ ,  $\tau$ ,  $\tilde{t}$ , ..., as  $t \to \infty$ . Without proof (see, e.g., Thomas, 1968, p. 248), it will be recalled that (a) the exponential function is its own derivative, and (b) it is the only function with property (a).

Property (a) implies that R(t) can also be expressed in differential form

$$\dot{R}(t) = -kR, 
\dot{R} + kR = 0,$$
(12)

where *k* is the government downfall constant.<sup>17</sup> In other words, the government's rate of deterioration at time *t* is proportional to the political reliability it has at that time. Put differently, Italian governments lose political reliability at a rate proportional to the political reliability they have: the more the faster, the less the slower. Their political reliability erodes at a decreasingly rapid rate.

Property (b) practically guarantees that any other model of the political reliability of Italian governments *must* be more complex than equation (8). In particular, it guarantees that dR/dt, the rate at which their political reliability deteri-

<sup>17</sup>Technically, equation 12 is a first-order stochastic differential equation.

Table 5. Characteristic Functions of the Exponential Model of Political Reliability for Italian Governments

Function	Equations	f(R)	Graph
1. Political reliability	$R(t) = e^{-kt}$	R	R(t) 1 0 t
			M(t)
2. Political mortality	$M(t) = 1 - e^{-kt}$	1 – R	
			k <sup>L</sup>
3. Lifetime density	$L(t) = ke^{-kt}$	$-\dot{R}$	o t
			k D
4. Downfall rate	D(t) = k	$-\dot{R}/R$	0 t
			C 1
5. Cumulative breakdown	C(t) = kt	1n R	0 τ t

Source: Compiled by the author.

orates, will be more complex than just -kR.

Associated to R(t) is a second characteristic function.

**Definition 4.** The political reliability lifetime density L(t) is the rate at which governments lose their political reliability (or the rate at which their political mortality M rises; see Table 5). Formally,

$$L(t) = -\dot{R}(t) = ke^{-kt} = kR.$$
 (13)

The lifetime density describes the peak period of governments falling. Since R(t) can also be interpreted as the propensity to stay in power, L(t) also describes the rate at which such a propensity declines. In this case,  $k \ll 1.0$ , and therefore, even when t is small, L(t) is small. By  $t = \tau$ ,  $L(\tau) \approx .01$ , and since  $L(0) \ll R(0)$ ,  $L(t) \ll R(t)$  so both L and R approach zero at t increases. In sum, L starts out very low, and it decreases very slowly. From equation (13) note that L/R = k for the entire duration in power.

It will be recalled that R(t) describes the probability of a cabinet surviving in power until time t. L(t) views the process somewhat differently. Note that, from definition 4,  $R(t) = \int_0^t L(u) \ du$ . Hence,  $L(u) \ du$  is the a priori probability that the government will fall in the interval (t, t + du]. This result will be compared with a similar one below.

#### Political Mortality M(t)

The third characteristic survival function of theoretical importance is the political mortality function M(t) (see Table 5).

**Definition 5.** The political mortality M(t) of a government is the compliment of its political reliability, or the probability that it will fall in the interval (0, t]. Formally,

$$M(t) = 1 - R(t) = \Phi(t)$$
 (14)  
= 1 -  $e^{kt}$ 

Note that, as  $R(t) \to 0$ ,  $M(t) \to 1$ , or equivalently, as  $t \to \infty$ ,  $M(t) \to 1$ .

Three aspects of M(t) in relation to R(t) are worth noting. First, just as R(t) drops by half every  $\tau = 33$  wk, political mortality obeys the complementary law: every  $\tau$  it grows by half the previous level. Hence,  $M(\tau) = .50$ ,  $M(2\tau) = .75$ ,  $M(3\tau) = .88$ , ... and, in general,  $M(m\tau) = 1 - R(m\tau) = 1 - (.5)^m = 1 - \frac{1}{2}m$ , where  $m = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$ 

Second, since 
$$\int_{0}^{t} R(t) dt = \int_{0}^{t} e^{-kt} dt = 1 - e^{-kt}$$

= M(t), political mortality has the geometrical

property of being equal to the area under the political reliability curve (see Figures 3 and 4).

Third, from equation (14),  $\dot{M}(t) = kR(t)$ , and therefore the political mortality of a government increases at a rate proportional to its reliability. Since the latter drops for large t, it also follows that M(t) increases mostly during the first weeks of being in power.

## Government Downfall Fate D(t) and Its Cumulative C(t)

In this model of Italian government longevity, D(t) refers to the propensity of governments to fall, or the "political stress" on them, or the "forces of downfall" acting on governments. <sup>18</sup> As noted earlier, D(t) uniquely determines the  $pdf \ f(t)$  of T, and it can have various forms. When D(t) = k, then  $R(t) = e^{-kt}$ . This has been supported by observation, with  $k = .021 \pm .002$  wk<sup>-1</sup>.

The significance of D(t) stems from this powerful substantive interpretation. Specifically, a constant downfall rate means that Italian governments do not age; they do not suffer political wear, or the wear they suffer is empirically trivial. This seemingly unnatural aspect can be explained as follows by the theory of political reliability.

Consider for  $\Delta t > 0$  the probability  $P(\cdot)$  of downfall during the next  $\Delta t$  weeks, given that the government has not fallen by time t. From the definition of conditional probability,

$$P(t \le T \le t + \Delta t \mid T > t)$$

$$= [e^{-kt} - e^{-k(t+\Delta t)}]/e^{-kt}$$

$$= 1 - e^{-k\Delta t}.$$
(15)

But note that equation (15) does not contain t, and therefore  $P(\cdot)$  is independent of t (see also Parzen, 1960, p. 262). Substantively, this result means that the probability of a government falling is independent of its past history. Hence, unnatural as it might seem, so long as an Italian government is in power, it is as good as new (or buono come nuovo). This is yet another aspect of the political stability of Italian government systems.

Finally, the cumulative downfall rate is defined as follows.

"In other empirical applications (see Bartholomew, 1973; Kaufmann et al., 1977; Mann et al., 1974) the function defined by equations (3) and (4) has also been called "hazard function," "hazard rate," "force of mortality," "mortality rate," "exit force," "breakdown rate," etc.

**Definition 6.** The cumulative downfall rate C(t) of a government is the accumulated propensity to fall as a function of time, or the build-up of political stress on it. Formally,

$$C(t) = \int_{0}^{t} D(u) du = kt.$$
 (16)

Since for Italian governments  $k \approx .021$ , clearly C(t) is a very slowly rising linear function of time.<sup>19</sup> C is also a pure number, without dimensions, since  $[C(t)] = [T^{-1}] \cdot [T]$ .

It will be recalled that an important relationship exists between  $\tau$  and R(t). In particular,  $R(\tau)$  = .50. An equally interesting relation exists this time between  $\bar{t}$  and C(t). In fact, from equation (16), C(t) = kt, but t = 1/k. Hence, C(t) = 1.0 exactly, which means that every mean survival time, C(t) charges up exactly by one unit. As a result, the average Italian government falls having accumulated, or built up, exactly one unit of political stress. However, such an accumulation does not cause the government to fall, since from equation (15) it turns out that Italian governments suffer no wear. Italian governments, in a sense, then seem to topple intact, a view supported also by the fact that the turnover of cabinet ministers and sottosegretari is effectively very small. The small turnover of ministerial posts, from one government to the next, is indeed consistent with the lack of political wear.

#### Support and Collapse of Italian Governments

Several other aspects of the political reliability of Italian governments can be investigated with the exponential model; among these, the support system and the mechanism triggering their collapse assume particular importance. Both aspects shed light on the reliability of the Italian political system as a whole, although the emphasis here is on the political reliability of the government process.

#### Systems Reliability of Governments

The exponential model is also consistent with the following two hypotheses about the political support system that maintains Italian governments in power: (a) the government is supported by a number of key, pivotal actors in the sense of

"In other empirical applications this function is also known as the "log-survival" function, since  $\int_0^t Ddu = -\ln R(t)$ . Kaufmann et al. (1977) also define a "hazard rate average," but this is not used here.

Riker (1962);<sup>20</sup> and (b) the political reliability of the jth pivotal actor, denoted by  $r_j(t)$ , or the probability that it will support the government at time t, is also exponential.

To prove that both of these hypotheses about the intragovernmental, or systems reliability of Italian cabinets are consistent with the model, consider the following argument (Cioffi-Revilla, 1983b). First, from (a),  $R(t) = r_1(t) \cdot r_2(t) \cdot r_3(t)$ 

$$\dots r_r(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{\nu} r_i(t). \text{ Second, from (b), } r_i(t) =$$

 $e^{-x}i^{t}$ . Substituting this last expression into the

first, 
$$R(t) = \exp(-\sum_{j=1}^{\nu} x_j t)$$
. Letting  $k = \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} x_j$ ,

it then follows that  $R(t) = e^{-kt}$ , which is equation (8).

At least two aspects of the systems reliability of Italian governments should be mentioned. First, when k is small, the various defection rates  $\kappa_j$  of the individual pivotal supporters must be even smaller. This is particularly true as  $\nu$  increases.

Second, it has been shown (Cioffi-Revilla, 1983a) that a drop in the political reliability of any one pivotal actor induces an amplified, more-than-proportional drop in the systems reliability of the government as a whole. This phenomenon, known as the hyper-weakening effect, can be seen in the following example. Let r = 4, and  $r_1 = r_2 = r_3 = r_4 = .99$ . Then  $R = (.99)^4 = .96$ . But suppose the reliability of, say, the third actor drops to  $r'_3 = .95$ , or by just 4%. Now, R' = .92, which is a systems drop of 8%, or twice as much!

#### The Poisson Crisis Process

That the political reliability of Italian governments obeys an exponential law is an important clue for explaining the triggering mechanism that might cause them to fall. Such a mechanism can be a Poisson process, occurring under the following conditions:<sup>21</sup> there are many opportunities (weeks) during which governments can fall; there

<sup>20</sup>These coalition members can be either parties (e.g., PRI, PSI, PLI) or intraparty groups (e.g., fanfaniani, "Iniziativa Socialista," dorotei).

<sup>21</sup>Feller (1957, p. 156) remarks that "there exist a few distributions of great universality which occur in a surprisingly great variety of problems. The three principal distributions, with ramifications throughout probability theory, are the binomial distribution, the normal distribution, and the Poisson distribution." (See also Midarski, 1981.) Numerous standard references (e.g., Feller, 1957; Parzen, 1960; Thomas, 1968) provide the mathematical derivation of the Poisson distribution.

is a very small probability that a government will fall on any given week; and from one week to the next the chances that the government will fall remain the same.

It can be shown (e.g., Thomas, 1968, pp. 706-709) that, from these three assumptions, the number  $\gamma$  of governments falling in the interval (0, t] obeys the general Poisson probability law  $P_{\gamma}(kt) = p\{\gamma \text{ governments fall in } (0, t]\} = p(\gamma; kt) = e^{-kt}[(kt)^{\gamma}/\gamma!]$ . Now, for the special case of no government falling  $(\gamma = 0)$  during (0, t],  $P_{0}(kt) = p(0; kt) = e^{-kt} = R(t)$ . The exponential distribution is therefore the zero-term distribution of the general Poisson distribution.

In sum, from these three conditions a Poisson distribution obtains, and from it follows the exponential distribution of government durations  $t_i$ . Since the exponential distribution fits the observed survival times, the assumptions are empirically supported, so the probability of an Italian cabinet crisis in any given week is small, constant, and independent of any other week. This model of *crisi di governo* is therefore in full agreement with the idea that Italian governments are subject to random political shocks and crises, having numerous manifestations, such as scandals, parliamentary defeats, pivotal defections, and other occurrences. These, in turn, probably come from the characteristics of the Italian political system as a whole.

# Ontology and Models of Italian Government Durability

In political science, the concepts of cause, randomness, determinism, and related ideas are often surrounded by confusion. Although these ontological categories cannot be discussed here (see Bronowski, 1978; Sutherland, 1973), two clarifications are in order.

#### Randomness and Italian Governments

The key dependent variable in this model is the duration T of governments in power, and two approaches exist to describe its causes: deterministic and stochastic. The former views T as dependent upon a small, identifiable, and determinate number of factors (i.e., conditions which cause T if and only if they arise), and the essential task is to determine a function  $T(x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots)$  making T entirely determined and exactly predictable from independent variables  $x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots$  <sup>22</sup> However,

<sup>22</sup>Viz. Hurwitz (1972), de Swaan (1973), Laver (1974), or Warwick (1979, p. 478).

as Warwick (1979, p. 482) points out, "one could find numerous other factors; . . . any of [which] might be the true cause."

In the stochastic situation two cases exist: either T is totally haphazard or chaotic (trivial case) or analysis of the set of durations can yield a probability law governing T. In the former case nothing else can be said about the duration of Italian governments, since chaos has no form or pattern to it, and the matter remains outside the realm of scientific investigation. But in the latter case (political reliability theory) T is seen as caused by a large number of factors, each contributing differently in every observation of T.

The causes of government downfall in the Italian political system have been numerous, varied, and essentially unpredictable. Ferruccio Parri's government fell as a result of a DC-PLI withdrawal of support; De Gasperi I fell when the results from the election just held became known: De Gasperi II fell because of the Saragat-Matteotti socialist scission; De Gasperi III fell when De Gasperi resigned after numerous attacks from the socialist press; De Gasperi IV fell after the crucial election of 1948. Three governments later, De Gasperi VII fell when it lost the confidence of Parliament; Pella fell because the DC political secretariat withdrew its support; Fanfani I fell because the DC did not trust him; Scelba fell when the PRI withdrew pivotal support; Segni I fell when the PSDI withdrew its support anticipating electoral gains; like De Gasperi III, Andreotti III resigned because of criticism. These unpredictable characteristics of the downfall process in a multitude of governments are at the basis of the stochastic approach. Factors such as elite memory and renewal (Cotta, 1981) play a role in that the same (constant) rate of government breakdown carries over from one government to the next. But it is important to note that the model proposed here is synchronic or stationary; i.e., it does not deform or evolve through recent decades. Such a time-varying model, however, can be built in subsequent research from principles developed here.

The stochastic approach of political reliability theory recognizes the variety and complexity of the causes of downfall, but rather than trying to establish them in an exact way (which seems impossible!), it constructs a stochastic model of the set of observed durations. The difference between this approach and a nonstochastic treatment is that this approach takes an indeterminate view of the process of duration in power, whereas other treatments take a deterministic view. Both approaches consider causes, but the political reliability approach views these as probabilistic rather than deterministic.

#### Randomness and Political Reliability

Thus far, most analyses using stochastic models in political science have used them primarily as descriptors of observed data (Cioffi-Revilla, 1979; Zinnes, 1976).<sup>23</sup> By drawing more extensively upon both the assumptions and deductions associated to various stochastic models (e.g., exponential, Weibull, and Rayleigh), the political reliability approach makes greater theoretical use of stochastic models.

Theoretical and substantive parsimony, as well as empirical correspondence, are important criteria for using these models. In this study assumptions were made concerning the behavior of *T*; from such assumptions a model was developed. A crucial and observable deduction of the model was then derived and empirically tested. The test succeeded, and additional properties of the model were then investigated in order to gain insights on the duration of Italian governments. What is the ontological status of such insights?

The logic of sociopolitical modeling is well explained elsewhere. Following Zinnes (1976), it can be argued that, having found agreement between the function  $R(t) = e^{-kt}$  and the set of observed durations, it cannot logically be argued that the assumption D(t) = k is in fact a true statement about the way Italian governments fall. However, it can be argued that the exponential reliability model is a good explanation of the duration of Italian governments, because it led to a deduction which was supported by data. "Until a more parsimonious or more powerful set of assumptions is found to explain [the] observed f(x), we can argue that we are content with the explanation provided" (Zinnes, 1976, p. 252).

In sum, the political reliability approach demonstrates that 1) not all models of empirical behavior need be deterministic in order to say something interesting about political nature; 2) stochastic models are not haphazard descriptions; 3) deterministic models are not the only vehicles for saying something concrete, empirical, and testable about significant political phenomenon.

#### **Further Research**

Several distinctive features of the political reliability approach suggest a number of directions for further research, most of which can be pursued either separately or in combination. To

<sup>23</sup>Midlarski (1981) presents an excellent overview of this research.

<sup>24</sup>See Zinnes (1976, pp. 252-253), Bartholomew (1973), Maki & Thompson (1973, pp. 1-23), Lave & March (1975, pp. 1-84).

begin, political assumptions different from those used here may yield other useful stochastic models of Italian government reliability. For example, the exponential model is a good starting point for investigating models with variable, rather than constant, political downfall rates. However, parsimony should be kept in mind because in this type of model complexity increases quickly as realism is added. Moreover, estimation methods are not always easily available for models having more than moderate complexity, although methods other than maximum likelihood can be used and compared (Gehan & Siddiqui, 1973; Menon, 1963).

Among the set of more complex models which could be investigated, time-varying, non-stationary models of Italian government reliability might prove particularly interesting. As the number of observations increases in the future, reanalysis of government lifetime data might demonstrate significant structural transformations, such as argued recently by Pridham (1981) and Tarrow (1980). Systems transformations might correlate with widely recognized periods, such as *l'apertura a sinistra*, *il centrismo*, or *il dopoguerra*; or analysis might open the way to a reinterpretation of how the Italian system evolved to its present state of "provisional that lasts" (Hughes, 1979).

Beyond the Italian system, this approach lends itself to replication, extension, and comparison in other political systems. Probably no two political systems have the same downfall constant k, so kmight be a unique, idiographic quality of governments, particularly since it results from the combined defection rates of many different pivotal supporters. What will the range of variation be between the highest and lowest empirical values of k within the same class of political systems? Do all political systems in such a class obey the same characteristic survival law? Are parameters the only differences, or are other laws also observable in this part of the political universe? Can political systems be re-classified according to the characteristic form and parameter(s) of their respective reliability functions? Would such future taxonomies conform to standing accepted theories?

Finally, given the overlap between democratic systems and cabinet governments, what can this approach contribute to democratic theory? Is there a relationship between types of political reliability models and democratic regimes? Are democratic transitions accompanied by transformation of the political reliability model of the systems? If so, how can successful democratic transitions be described, or maybe predicted, using such model transformations? These and other problems might benefit from application of political reliability theory.

#### Conclusions

On the basis of this study, we can conclude that previous research on cabinet durability in parliamentary democracies has favored a deterministic approach. Although such an approach might be justified for many other political systems, in the case of Italian governments their history seems to indicate that the causes of downfall are quite indeterminate.

The theory of political reliability (Cioffi-Revilla, 1983b) is able to model political indeterminacy, and in this article an exponential model of Italian government reliability (durability) is proposed. The model, which provides a good fit of the observed durations, has exponential form  $R = e^{-kt}$ , with government downfall constant  $k \cong .021$  per week.

From this model, the following implications obtain:

- 1. The political half-life of Italian governments is approximately 33 weeks. This is the length of time after which their political reliability (defined as their probability of staying in power) drops below 50%. (The recent Forlani government fell 3% short of this time, one week too soon.) Their average duration is 43.5 weeks.
- 2. The probability of an Italian government surviving as long as the average is not 50%, but only 36.8% (hyporeliability).
- 3. The political reliability of Italian governments declines at a decreasingly rapid rate.
- 4. The peak period of Italian governments falling is just after they are formed, but this is only slightly higher than at any time thereafter.
- 5. Unnatural as it might seem, Italian cabinet governments do not age, and they do not suffer political wear; so long as they are in power they are as good as new.
- 6. The average government falls when it has accumulated exactly one unit of political stress.
- 7. This model is consistent with a multi-actor, pivotal support system sustaining Italian governments, the political reliability of which can also be analyzed using this approach.
- 8. A drop in the political reliability of any one single pivotal supporter induces a more-than-proportional drop (hyper-weakening effect) in the political reliability of the entire government.
- 9. Pivotal actors in Italian governments must have a much lower rate of defection than the downfall rate of the government as a whole.
- 10. Overall, the probability of an Italian government falling in any given week is small, constant, and independent of any other week.

The political reliability approach can be extended to more complex models, other systems, and different political processes, thereby supplementing deterministic analyses. It is hoped that

the political reliability approach will thereby prove helpful in advancing our understanding of political systems.

#### Appendix: List of Symbols

durability or lifetime of government f(t)probability density function (pdf) of T  $\Phi(t)$ cumulative density function (cdf) of T political reliability R(t)probability D(t)government downfall rate base of natural (Napierian) logarithms e k government downfall constant number of Italian governments average government duration first estimate of k second estimate of k asymptotic  $\chi^2$  $O_i$ ith observation  $E_i$ ith expected value first estimated parameter  $\Theta_1$  $\Theta_2$ second estimated parameter MLE maximum likelihood estimate  $\frac{k}{\tilde{t}}$ mean of estimated k median government duration half-life of government duration τ number of time intervals m A availability of government 1 duration of government crisis L(t)political reliability lifetime density M(t) political mortality cumulative downfall rate C(t) $\Delta t$ interval of time political reliability of the ith pivotal actor  $r_i(t)$ breakdown (defection) constant of the ith  $x_i$ 

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reverse rank of the durations  $t_i$ 

number of pivotal actors supporting the

pivotal actor

government

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### Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record

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Reagan's view of how to deal with the Soviet Union is compared to the U.S. performance record in three Soviet-American crises: Berlin, 1948-1949, Berlin, 1961, and Cuba, 1962. Reagan's public statements indicate that he views the Soviets as incorrigibly hostile, so that conflict bargaining with the Soviets is a zero-sum game requiring a coercive U.S. bargaining strategy. This is characterized as a "bullying" strategy and contrasted with a "reciprocating" approach. The two approaches provide competing hypotheses for an examination of Soviet responses to U.S. influence attempts. The study tests the association between types of U.S. influence attempts and initial Soviet reactions and then proceeds to an interrupted time series analysis of the longer effects of U.S. threats of force on the mix of coercion-accommodation in Soviet crisis bargaining. The author finds a positive association between specific U.S. threats of force and initial Soviet responses in kind, and between carrot-andstick inducements that use less specific threats and more accommodative Soviet responses. With the exception of the Cuban crisis, U.S. threats of force have not been associated with significant extended shifts in the level of Soviet hostility. The article concludes that, on balance, the performance record of the United States is more supportive of the efficacy of a reciprocating strategy than the coercive bargaining strategy implied by Reagan's beliefs.

Ronald Reagan has changed the American approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. Behind the change lie the president's beliefs regarding the nature of Soviet foreign policy and, more particularly, how to deal with the Soviets in future disputes. Should we find ourselves in another crisis with the Soviet Union, the validity of those beliefs could determine whether or not we are faced with a nuclear war.

Although it is not possible to test conclusively the validity of Reagan's beliefs short of such a confrontation, we can reach tentative judgments by examining those beliefs against the performance record of American bargaining during the three major Soviet-American crises since World War II: the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961, and the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962.

Recent studies (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Leng, 1980) suggest a positive relationship between the risk acceptance of national leaders and the likelihood that crises involving their states lead to war. Several factors can account for variations in risk-taking, but, as Ellsberg (1968) has argued, a policymaker's estimate of the other party's intentions is likely to be a critical ingredient. The higher the perception of aggressive intentions, the greater the critical risk he is likely to accept to discourage attempts at coercion (see also Kaplowitz, 1982, pp. 8-9; Snyder & Diesing, 1977, pp. 298-300). Thus Reagan's beliefs regarding the Soviet leadership's intentions are likely to influence the risks that he will accept in a confrontation with the Soviets.

#### Reagan's Belief System

A widely used approach to analyzing the relationship between beliefs and actions in international politics is that generalized by George (1969, 1979), from Leites' (1951) study of the belief system, or "Operational Code," of the Politburo. There are two basic components to the Operational Code: The first is what George (1979, pp. 100-101) refers to as the "master belief," or philosophical component, the policymaker's notion of the "fundamental nature of politics and political conflict, and his image of the opponent." The second component is instrumental; it represents the policymaker's notion of how to deal with the opponent, i.e., "How goals and objectives can be pursued most effectively, the best approach to calculation, control, . . . and acceptance of the risks of political action, and the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests." Thus George (1979, p. 101) argues how national leaders view each other is of "fundamental importance in determining what happens in relations among states."

Although I do not follow the standard ap-

Received: March 28, 1983 Revision received: July 11, 1983 Accepted for publication: August 18, 1983 proach to operational code analysis, which is based on a set of ten specific questions, I use the notions presented above as a framework for a description of Reagan's beliefs about the Soviets and how to deal with them. I begin with a review of the president's beliefs about the nature of international politics in our time and then turn to his image of the Soviet Union in particular, drawn from his statements on international affairs from the 1980 presidential campaign through March, 1983, which in turn provide a basis for his views on how to bargain with the Soviets.

#### The Nature of International Politics

Reagan's beliefs regarding the fundamental issues facing American foreign policy have been consistent. He views international politics in the modern era as a struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, "between right and wrong, good and evil" (March 8, 1983), with today's totalitarian challenge coming from the Soviet Union, a revolutionary state ideologically driven to attempt world conquest. Perhaps the most forthright statements of this view appear in his address to the British Parliament on June 9, 1982 and in a speech to American evangelists on March 8, 1983.

#### Image of the Soviet Union

Reagan argues that Soviet bargaining behavior is different from that of Western states. The Soviets cannot be trusted to negotiate on the basis of reciprocity; they do not keep their word. A dramatic statement of this view came in his first presidential press conference (January 29, 1981). Responding to a question about detente, the new president accused the Soviets of a willingness "to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" to attain world communism. These convictions were forcefully restated two years later (March 8, 1983) in the address to Christian evangelists.

#### **Bargaining with the Soviets**

The instrumental component of Reagan's political belief system—how to bargain with the Soviets—follows logically from his beliefs about Soviet motivations and behavior. With the exception of a mutual recognition of the need to avoid nuclear war, Reagan views bargaining with the Soviets as a zero-sum game. This perspective leads to a strong emphasis on coercive bargaining: we must negotiate from strength and credibly demonstrate our willingness to use our power to protect

'Quotations from Reagan's statements have been taken from the text reprinted in the New York Times.

and to further American interests. Increasing America's military strength vis-à-vis the Soviets has been a major goal of Reagan's since the beginning of his campaign and throughout his presidency.

The imperative to negotiate from strength is coupled with an emphasis on credibly demonstrating determination to use American military power to achieve national objectives. Throughout the presidential campaign Reagan attacked Carter for risking "our national security—our credibility" by sending "timid" signals to the Soviet Union (February 15, 1980). He argued that "More nations can back themselves into trouble through retreat and appeasement than by standing up for what they believe" (January 29, 1980). An unwanted war, in candidate Reagan's view, was more likely through vacillation and weakness, than from a strong demonstration of the willingness to use our military strength (TV advertisement, October 19, 1980). Too often we have been caught reacting to Soviet moves, he argued; the time has come for the United States to seize the initiative, to "give them some problems to worry about" (January 29, 1980).

In short, bargaining with the Soviet Union is a zero-sum game; therefore the American bargaining strategy must be to take the initiative and credibly demonstrate our determination to achieve our objectives. In a confrontation with the Soviets, with American security interests at stake, this view translates into using credible threats with the military capability to back them up. In earlier studies, I have referred to this as a "bullying" strategy (Leng, 1982; Leng & Wheeler, 1979).2 Behind this strategy is the assumption that a credible demonstration of our willingness to accept a high risk of war to achieve our objectives will cause the Soviets to submit to our will, whereas efforts to reach a compromise through positive inducements will be perceived as indications of weakness and encourage more coercive Soviet bargaining.

Reagan's beliefs about the nature of Soviet foreign policy are consistent with a school of thought that dominated American thinking at the outset of the Cold War and that has continued to represent one side of the continuing debate about how to deal with the Soviets (see Conquest, 1979; Pipes, 1980). What Yergin (1977, p. 11) has called the "Riga axiom" sees the Soviet Union as "a world revolutionary state, denying the possibilities of coexistence, committed to unrelenting

<sup>2</sup>The term "bullying" may have unintended negative connotations to some readers; however, it was chosen to obtain consistency with game theoretic studies of conflict bargaining (see Snyder & Diesing, 1977).

ideological warfare, powered by a messianic drive for world mastery." Yergin (1977, pp. 42-68) contrasts this image with what he calls the "Yalta axiom." Proponents of this view (Kennan, 1981; Kissinger, 1979) see the Soviet Union as a traditional great power operating to achieve its objectives within the context of the international system rather than trying to overthrow it.

If Reagan's assumptions are correct, that is, if the Riga axiom provides an accurate picture of Soviet foreign policy, then the bullying strategy that he has advocated is not a radical approach. although it carries high risks. In a confrontation where compromise is unthinkable, relative bargaining power is a function of what Snyder and Diesing (1977, p. 190) call "perceived comparative resolve," that is, each side's perception of the credibility of the other's willingness to accept the risk of war. But if Reagan is wrong, if the Yalta axiom is closer to reality, if each of the Superpowers acts primarily out of a concern for its security and a perception of implacable hostility on the part of the other, and if each is willing to accept a high level of critical risk to protect its interests, then such a strategy promotes the very dangers it is designed to deter. An effective coercive bargaining strategy ultimately depends on an asymmetry in the resolve of the two sides. If the parties are equally intent on demonstrating their resolve, the result can be a dangerous escalation of the conflict that stems from each side's determination to make its commitment to winning more credible. In game theoretic terms, this is the classic confrontation of a game of chicken.

Questions regarding the effectiveness of different bargaining strategies have been at the center of research on crisis behavior for the past two decades. The bullying strategy advocated by Reagan is representative of a perspective (Schelling, 1960, 1966) that views conflict bargaining as a game in which the key to success lies in credibly demonstrating one's resolve and commitment to winning through a coercive strategy. (See Kaplowitz, 1982, pp. 8-10; Leng & Wheeler, 1979, pp. 658-659; Snyder & Diesing, 1977, Chap. 3 for a fuller discussion.)

A bullying approach, and the assumptions behind it, can be contrasted with the "reciprocating," or "firm-but-fair," strategy described by Leng and Wheeler (1979), a bargaining strategy combining a firm stand against bullying by the other side with positive initiatives to obtain a compromise settlement. The difference in orientation is in encouraging cooperating rather than attemptin to coerce it. This approach is also emphasized by George, Hall, and Simons (1971, pp. 25-30), George and Smoke (1974, pp. 604-613), Kaplowitz (1982, pp. 10-13), Snyder and Diesing (1977, pp. 218-221), and in the interpersonal bargaining

experiments of Esser and Komorita (1975). The approach is consistent with the image of Soviet foreign policy represented by the Yalta axiom; it assumes that one is dealing with an adversary possessing traditional great-power security concerns, rather than a revolutionary power for whom compromise has only tactical meaning.

Leng and Wheeler (1979) have offered evidence of the effectiveness of a reciprocating approach to crisis bargaining, and several studies have noted the prevalence of reciprocating or tit-for-tat patterns of crisis behavior in general (Leng & Wheeler, 1979; North, Brody, & Holsti, 1964; Ward, 1982), and in Soviet-American bargaining in particular (Gamson & Modigliani, 1971; Hopmann & Smith, 1977; Triska & Findley, 1968).

The following analysis offers a historical comparison of the relative effectiveness of bullying and reciprocating approaches in three American post-World-War-II crises with the Soviet Union.3 The presumption is that Reagan's views, which I have associated with the bullying approach, are based on his understanding of past Soviet behavior, and that he believes that there have been no significant changes in that behavior over the past several decades. Given Reagan's statements and actions since assuming office, these appear to be safe presumptions. Although our discussion also implies that Reagan's instrumental beliefs will be reflected in any crisis bargaining with the Soviets, a test of that proposition obviously is not possible. Nevertheless, given the positive associations found between the instrumental beliefs and the conflict bargaining of previous American policy makers (Hoagland & Walker, 1979; Starr, 1980; Stuart, 1980; Walker, 1977) as well as the consistency between Reagan's public views and his actions regarding other policy matters, this would not be an unreasonable forecast.

#### Hypotheses

If Reagan's views are correct, and a bullying strategy offers the best approach to crisis bargaining with the Soviets, then we should observe the Soviets responding most positively to influence attempts that contain strong and highly credible threats. Less severe or less credible threats are likely to produce defiant Soviet responses owing to Soviet efforts to demonstrate resolve when the risks are not as high. Positive in-

'Each of the crises has been examined at length by others (Allison, 1971; Gamson & Modigliani, 1971; Hoagland & Walker, 1979; Snyder & Diesing, 1977; Tanter, 1974), but the questions that we ask are new ones, and the analytic approach is different.

ducements would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and would promote more coercive Soviet behavior. These assumptions can be stated as three hypotheses.

Hypothesis B1. The Soviet Union is most likely to respond positively to negative inducements employing threats of force whose credibility is supported by a specific U.S. commitment to carry them out.

Hypothesis B2. The Soviet Union is likely to respond to non-military threats or warnings, or threats of force where the U.S. commitment to carry them out is ambiguous, by issuing counterthreats.

Hypothesis B3. The Soviet Union is likely to respond with more coercive bargaining to positive inducements that are not backed up by accompanying threats.

The seeming inconsistency between hypotheses B1 and B2 results from the assumption that, although the Soviets are incorrigibly hostile and therefore react defiantly to lesser warnings and threats, they become cautious when there are high risks. Although this view is implied by the logic of Reagan's statements, i.e., that a tough stand provides the best means of avoiding war with the Soviets, it is stated explicitly by Leites (1951).

On the other hand, if the assumptions underlying a reciprocating bargaining strategy are more correct, that is, if the superpowers each react out of a concern for their security, and a determination to resist the presumed hostility of the other, then purely coercive threats should be counterproductive. The most effective influence attempts would combine less provocative threats or warnings with positive inducements. The objective would be to indicate firmness without unnecessarily threatening the security, prestige, or reputation for resolve of the other party. This is assumed to be especially important in crisis bargaining between status equals (see Leng, 1980, pp. 155-157; Snyder & Diesing, 1977, pp. 218-219). At the same time one would offer positive inducements to indicate a willingness to achieve a compromise settlement, or at least provide a facesaving concession for the adversary. With both sides acting from a desire to protect security interests, we would expect to find considerable reciprocity in American and Soviet conflict behavior; each side would be likely to respond in kind to the inducements of the other. These propositions also can be stated as three hypotheses.

Hypothesis R1. The Soviet Union is likely to respond in kind to negative inducements that use threats of force whose credibility is sup-

ported by a specific commitment to carry them out.

Hypothesis R2. The Soviet Union is most likely to respond positively to carrot-and-stick influence attempts that combine positive inducements with less provocative threats or warnings.

Hypothesis R3. In crises with the United States, the Soviet Union is likely to respond to American influence attempts in a reciprocating, or tit-for-tat manner.

#### Research Design

Each of the cold war crises presented a major test of American resolve. Although the United States enjoyed strategic military superiority in all three, the balance of conventional force was in the United States' favor only during the Cuban missile crisis. In each case the United States reacted to a Soviet challenge (the blockade in 1948, the ultimatum to recognize East Germany in 1961, and the missiles in 1962) with firmness, and the Soviets dropped their initial demands. The outcomes of the 1948 and 1962 crises were political victories for the United States, whereas the Berlin crisis of 1961 ended in a stalemate. War was avoided in all three crises.

But both the bullying and reciprocating approaches recognize the need to respond with firmness when vital interests are at stake; the question is just how the United States displayed its firmness and how the Soviet Union reacted to particular American influence attempts. Was the United States most successful in achieving Soviet compliance with its demands when it adopted the purely coercive tactics of a bullying bargaining strategy, or when it used the tactics suggested by a reciprocating bargaining strategy? Answering that question requires a closer look at the behavior of the two countries over the course of the crises.

To obtain as complete a picture as possible, I examine the actions of the two countries from three perspectives. First, I examine the initial Soviet responses to American influence attempts, particularly threats of force. Then I consider the extended effect, if any, that these threats had on the mix of cooperative and conflictive Soviet acts over the remainder of the crisis. Finally, I take a broader look at the overall pattern of behavior for the two countries.

#### Data

I have used the accounts of diplomatic historians to determine the beginning and ending

Table 1. Soviet-American Crises

	of the latest designation of the latest desi	
Berlin blockade	Begin:	March 6, 1948. Allied powers agree to merge the three western zones.
	End:	May 12, 1949. Blockade lifted.
Berlin Wall	Begin:	June 4, 1961. Khrushchev threatens separate peace treaty with East Germany by the end of the year.
	End:	October 28, 1961. U.S. and Soviet forces moved back from confrontation at the Wall.
Cuban missiles	Begin:	September 4, 1962. Kennedy warns Soviets against introduction of offensive missiles in Cuba.
	End:	November 20, 1962. U.S. ends "quarantine" blockade of Cuba.

dates of the three crises. These are listed in Table 1. Events data tracing the behavior and interactions of the disputants were generated from the written accounts of journalists and historians; 1,500 events were identified from 9 sources. A single verbal chronology of events was constructed for each case and then coded into machine-readable form using the Behavioral Correlates of War (BCOW) typology designed by Leng and Singer (1977). The coded events serve as the raw data for our indicators of influence attempts and responses, and for the level of hostility in aggregate American or Soviet actions observed at daily intervals.

#### **Operational Measures**

The method used to identify and classify Soviet responses to American influence attempts is described in an earlier study (Leng, 1980, pp. 134-141), so only a brief discussion is presented here. I begin by assuming that each party to the dispute signals its desires and intentions to the other through *influence attempts* composed of demands and inducements.

Inducements. These fall into three broad categories: negative (threats and warnings), positive (promises), and carrot-and-stick (a combination of positive and negative inducements). A fourth possibility is that there is no overt inducement accompanying the demand, i.e., one side simply attempts to persuade the other than the action is in their interest. Since we are primarily interested in the effectiveness of threats, we make further dis-

"The three crises are treated as dyadic disputes; however, in the two Berlin crises, U.S. actions taken in concert with its allies have been identified as U.S. actions. By the same token, actions that the Soviet Union directs toward the allied governments (United States, Britain, France) are identified as directed at the United States. tinctions according to the degree and specificity of negative inducements. Because of President Reagan's emphasis on the importance of demonstrating America's willingness to use its military power in dealing with the Soviets, we dichotomize all negative inducements according to whether or not the use of military force is threatened.

Commitment to act. To measure the extent to which the United States attempts to make credible its commitments to carry out its threats, I distinguish between threats of a specific action and the circumstances under which it will be undertaken, and "warnings" that are less specific about the action to be taken or the conditions under which it would be carried out. Thus the degree of inducement provides a measure of the power the actor is willing to exercise to achieve its demands; the specificity of the inducement provides a measure of the commitment to carry out the threat. These two distinctions also provide rough indicators of the provocativeness of individual threats, as specified in Hypothesis R2.5

Responses. The initial Soviet responses to American influence attempts are categorized according to five response types: to comply with the demand, to placate the actor with an alternative positive response, to ignore the demand by taking no action beyond an evaluative comment, to defy the actor with a threat or warning, and to send a mixed response combining a threat or warning with a positive action. A full discussion

'Another dimension to the provocativeness of a threat would be whether it was offensive or defensive, that is, whether it demanded a change in, or defended, the precrisis status quo. In a confrontation between two global powers, any change in the status quo in favor of one side is likely to be perceived by the other as a threat to its security interests. In the three crises at hand, however, all of the U.S. threats of force could be considered in defense of the status quo, so the distinction is not useful for our purposes.

of the procedure for linking influence attempts and responses appears in Leng (1980, pp. 141-143). Briefly, we identify the initial response as consisting of overt actions directed by the Soviets to the United States in the first two weeks after the influence attempt or until the United States issues its next influence attempt, whichever comes first. The identification of the initial Soviet response is not an attempt to link a particular Soviet act to a particular U.S. act, but to ask, "What effect, if any, does the influence attempt have on the succeeding behavior of the Soviets toward the United States?"

The design of the BCOW coding scheme permits a fine-grained examination of the conditions attached to requests (demands) and accompanying inducements, as well as the action demanded or threatened, which enables us to observe whether or not the target of the request complies with the demand, and whether or not the actor delivers the threatened punishment or promised reward.<sup>6</sup>

Extended Effects. Beyond the initial Soviet response to American influence attempts, we are interested in the extended effect, if any, that particular influence attempts have on the mix of cooperative and conflictive Soviet actions. Here too we use a measure employed in an earlier study (Leng & Gochman, 1982): the hostility score, a measure of the level of coercive behavior in aggregate events measured at daily intervals. Each action is classified as cooperative or conflictive and then assigned a weighted score according to its

\*For a full discussion of this property of the coding scheme, as well as the procedures for identifying influence attempts and responses, see Leng (1980, pp. 134-141). placement on continuum of coercion-accommodation developed by Rubin and Hill (1973) and modified by the author to fit the BCOW typology. The six categories on the continuum weight each act from -3 (most hostile or coercive) to +3 (most accommodative). This method enables us to generate a time series of the level of coerciveness in Soviet behavior over the course of the crisis, so that any significant changes associated with particular U.S. influence attempts can be observed.

#### **Analysis and Findings**

### Initial Soviet Responses to U.S. Influence Attempts

We will begin the analysis by examining contingency tables of initial Soviet responses to U.S. influence attempts. Table 2 presents the frequencies and percentages of Soviet responses based on the types of inducements used by the United States; Table 3 presents the frequencies and percentages of Soviet responses based on the U.S. commitment to act, as measured by the specificity of inducements. Although the data in Tables 2 and 3 do not represent samples from which we are attempting to draw inferences to a larger population, tests of statistical significance are included to

'Ongoing events, such as a military alert, or ongoing negotiations are coded for each day until the event is over, as opposed to other coding schemes (WEIS, COPDAB), which code such events only on the beginning day. The coding scheme also allows for measurement of increases or decreases in the intensity of such events, such as movement from one level of alert to another.

Table 2. U.S. Inducement Types and Soviet Responses in Three Crises

Inducement	Response						
	Comply	Placate	Mixed	Ignore	Defy	Total	
Threat only Military force Other	0 ( 0.0) <sup>a</sup> 0 ( 0.0)	3 (27.3) 0 ( 0.0)	2 (18.2) 0 ( 0.0)	1 ( 9.1) 7 (77.8)	5 (45.5) 2 (22.2)	11 (100.0) 9 (100.0)	
Carrot and stick Military force Other	3 ( 50.0) 1 (100.0)	0 ( 0.0) 0 ( 0.0)	1 (16.7) 0 ( 0.0)	1 (15.7) 0 ( 0.0)	1 (16.7) 0 ( 0.0)	6 (100.0) 1 (100.0)	
Promise	2 ( 25.0)	1 (12.5)	2 (25.0)	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	8 (100.0)	
No inducement	0 ( 0.0)	0(0.0)	0 ( 0.0)	3 (75.0)	1 (25.0)	4 (100.0)	
Total	6 ( 15.4)	4 (10.3)	5 (12.8)	14 (35.9)	10 (25.6)	39 (100.0)	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Row percentages. Chi square: p < .05.

give a sense of the extent to which we can be confident that we have found systematic patterns stronger than those that might be found by mere chance (see Winch & Campbell, 1969, pp. 140-143).

Bullying Hypotheses. The data in Tables 2 and 3 run counter to the three bullying hypotheses. Table 2 indicates that threats of force alone do not lead to compliance, but are most likely to lead to defiant responses (counter-threats). Table 3 suggests that the more specific the threat, the greater the likelihood of a defiant response. These results not only contradict the first of the bullying hypotheses, they are consistent with the counterhypothesis (Hypothesis R1) of the reciprocating approach, which predicts that the Soviets are most likely to respond in kind to highly credible U.S. threats of force. Hypotheses B2 and B3 do no better. Table 2 indicates that, rather than evoking defiant Soviet responses, the U.S.'s nonmilitary threats tend to be ignored, whereas positive inducements actually produced a better record of attaining positive Soviet responses than did threats.

Reciprocating Hypotheses. The findings in Tables 2 and 3 are more supportive of the reciprocating hypotheses. Besides producing the predicted negative effects of attempting to use coercive threats alone (Hypothesis R1), Table 2 indicates that the most effective U.S. influence attempts used carrot-and-stick inducements combining threats of force with positive inducements. Although the number of these cases is small, the high percentage of positive responses, against only one instance of a defiant response to a carrot-and-stick inducement, is consistent with Hypothesis R2. At the very least, the refusal of the Soviets to comply with U.S. demands when threats of force alone were employed, suggests the

importance of a facesaving gesture to allow the other side to retreat gracefully.

The distribution of responses in Table 3 is particularly suggestive. As the U.S. commitment to carry out its threats becomes more precise, the threats are more likely to be met with defiance, whereas less precise warnings are likely to be ignored. By comparing Table 3 with Table 2, we can see that the most successful carrot-and-stick inducements are those accompanied by warnings rather than specific threats. This finding, which is consistent with the emphasis on less provocative threats in Hypothesis R2, suggests that a degree of vagueness may promote compliance by allowing the other side to avoid the appearance of being bullied. Although the chi square tests for both tables are statistically significant (p = .05 forTable 2; p = .01 for Table 3), the small cell entries could affect the stability of this statistic, so these scores should be treated with caution.

Threats and Defiance. The most striking finding in Tables 2 and 3 is the association between specific threats of force and defiant Soviet responses. Table 4 collapses both measures into a two-by-two table showing the frequency with which specific threats of force, whether issued alone or as part of a carrot-and-stick inducement, evoke defiant responses.

The entries in Table 4 indicate that the Soviet Union responded defiantly to specific U.S. threats of force 75% of the time, whereas other inducements elicited defiant responses only 12.9% of the time. We have used a Fisher's exact test to gain a sense of the likelihood of finding such a relationship by chance. The p=.0014 score indicates that the probability of that is quite low, even with fairly small cell entries. An indication of the strength of the relationship can be obtained by simply calculating the percentage difference, which in this

Table 3. Specificity of U.S. Inducements and Soviet Responses in Three Crises

Specificity of Inducement	Response						
	Comply	Placate	Mixed	Ignore	Defy	Total	
Threats alone							
Action specified	$0 (0.0)^{a}$	1 (10.0)	0 ( 0.0)	1 (10.0)	8 (80.0)	10 (100.0)	
Unspecified	0 ( 0.0)	2 (20.0)	2 (20.0)	6 (60.0)	0 ( 0.0)	10 (100.0)	
Carrot and stick							
Action specified	1 (33.3)	0(0.0)	1 (33.3)	0(0.0)	1 (33.3)	3 (100.0)	
Unspecified	3 (75.0)	0 ( 0.0)	0 ( 0.0)	1 (25.0)	0 ( 0.0)	4 (100.0)	
No threat							
Promise	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	2 (25.0)	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	8 (100.0)	
No inducement	0 ( 0.0)	0 ( 0.0)	0 ( 0.0)	3 (75.0)	1 (25.0)	4 (100.0)	
Totals	6 (15.4)	4 (10.3)	5 (12.8)	13 (33.3)	11 (28.2)	39 (100.0)	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Row percentage. Chi square: p < .01.

Table 4. Specific U.S. Threats of Force and Defiant Soviet Responses

	Response				
Inducement	Defy	Other	Total		
Specific threat of force	6 (75.0)a	2 (25.0)	8 (100.0)		
Other inducement	4 (12.9)	27 (87.1)	31 (100.0)		
Total	10	29	39		

aRow percent. Fisher's Exact: .0014. Percentage difference: .62.

case is .62, indicating a strong relationship between the two variables.

Comparison with Other Crises. Although our investigation is concerned primarily with the relationship between the president's belief system and the three previous Soviet-American crises, these findings can be placed in a larger context by comparing them with the results of an earlier study (Leng. 1980) of influence attempts and responses in a stratified random sample of 14 interstate crises occurring between 1850 and 1965. In most respects the findings were quite similar to what we have observed in the Soviet responses to American threats. There was a statistically significant association between the specificity of threats and defiant responses among all pairs in the study and between threats of force and defiant responses in disputes between states evenly matched in power.9

#### **Extended Effects of Threats of Force**

The results of our examination of the initial Soviet responses to specific U.S. threats of force favor the reciprocating over the bullying hypotheses, but they present only part of the picture. Perhaps a concern for their reputation for resolve encourages Soviet leaders to issue immediate counterthreats, but, once convinced of the credibility of the U.S. commitment to carry out its threats, they are likely to follow the facesaving gesture of defiance by moving to more accommodative actions. If this is the case, their behavior would be more consistent with the president's instrumental beliefs than the initial Soviet responses indicate.

If we observe this pattern as part of a time series of Soviet hostility scores over the course of the crisis, the initially defiant response should appear

\*The value of phi, a measure of association based on chi square = .85. Phi<sup>2</sup> = .73.

"Highly specific threats of force also were found to be associated with compliance in the larger sample, but these cases were accounted for by the crises in which the power relationship was significantly asymmetric. as a temporary upward pulse in the magnitude of Soviet hostility scores. Then there should be an abrupt or (more likely) gradual, and continuing shift downward toward more accommodative bargaining. Borrowing a term from an earlier study of crisis behavior (Leng & Gochman, 1982, pp. 669-673), we will refer to this pattern as evidence of a "put-down"; wherein one disputant begins yielding to the coercive demands of the other after only token resistance.<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand, if the hostile Soviet reaction to the threat is more lasting, we can conceive of two likely patterns. The Soviets could respond in kind to the U.S. threat of force, for example, by matching a U.S. show-of-strength with one of their own, and the crisis could remain at the new level of hostility for an extended period. Or, the immediately hostile Soviet response could set off a chain of threats and counterthreats causing the level of mutual coercion to spiral upward. Borrowing again from Leng and Gochman (1982), we will refer to the first of these two behavior patterns as "resistance," and to the second as a "fight" (see also Rapoport, 1960).11 Both patterns are consistent with the negative effects predicted by Hypothesis R1, but it is the fight that exhibits the classic pattern of escalation described by spiral theorists of crisis behavior (see Jervis, 1976, chap. 3).

<sup>10</sup>Leng and Gochman (1982) constructed a typology of militarized disputes based on three behavioral characteristics: the level of military activity, escalation in coercive actions, and the degree of reciprocity in the interactions of the two disputants. A put-down is characterized by high militarization, but low escalation and low reciprocity. After reaching a fairly high level of military preparation on both sides, B but moves to more accommodative bargaining in the face of continuing pressure from A.

"Leng and Gochman's (1982) resistance dispute type is characterized by high militarization, high escalation, and low reciprocity. B resists A's attempts at coercion with deterrent threats, but the dispute does not become locked into a pattern of increasingly severe threats and counterthreats, as in a fight, which has high scores on all three behavioral measures.

Still, a fourth possibility is that U.S. threats have no lasting effect—in either direction—on the level of Soviet coercive behavior. The Soviets could accept the threats as part of what Snyder and Diesing (1977, pp. 98-102) describe as the normal probing and testing that comes with the confrontation phase of a crisis. The Soviets respond with a counterthreat to indicate that they will not be bullied, but their overall behavior remains unchanged. The initially defiant Soviet response would appear as an upward pulse in the time series, but the level of hostility would soon return to its prethreat level. This pattern is consistent with what Leng and Gochman (1982, pp. 669-673) refer to as a "stand-off,"12 One can think of a number of other interesting variations; however, these four basic types should be sufficient to provide benchmarks for our consideration of the extended effects, if any, of U.S. threats of force on Soviet behavior in the three crises under consideration.

I begin the analysis with a time series plot of the hostility scores for both sides for each of three crises, which will provide a good visual sense of the interaction, including any shifts in the level of coercive Soviet actions in response to American threats of force. Then I perform a statistical analysis of the Soviet scores with a Box-Jenkins (1976) approach to modelling an interrupted time series.

The Box-Jenkins (1976) methodology was developed to overcome the problem of unmodelled autocorrelation in time series by constructing an explicit model of the autocorrelation ("noise" component) in the series, and then fitting it to the data. Without going into detail (see Box & Jenkins, 1976 for a full discussion), the technique is to fit an autoregressive, moving average, or mixed autoregressive-moving average (ARIMA) model to the data series. The first step is to difference the series so that it is stationary, that is, free of cyclical and secular trends. In our three crises, this step required taking first differences for the 1948 Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, and taking second differences for the 1961 Berlin crisis. The second step is to model any remaining autoregressive or moving average component in the differenced series; this led to a first order autoregressive model for the 1948 Berlin crisis, a second order moving average model for the 1961 Berlin crisis, and a first order moving average model for the Cuban missile crisis.

<sup>12</sup>Leng and Gochman (1982) describe a stand-off as characterized by high militarization, low escalation, and high reciprocity. B matches A's coercive actions, but both sides act cautiously to keep the dispute from escalating beyond a certain point.

With the estimation and diagnostic checking of the ARIMA model completed, the next step is to test for any significant changes in the modelled series following interruptions, in this case, U.S. threats of force. Of the our hypothetical intervention effects that we mentioned above, the simplest would be the "resistance" pattern, an abrupt and lasting shift upward in the level of coercive Soviet behavior immediately following an American threat of force. The Soviet hostility score Y at time t would be described by the step function  $Y_t = wI_t + \text{noise}$ , where w is a parameter interpreted as the magnitude of the abrupt change, with the sign of w indicating whether the shift is upward or downward. It refers to the intervention at time t expressed as a dummy variable where  $I_t = 0$  before the intervention, and  $I_t = 1$ after the intervention. The noise component is the ARIMA model.

By adding another independent value to the intervention function, the continuing constant upward change of a "fight" can be modelled. This model would take the form of  $Y_t = \delta Y_{t-1} + wI_t$ + noise, where  $\delta$  describes the continuing upward movement after the initial shift. The model for a put-down, wherein the Soviets move to more accommodative actions after a token counterthreat, would be of the same form, except that the value of  $\delta$  would be negative, indicating a shift downward, which would continue to below the prethreat level. The abrupt, temporary, effect of threats of force in a stand-off would be generated by the same equation, except that  $I_t$  would be defined as a pulse function, that is, its value would be 1 immediately after the threat of force was issued, and  $I_t = 0$  for the preceding and succeeding observations. (See Cook & Campbell, 1979, or Box & Tiao, 1975, for a more complete discussion.)

The adequacy of the resultant model may be judged by the statistical significance of the model parameters and the observation of a white noise or random distribution to the model residuals. An overall statistical test of the latter may be obtained with a Q-statistic, which is essentially a chi square test for goodness-of-fit for the residuals. If the Q-statistic is significant, there is reason to question the adequacy of the model (see Box & Jenkins, 1976, pp. 290-293). Having described the approach, we now can turn to a consideration of the overall Soviet behavior patterns in each of the three crises.

Berlin blockade. Figure 1 plots the U.S. and Soviet hostility scores over the course of the Berlin crisis of 1948-1949.<sup>13</sup> The Berlin blockade crisis

<sup>13</sup>Owing to space considerations, Figure 1 does not extend through the full eleven months of the crisis, but is


began in March of 1948 with the Allied plan to merge the three western zones. Publication of the plan on June 7th was followed, on the 18th, by the introduction of a new currency in the western zones. The Soviets responded with their own currency reform in the eastern zone three days later and, on June 24, with a blockade of access routes to the city. The only U.S. threat of force, on June 30, stated the U.S.'s resolve to defend the city and to increase the airlift as much as necessary until the blockade was lifted. The crisis ended nearly a year later when Stalin lifted the blockade in the face of the dramatically successful airlift.

As Figure 1 suggests, the initial Soviet response to the June 30 threat was defiant. The Soviets

cut off in January 1949. If the plot were continued, it would remain at the same level until it dropped downward in May when Stalin lifted the blockade.

withdrew from the unified command on July 1st, and Stalin announced on July 3rd that the blockade of the city would continue until the West abandoned its plans for a West German state. But Figure 1 indicates that there was no lasting change in Soviet behavior, and certainly not in the direction of the greater accommodation predicted by Hypothesis B1. An analysis of the time series for the Soviet scores adds statistical confirmation to what the visual inspection of Figure 1 suggests. The June 30th intervention provides no significant improvement in the differenced ARIMA model. The only significant interruption in the time series for Soviet hostility scores occurs on June 24th. when the Soviets complete the blockade of the city. This interruption comes shortly after the West introduced its new currency, but the currency change was not a threat of force, even if it was seen by the Soviets as threatening the security of their position in Berlin.

Figure 1. Berlin, 1948



The Box-Jenkins analysis identifies the Soviet blockade as a constant step function in the time series, that is, an abrupt upward shift in hostility scores that remains at roughly the same level until Stalin lifts the blockade nearly a year later; this can be seen in Table 5, which presents the parameter estimates and significance tests for the best models of the time series that we were able to obtain for each of the three crises. In all three of the models presented in Table 5 the model parameters are statistically significant. The Q-statistics, none of which is significant at the p = .10 level, indicate the presence of a white noise process among the model residuals. Thus, we conclude that each of these models adequately represents the time series.

In the case of the first Berlin crisis, the ARIMA model in Table 5 indicates a gradual decline in Soviet coercive actions over the course of the crisis (with a parameter estimate of .547), but with an abrupt upward shift (4.84) representing the Soviet actions accompanying the blockade on the 24th of June. Since we did not find a significant shift in the level of Soviet hostility after the explicit U.S. threat of fore on June 30th, we have classified the time series as a stand-off. The U.S. threat of force had no significant effect (in either direction) on the mix of coercion and accommodation in Soviet behavior.

Berlin Wall. Figure 2 presents the time series plot for the Berlin crisis of 1961. The dispute

began in November of 1958 when Khrushchev made his initial threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, but it did not reach crisis proportions until the summer of 1961. On June 4th, Khrushchev reissued his threat as an ultimatum, with a deadline of December 31, 1961, for an Allied settlement recognizing the post-World War II borders in Central Europe and an end to the occupation of Berlin. The crisis reached its peak in mid-August with the erection of the Berlin Wall. Then it tapered off gradually, except for a brief flare-up at the Wall in October. Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev tacitly accepted Kennedy's offer of de facto recognition of the division of Germany and withdrew the ultimatum.

There are eight American threats of force during the summer and fall of 1961. The three most salient occur on June 28, seven days after Khrushchev's ultimatum, on July 25 when Kennedy issued a major policy statement, and on August 17, four days after the beginning of the erection of the Wall. The June 28 and July 25 statements are carrot-and-stick influence attempts, which mixed warnings expressing the United States's determination to defend Berlin with offers to negotiate. Kennedy's July 25 speech also included an announcement of a buildup in conventional forces. The threat of force on August 17 was in the form of a show of strength—an alert of U.S. forces and maneuvers around Berlin. All three influence attempts were followed by an immediate,

Table 5. ARIMA	Models	of Shifts in	1 Coercive	Behavior	by the	USSR
	during	Three U.S.	Soviet Cr	ises		

	Estim	nates of model par		Goodness	
Model components	Order	Parameter estimate	Standard error	T-ratio	of fit $Q^{f}$
Berlin, 1948					
Noise component	AR 1 <sup>a</sup>	547	.051	-10.83	32.0
Intervention (June 24)	$0_{\mathbf{p}}$	4.843	.937	5.17	
Berlin, 1961					
Noise component	MA 2 <sup>c</sup>	.557	.069	8.02	30.0
Intervention (Aug. 13)	0	2.332	.752	3.10	
Intervention (Sept. 7)	0	-3.802	1.128	-3.37	
Cuba, 1962					
Noise component	MA 1 <sup>d</sup>	1.006	.010	104.68	21.0
Intervention (Oct. 23)	0	6.628	.412	16.09	
Intervention (Oct. 27)	1e	-3.742	.405	-9.23	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>First order, first difference, autoregressive process.

bZero order. An abrupt upward shift.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>c</sup>Second order, second difference, moving average process.

dFirst order, first difference, moving average process.

First order. A more gradual shift, in this case, it is downward.


f O score after 25 lags. None is significant at the p = .10 level.

but temporary, Soviet response in kind.

None of the U.S. threats of force has a significant effect on the differenced time series. Brief dips in the Soviet hostility scores in September reflect Soviet offers to negotiate, but these follow positive initiatives from Kennedy in late August and early September.

Parameter estimates for the ARIMA model of the differenced time series providing the best fit appear in Table 5. The model includes a step function upward on August 13, with the erection of the Wall, then a temporary pulse downward, toward more accommodative behavior, on September 7 when there is a conditional Soviet offer to negotiate a settlement. The latter follows positive U.S. initiatives in late August, i.e., statements indicating a willingness to negotiate a settlement. Since these initiatives are backed by an ongoing military show of strength, the Soviet response is consistent with Hypothesis R2. But, as

Figure 2. Berlin, 1961




we noted above, none of the four explicit U.S. threats of force appears to have had a significant extended effect on the mix of coercion and accommodation in Soviet behavior. Therefore we will classify this crisis as another stand-off.

Cuban missile crisis. The Cuban missile crisis began with the discovery, on October 14, 1962, of the Soviet construction of IRBM and MRBM sites. It reached its peak after President Kennedy's "quarantine" speech of October 22, in

which he announced the American blockade of Cuba, and it began to de-escalate following Robert Kennedy's carrot-and-stick ultimatum of October 27th. The stick was American military action if the missiles were not removed the next day; the carrot contained pledges not to invade Cuba and to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey as rewards for Soviet compliance. Thus there were two strong American threats of force in the Cuban missile crisis: the quarantine speech of Oc-

Figure 3. Cuba, 1962



tober 22nd, and the carrot-and-stick ultimatum on the 27th. As Figure 3 shows, the initial Soviet response to the first threat was defiant, but beginning with mixed responses from Khrushchev on the 26th, which the United States followed with its carrot-and-stick ultimatum on the 27th, the Soviet behavior moves fitfully toward greater accommodation.

The model parameters in Table 5 indicate that each of these events is associated with a significant shift in the level of Soviet coercion. Kennedy's October 22 threat is followed by an abrupt step function upward in Soviet hostility, from which the series does not completely recover until the end of the crisis. October 26, however, marks the beginning of a gradual downward trend that ultimately leads to the Soviet agreement to remove the missiles. At first glance, the Soviet behavior appears to fit the put-down model remarkably well. There is a strong U.S. threat, an immediate Soviet counterthreat, and then a gradual move toward more accommodative Soviet behavior. But the downward shift in the level of coercive behavior does not come until there has been a pronounced escalation of the crisis and a secondcarrot-and-stick-ultimatum from the United States. On its face, this is not necessarily inconsistent with a put-down, but there clearly are indications of the beginning of a fight as well.

Discussion. What are we to make of the three patterns of Soviet behavior? In the first Berlin crisis, the United States limited its display of force to deterrent threats and warnings—to which the Soviets responded in kind—and successfully met the Soviet challenge with a "circumventing" bargaining strategy (see Lockhart, 1979, pp. 101-102). Once the blockade was in place, the level of Soviet hostility remained virtually unchanged until Stalin realized the futility of his strategy and lifted the blockade. The United States demonstrated its resolve, but in a way that minimized the risk of Soviet miscalculation or an uncontrollable escalation of the crisis.

Soviet behavior during the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961 exhibits a similar pattern. U.S. threats of force are matched in kind—as are the positive initiatives—but the crisis does not escalate out of control. The level of hostility jumps to a new level with the construction of the Wall, but it does not continue to rise, except for a brief military confrontation at the Wall at the end of October.<sup>14</sup>

"The decision to construct the Wall appears to have been related partially to Kennedy's July 25th statement, but more because of the implication that the United States was less concerned with free movement within Berlin than because of a reaction to a perceived American threat (see Schick, 1971, pp. 148-150, 154). The overall level of hostility remains relatively constant until the U.S.'s positive initiatives of late August are followed by reciprocal Soviet actions.

The observed patterns of the two Berlin crises are consistent with the interpretations of George and Smoke (1974, pp. 134-136), who describe the two crises as examples of "controlled pressure," that is, bargaining strategies based on limited probes of the other side's resolve and an avoidance of excessive risks. As we noted above, the patterns also are consistent with Leng and Gochman's (1982) description of a stand-off, with its low level of escalation, but relatively high reciprocity, a dispute in which "neither party is willing to back down, yet neither is willing to increase significantly the level of hostilities."

The Cuban missile crisis presents a different picture. Kennedy's quarantine speech is a compellent<sup>15</sup> threat demanding that Khrushchev undo his attempted *fait accompli*. And it is backed up by force—the naval quarantine. The risk of war is higher than in the other two crises, and the Soviet response is more bellicose. But, with the help of the U.S. promises to refrain from any more attacks on Cuba and to dismantle its missiles in Turkey, Khrushchev submits to Kennedy's demand. In this respect, the Soviet behavior pattern supports the modified version of the first bullying hypothesis represented by the put-down model.

On the other hand, the initial effect of Kennedy's October 22nd quarantine speech is a dramatic escalation of the level of Soviet hostility that could be associated with a fight process. Thus the Cuban crisis falls on the border between a putdown, in which one side acquiesces before the crisis has a chance to escalate, and the spiralling escalation of a fight. The pattern is intriguing because, although it is seemingly supportive of our modified version of Hypothesis B1 of the bullying approach, it contains elements of the dangers suggested by Hypothesis R1 of the reciprocating approach. Moreover, the move to more accommodative behavior on the part of the Soviets follows Robert Kennedy's carrot-andstick ultimatum, as opposed to purely coercive threats. Viewed from this perspective, the Soviet

"Schelling (1960, p. 72) distinguishes between deterrent threats, which demand that the target stop what it is doing or refrain from some anticipated action, and compellent threats that demand that the target undo or reverse what it has already done. The meaning is different from our distinction between offensive v. defensive threats, which refers to whether the actor is demanding a change from the precrisis status quo or a restoration of it. Thus the U.S. threats of force in all three crises were defensive, but in the 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises, they were compellent as well.

actions are consistent with the first two hypotheses of the reciprocating approach. President Kennedy's compellent threat on October 22 leads to defiance and escalation (Hypothesis R1). It is only after the trade-offs offered by Robert Kennedy on October 27 that Khrushchev agrees to remove the missiles (Hypothesis R2).

This returns us to the question that distinguishes between the assumptions that underlie the hypotheses. Do the Soviets, as an incorrigibly hostile, but cautious, adversary respond positively only to a demonstration of superior power and resolve, or are they inclined to respond in kind to attempts at coercion—even when the risks of war are high—unless reciprocal concessions are offered by the United States?

The earlier examination of initial Soviet responses to U.S. influence attempts supports the latter view. There is a positive association between U.S. threats of force without accompanying promises and defiant Soviet responses, whereas all six instances of Soviet compliance with U.S. demands followed promises or carrot-and-stick inducements. In fact, only 2 of 15 carrot-and-stick inducements led to defiant responses.

#### **Overall Patterns and Reciprocity**

This observation suggests support for the third of the reciprocating hypotheses (R3), which predicts that American-Soviet crisis bargaining will follow a tit-for-tat pattern. We can get a fuller picture if we take a closer look at all Soviet-American actions over the course of the crises. One way of doing this is through a visual inspection of the time series plotted in Figures 1-3, which suggest considerable reciprocity in all three crises.

We can obtain a statistical measure by computing a product moment correlation between differenced hostility scores of the two sides. <sup>16</sup> These scores can be viewed in a wider context by comparing them to a mean reciprocity score computed in the same manner from the randomly drawn sample of interstate crises used in Leng and Gochman (1982). This provides a rough sense of the level of reciprocal action in U.S.-Soviet crises relative to that of other interstate crises. The correlation coefficients for the three crises in the present study are: Berlin blockade = .55, Berlin Wall = .49, and Cuban missiles = .96, whereas

the mean correlation for the 28 crises appearing in Leng and Gochman (1983, p. 677) equals .30.<sup>17</sup> Thus, both the immediate Soviet responses to American influence attempts and the overall pattern of interaction between the two sides are consistent with the tit-for-tat pattern predicted by Hypothesis R3 of the reciprocating approach.

Summary of Findings. In the three crises investigated, the Soviets tended initially to respond in kind to American threats of force as predicted by Hypothesis R1. The more positive Soviet responses to carrot-and-stick inducements, and to positive inducements alone, suggest the greater efficacy of a reciprocating approach combining defensive threats with cooperative initiatives (Hypothesis R2). These findings are consistent with those found by Leng and Wheeler (1979) for a randomly selected sample of 20 crises occurring in this century. At this point, the findings support the first two reciprocating hypotheses, as well as suggesting that Soviet crisis bargaining is not significantly different from that of other states.

An interrupted time series analysis of each of the three crises has provided a sense of whether the initial Soviet responses were the beginning of an extended pattern or temporary in nature. Did the level of Soviet hostility continue to rise or stay at the new level (Hypothesis R1)? Or did it represent merely a token gesture of defiance to be followed by movement toward greater accommodation (Hypothesis B1)? The results of the interrupted time series analysis for the two Berlin crises indicates that American threats of force, in fact, had no significant extended effect on the level of Soviet hostility. In this respect Soviet behavior is more consistent with the rational bargaining models of deterrence theorists than either a spiralling pattern of escalation, or acquiescence to American threats of force. As such, it offers no direct support for either of the competing hypotheses, although the downturn in the level of Soviet hostility following the United States's positive initiatives in late August is consistent with Hypothesis R2.

The Cuban crisis presents a provocatively different pattern. On the one hand, the compellent American threats of force lead ultimately to Soviet compliance with American demands (Hypothesis B1). On the other hand, it is the one case where an American threat of force results in a significant escalation of Soviet hostility (Hypothe-

<sup>16</sup>Before computing the statistic, we differenced the time series to remove serial correlations in the data. The observations were taken at one week instead of daily intervals to provide a greater opportunity for reciprocal actions and responses to appear within the same interval.

<sup>17</sup>The Cuban crisis and the Berlin crisis of 1961 also appeared in the random sample of 30 disputes used in Leng and Gochman (1982). These disputes were removed in calculating the mean score for comparative purposes, so 28 cases were used, and the mean dropped from .35 to .30.

sis R1), and the eventual move toward greater accommodation follows a carrot-and-stick ultimatum (Hypothesis R2). It also is the crisis exhibiting the strongest tit-for-tat pattern of the three cases (Hypothesis R3). We found, in fact, that the reciprocity scores for the three crises were above the mean for a randomly selected sample of 28 crises, a finding particularly supportive of Hypothesis R3 of the reciprocating approach.

#### Conclusion

Overall, the findings from our examination of the performance record of the United States in the three Cold War crises do not support the bullying hypotheses derived from the image of the Soviet Union held by Reagan and other proponents of the Riga axiom, or their notions of how to bargain with the Soviets. Moreover, the high level of critical risk associated with a bullying strategy can be seen in the darker side of the tit-for-tat pattern that we have observed. In all three crises we found the Soviets responding in kind to American attempts at coercion, and although the Soviets reacted in a measured manner to the less provocative American threats of force in the two Berlin crises, the sudden escalation of the Cuban crisis suggests the dangers of uncontrollable escalation.

In the two Berlin crises the United States responded with firmness to protect the status quo, but with a sense of proportion and patience to avoid unnecessary provocation. Patience paid off in the first Berlin crisis when Stalin abandoned the blockade in return for an allied promise to negotiate. In the second Berlin crisis, while Kennedy's military moves were met in kind, his offer of late August to negotiate a settlement was reciprocated and followed by Khrushchev's decision to drop his ill-fated ultimatum.

If the urgency of the Cuban Missile crisis illustrates the limits of a strategy of patience and proportion, the sudden escalation after President Kennedy's dramatic challenge to the Soviets illustrates the dangers of uncontrollable escalation. As Averell Harriman warned after the October 22 speech, "If we do nothing but get tougher and tougher, we will force him [Khrushchev] into counter-measures... if we deny him an out, then we will escalate this business to nuclear war" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 821).

Was Harriman correct? Would the Cuban missile crisis have exploded in nuclear war if the United States had not balanced its threats with positive concessions? What are the likely consequences of adopting a purely coercive bargaining strategy in a future Soviet-American crisis with greater parity in usable military options, more comparable security interests at stake for the Soviets, and Soviet memories of the cost to its

reputation for resolve that resulted from its retreat over Cuba? The answer turns on whether, as Reagan's beliefs imply, and others have stated more explicitly (Leites, 1951), it is somehow the nature of the Soviet leadership to retreat when the risks of war become high, or whether the United States's success over Cuba was dependent on a combination of bargaining advantages unlikely to occur in a future crisis with the Soviets, coupled to a willingness to offer positive concessions to match its firm stand. At the very least, our analysis of Soviet actions in the three post-World War II crises indicates that the United States would have to be willing to raise the level of riskfor both sides-very high indeed before it could hope to achieve Soviet compliance through a bullying bargaining strategy.

The other side of this question is whether the Soviets may be more willing to reciprocate cooperative initiatives than President Reagan credits. Even in the three Cold War crises our findings indicate considerable reciprocity in the mix of accommodative and coercive actions by the two sides. Kennedy's positive initiatives in late August of 1961 led to the turning point in the Berlin Wall crisis and, as we suggested above, the trade-offs offered in conjunction with the ultimatum of October 27th may have been as important as Kennedy's firmness in reversing Khrushchev's attempted fait accompli in the Cuban crisis. On the other hand, in none of the three crises is there any indication that the Soviets were willing to move to a compromise before becoming convinced of the U.S.'s willingness to defend the status quo. The most effective U.S. influence attempts were carrot-and-stick inducements combining a demonstration of resolve with cooperative initiatives. A reciprocating bargaining strategy does assume the possibility of eliciting cooperative behavior by mixing firmness with flexibility. Such an approach implies that bargaining in a confrontation between equals demands a sense of proportion, an understanding of the limits of coercion.

In an earlier study (Leng, 1980) I speculated that there is an unspoken "equity norm" in relations among states of equal rank that promotes responses in kind to attempts by one side to bully the other with threats of force. Strong states sometimes can afford to ignore the threats of weaker states; weaker powers often must accept the reality of an overwhelming military disadvantage." But among status equals, yielding

<sup>18</sup>One has to add a caveat to this assumption in the current era where all international actions become the center of public attention, as the recent Falklands War has so dramatically demonstrated. In that instance, the

before a threat of force, particularly in public view, exacts an unacceptable cost to the government's reputation for resolve. This is consistent with a finding by Wilkenfeld and Brecher (1982, p. 205) who found across a wide range of crises that the United States enjoyed a certain amount of success when using violence as a crisis management technique, except in direct confrontations with the Soviet Union. In those crises, the authors found the United States was most successful when less violence was used. Kennedy understood the need to allow Khrushchev to save face in the Cuban crisis, when he noted that "every setback has the seeds of its own reprisal, if the country is powerful enough" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 841). Nevertheless, the popular perception was that the Soviets were stared down-they blinked-with the rest of the world watching. Some empirical support for Kennedy's intuition appears in a historical study of six pairs of states, where each pair became embroiled in three successive crises (Leng, 1983). The findings indicate that the diplomatic loser in one crisis was likely to adopt a more coercive bargaining strategy in its next confrontation with the same adversary,19 which suggests that the Cuban missile crisis experience has created a dangerous legacy for any American attempts to coerce the Soviets in a future crisis.

President Reagan has argued that the United States' approach to the American-Soviet competition has been too defensive, that we should seize the initiative in the global political and ideological competition (January 29, 1980; June 9, 1982). Such challenges could promote new crises with the Soviets. If they do, the president would be unwise to rely on a bargaining strategy stemming from his political beliefs. Henry Kissinger (1982, p. 594) sounded an appropriate warning when he announced publicly the American alert in the near confrontation with the Soviets during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973: "It is easy to start confrontations, but in this age we have to know where we will be at the end and not only what pose to strike at the beginning."

reputation for resolve of the stronger power (Britain) was perceived to be at stake, despite the obvious British military superiority. By the same token, once having seized the islands, the Argentine government found itself publicly committed to stand firm before the British threats.

<sup>19</sup>The study compares the levels of hostility exhibited by six pairs of states that are each involved in three successive crises.

<sup>20</sup>It is interesting to note that in the "alert crisis" of October 24-25, 1973, the United States deterred Brezhnev's warning of unilateral Soviet intervention in Egypt

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with a carrot-and-stick influence attempt combining the alert, a private warning of *unspecified* "incalculable consequences" (Kissinger, 1982, p. 591), and a threat to detente, with a hint of meeting a part of Brezhnev's demands and a promise of future cooperation if the Soviets would rescind their demand for joint U.S.-Soviet military policing of the ceasefire. Brezhnev accepted the facesaver (nonmilitary observers from both countries) after Kissinger's conciliatory public statements of October 25. The 24-hour crisis was too short to qualify for the quantitative analysis performed on the other three crises, but the U.S. strategy fits the type found most successful in those cases: a carrot-and-stick inducement with an ambiguous threat of force.

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# Explaining Presidential Priorities: The Competing Aspiration Levels Model of Macrobudgetary Decision Making

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This article develops a new statistical model of trade-offs among defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy concerns as they are reflected in the presidential budgetary process. The Competing Aspiration Levels Model (CALM) builds on Crecine's (1971) "Great Identity" argument, Unlike most previous attempts to model presidential budgeting, CALM explicitly represents the interdependence of decisions about defense, nondefense, and total federal expenditures. CALM models this interdependence as the result of the interaction of minimal aspirations for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level of expenditures from a fiscal policy standpoint. Statistical analyses of presidential budgets for the fiscal years from 1955 through 1980 provide strong support for the CALM formulation. Substantively, the results indicate that fiscal constraints on total expenditures have progressively weakened, that the maximum acceptable expenditure level has generally exceeded the minimal expenditure aspiration level, and that when a potential "fiscal surplus" has existed, the nondefense sector has been more successful in capturing a share of this surplus than the defense sector. In keeping with traditional incrementalist arguments, the results indicate that previous year expenditure levels provide a relatively secure "budgetary base" for both the defense and nondefense sectors. Both sectors tend to receive their minimal aspiration levels plus a share of whatever fiscal surplus exists. The analysis also indicates that the executive branch has not been as strong a direct force for budgetary growth as Congress.

When President Reagan took office, he and the spokesmen of his administration declared that the federal budget was out of control. Further, they claimed, the runaway federal budget was to blame for most of the nation's economic woes, ranging from inflation and tight credit, on the one hand, to sluggish economic growth and high unemployment, on the other. Administration spokesmen also suggested that uncontrollable growth in domestic outlays imperiled the nation's security by diverting resources from urgently needed defense programs. These claims raise questions

Received: April 5, 1982 Revision received: June 24, 1983 Accepted for publication: August 18, 1983

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 1981. We would like to thank Dennis Epple, Stephen Flenberg, Richard Frank, Steven Garber, J. B. Kadane, Steven Klepper, Richard Lau, Timothy McGuire, David Mowery, John Padgett, Charles Ostrom, and several anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.

'See, e.g., "The State of the Nation's Economy: We Are Out of Time," presidential address from the White House, February 5, 1981. Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 47, no. 9.

that have attracted substantial academic interest over the past 25 years. How should society decide how much is enough in the areas of defense and domestic programs? What is the "proper" tradeoff between defense and domestic program objectives, on the one hand, and macroeconomic policy objectives on the other? Finally, how are these conflicts resolved in fact? This article focuses on the last of these three questions. Our goal is to gain insight into how these great budgeting tradeoffs actually were resolved over the 25-year period that began with the first Eisenhower budget (FY1955) and ended just before the 1980 presidential campaign (FY1980). Our emphasis is on presidential budgets. Our approach is to develop a structural model that permits inferences concerning both the factors that determine desired defense budgetary policy, domestic budgetary policy, and fiscal policy, and the trade-offs among these objectives.

#### Explaining Presidential Budgets: A Brief Review

#### **Independent Process Models**

Most previous attempts to model formally presidential budgeting have assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that decisions about a given budgetary category are statistically independent of decisions about all other budgetary categories. Consider, for example, the agency request rule that Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (1966) found gave the best fit to most of the domestic agencies and subagencies that they studied.

$$PA_t = \beta C_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \tag{1}$$

Here, PAt denotes the presidential budget request for the agency in question in fiscal year (FY) t,  $C_{t-1}$  is the congressional appropriation for that agency in FY t-1,  $\beta$  is "a fixed mean percentage of the congressional appropriation for that agency in the previous year," and  $\epsilon_t$  is "a random variable (normally distributed with mean 0 and unknown but finite variance) for that year." For present purposes the critical aspect of this agency decision rule is that it contains information concerning only the agency in question. (The same is true of the more complex decision rules considered by Davis et al., 1966.) Further, the estimation procedures used by Davis et al. assumed that the  $\epsilon_t$  were independently distributed across agencies. In effect, then, Davis et al. asserted that the president's budget is the product of a set of parallel independent processes concerning agency or subagency budgets. Any possible influences of defense and fiscal policies on the executive branch's determination of domestic agency budgets are ignored. As we will argue below, in its extreme form this is implausible. Nonetheless, the Davis et al. parallel independent processes model has been shown to provide a relatively precise statistical account of presidential decisions concerning both domestic (Davis et al., 1966) and defense agencies (Stromberg, 1970).

Attempts to investigate arms race effects in defense budgeting have taken a similar approach. Applying a discrete time version of Richardson's (1960) action-reaction model to presidential defense budgeting gives

$$PD_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \hat{D}_{t-1} + \beta_2 \hat{S}_{t-1} + \epsilon_t$$
 (2)

where  $PD_t$  is the president's proposed level of defense outlays (expenditures) in FY t,  $\hat{D}_{t-1}$  is the estimated level of defense outlays in FY t-1,  $\hat{S}_{t-1}$  is the estimated level of Soviet defense expenditures in FY t-1, the constant  $\alpha$  is interpreted as a grievance term, and  $\epsilon_t$  is a random disturbance term.<sup>2</sup> The critical point to be made here is that this model of defense budgeting contains no in-

<sup>2</sup>We use the symbol <sup>^</sup> to indicate an estimate of a past level of expenditure, such as last year's defense outlays or last year's level of Soviet defense expenditures. We use the symbol <sup>^</sup> to indicate estimated levels of future

formation concerning nondefense spending; it implicitly assumes that defense budgeting proceeds independently of domestic and fiscal policy planning and decision making. Variants of the Richardson action-reaction formulation have been shown to give a good statistical account of presidential defense budgets over the past 25 years (Fischer & Crecine, 1981; Ostrom, 1978).

#### The Great Identity Argument

Both Crecine (1971) and Huntington (1961) have noted that presidential budgeting can only be understood in the larger context of revenues and fiscal policy objectives. This point is clearly illustrated by an accounting relation that Crecine (1971) termed "the Great Identity":

$$PD_t + PN_t = \widetilde{R}_t - \widetilde{GAP}_t. \tag{3}$$

Here  $PD_t$  and  $PN_t$  are the planned levels of defense and nondefense spending, respectively. R. is the anticipated level of total federal tax revenues, and  $\widehat{GAP}_t$  is the anticipated budget deficit (if  $\widehat{R}_t < PD_t + PN_t$ ) or surplus (if  $\widehat{R}_t > PN_t$ )  $PD_t + PN_t$ ). As Crecine (1971, 1975) has argued, each of the four terms of the Great Identity is politically or economically significant in its own right. Interest groups, congressmen, agency personnel, and past legislation all generate pressures leading to higher levels of  $PD_t$  and  $PN_t$ . On the other hand, the size of the planned deficit (or surplus) is the principal macroeconomic tool at the disposal of the president. There is a relatively narrow range within which GAP, must be maintained if the president hopes to see a healthy state of the nation's economy. Also, the size of the planned deficit has assumed great political interest in its own right. Finally,  $\tilde{R}_t$  is also highly constrained. Major changes in tax laws are difficult to achieve, and presidents are much more apt to try to solve their budget problems for a given fiscal year through altering defense or nondefense expenditures or fiscal policy than by raising taxes. Tax reductions are much more politically palatable, but they have seldom been sought by presidents desiring to keep the deficit from becoming too large. The Reagan tax cut is an exception whose consequences may reinforce the historical aversion to tax cuts. These observations question the plausibility of the independent processes formulation of executive budgeting; they point instead to the necessity of trade-offs among fiscal,

budgetary quantities, such as anticipated revenues for the budget year currently being planned. defense budgetary, and domestic budgetary priorities.

How might an administration resolve the difficult trade-offs implied by the Great Identity? Assume for the moment that political constraints rule out changes in tax policy: the administration will simply live with the revenue level that will be generated by existing tax codes. The independent processes formulation represents one extreme solution to this problem. The deficit is simply an incidental byproduct of independent decision processes concerning  $PD_t$  and  $PN_t$ . Fiscal policy considerations receive no weight whatsoever. To our knowledge, no one has seriously suggested that presidential budgeting should proceed in this fashion, although most statistical models of executive budgeting implicitly assume that it does.

The "defense requirements" approach provides a second extreme solution to the macrobudgetary problem. This approach holds that essential "defense requirements" must be met without regard for other national priorities. Former Defense Secretary McNamara has argued that this approach was actually followed during the 1960s: "[M]y instructions from both President Kennedy and President Johnson were simple: to determine and provide what we needed to safeguard our security without regard to arbitrary budget limits, but to do so as economically as possible" (McNamara, 1968, p. 87, emphasis added). With this approach, any trade-offs that must be made will be between nondefense and fiscal policy objectives. If fiscal responsibility is viewed as essential as well, nondefense programs will get whatever is left over after defense needs have been subtracted from a fiscally responsible level of total expenditures.

A third extreme solution is to give total priority to nondefense and fiscal requirements, with defense receiving whatever is left over after nondefense requirements are subtracted from the desired level of total expenditures. Huntington (1961, p. 221) claimed that this approach was used by the Truman administration, before the outbreak of Korean hostilities, and by the Eisenhower administration after the end of the Korean conflict.

From a normative perspective, the requirements concept is untenable. As Enthoven and Smith (1971) repeatedly argued, what is worth doing in one sector depends on what one must give up in another. Nonetheless, the possibility exists that the actual budgetary process gives total priority to two of the three macrobudgetary policy objectives, with the third receiving what is left over after the first two sets of political demands have been satisfied. It seems more likely, however, that the actual process is one of compromise between those advocating either defense or nondefense

programs on the one hand, and those advocating fiscal policy objectives on the other. Matters become more complex when we introduce the option of seeking tax law change to alter anticipated revenue levels. But the logic is fundamentally the same. Although we can imagine extreme solutions which eliminate compromise or tradeoffs, such solutions lack normative appeal and appear less likely to arise, in fact, than a process of mutual compromise or trade-off. The econometric approach taken below will permit us to make inferences about how the conflicts embodied in the Great Identity actually have been resolved by the presidential budgetary process during the past quarter century.

### The Competing Aspiration Levels Model of Macrobudgetary Trade-offs

In this section we develop a new model of presidential budgeting. The model focuses on what we term "macrobudgetary decisions," that is, highly aggregate decisions about the terms of the Great Identity. We call this new model the *Competing Aspiration Levels Model* (CALM). CALM posits the existence of unobserved aspiration levels for defense outlays, nondefense outlays, and total outlays. CALM represents the presidential budgetary process as resulting from the reconciliation of minimum acceptable aspiration levels for defense and nondefense expenditures with a maximum acceptable level for total expenditures.

#### Aspiration Levels in Macrobudgetary Decisions

The simplest interpretation of an aspiration level is that it is a level of an outcome variable (e.g., profits earned, or the amount spent on a given program) that partitions the set of possible outcomes into two classes, those that are acceptable and those that are not (Simon, 1955). Alternatively, an aspiration level may be thought of as the inflection point of an S-shaped intensity of preference function, with preferences falling off steeply on the bad side, and rising, although more gradually, on the good side (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1955). In a budgetary context, the aspiration level concept can be expanded to include legal and political constraints; that is, previous obligations and commitments that are very costly (if not impossible) to reverse. Although it may not always be possible to devise satisfying alternatives that simultaneously meet all subunits' aspirations levels, when such alternatives exist, the incentive to choose one is strong.

Aspiration levels presumably arise at every level in the budgetary process, from the lowest subagencies of the government to the highest policy-

making bodies. Our concern is only with the highest level executive branch decisions concerning the size of total federal expenditures (in relation to revenues) and decisions concerning the allocation of that total between defense and nondefense uses. Recent research on executive branch budgeting suggests the existence of three largely separate policy streams involving different actors and different institutions, each concerned with one of the three elements in the macrobudgetary equation: defense spending, nondefense spending, and the level of total federal expenditures (Crecine, 1971; Crecine & Fischer, 1973; Mowery, Kamlet, & Crecine, 1980). The principal advocates of defense programs are typically the secretary of defense and his principal assistants, the president's national security adviser, and a few key congressmen. The main advocates of nondefense programs include top OMB officials, the principal domestic agency heads, a variety of special interest groups, and again key members of Congress. The principal advocates of fiscal restraint (i.e., keeping total spending under control) typically include members of the Council of Economic Advisers, top officials from OMB, and select members of the Cabinet and Congress.

The CALM model (described in detail below) posits the existence of distinct aspiration levels for defense, nondefense, and total federal expenditures. Aspirations for each of these three macrobudgetary components are determined primarily by parochial environmental and organizational considerations pertaining only to the policy area in question. Pressures from other components of the Great Identity only operate indirectly in the sense that over time compromises that have been worked out among the demands of the components may shape each component's aspirations (Manns & March, 1978; March & Simon, 1958). The composition of the sets of actors involved in the three policy streams will vary from year to year, as will their priorities. For our purposes, though, the key observation is that high level decisions about the president's budget result from the reconciliation of pressures or desires generated by these three largely separate policy streams.

The aspiration levels for defense and nondefense expenditures are assumed to be *minimal* acceptable levels. We denote them by  $DMIN_t$  and  $NMIN_t$ , respectively. In the presence of  $DMIN_t$ and  $NMIN_t$ , we can define a level of total expenditures,  $TMAX_t$ , such that minimal levels of defense and nondefense expenditures will be met unless the implied total level of expenditures exceeds  $TMAX_t$ . Total expenditure levels above  $TMAX_t$  are as undesirable from a fiscal policy perspective as expenditures below  $DMIN_t$  and  $NMIN_t$  are from a defense and nondefense policy perspective, respectively.  $TMAX_t$  is thus the maximum acceptable level of total expenditures.3

There are two complementary interpretations to  $DMIN_t$ ,  $NMIN_t$ , and  $TMAX_t$ . They may be thought of as being the aspirations held by the policymakers most directly involved; for instance, DMIN, would be the minimal aspiration for defense spending held by the secretary of defense or the national security adviser. These minimal aspirations would then give rise to political actions directed toward the president or whoever plays a key role in reconciling conflicting budgetary demands. Alternatively, the aspirations may be thought of as being held by the policymakers doing the reconciling, principally the president. from whose perspective cutting expenditures below certain levels is likely to be politically costly and organizationally difficult when such actions require personnel layoffs and program contractions. The resulting political fallout may well be viewed as unacceptable by the president. Similarly, excessively high levels of total expenditures may result in deficits so large as to cause severe economic disruption and political reaction. This, too, may well be viewed as unacceptable from the point of view of a president. These two interpretations of aspiration levels are really complementary notions. If a president has a sense of what is acceptable and what is not in the defense, domestic, and fiscal domains, in all likelihood that conception has been heavily influenced by the arguments and information provided by the highest officials whose primary concern is with the sector in question.

Construed as minimal acceptable levels, *DMIN<sub>t</sub>* and *NMIN<sub>t</sub>* are similar to the notion of the "budgetary base" (Davis et al., 1966, 1971; Kamlet & Mowery, 1980; Wildavsky, 1964), although, unlike the base notion, minimal acceptable levels need not be equal to last year's level of expenditure. In the CALM formulation, it becomes an empirical question whether *DMIN<sub>t</sub>* and *NMIN<sub>t</sub>* assume this particular form. Finally, in defining the aspiration levels, it is important to keep in mind that the aspiration levels as posited in the CALM model are not observed. They should not be thought of as publicly stated bargaining demands. Rather, they are privately held convic-

<sup>3</sup>Presumably, there is also a lower acceptable bound on total expenditures from a fiscal policy perspective. But in the presence of constant growth in agency budgets, we assume that the problem of planning to spend too little rarely if ever arises. Thus,  $TMAX_t$  is the relevant constraint. We sometimes will refer to  $TMAX_t$  as a well as  $DMIN_t$  and  $NMIN_t$ , as a minimal aspiration level. We do this for expositional convenience and because  $TMAX_t$ , in being the maximal allowable level of total expenditures, is also the level that is minimally acceptable from a fiscal policy perspective.

tions concerning what is acceptable and what is not.

#### The CALM Equations

CALM represents the presidential budgetary process as a competition among the advocates of defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy priorities, which involves, first, a reconciliation of the minimum aspiration levels for defense and nondefense spending with the maximum acceptable level for total expenditures, and, second, the allocation of any funds that remain once these minimal requirements are satisfied. Algebraically, the allocation equations are as follows:

$$PD_{t} = DMIN_{t}$$

$$+ \beta_{1}[TMAX_{t} - DMIN_{t} - NMIN_{t}]$$

$$+ \mu_{1,t}$$

$$PN_{t} = NMIN_{t}$$

$$+ \beta_{2}[TMAX_{t} - DMIN_{t} - NMIN_{t}]$$

$$+ \mu_{2,t}$$

$$PT_{t} = [DMIN_{t} + NMIN_{t}]$$

$$+ \beta_{3}[TMAX_{t} - DMIN_{t} - NMIN_{t}]$$

$$+ \mu_{3,t}$$

$$(6)$$

$$PT_{t} = PD_{t} + PN_{t}$$

$$(7)$$

Here  $PD_t$ ,  $PN_t$ , and  $PT_t$  denote the levels of defense, nondefense, and total outlays in the president's budget message to the Congress. DMIN<sub>1</sub>,  $NMIN_t$ , and  $TMAX_t$  are as defined above. The central constraint in this allocation process is that  $PT_t$ , which must be justified in fiscal policy terms, must equal the sum of  $PD_t$  and  $PN_t$ , which have to be justified on programmatic, legal, or political grounds. This constraint is simply an accounting identity and must be satisfied exactly (see Equation 7). The  $\mu_{Lt}$ 's are error terms, assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and uncorrelated over time.  $\mu_{1,t}$ ,  $\mu_{2,t}$ , and  $\mu_{3,t}$  are not independent of one another at any given time, however. Substituting Equations (4-6) into equation (7) demonstrates that  $\mu_{1,t} - \mu_{2,t} + \mu_{3,t} = 0$  for all t. Thus, deviations from the standard allocation pattern are necessarily interdependent. This dependence, linking the macrobudgetary components, is central to executive branch budgetary decision making.

As specified in Equations (4-7), the CALM allocation equations can represent two rather distinct types of allocation problems, depending on whether  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$  is greater or less than  $TMAX_t$ . Consider first the case where  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t < TMAX_t$ . Under these circumstances,

the minimal aspirations of all three sets of policy-makers involved in the macrobudgetary process can be satisfied. In this case, CALM posits that all three aspirations are satisfied and that controversy over allocation decisions concerns the allocation of  $TMAX_t - (DMIN_t + NMIN_t) > 0$ . This positive quantity may be thought of as slack, a fiscal dividend, or a zone of contention to be allocated among defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy priorities.

In such instances,  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  represent the proportion of this zone of contention that are allocated to defense and nondefense expenditures, respectively. If  $\beta_1 = 0$ , for instance,  $PD_t =$ DMIN<sub>t</sub> (plus error), and defense receives only its minimal aspiration level. If  $\beta_1 = 1$ , on the other hand,  $PD_t = TMAX_t - NMIN_t$ , and defense receives all of the zone of contention, leaving both the nondefense and fiscal sectors with only their minimal aspirations. A similar interpretation applies to  $\beta_2$ . So under conditions where  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t < TMAX_t$ , large values of  $\beta_1$  result in favorable outcomes for defense, and large values of  $\beta_2$  in favorable outcomes for nondefense.  $\beta_3$ represents the total proportion of the zone of contention that is allocated to either defense or nondefense. If  $\beta_3 = 0$ , then  $PT_t = DMIN_t +$ NMIN, and defense and nondefense are held to their minimal aspirations levels. All of the slack is used to reduce the size of total expenditures. On the other hand, if  $\beta_3 = 1$ ,  $PT_t = TMAX_t$ , and defense and nondefense consume all of the potential slack. Thus, when  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t <$  $TMAX_t$ , large values of  $\beta_1$  indicate that the proponents of fiscal restraint fare poorly relative to the proponents of defense and nondefense spending. Small values of  $\beta_3$  indicate the opposite.

The budgetary problem is different for years when  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t > TMAX_t$ . In this case there is no budgetary allocation that does not violate at least one of the minimal aspiration levels. Equations (4-7) remain valid, but the parameters assume a somewhat different interpretation and carry with them rather different implications for whose priorities are satisfied to what extent. The problem now is one of deciding allocation levels that fail to meet the minimal aspiration levels.  $TMAX_t - (DMIN_t + NMIN_t) < 0$  now represents a shortfall that must be divided among the three policy sectors. Each would like to bear as little of this shortfall as possible. Under these circumstances, values of  $\beta_3$  near 1 indicate that defense and nondefense programs bear most of

<sup>&#</sup>x27;Here, and throughout the next two paragraphs, we omit the error terms to simplify the discussion. The statements made can be interpreted as expected values, e.g.,  $E(PD_t) = DMIN_t$  when  $\beta_1 = 0$ .

the burden, with minimal fiscal aspirations being basically satisfied. (Recall that when  $\beta_3 = 1$ , Equation (6) becomes  $PT_t = TMAX_t$ .) Values of  $\beta_1$ and  $\beta_2$  near 0, on the other hand, indicate that defense and nondefense programs receive close to their minimal aspirations, with fiscal policy aspirations being forced to give in the face of the shortfall. Thus, the magnitudes of the  $\beta_i$ 's have very different implications concerning which sectors do well and which do not, depending on whether  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$  is greater or less than  $TMAX_t$ . If both types of years occurred relatively frequently, one might reasonably conjecture that the  $\beta_l$  allocation parameters would be different for the two types of years. As seen below, however, the vast majority of the years we analyze appear to be cases where  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t <$  $TMAX_t$ , so we do not consider two separate sets of allocation parameters.

From the above discussion it is clear that the  $\beta_i$ 's are not independent; in fact, it is easily shown that Equation (7) implies that  $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = \beta_3$ , which simply reflects the fact that the proportion of the zone of contention going to defense plus nondefense must equal the total that is allocated. The above interpretation of the  $\beta_i$ 's also implies that each must lie in the interval [0,1], and that  $\beta_1 + \beta_2$  must not exceed 1. Thus, the validity of the CALM formulation can be partially tested by examining the extent to which (unconstrained) estimates of the  $\beta_i$ 's lie within these theoretically justifiable ranges.

Finally, as we have developed the CALM model, Equations 4-7 represent the interaction of three sets of actors with different policy concerns. From this organizational politics perspective, the  $\beta$  coefficients are naturally interpreted as temporally stable indicators of the relative power of the proponents of defense, nondefense, and fiscal objectives during disputes concerning division of the zone of contention. It can be shown, though, that Equations (4-7) also result from maximizing a utility function of the form  $U_t = (PD_t - DMIN_t)^{\beta_1} (PN_t - NMIN_t)^{\beta_2} (TMAX_t - PT_t)^{(1-\beta_1-\beta_2)}$  subject to the constraint that  $PT_t = PD_t + PN_t$ . Thus, although the CALM model was developed to represent stable conflicts between competing groups of policy advocates, it is formally interpretable as reflecting the "revealed allocation preferences" of the executive branch acting as a single rational decision maker. On the surface, this interpretation appears to differ significantly from the organizational politics interpretation offered above. This need not be the case, however. For instance, in both the utility maximization and organizational politics interpretations, the president can be viewed as reconciling disputes between the conflicting aspirations of the proponents of defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy objectives.

To use Equations (4-7) to estimate trade-offs between defense, nondefense, and fiscal aspirations, it is first necessary to specify the determinants of these aspirations. The present specification of CALM incorporates the following set of aspiration level equations:

$$DMIN_{t} = \delta_{1} \hat{D}_{t-1} + \delta_{2} \hat{S}_{t-1} + \delta_{3} \Delta \widetilde{W}_{t} + \epsilon_{a,t}$$
(8)

$$NMIN_t = \alpha_1 \hat{N}_{t-1} + \epsilon_{b,t} \tag{9}$$

$$TMAX_{t} = \gamma_{1} \tilde{R}_{t} + \gamma_{2} TIME_{t} * \tilde{R}_{t}$$

$$+ \gamma_{3} REC_{t-1} * \tilde{R}_{t} + \epsilon_{G,t}$$
(10)

These specifications are admittedly simple, but they include as determinants those factors most frequently mentioned in the budgeting literature.

Equation (8) views defense aspirations as the result of a Richardson-type action-reaction process (without a constant grievance term), modified by the addition of a variable reflecting changes in the anticipated level of intensity of U.S. combat involvement. In this equation, DMIN, denotes the (unobservable) aspiration level for U.S. defense expenditures in FY t,  $D_{t-1}$  the estimated level of actual U.S. defense expenditures in FY t-1,  $S_{t-1}$ an estimate of the dollar-equivalent value of Soviet military expenditures in the year preceding submission of the budget,  $\Delta \vec{W}_t$  the anticipated change in the level of active U.S. combat involvement, and  $\epsilon_{a,t}$  an error term representing the impact of other influences on DMINt. The logic of the modified action-reaction model implies  $\delta_1$ ,  $\delta_2$ , and  $\delta_3$  should all be positive in sign. Further, if minimal aspiration levels correspond to the traditional notions of a budgetary base, then  $\delta_1$  should be close to 1.0 in magnitude.  $\delta_2 = 0$  would indicate that U.S. defense aspirations are not influenced by Soviet defense expenditures, whereas  $\delta_2$ = 1 would indicate that U.S. aspirations match Soviet expenditures on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Finally,  $\delta_3 > 0$  indicates that defense expenditure aspirations rise during periods of escalating combat involvement and fall during periods of combat deescalation.

Equation (9) represents aspiration levels for nondefense outlays as arising from a simple growth process. The sources of pressure for growth include the steady growth of domestic uncontrollables (primarily trust fund and entitlement programs), along with bureaucratic and political pressures for agency and program growth. We do not model these pressures in detail, but rather assume that they are proportional to the size of the existing expenditure base. We assume that the

appropriate expenditure base is the estimate of outlays for fiscal year t-1 at the time fiscal year t's budget is presented to Congress. We denote this estimate by  $\hat{N}_{t-1}$ . This expenditure base is the result not only of the president's budget proposal for fiscal year t-1, but also accounts for exogenous influences that have occurred over the 12 months since fiscal year t-1's budget was presented to Congress,' most important, the impact of congressional action on fiscal year t-1's budget. Again, if minimal aspiration levels are analogous to the budgetary base,  $\alpha_1$  should be near 1.

Equation (10) models the aspiration level for total outlays from a fiscal policy perspective. This representation includes three right-hand variables, apart from the error term,  $\epsilon_c$ . The first is  $\tilde{R}_t$ , the revenue forecast. If economic policy planners seek to avoid excessively large budget deficits or surpluses, then  $\gamma_1$  should be close to 1. The second right-hand variable is the time-indexed variable, TIME, interacting multiplicatively with  $\tilde{R}_t$ . TIME is indexed such that it assumes a value of 0 for the midpoint of our time period, FY 1967, increasing by one for every subsequent year and decreasing by one for every prior year. Many analysts have contended that there has been a loosening of fiscal policy constraints on federal expenditure levels as a result of increased reliance on discretionary fiscal policy for macroeconomic stabilization objectives. Similarly, many have felt that pressures for expenditure growth have increased over the period from 1955 to 1980, which also resulted in a loosening of minimally acceptable fiscal policy standards. This expenditure pressure has been variously attributed to uncontrollable programs, transfer programs, trust fund expenditures, the rise of special interest groups, and Great Society programs. This was one of the central themes of Carter's farewell address.6 Any such loosening of fiscal policy constraints over time will be picked up by  $\gamma_2$ , which should then be greater than 0. The third right-hand variable is  $REC_{t-1}$ , a dummy variable for recession during the preceding fiscal year. If recession leads to countercyclical expenditure goals, then  $\gamma_3 > 0$ .

Finally,  $\epsilon_{a,t}$ ,  $\epsilon_{b,t}$ , and  $\epsilon_{c,t}$  denote disturbance terms in Equations (8-10). These disturbances are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero, and also to be uncorrelated over time. We

'For example, weather effects on crop yields which influence price support payments or changes in unemployment affecting unemployment compensation payments.

6"Farewell Address: Major Issues Facing the Nation," Jimmy Carter, January 14, 1981. Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 47, No. 8.

do not assume, however, that  $\epsilon_a$ ,  $\epsilon_b$ , and  $\epsilon_c$  are independent in any given time period.

Together, Equations (4-10) define the Competing Aspiration Levels Model of presidential macrobudgetary decision making. There are three key assumptions of this model. The first is the existence of three separate aspiration levels- $DMIN_t$ ,  $NMIN_t$ , and  $TMAX_t$ —generated by parallel but separate policy-making streams concerned with defense, nondefense, and fiscal policy objectives, respectively. The second is that actual presidential budgetary proposals result from the direct interaction among these aspiration levels. The third is that revenues and the tax structure generating revenues can be taken as exogenous to the model. We believe this to be a reasonable approximation for the time period under consideration.7 The model does not prejudge the relative strength of fiscal, defense budgetary, and domestic budgetary priorities, nor the importance of different factors on the associated aspirations. These considerations are determined by the statistically estimated parameters of the model.

### Relationships to Other Models of Presidential Budgeting

CALM provides a very general representation of the executive branch budgetary process, one that can encompass a broad range of types of behavior. Many of the different theories of the budgetary process found in the literature can be seen as special cases of CALM, each implying certain values for the parameters of Equations (4-10). As noted earlier, incrementalist and other independent process models of defense and nondefense budgeting implicitly assume that fiscal policy concerns play no direct role in the budgetary process. Total federal spending is simply the byproduct of independent decisions about defense and nondefense budgetary categories. In terms of CALM, these independent process models assume that  $\beta_1 = \beta_2 = 0$ . The incrementalist independent process models further posit that  $DMIN_t$  and  $NMIN_t$  are functions of last year's expenditures,  $\hat{D}_{t-1}$  and  $\hat{N}_{t-1}$ , respectively. In this case, we add to the above hypotheses that  $\delta_1$  and  $\alpha_1$  should be near to or slightly greater than 1.

We can also use CALM to test the defenserequirement model, which holds that defense needs come off the top, with any necessary tradeoffs made between fiscal and domestic policy considerations. (Traditional Richardsonian action-

"See Schick (1980) for a discussion of the extent to which tax policy, as opposed to budgetary policy, was a "nondecisional" process during much of the 1960s and 1970s.

reaction models of defense budgeting might be viewed as compatible with this view, as well as with the independent processes view, because they do not explicitly preclude trade-offs between domestic and fiscal concerns, although they do assume defense needs are fully accommodated.) The defense requirements hypothesis implies that  $\beta_1 = 0$ , and that  $\beta_2 = \beta_3 > 0$ . Whatever the zone of contention, defense spending is unaffected. Basic defense needs are met. The zone of contention is divided between domestic and fiscal claims. Through a parallel line of reasoning, the non-defense-requirements hypothesis (i.e., nondefense needs come off the top) implies that  $\beta_2 = 0$ , and that  $\beta_1 = \beta_3 > 0$ .

CALM can also be used to evaluate the "shares-of-the-planned-change" model proposed by Fischer and Crecine (1981). This model assumes that presidential budgeting is a two-stage process in which total spending,  $PT_t$ , is determined in the first stage, then divided into its defense and nondefense components, PD<sub>t</sub> and PN<sub>t</sub>. Previous year expenditure levels are assumed to provide a secure base. Planned total expenditures,  $PT_t$ , are a function of anticipated revenues, whether the economy is in recession, and past total expenditures. The planned change in the total  $PT_t - (\hat{D}_{t-1} + \hat{N}_{t-1})$ , which is assumed normally to be positive, is totally allocated in some fixed proportion to defense and nondefense. Each sector receives its previous year's base level of expenditures, plus a share-of-the-plannedchange. (Larkey, 1978, and Stolp, 1983, have used similar formulations to explain municipal budgeting.) In the context of CALM, the shares-of-theplanned-change model implies the following: first,  $\beta_3 = 1$ ; the fiscal constraint is exactly satisfied. If there is any slack to be absorbed, the defense and nondefense sectors receive it. But if expenditure aspirations exceed the fiscal constraint, the fiscal constraint takes total precedence. Second,  $DMIN_t$  and  $NMIN_t$  are equal to  $\hat{D}_{t-1}$  and  $\hat{N}_{t-1}$  respectively. Finally, the ratio  $\beta_1/\beta_3$  in CALM corresponds to the defense shareof-the-planned-change and  $\beta_2/\beta_3$  the nondefense share-of-the-planned-change in the Fischer-Crecine formulation. The Fischer and Crecine (1981) estimation results indicate that (apart from the effects of actual combat), the defense share has been 23% during the post-Korean period.

Finally, CALM can be used to interpret recent criticisms of the presidential budgetary process. Buchanen and Wagner (1977), for instance, have argued that the problem with Keynesian economics is not economic but political. It opens the door to budgetary deficits under certain conditions, then succumbs to political temptation and fails to close the door when the circumstances no longer hold. Thus, chronic budget deficits become

built into the system. In this view,  $TMAX_t$  usually exceeds available revenues, the zone of contention  $TMAX_t - (DMIN_t + NMIN_t)$  is usually large and positive, and  $\beta_3$  is greater than 0. The strength of the CALM formulation is that all of these theories of federal budgeting can be viewed as special cases of the more general specification. None of the interpretations is presupposed, and each can be tested empirically.

#### **Estimation Procedure and Results**

This section describes the results we obtained by substituting the aspiration level models of Equations (8-10) into the trade-off structure of Equations (4-7). First, however, it will be useful to describe the data we used in the estimation process.

#### **Data Considerations**

There are two versions of the president's budget, one expressed in present-year outlays (actual expenditures), the other expressed in new budget authority for the present and future years. Because the need for fiscal restraint is most apparent in current year outlays, we have based our analysis on this version of the president's budget. We have also included trust-fund receipts (e.g., FICA) and trust-fund outlays (e.g., Social Security) for all the years in our sample, namely FY 1955-1980. (Before FY 1968, trust-fund activities were separately recorded.)

Data for most of the variables of interest were taken from *The Budget of the United States Government*, prepared each year for submission to Congress. This document records the president's budget, The variables coded directly from it were  $R_b$   $PD_t$ ,  $PN_t$ ,  $PT_t$ ,  $\hat{D}_{t-1}$ , and  $\hat{N}_{t-1}$ . The latter two variables are estimates for fiscal t-1 outlays, rather than final figures, since fiscal year t-1 is less than four months old at the time when the president submits his fiscal year t budget to Congress.

The other variables in our model were based on other sources. We defined a recession year as any year in which there were at least two quarters marked by the absence of real growth in GNP. The  $\hat{S}_{t-1}$  and  $\Delta \hat{W}_t$  variables posed the greatest difficulties. Ideally,  $\hat{S}_{t-1}$  should represent U.S. policymakers' perceptions of the degree of Soviet threat, not necessarily measured in monetary terms. In practice, there is no widely accepted measure of the magnitude of the Soviet threat. Here we use a time series taken from estimates presented by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in its yearly publication, *The Military Balance*. These figures provide at best a

crude proxy to the threat perceived by various U.S. officials.

The  $\Delta \widetilde{W}_t$  variable is intended to reflect anticipated changes in the level of U.S. combat activity. Again, this is an unobservable factor. As a proxy for these expectations we used  $\Delta \widetilde{W}_t = KIA_{t-1} - KIA_{t-2}$ , where  $KIA_t$  denotes the number of U.S. servicemen killed in action in calendar year t. For a detailed justification of this index, see Fischer and Crecine (1981).

The final data issue concerns the use of real versus nominal (current year) dollars. The budget is prepared in terms of nominal dollars. So behavioral realism suggests that the models be formulated in the nominal units actually considered by decision makers. (Only in the late 1970s were defense budgets "indexed" to inflation.) But budget models formulated in nominal terms can be criticized on the grounds that much of their apparent explanatory power arises from the inevitably high correlations between variables subject to the same underlying rate of inflation. Worse, estimates based on nominal dollars suffer from the high degree of multicollinearity present in undeflated time series. Our solution has been to obtain two sets of parameter estimates, one based on real dollar data and the other based on nominal dollar data. In deflating our data to obtain real dollar time series, we assumed that policymakers simply extrapolate the inflation rate that prevails in calendar year t-2, the year in which the fiscal year t budget is prepared. The price deflator series we used for this purpose was for "Federal government purchases of goods and services," using 1972 as a base year.9

#### **Estimation Method**

One can substitute equations (8-10) into Equations (4-7) yielding the following:

$$PD_{t} = -\alpha_{1}\beta_{1}\hat{N}_{t-1} + \delta_{1}(1-\beta_{1})\hat{D}_{t-1} + \delta_{2}(1-\beta_{1})\hat{S}_{t-1} + \delta_{3}(1-\beta_{1})\Delta \tilde{W}_{t} + \gamma_{1}\beta_{1}\tilde{R}_{t} + \gamma_{2}\beta_{1}TIME_{t} * \tilde{R}_{t} + \gamma_{3}\beta_{1}REC_{t} * \tilde{R}_{t} + \pi_{a,t}$$
(11)

\*See Fischer and Crecine (1979, 1981). Note that although there are great difficulties in transforming Soviet outlays to dollar figures due to (among other things) different relative prices for items of expenditure and different definitions of what constitutes the Soviet military, all that is really required here is that the yearly changes in overall expenditures be adequately captured.

<sup>9</sup>The Economic Report of the President, 1980, Table B-3.

$$PN_{t} = \alpha_{1}(1 - \beta_{2})\hat{N}_{t-1} + \delta_{1}(-\beta_{2})\hat{D}_{t-1} + \delta_{2}(-\beta_{2})\hat{S}_{t-1} + \delta_{3}(-\beta_{2})\Delta \tilde{W}_{t} + \gamma_{1}\beta_{2}\tilde{R}_{t} + \gamma_{2}\beta_{2}TIME_{t} * \tilde{R}_{t} + \gamma_{3}\beta_{2}REC_{t} * \tilde{R}_{t} + \pi_{b,t}$$
(12)

$$PT_{t} = \alpha_{1}(1 - \beta_{3})\hat{N}_{t-1} + \delta_{1}(1 - \beta_{3})\hat{D}_{t-1} + \delta_{2}(1 - \beta_{3})\hat{S}_{t-1} + \delta_{3}(1 - \beta_{3})\tilde{\Delta}W_{t} + \gamma_{1}\beta_{3}\tilde{R}_{t} + \gamma_{2}\beta_{3}TIME_{t} * \tilde{R}_{t} + \gamma_{3}\beta_{3}REC_{t} * \tilde{R}_{t} + \pi_{c,t}$$
(13)

$$PT_t = PD_t + PN_t \tag{14}$$

where

$$\pi_{a,t} = (1 - \beta_1)\epsilon_{a,t} - \beta_1\epsilon_{b,t} + \beta_1\epsilon_{c,t} + \mu_{1,t}$$
 (15)

$$\pi_{b,t} = -\beta_2 \epsilon_{a,t} + (1 - \beta_2) \epsilon_{b,t} + \beta_2 \epsilon_{c,t} + \mu_{2,t}$$
(16)

$$\pi_{c,t} = (1 - \beta_3)\epsilon_{a,t} + (1 - \beta_3)\epsilon_{b,t} + \beta_3\epsilon_{c,t} + \mu_{3,t}.$$
 (17)

Equation system (11-14) is a simultaneous equation system without any unobserved variables. It is nonlinear in its parameters and, as Equation (14) indicates, the dependent variables are constrained. All of the  $\beta$ ,  $\alpha$ ,  $\delta$ , and  $\gamma$  parameters are identifiable. 10 As shown in McGuire et al. (1968), one can efficiently estimate the parameters of such an equation system by dropping any one of Equations (11), (12), or (13) and performing simultaneous equation system maximum likelihood estimation. (Equation (14) makes one of the first three equations superfluous, derivable in its entirety from the other two.) Maximization was done with respect to the  $\alpha_i$ ,  $\beta_i$ ,  $\gamma_i$ , and  $\delta_i$  parameters and the components of the variancecovariance matrix of the  $\pi$ 's.<sup>11</sup> Asymptotic standard errors for the parameter estimates were based on the inverse of the information matrix.12

<sup>10</sup>For proof of identifiability in Equations (11-14), as well as for the CALM model in general, see Frank and Kamlet (1983).

"Although  $\beta_i$  parameters are in the variance-covariance matrix of the  $\pi$ 's, they are underidentified. As such, their presence in the variance-covariance matrix does not add information in the estimation either of themselves or the variance-covariance components, and the asymptotic consistency and efficiency of maximum likelihood remains unaltered.

<sup>12</sup>Estimation was performed using LSQ, a nonlinear least squares procedure in the *Time Series Processor* package, Version 3.4.

#### **Estimation Results**

The Allocation Model Parameters. The parameters of Equations (11-14) were estimated using both real and nominal dollar data for the time period fiscal year 1955 to fiscal year 1980. Although the two sets of estimates are generally quite similar (they never differ significantly from one another), the estimates based on real dollars are (as anticipated) slightly more precise in the sense that the ratios of coefficients to their asymptotic standard errors tend to be larger for the real estimates. Thus, the discussion and analysis that follow focus on the real dollar estimates in Table 1.

In interpreting the CALM coefficients, it is first important to determine whether  $TMAX_t$ , the upper bound of fiscally acceptable expenditures, is greater or less than the sum of the minimum expenditure aspirations,  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$ . In fact, the coefficients in Table 1 imply that  $TMAX_t$  exceeded  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$  in 22 of the 26 years considered (and in 18 of the 19 non-Eisenhower years). So 85% of the time the estimated zone of contention is positive and in all four exceptions, the estimate of  $(DMIN_t + NMIN_t) - TMAX_t$  is small (less than \$2 billion twice, \$6 billion and \$7 billion the other two times). Thus, our discussion

of the estimation results assumes that the zone of contention involves a positive surplus.

The estimates of  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2$ , and  $\beta_3$  all differ significantly from 0.13 The estimate of  $\beta_3$  is .31, indicating that approximately 30% of the zone of contention is allocated to expenditures beyond the minimal aspiration levels for defense and nondefense outlays. The remaining 70% is in effect used to reduce the size of the deficit from what it would be if  $PT_t$  were to equal  $TMAX_t$ . On the one hand this would seem to suggest that the executive branch has displayed a strong degree of fiscal restraint. Yet we estimate the sum of defense and nondefense aspirations to come close to available revenues. On average,  $DMIN_t + NMIN_t$  is estimated to be within \$1 billion of  $R_t$  (all measured in 1972 dollars). When  $TMAX_t - DMIN_t -$ NMIN, is large, substantial deficits can result even though  $\beta_3$  is only .31.

 $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  are estimated at .083 and .229, respec-

<sup>13</sup>Throughout the following discussion, we will refer to a parameter as statistically significant if it is significantly different from 0 at a 95% confidence level based on the asymptotic standard error and the corresponding *t*-statistic. (Note that this discussion refers to our estimates of *TMAX<sub>b</sub> DMIN<sub>b</sub>* and *NMIN<sub>t</sub>*.

Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results

Parameter	R	eal estimates		Nominal estimates		
	Estimate	SE	t	Estimate	SE	t
Trade-offs						
$eta_1$	.083	.039	2.12	.045	.033	1.37
$\beta_2$	.229	.065	3.51	.164	.080	2.05
$\beta_3$	.312	.092	3.37	.208	.106	1.96
Defense						
$\delta_1$	.964	.019	50.8	.954	.017	56.9
$\delta_2$	.059	.042	1.39	.053	.040	1.32
$ \delta_2 $ $ \delta_3 $	1.322	.206	6.40	1.220	.198	6.16
Nondefense						
$\alpha_1$	1.024	.053	19.4	.983	.072	13.6
Total						
$\gamma_1$	1.060	.099	10.7	1.214	.274	4.44
$\gamma_2$	.013	.004	2.98	.018	.011	1.62
γ3	.090	.036	2.46	.119	.065	1.83
Statistics	R <sup>2</sup>	SER	d	R <sup>2</sup>	SER	d
Defense	.942	2.18	2.07	.996	1.63	2.44
Nondefense	.996	3.93	2.18	.999	3.90	2.19
Total	.994	5.01	2.46	.999	4.65	2.50

tively. These estimates indicate that defense and nondefense each receive their minimal aspirations plus a share of the zone of contention of 8% and 23%, respectively. Or, equivalently, of the 31% of the zone of contention that is allocated to defense and nondefense, defense receives 27% and nondefense 73%.

The Aspiration Level Model Parameters, Consider first the defense aspiration level model (Equation 8). The estimated value of  $\delta_1$  is .964, which indicates that, controlling for Soviet actions and the effects of active combat involvement, defense expenditure aspirations are almost equal to previous year outlays, a result quite consistent with the notion that previous year expenditures serve as the budgetary base. The actionreaction coefficient,  $\delta_2$ , is estimated to be .059, which does not differ significantly from 0 at the 95% confidence level. Nonetheless, the sign of  $\delta_2$ is consistent with the action-reaction hypothesis, and the estimated magnitude of  $\delta_2$  is not substantially different from estimated reaction coefficients in Richardson models of actual presidential defense budget requests (Fischer & Crecine, 1981; Ostrom, 1978). Moreover, although a reaction coefficient of .059 may appear small, it should be kept in mind that once an adjustment is made, it becomes built into the defense base and is carried over into future years. Also, in recent years, when Soviet expenditures have been estimated to be much greater than U.S. expenditures, the stimulus on U.S. defense spending could be substantial. Although the present findings do not constitute strong support for the action-reaction hypothesis, they are compatible with it. The estimated value of  $\delta_3$  is 1.322 which indicates that each incremental anticipated combat death produces roughly a \$1.3 million response in proposed defense expenditures. This estimate is similar to that obtained by Fischer and Crecine (1981).

Turning next to the nondefense aspiration model, the estimated value of  $\alpha_1$  is 1.024, which does not differ significantly from 1. This estimate indicates that nondefense aspirations have been quite modest. Again, the result is also consistent with the notion that the previous year's actual expenditure level serves as the base in the presidential budgeting process.

Turning finally to the fiscal aspiration model, the estimated values of  $\gamma_1$  and  $\gamma_2$  together indicate the extent to which maximum acceptable total expenditures are permitted to exceed the anticipated level of revenues. The estimated value of  $\gamma_1$  is 1.06, implying an expenditure level 6% in excess of anticipated revenues in FY 1967 when the TIME variable has a value of 0. The estimated value of  $\gamma_2$  is .013, and differs significantly from 0 at the 95% confidence level. This finding indicates a significant relaxation in the fiscal constraint

between FY 1955 and 1980, at an annual rate of approximately 1.3% of (real) revenues. Combined with our estimate of  $\gamma_1$ , this indicates that modest surpluses were aspired to during the Eisenhower years, which served to constrain tightly expenditure aspirations. In fact, the estimates of  $DMIN_t$ +  $NMIN_t$  exceeded  $TMAX_t$  in three of the eight Eisenhower years, and all four years of our sample in which surpluses were aspired to (years in which  $TMAX_t \leq R_t$ ) were during the Eisenhower administration. By the end of our sample period, however, large deficits were viewed as at least minimally acceptable. In FY 1980,  $\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 TIME$ = 1.23, indicating that  $TMAX_t$  exceeded available revenues by roughly 23%. Finally,  $\gamma_3$  is estimated to be .090, implying that recessions provoke greater-than-normal acceptable expenditure levels, with the increment being roughly equal to 9% of anticipated revenues. Again this effect is significantly different from 0.

Taken as a whole, a coherent and plausible story emerges concerning the nature of macrobudgetary decision making in the executive branch over the postwar period. Minimal aspiration levels for defense and nondefense expenditures were closely related to the previous year's levels of expenditure, being modified for defense by the level of active combat and, possibly, by Soviet defense spending. In general, these minimal aspirations were fully met.14 In addition to base levels of expenditure, defense and nondefense received a proportion of the zone of contention, nondefense receiving substantially more than defense. The zone of contention grew over the period as a result of an increasingly lax maximum allowable expenditure total. This may have been the result of greater reliance on discretionary fiscal policy or of greater pressures for domestic spending. Fiscal policy was clearly expansionary in the aftermath of recessions.

Evaluation of Model Fit. One criterion for assessing the validity of CALM is the reasonableness of the resulting parameter estimates. As the above discussion indicates, the estimates actually obtained were well within the theoretically permissible range and have meaningful substantive interpretations that are compatible with previous theoretical and empirical work in the budgeting area. Thus, CALM performs well in this respect. Goodness-of-fit provides a second criterion for evaluating CALM. As the  $R^2$  and standard error

<sup>14</sup>For 21 of the 22 years for which  $TMAX_t - DMIN_t - NMIN_t > 0$ ,  $PT_t$  was less than  $TMAX_t$ . In the other year it exceeded  $TMAX_t$  by only \$2 billion. Similarly, in 19 of these 22 years,  $PD_t$  exceeded  $DMIN_t$ , and was always within \$2 billion of  $DMIN_t$ . And in 21 of these 22 years,  $PN_t$  exceeded  $NMIN_t$ , falling short in the one other case by only \$2 billion.

statistics at the bottom of Table 1 show, CALM provides an excellent fit to the data. Good fits are not uncommon in the budgeting literature, but CALM's ability to fit even deflated budget data is exceptional.

A final, and perhaps the strongest criterion for evaluating CALM is to compare the CALM specification with a more general class of specifications. In particular, one might accept that fiscal, defense, and domestic priorities interact and that the variables we have specified are important influences on actual budgetary totals, but believe that these variables interact in some different way. Our final equation system, Equations (11-14), implies that the independent variables of our model influence the dependent variables in very particular ways. Discarding one of the equations, for example, Equation (13) (recall that the constraint (Equation 14) makes one of the equations superfluous), there are a total of 14 righthand variables in the remaining two equations. The CALM specification restricts these 14 parameters to be (nonlinear) functions of 10 parameters (three  $\beta$ 's, one  $\alpha$ , three  $\delta$ 's, and three  $\gamma$ 's). Actually, because  $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = \beta_3$ , there are only 9 free parameters in the CALM specification presented.

We can explicitly test the hypothesis that the 14 parameters of the unconstrained version of Equations (11) and (12) are indeed functions of the 9 underlying parameters of the CALM specification. This is a strong hypothesis; it amounts to contending that one cannot significantly better predict PN, PD, and PT by any other set of restrictions on the parameters of the right-hand variables in Equations (11-14) (including the case of imposing no restrictions whatsoever). One can test this hypothesis by imposing no restrictions on the right-hand variable parameters at all and comparing the results with those obtained under the CALM restrictions. One can then compute the logarithm of the ratio of the likelihood functions obtained for the constrained and unconstrained specifications, and perform a likelihood ratio test. Asymptotically, -2 times the ratio of the likelihood functions has a  $\chi^2$  distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the dimensionality of the constraints imposed under the null hypothesis, which is 5 in this case. (CALM restricts the number of free parameters from 14 to 9.) Running this test, the logarithm of the likelihood function for the CALM specification is -487.673. The logarithm of the likelihood function for the unconstrained estimation, allowing 14 free parameters, is -485.014. Twice the difference in these logarithms is the log-likelihood ratio statistic, which here is 5.32. The critical value for a  $\chi^2$  distribution with 5 degrees of freedom at the 95% confidence level is 13.28. Thus the CALM model passes this test, and we can accept the hypothesis that all of

the CALM-imposed parameter constraints hold, and that one could not significantly improve the prediction of *PD*, *PN*, and *PT* values for the time period examined by any other set of parameter constraints.

Implications for Other Models of Presidential Budgeting. One of the strengths of the CALM formulation is that it includes many of the primary models of executive branch budgeting as special cases that can be empirically tested in terms of the parameters of the CALM equations. Our parameter estimates imply that DMIN, and NMIN<sub>t</sub> correspond closely to last year's level of expenditure and that, with very few exceptions, these minimal aspirations are satisfied. These results are consistent with the incrementalist view of budgeting. On the other hand,  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$  are both significantly greater than 0, which indicates that there has been a significant influence of fiscal and domestic policy on defense expenditures and a significant influence of fiscal and defense policy on domestic expenditures. This result is in contrast to the assumptions of the independent processes models and the "requirement" models that hold that one of the Great Identity components, defense, nondefense, or total expenditures, comes off the top and is unaffected by the other two.

The results do not support one implication of the shares-of-the-planned-change model; that  $\beta_2$ = 1. The fiscal aspiration level  $(TMAX_t)$  is not exactly satisfied. The parameter estimates are compatible with the share-of-the-planned-change model, however, in that last year's expenditures do correspond closely to  $DMIN_t$  and  $NMIN_t$ , and in that both models portray PD and PN as being the result of some base level of expenditure plus a fraction of a zone of contention. Indeed, the relative size of the zone of contention going to defense and nondefense is estimated by Fischer and Crecine (1981)'s shares-of-the-plannedchange model at .23, quite comparable to CALM's estimate of .27. CALM and the sharesof-the-planned-change formulation may be reconciled as follows. The shares-of-the-change model assumes that the planned total in the president's budget,  $PT_t$ , is precisely specified before any decisions are made concerning  $PD_t$  and  $PN_t$ , and that the implied change (usually growth) is then divided between defense and nondefense. In CALM, defense and nondefense aspirations, as well as fiscal considerations, affect the size of the total. But (given our parameter estimates), the process normally generates a total that exceeds minimal defense plus nondefense aspirations, so defense and nondefense compete for shares of this fiscal surplus in a manner that is essentially equivalent to competition for the planned growth in the shares-of-the-change model.

The CALM results can be related to recent

works by Domke, Eichenberg, and Kelleher (1983) and by Russett (1982). Both analyses differ from ours in important respects. In considering trade-offs between defense and nondefense expenditures, both restrict themselves to subsets of nondefense expenditures. Both also consider the combined budgetary effects of Congress and the executive branch. Domke et al. (1983) use a recursive simultaneous equation framework that prejudges the causal interactions among defense, welfare, and fiscal policy priorities. Like Fischer and Crecine (1981), they assume that total expenditures are determined exogenously. Total expenditures influence welfare expenditures, and both influence defense expenditures. Russett uses ordinary least squares regressions of domestic program expenditures on military (and other program) expenditure levels and on a variety of exogenous variables. This can result in simultaneity problems if one wishes to interpret the parameter estimates causally and ignores any independent influence of fiscal policy. Both studies find an absence of trade-offs between defense and nondefense expenditures. The CALM analysis is both broadly consistent with and helps shed light on these results. As the CALM framework emphasizes, the real trade-off is not between guns and butter, but among defense, nondefense, and fiscal objectives.

Our estimation results support the contention that fiscal policy constraints have systematically given way to spending pressure over the postwar period. Still, the results certainly do not suggest that fiscal policy considerations have capitulated entirely to nondefense and defense programmatic priorities.  $\beta_3$  is estimated at only .31, indicating that most of the zone-of-contention is used to reduce the size of the deficit. Coupled with minimal defense and domestic aspirations that are tightly linked to last year's level of spending, the results indicate that the executive branch is an engine of only moderate budgetary growth, even toward the end of the sample period.

How is this finding reconcilable with the large levels of real growth experienced over this period, especially for nondefense programs? (Nondefense programs have grown in real terms from \$57 billion in FY 1955 to \$265 billion in FY 1980.) To answer this, one must recall that Equations (4-10) separate executive branch effects from congressional effects on the size of expenditures. Congress enters the loop by modifying (usually increasing) presidential budgetary requests (PD, and PN<sub>t</sub>) which alters (usually increases) actual expenditures  $(D_t$  and  $N_t$ ) that serve as the base for the next year's budgetary cycle. Over the period from FY 1955 to 1980, of the \$208 billion in real growth in nondefense programs, \$176 billion was the result of changes to the budget after it had been presented to Congress. Over the same period, the executive branch proposed, in net, increases of only \$31.9 billion over the previous year's budget as enacted by Congress, which underscores the importance of analyzing both congressional and executive budgeting to understand fully the growth of the federal sector in the United States in the postwar period. Congress, not the executive branch, has been the primary engine of growth in nondefense outlays.

Qualifications. As with any statistical analysis of macrophenomena, a number of caveats are in order with respect to the above results. It is clear that the equations specifying aspiration levels are simplified, owing to the difficulty of estimating parameters in Equations (11-14) and the limited degrees of freedom available for estimating additional parameters. Although Equations (8-10) capture much of the flavor of earlier models that have dealt with defense, domestic, and fiscal policy separately, our equations necessarily omit more refined influences that may be of substantive interest.

It can also be argued that the specifications put forth above have parameters that may have varied substantially across administrations. This argument is undermined by the precision of the parameter estimates and the overall goodness of fit of the equation system, even when estimated in real (versus nominal) terms. Also, we have tried various specifications involving administration or party effects or both, but were unable to detect any significant effects. Table 2 lists the residuals from the estimation for PT, PN, and PD. As this table indicates, there do not appear to have been great political effects of party or administration during the period studied (other than those captured by the time trend in the fiscal policy specification). It might be conjectured that the Reagan administration finally does mark a major shift from budgetary parameters that have prevailed since Eisenhower took office. The truth of this hypothesis will be revealed in time. The CALM framework makes it easier to test.

Third, the present CALM formulation assumes that revenue and tax policy are, to a first approximation, exogenous to the normal executive branch budgetary process. The infrequency of major restructurings of the tax system by the executive branch and the time involved in enacting major tax legislation<sup>13</sup> are consistent with this perspective. Nonetheless, we find this assumption to be the weakest of those employed here and hope to do further research to allow tax policy to be at least partially endogenous.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between

<sup>13</sup>See Schick (1980).

Table 2. Model Residuals<sup>a</sup>

Fiscal Year	President	Defense	Nondefense	Totalb
1955	DDE	-3.3	6	-3.9
1956	DDE	6	-1.8	-2.4
1957	DDE	1.9	1.6	3.4
1958	DDE	4.2	2.2	6.4
1959	DDE	.5	-1.4	9
1960	DDE	1	-2.7	-2.8
1961	DDE	-1.0	8	-1.9
1962	DDE/JFK <sup>c</sup>	.6	-4.8	-4.2
1963	JFK	1.4	.7	2.0
1964	JFK	4.2	4.0	8.2
1965	LBJ	-1.9	-1.3	-3.2
1966	LBJ	-3.3	5.7	2.4
1967	LBJ	-2.2	-2.2	-4.4
1968	LBJ	.8	1.2	2.0
1969	LBJ	-1.9	-8.3	-10.2
1970	LBJ/RMN <sup>c</sup>	3.6	1	3.5
1971	RMN	-3.7	-1.2	-4.8
1972	RMN	1.9	6.7	8.6
1973	RMN	-1.1	3.3	2.1
1974	RMN	7	1.1	.4
1975	RMN	1	3.4	3.2
1976	GRF	.6	7.7	8.4
1977	GRF	8	-7.6	-8.4
1978	GRF/JEC <sup>c</sup>	3.0	-2.1	.9
1979	JEC	.8	3.6	4.3
1980	JEC	-1.7	-5.3	-7.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Actual-Predicted, in billions of real (1972) dollars.

"process" and "outcome" oriented theories of the budgetary process. CALM is outcome oriented. We do not intend to suggest that CALM mirrors the details of the actual bureaucratic and political processes that generate the president's budget. The aspiration levels posited by CALM are unobservable. They should not be construed as publicly stated bargaining positions. In fact, an actor who held them would be foolish to reveal them honestly. Rather, we view the aspiration levels as providing the context around which the larger budgetary game revolves. CALM's exceptional ability to forecast actual budgetary decisions retrospectively lends credence to its assumptions concerning the general structure of the budgetary process and the most important determinants of behavior within this structure, but with two exceptions says relatively little about the actual details of the decision-making process. The exceptions are, first, the observation that both  $\beta_1$ and  $\beta_2$  are greater than 0, which casts doubt on independent process and requirements models; and, second, the observation that  $\beta_3 < 1$ , which casts doubt on process theories that hold that presidential budgeting is a strict top-down process at the macrolevel. These strict top-down explanations (e.g., Fischer and Crecine, 1981) hold that decisions about the total  $(PT_t)$  precede and constrain all subsequent decisions about components of the total (e.g.,  $PD_t$  and  $PN_t$ ). On the other hand, our results simply do not bear on the question of whether microbudgetary decisions (about the division of  $PD_t$  and  $PN_t$ ) proceed in a strict top-down fashion as suggested by Crecine (1975), Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine (1980) and Kamlet and Mowery (1980). This view rests on the empirical observation that macroplanning targets for total defense  $(PD_t)$  and nondefense  $(PN_t)$  expenditures are established early in the planning cycle, and change little thereafter. Microdecisions about specific agencies and programs appear to adapt to these macrolevel targets. Our results neither support nor challenge this characterization of the microbudgetary process. They simply do not bear on the issue.

In general, the estimation results are largely compatible with what is known of the process of executive branch budgeting. Despite the ultimate

bBecause of rounding error, the residual for total outlays does not always equal the sum of the residuals for the parts.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>c</sup>Presidential election transition year.

interdependence of fiscal, defense, and domestic policy, the policy-making processes proceed largely independently (Crecine, 1971, 1975; Mowery, Kamlet, and Crecine, 1980). Actors in each policy stream focus primarily on a parochial set of concerns, with expenditure desires being tempered by general expectations about the constraints that other macrobudgetary components will impose. Coordination among macrobudgetary priorities does not take place continually, only periodically, and then at very high levels, usually presidential. This description is broadly compatible with the CALM assumptions that there are separate aspiration levels for each of these policy areas and that actual allocations are the result of a competition among these policy areas for available funds.

In short, the analyses described above do not address every issue that has been of interest to budgetary theorists, and estimation considerations have forced us to use a relatively simple model specification. Nonetheless, the issues that are addressed are important ones, and the specifications used include the most important variables identified in previous statistical studies. The model fits the data extraordinarily well, and the estimated parameter values are all plausible. We believe that the estimation results reported provide important insights into the structure of budgetary aspirations and trade-offs during the Eisenhower-to-Carter era.

#### Conclusions

For too long, statistical investigations of executive branch budgeting have ignored the inescapable tension between defense, domestic, and fiscal policy objectives. <sup>16</sup> Such conflict is the very essence of budgetary politics. Absent the need for fiscal restraint, budgetary decision making would be easy, and budgetary politics would be dull, if not nonexistent. The logic of the Great Identity is inescapable, and budgetary decision making at the highest levels focuses on reconciling the conflicting demands of defense, domestic, and fiscal priorities.

The Competing Aspiration Levels Model (CALM) fills a void in the budgetary literature by providing an explicit statistical representation of both the sources of this conflict and the processes that resolve it. The particular specification embodied in Equations (4-7) and (8-10) provides an extremely accurate statistical account of presidential budgetary decisions between FY 1955 and

<sup>16</sup>Fischer and Crecine's (1979, 1981) Great Identity/ Shares of the Planned Change Model is an exception to this rule. But this model prejudges the trade-off issue by assuming that  $PT_t$  is determined before  $PD_t$  and  $PN_t$ . 1980, but the basic structure of CALM is very flexible. Alternative hypotheses about the determinants of defense, domestic, and fiscal policy aspirations can be investigated by altering the right-hand variables in Equations (8-10).

More generally, we view the Competing Aspiration Levels Model as a general framework for representing resource allocation processes in bureaucratic organizations. Organization theorists of the Carnegie school have traditionally appealed to the aspiration level concept to explain the formation of goals by organizational subunits (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1964). The Competing Aspiration Levels Model uses the aspiration level concept to provide a very general representation of macrolevel resource allocation processes. CALM should be applicable not only to federal budgeting, but to state and local budgeting as well. It may even be applicable to some multi-unit businesses and nonprofit organizations. Nonetheless, the most interesting application is to presidential budgeting. In this context, CALM provides a general framework for testing a wide range of hypotheses relating to arms race phenomena, the growth of government, the impact of elections on budgeting, revenue policy, the fiscal impact of war, and trade-offs between defense, domestic, and fiscal policy objectives.

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## Exposure to Information, Belief Integration, and Individual Responsiveness to Agenda Change

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This article examines individual responsiveness to the media's changing political agenda during the years from 1964 to 1980. In the context of a dynamic model, the data indicate that responsiveness is positively associated with education, political interest, and a social motivation to attend to public affairs. A two-component model, in which heightened involvement increases individuals' exposure to information but also decreases their receptivity to the impact of the messages, is considered in a multivariate analysis. Although the results are only suggestive, the exposure function appears to operate for all three variables, whereas the inhibitions owing to the integration of previous information are evident only for political interest. Some speculations are offered about how these results may elaborate models of democratic public choice.

The study of democratic practice requires an explicit consideration of the dynamics of elitemass linkages. The analysis presented here focuses on citizen responsiveness. It describes the speed with which citizens adjust to changes in the elite political agenda presented in the mass media. Under successively more elaborate theoretical assumptions, the data from election surveys of the past two decades indicate that the skills and motivations that condition individuals' contact with their information environment shape citizen responsiveness. The results also suggest (although more conditionally) that the manner in which citizens integrate information into their world view is more inductive and associational than deductive or ideological in its character.

The idea of studying citizen responsiveness to media messages about the political agenda is motivated by an understanding of the role the political agenda plays in determining democratic outcomes (see, for example, Cobb & Elder, 1972; Crenson, 1971; Dahl, 1966; or more formally, Davis, Hinich & Ordeshook, 1970; Downs, 1957). It is well known that citizens' agendas are largely set by the media (Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; Funkhouser, 1973; MacKuen, 1981; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McLeod & Byrnes, 1974; Stone & McCombs, 1981; Tipton, Haney & Basehart, 1975; Watt & van den Berg, 1981;

Received: April 4, 1982

Revision received: June 6, 1983

Accepted for publication: June 28, 1983


I should like to thank my colleagues James Alt, Barry Ames, Randall Calvert, John Sprague, and Kenneth Shepsle for their comments on an earlier version. Three anonymous referees also provided helpful suggestions. Of course, all remaining errors of interpretation are my own.

Winter & Eyal, 1981). The additional observation that explicit media messages can alter these issue weights more easily than they can change concrete evaluations (at least in the short run—for summaries of an extensive literature see Klapper, 1960; Kraus & Davis, 1976; O'Keefe & Atwood, 1981) suggests that the agenda-setting vein is potentially rich for examining the nature of responsiveness.

Although the broad outlines of the linkage are apparent, the character of citizen information processing that produces this empirical regularity is not well understood. This investigation examines the relationship between the skills and motivations with which citizens approach political messages and their ultimate responsiveness to agenda change in the press. Most existing evidence suggests that better educated and more highly motivated individuals will respond more decisively (Erbring, Goldenberg & Miller, 1980; McLeod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974; Shaw, 1977). However, a minority view holds that the greatest sensitivity (particularly around election time) can be found among the generally less educated and less interested (McCombs, 1977; McLeod, Becker & Byrnes, 1974). Further work on which factors affect responsiveness may reveal insights into 1) the character of agenda-related political understanding, and 2) the degree to which the electorate's ultimate voting choice is susceptible to short-term influence.

The analysis below is developed in three stages. The preliminary part describes briefly a conceptual model of responsiveness that takes into account theoretically contradictory exposure and integration expectations, and it suggests different skills and motivations that might affect political information processing, sets up a simple dynamic model of attitude change, and describes the data used for the empirical work. The second part

Figure 1. Impact Resulting from Combinations of Exposure and Integration



states more precisely how responsiveness may reflect the contrary exposure and integration effects of individuals' skills and motivation, and it develops an indirect strategy for estimating the inherently unobservable exposure and integration components. The third major part examines the empirical evidence about how responsiveness (as a composite of the contradictory components) is shaped by the skill and motivation variables. The section then provides estimates of the separate effects of the variables on exposure and integration. The last section of the article discusses two sorts of implications that the evidence might have for substantive political analyses.

#### The Nature of the Problem

#### A Two-Component Model .

The relationship between responsiveness and motivation may be incorporated into a more general model of an individual's sensitivity to his current environment and his reliance on past experience (Converse, 1966). As a first approximation consider two components: exposure and integration (see Figure 1). Exposure is contact. As individuals encounter (and understand) more of

the new information in their environment, they are more likely to absorb its content (Figure 1a). Thus, ceteris paribus, whatever increases this effectiveness of exposure will lead to a greater appreciation of the contemporary scene. Integration (Figure 1b) is a matter of fitting new ideas into old preconceptions; it reflects an understanding that individuals' retention of previous experience will immunize them against contemporary appeals and hence diminish their receptivity to any potential new impact. From a theoretical viewpoint, retention is shaped by the individuals' integration of new information into a broader framework which persists through time rather than their mere transient reaction to the message. Thus, to the extent to which the individuals' integrative capabilities guide their reactions to current events, the impact of their accumulated experience will be relatively high and their immediate responsiveness, their receptivity, may be thereby muted.

The two parts are confounded because factors such as political interest, education, and issue sensitivity are commonly related to both effectiveness of exposure and learning from the past. As McGuire (1973) has pointed out with regard to a wide range of personal attributes, information

must both be received and adopted before it has any impact, but the same factors that enhance reception may also inhibit adoption. For instance, if individuals involved with political affairs have lower information costs or anticipate greater benefits from acquiring more knowledge, they will be more likely to be effectively exposed to new messages. However, these more involved citizens will previously have accumulated more information and have developed a firmer cognitive and evaluative framework, so that any new messages that they encounter must compete against well-established preconceptions. They will resist the attitude changes implied by the new inputs. Overall, citizen responsiveness to any new information will depend on the relative impact of the exposure and integration factors and on how the factors are combined together.

Any number of patterns may be so generated. and two idealized types are illustrated in Figures 1c and 1d. On the left, the importance of effective exposure is dominant, and the curve describing contemporary impact climbs upward as the individuals' involvement grows. Such is the pattern that typifies the impact of purely informational messages in educating a public. The messages are encountered and understood most clearly by those with high cognitive skill and interest (Tichenor, Donohue & Olien, 1970), and find no resistance from what has already been learned. On the other hand, the curve on the right better represents the pattern for domains in which some sort of evaluative judgment is concerned. Mueller (1979), studying the reaction of the public's war expectations to fluctuations in the international environment. found that all sorts of people were sensitive to recent events, but only the better educated demonstrated any continued impact six months after those events. Similarly, the vote choices of the politically attuned are more closely associated with partisanship (an accumulation of past experience) than the choices of the less-interested individuals (Dreyer, 1971; Zukin, 1977). In both these cases members of the upper strata are expected to have processed as much political information as their less-involved friends. Their effective exposure will have been as high. However, by relying more heavily on the guidance of their past political learning, they found themselves to be relatively immune to the latest fashion. These investigations, as well as a number of others (Bybee et al., 1981; Converse, 1966; Kazee, 1981; Mueller, 1973; Weaver et al., 1981), suggest that the combined effects of exposure and learning may yield distinctly different curves for different types of subject matter and measures of involvement. There exists no general pattern. Even less well understood are the characters of the two underlying processes (here drawn in broken lines

to suggest their hypothetical nature), and how they interact to produce the composite result.

#### Skill, Motivation, and Responsiveness

What characteristics shape responsiveness? Among those affecting individuals' contact with their information environment are skills in dealing with symbolic material, personal motivations to follow politics, and incentives to gather information for social interaction. First, individuals' effective exposure to news content will depend on their capability and willingness to deal with abstract concepts. Formal education is a measure of such capabilities, perhaps as much for the selectivity of the screening process as for the effectiveness of the schooling itself. Almost everyone in the United States is capable of consciously registering the contents of a newspaper front page or the evening television news. However, in most cases this contact is fairly casual. Abstract reasoning skills affect the efficiency of this exposure. The ordinary expectation, then, suggests that more highly educated people should exhibit a greater level of effective exposure. On the other hand, owing to their better-developed analytic frameworks, these same persons should better integrate previous agenda judgments and thus show greater stability in their sense of priorities. People on the lower end of the education scale might be less effectively exposed to news content, but their agendas ought to be less securely anchored in the past. The relative weight of the two components, exposure and integration, will thus determine the pattern of the results.

Ease of understanding is only one determinant of differences in responsiveness. Another is personal motivation. Individuals who take a personal interest in public affairs, even if only as a spectator sport, will attend to its events more closely than will their uninterested neighbors. At the same time, the sheer amount of their past experience should also be much greater. Again, for the more attuned, a higher effective exposure rate and a simultaneously stronger integration factor are expected.

These skills and motivations are found within individuals. But participation in social activity and its resulting interactions might affect issue sensitivity, and this could happen in two ways—the classic sense that information is indirectly filtered down to a mass of opinion followers (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955), and the recent argument that the anticipation of discussions may motivate political attentiveness while a public testing of ideas shapes the nature and content of opinion (Noelle-Neuman, 1974, 1979). In particular, some evidence suggests that engaging in political conversations acts as a factor beyond personal

political interest in motivating attention to the press (Genova & Greenberg, 1979; Sohn, 1978; Tan, 1980). Like education and intrinsic interest, this social form of involvement predicts immediacy in reaction to political news, but also an associated immunity. Citizens may find new information more credible and influential when it is consistent with the views expressed by friends and neighbors. They may be more likely to reject media-carried agendas that challenge world views embedded in their social network. To be sure, this inhibition against discussing new ideas may not be as strong for agendas as for items of explicit emotional content. Nevertheless, whatever "integration" exists is derived from a social process—the way in which conversational groups define their topics of conversation and their perceptions of reality. An examination of individual responsiveness as a function of conversational incentives yields information about social rather than psychological motivations and social rather than psychological forms of cognitive organization and further completes the exposure-integration model.

#### Responsiveness: A General Model of Attitude Dynamics

Most of the studies of attitude and agenda change cited above make their inferences on the basis of a simple dynamic model, although its form is sometimes not explicitly specified. It posits that an attitude at any given time can be expressed as a function of the nature of the environmental conditions experienced by the individual and the strength of the previous attitude. For example, take the model for political agendas where  $C_t$  is the concern an individual has about an issue, and  $M_t$  is the proportion of news coverage devoted to the issue in the interval between measurements. The level of concern at any time can be expressed in a simple equation:

$$C_t = bM_t + dC_{t-1}. (1)$$

The term d represents the duration of the previous attitude and is sometimes referred to as a "memory" function of the past. Most of the correlational studies of attitudes over time focus on the last term (to see if attitude stability differs across individuals). Most of the media studies concentrate on the first term, treating the second (if at all) as a statistical artifact. As will be shown, neither of these tacks is completely off course.

When properly specified (and if d is less than unity—a condition that will obtain for stable systems), the parameters in equation (1) can be described as an exponentially declining distributed lag. Note that  $C_{t-1} = bM_{t-1} + dC_{t-2}$  and  $C_{t-2}$ 

=  $bM_{t-2}$  +  $dC_{t-3}$ , and so forth. Expanding equation (1) by replacing the previous levels of concern  $C_{t-\tau}$  (where  $\tau$  is the time lapse) with their function of  $M_{t-\tau}$  and  $C_{t-\tau-1}$  produces

$$C_t = b \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} d^{\tau} M_{t-\tau}, \tag{2}$$

This general form has been widely used as a conceptual model for political learning (see, or example, Fiorina, 1981; for a more general discussion, see Alt & Chrystal, 1983). A good recent example of an empirical analysis of this form can be found in Hibbs (1982a, b).

For estimation purposes it may be equivalently written

$$C_t = b M_t + d \hat{C}_{t-1} \tag{3}$$

where  $\hat{C}_{t-1}$  is endogenously generated as a function of the previous  $M_{t}$ . This sort of specification (either equation (2) or (3)) has an advantage over equation (1) in that it does not require a continuous observation on the  $C_{t}$ 's. Instead it relies on the history of the exogenous variable, in this case media coverage.

#### Observing Skill, Motivation, and Responsiveness

An empirical analysis of agenda dynamics as a function of skill and motivations thus requires occasional observations on citizens' agendas and

<sup>1</sup>A series of  $\hat{C}_{jt} = \hat{b}m_{jt} + \hat{d}\hat{C}_{jt-1}$  can be generated (with a starting condition for  $\hat{C}_{j0}$ ) and the values of  $\hat{b}$  and  $\hat{d}$  can be estimated by iterating on their values so as to minimize  $\sum (C_{jt} - \hat{C}_{jt})^2$  for all observable values of  $C_{it}$ . This is equivalent to equation (2) and has some computational advantages. See Box and Jenkins (1976) for a description of this strategy, or see MacKuen (1981) for further discussion of more complex matters. The starting conditions  $(\hat{C}_{j0})$  were estimated by taking the mean of four months' news coverage  $(\bar{m}_0 = m_{t-21} - m_{t-21})$  $m_{t-24}$ ) two years before the first observation in each series and applying the equilibrium gain coefficient (b/(1-d)), to get a reasonable approximation of public concern at that time. Given the dynamics estimated below, the maximum weight of the starting condition is 0.039 for the first observation, 0.0007 for the second, and of course less for the third. If the original conditions are not far wrong, their effects will not dominate the estimation. (Starting conditions of zero and b/(1-d)  $m_{t-24}$ , which are clearly less well anchored do not yield substantially different estimates.) This format has an additional modest advantage (over equation (1)) because it does not directly incorporate the autocorrelation in the disturbances (in  $C_{t-1}$ ) which bias the estimates of endogenous lag models (although the disturbances that affect both  $M_t$  and  $C_t$  will remain, perhaps desirably so).

their skills and motivations, and continuous readings on the associated media histories. This study uses the biennial election studies conducted from 1964 to 1980 by the SRC-CPS to sample the response of the issue concerns of the voting-age population of the United States to 20 years of varying news coverage of a broad set of issues, all prominent in their time. The set includes nine survevs and seven issue areas (unemployment and recession, inflation, civil rights, Vietnam, crime, campus unrest, and energy), each combination of which has associated with it a unique mediahistory of two years' news coverage. The variation in issue-media histories which can be examined reduces the threats to inference associated with specific issue-media combinations, and the large number of individuals (more than 14,000 for these analyses) reduces the error associated with a particular individual's life history.

The level of concern that any individual has about an issue was measured by his or her response to an open-ended question about the most important problem facing the nation or the government. Education was measured by the number of years in formal schooling, political interest by the respondents' self-assessment of how frequently they paid attention to political affairs, and social interaction by their reported attempts to engage in political persuasion.<sup>2</sup> The media his-

<sup>2</sup>The data were initially collected for other purposes by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan and provided through the facilities of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Obviously those institutions bear no responsibility for the inferences drawn here. Until 1970, and again in 1980, the respondent's agenda was tapped by a question that explicitly dealt with problems that the government should address. Otherwise, the items mimic the familiar Gallup phrasing. Although the overall response distributions of the two types of questions are not identical, the relative weight given to the included items (which dominated the national agenda and were clearly governmental) is not as likely to be warped by the change in format as such items as, for example, religious decay. Nevertheless, some error is probably directly attributable analyzing the responses to the different question stimuli.

An individual's concern with an issue is measured as the probability that he or she will volunteer that issue to the interviewer's question. If the problem is mentioned, it is scored one, otherwise zero. Each individual is given a score averaged for the class of individuals being studied at the particular time point—this is equivalent to scores of one and zero, it carries the same information, but eases estimation (see Amemiya, 1981). These are qualitative response variables and some assumption is necessary about the underlying probability function which generates mentions and non-mentions. The usual assumption is that the function is distributed logit or

tories were constructed from a number count of news magazine articles about the issues studied from 1960 to 1980. The numbers are an indicator of the fluctuations over time in general news content about various political issue areas.<sup>3</sup> The time

probit. Here the function is approximated linearly (the logit transfer was tested and did not fit the data better) which eases interpretability in the context of a more complicated theoretical model.

Education was assessed by self-report and broken down into five categories (grade school, some high school, high school, some college, and college graduates). Political interest comes from the respondents' self-reported attentiveness to "what's going on in government and public affairs . . . whether there's an election going on or not." The explicit emphasis on longterm rather than election-specific habits coupled with the fact that the observed distribution of responses has been fairly steady over time (about one-third in each the high and medium, and one-sixth in the low and very-low categories) enables its use as an indicator of the respondents' long-term political interest. Talking politics was indicated by respondents who had talked with someone to "show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates." The main problem here is that the indicator explicitly measures election-oriented conversational activity, not that dealing with the nature of political priorities. In order to correct for this shortfall, the 1976 respondents were asked whether they had talked with anyone about the problem they had volunteered as most important. Certainly more people chatted about problems facing the country (75%) than engaged in even informal electioneering (37%). However, almost everyone who had talked about a voting choice had also talked about political problems: only 4% of the entire sample talked partisan choice but not issues. Thus the persons marked as having special social motivations to follow politics around election time also carried those incentives to the issue domain. However, many not bending their partner's ear about the election were talking about political problems; the clarity of the distinction which needs to be measured may be obscured in the data available, and the strength of the variable's explanatory power may be diminished. Nevertheless, addressing the measurable social activity will at least provide a clue about the relative strength of social as opposed to individual motives and anchoring.

The timing of the survey measures is peculiar. They were conducted during election campaigns, periods when political information is unusually cheap and forceful. Further, none of the historical moments coincided with seismic shifts in the national political agenda. These factors may lead to an underestimate of the theoretically expected results: the identifiable effects outlined below may understate the importance of the skill-motivation variables.

'The counts were made on the basis (and are subject to indexing vagaries) of the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* entries for *Time, Newsweek,* and *U.S. News & World Report.* The issues examined here are unemployment and economy generally, inflation, racism

cuts are in month-long units, so that any short-term movement (resulting from medium differences) will be missed, but the general sweep of change will be picked up. The monthly time frame does, however, allow richer statements about dynamics than, for instance, quarterly or yearly measurements. Thus, each individual's response is associated with seven different media histories, each of which is constructed from dozens of monthly media measurements.<sup>4</sup>

Although rich in some aspects, this historical record is not perfect for present purposes. The results laid out below are complementary to those derived from laboratory research (for example, see Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder, 1982) and "natural" experimentation. Certainly more control over the conditions that lead to agenda change and better readings on theoretically interesting individual and social characteristics may produce more subtle understandings of the process. However, the SRC-CPS surveys do provide a unique opportunity to examine agenda change in a wide variety of contexts, and their analysis should yield parameter estimates of some interest for their own sake and which can serve as a guide for further exploration.

#### A More Precise Formulation

### Responsiveness as a Function of Exposure and Integration

The purpose of this study is to analyze how individual information processing is shaped by skills and motivations. Differences in the dynamics may

and civil rights, Vietnam, crime, campus unrest, and energy. The issue of dissatisfaction with government (Watergate) was not included because respondents' concern with that item during Nixon's decline might be confounded with their partisanship. Concern with the environment fluctuated over the period but was not easily modeled as a function of media coverage.

'Given the apparent dynamics (see Table 1) and the fact that the time points are separated by two years, each case history of media coverage appears to be an independent piece of information for this examination of agenda setting. That is, the relevant media input for individuals interviewed in 1968 does not overlap much with that affecting respondents in 1970. Interviews taken only a few months apart would share much of the same relevant history, and the sampling of media histories would represent less unique information than is possible with interviews taken over such wide intervals. The time frame is necessarily restricted by the sampling design of these surveys. Interviews were taken over a period of about six weeks, although most occurred in the month they were assigned. Thus a little additional imprecision is unavoidably introduced.

be assessed by estimating the parameters in equations (2) or (3) and modeling those differences as functions of the individual or social characteristics of moment. However, as they stand so far, the parameters are descriptive in nature—their theoretical implications are not immediately apparent. A little development can show that they are more meaningful than they may look.

What sorts of factors might increase an individual's (say, teacher's) concern C with issue i at time t, measured as the probability that she will mention the problem in a survey response? What sort of model might describe how media coverage might move  $\Delta C_{jt}$  in a positive direction? The literature suggests that the upward movement will depend on the proportion of media attention given to the issue at the time  $(M_{it})$ . Further, the effect of the available coverage on an individual will be governed by the probability that she will notice it and understand its implications—the effective exposure ( $\epsilon$ ). Thus the impact on the teacher might be  $\epsilon M_{it}$ . However, that impact is bounded (an individual can have a maximum probability of giving a response of only 1.0), which is equivalent to saying that her concern can only be increased to the extent to which she is also concerned about some other issues at the previous time. Because the sum of probabilities associated with all issues (including those not being examined) will be unity, the possible range of increase for issue j is one minus the previous level of concern about issue j:  $1-C_{it-1}$ . Now the impact of the new media coverage may be inhibited to the extent to which the individual has integrated those other concerns into her world view. Let the probability that the individual be set in her ways be expressed it (for integration) and the probability that the coverage, once received and understood, can effect a change be  $(1-\iota) = \rho$  a measure of receptivity to change (e for receptivity). Thus the maximum possible impact is  $\varrho(1-C_{jt-1})$ . The overall positive movement in the probability that she will mention the problem j may be expressed as the joint probability that she will effectively process the new information,  $\epsilon M_{jt}$ , and that she will adopt it,  $\pi(1-C_{|t-1})$ , or

$$\Delta^+ C_{it} = \epsilon M_{it} \cdot \varrho (1 - C_{it-1}). \tag{4}$$

Note that if the teacher is completely open to new ideas  $(\varrho = 1.0)$  and hadn't given issue j a previous thought  $(C_{jt-1} = 0)$ , then the effect is simply  $\epsilon M_{jt}$ . Similarly, if she is absolutely dogmatic  $(\varrho = 0.0)$  or already completely consumed by the issue in question  $(C_{jt-1} = 1.0)$ , then no increase in concern can occur.

Of course other messages in the environment may cause the individual to change the level of concern downward. For example, if the teacher were concerned about civil rights and suddenly the news were full of Vietnam stories, then she would be likely to change downward her weighting of civil rights in favor of the war. The probability of these other stories being appreciated is, of course,  $\epsilon$ , and their total weight is the proportion of all news coverage not devoted to issue j:  $(1-M_{jl})$ . The maximum amount that they may reduce her concern is the level she started out with  $(C_{jl-1})$ . This impact will, of course, be affected by her receptiveness to novel ideas  $\varrho$ . So the impact of all other coverage on the teacher's concern about issue j is the same sort of joint product:

$$\Delta^{-}C_{it} = -\epsilon(1 - M_{it}) \cdot \varrho(C_{it-1}). \tag{5}$$

This expression produces the memory parameter in equations (2) or (3) as a function of the individual's experience during the interval between observations rather than as a simple function of time's passage.

Combining the positive and negative terms (4) and (5) yields

It may be noted that one may specify an  $\epsilon$  and  $\varrho$ , which is unique to each issue (for example, an individual may be especially attentive to news about the war and loath to give up his concern about inflation). This produces a complex model of the form

$$\Delta C_{jt} = \epsilon_j M_{jt} \cdot (\Sigma \varrho_{jk} C_{kt-1}) - (\Sigma e_k M_{kt}) \cdot (\delta_{kj} C_{jt-1}).$$

For an excellent discussion of models of this sort (and ones more complex) see May (1973). Such coefficients are in principle measurable and might yield inferences about issue characteristics and individual cognitive structures. The model could be further developed if  $\epsilon$  and  $\varrho$  were specified as dependent on the level of  $C_{jt-1}$  (say, through self-selection processes). Both of these developments suggest themselves for further analysis, but the historical record is not up to the task. The purpose of the work presented below is to model responsiveness as parsimoniously as possible, with an understanding that interesting side issues remain to be explored.

The crucial assumption that enables the aggregation across issue domains in this study is that the issue-specific disturbances are independent of the theoretical factors that shape responsiveness. That is, if  $\epsilon_j = \epsilon + u_j$  and  $\varrho_j = \varrho + \nu_j$ , that  $E(\epsilon, u_j) = E(\varrho, \nu_j) = 0$ . This is, of course, an assumption about specification; however, its effects can be tested. A particularly troublesome aspect of the models being developed here is the underspecification of directly experiencable conditions in the individuals' personal lives which might influence their issue agendas. As has been shown elsewhere (MacKuen, 1981), this threat is greatest for the economic issue areas. With this in mind, the analyses were carried out eliminating unemployment and inflation. Although the parameter estimates bounce around a little (well within

$$\Delta C_{jt} = \epsilon M_{jt} \cdot \varrho(1 - C_{jt-1}) - \epsilon(1 - M_{jt}) \cdot \varrho(C_{jt-1})$$

or

$$\Delta C_{it} = \epsilon \varrho \, M_{it} - \epsilon \varrho \, C_{it-1}. \tag{6}$$

Applying the difference operator and adding  $C_{tt-1}$  to both sides produces

$$C_{jt} = \epsilon \varrho \, M_{jt} + (1 - \epsilon \varrho) C_{jt-1}. \tag{7}$$


The individual's dynamic behavior thus depends on the value of the responsiveness ( $\epsilon \varrho$ ) parameter. The implications of equation (7) are illustrated in Figure 2 for a low level of responsiveness (.14) and for one of higher magnitude (.33). The graph depicts the response of an individual to an idealized shift in media coverage of an issue which starts at zero and then jumps to 1.00 (which is to say that the press is completely full of such issue coverage). The amount of citizen concern  $C_t$ , measured on the vertical axis, is shown as it responds to the continuous coverage over time, marked on the horizontal. While the curves asymptotically approach 1.00, the differential speed in response is clear.

For estimation purposes, a problem arises because  $M_{jt}$  (the proportion of media coverage devoted to issue J) is not readily measurable. However, if it is assumed that total media coverage on all matters is constant through time (the reasonableness of which can be attested to by many frustrated editors who fight battles about

the standard errors given), the values were not changed much and their pattern remained constant. The results speak well for combining a number of issues in order to maximize the ratio of the theoretically interesting variation to the variation due to issue-specific disturbances. They also suggest that the issue-specific disturbances are relatively independent of the theoretical factors that determine responsiveness and that the given results are not too badly biased.

This issue is a little more complicated. Individuals may discount news stories about commonly covered items (e.g., the economy). In addition, the news coverage of news magazines may be weighted slightly differently from that of the more general media environment. An analysis, not shown, of the news magazines and the Washington Post, the New Orleans Times-Picayune, the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times from 1972 to 1976 suggested that the absolute levels of coverage of each issue varied with the particular publication, but that those levels move in concert over time. The term b thus includes an additional reweighting of issues coverage to reflect individual expectations or cross-source variations.

Figure 2. Dynamic Response in Concern to a 0-1 Step Function Input



(8)

fitting competing stories into a fixed newspaper, magazine, or television program), then  $M_{jt}$  may be written  $m_{jt}/M_{...}$ , a ratio of the observable amount of coverage and an unknown constant "newshole." Equation (7) becomes

$$C_{jt} = \epsilon \varrho \ (1/M_{..}) \ m_{jt} + (1 - \epsilon \varrho) C_{jt-1}$$
  
or letting  $b = (\epsilon \varrho/M_{..})$  and  $d = (1 - \epsilon \varrho)$ ,  
 $C_{jt} = b m_{jt} + d C_{jt-1}$ .

This is identical to equation (3). Happily, the expression yields a clean estimate of  $\epsilon \varrho$  (from d) which is not confounded with  $(M_{\cdot})$ , which is, strictly speaking, unknowable. Note, however, that  $\epsilon$  and  $\varrho$  counterbalance each other if they are negatively associated (as expected). Any observable differences in their products will considerably understate differences in their individual values.

These estimates of the  $\epsilon \varrho$  coefficients can serve two purposes. At the most direct level, they may indicate the relationship between responsiveness and citizen skills and motivations. Responsiveness may be expressed as a function of the theoretical variables:  $\epsilon \varrho = (1-d) = f(V)$ , where f is to be determined. Measuring differential responsiveness by itself will be a useful addition to an understanding of mass-elite dynamics. But the terms contain more information than that. By making appropriate assumptions, it will be possible to model the impact of skill and motivation on the underlying components.

# Exposure and Integration as a Function of Skill and Motivation

For this more ambitious purpose, the first step is developing a theoretical specification of how the skill-motivation variables are likely to translate into effective exposure and integration. The argument for equation (7) produced a composite  $\epsilon \varrho$  term for each class of individuals; the matter at hand is uncovering how exposure and integration can be expressed in terms of political interest, education, and conversational activity. Exposure may be written e(V) and integration i(V), where V represents the theoretical variables, but neither e(V) nor i(V) may be observed directly. However, because  $\rho = (1 - \iota)$  from equation (4) above, it follows that  $\epsilon \pi = f(V) - \epsilon(V) \cdot (1 - i(V))$ . Thus, if the functional forms of e(V) and i(V) can be determined, then they may be expressed in terms of  $\epsilon \varrho = f(V)$ , which is observable. Such expressions are not self-evident. The strategy used here is to introduce a minimal set of theoretical constraints on their functional forms in order to measure the relative slopes of exposure and integration with respect to skills and motivations.

The simplest guess, that the functions are roughly linear, cannot reproduce the general form of the data (see below), so some theoretically informed specification is required. Here the exposure function is laid out as having a quadratic form under the argument that as individuals learn about or get engaged in politics, they will be inclined to go even further. A logarithmic form is given to the integration function. This form is motivated by its use as a fundamental element in information theory as a representation of how past information gets organized. (See the Appendix for further discussion.) This introduction of the quadratic and logarithmic forms does not mean to state an exact formulation of the functions (which are likely to be more complex), but to produce parsimonious representations that are consistent with theoretical ideas of how they might look. The aim is to see how exposure and integration might be related to the theoretical variables, not to model those relationships in a precise way. Any inferences about these patterns must be broad gauged and suggestive rather than definitive in form.

This rough outline may be approximated by translating the responsiveness expression into the quadratic and logarithmic forms:

$$\epsilon \varrho = e(V) \cdot (1 - i(V))$$

or, as derived in the Appendix,

$$\epsilon Q = (K_e + \frac{1}{2}b_F F^2 + \frac{1}{2}b_E E^2 + b_T T) 
\cdot [1 - (K_i + c_F / d_F \log (1 + d_F F) 
+ c_E / d_E \log (1 + d_E E) + d_T T)].$$
(9)

for various combinations of Follow Politics (F), Education (E), and Talk Politics (T).

This estimation equation represents exposure as an additive combination of the two quadratic functions of follow politics and education plus an inseparable constant  $K_e$ , and information integration as an additive combination of the two logarithmic functions plus a constant  $K_l$ . The dichotomy for talking politics is also introduced to complete the specification, However, little can be done with the last variable other than to generate a simple pair of estimates.

#### **Empirical Results**

#### Evidence on Responsiveness

The estimates of the separate effects of education, follow politics, and talk politics on composite responsiveness are outlined in Table 1. They show empirically how far these skill and motivation variables affect how citizens respond

Table 1. Responsiveness to Media Agenda Change by Citizen Skill and Motivation

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	$\epsilon  ho$	
	(1-d)	
Education		.67
Grade school	.16 (.06)	
Some high school	.17 (.05)	
High school	.24 (.05)	
Some college	.23 (.06)	
College	.32 (.08)	
Follow politics		.69
Very low	.15 (.05)	
Low	.19 (.05)	
Medium	.21 (.05)	
High	.33 (.08)	
Talk politics		.69
Not talk politics	.21 (.05)	
Talk politics	.27 (.08)	

Notes. These estimates derive from estimating the concern of an individual at time t as a function  $C_{ijt} = b M_{it} + d C_{ijt-1}$  for each of the subclasses involved, where ep = (1-d). See text and equations (7,8) for details. Standard errors for the ep estimates are displayed in parentheses.

to changes in their political environment. They may also encourage the more demanding exposure-integration investigation. Table 1 (Education) displays the parameter estimates' for

The actual observations (of  $C_i$ ) used here are the proportions of the public who named the particular problem as "most important" for each level of skill and motivation for each year and each issue. This procedure retains the information that would result from running the analysis on the entire set of individual cases (scored zero or one), and is computationally more efficient. The analysis excludes from consideration readings taken when an issue was not at all on the public agenda (for example, energy before 1974). Although diminishing the apparent degrees of freedom for the analysis, this tactic avoids artificially boosting apparent explanatory power (and apparent precision in parameter estimation) which would ensue from predicting no issue concern when there is no media coverage. This prediction is, of course, sustained but it contains no novel information about dynamics. Thus the number of separate histories is 44 rather than 63 (nine surveys and seven issues) for each class of individuals.

Because the observed media content comes from news magazines and is scored in raw numbers of stories, some issue-specific scalar transformation of  $m_{jt}$  was necessary for it to reflect  $M_{jt}$ , the proportion of stories on issue (f) at time (f) which was available to the individual (see note 6). This was accomplished by estimating a scalar transform  $a_j$  such that  $\hat{C}_{jt} = \hat{a}_j(m_{jt} + m_{jt-1} + m_{jt-2} + m_{jt-3})/4$  for all individuals (regardless of subclassification). The results of the procedure acted as a starting estimate for the nonlinear-parameter models.

In addition, these results provide a check on the validity of the expression developed for equation (7). When

the dynamic model (7), estimated by equation (3), for each of five levels of formal schooling. Here the form of f, which relates education to responsiveness, is unconstrained:  $\epsilon \varrho$  is left free to vary for individuals of each education category. The parameter estimates suggest that the agendas of the better educated are more responsive to the

the  $\epsilon_{\ell}$  values are calculated from the estimated  $a_j$ 's and the b's from the estimation equation (8), they are in close accord with the  $\epsilon_{\ell}$  values estimated directly from the d's in equation (8) shown in Table 1. The indirect estimates are: (Education) .14, .17, .24, .23, .33; (Follow politics) .14, .18, .21, .32; (Talk Politics) .21, .26. The assumptions that produced equation (7) imply that  $b=(1-d)=\epsilon_{\ell}$  for each category of response type, a constraint not inherent in the more general dynamic model. The similarity of the separate estimates of  $\epsilon_{\ell}$  supports the theoretical motivations for exposure and integration that underlie this analysis.

Second-order dynamic models (with coefficients in the real domain) proved no better at representing the data than the simpler ones discussed in the text. This is not to say that further work on the nature of the causal process is likely to be fruitless; only that no alternatives jump out and demand their implementation. Technically, the model requires an iterative nonlinear estimation (a combination grid search and steepest descent convergence algorithm was used—for a description, see Ralston & Jenrich, 1978). The efficiency of the estimates takes into account probable heteroskedasticity in the disturbances due to theoretical measurement variance in the dependent variable—a form of weighted least squares was used in calculating the evaluation criterion.

media's message than are those of their fellows:  $\epsilon_Q$  for the college educated is .32, twice the value of .16 estimated for those with grade school education only.

The second conceptual item is motivation. The question is whether following politics (rather than a more general cognitive capability) generates a firmer organization of past experience and thus tempers the media's immediate impact. An estimation of the model's coefficients for separate groups corresponding to levels of interest yields Table 1 (Follows Politics). Again, the more involved individuals demonstrate a greater volatility than anyone else. Thus the tentative story developed for education is substantiated by the similar pattern for political interest. Here the differences stand up a little better against the null hypothesis (the probability that differences between the top and bottom categories arise by chance is p = .03).

The differences in the estimated magnitudes of responsiveness are substantial. The coefficients for the high and low categories of education and interest are almost exactly those illustrated in Figure 2. This means, for example, that if one were able to control the media agenda completely for two months (the length of a formal electoral campaign), one could change the agenda of about 26% of the less interested or the poorly educated as opposed to approximately 55% of the most highly involved. For six months' control, the numbers are 60% and 91%. The uninvolved are considerably less responsive.

Finally, the social interaction model provides the response patterns of Table 1 (Talk Politics). Although talkers show a modestly greater and quicker media impact, they do not differ markedly from their less-sociable neighbors. This is true

The estimates are not so precise as to enable this inference to stand against a strong argument for a null effect (or a mutually balanced exposure integration). The extreme points are about two standard errors apart and are arrayed in the direction suggested by the bulk of published evidence, but a test of their difference (which combines the variances) allows a probability (p=.16)that they might come from the same distribution (although, of course, the best estimates suggest that they are substantially different). If the inferences were counter to the weight of previous findings (see above) or were totally counterintuitive, their acceptance would be problematical. However, the data certainly do not suggest that the null hypothesis (of no effect) dominates. The alternate view, that the pattern from top to bottom is reversed, is of course disconfirmed in these data. The fact that the pattern is pretty nearly monotonic and is consistently maintained through the rest of the breakdowns (see below) gives further support to the conclusion that the observable differences are not simply the result of a chance occurrence.

with regard to both the magnitude of the difference and its weaker ability to fend off the null hypothesis of no difference (p=.29). Thus, the indications are that the social incentive to attend to the news is not particularly potent (although they fall in the expected direction, the coefficients are not really statistically distinct), or that it is partially counterbalanced by the social integration component, or that the measure is insufficiently precise to pick up differential sensitivity.

Nevertheless, these straightforward empirical estimates suggest that responsiveness to political agenda information may be shaped in an important way by individual skill and motivation. The evidence on the social factor is somewhat weaker. By themselves, the data indicate that the theoretical expectations are confirmed, or at least not disconfirmed. The statistical precision of such dynamic estimators does not allow very definite statements.

Further, consistently finding the volatility at the top of the involvement scale indicates that as far as a sense of political urgency goes, the underlying exposure-integration model for agendas is different from that of voting preference or war expectations and similar to that of pure information acquisition. Citizen political priorities are apparently not very firmly embedded in a broader conceptual framework. Among the most sophisticated stratum, it appears that the integration factor hardly plays a part at all, but it is here that

'Ideally, one would like to estimate its parameters on the full set of data (here 1760 observations: 44 issuetime readings containing dynamic information times 40 skill-motivation combinations). However the nonlinearities in the parameters make this ideal unattainable because the computational requirements for such an estimation are spectacular. A second-best strategy entails estimating the relationship between exposureintegration and the conditional variables on the 40 estimated responsiveness parameters—one for each combination of the theoretical variables. This idea is not as bizarre as it sounds. The estimates represent the same information as found in the original data. Modeling their values (weighted by their relative efficiency and sample size) will provide unblased and relatively efficient estimates of how exposure and integration are related to interest and education. The procedure can produce useful parameter estimates, but cannot yield good estimates of precision. This tactic is similar to an analysis of variance of subgroup means, when the "within" variance is represented in summary form.

The utility of the collapsed data set is confirmed when the estimated model (see below) is tested on the entire data set. Although it is not possible (for computational reasons) to search over the entire parameter space, when the estimates presented below were used as starting conditions, their values appeared to be relatively stable and the fit was essentially the same. one would expect the organization of experience, the political learning, which might insulate the individual from manipulation. The evident stability toward the bottom of the scale may be attributed to the relatively low media impact rather than an organizing world view, thereby suggesting a portrait of innocence rather than a worldly wise skepticism toward new ideas. As a first sketch, at low levels of skill and motivation lies a relatively inert mass whom the media move only modestly and then only by a long accumulation of partial effects. Short-term public responsiveness to events on the public stage is concentrated only at the upper stratum of political involvement.

#### Evidence on Exposure and Integration

These results suggest that the posited relationship between the separate exposure and integration components and the skill and motivation variables may yield to empirical analysis. Because exposure and integration cancel each other, their individual association with the theoretical variables may be expected to be stronger than that of their composite. Observing the tip suggests looking for the iceberg beneath.

The task of estimating the different effects of the skill-motivational variables on exposure and belief integration is a delicate one. It relies on both the assumption of how the underlying processes are related to the theoretical variables and on a highly interdependent model specification. To carry the iceberg analogy one step further, this is equivalent to applying general physical principles in estimating the mass of subsurface ice from the observable profile. The underlying physics may not be adequate for describing the unknown in detail, but they may permit an estimate of whether the underwater structure is large or small.

For this more ambitious purpose, the data will lie in the subgroup-based estimates of  $\epsilon \rho$  for each of the 40  $(5\times4\times2)$  combinations of Education (5), Follow Politics (4), and Talk Politics (2).9 Any particular estimate for each cell will be noisy, so the entire pattern must be examined at once. This may be accomplished by systematically subjecting the pattern of responsiveness to the more formal analysis suggested by the development of expression (9). The numeric estimates presented in Table 2 represent the coefficients of the quadratic-logarithmic combination of functions. A first inference is immediately apparent. Conversational activity increases the probability of gathering information (by .053), but does not increase resistance at all (.00). Thus, the social motivation to attend to public affairs is given some (though statistically weak) support, whereas the resistance to new ideas in a conversational circle, the notion of a socially determined reality, is not. In terms of the individual skill-motivation components, the b coefficients suggest that the following-politics effect on exposure is greater than that of education. Similarly, the effect on belief integration is greater for following politics than for education (the slope is inversely related to the d coefficient). It should be noted, however, that these coefficients have little meaning when they are taken out of context. By construction, the individual terms are highly interdependent; their estimators are collinear and thus covary. Furthermore, the slopes depend on the values of the variables involved. For this reason, the two sets of components that the coefficients represent may be generated for the values of F and E in order to give a graphic illustration of how the two variables differ. Figure 3 shows exposure and integration for education (left) and the curves for political interest (right).

The two sets of curves are dissimilar. In terms of education, the slope of i(V) seems almost zero, except for those individuals with only a grade school education or less. The college graduates do not seem to have organized their agenda information any better than those of a ninth-grade achievement (the level of political interest being held constant). Only at the very bottom is any effect noticed, in that the woefully unschooled do seem slightly less resistant to the latest ideas. Thus, the two-component model's integration feature seems rather limited in its application to symbolic skills. The whole ball game lies in the better educated's being more effectively exposed to the available media content.

The picture is markedly different for following politics. The exposure function and the integration function rise over the range. Increased political interest generates greater effectiveness of ex-

<sup>10</sup>The estimates reflected in Figure 3 are by no means precise. The temptation to read the probability values on the vertical axis must be avoided. Because the parameters that drive the curves are so collinear, no simple statement for statistical inference is available, but it is apparent from experimentation that the level of the curves may be shifted up and down to produce similar fits to the data. However, the important inference, that the slopes are different for Follow Politics and Education, can be subjected to a rough statistical test. Modeling the process with the same parameter values for the two variables yields a notably inferior fit  $(R^2 = .44)$  as opposed to .58). This difference persists under a strong test that assumes that the parameters are independent (they are not); the Adjusted R2's are .38 and .45 for the simpler and more complex models respectively. Thus, although the picture in Figure 3 is only a very rough sketch of the true relationship, the apparent differences in slopes (particularly for integration) are given fairly strong support by the data.

Table 2. Numerical Estimates of the Exposure-Integration Model for Follow Politics, Education, and Talk Politics (Variable Derivative Model)

Observable	Ex	posure	In	tegration
Constant		.160		.087
Talk politics	, <b>b</b>	.053	đ	.000
Follow politics	b	.065	c d	.910 14.44
Education	<b>b</b> `	.025	c d	10.45 1161.11


Note. This model specifies the e(V) as exponential and the i(V) as logarithmic functions of Follow Politics and Education, and introducing Talk Politics as a pair of dichotomies. See equation (9) in the text. Thus the slope on exposure is explosively associated with b and that on integration is inversely associated with the d coefficients. The fit is indicated by an  $R^2$  of .583.

posure than does increased education, but the impact of that exposure is dampened by its having to overcome a much stronger weight of previously acquired information. Here the two-component model's excitation-inhibition operation can be seen clearly. The volatility of the uninterested can be attributed to their innocence about political matters—whatever mark political events have had on them has been exceedingly poorly stored and does not inhibit their responsiveness to the media's recent messages. Their counterparts on the opposite end of the spectrum have retained a much stronger guide to an interpretation of poli-

tics and would show much less responsiveness were they to be exposed to their brethren's modest level of information. However, because they are motivated to attend to the media's message, that greater inhibition is overwhelmed by the much higher levels of input, so that they are the most responsive of all.

After modeling the two processes, the picture of political cognition that emerges differs considerably from the sketch of the last section. The initial portrait of a citizenry whose less-involved strata remain political isolates and whose upper echelon are led willy-nilly by the media's message

Figure 3. Exposure and Integration for Education and Follow Politics



Note. Graphed on the vertical axes are the estimated probabilities that individuals see and understand a message (Exposure) and the probabilities that they will be immunized against it (Integration). On the horizontal axes are Education (0=GS, 1=Some HS, 2=HS, 3=Some College, 4=College) and Follow Politics (0=Very Low, 1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High). The estimates were derived by assuming the exponential and logarithmic shapes of the curves.


can be elaborated. As a vague empirical description it is adequate, but the understanding of the underlying mechanisms suggests that this is not simply a matter of ignorance and gullibility. The evidence indicates the politically interested exhibit a responsiveness not because they naively accept every news story, but because they are so much more attentive. The effects of their previous experience are clearly seen to be substantial, and if their increased reading of the press were not so heavily conditioned, then their responsiveness would be very much greater. The less interested. and to a modest extent the less skilled, also show some responsiveness simply because those inhibitions of accumulated past information are much less evident.11

<sup>11</sup>A note of caution. These results on exposure and integration are clear, but their meaningfulness may be restricted for two reasons. First, the probability numbers can be produced only by assuming the exposure and integration functions to be quadratic and logarithmic in form. Thus the shape of the curves in Figure 3 is predetermined, and only their relative slopes were elicited from the data. Of course it is the slopes that are crucial for the inferences made here. These functional forms are likely to be very much more complex. Further work may yield richer theoretical statements. Similarly, the measurement scales for Follow Politics and Education are ordinal, and the shapes of the curves might be

Finally, the implications for the overall model are illustrated in Figure 4. The two surfaces represent the estimated  $\epsilon \varrho$  for political interest and education; the one on the left is for the less socially active (talk = 0), whereas the one on the right is for those engaged in more political conversations (talk = 1). Apparently the social process modestly raises volatility (through exposure). The character of the two-component exposure-integration model is demonstrated in the bowl-like shape of the surfaces. At the upper extremes it is most obvious that interest and symbolic skills are not strictly monotonic with volatility. This curvilinearity, due to the integration effect, is represented all over the surfaces, but its impact is muted in the lower regions where the exposure it

different for other cardinal mappings. The point assignments are, however, roughly linearly related to the number of media sources consulted and to the number of years of formal education. Things would have to be very wrong for the overall picture presented here to be absolutely misleading. Second, the estimates are imprecise. The goal here was to get an idea of the strength of a relationship between a hypothetical construct and the skill-motivation variables. The data support the very broad-gauged inferences offered here, but cannot sustain more precise interpretations.

Figure 4. Multivariate Estimates of Responsiveness Education, Follow Politics, and Talk Politics (Exposure and Integration Model)



Note. The estimated responsiveness,  $\epsilon_i \rho_i$ , to the media environment are graphed in the joint space of Education and Follow Politics for relative isolates (Talk Politics=0) on the left and for those who talked with their fellows (Talk Politics=1) on the right. The estimates were derived by assuming the exponential and logarithmic forms for Exposure and Integration in a mildly interactive model.

operates on is least. The magnitudes of responsiveness ( $\epsilon \varrho$ ) are similar to those indicated by the bivariate analysis, with the extremes being slightly more distinct. The range of dynamic behavior estimated by the multivariate analysis is similar to that depicted in Figure 2.

#### Some Implications

This analysis has been limited to the subject of heterogeneity in citizen responsiveness to agenda changes in the media. This is a matter of some consequence in its own right. However, the central ideas that political dynamics may vary in theoretically interesting ways and that any given reaction may be composed of several, even contradictory, components should be more generally applicable. Sensitivity to these sorts of subtleties may provide leverage in developing richer models of political interactions.

This modeling and empirical work presents results at two levels of certainty. The results on responsiveness are relatively straightforward; they indicate that the speed with which citizens react to changes in media coverage is shaped by the skill and motivations associated with their information processing. The magnitudes of the differential responsiveness are substantial. On less certain empirical footing is the work on the skill-motivation effects on exposure and integration. The analysis depends on theoretical assumptions about functional forms and on relatively imprecise estimators. Nevertheless, the exploratory work does suggest that ability, personal motivation, and perhaps social incentives increase exposure to information, but that the integration of previous agenda beliefs is associated only with following politics. These inferences are of some interest on their own right, although of course they remain tentative subject to further work. However, if they are indicative of the true state of the world, then they may have some implications for more substantive political analysis.

#### **Political Cognitions**

Examining the dynamics of agenda response produces an insight into the style of political cognition which is associated with individuals' developing a sense of political priorities. The evidence on composite responsiveness ( $\epsilon \varrho$ ) indicates that agenda changes look much like simple information acquisition—the exposure function dominates.

The more indirect estimates of integration effects yield a further characterization of what substantiates political priorities. Three manners of belief organization spring to mind: abstract structure, associational linkages, and social

definition of reality. Perhaps the most commonly discussed form is the first, in which individuals condition their learning on abstract principles, whether they be complex ideologies, historical analogies, or laymen's rules of political thumb. The quality of such a consciousness would clearly be different from that of individuals who merely accumulate political facts or symbolic representations and generate a view of the world by deriving correlations among observations. Also of a distinct quality would be those views that relied on conversational cues for their formulation. The skill-motivation variables outlined here do not correspond uniquely with these styles of learning, but a differential weighting may be made. In a carefully constructed study of political cognition, Neuman (1981) reports that education is clearly associated with abstract organization and hardly at all with the number of discrete cognitions an individual holds. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to expect that the extent to which an individual follows politics would be associated with the mass of acquired information and, when the abstraction capability is factored out, with a dependence on associational linkages rather than conceptual organization for firming up a political view. On its face, the conversational activity variable is most closely associated with the social definition of reality.

The integration effects elicited from the data indicate that the substance of individuals' political agendas is formed by the mass of their previous exposure rather than by any abstract organization or social anchoring. Any inhibition to responsiveness is limited to those who follow public affairs regularly. It is not evident for the highly educated or the socially active. The rough equivalence of the three measured variables with the three styles of cognition suggests that the mortar holding agenda beliefs together is associational, rather than abstract or social, in character. These views appear to be more informational than evaluative in their content—they depend more on content of the information environment than on internalized standards. Thus the character of public agendas may better reflect the need for individuals to orient themselves to a changeable world than their political demands or fundamental interests.

This finding is consistent with the oft-reported empirical finding that individuals' political agendas are more easily altered than their evaluations of political ideas. More specifically, it suggests that those seeking to alter the public's sense of priorities may be less concerned with altering the abstractions that motivate the status quo in favor of generating a sufficient volume of targeted messages, so that their coincidence will appear to have an associational logic powerful enough to overcome previous linkages. At the limit, a candidate

or other political actor need only repeat a message for it to be accepted as a matter requiring political attention. Thus the exogeneity of citizen views comes into question not only in the sense that they may be shaped by elite or press posturing, but also in the sense that their substance depends not on any abstract understandings or social anchors which might be outside the control of political actors, but instead on the mere volume of political appeals that is surely in the hands of political elites. Rulers may set the standards by which they are judged.

## Strategic Behavior, Popular Choice, and Institutional Constraints

A second, and more indirect implication has to do with candidate electoral strategies and democratic theory. In the classic treatment of competitive representative democracy (Downs, 1957), the candidates move about in a policy space so as to enhance their chances for victory. In purely theoretical terms, it has been shown (McKelvey, 1976) that, aside from unusual circumstances, the electoral outcome of this process will not depend in any crucial way on the distribution of voter preferences. For this class of situations Shepsle (1979) and Riker (1980) argue that the outcome will be determined by the institutions that constrain political strategies. The idea of looking for systematic constraints which translate individual volitions into public decisions is an attractive and important area for consideration. In application to electoral politics, however, the idea of institutional constraints finds no formalized referent.

In practice, candidates are not able to wander freely over the issue space because they must maintain credibility in the electorate and carry their own supporters along with them. Similarly, candidates may find it difficult to raise new issues quickly enough to take advantage of their efforts. More often, it seems, candidates seek to influence the citizens' evaluations of the political alternatives by shaping the ground on which the campaign is fought: they will try to raise the voters' concern about the issues for which their established policy posture (promise or record) is favored by the electorate and also try to distract the voters' attention from issues on which their opponents figure to be more appealing. For example, the 1972 media campaign for president seems to have been one of agenda setting in which each candidate tried to impress "his" issues on the voters' minds (Hofstetter & Zukin, 1979). More recently, the 1976 electorate preferred the prospect of Carter's handling the problem of unemployment while it preferred Ford on inflation, and the 1980 electorate preferred Reagan's stance on economic recovery and Carter's on the maintenance of peace. From casual observation, it appears that both campaigns concentrated on trying to alter voters' views about the issue agenda rather than their more fundamental evaluations.

The theoretical result of this agenda contest is the same as the majority disequilibrium problem, with the indeterminacy being derived from the candidates' altering the electorate's agenda rather than from their shifting policy positions. Because the voters must choose between bundles of policy positions, and they do so by weighting the significance of each item, the final outcome may be as much the result of weighting scheme as of the policy comparisons themselves. Thus, without constraints on the agenda game, the democratic result may be independent of the electorate's policy preferences and entirely the result of candidates' ability to manipulate the electoral agenda (at least to the extent to which voting depends on the terms of evaluation).

However, the data in this article indicate that individuals differ in the speed with which they respond to changes in the elite political environment. The responsiveness estimates (the implications of which are illustrated in Figure 2) indicate that the priorities of a number of citizens are largely beyond the control of political candidates, even if politicians can dominate the topics of elite political analysis.12 A democratic result is thus constrained by the agendas of those who remain largely unaffected by recent events. This differential responsiveness limits the solution set of the agenda contest, and the fact that political communication must take place over time provides an institutional setting in a broad sense. Further, the set of social characteristics considered here, individual abstract reasoning skills and personal and social motivations to follow politics, have some of the same properties as formalized institutional rules: they are not strictly part of the agenda game (because candidates may not hope to change citizens' fundamental skills and motives as a short-term strategy), but they are interesting nevertheless because they may have policy consequences-these citizen attributes may not be neutral with respect to political interests, and they are in theory manipulable over the longer run. For purposes of abstraction they may be taken as fixed for individual elections but may be considered endogenous in a longer set of repeated

<sup>12</sup>The power of politicians to set the media agenda is great but far from absolute. Sigal (1973) reports that the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* front page stories rely predominantly on government officials for sources. However, Patterson (1980) points out the proclivity of news organizations to look for novel campaign issues during election coverage. Those issues are not always candidate directed.

contests. An unfortunate aspect of this result, however, is that this constraint is most clearly generated by the least well-educated and the least-interested citizens.<sup>13</sup> To the extent to which democratic outcomes are judged on the consideration voters give to the policy alternatives, this result is discouraging.<sup>14</sup>

#### **Appendix**

The choice of the function to represent e(V) and i(V) is an important matter. Only by positing these functions can one dissect the information in the estimates of  $\epsilon_Q = f(V)$  to produce an idea of how strongly the theoretical variables are related to exposure and integration. The goal is to measure the first derivative of e(V) and i(V).

The first assumption deals with the sign of the derivatives and is motivated by the elementary information-processing ideas discussed above. They are that with respect to the skill-motivation variables the derivatives of e(V) and i(V) be positive. That is to say, that as individuals' political

<sup>13</sup>Although the less involved are slightly less likely to vote, the profile of voters-only looks much like that for the general population. This is true for both presidential and congressional elections; the warping of the space does become slightly more noticeable for the electorate participating in primaries (in which relatively few of the isolates participate). It is tempting to speculate about the extra power given to the uninvolved and its implications for policy—say, a heightened concern for redistributive issues—but such a matter is best left for empirical analyses.

14An intriguing aside here relates to how candidates may use this temporal framework in devising their agenda-setting strategies. A simple result is that, given resource constraints, a single candidate will try to mold the views of the less involved first (because the opponents' counterarguments will not erode the initial message) and concentrate on the involved in later time periods. However, the opponents may follow the same strategy and cancel out its effects. Devising solutions to this game depends on adding further complications that would extend this argument considerably.

An illustration of the use of this sort of tactic may be found in the strategies followed by political action committees in recent years. They have entered political contests a year or so before the election and set an initial agenda favoring their candidates, and then left the scene well before "politics as usual" began. When the official candidates have tried to set their own electoral agendas, they have found their task exceedingly difficult. The expectation here is that the candidates' efforts would have been least effective in altering the reference frames of the politically uninvolved. If this were so, then the effects of the early-bird strategy would have been less evident to political elites, and thus discounted in political discussions, but remained undercover waiting for election day to show themselves.

interest, education, and conversational activity increases, so should the effectiveness of their exposure to information. Also, as that involvement grows, so should the organization and mass of their reservoir of experience and perhaps the impact of social consensus.

Beyond the sign of the derivative, the forms of the e(V) and i(V) functions are not determined. The simplest assumption is that e(V) and i(V) may be approximated by a linear function (the first term of the Taylor series). This sets a constant first derivative. Here, however, this first approximation fails empirically. Geometrically, the data indicate that the surface of  $\epsilon \varrho$  as a function of Education and Follow Politics is convex (from below), whereas a constant positive slope formulation can only produce a concave surface. Thus the simplest form of e(V) and i(V) is inadequate for the purpose of uncovering the underlying parameters. If those terms are to be measured, then a more elaborate strategy must be used. Some further understanding of the underlying processes must be mobilized.

In order to develop an exposure function, consider the internal dynamics that are likely to be involved. Changes in an individual's attention toward politics must certainly be partially contingent on his or her current motivational level. The highly interested will see a great deal of material which not only satisfies current levels of curiosity but which also spurs further interest. The totally inattentive will see nothing of interest which might otherwise motivate them to attend more closely. Thus the change in exposure level will depend on current motivations: e' = b V. The same model holds for political understanding in a way familiar to educators. Those of little comprehension will be unable to fathom the political material that they do see and are unlikely to increase their understanding much at all. On the other hand, those who already understand a great deal will be able to utilize new information and readily increase their level of comprehension. Again, e' = b V. Of course this growth may be limited at the top, but it is unlikely that the boundary conditions are encountered by large portions of the general public. Integrating (in the mathematical sense) these differentials yields

$$e(V) = (1/2)bV^2 + K_e (10)$$

(where  $K_e$  is the constant of integration) which suggests that effective exposure ought to be (roughly) a quadratic function of political interest and education.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup>Although the specification of function is an assumption, some evidence which examines the reasonableness

On the integration side, the idea is to model how the individual's certainty about the world varies with his or her nominal political interest or symbolic skills (it is this certainty about the true state of affairs that leads to the individual's resisting the implications of the new evidence presented by the media). As a typical citizen's political interest increases, so should the mass of ideas against which new evidence must compete. However the number of elementary beliefs that must be changed should increase more slowly simply because much of the rise in mass will be redundant. Elementary information theory (for a classic introduction, see Shannon & Weaver, 1949) suggests that the amount of fundamental "information" that lies at the heart of a mass of different representations may be expressed as a logarithmic function of the mass. In this application, the number of central ideas against which the media's message must compete is expressed as a logarithmic function of the nominal mass of past experience.16 Abstract organization similarly ought to be a logarithmic function of symbolic skills. As an individual gains abstract concepts with which to order his or her images of the political world, the strength of that organization should increase.

of this form may be mobilized. Data pertaining to these matters are not available for all the surveys, but in 1974 the respondents were asked which of four television newscasts (morning national, evening local, evening national, and nightly local) they watched, and which public affairs sections (international, national, state and local, and editorials) they consulted in the newspaper. The relation between the four-point Follow Politics scale and simple exposure is roughly linear. However, if the criterion is how often those channels were attended to, the relation becomes markedly quadratic. Thus, to the extent to which exposure is measured in terms of intensity, the functional form begins to appear to require higher order terms. Similar evidence holds for education and comprehension. Respondents were asked if politics were "so complicated that a person like (the respondent) can't really understand what's going on." The five-point education scale is best mapped into those responses (reversed) by a quadratic function.

A similar form can be derived for e' = e(V), which yields the exponential form  $e(V) = \exp(bV)$ . This specification produces a modestly better fit, although the qualitative inferences are the same. The quadratic function was used instead to maintain parallelism with the logarithmic derivation below.

<sup>16</sup>The theoretical specifications are usually in terms of  $\log_2$  or  $\log_e$ , but the Follow-Politics and Education variables are at best a rescaling of the amount of previous information and its Integration. Thus it is not surprising that the base of the logarithm varies to fit the scale (the  $\log \operatorname{base} = \exp(1/c)$ ). Nevertheless, the functional form (with its decreasing slope) is motivated by elementary information theory.

However, the rate of increase should taper off again, as those ordering principles take on a logical or symbolic coherence.

Another way of looking at the same phenomenon is to examine the changeability of an individual's certainty about his or her understanding of the world. For the relatively innocent, the addition of a few pieces of information may lead to a reevaluation of the world view; for the worldly wise a similar input will have little effect. Similarly, for those with sparse intellectual organization, the acquisition of a few integrating principles may lead to a much firmer sense of understanding whereas the ideologue's encountering a new argument will do little to increase his or her sense of coherence. One way to express this is to model the changeability of an individual's integration (i) as inversely related to the current level of experience or abstract skills: i' = 1/(dV), or, integrating (again in the mathematical sense)  $i = (1/d) \log (dV) + K_i$  (where  $K_i$  is again a constant of integration). The last term, as it turns out, is not sufficiently subtle to yield a curve within the probability range 0-1, so two modifications are introduced:

$$i(v) = (c/d)\log(1+dV) + K_b$$
 (11)

where c is merely a scalar transformation and the introduction of the constant term into the log function assures a positive result.

In order to obtain equations that can be estimated, values for Education (E) and Follow Politics (F) are substituted for V in these quadratic (10) and logarithmic (11) equations for e(V) and l(V). The result is portrayed in equation (9) in the text.

Although these functions can be specified on theoretical grounds, the purpose here is not to provide a precise theoretical model, but only to set up a minimal tool for the empirical work. Certainly the true functions may be more complex. These forms constrain the derivatives only in the sense that they are said to be direct and inverse functions of (V). Other arguments (for example. Bayesian updating) produce categorically similar results, although the details may differ. It might be noted that a number of alternative specifications were examined; they proved too complex for empirical use or they were unable to match the broad outlines of the data. Although no claim is offered about the unique virtue of the exponential-logarithmic combination, it does work.

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# Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?

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This study examines the impact of black school board members on educational policies that affect black students. Using data from 82 of the largest urban school districts in the United States, several measures of second-generation educational discrimination are analyzed. Black membership on the school board is associated with more equitable educational policies; this relationship remains in some cases even with controls for black political and economic resources. The implications of these findings for the study of representation are then discussed.

A growing number of studies have assessed the representation of blacks and other minority groups in the federal bureaucracy (Meier & Nigro, 1976), in state and local bureaucracies (Cayer & Sigelman, 1980; Dye & Renick, 1981; Eisinger, 1982a, b; Sigelman, 1974), on city councils (Cole, 1974; Engstrom & McDonald, 1981; Jones, 1976; Karnig, 1976, 1979; MacManus, 1978; Robinson & Dye, 1978), and on urban school boards (Robinson & England, 1981; Welch & Karnig, 1978).1 Using concepts such as "proportional representation," "representative bureaucracy," and "affirmative action," these studies empirically examine a variety of questions, including aggregate black representation scores for bureaucracies and other political institutions, the impact of political and structural characteristics (e.g., form of government and size of body) on minority representation, the effects of socioeconomic conditions on black representation, and regional variations in black representation levels.

Despite the massive literature, the research is not clear on whether or not black representation results in different policy outcomes. As Eisinger

Received: December 12, 1983 Revision received: July 6, 1983

Accepted for publication: November 16, 1983

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado. We would like to thank Michael Goldstein, Joseph Stewart, Jr., Charles S. Bullock, III, Theodore P. Robinson, Susan Welch, Lee Sigelman, Peter Eisinger, Gary Copeland, and several anonymous reviewers for their comments. We would also like to thank Denise Goins-Stocton, Theodore Robinson, Joseph Stewart, and Franklin Wilson for the use of their data sets.

<sup>1</sup>For studies focusing on the representation of women, see Karnig and Walker (1976) and MacManus (1976); for Hispanics, see Taebel (1978).

(1982a, p. 380) notes, "There are still few explorations of the impact of black officials . . . and those that do exist are comparatively rudimentary." Addressing this gap in the literature, this article examines the relationship between black representation on urban school boards and a number of nonexpenditure educational policy indicators. The study is organized into three sections. The first section establishes the theoretical context for the study of black representation and surveys the literature with a focus on policy impacts. In the second section, the measures used to test the linkage between black school board representation and educational policy are analyzed with the use of a variety of univariate and multivariate tests. Finally, we discuss the implications of the study with respect to representation, public policy, and black politics.

#### Black Representation: Theory and Policy Impact

As Kuklinski (1979, p. 121) so aptly reminds us. "Few concerns, if any, have as hallowed a tradition in political science as the linkage between the few who represent and the many who are represented." Despite the voluminous research, however, little consensus has developed as to the meaning of representation. Representation, rather, is a concept with a myriad of facets. A survey of the general representation literature shows that the nature and meaning of representation has been characterized as description (Pitkin, 1967), congruence (Miller & Stokes, 1963), concurrence (Verba & Nie, 1972), responsiveness (Eulau & Karps, 1977), representativeness (Kingsley, 1944), accountability (Friedrich, 1950), institutional (Weissberg, 1978), and activity (Pitkin, 1967). The study of black representation has focused on only a few of these dimensions, and therein lies its major weakness. More specifically, black representation has been largely defined in passive rather than active terms, and the major analytical focus of the literature has been on identifying the determinants rather than on analyzing the impact of black representation. As a result, the linkage between passive (or descriptive) and active black representation (policy outcomes) remains unclear. Drawing upon the general representation literature, a brief explanation is in order.

## Defining and Measuring Representation: Passive v. Active Modes

In large part, the study of black representation has been based on "some variant of a proportionality notion . . . representation is described as equitable or fair when it approaches symmetry with the share of the black population" (Lineberry, 1978, p. 174). The literature on minority representation demonstrates, for example, that blacks are underrepresented (i.e., the proportion of offices they hold is smaller than their proportion of the population) on city councils (Karnig, 1976: Robinson & Dye, 1978), police forces (Preston, 1977), and upper-level administrative positions (Dye & Renick, 1981; Eisinger, 1982a, for cities; Cayer & Sigelman, 1980; Hutchins & Sigelman, 1981, for states; Meier & Nigro, 1976, for the federal government). In contrast, blacks are equitably or overrepresented on central city school boards (Robinson & England, 1981; Welch & Karnig, 1978) and in total government employment (Eisinger, 1982a; Meier & Nigro, 1976; Sigelman, 1974).

This accounting or census perspective of representation corresponds to what Pitkin (1967) labels descriptive representation, where representation is defined in terms of the characteristics of representatives or the compositional make-up of policymaking bodies. The notion of descriptive representation is inextricably linked to the concept of representativeness and more specifically to the theory of representative bureaucracy (see Kingsley, 1944; Long, 1952). Although this theory was developed for minority representation in bureaucracies, the logic also applies to minority representation in elected positions. If, the argument goes, officials have some discretion in the policies they adopt or implement, then the officials are likely to use this discretion to maximize their own political values.2 The source of these political values is, of course, rooted in the

<sup>2</sup>Discretion is still a key even when elected officials are examined. All elected officials are constrained by their political and economic environments as well as by constitutions, charters, and laws. In some areas of policy, the elected official may have no discretion to act.

political socialization of the individual. Since socialization patterns vary by race, sex, ethnicity, income, and other demographic characteristics, the theory argues that policy will be responsive to the general public to the extent that the officials mirror the origins of the populace (Mosher, 1968).

Descriptive representation, however, is only one dimension of the representational process. In fact, Pitkin (1967, p. 67) suggests that it constitutes a passive view of representation—it focuses on "being something rather than doing something." Instead, Pitkin (1967, p. 209) argues, representation should be viewed as an "activity"; representation means "acting in the interests of the represented." The important theoretical question, therefore, is to what extent is passive representation linked to active representation? Does electing blacks to school board positions (passive representation) result in school board policies beneficial to black constituents (active representation)?

In the more general representational studies, the link between active and passive representation has received some attention. For example, Eulau et al. (1959, adapted to school boards by Mann, 1974) suggest that after assuming an office or position, political representatives choose a representational style as they go about their business (activity) of representing. Three main representational role orientations are available: trustee, the official makes decisions based on his or her own judgments or values; delegate, the official follows constituency preferences; and politico, the official adopts either the trustee or delegate style depending on the situation. In the American context. with its focus on representative government, representation has generally been defined as a high congruence between constituency opinion and legislative voting on a pairwise basis—a delegate orientation (Weissberg, 1978, p. 536). The widely cited Miller and Stokes (1963) study, as well as numerous other representative-constituency linkage efforts (see Kuklinski, 1979, for a review), testifies to the popularity of measuring representation according to this dyadic perspective.

Eulau and Karps (1977, p. 235) assert, however, that "restricting the study of representation to the electoral connection produces a very limited version of the representational process." Instead, they argue that representation as an activity may manifest itself in one of four ways: 1) as official-constituent policy congruence (e.g., representative follows constituency policy preferences); 2) as service responsiveness (e.g., representatives secure particular benefits for individual constituents); 3) as allocative responsiveness (e.g., representative obtains collective benefits for his or her constituency); 4) symbolically (e.g., representative takes actions that build constituency trust and diffuse

support). Active black representation can take place on any of these four dimensions if black officials, for example, 1) pursue constituency-favored policy goals, 2) seek jobs and other benefits for individual minorities, 3) seek compensatory education funds or other collective benefits, or 4) attempt to mobilize the political resources of the black community.

Unfortunately, few black representation studies have been based on even the simple congruence models (for exceptions see Brooks, 1982; Harmel, Hamm & Thompson, 1983), let alone the four dimensions of activity that Eulau and Karps (1979) discuss. As a result, the degree to which black electoral success results in substantive benefits for blacks has received little analysis (Eisinger. 1982a, p. 380). Rather, employing an approach used by state and local policy output analysts (see, for example, Cole, 1971; Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Dye, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Rodgers, 1969; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969), the major analytical focus of the black representation literature has been on isolating the determinants of representation (Davidson & Korbel, 1981; Lineberry, 1978). Of particular concern has been the type of election plan (Jones, 1976; Karnig, 1976; Robinson & Dye, 1978; Taebel, 1978). Other determinants examined include the size of the organizations (Long, 1952; Meier, 1979; Robinson & England, 1981; Taebel, 1978), socioeconomic factors (Cole, 1974; MacManus, 1978), political influences (England & Robinson, 1981; Karnig, 1979), and region (Engstrom & McDonald, 1981; Karnig, 1976, 1979; Taebel, 1978).

Just as a focus on descriptive minority representation tells us little about representation as an activity, an analytical approach that focuses on isolating the determinants of minority representation tells us little about the impact black representation has on public policy. Five years have passed since Lineberry (1978, p. 175), in a concluding essay on the significance of several of the major descriptive and determinant black representation studies, stated: "I, for one, would be very interested in knowing whether the composition of school boards and city councils resulted in any appreciable differences in their policy choices,"

Although the impact of black representation on public policy has not received the attention that explaining black representation in descriptive or determinant terms has, a few studies have examined the question (see Welch & Karnig, 1980, for a comprehensive review). Keller (1978) examined six cities, three with black mayors (Gary, Cleveland, and Newark) and three with white mayors (Cincinnati, Trenton, and Indianapolis). Based on an analysis of spending patterns between 1965 and

1973 across functional areas (police, fire, roads, housing and urban development, parks and recreation, and public welfare), Keller (1978, p. 50) found "Black mayors do not, as a rule, spend less than white mayors on community wide items... and...it is not clear that they spend more on welfare type programs." In contrast, Keech's (1968) case studies of Durham and Tuskegee found numerous cases of black officials affecting public policy, particularly in Tuskegee. Other case studies of black mayors show additional instances of impact (Campbell & Feagin, 1975; Levine, 1974; Nelson, 1972; Nelson & Meranto, 1976; Poinsett, 1970; Stone, 1971).

Building on this work, Welch and Karnig (1979a, b; 1980) present a comprehensive analysis of the effects of black mayors and city council members on public expenditures. For 135 cities with populations of at least 50,000 and at least 10% black population, they found that black mayors spent more for social welfare and less for protective services, physical facilities (except for hospitals), and amenities. Black representation on city councils, however, had no consistent impact.

In a state-level study, Meier (1979) related minority employment in the state bureaucracy—both in numbers and in access to high level positions—to variations in state expenditure levels. He found that minority employment was, in fact, related to policy outputs even when a series of socioeconomic control variables were introduced.

Rather than using expenditure measures of public policy, Dye and Renick (1981) and Eisinger (1982a, b) used minority employment (particular benefits, Eulau & Karps, 1977) as the dependent variable. Analyzing the workforce composition in 42 cities, Dye and Renick (1981, p. 484) found that "For blacks and Hispanics, employment in top city jobs appears to be a function of political power as it is reflected in city council representation." City council representation is more important than other variables such as income or education in gaining administrative and professional positions. Eisinger (1982a, p. 390) found that the presence of a black mayor has a "modest incremental effect on levels of black employment and on affirmative action effort," but he is quick to note that the black population percentage is the best predictor of black employment.

These studies hardly resolve the question of whether or not passive black representation translates into active black representation and, therefore, public policy. Most of the studies use expenditure measures as policy indicators. As Eisinger (1982a) contends, expenditure measures are too crude and too distantly related to favorable policy toward blacks to be valid indicators of such policies. In addition, aggregate expenditures hide any shift in policies within a functional category which

may be favorable to blacks (Welch & Karnig, 1979b, p. 122). Similarly, using personnel measures of public policy is not a great improvement, since this process will result in determining if representation in one political institution will also translate into representation in another political or bureaucratic institution (see Sigelman & Karnig, 1976). The question still remains; given better policy measures, will representation result in favorable policy outputs?

#### Data and Analysis

#### Measures of Representation

The impact of black representation on public policy will be examined for 82 of the largest central city school districts in the United States. These districts were chosen because data had to be gathered from numerous divergent sources and matched for this analysis. In many cases the data did not exist for smaller school districts. As a result of the "sample," our generalizations are only relevant to these large urban school districts, although the process by which representation is transformed into public policy should be similar in other jurisdictions.

The two most frequently used measures of representation are the representation index—a ratio of the percentage of blacks on the school board to the percentage of blacks in the school district

The percentage of blacks on the school board was taken from two different sources for three time points: 1978, 1974, and 1970. The 1978 data are from an original survey of urban school boards by Theodore P. Robinson (see Robinson & England, 1981). Data for 1970 and 1974 are from the Joint Center for Political Studies. In cases where the Center did not have data for certain cities, we supplemented their data with our own survey efforts. Different years are used so that representation measures could precede temporally the dependent policy variables; that is, if the dependent variable was for 1976, the 1974 representation measure was used. In univariate analysis, the 1978 data were used. In two cases, for college attendance and high school dropouts, the independent and dependent variables are for the same year.

We should also note that the data from the Joint Center have been criticized for errors; Robinson and Dye (1978), Taebel (1978), and MacManus (1978) all note that not all black officials are reported to the Center. Comparison of Center data for 1978 with the Robinson and England (1981) data for 1978 showed several errors. Because of such errors, we tried to correct some of the 1974 and 1970 data by our own survey efforts. Problems with identifying errors and recall errors limited this effort. Both corrected and uncorrected data yield the same results.

'All demographic data are based on the school district, not on the district's city. School-district boun(Sigelman, 1974)—and the deficit measure—the difference between the percentage of blacks on the school board and the percentage of blacks in the school district (MacManus, 1978; see critiques by Engstrom & McDonald, 1981, and Karnig & Welch, 1982).' For the present study both these measures have flaws. If one is concerned with the policy impact of black representation, neither of these measures is, in theory, monotonically related to policy impact. For example, black representation has a greater chance of being converted into black-favored policy outputs in Atlanta, Georgia, where blacks compose 55.6% of the school board than in Madison, Wisconsin, where blacks have 14.2% of the school board seats. Despite the obvious nature of this comparison, Madison has a more positive deficit (+12.9% versus 9.1%) and a much larger representation index (10.2 versus 1.2). To translate black demands into public policy, numbers on the school board are the sine qua non. If a school board has a 60% black majority, the representation ratio and the deficit measure become irrelevant.6 For this reason, the present study uses the

daries may differ significantly from those of the city. All school district demographics are taken from The National Center for Education Statistics (1975), Social and Economic Characteristics of U.S. School Districts, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare). The correlations between the school district and city demographics are as follows: income (.89), poverty level (.88), education (.86), and percent black (.94). This study deals with representation of and public policy toward blacks. In many cities in the Southwest and West, both Hispanics and Asians constitute a significant minority population. These minorities were not analyzed because only a small number of cities had large non-black minority populations. As a result, finding significant relationships would not be likely.

For this data set, the representation index ranges from 0 to 10.2 with a mean of 1.20 (i.e., the average school board overrepresents blacks by 20%). For the deficit measure, the scores range from -28% to +59% with a mean of 1.4% (very slight overrepresentation).

\*In practice, there might be cases where blacks would benefit more from minority status on the governing board than from majority status. A black majority might result in whites fleeing the school system. If this occurs and whites no longer care about the public education system, whites may be able to limit the resources available to the school system. The black student in Madison, Wisconsin, therefore, might be better off than the black student in Atlanta. In addition, one black member might be able to make a difference by articulating new views, checking racist impulses, and educating other members. I am indebted to Mike Goldstein of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and Joseph Stewart for these arguments. For an alternative view, see Keech (1968).

percentage of black-held seats on the school board as the representation measure and, thus, prime independent variable (see Bullock & Dennis, 1982; Bullock & MacManus, 1981; and Welch & Karnig, 1979b, p. 106). The percentage of blacks on urban school boards ranges from 0 to 80% with a mean of 20.1%.

#### **Policy Indicators**

Good policy indicators must meet two criteria. The indicator must relate to a program output that the policymaker can affect, particularly in the short run. The indicator must also be directly tied to race, so that the linkage between race and policy is clearly evident to the policymaker. Traditionally, expenditure data have been used in policy analysis (see Dye, 1966). Unfortunately, expenditure data meet neither of the two criteria. Expenditures are often limited by law or economics and may not be under the control of the school board in the short run. Expenditures are also difficult to link to black-favored policy goals; i.e., does increasing education spending automatically indicate policy outputs favorable to blacks (see Eisinger, 1982a)? Similarly, normal measures of educational attainment (e.g., scores on standardized tests) are difficult for the school board to affect in the short run.

The policy indicators in this study are more direct indicators of racial preference. Although segregation policies are affected by numerous actors other than school boards, one element of segregation, hiring black teachers, is under direct school-board control. Segregation can be main-

The intercorrelation (r) between the deficit measure and the representation ratio is .58. The correlation of the percentage of blacks on the school board with the deficit measure is .62 and with the representation measure is .28.

tained by denying blacks access to teaching positions, thus eliminating positive role models for the black student. As a measure of teacher segregation, we use the percentage of school teachers who are black divided by the percentage of the district population that is black. Similar to the representation index, this measure equals 1.0 if the proportion of black teachers is equal to the proportion of blacks in the population. Index numbers less than 1.0 indicate too few black teachers, and numbers greater than 1.0 indicate more black teachers than expected. The mean and range for this and other dependent variables are found in Table 1.

In a series of articles, Bullock and Stewart (1978, 1979; Stewart & Bullock, 1981) argue that as schools become desegregated, more subtle forms of discrimination may take place against black students. Black students are punished in greater numbers, are more likely to be assigned to special education classes to get rid of them, and are less likely to be guided into college prep and quality programs. Eight "representation" measures of "second generation discrimination," as Bullock and Stewart term these actions, were created by dividing the proportion of blacks experiencing some form of second generation discrimination (e.g., suspensions) by the proportion of whites similarly treated. Measures were created

\*Teachers can also be segregated in the sense that all the minority teachers can be located in specified schools. Although this is also an important segregation policy, there are no currently available Tacuber indexes (which measures segregation) for school teachers. See Tacuber and Tacuber (1978).

'The teachers' data are taken from the U.S. Office of Civil Rights ("Student Trend Data") and were supplied by Professor Franklin Wilson of the University of Wisconsin. The data are for 1973, the last year without large quantities of missing data.

Table 1. Measures of Policy Impact for Urban School Districts

Measure	Low	High	Means	Standard Deviation	n
Teacher ratio	.42	1,58	1.02	.27	- 77
Ratio of blacks to whites:					
Attending college	.05	2.24	.38	.31	79
In votech programs	.31	1.76	.96	.21	82
Suspended	.51	6.87	1.79	.80	82
School dropouts	.84	3.12	1.49	.42	81
Special education	.66	2.34	1.24	.31	80
EMR classes	.00	4.20	1.89	.87	82
Gifted programs	.07	1.72	.50	.30	82
Enriched classes	.11	2.72	.57	.34	82

(see Table 1) for graduates enrolled in college, 10 assignment to vocational programs, 11 students suspended, students dropping out of school, and students assigned to special education classes, educable mentally retarded (EMR) classes, gifted programs, and enriched, honors, or advanced classes.

#### **Findings**

If black access to school board seats results in policy changes, we would expect that those cities with higher proportions of blacks on the school board would also have better representation of black teachers, a larger proportion of blacks attending college, fewer blacks in vocational training programs, fewer blacks suspended, fewer blacks dropping out, fewer blacks in special education classes and classes for the educable mentally retarded, and more blacks in gifted programs and enriched classes. Table 2 shows the simple correlations between each of the nine policy indicators and the percentage of black members on the school board.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup>The college enrollment data are taken from the National Center for Education Statistics (1975; see note 4). The data are for 1970, the most recent available year. School dropout rates are taken from the same source and are for the same year.

"The vocational education data are from the U.S. Office of Civil Rights ("Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Survey: School Year 1976-77") and were provided by Professor Joseph Stewart of Rice University. The data on suspensions, special education, EMR programs, gifted programs, and enriched classes are from the same source for the same year.

<sup>12</sup>The correlations between the representation index and the policy variables are college (-.08), votech

Table 2 shows that employment of black teachers is related to school board representation as hypothesized. School districts with more black school board members also have a better representation of black teachers. The relationship is not strong, but it is in the correct direction.

Table 2 also shows that student career plans are not immune to influence via school board representation. The relative proportion of blacks attending college is related to black school board membership. Vocational enrollments, however, are unaffected. The absence of a linkage to vocational education may well be the result of a reevaluation of vocational education in the educational system. Given today's job market, many vocational schools are highly competitive, and admissions are prized. The positive relationship may well reflect the denial of opportunities to blacks in this area also.<sup>13</sup>

For all four punitive aspects of second generation discrimination—suspensions, dropouts, assignment to special education classes, and assignment to EMR classes—significant relationships exist in the hypothesized direction. In cities

(-.14), suspensions (.06), dropouts (.09), special education (.32), EMR classes (-.06), gifted (.00), enriched (-.12), and teachers (.00). The correlations for the deficit measure are college (-.04), votech (-.05), suspensions (-.01), dropouts (-.01), special education (.06), EMR classes (-.01), gifted (.01), enriched (-.08), teachers (-.06).

<sup>19</sup>The argument on vocational education was called to my attention by Michael Preston. According to Preston (personal communication), vocational education slots are highly valued in today's job market and in many locations are not used to funnel off blacks from better educational opportunities.

Table 2. Relationship between Black Representation and Policy Outputs

Policy Variable	Correlation with % Blacks on School Board	Predicted Direction
Teacher ratio, 1973a	.20*	+
Attending college, 1970a	.18	+
Vocational school, 1976b	.05	_
Suspended, 1976 <sup>b</sup>	<b>39*</b>	-
Dropouts, 1970a	40 <b>*</b>	-
Special education, 1976b	40*	_
EMR classes, 1976 <sup>b</sup>	32*	_
Gifted, 1976 <sup>b</sup>	.01	+
Enriched, 1976 <sup>b</sup>	.24*	+

p less than .05.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Independent variable is 1970 Black Representation.

bIndependent variable is 1974 Black Representation.

with more blacks on the school board, fewer blacks (proportionally) are suspended, drop out of school, are placed in special education programs, or are placed in EMR classes (Table 2).

Similar results hold for denial of access to quality programs. In school districts with a higher percentage of blacks on the board, proportionately more blacks are admitted to gifted and enriched classes. In the case of enriched classes, the relationship is statistically significant.

Although the correlations in Table 2 generally support our hypotheses, the relationships are fairly modest. One reason is that each of the measures of second generation discrimination contains some measurement error. The suspension ratio, for example, probably taps both second generation discrimination and some variations in discipline problems. The common variation shared by each of the eight measures of second generation discrimination, therefore, is probably a better measure of second generation discrimination than any of the individual measures. Using factor analysis, this commonality was extracted and used as a composite indicator of second generation discrimination.14 Higher scores on the factor score indicate greater second-generation discrimination. As expected, the correlation between the second generation discrimination factor and the percentage of black seats on the school board is larger than those for the individual indicators (r =-.48; p < .05).

Although Table 2 suggests that black representation on school boards can limit the degree of second generation discrimination against black students, this conclusion is premature. The relationship may well be spurious. For example, black representation might be high and second generation discrimination might be low because the proportion of blacks residing in the school district is large. A large black population can elect more black board members, and it also has the political influence to discourage discrimination efforts. Similarly, cities with greater black resources (education, income, political organization) will have a black minority that has the political clout both to elect more school board members and to influence the direction of educational policy.

To determine if the relationship between black representation on school boards and second generation discrimination is spurious, therefore,

<sup>1</sup>The first factor was used because all indicators loaded in the correct direction. The total variance explained by the first factor is 33.9%. It was the only significant factor. The loadings of each indicator on the factor were as follows: college (-.13), votech (.15), suspensions (.82), dropouts (.59), special education (.72), EMR classes (.80), gifted (-.21), enriched (-.37).

each of the policy indicators will be used as a dependent variable in a multiple regression. The independent variables are the percentage of blacks on the school board and four black resource variables—the black population percentage in the district, the median family income for blacks, the median black education level, 13 and a measure of black political resources. 16

The results of the multiple regressions appear in Table 3. As expected, the statistical results show some variation across the policy indicators. In six of the nine cases the relationship between black school-board seats and second-generation discrimination disappears when black resources are controlled. For placement in EMR classes, placement in gifted classes, and college enrollments. the impact of black school-board seats remains statistically significant. For the factor measure of second-generation discrimination, black population dwarfs the impact of all other variables. Black representation on school boards, therefore, does affect educational equity policies and in some cases has an impact even with controls for black population, black income, black education, and black political resources. This conclusion must be tempered, however, since many of the equations in Table 3 suffer from collinearity, thus, limiting the interpretation of the individual regression coefficients.

The relationship between black resources, black elected officials, and public policy merits further discussion. School district black resources strongly influence the extent of black representation on

<sup>13</sup>All data are from the National Center for Education Statistics (1975); see note 4. On the importance of education, see Sigelman and Karnig (1977).

16The black controlled-resource variable is a factor score index combining several indicators of black resources: 1) number of black state senators, 2) number of black state representatives, 3) number of black judicial officials, 4) graduate chapters of Kappa Alpha Psi, 5) number of Links, Inc., chapters, 6) number of Alpha Kappa Alpha chapters, 7) number of National Urban League chapters, 8) number of top 100 blackowned businesses, 9) number of black-owned banks, and 10) number of black-owned businesses registered with the Small Business Administration. The indicators were unidimensional, with the first factor accounting for 54% of the total variance. For a discussion of the validity of using these variables as indicators of blackcontrolled resources see Karnig (1979) and Birmingham (1977). We did not include black mayors or police chiefs in the resource variable because there were only nine black mayors and three black police chiefs in our sample. Exclusion did not affect the factor scores appreciably. Finding only one factor is significant because it indicates black political, economic, and organizational resources are highly linked.

Table 3. Impact of Black Representation on Public Policy Controlling for Black Resources

				•	Dependent P.	Dependent Policy Variable		•		
Independent Variable	Teachers	Votech	Suspensions	Dropouts	Spec, Ed	EMR Class	Gifted	Enriched	College	Factor
% Black population	21	05	74*	48*	53*	-1.00*	.61*	41	01	<b>*</b> 06 <b>*</b>
Black income	37*	08	15	.33*	.02	18	.03	.12	37*	05
Black education	ا. 2	21	60'-	38*	.07	26*	52:	18	.38*	23
Black resources	.45*	ġ	.05	.15	00	01	16	03	17	8.
School board seats	.22	80.	80.	22	8.	.39	37*	10	.42*	.11
R2	.27	8.	.40	.27	.30	.50	.10	.19	.19	.51

p less than .05. <sup>8</sup>Standardized regression coefficients.

school boards (see England & Robinson, 1981), and then black school board members create policies to limit educational discrimination. Because population and other resources cannot directly affect educational policies without going through the school board, representation on the school board becomes a necessary condition for policy impact. As long as black population and other resources are freely translated into black seats on the school board, public policy should be responsive to public sentiment. In cases where electoral systems restrict black representation, this linkage is attenuated. In other words, the determinants of representation studies are important because elected representatives transform public policy demands into public policies. Any variables that affect the efficiency of the transformation device, therefore, are important subjects of political research.17

To illustrate in a crude way the effect of one variable, school board section plans, on the translation of votes into policy, the percentage of black population was regressed on the percentage of blacks on the school board for subsets of cities with three types of selection plan—appointive, ward or mixed, and at-large. According to Engstrom and McDonald (1981), the slopes of these regression equations show whether or not representation is affected by the selection plan. The closer the slope is to 1.0 (indicating blacks hold seats in proportion to their numbers), the more equitable black representation is. Table 4 shows that the appointive system overrepresents blacks by approximately 10%, whereas ward or mixed

<sup>17</sup>One interesting question related to the efficiency of the translation of resources into policy is whether or not there is an interaction between resources and representation; that is, do resources have more impact when accompanied by representation? To test this proposition, we added four interaction terms (representation with each of the four resources variables) to the equations in Table 3. The results were disappointing. In none of the equations did the predictive power (measured by adjusted R²) improve appreciably. In only 4 out of 40 cases did significant relationships occur where none existed before, well within the limits of chance.

systems result in almost perfect representation.<sup>18</sup> At-large elections, on the other hand, produce only 69% of the black school board members that would be expected.

The use of an appointive school board raises an interesting policy question. Are the appointive school board members likely to be responsive to the black community, or is their loyalty to other political forces? Clearly the appointment process creates possibilities of minority appointees who are unresponsive to the minority community. To investigate this possibility, the means for the second-generation discrimination indicators are shown in Table 5 for each type of selection plan. The table definitely shows that appointive selection plans are not detrimental to black policy objectives. Second-generation discrimination policies are more favorable to blacks under appointive systems in eight of the nine cases compared to at-large systems and in six of nine cases compared to ward and mixed systems. In addition, ward and mixed systems result in more favorable policies toward blacks in six of the nine cases when compared to at-large systems. On the factor measure of second-generation discrimination, the appointive board is associated with the least-discriminatory school systems. Clearly appointive school boards are not less responsive than other school boards to the black community.

#### Summary and Implications

This research examined the relationship between black representation on urban school boards and several educational policies that affect blacks. The study was designed in a manner favorable to finding some representational impact on public policy. The policy arenas were local where fewer political resources are necessary to have an impact, and the educational policy indicators were nonexpenditure variables that are directly tied to second generation educational discrimination

<sup>16</sup>Ward systems and mixed systems (those that combine elements of both ward and at-large elections) were combined because there were too few cases in each category for separate analysis.

Table 4. The Relationship between Seats and Population for Different School Board Selection Procedures

-	Appointive	Ward and Mixed	A t-Large
Slope	1.096	.981	.690
Slope F Score	53.9	23.6	11.8
$R^2$	<b>.81</b>	.55	.21
N	`15	21	46

against blacks. Significant relationships were found between black representation and education policy. When controls for black resources were introduced, some, but not all, of the relationships disappeared. In short, a modest relationship between black representation on school boards and educational policy exists and, in some cases, persists when black political and economic resources are introduced.

Although the relationships were modest, expecting stronger relationships than those found here is not theoretically realistic. The barriers to black impact on educational policy are numerous. Specifically, six preconditions must be met before black school-board members can affect school policies. First, some blacks must be elected to the school board. Second, educational issues must matter to the black community; that is, the black community must have consistent preferences about the direction of educational policy. In this study we assumed that blacks wished to end inequitable treatment of black students in the educational process. Third, issues relevant to the black community must be on the school board's agenda. If such issues are kept off the agenda, representation will not affect policy (see Bachrach & Baratz, 1963). Fourth, the blacks on the school board must hold the same policy stands as the black community. If black school-board members adopt white educational values, the linkage between race and policy is severed. Fifth, the blacks on the school board must be able to influence the direction of the board's activities. If blacks are not able to persuade nonblack members to vote for favorable policies, then this condition may be met only if blacks constitute a majority or sizable minority on the school board. Sixth, the policies adopted by the school board must be implemented by the educational bureaucracy (see Mladenka, 1981; Tucker & Zeigler, 1980, pp. 229-230).

If these six conditions are not met, black repre-

sentation on school boards may become symbolic. Although symbolic representation and access are important, representation is more important if it leads to actual representation and policy responsiveness. In many districts these preconditions are not met or only partially met. As a result, the transformation of electoral results into policy will be inexact and partial. Expecting relationships stronger than those found in this research, therefore, is expecting too much. As more of the preconditions are met, the relationships between representation and policy will become stronger.

The findings in this research have implications for three research traditions—representation theory, black politics, and public policy analysis. First, in terms of representation theory, this study finds a linkage between passive and active representation. In some areas of representation research, such as representative bureaucracy (see Meier, 1979; Saltzstein, 1979; and Subramaniam, 1967, among others), and elite background studies (see Nagel, 1977), this linkage has been assumed with little empirical evidence. Although active and passive representation are theoretically distinct dimensions of representation, in this study they partially overlap. What is needed in representation theory, therefore, is some effort to specify the conditions under which the two representations are linked.

Second, in terms of black politics, this study supports those findings that contend electoral structure is important. Haunting the large literature on the impact of at-large districts and other urban "reforms" on black representation has been the question of whether or not representation makes a difference. If it does not, representation becomes symbolic. In terms of school districts, an argument can be made that representation makes a difference. The type of electoral system affects the number of seats blacks attain on the school board (Table 4), and the number of black-held seats on the school board affects

Table 5. School Board Selection Plan and Second Generation Discrimination

Discrimination Measure	Appointment	Ward and Mixed	At-Large	p
College	.43	.33	.39	NS
Suspensions	1.56	1.67	1.93	NS
Special education	1,14	1.22	1.28	NS
Gifted	.53	.48	.51	NS
Votech	1.03	.98	.94	NS
Dropouts	1.32	1.41	1.57	.10
EMR	1.66	1.78	2.02	NS
Enriched	.68	.72	.47	.01
Black teachers	1.04	1.09	.98	NS
FACTOR	-6.02	-2.94	8.96	.08
N	15	21	46	

second-generation discrimination (Tables 2 and 3). This finding underscores the importance of the determinants research and the litigation challenging at-large elections.

The third finding, also in terms of black politics, concerns the effect of appointive school boards. School districts with appointive boards had the least second-generation discrimination of any type of selection plan. This finding implies that elections are not a necessary condition for the exercise of black actual representation. Although this is a fairly common perspective in the bureaucratic politics literature (see Rourke, 1976), the black-politics literature has always been concerned about the potential of cooptation. Possession of policymaking positions, therefore, may be more important than how those positions are attained.

Fourth, in terms of public policy analysis, this research indicates that the area needs continued effort to refine its policy output measures. Expenditure measures are too difficult to link theoretically to public preferences and too often constrained by environmental factors. In this case and possibly others, moving beyond expenditures is possible. The result should be more exacting tests of key hypotheses.

Finally, in terms of public policy analysis, this study contributes to the massive debate on politics and public policy. Are political variables or socioeconomic variables the key to understanding public policy? No other question in the state policy analysis literature has received the attention that this one has. Using expenditure measures of public policy, the frequent conclusion is that political variables have little or no impact on public policy (Dye, 1966). In this case, political factors (the election of blacks to school board seats) are associated with variation in specific educational policies. Politics matters.

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# The Public Hearing as an Effective Citizen Participation Mechanism: A Case Study of the General Revenue Sharing Program

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Students of citizen participation in public affairs disagree as to the effectiveness of such citizen involvement. Using the General Revenue Sharing program as a case study and applying techniques of both cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis, this article examines the effectiveness of one form of citizen participation, the public hearing. It is found that in the revenue-sharing program, the public hearing did have an immediate, but only short-term, impact on levels of public interest and citizen involvement. Evidence to support some short-term and some long-term effects on reported expenditure decisions is presented; however, these impacts generally are found to be inconsequential and not statistically significant. It is concluded that, as a form of citizen participation, the public hearing—at least as demonstrated in the General Revenue Sharing program—has not had much of an impact on citizen behavior or policy choices.

Two dominant outcomes [of citizen participation] are improved services and improved flow of information. The rates of these outcomes, especially of improved services, suggest . . . a fairly positive picture for the decentralization experience. (Yin & Yates, 1975, p. 56).

Advocates of citizen participation have more reason to despair now than they did ten years ago. Citizen organizations have little influence on the . . . decision making process. (Gittell, 1980, p. 741).

These quotations reflect the polar views of students of citizen participation in public affairs concerning the effectiveness of such participation efforts. Indeed, in spite of the literally hundreds of studies of direct citizen participation in the public sector conducted in the past three decades,1 there has been little consensus about the effectiveness of such behavior. As Checkoway and Van Til (1978) have noted, "It is remarkable how little research and analysis has been done [on the ways in which participation can make a difference in the policy outcomes of government]. Does participation work? Does it make government more responsive? Few major studies address these questions and the important issues they raise." As many citizen participation programs now are potentially threatened by budget cuts, decentralization of decision making, deregulation, and weakening of statutes,2 it seems especially appropriate to examine the accomplishments of citizen participation efforts and to attempt to determine what sort of citizen participation strategies are successful under what conditions.

This is a study of the impacts of one form of citizen participation—the public hearing—in one federally sponsored and locally administered program, General Revenue Sharing (GRS). Considering the number of participating jurisdictions, GRS represents the most extensive federal grant

Received: February 2, 1983 Revision received: September 29, 1983 Accepted for publication: November 7, 1983

The authors would like to thank Robert Utz and Ilese Hoyniak for data processing assistance and the University of Texas at Arlington and Purdue University for research support. We also wish to thank Delbert A. Taebel for his comments on this manuscript, and especially wish to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for their excellent and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

<sup>1</sup>For an introduction to the citizen participation literature in the private, corporate sector, see Vogel (1978).

<sup>2</sup>See the discussion by Berry (1981).

program incorporating the public hearing process ever enacted and offers a unique opportunity to assess the impact of the public hearing as a form of direct citizen involvement.

#### The General Revenue Sharing Program

The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act (GRS), originally passed as part of President Nixon's New Federalism program in 1972 and extended by two renewal legislations through 1983, has been called by some a "milestone in fiscal federalism" (Reagan & Sanzone, 1982, p. 81). There is no question that GRS is an important program in the contemporary intergovernmental system. In 1980, GRS was the sixth largest federal grant program.3 At the conclusion of fiscal 1983, GRS has distributed more than \$62 billion to states and localities. Equal in importance to the amount of money distributed through the program is the way in which the money is allocated. The no-strings (or at least few-strings) feature of GRS marked a significant departure from many of the categorical grant programs of the 1960s and initiated a trend that to varying degrees would be reflected in other major grant programs of the 1970s. The significance of GRS is illustrated by a poll of scholars of American government and politics, which found the program to be rated the second most important intergovernmental program of the past two decades (Cole, Stenberg, & Weissert, in press).

But for scholars of active participation in public affairs, GRS is important in terms other than amount and flexibility of money allocated through the program. Because of its nature and because of some significant changes in the 1976 renewal legislation, GRS provides a rare opportunity to examine the effectiveness of one form of citizen participation.

The initial GRS legislation (1972 to 1976) included no requirement for citizen participation by recipient units of government, which in fact was one of the most controversial and distinguishing features of the program, especially when compared with many of the Great Society programs. Yet, many cities did hold public hearings in reaching their GRS expenditure decisions. Thus, use patterns from 1972 to 1976 can be compared for those localities permitting hearings with those not

'See the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1981, p. 158).

"The exceptions to this statement are few. The recipients were required to prepare planned and actual use reports and to publish these reports in local newspapers and also were required to expend funds in accordance with state law. permitting hearings, and inferences can be made about the effects of public hearings. In fact, a few studies are available which make such comparisons for the early years of GRS. A later section of this article compares the results of those studies with our own similar analysis.

More important, the 1976 renewal legislation required all recipient units of government to hold public hearings before allocating GRS funds. Specifically, the 1976 renewal legislation required a proposed-use hearing to be held not less than seven days before the presentation of the budget to the body responsible for enacting it. Notice of this hearing must be published at least ten days before the hearing. After this, a hearing must be held before the adoption of the entire budget, and this second hearing must focus on the relationship of revenue-sharing funds to the entire budget. Notice of this hearing, too, must be published at least ten days before the hearing, and a summary of the entire budget and the proposed use of the GRS funds must be made available for public inspection. These very important changes in the legislation permit a comparison of use patterns and other outcome measures for those cities that did not hold hearings before 1976 but were required to hold hearings after 1976. Thus the program permits the application of a quasi-experimental research design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963), where a type of pre- and post-test analysis is possible. Before the discussion of our methods and the presentation of results, a brief review of attempts to measure citizen participation in the broader context is in order.

# Citizen Participation, Public Hearings, and Prior Research

It is not possible in the present article to review all the citizen participation literature of the last three decades or even that portion dealing specifically with the public hearing as a citizen participation device. It is important to note, however, that in spite of numerous citizen-participation studies,5 very few serious and systematic attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation in general, or of public hearings in particular, are available. In a major analysis of citizen-participation efforts in federal programs, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) acknowledged the "general absence of soundly prepared evaluation studies in the federal government and elsewhere" (ACIR, 1979, p. 305). Reviewing specifically the literature in the area of public hearings, Checkoway (1980)

For a thorough review of this literature, see Hutcheson and Shevin (1976).

found "few studies which address the effectiveness [of the public hearing] as a participation method."

Given the extensive reliance on the public hearing as a form of citizen involvement in the United States, it is indeed remarkable to reflect on how little is known about the effectiveness of the technique. As Checkoway (1980) notes, "Public hearings are among the most traditional methods for citizen participation in America. They are required at all levels of government and are increasing in number and use. It is safe to estimate that their numbers run to the tens of thousands per year." The ACIR, in its 1979 survey of participation requirements in federal grant programs. found that of the 155 federal grant programs requiring citizen participation, 55 of these mandated public hearings as the form of citizen input (ACIR, 1979). Clearly the time has come for at least some initial evaluations of the public hearing as a citizen participation device.

Some attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of citizen participation efforts are available. But, as Rosener (1978) points out, the participation concept is multifaceted, and many of the past evaluation efforts do not adequately address this complexity. For effective evaluation, Rosener (1978) argues, there must be agreement on goals and objectives, and there needs also "to be fairly complete knowledge of a cause and effect relationship between some specified participation program, and the achievement of agreed upon goals or objectives." Similarly, in discussing the obstacles to effective citizen participation program evaluation, Yin and Yates (1975) described these evaluation problems as follows: studies rarely possess even elementary aspects of experimental design; criteria for success or failure are often vague and ambiguous; many of the studies cover only very brief time periods; and often evaluators are themselves active participants in the experiments.

A study of citizen participation in the GRS program does not resolve all of these problems, but it does address many thorny methodological issues that have long plagued evaluation research in the participation area. First, since the program has been in existence for a decade, extensive longitudinal data can be analyzed. Second, GRS is received by every general purpose unit of local government in the country, so a large number of experiences are available for study. These two points alone—a large number of cases and a rela-

In her review of citizen participation evaluation attempts, Rosener (1978) cites the following studies as those evaluating participation effectiveness: Cole (1974), Mazmanian (1976), Rosenbaum (1975), and Yin and Yates (1975).

tively long time period—distinguish evaluation of citizen participation in GRS from that possible in the majority of participation efforts. Additionally, the aggregate analysis possible with GRS avoids some of the more subjective biases that may be associated with case studies or participant-observation methodologies. And, although the 1976 GRS renewal legislation is typically vague concerning the objectives of citizen involvement in the program, enough revenue-sharing research has been completed so that, at least among scholars, some common interests and expectations of the outcomes of citizen involvement in the program have developed. These objectives will be reviewed more carefully below.

But, most important, as previously mentioned, GRS provides an opportunity to utilize a research design somewhat analogous to the true experiment where pre-test and post-test conditions apply. Collectively, these aspects of GRS render the program a very attractive test of the effectiveness of citizen participation, or at least of the public hearing as a form of citizen participation, in a public program.

#### Data and Methodology

GRS also poses some very difficult methodological issues, especially for those attempting to assess fiscal impacts of the program. The most critical of these center around two concerns: fungibility and substitution. Briefly stated, fungibility involves the difficulty in tracing specific expenditure decisions to GRS funds rather than other general revenues, whereas substitution involves the use of GRS funds to release (substitute for) local funds that can then be used for other expenditure purposes. As observers of local finance will attest, these closely related problems complicate analysis and make it extraordinarily difficult to measure the net effects of GRS or, for that matter, any other grant or intergovernmental transfer program. Various strategies have been used by those attempting to measure GRS's fiscal impact, including the analysis of reports filed by recipient units with the Department of the Treasury, the use of field observers for monitoring how GRS is used in various jurisdictions, the use of survey research methods, and the development of sophisticated computer simulation models which attempt to predict what would have been expected to happen to local expenditures in the absence of GRS funds.' We do not intend to raise, let alone to resolve, in this article the com-

<sup>7</sup>For a survey of these approaches, see Caputo and Cole (1976), Nathan and Adams (1977), Larkey (1979), and Newcomer and Welch (1981).

Table 1. Frequencies of Public Hearings in General Revenue Sharing Decisions, 1973-1982 (%)

	Hearin	gs held	
	Yes	No	N
1973	49.7	50.3	214
1974	58.6	41.4	217
1975	57.9	42.1	207
1976	56.2	42.8	208
1977	83.4	16.6	163
1978	96.4	3.6	165
1979	100.0	-	213
1980	98.1	1.9	215
1981	100.0		220
1982	100.0	_	211

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

plex conceptual and methodological points addressed by these various approaches. Our method is to ask chief executives, as local expert judges, to indicate what they believed to have been the fiscal impact of GRS. Thus, we rely on survey research methods to measure fiscal impact, and our data can best be described as estimates of perceived impact by local officials. Although our methodology is as vulnerable to the fungibility and substitution problems as that of others, we believe that in most of the areas of interest to GRS researchers, our previous findings generally conform to the conclusions of scholars using other techniques.

Our data are derived from mailed questionnaire surveys of chief executive officers in every American city with a population over 50,000 conducted by the authors every year since the inception of GRS. In addition to questions on citizen involvement, our survey has dealt with perceived impact of the program. All of our fiscal impact questions and many of our attitudinal questions are identi-

This is not to minimize some of the significant differences found by students of GRS using differing methodologies. But it is to say that the available research demonstrates broad areas of consensus and also that precise comparisons among studies are difficult owing to differing populations and categories of jurisdictions studied and differing time periods of analysis. For our sample of cities over 50,000 we found in 1975 responding officials to report allocating 34% of GRS to public safety and 6.0% to social services. The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan's study of that same year (using an equal dollar weighting scheme) found cities over 300,000 allocated 20.5% to public safety and 13.6% to social services. The SRC found cities between 100,000 and 300,000 to have allocated 45.7% to public safety and 1.8% to social servcal, or nearly so, over the entire period. Thus, we are able to draw upon a unique set of time series data. Our annual return rate has been approximately 50% (ranging from 41% in 1977 to 54% in 1982). Extensive and published analysis has failed to detect any systematic demographic, regional, or political bias in the return (Cole & Caputo, 1977). Data for this article represent results from the 1973 through 1982 surveys. Our 1977 survey, conducted in late spring and early summer of 1977, is the first survey reflecting post-renewal (i.e., post-1976) data.

#### Participation in the GRS Program: Hypotheses and Assumptions

As mentioned above, a number of cities held public hearings in conjunction with GRS decisions even before the 1976 renewal legislation

ices. The SRC found cities between 25,000 and 100,000 to have allocated 31.7% to public safety and 4.4% to social services. We found in our sample of cities over 50,000 that 49.7% and 58.6% reported having held public hearings in 1973 and 1974, respectively. The SRC found 64.5% and 56.2% of cities over 300,000 in its sample to have held hearings those years. The SRC found significantly fewer smaller cities having held hearings in those years. In our 1974 survey, we found cities reporting about 18% of their revenue sharing funds to have been allocated to new program areas (as compared with substitution uses). The SRC found this figure to be about 20% for cities over 100,000 (the only size category they reported for this area).

This is the case with the exception of 1973, when we did not ask respondents to indicate levels of public interest. For purposes of analysis, we assigned cities a 1973 public interest level score identical to their 1974 score. For all cities, agreement from one year to the next on this variable was 84%.

required such participation. Table 1 indicates the proportion of our sample reporting public hearings for the entire period of our surveys.

It can be seen that approximately half of the cities in our sample reported holding public hearings in the prerenewal period. In this sense, our data are comparable with other studies of the early years of the GRS program. The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, in its NSF-sponsored study (Juster, 1975), found in 1973 that 54.7% of the cities in its sample held public hearings. (The SRC study did not include separate breakdowns for cities in the "over 50,000" category.) Table 1 indicates that the renewal legislation and its requirement for public involvement did have an impact. By the end of the decade virtually 100% of all cities reported compliance with the provision of the renewal legislation requiring public hearings.

But those interested in the impact of citizen involvement in the GRS program obviously are concerned with impact factors other than simply compliance with the law. The real question, and the one that this article addresses, is whether in a substantive sense the public hearing process has had an impact. In assessing the impact of the public hearing process, three measures will be examined: expenditure outcomes, public interest and involvement in local affairs, and net fiscal effect (i.e., proportion allocated to new and expanded programs as opposed to proportion used for program maintenance, tax reduction, and other substitution uses). These are issues that have concerned students of GRS and especially those interested in public involvement in GRS since the inception of the program. Each of these is discussed below.

Expenditure Outcomes. Expenditure outcomes have always been a major concern of those advocating greater citizen involvement in GRS and especially those concerned with the small proportion of GRS allocated to human services. Study after study has concluded that very large proportions of GRS have been allocated to traditional municipal services, but very little has been allocated to social and human services (Juster, 1975). For those concerned about these differentials, it always has been hoped that greater citizen involvement would result in higher proportions of GRS being allocated to human services. As noted in the ACIR (1979) study, "A substantial share of the original demands for federal participation requirements in GRS sprang from dissatisfaction with the alleged allocation of funds in a racially or geographically discriminating way. Particular emphasis was placed on the tendency for established budget processes to allocate GRS funds to traditional municipal services (e.g., police, fire, sanitation) as against social or human services."

Indeed, in their early study of the GRS program, Nathan and Adams (1977) found that in those jurisdictions where public interest groups were active in GRS decisions, those groups favored the use of GRS "primarily for social service programs affecting the poor and otherwise disadvantaged."

The GRS legislative hearings themselves provide numerous examples of witnesses attempting to link the citizen participation issue with the expenditure of GRS funds for social services. John Martin (1975) of the National Retired Teachers Association testified during the first renewal debate that "Communities have shown little or no inclination to use these monies to increase available social services. . . . " In order to remedy this, Martin argued, "There is a need for more adequate citizen input into the process of planning for the use of such monies." Likewise. Nan Watterman (1975) of the League of Women Voters testified, "Our basic concern is that the distribution of funds is equitable and meets human needs. . . . To fulfill the promise of the program, citizens must be involved in decisions about spending GRS funds." It has been widely assumed, then, that citizens and public interest groups would favor greater proportions of GRS funds to be allocated to human services and that mandated public hearings would be a way to accomplish such a distribution.

In fact, early studies of GRS did establish certain links between public hearings and the proportion allocated to social services. The Survey Research Center's study (Juster, 1975), for example, found that of the cities with populations over 100,000 which had held public hearings, 77% reported health and social services to be new issues attended to because of GRS, compared with only 37% of the same size cities not holding public hearings. The study further concluded, "City officials in places with hearings and citizen activity reported attention to social services more than other city officials," and that "Both large and small cities with initial hearings did spend a greater percent of their GRS allocations on social services than did other cities" (Juster, 1975, pp. 75, 76).

In an earlier study, we found an association between public hearings and the proportion of GRS allocated to social service programs. In that study, we concluded that "Cities which did not hold public hearings were much more likely to allocate their revenue sharing funds for public safety functions. . . . Cities that did hold public hearings, on the other hand, spend larger proportions of their money . . . for social services and health services" (Caputo & Cole, 1974, pp. 102-103).

The first proposition we examine, then, is that public hearings will influence expenditure outcomes and, in particular, that such hearings will be associated with greater proportions of GRS being allocated in the areas of human services and smaller proportions being allocated in traditional service areas, such as public safety.

New or Expanded Operations. It also is anticipated that citizens and public interest groups will favor greater GRS allocations for new programming areas because, as Nathan and Adams (1977) argue, "New or expanded operating programs can be expected to have a more direct and immediate effect on people than is true of most capital projects." As was the case with functional expenditure outcome, some early, but tentative, evidence already exists to substantiate this expectation. The Survey Research Center's study, for example, concluded that "cities with initial GRS hearings spent more than twice as great a percentage of their GRS allocations on new programs as cities without hearings" (Juster, 1975, p. 76). Also, Nathan and Adams (1977) found that cities having no citizen involvement allocated 8% of their GRS funds to new operating uses compared with 13% for new operating outlays for those cities permitting citizen involvement. We will test the proposition, then, that public hearings will be positively related to the proportion of GRS allocated to new and expanded uses as opposed to that allocated for substitution purposes.

Public Interest and Involvement. Our final measure of effectiveness is impact of public hearings on the overall level of citizen interest in local affairs. Again, some of the earlier studies provide hypotheses that can be more fully explored in this study. The Opinion Research Corporation (1975) survey, funded by NSF, included more than 1,000 telephone interviews of the general public and 800 telephone interviews of community leaders. Approximately 18% of the public and 24% of community leaders believed the GRS program had increased their public interest and participation in local affairs. Further, one-third of all respondents to the Opinion Research Corporation's survey believed GRS had increased the participation of local organizations in local government.

Nathan and Adams, too, found increased public interest as a result of GRS, especially among those jurisdictions permitting public hearings. They stated, "One distinguishing characteristic associated with those jurisdictions permitting citizen involvement was the degree of overall public interest in revenue sharing. In six of the nine citizen involvement localities, the overall level of public interest was described as significant. By comparison, in only two of the other forty-four governments... was significant public interest reported" (Nathan & Adams, 1977, p. 119). We examine the assumption, then, that

public hearings are positively associated with increased public interest in community affairs.

#### A Summary Thus Far

Using GRS as a case study, we intend to test for the possibility that public hearings are positively related to expenditure outcomes, new program allocations, and increased public interest. Some research, in fact, has been conducted in each of these areas, and, as reported above, generally confirms a positive association between public hearings and these impact areas. But the available literature, although supportive of general hypotheses and expectations, suffers in at least two significant ways.

First, almost every major empirical GRS study was conducted in the first year or two of the program. This is true of the Nathan and Adams study, of the SRC study, and of the Opinion Research Corporation survey. It also is true of much of our own published research. The country's decade-long experience with the program now permits a much longer-range and definitive assessment of the impact of public hearings.

Second, and more important, we are now able to study the impacts of public hearings in those cities not holding hearings in the pre-1976 period, but which are now required to hold public hearings. Prior studies only compared groups of cities with respect to whether or not they had held public hearings. Although important differences have been found (as reported above), it is not possible to conclude from these studies that public hearings caused these differences (cities that voluntarily held public hearings may also have been more prone to allocate GRS for social and human services and for new and expanded programs). The pre-test and post-test aspect of the renewal legislation provides increased confidence in our conclusions about the impact of the public hearing process. Our impact measures, tested below, are effects of public hearings on expenditure outcomes, public interest, and new spending. Three separate propositions are tested:

- 1. Before mandated public hearings, GRS behavior will be found to be different in cities that voluntarily held public hearings from those that did not hold hearings.
- 2. Before mandated public hearings, GRS behavior will be found to vary with the number of hearings held.
- 3. GRS behavior will be found to change in the post-renewal period for cities required to hold public hearings, but which had not held hearings in the pre-renewal period.

These propositions require separate research procedures. The first two may be tested by what

Table 2. Reported Public-Safety Allocations by Presence or Absence of Public Hearings and by Number of Public Hearings (%)

	Public Hearings			Number of Hearings			
	Yes	No	p	1	2	3+	N
1973	. 21.9	22.3	NS	8.	•	,	214
1974	25.6	40.2	.05	8.			217
1975	29.6	40.7	.05	35.2	33.2	25.6	207
1976	38.4	45.2	NS	48.4	46.6	49.8	208
1977				54.9	35.9	18.9	163
1978				52.0	47.6	32.5	165
1979				55.1	45.8	40.1	213
1980			,	66.6	45.4	40.9	215
1981			,	72.7	42.9	30.4	220
1982				50.8	46.5	38.1	211

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Question not asked this year.

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

Tucker (1981) calls "cross-sectional analysis." Here, the comparison is between cities holding and not holding hearings at distinct points in time. The third proposition requires what Tucker calls a "longitudinal" or time-series research design. In this case, the focus is on the behavior of cities over several time periods. Both of these approaches will be used in this study (see also Tucker, 1982a, b).

#### **Findings**

#### GRS Behavior: A Cross-Sectional Analysis

The first impact measure to be examined is expenditure outcomes. If public hearings are to have an impact, the expectation is that hearings will be associated with smaller proportions of

GRS being allocated to traditional areas and larger proportions being allocated to areas of human needs. We have combined operating and capital expenditures in the areas of fire prevention and public safety into one category called "public safety." Likewise, we have combined operating and capital expenditures in the areas of health and social services into one category called "social services." Tables 2 and 3 show the results of our analysis of public safety and social services expenditure patterns by whether cities did or did not hold public hearings in the pre-renewal period, and by the number of public hearings in all years (except in 1973 and 1974, when we did not ask for number of hearings).

In general, the findings shown in Tables 2 and 3 confirm our expectations. In all cases in the prerenewal period, the criterion of whether cities did

Table 3. Reported Social Service Allocations by Presence or Absence of Public Hearings and by Number of Public Hearings (%)

	Public Hearings			Number of Hearings			
•	Yes	No	p	1	2	3+	N
1973	3.6	1.5	.05	a			214
1974	7.7	3.3	.05	· a			217
1975	6.8	4.7	NS	4.1	6.2	8.8	207
1976	5.4	3.1	.05	4.3	4.4	7.7	208
1977				3.9	2.6	10.5	163
1978				2.2	3.4	7.0	165
1979				6.4	3.4	5.2	213
1980				3.3	4.9	7.4	215
1981				1.6	3.5	4.8	220
1982				3.1	5.5	6.4	211

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Question not asked this year.

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

or did not hold public hearings was associated with public safety and social service GRS allocations in the predicted directions. Cities holding public hearings reported allocating more to social services and less to public safety than cities not holding hearings.

For all years this pattern is strengthened when the number of hearings is considered. Generally, cities that held greater numbers of public hearings report allocating even larger proportions of GRS funds to social services and even less to public safety than those holding fewer or no hearings. These trends are especially pronounced for those cities holding three or more public hearings both in the pre- and post-renewal periods.

Almost uniformly then, we find that for all the years our public-hearing criteria of whether cities did or did not hold hearings and numbers of hearings held are associated with expenditure outcomes in the expected directions. To this extent, our data confirm the earlier SRC and Nathan and Adams studies reaching similar conclusions. Although we find that even one public hearing made a difference, we find the expenditure distinctions particularly marked with greater numbers of hearings.

A second area of concern to observers of GRS is its effect on public interest in local politics. Some reserch detected a relationship between public hearings and levels of public interest in the early years of the program. In a more recent survey, the ACIR (1979) reported evidence to suggest a link between the renewal legislation's mandate for public hearings and increased public interest, but the ACIR also speculated that any such effect might have been only temporary. Table 4 indicates the relationship between public hearings and proportions of respondents in our survey who

reported GRS to have had a positive impact on public interest and involvement in local affairs.

For all years a pattern similar to that noted when examining expenditure outcomes is found; that is, greater public interest is reported by those cities holding public hearings than by those cities holding none, and for all years the proportion reporting a positive impact generally increases as the numbers of hearings increase. These differences are shown to be statistically significant.

But Table 4 also demonstrates another important aspect of the extent of public interest in GRS. This is a general decline in the overall levels of public interest generated by GRS as the program has matured. By the time of our 1981 and 1982 surveys, only 32 and 27% respectively of all cities were reporting a positive impact of GRS on public interest in local affairs. This compares with about 70%, indicating a positive impact in the program's earlier years. Numbers of public hearings do seem to stimulate greater levels of public interest in local affairs. As the number of hearings increases, the level of reported public interest increases; however, the overall level of public interest attributable to GRS has declined over the years.

The last impact measure examined is the proportional allocation of GRS to new or expanding service levels compared with the proportion of GRS used for funding substitutions (a ratio sometimes referred to as "net fiscal effect"). The general argument, it will be recalled, is that, because of their direct and more obvious effect on people, new and expanded expenditure patterns are more likely to be favored by citizens. The early SRC and Nathan and Adams studies, as reviewed above, did detect such deviations between cities holding and those not holding public hearings.

Table 4. Percentage of Cities Reporting Positive Impact on Public Interest by Presence or Absence of Public Hearings and by Number of Hearings

	Public Hearings .		Number of Hearings				
	Yes	No	p	1	2	3+	N
1973	71.2	64.7	.05	a		_	
1974	71.3	50.0	.05	a			
1975	77.7	55.4	.05	60.0	80.0	75.0	207
1976	68.9	42.7	.05	55.7	61.5	73.2	208
1977				46.7	58.5	62.9	163
1978				50.0	49.5	61.4	165
1979				24.1	33.3	36.4	213
1980				20.0	35.4	44.2	215
1981				16.7	28.6	44.4	220
1982				20.0	23.8	37.8	<b>21</b> I

<sup>a</sup>Question not asked this year.

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

Table 5. Percentage of General Revenue Sharing Allocated to New and Expanding Functions by Presence or Absence of Hearings and by Number of Hearings, 1975 and 1976

	Public Hearings			Nu	mber of Heari	ngs
	Yes	No	<u>p</u> .	1	2	3+
1975						
Operating	6.2	3.8	NS	6.0	7.5	7.9
Capital	12.7	6.6	.05	11.4	17.2	12.8
Total	18.9	10.4	.05	17.4	24.7	20.8
N	114	55		51	35	57
1976	•					
Operating	3.0	3.8	NS	3.0	3.0	6.6
Capital	9.6	6.6	NS	6.3	12.2	10.2
Total	12.6	10.4	NS	9.4	15.2	16.8
N	119	55		61	39	56

Source: Authors' annual survey data.

Table 5 indicates the effects of holding or not holding public hearings on expenditure patterns. For convenience of presentation, only data from the 1975 and 1976 surveys are presented. Analysis for all years does not deviate from the trends shown in Table 5 except that the total proportion of GRS funds allocated to new programming areas declined steadily over the ten-year period.

Holding public hearings does appear to be related to allocations when considering proportions of GRS allocated to operating expenses, capital outlays, and total new program spending as shown in Table 5. Although the reported differences are not always statistically significant, those cities holding public hearings generally allocated larger proportions of their GRS funds to new program areas than did cities not holding public hearings. This is true for all ten years of our survey, and it also is the case that greater numbers of public hearings were associated with even larger proportions of GRS allocated to new program areas.

Cross-sectional comparisons tend to confirm the propositions as stated. As earlier analysts have shown, the holding of public hearings in the prerenewal period tended to be associated with larger proportions of GRS allocated to areas of human services and needs, larger proportions allocated to new and expanding program areas, and greater levels of public interest and involvement. These trends all were strengthened when considering numbers of public hearings.

#### GRS Behavior: A Longitudinal Analysis

In her treatment of American state policies, Gray (1976) points out that cross-sectional analysis alone may lead to severe inference errors. Cross-sectional analysis, she argues, is subject to interpretation problems similar to those encountered in the ecological fallacy situation (Gray, 1976). What has been termed by others "cross-sectional illusions" may seem to justify inferences which, in reality, do not exist (Boudon, 1974). The proposition that GRS behavior has changed for cities that in the pre-renewal period did not hold hearings can only be tested by means of a longitudinal research design. We use a quasiexperimental time-series design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963, pp. 37-43), to test for the effects of the mandated hearings over time. In order to apply the model, the cities are divided into two groups: an experimental group consisting of those that did not hold hearings in the pre-renewal period, but which have been required to hold hearings since and (as a control) those cities that consistently held hearings over the entire period. According to Campbell and Stanley (1963, p. 40), such a scheme controls for many of the commonly discussed threats to internal validity, including maturity, testing, regression, selection, mortality, and the interaction of these.

Also, as Campbell and Stanley (1963) demonstrate, although the results of an interrupted time series can often be shown graphically, statistical testing is necessary for conclusive interpretation. McCain and McCleary (1979) have developed a statistical model that estimates both short-term and long-term impacts. <sup>10</sup> We use that model to test for the impacts of the mandated public hearing, but before presenting our findings, we pause

<sup>16</sup>That model, used successfully in other recent policy research situations (see Morgan & Pelissero, 1980, and Meier, 1980), can be presented as follows:

$$Y = a + b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_2 + b_3 X_3 + e$$

#### where:

Y = predicted GRS behavior

 $X_1 =$  a linear measure of time coded 1, 2, 3, ... N

X<sub>2</sub> = a dummy variable coded 0 before renewal and 1 after renewal

X<sub>3</sub> = a dummy variable coded 0 before renewal and is a time variable thereafter (e.g., 0,0,0, 0,1,2,3, ...N)

The coefficient  $b_2$  will be statistically significant if the renewal legislation and its mandate for public hearings had a short-term effect. If the renewal legislation has had a long-term effect,  $b_3$  will be statistically different from zero. In each case, of course, the direction of change as represented by the slope must be in the proposed direction if it is to be concluded that the mandated hearing has had the impact proposed.

As is true with any time series analysis, the risk of autocorrelation is high. The Durbin-Watson test (Durbin & Watson, 1951) was used to examine for autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is found, procedures for identifying the pattern of autocorrelatioan will be used and new regression models generated.

for some clarifying comments. Our regression formulas include no measures of other social, economic, or political characteristics of the cities; only the time variables are examined. Following Morgan and Pelissero (1980), we find that the level of explained variance for all equations generally is very high, and the inclusion of additional variables would have relatively little explanatory effect. Additionally, with a small N, more variables risk over determining the equations. Also, it should be noted that the dependent variables in our equations reported in Table 6 are averages for all cities in the categories examined. Again following Morgan and Pelissero, we use this averaging procedure in order to permit the reporting of far fewer equations than would otherwise be required. However, a separate time series analysis was conducted for individual cities. The individual city analyses do not alter the conclusions reported for the aggregate analysis. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 6.

In Table 6, the regression coefficients are shown for each variable along with the degrees of statistical significance and the variance explained. (The Durbin-Watson test of autocorrelation was

Table 6. The Impact of the Public Hearings on GRS Behavior

Dependent Variables	<i>X</i> <sub>1</sub>		X <sub>2</sub>		<i>X</i> <sub>3</sub>		
	Average Yearly Change (Time)	F Value	Short- term Impact	F Value	Long- term Impact	F Value	R <sup>2</sup>
Public safety expenditures Cities required to hold hearings (N=83) Control cities (N=114)	5.53	.05	-1.70	NS	-5.53	.05	.74
	6.92	.01	1.42	NS	-6.43	.01	.97
Social service expenditures Cities required to hold hearings Control cities	.98	NS	-3.03	NS	40	NS	.45
	.77	NS	48	NS	-1.35	.05	.65
Public interest levels Cities required to hold hearings Control cities	95	NS	5.17	NS	-5.97	NS	.82
	-4.80	NS	2.09	NS	-2.64	NS	.92
Net fiscal effects (operational allocations)  Cities required to hold hearings Control cities	2.04 19	.01 NS	-7.87 -1.01	.01 NS	-2.48 87	NS NS	.98 .53
Net fiscal effects (capital outlays) Cities required to hold hearings Control cities	1.25	NS	97	NS	-1.83	NS	.74
	.07	NS	-6.09	NS	-1.00	NS	.38
Net fiscal effects (total)  Cities required to hold hearings  Control cities	3.29	.05	-8.85	.05	-5.32	.01	. <del>94</del>
	11	NS	-7.10	NS	-1.88	NS	.81

performed, and the results in each case were not significant.) Interpreting Table 6, one is first concerned with the direction of change as reflected in the various slopes. If change is not in the predicted direction, then the results of mandated hearings cannot be said to have had the expected results. For public-safety expenditures, we predict that public hearings would reduce the level of spending and thus yield a negative slope. For all other dependent variables, we predict positive slopes.

Table 6 indicates that many of the changes are not in the expected directions. The proportion of GRS allocated to social services changed very little for both sets of cities over this time period (less than an average of 1% per year), and for both sets of cities the period following the renewal legislation and mandated hearings is marked by a decrease in social service allocations. Thus, the direction of change is counter to that proposed; public hearings had no effect in increasing levels of GRS allocated to social service functions. Similarly, the mandated public hearings appear to have had no significant impact on the allocation of GRS to new programming areas. Here, too, the post-renewal period is marked by a general decline of spending for both sets of cities, trends that were not abated by the mandated hearings.

The mandated public hearings do appear to have had a short-term impact on public interest levels for both sets of cities. Indeed, both sets of cities experienced a short-term increase in public interest levels, and this is greater for cities newly required to hold hearings than for those holding hearings over the entire period. For neither set of cities, however, is the impact of the mandated hearing found to be statistically significant. As can be seen, no positive long-term impact on interest levels was recorded. Rather, the post-renewal period has been marked by a steady decline in levels of reported public interest and involvement.

Perhaps the most important impact of the mandated public hearing as demonstrated in this study is its impact on public safety expenditures, which increased over this time period; however, the model demonstrates both a short-term (but not significant) and a long-term (statistically significant) impact on public safety expenditures in the expected direction. However, this finding is tempered by the fact that the control cities also experienced a long-term reduction in public safety expenditures, indicating that perhaps factors other than, or in combination with, the public hearings were responsible for the detected decline.

Thus, of all the impact tests for those cities required to hold public hearings, only three were in the predicted directions (short-term impacts on public interest levels and short- and long-term impacts on public safety expenditures), and only one of these (long-term impact on public safety allocations) was found to be statistically significant. Overall, the aggregate findings do not provide much evidence for accepting the propositions that public hearings greatly affected GRS expenditure results.

We also analyzed results at the individual city level. Among the 79 cities that responded to at least eight of our ten surveys, results generally conform to those presented above. It will be recalled that we predicted a positive slope for social service allocations and public interest levels and a negative slope for public safety expenditures. Of a total of 79 cases, only 22 short-term and 18 long-term positive slopes for social service allocations were found, and only 11 of these were among the experimental group of cities (N=39). As with the aggregate analysis, the individual city analysis demonstrates the mandated public hearings to have had more of an impact on short-term than on long-term interest levels. Forty-six of the cities experienced a short-term positive effect on public interest levels, and 23 experienced longterm positive impacts. (However, none of these was statistically significant.) The individual city analysis also conforms with the aggregate findings that the mandated public hearing was most significantly related to public safety expenditures. Thirty-three of the cities experienced short-term impacts on public safety expenditures in the predicted direction (18 of these were control cities), and 46 experienced long-term impacts (24 of these were control cities).

The individual city analysis shows, again, that the public hearing was occasionally related to GRS behavior in the predicted directions. Some cities experienced short-term increases in public interest levels, and several experienced declines in public-safety expenditures, both in the short and long runs. But overall, most of the relationships were opposite to that predicted. Even those that were in the predicted directions were rarely of the magnitude to be statistically significant.

#### **Conclusions**

The citizen participation movement of the past two decades has had many objectives, but surely one major goal has been the forging at all levels of a more accountable, more responsive, more democratic government, especially in administrative and bureaucratic activities. As noted by the ACIR, one of the "ultimate objectives" of such participation "is to change governmental behavior so that governmental units respond better to citizens' needs and desires and refrain from the arbitrary, capricious, insensitive, or oppressive exercise of power" (ACIR, 1979, p. 61).

The data that can be brought to bear on one form of citizen participation (the public hearing) in one federally funded program (General Revenue Sharing) present a fairly consistent picture of the consequences of such an effort. Crosssectional analysis showed that in the pre-renewal period, there was an association between the voluntary holding by cities of public hearings and GRS behavior. These differences were accentuated when the numbers of hearings held were considered. However, longitudinal analysis, based on data collected over a ten-year period, indicates that the public hearing has had very little lasting effect on altering GRS decisions or behavior. We find that the 1976 mandated GRS public hearings did have an immediate, but short-term, impact on levels of public interest and involvement. We found evidence that some short-term and some long-term effects on levels of public-safety expenditures may have been attributable to the mandated public hearing. However, these findings generally were not statistically significant and did not deviate appreciably from behavior of the control group of cities. No short-term or long-term effect of the hearings on social service, welfare, and health expenditures were detected, nor were any effects found on levels of spending for new and expanding capital outlays or operating programs.

Perhaps it is not surprising to find that the public hearing-generally considered to be a "weak" form of public involvement (Arnstein, 1971)—would not have a significant impact on policy choices. However, as discussed earlier, the public hearing now is among the most often utilized forms of citizen participation. The ACIR (1979) found that in 1978 an average of 30 citizens per city participated in GRS public hearings. Considering the GRS program alone, then, more than half a million citizens annually participate in the hearing ritual. If experiences with the GRS program are representative of experiences with the several dozen other federal programs and hundreds of state and local programs requiring public hearings as the principal form of citizen involvement, one must ask what is accomplished by the hearing process if significant policy impacts are not realized.

Perhaps participation in the hearing process may have positive results for participants themselves. Perhaps such participation promotes and enhances individual leadership qualities, personal growth, and awareness of government and the process of making public policy. In short, the process may lead to a better and more informed citizenry. We have not tested for these possibilities in this study. However, as a mechanism for changing government behavior, we find the public hearing to have been largely inconsequential. Un-

fortunately, rather than opening the process of administration to public involvement, the public hearing may permit sanctioned isolation of agencies and agency officials seeking as little program and policy change as possible. Certainly, this does not describe GRS decision making for all cities, but it is the case that for the majority of cities in our sample, the mandated hearing had little significant or lasting effect on patterns of behavior.

For those who advocate greater public involvement in administrative decision making, we do not conclude that the time for despair is upon us, as Gittell (1981) seems to suggest. But we do suggest that now is the time for more thoughtful and more thorough examinations of the effectiveness of the various forms of citizen participation. The extensive experience the country has had with a variety of citizen participation alternatives in a variety of program contexts should allow for the removal of these questions from the realm of conjecture and speculation and permit, instead, more rigorous and conclusive examination. We should seek to discover which structural and environmental characteristics appear to maximize the effectiveness of citizen involvement. Also, we should seek a better understanding of bureaucratic norms as well as those circumstances under which citizen involvement may be actively sought by program administrators (rather than simply required by funding sources) for expertise, program responsiveness, and perhaps, most of all for needed political support. Ultimately, such examinations would call for the development of sounder theoretical linkages between public policy formulation and administration and citizen participation.11

Citizen participation was, and remains, a bold and exciting experiment in the administration of public policy. The experiment has not failed, but we do not yet know when and under what conditions it may best succeed. We believe that these issues demand attention and that the data are now at hand to begin to provide at least tentative answers to the many questions raised by the citizen participation movement. Both the theory and the practice of public administration would be strengthened by such efforts.

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## Political Solutions to Market Problems

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For some, market failures serve as a rationale for public intervention. However, the fact that self-interested market behavior does not always produce felicitous social consequences is not sufficient reason to draw this conclusion. It is necessary to assess public performance under comparable conditions, and hence to analyze self-interested political behavior in the institutional structures of the public sector. Our approach emphasizes this institutional structure—warts and all—and thereby provides specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance.

We may tell the society to jump out of the market frying pan, but we have no basis for predicting whether it will land in the fire or a luxurious bed.

George Stigler, Citizen and the State

For Bator (1958), Baumol (1965), Head (1962), and others, the presence of externalities, the undersupply of public goods, and, generally, the existence of market failures serve as now-standard justifications for (if not explanations of) a positive governmental role in the private economy. Governmental coercion, it is maintained, can resolve the free rider problem, mitigate third-party effects, regulate natural monopolies, and otherwise restore market competition or substitute for it. In short, political governance of the marketplace enhances efficient performance.

The idea of political solutions to market problems became something of a political-economic orthodoxy in the post-New Deal period. In recent years, however, this orthodoxy has spawned a revisionist literature that identifies some of the warts on the body politic. Models of bureaucratic, regulatory, and legislative institutions; of selfinterested pressure groups, elected politicians, and bureaucrats; and of fiscal illusion and incrementalism all underscore potential biases that may neutralize the anticipated efficiency gains associated with political solutions. Political solutions may entail efficiency gains or they may exacerbate market failures. The common theme in these models is that political actors do not reserve a privileged place for efficiency in their solutions to market problems. In fact, politicians, either in reaction to or in anticipation of constituency clamoring, often have no incentive to discriminate between market failures and market successes.

According to the market failure orthodoxy, inefficiency in the marketplace provides a prima facie case for public intervention. To the public failure school, on the other hand, efficiency distortions associated with political choice constitute a basis for strongly qualifying, if not rejecting, this case. The lesson of these contending arguments is that alternative institutional arrange-

<sup>2</sup>See Aranson (1980) and Wolf (1979).

'See Aranson and Ordeshook (1977a, b, 1978) and Wagner (1976).

'In our view the mechanism that enables a political agent to detect the concerns of his principal (the constituency) is much like a decibel-meter. Noise from the folks back home grabs his attention. The problem with this kind of mechanism is that it does not identify the reasons for all the noise. In some cases it may derive from complaints about negative externalities, moncpolistic practices, or undersupplied public goods. On other occasions, it may derive from the fact that in efficiently operating markets, changes in relative prices adversely affect individuals, eroding their capitalized wealth position ("prices push people around"). Both those bearing externality burdens and those "victimized" by price changes scream loudly; politicians hear undifferentiated noise.

Received: November 22, 1982 Revision Received: July 30, 1983 Accepted for publication: November 7, 1983

We acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-8112016). We appreciate the comments and suggestions of Thomas Borcherding, James Buchanan, Arthur Denzau, and Charles Wolf.

'See Niskanen (1971), Stigler (1971), and Buchanan (1967). More generally, for the "public failure" school, see Mitchell (1978), Buchanan (1979), and Wolf (1979).

ments are imperfect, implying that the ultimate choice of institutions must depend upon comparative performance (Buchanan, 1967; Buchanan & Brennan, 1980). This conclusion requires a theory of comparative institutional performance—a theory that currently does not exist.

The tension between the public failure and market failure schools remains alive today. The issues over which they quarrel, as indicated by Musgrave's (1981) recent article, "The Leviathan Cometh—or Does He?," remain unresolved. In our opinion, insights on these controversies will not be forthcoming unless grounded in a theory of comparative performance. The analyses of both the market failure and the public failure schools entail comparisons of an institution's performance against an ideal. We believe it is more fruitful (and scientifically appropriate) to compare the performance of one institutional arrangement with that of another. This practical perspective is especially appropriate for students of public policy. Much of the discussion of public policy has assumed that political solutions can improve on market failures. The model we offer shows that this assumption is not justified. Consequently, students of public policy must pose for themselves questions of *comparative* institutional performance rather than those that compare markets against an unattainable ideal.

This article points the way toward the development of the missing theory. We develop models of legislatures in a manner that allows direct comparison of political performance with market performance. The models are simple and hardly definitive, but they do focus the debate squarely on the issue of comparative institutional performance and on endogenous political institutions that are the counterpart to market mechanisms. It is important to emphasize that the simple models we develop initially are barren of complex institutional detail; their purpose is to sharpen intuitions about how a stripped-down institutional arrangement works. These intuitions, in turn, serve to focus analysis in richer institutional settings, which we then develop. Finally, we explore, even in the richer setting, the effects of relaxing some still restrictive features of our analysis.

The article proceeds as follows. After developing a model of political preference in the next section, we investigate the performance of a majority-rule legislature in the context of some familiar market failures. In each case, we compare the political solution, the market failure outcome, and the efficient outcome in order to gain some purchase on the question of comparative institutional performance. The techniques that are more clearly developed in a simple context are then applied to more complex and realistic institutional arrangements like those found in existing legislatures.

#### A Model of Political Preferences

The simple model of political choice we develop is one in which legislative institutions and processes of representation induce net benefit functions for legislative agents. These benefit functions differ from their normative economic counterparts because politicians pursue private purposes that need not be consonant with broader public ideals. Specifically, the geographic basis of representation encourages a truncated form of cost-benefit calculation in which the geographic impact of policy looms large in the politician's calculus.

Consider a public policy or project  $\pi(x)$  where x is initially assumed to be a scalar measure of project size, scope, or scale. This is a restrictive assumption that is relaxed below under "Political Solutions in Richer Institutional Settings." Let  $\beta(x)$  and x(x) represent the present values, respectively, of the social benefits and costs flowing from  $\pi(x)$ . The benefit and cost functions may be "unpacked" into politically relevant components by examining them from the point of view of the agents of the n legislative districts into which the polity is partitioned. Since  $\beta(x)$  and x(x) have distributional characteristics, and since the relevant distributional characteristic for legislators is geographic (because that is the basis on which their constituencies are determined), we decompose the benefits and costs according to their incidence on the jth legislative district. Consider benefits first. Letting  $b_j(x) = \sum_{\substack{i \neq j}} b_i(x)$ , we characterize total

benefits as

$$\beta(x) = b_j(x) + \hat{b}_j(x). \tag{1}$$

Equation (1) distinguishes economic benefits according to their incidence. For the constituency-oriented representative of the *j*th district,  $b_j(x)$ , not  $\beta(x)$ , is the politically relevant benefit function when the policy  $\pi(x)$  is evaluated. Benefits flowing to other districts,  $b_j(x)$ , do not figure in *j*'s calculations. We assume that the various  $b_k(x)$  functions, and consequently  $\beta(x)$ , are concave and increasing in x:

Assumption 1. 
$$b_{k'}(x) > 0$$
,  $b_{k''}(x) < 0$ ,  $k=1,\ldots,n$ .

Similarly, costs may be represented in terms of their respective incidences. Two kinds of costs are distinguished. First, there are public expenditures that are authorized and appropriated by the legislature to purchase inputs for the policy or project. By  $c_{1k}(x)$  we designate the amount earmarked to be spent in the kth district; by  $\hat{c}_{1k}(x) = \sum_{k \neq k} c_{1k}(x)$  we designate the amount earmarked for

all districts but the kth. The amount  $c_1(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} c_{1i}(x)$  represents total expenditure cost for  $\pi(x)$ . Second, there are nonexpenditure costs borne by each of the n districts, e.g., project externalities. By  $c_{2k}(x)$ , we denote externalities borne by the kth district and, by  $\hat{c}_{2k}(x)$ , those borne by all other districts. Total cost for the project  $\pi(x)$  is the sum of expenditure and nonexpenditure costs:

$$x(x) = [c_{1j}(x) + c_{2j}(x)] + [\hat{c}_{1j}(x) + \hat{c}_{2j}(x)].$$
 (2)

Regarding expenditure and nonexpenditure costs, we assume

Assumption 2. 
$$c_{ik}'(x) > 0$$
,  $c_{ik}''(x) > 0$ ,  $i=1,2, k=1, \ldots, n$ .

That is, both expenditures and externalities increase with project scale x at an increasing rate; so, too, does x(x).

Taxes are raised to cover all expenditures, with district j's share exogenously given as  $t_j$ . Regarding taxes, we assume

Assumption 3. There is a vector of tax shares,  $t = (t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ , with  $t_k \ge 0$  and  $\sum_{k=1}^{n} t_k = 1$ . For project  $\pi(x)$ , the tax bill, T(x), satisfies  $T(x) = \sum_{k=1}^{n} c_{1k}(x)$ ,

with district k's share given by 
$$T_k(x) = t_k T(x), k=1, \ldots, n$$
.

That is, taxes just cover expenditures, with the tax bill apportioned among districts according to a fixed sharing rule, t. Some policies do not entail expenditures and thus do not require taxes (see below).

As in his evaluation of benefits, legislator j is concerned with (and only with) district-specific components of cost: geographically earmarked expenditures,  $c_{1j}(x)$ ; nonexpenditure costs borne by the district,  $c_{2j}(x)$ ; and the district's tax bill,  $T_j(x)$ . By virtue of our specification in equations (1) and (2) and Assumptions 1-3, then, the project  $\pi(x)$  has (present-value-adjusted) benefit and cost flows that have an associated geographic incidence. Notice that we place great weight on geography as the basis of representation and hence as the politically relevant feature of policy incidence. This is a narrow construction of the "electoral connection." Indeed, our legislators are mere

shadows of their real-world counterparts. In our concluding section we show that the form of our conclusions is not fundamentally altered by richer conceptualizations of representation. Further discussion of this point is best left until after our simple models are presented.

Having described the incidence of benefits, expenditures, external costs, and tax shares in terms of political districting, we now complete the initial characterization of our model with a discussion of political accounting. The geographical basis for representation determines, in a natural way, a political objective function for legislative agents. The political objective functions, in turn, induce preferences over various values of x for these agents, and hence over various projects  $\pi(x)$ . Political institutions aggregate these preferences, usually through some voting rule or bureaucratic process, into political choices.

Consider the *objective function* of the *j*th legislative agent:

$$N_j(x) = b_j(x) + f[(c_{1j}(x)] - c_{2j}(x) - t_j T(x)]$$
(3)

The n equations of formulation (3) represent the evaluative criteria by which each of the n legislative agents assesses the project  $\pi(x)$  in terms of impact on his district.  $N_i(x)$  is the legislator's objective function since his political support is enhanced by consumption benefits and public spending targeted for his district and, conversely, his support erodes with increasing externality and tax burdens for his district. Notice first that, in contrast to equation (1), j includes only his district's benefits in the calculation; he ignores  $\hat{b}_i(x)$ . Second, in contrast to equation (2), the taxation mechanism induces j to focus only on his district's tax bill, thereby ignoring  $(1-t_i)T(x)$ . Third, and again in contrast to equation (2), j internalizes in his calculation only those externality costs his district bears, paying no attention to  $\hat{c}_{2i}(x)$ . Finally, j attributes indirect benefits,  $f[c_{1/2}(x)]$ , to project expenditures targeted for his district to purchase project inputs. In  $c_{1/2}(x)$ , the constituents of district j see employment, business contracts, local tax revenues, and generally increased economic activity in the district.

In equation (3), the  $b_j(x)$ ,  $-c_{2j}(x)$ , and  $-t_jT(x)$  terms need no further elaboration except to re-

In equation (3) we represent the political benefits derived from district-earmarked expenditures by  $f[c_{1j}(x)]$ . We assume throughout that f is concave and increasing in x—that political benefits from expenditures increase in project scale at a decreasing rate—and that f(0) = 0.

emphasize that, in the political arena, geographic incidence matters profoundly. However, the transformation of expenditures earmarked for the jth district,  $c_{1j}(x)$ , into a kind of political benefit requires a few additional comments (a more detailed discussion is found in Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981). First, and perhaps most transparent, legislators and their constituents regard  $c_{1/}(x)$  as a source of rent for the district. Citizens (at least those that own inputs) support public expenditures in the local economy because, by increasing the demand for the project's inputs, these expenditures produce windfall gains for input owners. These gains, in turn, filter through the local economy. In response to constituent desire for local public expenditures, the district representative, moreover, seeks to attract local expenditures because they are "credit-claimable" (Mayhew, 1974). Although a single legislator cannot credibly claim responsibility for broad public policies like national defense, for example, he can claim credit for the weapons contract given the local defense contractor, the uniform order for the textile plant in the district, or the increased personnel expenditures at the local military base. Because expenditures made in a given legislator's district redound to his credit, legislators go after  $c_{1i}$ -type expenditures, thus making it appropriate for us to treat this peculiar form of cost accounting as in equation (3).6

Equation (3) and Assumptions 1-3 provide the basis for deriving the preferences of legislative agents. Once political institutions are specified, public choices on policies may be deduced from the preferences given by the  $N_j(x)$  functions and the institutional rules of preference aggregation.

As a baseline against which to compare political choices given the political objective functions of equation (3), consider the objective function that embodies the criterion of economic efficiency:

$$E(x) = \beta(x) - x(x). \tag{4}$$

Our notion of political cost accounting displayed in equation (3) formalizes some ideas originally presented in a somewhat different context by Aranson and Ordeshook (1977a, b, 1978) and discussed by Shepsle (1980). They seek to learn why interest groups lobby for public goods in view of the fact that the same logic that implies market failure in the private supply of public goods also applies to the phenomenon of private lobbying for public provision. They note, however, that goods public in consumption are typically private in production, that is, contracts for inputs are appropriable and excludable. A private interest group lobbies in anticipation of private pecuniary gain (the public good is a by-product of that enterprise). Our model complements their analysis by allowing the politician to target these private pecuniary gains to his constituency.

Economic efficiency requires the selection of a project scale that maximizes net benefits (with x = 0 if E(x) < 0 for all positive project scales), irrespective of the incidence of those net benefits. It is this last feature that distinguishes the economic norm from political objectives and, as we show below, is the basis for efficiency distortions caused by political intervention. With the efficiency model as a normative benchmark, we may begin the task of comparative institutional performance.

#### Market Fallure

Since our concern here is with political performance in the context of market failures, we now turn to a definition of the latter. We shall say that a market has failed whenever the market equilibrium is inefficient. As this outcome constitutes the status quo ante for potential political intervention, we label it  $x^0$ . Thus, a market failure is an inefficient status quo. Specifically, letting equation (4) serve as our criterion or objective function, an efficient outcome is a point  $x = x^E$  satisfying

$$E'(x^{E}) = \beta'(x^{E}) - x'(x^{E}) = 0$$
 (5)

and

$$E''(x^{E}) = \beta''(x^{E}) - x''(x^{E}) < 0.$$
 (6)

From Assumption 1 and 2, there is a unique global maximum of E(x); thus,  $x^E$  is the unambiguous normative solution to the problem of policy choice according to equation (4).

**Definition.** The political status quo,  $x^0$ , is said to constitute a *market failure* if and only if  $x^0 \neq x^E$ .

That is,  $x^0$  is a case of market failure if and only if  $E'(x^0) \neq 0$ . If  $E'(x^0) > 0$ , then Assumptions 1 and 2 imply  $x^0$  is "too small," whereas the converse is implied if  $E'(x^0) < 0$ . Of course, market failures may manifest themselves in distinct ways—externalities, public goods, and other market imperfections. For now it is the existence of a market failure rather than its particular form that is important.

#### Political Choice: A Simple Legislature

As noted above, comparing political solutions to market failures requires specific, clear notions of each. We already have a precise definition of market failure. We now require a model of political institutions and an identification of their

equilibrium outcomes.' We begin with an examination of majority rule in a one-dimensional special case where the market has failed  $(x^0 \neq x^E)$ . The results derived in this case are then extended in the next section to choices by structured legislatures in multidimensional settings.

A political equilibrium in the one-dimensional case is the familiar Condorcet winner, where the preferences of individual legislators are induced by the  $N_J(x)$  functions given in equation (3). That is, a majority rule equilibrium is a policy alternative  $x^*$  having the property that no other policy alternative can command a majority against it. Technically, we have

Definition. A political outcome  $x^*$  is said to be a majority rule equilibrium (MRE) if and only if it is strictly preferred by more than n/2 legislators in paired comparison with each other feasible outcome. Specifically, if  $S(x^*, x) = \{j|N_j(x^*) > N_j(x)\}$ , where  $N_j$  is given in equation (3), then  $x^*$  is a MRE if and only if  $|S(x^*, x)| > n/2$  for all feasible  $x \neq x^*$ .

Thus, in our terminology, a "political solution to a market failure" is an outcome  $x^*$  which is a MRE given a status quo,  $x^0 \neq x^E$ .

Public policies differ in their characteristics, and it will be useful to distinguish between two classes, regulatory and expenditure.

A troublesome feature with political institutions is that they often lack equilibrium outcomes. Rarely, in Riker's (1980) terms, is there an "equilibrium of tastes," since political choices typically entail preference cycles. For our purposes, the lack of equilibrium implies that there is no basis for unambiguously claiming that a political solution will improve or fail to improve upon the market failure it sought to correct. However, even though there is normally no equilibrium of tastes owing to preference cycles, there may nevertheless be equilibrium outcomes induced by structural arrangements. For example, rules governing the comparison of alternatives, various forms of agenda control, requirements on the order of voting like considering the status quo last, all serve to prevent endless cycling. Consequently, we believe the pure majority rule/unstructured legislature, that has been the object of analysis for most political equilibrium theorists, is a very special case. Some insight on the question of political solutions to market failures can be obtained by studying legislatures. not as atomistic collections of legislative agents, but rather as structured institutions (see Shepsle, 1979a, and Shepsle and Weingast, 1981b).

\*This definition characterizes strong Condorcet winners. If the requirement is relaxed to  $|S(x^*,x)| > |S(x,x^*)|$  for all feasible  $x \neq x^*$ , we have strong plurality winners. And if the requirement is further relaxed to  $|S(x,x^*)| < n/2$  for all  $x \neq x^*$ , we have characterized the strong majority core. Each reflects slightly different treatments accorded indifferent voters.

Definition. A policy,  $\pi(x)$ , is said to be a regulatory policy, whenever  $c_{1j}(x) = 0$  for every j; otherwise it is said to be an expenditure policy.

A regulatory policy entails no public expenditure, and, since taxes are collected only to cover expenditures, it thus entails no taxes. The costs of a regulatory policy are borne by the private sector directly; the government plays no role as fiscal intermediary in this class of policies. An expenditure policy, as in selective subsidies to the private sector or in the public provision of a public good, entails governmental spending and taxing with their geographic incidences as noted earlier. Whenever  $\pi(x)$  is a regulatory policy, political objective functions given in equation (3) specialize to

$$N_i(x) = b_i(x) - c_{2i}(x)$$
 (7)

For regulatory policy, the standard median voter theorem affords the following result.


Proposition. For any regulatory policy  $\pi(x)$  decided by a majority rule, a MRE exists. In particular,  $\pi(x^M)$  is the MRE, where  $x^M = \max_{j \in N} \{x_j^* | x_j^* = \underset{x}{\operatorname{argmax}} N_j(x)\}$ .

From Assumptions 1 and 2,  $N_j(x)$  as given in equation (7) is strictly concave in x. It may be established that a function concave in x is single peaked in x. Consequently, the proposition follows from Black's Median Dominance Theorem (Black, 1958). Thus, the majority rule equilibrium in this context is the most-preferred point of the median legislator,  $x^M$ .

The main effect of a regulatory policy is through the benefits and costs that are distributed as a consequence of compliance (Weidenbaum, 1978). In contrast to expenditure policies, government expenditures and tax burdens in the regulatory realm figure much less prominently (indeed, we have stipulated here that they are zero). The Proposition establishes that the process of regulatory policymaking in a majority-rule legislature is both decisive and stable. To be sure, the MRE Policy might be  $\pi(0)$  if the incidence of costs and benefits for a majority of legislators is such that  $c_{2j}(x) > b_j(x)$  for every x > 0. Alternatively, for other distributions and costs,  $x^M > 0$ , as is illustrated for a five-person legislature in Figure 1. Under these conditions there exists a positive policy scale that defeats all contenders in a majority rule contest.

In order to explore the application of this well-known result to the question of market failure, we state an obvious

Figure 1. Majority Rule Equilibrium for Regulatory Policy



Corollary 1. A regulatory policy,  $\pi(x)$ , is a MRE if and only if  $b_{M}'(x) - c_{2M}'(x) = 0$  (or x=0 if the median ideal point is a corner solution of equation (7)).

That is, for legislative decision making in the regulatory realm, the political solution that emerges in a simple majority-rule context is one for which the first-order condition is satisfied for the median legislator. Contrast this fact with the efficient scale  $x = x^E$  satisfying:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{n} b_{j}'(x) - \sum_{j=1}^{n} c_{2j}'(x) = 0.$$
 (8)

This follows from substituting equations (1) and (2) into equation (5) with the stipulation that  $c_{1j}(x) = 0$  for all j and all x.

Letting  $x^E$  be the efficient solution,  $x^0$  the market solution (which constitutes the political status quo), and  $x^L$  the regulatory solution of a simple legislature, we know, in the case of market failure, only that  $x^E \neq x^0$  and  $x^L = x^M$ . If  $x^L \neq x^0$ —that is, if the regulatory solution differs from the market (failure) solution—then we know only that a majority of legislators prefers  $x^L$  to  $x^0$ , viz.  $N_j(x^L) = N_j(x^0)$  for more than n/2 legislators. What we do not know is the relationship of  $x^L$  to  $x^B$ , and only a very benign view of political in-

stitutions allows the belief that  $x^L$  "improves" upon  $x^0$ .

Combining the first-order conditions of Corollary 1 and equation (8), we may specify the rather stringent requirement for efficient regulatory solutions.

Corollary 2. 
$$x^L = x^E$$
 if and only if 
$$\sum_{i \neq M} b_i'(x^M) - \sum_{i \neq M} c_{2j}'(x^M) = 0.$$

That is, for the legislative equilibrium to be efficient, the distribution of marginal net benefits at the policy scale preferred by the median legislator must sum precisely to zero. This knife-edge condition is very stringent and unlikely to be observed in practice.

An additional implication follows from this analysis. Since  $x^L$  is the ideal point of the median legislator, i.e.,  $x^L = x^M$ , and since it is highly unlikely that  $x^L = x^E$ , it follows from the definition of an MRE that  $x^L$  beats  $x^E$ . That is, a majority actually prefers the chosen outcome to the efficient point. As noted, political agents worry about benefit and cost incidences, not efficiency.

This treatment has paralleled the traditional market-failure analysis, comparing expected institutional performance against an ideal. Like its counterpart in market-failure analysis, however, it fails to take the next step. That is, it neglects to compare expected performance under one institutional regime with performance under alternative institutional arrangements. This we now proceed to do. Therefore, of more interest, and at bottom of greatest importance to an accurate assessment of political solutions in market-failure situations, are the six possible orderings of  $x^E$ ,  $x^0$ , and  $x^L$  (notice that *strict* inequalities are sometimes used to be consistent with an assumed market failure):

1. 
$$x^{0} \le x^{L} \le x^{E}$$
  
2.  $x^{0} < x^{E} \le x^{L}$   
3.  $x^{E} \le x^{L} \le x^{0}$   
4.  $x^{L} \le x^{E} < x^{0}$   
5.  $x^{L} \le x^{0} < x^{E}$   
6.  $x^{E} < x^{0} \le x^{L}$ .

Here we inquire not whether  $x^L = x^E$ —the unlikely circumstances for this are given in Corollary 2—but rather whether  $x^L$  improves upon  $x^0$ . Cases 1 and 2 are traditional market-fallure situations in which the market operates at suboptimal scale. In each of these cases, the regulatory solution is a scale exceeding  $x^0$ . In case 1 the political solution is an unambiguous improvement upon the market failure/political status quo. Case 2, on the other hand, has the scale of the regulatory solution exceeding both  $x^0$  and  $x^E$ ; whereas the market fails to produce enough of, say, a positive externality,

the public solution may entail too much public provision. At any rate, the signals are ambiguous and there is no prima facie case for either tolerating market failures or permitting public intervention. Cases 3 and 4, respectively, are mirror images of cases 1 and 2. Here the market operates at an undesirably high level, producing too much of, say, pollution or some other public bad. Case 3 is, and case 4 is not, an unambiguous public improvement over the market-produced status quo. Cases 5 and 6 are interesting because they describe instances of perverse public intervention in which  $x^L$  represents a deterioration of the market-produced status quo. These are unanticipated consequences in extremum!

Cases 1, 2, and 5—market failures representing "undersupply"—may be examined more systematically in the following simple example (cases 3, 4, and 6—instances of "oversupply"—are simply mirror images). Cases 1 and 5 are instances of improvement and deterioration in  $x^0$ , respectively, from political intervention. Case 2 is more ambiguous. We set  $x^0 = 0$ , and choose a very simple representation for political preferences:

$$N_i(x) = k_i - (a_i - x)^2$$
 for  $j = 1, ..., n$ .

Legislator j's ideal point is  $a_j$ . At that level,  $N_j(x)$  is maximized with  $N_j(a_j) = k_j$ . Defining  $E(x) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} N_j(x)$ , the first-order condition for a maximum, E'(x) = 0, implies that the efficient point is simply the *mean* ideal point:  ${}^{9}x^E = 1/n\sum_{j=1}^{n} a_j = \bar{a}$ . The political choice, on the other hand, is  $x^L = \text{med } \{a_j\} = a_m$ . Thus, cases 1, 2, and 5 become (see Figure 2):

1. 
$$0 \le a_m \le \bar{a}$$
.  
2.  $0 \le \bar{a} \le a_m$   
5.  $a_m \le 0 \le \bar{a}$ .


From Figure 2, we observe that there is an unambiguous improvement from political intervention (case 1) when the mean ideal point exceeds the median (both positive), a circumstance reflecting a distribution of ideal points skewed toward  $x^0 = 0$ . If, on the other hand, both mean and

$${}^{n}E'(n) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} N_{j}'(x)$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^{n} 2(a_{j} - x).$$

$$= \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{j} - x = 0, \text{ or } \sum_{j=1}^{n} a_{j} = nx,$$
and the result follows.

Figure 2. Comparison of Market "Problem" with Political "Solution"



median are positive but the distribution is skewed away from zero (case 2), the improvement from political intervention is ambiguous. The more extreme the skew, the less warranted is the political intervention. That is, the more extreme the skew (i.e., move 1 and 2 closer to  $x^0$ , with  $\overline{a}$  moving toward  $x^0$  as well), the more likely the costs imposed on constituencies from political intervention will exceed total benefits (even though a majority of districts will, on net, experience an improvement). Finally, if more than half of the legislators prefer a level of x below  $x^0$ , i.e.,  $a_i < 0$ for n/2 or more legislators, but a minority of districts prefer positive levels that, on average, more than compensate for the majority wishes (case 5), then politicizing this market failure will actually lead to a reduction in social welfare.10

This example illustrates the results that can be derived under specific assumptions about preferences. Before turning to our more general analysis, we identify some circumstances in which public policies outperform market institutions, and vice versa. These results are of a more substantive nature.

1. Assume there is a market failure but that the potential net beneficiaries of a political solution

1°This last case is reminiscent of the classic democratic paradox of the intense minority opposed by a (relatively) indifferent majority. Perhaps it should not be surprising that, in general, political solutions improve upon market failures when (with appropriate qualifications) means and median preferences do not differ by much. Indeed, when equal, we have efficient political intervention. However, if mean and median diverge, and especially when the mean and median are on opposite sides of the status quo, then opening the gates to political intervention produces "public failure."

do not involve a majority of districts. Then  $x^0$  is an MRE. In short, absent additional ingenuity, the political solution exactly duplicates the market failure. Market failures that do not impose burdens on a majority of districts will not be improved upon by political intervention.

2. Assume there is a market failure that affects a large number of districts. Some legislators will prefer high values of x, some low values. As long as the median legislator prefers a level  $x^M$  greater than  $x^0$  but less than  $x^E$ , then Pareto improvements follow from public intervention. This is the most sanguine conclusion of our model, and shows that public sector performance is not, in principle, strictly inferior to market performance.

3. Suppose that markets are working perfectly, i.e.,  $x^0 = x^E$ . Here, too,  $x^M$  need not equal  $x^E$ . It may well be that large numbers of districts, possibly including a majority, benefit from some type of market intervention. Intervention in efficient markets occurs whenever a majority of districts can benefit from it. Nothing in the model constrains current, temporary majorities from advantaging themselves at the expense of others, and in the process destroying efficient markets.

4. Consider, finally, a very troubling result that underscores how fundamentally arbitrary political choice is in relation to the underlying configuration of districts. Assume a market failure exists so  $x^0 \neq x^E$  and let  $x^M$  be the legislative solution based upon some set of districts. Now, fix the economic interests of every citizen (so that the underlying economic problem remains unchanged), but redraw the boundaries of political districts. Regrouping citizens in different districts changes the preferences of political representatives, since the politically relevant incidences now differ. In particular, redistricting may alter the

preferences (indeed, change the identity) of the median legislator, thereby altering the location of  $x^M$ . This implies that the political solution to a given market problem is not invariant with respect to arbitrary political divisions associated with geographic representation. This underscores our main point, namely that there is no determinate relationship between  $x^M$  and  $x^E$ .

What, on balance, does this simple but suggestive analysis say about the ameliorative impact of political solutions on market failures? We have some positive results (result 2), some null results (result 1), and some negative results (results 3 and 4). In some specific circumstances, however, we can provide realistic expectations. In economies suffering pervasive, geographically dispersed, and wide-ranging, market failures, result (2) may well provide the inspiration and justification for market intervention. However, in economies with competitive markets prevalent and market failures minor and few in number, most political interventions will themselves fail to correct these failures. Indeed, they will more likely have a destructive effect on reasonably well-functioning markets.

We have developed our model of political incidence in some detail for the one-dimensional world of regulatory policymaking in an unstructured legislature. We have conducted this analysis, not because we believe it to model real legislative choice adequately, but rather because it reveals cleanly and in an unencumbered fashion the potential divergence between social choice and social welfare. We underscore "potential" to emphasize that public failure proponents are quite wrong to maintain their viewpoint everywhere and in all circumstances. But so, too, are the market failure advocates."

"We mention for completeness that the results just obtained are not substantially changed when we switch from regulatory to expenditure policy. Technically, adding  $f[c_{1j}(x)] - t_i T(x)$  to equation (7) preserves concavity and hence single peakedness. Thus, although the details differ somewhat, we still obtain a majority rule equilibrium. Similarly, an efficient expenditure policy, like an efficient regulatory policy, depends upon the satisfaction of a knife-edge condition that parallels the one given in Corollary 2 above. So, as in the case of regulatory policy, efficiency is unlikely in expenditure policies, and "public success" is a chancy business. The only detail worth stressing is that social choices and their welfare consequences, in the expenditure realm, depend on a public production process, and hence on where inputs are purchased and taxes extracted. These incidences are a complicating factor that likely cause distortions in productive efficiency. A more complete analysis of expenditure policy is contained in an earlier draft of this article, issued as Working Paper No. 74 of the Center for Study of American Business, Washington University, and available from the authors.

## Political Solutions in Richer Institutional Settings


In the simple, one-dimensional context of an unstructured legislature, we have argued that there is no basis for presuming political interventions improve upon market failures. Our principal aim now is to enrich our simple legislative model in ways that are relatively general, but which nevertheless possess features characteristic of real legislatures. Although our strictly geographic representation of benefit and cost incidences remains simple and mechanical, we define our task now as that of moving beyond the abstract world of Duncan Black and public choice theory to the more substantive world of David Mayhew and Richard Fenno. Our modest objective is to trace the consequences of our simple "incidence analysis" for policy formation in a political institution more structured than the pure majority rule legislature.

Three elements are described: committees with agenda power, a status quo that prevails if committees fail to make proposals or if the parent legislature rejects such proposals, and a policy space, multidimensional in nature, partitioned into committee jurisdictions. Our purpose here is not so much to provide a finely fashioned model of a legislature; rather we intend to demonstrate the robustness of our earlier claims for political solutions in circumstances that possess the prominent features of legislatures like the U.S. Congress.

Observers since the time of Woodrow Wilson (1885) have been struck by the importance of legislative committees in shaping policies within the jurisdictions entrusted to their care by the entire legislature. In developing a legislative committee model, we assume that a subset of the legislature, called a committee, is delegated agenda power or jurisdiction over a particular set of policy issues. We model this jurisdiction as a subspace, X, of a multidimensional policy space. For the present, we rule out the possibility of amendments to committee proposals so that committees have exclusive agenda control. Further, we abstract from the question of committee composition and assume that the committee can be characterized by a transitive utility function,  $U^{C_{12}}$ 

<sup>12</sup>Since committees are legislatures writ small, unless the committee assignment mechanism selects out only special subsets of preferences, majority committee cycles are normally expected. However, precisely the same argument we are about to present for committees (with agenda control) in legislatures can be made for a chairman (with agenda control) in committees. That is, ultimately we can claim to be dealing with a "well-

Figure 3. Voter j's Preferred-to and Indifferent-to Sets



Finally, we impose the restriction, common in most Anglo-American legislatures including the U.S. Congress, that the status quo is voted upon last. Legislator preferences, as before, are induced by the policy incidence of an alternative, xeX, on his district (where X is multidimensional and x is a vector). Legislator j's most preferred policy alternative is  $x_j^N$ , the point in X that maximizes  $N_j(x)$ . Notice that the dimensions of X are not restricted to a single level of some public intervention; x is no longer a scalar, so that we no longer retain the restrictive interpretation required in the one-dimensional setting.

The process of legislative choice in this model differs systematically from the simple legislature described in the previous sections. First, in a multidimensional policy space, majority rule is not well-behaved. Specifically, following from the theorems of Cohen (1979), Matthews (1979), McKelvey (1976, 1979), Plott (1967), Schofield (1978), and Slutsky (1979), for any alternative in the policy space, there exists a set of points that command a majority of votes against it. In terms of our earlier development, this may be seen as follows. From each legislator's incidence-induced preference function  $N_j(x)$ , given in equation (3), we may define his preferred-to set:

$$P_j(x) = \{x' \in X | N_j(x') > N_j(x)\}.$$


behaved" utility function. For further details, see Shepsle and Weingast, 1981c.  $P_j(x)$  is the set of points j prefers to x. Our assumptions about  $N_j(x)$  imply that  $P_j(x)$  is a strictly convex set, a two-dimensional illustration of which is found in Figure 3. There, the ellipse passing through x, labeled  $I_j(x)$ , is an isopreference contour of  $N_j(x)$ , and its interior, a convex set, is j's preferred-to set. From the individual  $P_j(x)$  sets, the majority win set, W(x), is constructed. W(x) is the set of points contained in the  $P_j(x)$  sets of at least a simple majority of legislators:

$$W(x) = \{x' \in X | x' \in P_f(x) \text{ for more than } n/2 \text{ legislators} \}.$$

Thus, W(x) is the set of points preferred by legislative majorities to x. The theorems cited above show that generally  $W(x) \neq \phi$  for all  $x \in X$  (a fact illustrated shortly).

Second, the legislative committee model differs from the pure majority rule model of the last two sections in that agenda control is delegated to the committee with jurisdiction. The results of McKelvey (1976) and Plott and Levine (1979) show that agenda power, within limits, allows those controlling the agenda to manipulate the outcome. Even though our assumptions require the committee in its agenda formation role to allow the status quo to be voted last—a requirement that imposes significant restrictions upon the committee's ability to manipulate the outcome (Shepsle & Weingast, 1984)—committee members

Figure 4. Structure-Induced Equilibrium for Three Voters



have greater influence over outcomes than other legislative agents.

Consider the set of policy alternatives that command a majority against the status quo,  $W(x^0)$ . The committee will only propose alternatives from  $W(x^0)$  since any other would be rejected by the full legislature when paired against  $x^0$  in the final vote. Knowing this, the committee treats  $W(x^0)$  as a constraint—a feasible set—over which it maximizes. Let  $x^*$  be the point in this set that the committee prefers most, i.e.,

$$x^* = \underset{x \in W(x^0)}{\operatorname{argmax}} U^C(x).^{13}$$

"Since  $W(x^0)$  is defined as an open set, a limit argument is required for  $x^*$  to be well defined.

Complete agenda power allows the committee to propose this point for a vote against  $x^0$  (which then replaces  $x^0$  since  $x^* \in W(x^0)$ ).

Alternative  $x^*$  is the policy outcome of this legislative committee game in the following sense. Even though  $W(x^*) \neq \phi$ , so that points exist that command a majority of votes against  $x^*$ , the committee in its gatekeeping, agenda-setting role assures that only its proposals are moved for a vote. Those individuals who prefer some alternative  $y \in W(x^*)$  are prohibited by the legislative rules from proposing y. Given this structural arrangement imposed by the legislative rules,  $x^*$  is a structure induced equilibrium (Shepsle, 1979).

Figure 4 illustrates this discussion for three ideal points. The (one-man) committee's ideal point is located at  $x_c^N$ . Also depicted are the

status quo,  $x^0$ , and two other ideal points,  $x_1^N$  and  $x_2^N$ . The interiors of the ellipses passing through  $x^0$  are the preferred-to sets of the three legislators, and the shaded petals—points common to the preferred-to sets of at least a majority of legislators—constitute  $W(x^0)$ . The point  $x^*$  is simply the best one the committee can secure, given that its proposal must satisfy the constraint of being an element of  $W(x^0)$ , i.e., must command a majority against  $x^0$ .

So far we have not considered  $x^E$  in our discussion. It should be apparent, however, that  $x^E$  plays no necessary role in legislative choice. The legislative outcome,  $x^*$ , is determined by an optimization process over  $W(x^0)$  by a particular committee. Both the constraint set,  $W(x^0)$ , and the function constituting the committee maximand are determined by the legislator objective functions,  $N_J(x)$ . These functions tell us the set of policies that legislator J prefers to  $x^0$ , and hence the set of policies preferred by a majority to  $x^0$ .


Similarly, the objective functions of the committee members determine  $x^*$  from among the alternatives in  $W(x^0)$ . Since these functions and their respective optima,  $x_f^N$ , stand in no particular relationship to  $x^E$ , neither do  $W(x^0)$  and  $x^*$ .

Our model of choice in a structured, majorityrule legislature implies that the status quo (which constitutes a market failure, i.e.,  $x^0 \neq x^E$ ) is replaced by an extreme point of the constraint set  $W(x^0)$ . 'Feven if  $x^E \in W(x^0)$ , it would be sheer accident for it to be an extreme point, and even more unlikely for it to be the constrained maximum of  $U^c(x)$ . It is clear, then, that a highly implausible knife-edge condition must once again hold to insure efficient legislative choice.

We may also show the change in policy that accompanies a change in committee membership

<sup>14</sup>With one exception to be noted in the next two paragraphs.

Figure 5. Policy Change Following Committee Turnover



(Weingast & Moran, 1983). Suppose that the status quo is preferred by the current committee to all other points that beat this policy alternative. Then the committee qua agenda setter "keeps the gates closed," and the legislature is in equilibrium even though  $W(x^0) \neq \phi$  (Denzau & Mackay, 1983). The legislative rules yield  $x^0$  as a structure-induced equilibrium which cannot be upset as long as committee preferences remain unchanged. This holds regardless of the relation of  $x^0$  to  $x^E$ . Thus, even if  $W(x^0)$  is large relative to the convex hull of ideal points, and even if  $x^E$  is contained in  $W(x^0)$ ,  $x^0$  remains an equilibrium. The case of two-dimensional choice with five legislators is illustrated in Figure 5, where  $x^0 = x_c^{\bar{N}}$  is both the status quo and the ideal point of the committee, and  $x^{E}$  is the efficient point, a centrally located alternative that also is the ideal point of legislator 3.

If the committee changes hands, it is apparent that no matter which legislator takes over the committee,  $x^0$  is no longer an equilibrium. For all other legislators, alternatives exist in  $W(x^0)$  that are preferred to  $x^0$ . Notice, moreover, that all prefer  $x^E$  to  $x^0$ . The new equilibrium depends upon which member takes over the committee. Unless the new committee ideal is located at  $x^3$  (the exception referred to in note 14), the new equilibrium is not  $x^E$ , but rather is defined by maximizing the new committee's objective function over  $W(x^0)$ . If, for example, legislator 4 takes over, then the new equilibrium is  $x^{*4}$ . This new equilibrium need bear no necessary relation to  $x^E$ . In particular, this equilibrium is determined by the preferences of a small subset of legislators—the committee. It could be closer to or further away from  $x^E$  than is  $x^0$ . The rule or practice according to which members are assigned to committees will tell us the nature and extent of this bias.


The rules for assigning members to the committee attenuate any relationship between  $x^*$  and  $x^E$ . In order for  $x^*$  to bear some direct relation to  $x^E$ , the committee assignment process must select particular committee members on the basis of the relationship of their ideal points to  $x^E$ . Other assignment mechanisms may be biased away from  $x^{E}$ . In practice, assignment rules in the U.S. Congress typically select for qualities that are at best unrelated to  $x^E$ , and may in fact be negatively related. For example, in both the House and Senate the mechanism used assigns members to committees on the basis of their demand for committee positions. Those with the highest stake in a given jurisdiction generally gain membership on the relevant committees (Shepsle, 1978). Thus, this mechanism is disposed toward members from districts that bear either mostly costs or mostly benefits. The empirical evidence in the congressional literature lends strong support to the conclusion that committees typically consist of "preference outliers." The predictions of our models are consistent with these empirical regularities.

To see this, return to the situation illustrated in Figure 5. Suppose we are considering a multidimensional policy like environmental protection. The status quo is  $x^0$  and represents a market failure. Initially, it is an equilibrium since the committee's ideal is located there. These individuals might represent the Southern Democrats in the early 1960s who see little benefits but significant costs in changing the policy on environmental matters from the status quo. Environmentalists, who appear in the mid-1960s, are "high demanders" (that is, they prefer very high levels of environmental protection, see benefits everywhere, and do not bear much of the costs). Their ideal might be placed at  $x_5^N$ . As well, we have other legislators who bear different mixes of benefits and costs, including one centrally located representative whose ideal is precisely the efficient point. Now, what happens as the Southern Democrats, through attrition, begin turning power in the committee over to the environmentalist legislators—in particular, what happens if the high demanders at  $x_5^N$  are able to take over the committee? The new equilibrium is determined by maximizing the new committee objective function,  $N_5(x)$ , over the set  $W(x^0)$ . Since this maximand includes a disproportionate amount of benefits over costs, it selects a much higher level of environmental protection than  $x^E$ . In fact, this choice does not even guarantee an improvement over  $x^0$ , and may involve "too much" environmental protection. Since the committee system selects outliers from the distribution of preferences, it ensures that the political solution,  $x^*$ , to market problems,  $x^0$ , is biased away from  $x^E$ . Indeed, this conclusion holds even if many legislators prefer outcomes close to  $x^E$ —the latter a case of market failure that would seem to be the most amenable to a democratic resolution. Although there are only a few outliers, the committee system nevertheless advantages them.

This basic message about political solutions holds, a fortiori, in the case of no market failure. If  $x^0 = x^E$ , the earlier theorems cited on majority rule imply that  $W(x^E) \neq \phi$ . Thus, if the committee with jurisdiction prefers points in  $W(x^E)$  to  $x^E$ , the political intervention has the counterproductive effect of destroying an efficiently operating sector of the political economy. In short, once the political machinery is established, political "solutions" will be imposed everywhere, even in markets that have not failed.

There is one additional point we wish to emphasize, and it is best developed in a comparative statics framework. Nonempty win sets provide opportunities for agenda setters. Agenda setters,

Figure 6. Preference Outliers and the Comparative Statics of Win-Sets



by virtue of the committee assignment mechanism, are outliers of the legislature's preference distribution. Agenda setters, therefore, pick extreme points of  $W(x^0)$ . Replacing one set of agenda setters with another effects a switch from one extreme point of  $W(x^0)$  to another. Such changes bear no relationship to efficiency as, for example, when agenda setters preferring too little market intervention (in relation to  $x^{E}$ ) are replaced by those wanting too much. A counterintuitive comparative statics result follows in this setting (and generalizes ideas of Romer & Rosenthal, 1978). Fix  $x^E$ , and consider the effect of moving  $x^0$  away from  $x^E$  (thus worsening the market failure). The ironic consequence is that outlier agenda setters are now in a position to select an outcome even further away from  $x^E$  as a result of  $W(x^0)$  growing larger. In Figure 6, with x5N the ideal of the highdemand agenda setter, as  $x^0$  moves toward the southwest,  $W(x^0)$  grows so that the choice of Mr. 5 changes from x' to x'' (the latter even farther away from  $x^E$  than the former). Put simply, the worse the problem, the worse the solution!

#### Discussion and Extension

Having conceded at various points in this article the simplicity and restrictiveness of our model, it is appropriate to conclude our analysis with an attempt to address these complexities. We have little more than suggestions to offer at this point, although others (Cox, McCubbins & Sullivan, 1983; Fiorina, 1982, 1983) are already taking our model and enriching it in useful ways. We turn now to some of our sins of omission to determine whether and how they affect our conclusion.

# Alternative Evaluations of Incidence by Legislators

In the development of our model, the geographic incidence of benefits and costs, and only these incidences, induce legislator preferences. This observation suggests an almost religious attachment to Mayhew's "electoral connection," and perhaps a naive version of it at that. Yet one might ponder, even after having granted con-

siderable weight to geographic incidence, the extent to which other sources attenuate the tugs of geography. In most Anglo-American legislatures, for example, there is a tension between party and constituency. In a similar spirit, we may explore the effects of subgeographic constituencies (like Fenno's (1978) reelection, primary, and personal constituencies) and extrageographic constituencies (like organized groups, outside the district, which possess election-relevant resources). For each of the substantive extensions developed below, we show how our framework can handle the broader perspective. We emphasize that these modifications entail changes in the  $N_i(x)$  preference functions, but do not alter the form of our conclusions about policy choice.

Sub-geographic constituencies. Our incidence analysis takes the legally defined geographic constituency as the source of all electoral rewards. Although this view properly emphasizes the efficiency distortions of political solutions entailed by the less-than-national district perspective of legislators, it may not have gone far enough. There are two ways to think about the effects of subgeographic constituencies on the legislator's calculus, each of which reinforces our earlier conclusions.

The first, popularized by economists (Olson, 1965; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971), emphasizes the role of organization, transactions costs, and rational ignorance. According to this view, the transactions costs involved in organizing for political action give small groups, who may already be organized for other purposes, a distinct political advantage over unorganized groups. Because such groups are more easily mobilized, more skilled at raising resources to make their views and preferences known, and more capable of using their resources to reward or punish politicians, the induced political preferences of a given representative may give disproportionate weight to incidence on these privileged groups. Unorganized voter-citizens, on the other hand, may be victimized by policies tilted toward privileged groups.

The second view, articulated by Fenno (1978), suggests that politicians partition their geographic districts in politically relevant ways. The legislator is especially attentive to policy incidence on his political allies—his reelection, primary, and personal constituencies inside the geographic district—a perspective given some analytical force by Fiorina (1974).

Each of these views suggests that politicians, whom we had modeled as provincially oriented toward their geographic constituencies, may be more provincial still. Not only are the benefits and costs falling on citizens in other districts ignored, but the same may also hold for the powerless and

unorganized, according to the first view, or the opposition, according to the second, within the geographic constituency. Benefits, therefore, are targeted by politicians toward subgeographic constituencies, whereas costs are permitted to fall not only on those outside the district, but also on those inside the district who either will not notice, cannot mobilize, or would not support the legislator in any event.

Both of these considerations can be handled by a simple modification of our model. This involves disaggregating each district into a politically relevant set of groups (a la Fiorina, 1974, or Cox, McCubbins, & Sullivan, 1983). For example,  $N_j(x)$  may become

$$N_j(x) = \sum_{i} (b_{ij}(x) - c_{ij}(x)) a_{ij}$$

where l is an index over politically relevant groups and  $b_{ij}(x)$  and  $c_{ij}(x)$  are the benefits and costs, respectively, received from policy x by the members of the ith group located in district j. The term  $a_{ij}$  is a weighting factor which depends on group responsiveness and whether the group is in legislator j's electoral support coalition (see Cox, McCubbins, & Sullivan, 1983, for an explicit model of this process).

This modification of our model gives greater play to subgeographic constituencies, and it implies an even less sanguine appraisal of political solutions to market problems than we had initially given. Legislator attention to specific groups within the district implies political preferences for policies beneficial to narrow strata of the constituency, with the pool of citizens available to absorb costs including nonconstituents and (some) constituents alike. It is clientele politics with a vengeance!

Extra-Geographic Constituencies. Unlike the effects of subgeographic constituencies on the geographic calculus of legislators, which tend to exacerbate politically induced inefficiencies, extrageographic constituency effects are more ambiguous. On the negative side, an interest group, like the National Association of Car Dealers or the American Medical Association, is prepared to bribe legislators with campaign resources in exchange for a policy geared to its interests. A legislator would willingly accept his share of such bribes if the expected constituency votes that these payments could ultimately secure exceeded the votes the legislator expected to lose by virtue of his support for the policy (Denzau & Munger, 1983).

The paucity of empirical knowledge of the relative magnitudes of these various effects leaves us in the unhappy position of not being able to draw firm conclusions. Since little is known about how

contributions drawn from outside the district can be turned into votes within the district, the tradeoff between district and extradistrict welfare remains unknown.

Nevertheless, two hypotheses seem reasonable to assert. First, since the biggest source of extradistrict funds is interest groups, this process seems to build a bias into the legislative system away from efficient solutions in favor of those benefiting groups that can readily mobilize funds. Second, unless extradistrict resources completely dominate local elections, geographic incidence, in some form, survives.

Party. There is some reason to believe that partisan pressures attenuate legislator ties to geography and push political preferences toward less provincial policies. At the extreme, where a party regards the nation as a single constituency, the optimal party policy is driven toward  $x^E$  as external effects, ignored by individual legislators, are internalized (see Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981). To the extent, then, that a party position is responsive to these forces, it is one that pushes toward efficient resolution of market failures.

The model studied above can be modified in several different ways to include a party system. Again, we focus on how party impact at the district level alters the induced preference functions for legislators. Let the new induced preference functions be  $M_i(x, \alpha)$  where

$$M_j(x,\alpha) = \alpha N_j(x) + (1-\alpha) Q_j(x).$$

 $Q_j(x)$  is legislator j's party evaluation function on policy x,  $N_j(x)$  is defined as above, and  $\alpha$  ( $0 \le \alpha \le 1$ ) is a shift parameter that varies with the strength of the party system. This formulation allows for a direct trade-off between a legislator's parochial, district defined evaluation of a given policy, i.e.,  $N_j(x)$ , and that of his party, i.e.,  $Q_j(x)$ .  $\alpha$  represents the strength of the party system. As it declines, for example, the weight a legislator gives party evaluations increases relative to that of district incidence.

A perfect party system is one in which  $\alpha = 0$ , i.e., legislator preferences are induced solely by

"A closely related argument is made by Olson (1982, p. 53): "Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost of the redistribution." A party or president that treats the entire nation as a single constituency, and whose political success depends on producing policies that improve constituency well-being, is precisely an "encompassing organization" of which Olson speaks.

the position taken by his party, regardless of the incidence of the policy on his district. Although our model is capable of handling this substantive change, it is unclear what conclusions if any can be derived; this follows because there is virtually no theoretical understanding of party dynamics, i.e., from whence the  $Q_j(x)$  functions derive. Once some dynamics are assumed, however, conclusions from this perspective can be given.

This view of a strong party system is incomplete, however, since party "ideals" are not self-enforcing. If partisan pressure is to attenuate individual legislator ties to constituency, then there must be some mechanism of leverage on individual legislators by which the party enforces its positions. Control over party nominations and committee assignments in the United States, for example, are the tools with which party leaders could impose greater observance of party positions. Neither would appear to be of much significance in the contemporary American context. Local interests control nominations, and neither the national parties nor the president intrude on these local prerogatives. During most of the post-World War II period, committee assignments have essentially been by self-selection (Shepsle, 1978), although the last decade has witnessed a somewhat more active role by party leaders in the process. In neither the case of nominations nor that of committee assignments has the force of partisanship successfully competed with geography as a basis for legislator preferences.

Essentially the same conclusion is reached if we examine other possible sources of party leverage over individual legislators. Parties figure in only a minor way in the raising and allocating of campaign resources, so that the possibility of denying them to some legislator too attached to local interests is likely only to earn that party the enmity of one of its members. The same may be said of internal institutional resources, such as staff and office space, which tend to be distributed relatively evenly within parties.

In short, the absence of strong parties in the United States, exogenous to the legislature, means that the parties are legislative parties, composed of precisely the legislators for whom district-related incidences are paramount. It should come as no surprise that, if anything, parties facilitate the ties to constituency by giving legislators district-relevant committee assignments, by not intruding in local nominating processes, and by distributing campaign and institutional resources in a relatively evenhanded fashion.<sup>16</sup> Thus,

<sup>16</sup>The key appears to be whether or not a party has strength, resources, and leverage derived from sources outside the legislature itself. Polities with strong parties

although it would be useful to enrich our model with a partisan component to preferences, it would also be something of a surprise if such a component counted for much in the modern American context.

#### Conclusions

Market failures derive from structural defects in which self-interested market behavior does not produce the felicitous social consequences found in the externality-free world of perfect competition. In order to assess public performance in a comparable context, it would appear necessary to analyze self-interested political behavior in institutional structures of the public sector. One of the major advantages of our approach, therefore, is its emphasis on this institutional structure. The division-of-labor in a legislature represented by its committee system is not merely an economical way of doing business. Based on its gatekeeping and other agenda control power, a legislative committee may block changes in the status quo of which it disapproves and may strongly influence the menu of alternatives from which the parent legislature chooses. Given the propensity in the U.S. Congress for "preference outliers" to gravitate to appropriate committees, public interventions are distorted toward the extremes of the preference distribution represented in the legislature.

Our purpose in this article has been that of modeling public sector institutions which are the counterparts to market institutions in the private sector. Although it is well known that markets fail owing to various imperfections in production, consumption, and, more generally, in the system of property rights, it is presumed, according to one orthodoxy, that public interventions ameliorate such failure. This presumption involves a comparison of market institutions, richly detailed in terms of their divergence from the perfectly competitive model, with a smoothly operating, detail-free, public sector. There is no basis for this presumption. Our results provide specific cautionary warnings about optimistic reliance on political institutions to improve upon market performance.

Students of public policy need especially to take heed of this possibility—the cure may be worse than the disease. This conclusion is all the more important when it is noted that once the political machinery for market intervention is created, no

in this sense, like Great Britain, do produce legislators with less than all-consuming ties to geography (although even here the tugs of constituency are felt—see Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1979).

market is immune, even those that are tolerably efficient. Since majority preferences in a legislature diverge from those of social welfare maximization, even an efficient outcome,  $x^E$ , is vulnerable to democratic tinkering. The majority win set of  $x^E$ ,  $W(x^E)$ , is nonempty, so there are points which provide net improvements for a majority of districts at an expense to the minority that more than wipes out those gains. Thus, our analysis suggests not only that political interventions are no panacea for market failures; as well, they may be positively destructive of well-functioning markets.

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# Conflict and Complexity: Goal Diversity and Organizational Search Effectiveness

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There is a long-standing concern in organization theory with the effect of conflict on search. This article uses a computer model of organizational decision making to demonstrate an effect called "search-enhancing conflict": organizational decision-making performance when there are conflicting subgoals may be better than it would be if all subunits evaluated alternatives in terms of a single organizational goal.

Many of the systems that interest contemporary political scientists are formal organizations or are larger systems having organizations as their major actors. Thus it has been natural for work in fields as diverse as administrative reform (Taylor, 1983), legislative agenda setting (Kingdon, in press; Walker, 1981), foreign policy crisis management (Allison, 1971), or even political participation (Olsen, 1981) to construct explanations that rely in part on the observations and models of organization theorists from Max Weber to Herbert Simon.

Of course, contemporary organization theory is characterized by sharp disagreements on many important matters, but one can distinguish two principles that are especially appropriate for research on politics and on which there is a healthy consensus. The first of these is the need to appreciate the multiplicity of the goals pursued within an organization and the conflict that follows from that goal diversity. The second principle is the significance of the environmental complexity to which an organization must adapt. The central import of conflict among the diverse goals within an organization is a point of agreement among theorists as different as Argyris (1976) and Simon (1964). The role played by complexity is asserted in such fundamental theoretical contributions as those of Thompson (1967), Weick (1969), or Emery and Trist (1965). Environmental complexity implies that an organization's policies, or

Received: May 17, 1983
Revision received: October 11, 1983
Accepted for publication: October 26, 1983

Essential encouragement and valuable criticism have been supplied by Theo van der Tak, Harrison White, Robert Axelrod, John Chamberlin, Paul Courant, and Jon Bendor. The financial support of National Science Foundation Grant SOC 7726026 is gratefully acknowledged.

repertoire of standard operating procedures (Cyert & March, 1963), will be the result of a process of search. Conflict among goals implies a number of complications for search, since the existence of multiple goals makes it problematic which performance standards are to guide a search or be used in evaluating its results. The view is widely held that the net effect of goal conflict on a search is probably deleterious (Argyris, 1976; Beyer, 1981; Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979). There is, however, a long tradition on the other side, arguing that a search may benefit from conflict (Coser, 1956; Hedberg, Nystrom, & Starbuck, 1976; Wildavsky, 1964). A prominent example of the controversy is provided by Allison's (1971) treatment of the Cuban missile crisis and George's (1972) subsequent critique. In Allison's view the loyalties of the participants to the subgoals of the diverse agencies involved were a major obstacle to effective decision making. In George's view the "multiple advocacy" process which President Kennedy set in motion provides an excellent example of the way policies should be chosen in a complex situation.

This article contributes to the debate by using a formal model to demonstrate the existence of search-enhancing conflict. It shows that under plausible theoretical assumptions the loyalty of organizational members to the diverse goals of their subunits may lead to improved organizational search; that is, an organization may do better when the standard of performance measurement actually matters less to its members! The article also gives a detailed analysis of the process by which conflict can enhance search performance

The surprising effect is not always to be expected, of course, and the implications of this fact are an important part of the interpretation section that concludes the article. But demonstrating the effect with a rigorous theoretical procedure and explaining how it can occur may help to deepen

organization theory's understanding of the subtle connections between conflict and complexity and may enrich the conceptual repertoire of those who observe and design organizations.

The method used to demonstrate the existence of search-enhancing conflict is the controlled comparison of the search performance of two model organizations. The models are rich in organizational detail—far richer than has previously been possible in formal models of decision-making systems—and they are identical except for the goals pursued by individual members. In one case, called the global model, all members have the same goal, maximization of the organization's overall performance. In the second case, called the local model, members of the model organization are concerned only about the goals and operating constraints in their own part of the organization.

A controlled comparison is established by observing the behavior of both models in each of ten model environments that demand a very high quality organizational search to achieve policies that perform well. In every one of the ten model environments better performance is achieved by the local model, in which members are motivated by subunit goals at the expense of concern for the overall organizational objective; this leaves little doubt that, in this formalization, an increase in subgoal diversity and attendant conflict can enhance the quality of search.

The remaining sections of this article describe the organizational modelling system that provides the models used in the argument, explain the parameter variations that are studied here, report the model behavior resulting from the various combinations of parameter settings, and interpret that model behavior and its significance.

#### General Elements of the Models

The two organizational models used in the comparison are possible because of the development of a computer system for modelling organizational decision making which permits one to construct quite detailed models both of organizations and of their environments and to study the resulting organization-environment interaction. The foundation of the system is a model individual with sharply bounded information-processing capabilities: a very limited memory, a simple aspiration level driven by recently experienced rewards and compared with current rewards to yield a satisfaction state, a weak theory of the structure of the environment in which the organization operates, a small set of friends scattered through the organization, and a small set of specific decisions for which the individual is

responsible and which receive the greatest part of the limited total of available attention.

In the current version of the system, up to 40 of these individuals can be assembled into virtually any organizational structure one wants to examine, and they can be provided with any pattern of incentives and rewards for their decisions that one may want to study. Thus it is possible to make all the individuals in the organization maximizers of a single shared objective. It is also possible, while holding all other features of the model constant, to reward each individual according to a function of his local responsibilities, experience, and subunit membership. Comparisons of the performance of such paired models will provide the basic results we need.

A great many features of the model organizations that can be constructed in this system could be varied, but are held constant in the runs reported here. Among these are friendship networks, agenda for meetings, attendance patterns at meetings, rules governing collective decisions, noise, lags, and other environmental uncertainties, and organizational precedents. For our present purpose it is possible to suppress exposition of many of these details since they are arranged identically in the two models being compared and do not interact with the one difference being studied. But in order to judge results reported below, the reader will need some discussion of how individuals make decisions and receive rewards. That discussion will also show how the modelling system improves on other formal representations by incorporating a model individual with many more of the bounded rationality properties that are characteristically assumed in organizational studies (Axelrod, 1973; Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1958). The preliminary material on the structure of the modelling system concludes with a sketch of a typical period of model operation and an account of the particular type of environment in which both the models reported here are operating.

The decisions made by members of a model organization may be thought of as activating (or deactivating) potential standard operating procedures. At any moment in the history of a model, the organization has a policy that specifies for each of 64 distinct standard operating procedures

'A full account of these details is available in Cohen (1981a). An account of moderate length appears in Appendix 1. These two sources provide increasingly detailed accounts of the computer subroutines and data structures that provide formal analogs for the processes and structures that the body of the article designates with such everyday language terms as "considering an idea" or "a responsibility of an individual."

whether or not it is currently in effect.<sup>2</sup> In the model, each individual has a small set of ideas, each of which specifies the activation or deactivation or both of a small subset of the 64 potential standard operating procedures. Ideas are generated as individuals construct variations on current policy at the loci for which they are responsible or variations on ideas of others which they encounter at meetings. An individual considers an idea by comparing its estimated value to the estimated value of the least attractive member of his current short list of good ideas. If the new idea is better from the individual's point of view, it is substituted into the list. If not, it is forgotten. Good ideas are mentioned to others in meetings.

When an individual judges the value of an idea, a function is called to estimate the rewards that an individual would receive if current policy were modified as the idea specifies. (Ideas usually involve fewer than six loci. The remaining idea loci are blank and would leave current policy at the corresponding positions unaffected.) This estimate of the rewards, like the rewards themselves, may depend on the individual's identity or organizational position, on time, on the current or previous states of policy, or on exogenous events, stochastic or not. In addition, estimates may diverge, randomly or systematically, from the actual rewards that will occur if an idea becomes policy.

Actual rewards are produced in a model once per period when a function is called for each individual that gives the environment's actual response to the standard operating procedures that are in force under current policy. The actual and estimated reward functions can, of course, be strongly similar in those cases where one wishes to model individuals who "know what they are doing." In other cases one might want to study an organization in which some members acted on beliefs (estimates of the environment) that diverged systematically from the underlying reality. In the models reported here, estimated and actual rewards both result from a deterministic environment overlayed with random noise. Thus beliefs and experience may differ from each other.

An ordinary period in the life of one of the

<sup>2</sup>Current policy is represented by a string of 64 zeroes or ones. There are therefore  $2^{64} > 10^{19}$  possible policies. The many similarities of the evolution of policy to genetic evolution make it natural to refer to any particular position in the policy string as a "locus." See the discussion of "genes as routines," and Winter (1975) and Nelson and Winter (1982). In these works and others in the Cyert-March tradition organizational learning may be said to be equated to the coevolution of a repertoire of standard operating procedures.

model organizations studied here begins with every individual going through an updating cycle. The actual rewards generated for each individual by the policy in force at the close of the previous period are received. Aspiration level, satisfaction state, and just-noticeable-difference are brought up to date. Then each individual compares current policy on those loci for which he or she is responsible to what is believed to be best policy on those loci. If current policy is better, then ideas are adjusted. Each individual generates potential new ideas by reversing one locus of responsibility at a time in current good ideas. If any of these are estimated improvements, they are added to the individual's short list of good ideas in place of the list's current minimum-value member. If there are changes in loci of responsibility that the individual believes would be improvements and has authority to make unilaterally, those changes in policy are made.

In the next major cycle of a model period, the regularly scheduled meetings of the organization are held. At such meetings each individual mentions the most attractive idea on his or her list. The others consider each idea mentioned, remember it if it is found attractive, and, whether or not the mentioned idea is attractive, try to estimate which actions on their own loci of responsibility would be best if the mentioned idea became policy. These hypothetical responses to proposals are also mentioned to, and considered by, the others attending.3 At the close of the discussion, the group votes on each individual's current best idea, and the idea becomes new policy if estimates of its value are preferred by a majority to the estimated value of the status quo.

In the final major cycle of a period, any special or ad hoc meetings are held. Those attending consider specific agendas and vote on whether they should become policy. After the completion of all meetings, a new period begins with another updating cycle.

#### Particulars of the Present Models

What distinguishes this modelling system from others—and makes possible this study of search capability—is the presence in the models of both the very detailed internal dynamics just sketched and a model of the organization's environment. If we are to study the relationship between what Simon (1969) would call the organization's inner and outer environments, we must be able to represent and vary both. In this modelling system, it is

The response-to-proposals process goes no deeper than three iterations (i.e., responses to responses to responses to proposals).

Table 1. Dantzig's Original Transport Example

		Warehouse						
	1	2	3.	4	5	Factory capacity		
Costs of Shipping per uni	t	***************************************				<del></del>		
Factory 1	9	20	18	12	25	500		
Factory 2	6	16	14	18	25	750		
Factory 3	27	18	15	10	9	250		
Warehouse capacities	300	300	300	300	300	1500		
Optimal Solution								
Factory 1	150	0	0	300	50	500		
Factory 2	150	300	300	0	0	750		
Factory 3	0	0	0	0	250	250		
Total	300	300	300	300	300	1500		

Cost of optimal feasible solution 18,350 Cost of pessimal feasible solution 30,950

possible to study a very wide range of environments that includes all functions from the space of possible policies, time, individual identity, and past history into the rational numbers. Thus we can specify an environment for which optimal policy is known and study the organization's ability to find that policy, or a good approximation of it. Proceeding in this way we can, in effect, judge the behavior of the models relative to an external performance standard. In this case we will be using cost minimization, but in general the strategy of explicitly representing in the model both the organization and its environment makes it possible to erect a variety of expicit performance standards that can be used to assess model behavior. In turn, this makes it possible to follow the suggestion of Newell and Simon (1972, p. 13) that, along with the more conventional criteria, theory should be subjected to a test of "sufficiency"; does one's understanding of the phenomena permit the construction of a model that can perform relevant tasks? The models presented here pass this test with flying colors. (See also Cohen, 1981b.)

The environments studied in this article are all variations of a problem first used by Dantzig in his classic text on linear programming as an illustration of the power of operations research techniques to resolve complexities that would be difficult for unaided decision makers. Dantzig's original problem is shown in Table 1. It represents a system with three sources ("Factories") and five sinks ("Warehouses"). Each sink has a fixed demand (for "merchandise") each month, and each source has a ("monthly production") capacity as shown in the constraints. The first matrix displays the cost of ("shipping") one unit from

any source to any sink. The problem is to satisfy all the constraints at minimum cost. It is an instance of the standard transportation problem and has the optimal solution shown in the second matrix. In these problems there are 15 policy variables, one for each monthly order by a warehouse from a factory. The value of each of these variables within the model is controlled by four policy loci and thus may be in any of the 16 states, which may be thought of as varying from 0 to 15 "truckloads" of 25 cases each. In order to have sufficient replications of model performance, ten variants of the Dantzig problem have been created, each serving as an environment to which a model organization must adapt. The variants were created by holding the constraints (reexpressed in truckloads) constant and generating new cost matrices by drawing cost entries with equal probability and replacement from the integers 5 through 25. The resulting problems are shown in Appendix 2.

It should be noted that the model individuals proceed in the decision making without access to any of the relevant analytic technique. On the contrary, the processes embodied in the models only permit an individual to estimate (with error) the value (as measured by his own particular goals) of a concrete alternative to current policy that would occur if a particular small set of standard operating procedures were altered and then to compare that estimate to the status quo.

Now that the model environment has been described, it is appropriate to provide some detail about the model organizations that will actually be deciding every period how many truckloads of merchandise each warehouse should be ordering from each factory. In all the runs reported here,

an organization has 16 members, 15 of whom have direct responsibilities. Each of the five warehouses has an individual responsible for its orders from each of the three factories. Three individuals at each warehouse form a standing committee that holds a regular meeting each period. In addition, there is a sixteenth member, the manager, who calls and attends the organization's ad hoc meetings. The manager does this by choosing a warehouse at random, choosing two members of that warehouse at random, and bringing them together with their counterparts from a second randomly selected warehouse. The agenda of an ad hoc meeting is always the shifting of one unit order from one factory to another.

The individuals in a model are linked to the environment of the organization by the rewards that alternative policies actually produce for them and by the estimates they make of those rewards. The comparison that we want to make is between two patterns of reward which may be called global and local. In the global pattern, each individual is rewarded and gets estimates of that reward on the basis of the overall objective of the organization: cost minimization. A policy that costs less overall is better for everyone, so long as it satisfies the constraints at least as well. In the local pattern, the individuals are concerned primarily with minimizing ordering costs and constraint violations at their own warehouses, and secondarily with minimizing the number of units they are ordering individually. In both patterns constraint violations are subjected to penalties that are large relative to potential cost savings. In the case of warehouse constraints, the penalty is 25 times the squared magnitude of the violation. In the case of factory constraints, the cumulative effect is about 14 times the magnitude of the violation. In the local pattern individuals are insensitive to constraint violation penalties at other warehouses. In the global pattern, all constraint penalties affect everyone. The detailed functions are in Appendix 3.

Thus the global pattern of reward gives every model individual an incentive structure that corresponds to our external performance standard. The local pattern gives a model individual incentives that diverge from our external performance standard by ignoring the consequences that actions in one's own warehouse may have elsewhere in the organization. We shall see, however, that

'In runs reported in a preceding article (Cohen, 1981c), the manager also alters the incentives of the other members when he or she sees fit. That feature is not active in the runs reported here. The manager is primarily interested in satisfaction of factory constraints and secondarily in total cost minimization.

with noise in the environment, organizational performance, as measured by the external standard, can be markedly better in the local model.

In addition to the two patterns of reward, the model environments reported will embody random noise. Individuals' estimates of the rewards that would follow from alternative policies are constructed from an accurate base multiplied by an error factor drawn from a uniform density over (.90, 1.10), which corresponds to an average absolute estimating error of 5%. Actual rewards are subject to similar fluctuations.

These conditions will produce substantial difficulty in making a valid comparison of an alternative with existing policy. For example, if an individual considers an alternative with an expected value of 5% greater than that of the status quo. then, with noise in both the estimate of the alternative and in the actual value produced by the status quo, the superior alternative will be rejected more than a quarter of the time. The estimate of the alternative will be low enough for such an error to be possible three quarters of the time. The actual (noisy) result of the status quo will be high enough for error three quarters of the time. When both are in the range of possible error, such error will occur half the time under the distributional assumptions made for the noise. The product of the three probabilities is 9/32 > .28. Thus an alternative that is actually a 5% improvement will be rejected more than one quarter of the time. Symmetrically, alternatives 5% worse than the status quo will be adopted with the same probability.

#### Model Behavior

The global reward structure is meant to capture a commonly assumed pattern of conditions (although the empirical literature on organizations gives some grounds for expecting their actual occurrence to be rare). When global and local reward models are run with perfectly accurate rewards and estimates of rewards, the results are very similar. Both models are able to find optimal policies in a few periods, which demonstrates that an appropriate organization of either type built from model individuals with severe cognitive limitations is capable of very rapid and accurate adaptation and strongly indicates that an appropriate organization of boundedly rational individuals may be much more effective than the individuals themselves.5

The results presented in Table 2 and Figure 1 are from the conditions described earlier: local

'This point is developed in Cohen (1981a). See also March (1978, p. 590).

Table 2.

		Loca	1		Global					
Problem	Performance mean	Performance SD	Distance from optimum	Constraint violations	Performance mean	Performance SD	Distance from optimum	Constraint violations		
1	686.2	37.3	.011	0	761.7	136.5	.084	2		
2	863.5	56.4	.035	0	966.5	103.4	.208	4		
3	652.6	35.6	.016	0	810.1	231.3	.211	6		
4	693.9	39.6	.014	0	858 <b>.5</b>	152.3	.070	2		
5	792.0	63.8	.016	0	960.6	201.4	.121	2		
6	886.1	37.5	.009	0	1021.1	147.1	.260	6		
7	491.9	46.6	.021	0	602.5	187.2	.305	4		
8	781.0	75.0	.009	0	966.3	245.9	.057	. 0		
9	670.1	75.0	.005	0	727.3	142.1	.339	8		
10	678.6	79.7	.005	0	847.7	206.5	.128	2		

and global incentive patterns with noisy estimated and actual rewards. These results demonstrate that with uncertainty added to the picture, the local pattern of incentives may very significantly outperform the global one. The ten rows of Table 2 display the results achieved by the two models in each of the ten variants of the Dantzig transport problem. Each of the runs reported was 50 periods in length; the table shows for each variant the mean and standard deviation of a performance measure, the sum of costs and constraint violation penalties implied by the policy in force at the close of a period. This measure can be computed for both models and is comparable. The means are consistently lower for the local model

although—in fact, because—no one in the local organization is pursuing this exact measure. The next major objective of the article is to explicate this surprising contribution of goal diversity and conflict to search.

Two further measures of performance reported in Table 2 confirm the occurrence of the effect. The first measure is the distance from the policy in force at the close of the 50th period to an optimal policy. The measurement unit is the range of feasible policy costs. Thus in row seven the local model came within 2.1% of the optimal policy value, whereas the global model ended its run at a policy with a value equivalent to 30% of the maximum feasible policy cost error. Table 2 also

Figure 1. Logarithm of Global Cost of Closing Policy in Periods 1-50. Environment One





Figure 2. Environment Five



reports for each model the total number of constraint violations implied by the 50th period policy. On all three performance measures the local model is substantially better than the global. In all ten environments its average policy has lower cost, and its final policy is nearer the optimum. The local model always ends at a feasible policy, and the global does so only once.

Figures 1-3 give a better sense of the dynamics that produced the results in Table 2. The figures correspond to the runs in rows one, five, and nine. (The costs-plus-penalties performance measure has been subjected to a log transformation to compress the variation.) Figures 1 and 2 show the more typical situation in the runs. The local model has better performance in almost every period.

Figure 3. Environment Nine




Figure 3 shows a rare but instructive example. Even when the global model manages to find substantially better policy in the early going, it is unable to hold its advantage. The greater instability of the global model that is evident in all three plots and in the standard deviations of Table 2 eventually dissipates its advantage.

#### Interpretation

To understand how this happens we will have to explore the search and choice processes of the models in a little more detail. The runs of row one (shown in Figure 1) provide an excellent case study. In the 50 periods of these runs, both models experienced some setbacks, policy changes that reduced the performance of the organization relative to the previous period. If we take 10% of the feasible cost range as a (somewhat arbitrary) standard for a major setback, we obtain some interesting results. The local model experienced only three setbacks of that magnitude, whereas the global model had twelve, which indicates that the global model is substantially more prone to erroneous policy choices even though individuals in both models were subjected to identical noise distributions.

A further observation on setbacks is useful. By taking the ratio of the forward-to-backward first differences in the performance measure, we can compute a recovery ratio for each setback episode (i.e., what fraction of the setback loss did the model recover in the subsequent period?). The respective means (standard deviations) of the recovery ratios are 1.16 (.28) for the local and .29 (1.29) for the global models. This sharp contrast identifies a further difference in the models' abilities to make effective responses in policy once a major setback has occurred.

What properties of the search and decision processes in the two models contribute to the global model's greater tendency to make major errors, and its lesser ability to recover once this has happened? It should be pointed out that there is an upper bound on the size of errors either model can make in a single decision. At the limit, a majority of individuals making a decision could undervalue current rewards by 10% and overestimate rewards of an alternative by the same amount. Thus the largest possible error is 20% of the underlying expected value of current policy. Larger period-to-period differences appearing in major setbacks are actually the combined result of multiple errors within a single period; this is of particular relevance for the global model since it makes policy changes at a rate about three times that of the local model (six changes per period versus two).

Changes actually made in policy are the result of the convolution of two processes: search and choice. The search process in each condition may be characterized by the probability that alternatives in some class of interest will be generated by the individual reflection and group discussions that go on within the organization. The choice process may be characterized by the probability that proposed alternatives in some class of interest will be preferred to the status quo by a majority. The modelling system permits us to generate this kind of information for search and choice, respectively.

In Figure 4 histograms have been constructed for each model using all the alternatives proposed in meetings during the 50 periods of operation in Environment One, a total of 985 alternatives in the global condition and 951 in the local. The horizontal scale is the underlying total cost implied by the proposed alternative. This is our external standard of performance, and it is a well-defined measure on alternatives generated in either condition, although it was used by model individuals only in the global case. It is evident that the alternatives generated in the local model have a much lower total cost on average; thus the absolute quality of the local search process is clearly superior.

This difference in absolute search quality requires some qualification, however. Although the total populations of alternatives generated are better in the local case, one cannot conclude that this results from a superiority of local search in generating desirable alternatives if one controls for the quality of current policy. After all, the search processes in both models are strongly influenced by current policy. If most alternatives have value in the neighborhood of the value of current policy, then the difference in Figure 4 might well be the result of the global model's inferior policy choices, rather than the cause. Table 3 supports this view. It reports for the two models the fraction of alternatives generated that are total cost improvements with current policy value controlled. Both models are less likely to generate improvements when current policy is already quite good, but the global model is actually a little better than the local on each subinterval of current policy value. Since the global model relative search is, if anything, better than that of the local model, and the difference in absolute search quality seems derived from the choice errors we seek to explain, it seems appropriate to turn to an examination of choice processes themselves.


In Figure 5 the conditional probability that an alternative will be chosen, given that it has been generated by a search, is plotted as a function of the relative gain or loss in underlying total cost implied by the alternative. Both the global and

local models reliably choose alternatives representing substantial gains over the status quo. For alternatives not unmistakably superior to the status quo, however, clear and important differences can be seen. The local model choice process is less prone both to errors of omission and of commission. The global choice process is more likely to reject proposed alternatives that would

be decreases in underlying total cost and to accept alternatives that actually increase costs.

At first sight it may seem puzzling that the same noise distribution produces in the two models different probabilities of making an error of the same magnitude. But the scale on which both models' choices are being measured in Figure 5 is not the scale on which individuals in the local

Figure 4. Histogram of Global Values of Alternatives Generated in Environment One



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
1 i t

Table 3.

Global Value of Policy at	Fraction of Alternatives Better than Policy (N Alternatives)					
Time of Generation	Local	Global				
625-649	.018 (221)	.053 ( 19)				
650-674	.091 (132)	.143 (105)				
675-699	.102 (225)	.226 (208)				
700-724	.136 (301)	.251 (223)				
725-749	.213 ( 47)	.281 (178)				
750-774	( 0)	.345 (165)				
775-799	.222	.500 ( 22)				
800-824	.667 ( 3)	.250 ( 4)				
825-849	( 0)	.389 ( 18 <u>)</u>				
850-874	( 0)	.500 ( 10)				

Figure 5. Probability that an Alternative Will Be Accepted Given that It Has Been Proposed.

1% Intervals of Gain or Loss Relative to Global Value of Status Quo




model were actually measuring proposed alternatives. Figure 6 demonstrates the importance of this fact; it shows three histograms of the value of alternatives generated relative to the policy in force. The first shows, for 1% increments in magnitude, the frequencies of globally measured relative gains and losses implied by alternatives generated in the global model. The second shows globally measured gains and losses for alternatives generated in the local model. The third shows the same alternatives with gains and losses recalculated according to the local incentive structure of one of the participants in the particular meeting at

which each alternative was proposed. (In the local model other participants might take different views of the alternative.)

Alternatives that may be falsely preferred by an individual will be above the 10% loss level and below zero. This area is shown on all three histograms by the box in Figure 6. This area contains a very much smaller fraction of all alternatives in the locally measured local model case than it does for the global model. In effect, this returns the question to search, since the figure shows that fewer alternatives are generated in the local case that are close enough to the status quo to be easily

Figure 6. Three Histograms of Relative Value of Alternatives. 1% Intervals. Tails Slightly Truncated

Global Model Global Measure N = 985



Local Model: Local Measure N = 951

misjudged. The relative value of alternatives seen by an individual in the local model has greater dispersion and therefore misjudgments of the same relative magnitude produce fewer choice errors in the local case. The error-prone process that emerges in the global model is in substantial correspondence with the analysis by Goodin and Waldner (1979) of the pitfalls of incremental decision-making. With local incentives a different and far less error-prone process emerges. However, the condition giving rise to error proneness, homogeneity of the actors' incentives, is quite different from the decentralization on which Goodin and Waldner focused. Thus the considerably more rigorous exploration of theory that is possible within the modelling system casts a central question about the advantages of an incrementalist process in a surprising new light.

It is, of course, not necessary in general that a search under local incentives generate alternatives with more disperse relative value. However, there are two strong reasons to expect this effect to occur with significant frequency in models such as those used here. The local value of an alternative, if it is distinct from the global value, will usually depend on a proper subset of the many consequences the alternative has for the organization. Thus we expect local evaluations to be more clearcut and global evaluations to be a balancing of many pluses and minuses. But the latter will naturally tend to the error-prone neighborhood of the status quo. This tendency is reinforced by the expected negative correlations among effects. Once good policy has been reached, alternatives that are good for one part of the organization will usually be bad for some other part. The objects of search are precisely the exceptions to this rule, but the difficulty is to avoid errors along the way. This is easier when fewer alternatives look as good to participants as current policy.

A final basis for believing the pattern reported here to be common rests outside the specific assumptions of the models, but further fortifies the advantages of local incentives; it is the probability that relative errors will often be of smaller average magnitude in local judgments. This conclusion would seem to follow from the added difficulty faced by a global evaluator in assessing the magnitude of consequences remote from specialized responsibilities and daily flows of information and experience.

This "search enhancement effect," in which global goals are better served by an appropriate organization of divergent local incentives, demonstrates again that organizations may have properties very different from the properties of their component individuals. It also shows the potential value of a theoretical method that permits the rigorous tracing of complex interactions among

multiple organizational processes. The searchenhancement effect arises, as do many organizational processes, from the interaction of several organizational features. It is a (globally) positive effect because the divergent incentives of the actors are effectively channeled by the organization's structure of decision-making authority. Under a different pattern of authority, one might well expect different results. The art of institutional design is, in part, to conceive of decisionmaking arrangements that will successfully harness the potential inherent in strongly held and partially divergent incentives. If a theoretical method is to support the study of such possibilities, it must have the capability of representing a rich variety of interacting organizational features. The use of computer models in organization theory holds out some hope of increasing that required capability.

Although the behavior of the models provides logical support for the existence of search-enhancing conflict, it obviously does not provide empirical support, nor does it establish how general such phenomena might be. The results reported here are best thought of as an analog of a constructive existence proof, showing that goal diversity can enhance search by exhibiting ten cases in which it happens. Although the arguments made above give some reason to believe that the effect is likely to occur, real confidence in its empirical frequency will have to await careful field work and laboratory studies of organizational decision making.

In the meantime, the model results reinforce the position of those who have argued that conflict may enhance search by demonstrating a logically coherent formalization of the argument and by providing a detailed analysis of the simulated process producing the results. The modelling system has been shown to be a method of determining the consequences of our ideas about organizations that vastly extends our powers to reason about complex events that are determined by the interaction of multiple organizational processes.

## Appendix 1 Major Elements of the Modelling System

The models used here are members of a very large family that can be created by varying elements of the organizational modelling system. The general system is a computer program and subroutines that encode organizational structures and processes. By altering data that initialize the

One such laboratory study has begun (Cohen, 1981b).

program or by small changes in the subroutines, wide variations can be induced in organizational structures and processes. The major elements of the system fall into four clusters, which will be discussed in turn.

#### The Policy String

At any moment the policies in effect in a model organization are represented by the state of a 64 variable string. The most natural interpretation is that each variable displays whether (1) or not (0) a particular standard operating procedure of the organization is currently in force. For some applications, very different interpretations may be convenient. However, the favored interpretation meshes comfortably with an evolutionary view of organizational policy in which, following Winter (1975), routines of the organization are treated as analogous to biological genes. An individual variable will often be referenced as a "locus." The whole string will be called "the policy." In this interpretation following changes in policy is akin to observing the evolution of a system of genes.

#### The Environment Function

The meaning for any individual in the organization of a particular overall policy is determined by the interaction of the policy and the organization's environment. In each time period each in-

'The system is in FORTRAN and is transferable to most computer installations with relatively minor adjustments. Full details can be obtained from the Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, as Discussion Paper #151, "Documentation of an Organizational Modelling System."

In the ensuing presentation, as in the main text, the exposition is conducted using organizational and individual terms such as "meeting" or "responsibility" to designate processes and structures within the models. This usage has advantages and disadvantages that perhaps deserve explicit mention. Such terms denote the phenomena that the models seek to represent. The objective of the modelling system is to permit the careful study of the interactions among formal analogs of familiar processes and structures. Use of the terms (rather than, say, the computer names of the corresponding computer subprograms and data structures) helps the reader to gain intuition for the behavior of the models at the expense of a detailed understanding the formalisms themselves. It underrepresents to some extent the inescapable fact that the formalisms are simpler than the everyday language terms used here to designate them. Nonetheless, the correspondence of the detailed formalisms to the intention of verbal theoretical categories is far higher than one finds in typical mathematizations of organization theoretic issues.

dividual's identification number and the current policy become arguments of an environment function that returns to the individual the actual rewards he or she experiences in that period. This is called operating in real mode. "The environment of the organization" may be something different for each individual and in every time period. The only theoretical limit is set by what can be written as a mathematical function from the space of possible policies, individual identification numbers, and time periods, into the rational numbers. In the cases resembling the simplest firm models traditionally used in economics, all individuals may have the same environment function, typically one returning the utility associated with a profit stream produced by the policy. However, the system permits the study of more complex cases in which values differ between individuals or change over time or both, and in which environmental responses to organizational policies do not stand still (for example, see March, 1978).

The environment function may also be called by an individual in an estimating mode. In a typical model constructed in the system, there will be many such calls per time period. In this model, the function returns to the individual an estimate of the rewards that would flow from some altered version of current policy. In the limiting case in which individuals can predict perfectly the consequences of alternatives, the estimating mode may be identical to the real mode. The more interesting cases, however, will be those in which the estimates of rewards are distorted or erroneous assessments of the actual consequences of a potential policy. This feature makes it possible to study the variety of organizational learning "pathologies" surveyed by March and Olsen (1976) and Hedberg (1981).

#### Attributes of Model Individuals

An individual in models built with the system is represented by a small set of ideas for policy improvements, an aspiration level, a satisfaction state, and a just-noticeable-difference (JND). In effect, ideas are represented as 64-place strings from the alphabet 0,1 where # means "don't care." A typical idea for an individual will be blank (#) on most, but not necessarily all, loci outside his or her domain of formal responsibility, owing to the very limited attention range and sharply bounded cognitive power of the individuals. Operating in isolation, individuals are capable of systematic exploration of alternatives only in their domains of formal responsibility and only if those domains are relatively small, no more than six loci. Ideas about loci outside the domain of responsibility mostly come to an individual from others via organizational processes described in the next section. These structures are meant to conform to the strong tendency (Allison, 1971; Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1958) of alternatives considered to be few in number and sharply constrained by local attention focus and incentives.

When an individual considers an idea, either one self-generated or one suggested by someone else, it is evaluated by substituting current policy for all the don't care (#) loci and then calling the environment function in estimating mode. In the process of retaining or discarding new ideas, only ordinal use is made of the resulting estimate. If the new idea has a better estimate than the worst idea in an individual's set of good ideas, the new idea replaces the old minimum. Otherwise the new idea is forgotten. The set of good ideas is quite small, ordinarily about five.

The JND is the average distance between good ideas. The aspiration level is a weighted average of recent period rewards. The satisfaction state rises when rewards exceed aspirations by at least a JND and falls when the opposite occurs. Both high and low extremes of satisfaction dampen somewhat individual exploration of alternatives to current policy.

#### **Attributes of Model Organizations**

The organizational structure of any model developed using this system is determined by five major components: the regular meetings held in the organization together with their agenda; the method of calling irregular or special meetings and setting their agenda; the processes of give-and-take over ideas that occur as individuals "talk" in meetings; and the procedures in the organization for making authoritative choices of policy. The first and last of these can be altered by varying the initializing data set. Meetings and agenda setting can be changed by altering subroutines. Talk processes are relatively invariant.

The responsibilities of each individual are the loci to which he or she predominantly attends. This number is limited, usually to about four. Within that small domain, individuals examine deviations from current policy rather intensively. They do so both in isolation and when they explore how they would respond to policy changes suggested by others in meetings. Responsibilities may also enter into the choice procedures de-

scribed below. A given locus may have one, many, or no responsible individuals.

The regular meetings of the organization occur in every time period and bring together fixed sets of participants over fixed agendas. A typical example of a regular meeting process assembles meetings of individuals whose responsibilities are strongly interdependent. Each individual in such a meeting proposes a change in policy drawn from his or her list of good ideas. After talking the matter over, the organization's choice procedures are invoked and produce a change in policy or a continuation of the status quo. Then the next meeting scheduled for the period takes place. This example is consistent with the models reported here. For a different type of investigation, quite different regular meeting processes can be readily defined by altering the regular meeting subroutine.

The special meeting subroutine provides a device for holding meetings over a tabled proposal that responds to particular problems or non-recurring conditions the organization may confront. An example might be a meeting called to bring together individuals for a discussion of a policy alternative with effects that cut across the boundaries implied by the regular meeting structure.

The talk processes of a model consist of two phases. The first is the simple suggesting of ideas to others. The second is determining and reporting what responses an individual would make in his or her own domain to suggestions made by others. The latter amounts to answering the question "If that idea were to become policy, what changes would I want to make in the loci for which I am responsible?" Since the answer is also an idea, there can also be responses to responses to suggestions. A limit of three iterations is usual.

The choice procedures of a model specify for each locus the decision rule that must be used to make changes at that locus, a precedence structure that resolves conflicts over decision rules in multilocus decisions, and a set of individuals who must be present for choices that affect a given locus. A typical model might have majority rule decisions for all loci, with responsible individuals required to be present. An alternative might give veto power over changes at some loci to particular individuals, or some loci might be subject to unilateral changes made by the individuals responsible for them. Various combinations of unilateral, majority, and veto choice procedures can be made by altering the choice subroutine.

Appendix 2. Dantzig Problem Variants

Problem	Cost Matrix						Opti (in 25 u	Best Value/Worst			
1	21 15 23	23 10 16	5 5 8	24 16 13	12 5 7	8 4 0	0 12 0	12 0 0	0 2 10	0 12 0	630/912
2	12 9 8	17 16 11	23 24 22	12 18 19	5 14 12	0 12 0	0 2 10	0 12 0	8 4 0	12 0 0	766/1026
<b>3</b> .	9 6 21	20 8 17	10 23 18	15 8 24	15 17 19	6 6 0	0 12 0	12 0 0	0 12 0	2 0 10	622/1098
4	7 12 14	17 17 5	11 24 22	12 16 15	23 12 24	1 8 4 _0	0 2 10	12 0 0	0 12 0	0 12 0	656/1124
. 5	20 18 16	13 16 24	10 22 12	11 18 17	21 8 10	0 6 6	0 12 0	8 0 4	12 0 0	0 12 0	752/1236
6	18 18 12	17 23 11	5 6 24	15 14 7	22 23 19	. 0 12 0	2 0 10	12 0 0	0 12 0	6 6 0	858/1200
7	24 8 12	13 12 6	5 18 13	13 11 21	7 21 6	0 12 0	0 6 6	12 0 0	0 12 0	8 0 4	476/1142
8	15 6 10	20 21 6	16 24 8	21 23 11	. 6 13 6	0 12 0	0 6 6	8 0 4	0 12 0	12 0 0	742/1078
9–	18 12- 15	9 6 5	15 15 14	5 9 20	17 17 8	0 12 0	0 12 0	8 4 0	12 0 0	0 2 , 10	570/914
10	6 22 16	15 9 5	20 16 12	15 17 14	19 11 18	12 0 0	0 2 10	0 12 0	8 4 0	0 12 0	652/1082

### Appendix 3. Definitions

 $x_{ij} \equiv$  order level,  $0 \le x_{ij} \le 15$ .  $x_{ij}$  may be interpreted as "truckloads."

 $1 \le i \le 3$ , factories

 $1 \le j \le 5$ , warehouses

 $y_{ab} \equiv$  expected value of policy for individual (a,b)

 $z_{ab} \equiv \text{value for policy returned to individual } (a,b)$ 

 $c_{ij} \equiv \cos t$  of shipping one ordered truckload from i to j.

 $r_i \equiv \text{total of orders from factory } i = \sum_{j=1}^{5} x_{ij}$ 

 $p = |r_1-20| + |r_2-30| + |r_3-10| \equiv \text{sum of factory capacity violations}$ 

Appendix (continued)

$$w_j = \sum_{i=1}^{3} |x_{ij} - 12| \equiv \text{capacity violation at warehouse } j.$$

U(0, ... 2) = uniform random noise on the interval (0, ... 2)

For directly responsible local individual (a,b) ordering from factory a for warehouse b,

$$y_{ab} = \sum_{i=1}^{3} c_{ib} x_{ib} + (.55)p25 + (5w_b)^2 + .01(x_{ab}c_{ab})$$

The individual ordering from factory a for warehouse b seeks to minimize this function of total shipping costs at warehouse b, factory capacity violations, own warehouse capacity violations, and—to a very small degree—shipping costs of orders personally placed.

$$z_{ab} = y_{ab} (.9 + U(0, .2))$$

The actual report to the individual is the above expected value perturbed by uniform random noise.

For the directly responsible global individual (a, b),

$$y_{ab} = \sum_{i=1}^{3} \sum_{j=1}^{5} x_{ij} c_{ij} (.55) p_{25} + \sum_{j=1}^{5} (5w_j)^2.$$

The global individual acts to minimize this function of total shipping costs at all warehouses, factory capacity violations, and all warehouse capacity violations.

$$z_{ab} = y_{ab} (.9 + U(0, .2)).$$

This is again perturbed with uniform noise.

For the manager in either case

$$y_m = .0001 \sum_{i=1}^{3} \sum_{j=1}^{5} x_{ij} c_{ij} + p$$

$$z_m = K + y_m(.9 + U(0, .2))$$

where K is an index integer that increases each time organizational policy has been unchanged for three consecutive periods. The integer K plays no important role here, but is significant in other work with the model where policy stability has been made an important condition of managerial alteration of incentives. That process is absent in these models, so that  $z_m$  responds to  $y_m$ . The scaling factor (.0001) establishes a priority of reducing p, factory constraint violations, and preferring the least cost member of a set of alternatives with equal p.

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# Parliament and Political Support in Canada

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Legislatures are widely recognized as institutional embodiments of the concept of representation in contemporary liberal democracies, but how support for legislatures and evaluations of their members's activities influence support for national political regimes and communities is imperfectly understood. This article investigates the question with the use of data from a 1979 national survey of the Canadian public. Analyses of a model of support demonstrate that feelings about parliament and assessments of MPs' performance have significant effects on levels of support for the national political community and regime. Other important variables include cost-benefit evaluations of the personal impact of governmental activity, more general evaluations of governmental performance, and subcultural variations in political socialization.

The salience of legislatures as institutional embodiments of the concept of representation in contemporary liberal democracies suggests that public evaluations of the activities of these bodies and their members constitute important forces governing political support. Despite the plausibility of this proposition, the extent to which orientations toward legislative institutions and actors influence political support remains imperfectly understood. This article addresses the question by focusing on Parliament and its members in the matrix of forces governing support for the national political community and regime in contemporary Canada. The analysis builds on our previous research and also is informed by the results of investigations of the roles played by legislatures and their members in facilitating or eroding support for various political systems.1

Received: October 18, 1982 Revision received: April 6, 1983 Accepted for publication: September 27, 1983

The authors wish to thank William Keech and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

In the 1960s and 1970s the impetus for much of the research on legislatures and political support derived from a concern with the roles legislative bodies play in processes of economic and political development (Morris-Jones, 1983; Smith & Musolf, 1979). A substantial portion of this research was conducted by scholars associated with the Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa (Boynton & Kim, 1975; Boynton & Loewenberg, 1973; Jewell &

Conceptually, much of the recent research on how legislatures and the activities of their members affect political support has been informed by two propositions. First, and most basic, under certain conditions a legislature can foster a polity's legitimacy and enhance its effectiveness.<sup>2</sup> Although other institutions also can perform this function, the contention is that legislatures frequently can do it better, because in many countries they are the most salient and dramatic symbol of the representative character of the political system (e.g., Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979, Chap. 8; Mezey, 1979, pp. 272-273; Wahlke, 1971). Second, and relatedly, it is argued that individual legislators can play important roles

Kim, 1976; Kim, Barkan, Turan, & Jewell, 1984; Loewenberg, 1971, 1973; Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979; Patterson, Hedlund, & Boynton, 1975; Patterson, Wahlke, & Boynton, 1971; and Wahlke, 1971). See also Grumm (1973); Kornberg (1973); Kornberg and Musolf (1970); and, for a useful summary of much of the relevant literature, Mezey (1979).

<sup>1</sup>Of course, such activities can have deleterious consequences for political support. Packenham (1970, p. 578) has noted that legislatures in developing states often are vigorous and unyielding defenders of the status quo. Kornberg and Pittman (1979, pp. 68-87) have argued that legislators' actions can lead to public confusion and cynicism, outcomes that Price and Clarke (1980, p. 81) hypothesize are most likely to occur when individuals with little or no prior understanding of the substantive and symbolic significance of parliamentary procedure are exposed to the intricate and oftentimes arcane practices of legislative institutions.

in generating support for legislatures and other components of a political system by effectively executing various representational activities (e.g., Mezey, 1979, pp. 191-193; Muller, 1970; Wahlke, 1971). Legislators link citizens to the polity by articulating public needs and demands to political authorities, apprising constituents of governmental actions, obtaining pork-barrel projects for their districts, and performing ombudsman and other constituency services. The importance of these activities is underscored by the fact that they characterize legislative behavior in widely different political milieux (Clarke, 1978; Mezey, 1979, pp. 159-193; Morris-Jones, 1976).

# Political Support in Canada: Problems

Canada confronts support-eroding problems that most other mature liberal democracies either have long since resolved or are encountering in less acute forms. The 1976 election of a Parti Québécois government whose raison d'être is political independence for Quebec, the subsequent sovereignty-association referendum of 1980, and—despite the referendum's defeat—the comfortable reelection of the Parti Ouébécois in 1981, are the most recent and dramatic, but certainly not the only, illustrations of the national unity problems that the country continues to experience. To an extent, these problems are products of long-standing conditions, in particular the distribution of population and natural resources among the provinces. Regarding these conditions, the Canadian population is distributed in a narrow band along the American border: two-thirds of the population live on Ontario and Quebec, and the latter province is the home of four-fifths of Canada's francophones. (Approximately 29% of Canada's total population are persons of French descent [Kalbach & McVey, 1979, p. 195].) This distribution has provided the demographic basis on which culturally and economically based regional and other center v. periphery cleavages have fed. Exacerbating these cleavages are British-style parliamentary government, disciplined parliamentary parties, single-member constituencies, and plurality elections. In combination they have made it extremely difficult for small provinces to represent their interests in either the cabinets or parliamentary caucuses of the major parties (e.g., Irvine, 1979; Kornberg, 1970; Kornberg, Clarke, & Goddard, 1980). Public perceptions of inadequate representation have provided several provincial protest parties in Quebec and the West with opportunities to intensify and to exploit political discontent and to compete with Ottawa for the hearts and minds of Canadians (Cairns, 1977, 1983; Falcone & Van Loon, 1983; Simeon & Elkins, 1974).

Adding to problems of political support are substantial variations in the value and character of the provinces' natural resources. These factors, together with the fact that Canadians share their continent with a far richer and more powerful southern neighbor, have perpetuated sharp regional economic disparities and hindered the growth of a distinctive Canadian national identity (Bell & Tepperman, 1979; Feldman & Nevitte, 1979; Schwartz, 1967, 1974; Simeon, 1977; Smiley, 1980, pp. 284-303; Ulmann, 1977, 1978).

It can be argued that various policy decisions also have had deleterious consequences for support. Paradoxically, some policies intended to foster national unity appear to have had opposite effects. Attempts to respond to economically based regional grievances have been criticized as "too little, too late" (Smiley, 1980, pp. 261-269). Initiatives to satisfy the cultural and linguistic aspirations of Québécois have been rejected by many of them as condescending and mere symbolmongering while simultaneously irritating many English-speaking Canadians (e.g., Bernard, 1978; Simeon, 1977; Smiley, 1980, p. 256). Finally, federal government efforts to accommodate provincial demands for increased control over financial resources have led the former to agree to funding arrangements for major social programs in which Ottawa has been cast in the unenviable role of tax-collector, whereas the provinces have been able to represent themselves as providers of highly valued public goods (e.g., Cairns, 1977, 1983; Cody, 1977; Falcone & Van Loon, 1983).

# Political Support in Canada: A Model

In trying to provide a general explanation of the factors governing political stability and change, David Easton distinguished between three objects of support—community, regime, and authorities—and the character of support—diffuse or specific. Over the past two decades Easton's con-

'Easton defines the political community as "that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor" (1965, p. 177). The political regime includes formal structures of government and constitutionally prescribed procedures as well as "a broadly defined underlying set of political values and principles, articulated or implicit, which impose constraints on the purposes for which the energies and resources of the system may be committed" (1965, p. 194). Political authorities include all types of political officials, i.e., persons who "have acquired the primary responsibility for making decisions at the most inclusive level of the system" and those "whose authority is considerably narrower" (1965, p. 213).

cepts have inspired a number of empirical inquiries, among them the aforementioned investigations of legislatures and support (e.g., Patterson et al., 1973, 1975). Some of these studies have attempted to measure directly specific or diffuse support or both (e.g., Muller & Jukam, 1977; Muller & Williams, 1980), whereas others have used suggested analogs such as efficacy, trust, cynicism, or alienation.

A variety of criticisms of Easton's formulations of diffuse and specific support has accompanied the growth of this body of research. Some of these criticisms have been methodological, whereas others have been conceptual or theoretical. As an example of the former, Loewenberg (1971, p. 184) has argued that the distinction between diffuse and specific support cannot be established empirically. Similarly, Citrin and Muller and their colleagues have stressed the analytical difficulties of disentangling public evaluation (positive or negative) of the performance of governmental authorities from feelings of regime legitimacy or the lack thereof (e.g., Citrin, 1974; Citrin et al., 1975; Muller, 1979; Muller & Jukam, 1977). Zimmermann (1979, p. 72) has contended that there is a symbolic component to diffuse support, the content of which cannot be identified empirically. Conceptually, diffuse support has been criticized because it fails to acknowledge that all political support is ultimately contingent in nature (Rogowski, 1974). Regarding its theoretical utility, Wright (1976, p. 259) has observed that at least some democracies are seemingly able to function for long periods of time without large reservoirs of diffuse support. The notion of specific support, in turn, has been found wanting by some because it rests on the (debatable) assumption that citizens can make a cognitive connection between what they want from a political system and what that system actually delivers (Rogowski, 1983).

According to Easton, diffuse support "is independent of the effects of daily outputs. It consists of a reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against inputs or demands" (1965, p. 273). Specific support, in contrast, is accorded "as a consequence from [sic] system with respect to a demand that members make" (1965, p. 268). See also Easton (1975, 1976).

'Many of the studies using these concepts are cited by Muller and Jukam (1977, pp. 1562-1564, notes 5-7). See also Citrin (1974); Citrin et al. (1975); Finifter (1970); Gamson (1968); Miller (1974a, b); Muller, Jukam, and Seligson (1982); Muller and Williams (1980); Shanks and Citrin (1975); Shingles (1981); Sniderman (1981); and Wright (1976).

Given the difficulties with these concepts, we have concerned ourselves with what is supported and not whether support is diffuse or specific in character. We view political support as an affective orientation (positive, neutral, negative) toward a political object or process.5 Objects may include individuals or groups (e.g., legislators, political parties), institutions (e.g., Parliament, the bureaucracy), as well as more abstract entities such as the political regime and community. Processes may be relatively specific and well defined (e.g., procedures for electing members of Parliament or appealing judicial decisions) or very general and amorphous (e.g., federalism, representative democracy). In general, it is argued that support for any political object or process has two principal sources. One source is political socialization experiences in early or later life which generate affective feelings varying in their duration and intensity (e.g., Citrin et al., 1975; Easton, 1965, 1975; Sears, 1975). The other source of support is cost-benefit evaluations however rough and ready—concerning the effectiveness of political objects or processes in allocating societal values generally, and providing for the well-being of the person making judgments in particular (e.g., Citrin et al., 1975; Easton, 1965, 1975; Rogowski, 1974).6 In liberal democracies such as Canada not only must political objects and processes be perceived as effective. they also must be seen to be equitable in their operation and impact and capable of being affected by the needs and demands of average citizens, because concepts such as fairness, equity, and responsiveness are deeply embedded in the political cultures of liberal democracies and serve as normative standards for evaluating govern-

'Defining support this way retains what Easton and others consider to be the core meaning of the concept. "[W]e can describe support as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favorably or unfavorably, positively or negatively" (Easton, 1975, p. 436). Similarly, Muller and Williams (1980, p. 33) conceptualize support as "favorable through unfavorable affect [emphasis added] for the political system or structure of political authority in a nation."

'Muller and Jukam equate effectiveness with "approval of the performance of an incumbent administration" and legitimacy with "support for the system of government in general" (1977, p. 1563). They also state that the distinction between effectiveness and legitimacy is "roughly comparable" to that which Easton makes between specific and diffuse support. In the present analysis, the significance of effectiveness judgments as a source of support for any political figure, object, or process is treated as an empirical question rather than something to be assumed a priori.

EVALUATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL IMPACT ON PERSONAL WELL-BEING **EDUCATION** EVALUATIONS OF SUPPORT EVALUATIONS OF SUPPORT SUPPORT FEDERAL PERFORMANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE PARLIAMENT AND RESPONSIVENESS CONFRHIENT ATLANTIC CHIEBEC-FRENCH QUEBEC-NON-FRENCH

Figure 1. Proposed Model of the Determinants of Political Support in Canada

mental performance (Almond & Verba, 1963, Chap. 4; Hochschild, 1981; Rae, 1981).

As noted above, Canada provides an example of a liberal democracy encountering problems of support that most other such systems already have resolved or are experiencing less acutely. In previous investigations we have attempted to determine how deep-seated, reinforcing regional and ethnolinguistic cleavages and the associated configuration of partisan forces have affected the distribution of public support for Canada's national political community and regime (Kornberg. Clarke, & LeDuc, 1978; Kornberg, Clarke, & Stewart, 1979, 1980). In this article we extend our investigation by positing a multivariate model that specifies the roles Parliament and its members play in the support process. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of this model.

On its left-hand side are several exogenous variables, including a measure of respondents' evaluations of the impact of government on their own and their family's economic and more general well-being. Other exogenous variables include age, level of formal education, and regionethnicity. The two columns immediately to the right of the exogenous variables contain a measure of public assessments of the performance and responsiveness of members of Parliament and

a measure of the support ascribed to the institution of Parliament. To the right of those variables is an index of public evaluations of the equity or fairness and effective performance of the federal government. On the extreme right are two variables measuring support for the government of Canada (the national regime) and Canada (the national political community).

Regarding linkages between variables in the model, as indicated above, we hypothesize that one source of support is citizens' cost-benefit assessments of the impact of government on their own and their family's economic and more general well-being. Consequently, these assessments should have direct effects on their evaluations of the performance and responsiveness of members of Parliament, support for the institution of Parliament, and evaluations of the effectiveness, equity, and fairness of the federal government more generally. Since the second principal source of support is assumed to be sentiments resulting from socialization processes, we have included six sociodemographic variables (age, level of formal education, and four regionethnicity dummy variables) that are proxies intended to reflect the effects on support of those processes. Specifically, because residents of Quebec and the Atlantic and western provinces

long have believed that they are inadequately represented at the national level of government and that the operation of the federal system is disadvantageous to their regions, we expect that they will evaluate the performance of both their MPs and national governmental institutions less positively than will residents of Ontario, the country's largest and historically most favored region. We further expect support for Parliament and the national regime to vary with age and educational level, such that the older and more highly educated a person is, the more he or she will support those institutions. In addition, because the disaffection of many Québécois has gone beyond unhappiness with the performance of their MPs and the federal system and now extends to the national political community itself, as well as to its single most important political symbol, Parliament (e.g., Bernard, 1978; Clarke, 1983; Pinard & Hamilton, 1977; Simeon, 1977), direct negative links are posited between the Quebec-French variable and support for those two political objects. In contrast, the disaffection of non-French Quebecers is hypothesized to be less widespread, being confined to the performance of MPs and the federal government (Pammett et al., 1983). Thus, negative associations are hypothesized between those variables.

As for other relationships in the model (and consistent with the salience of legislators' representational roles in liberal democratic theory and practice), we hypothesize positive linkages between public assessments of the performance and responsiveness of MPs on the one hand, and support for Parliament and evaluations of federal governmental performance on the other. In turn, because of the potent symbolism of legislative institutions in liberal democracies, variations in support for Parliament not only should influence evaluations of governmental performance, they also should have a spread of affect to the national political regime and community. Consequently, positive linkages are hypothesized between support for Parliament and those objects. Further, consonant with the presumed importance of costbenefit calculations as sources of support in liberal democracies, positive evaluations of the effectiveness and equitable and fair performance of the federal government are expected to increase regime support. It can be hypothesized that variations in such evaluations have especially important effects on levels of regime support in Canada because of long-standing beliefs that the national political system has failed to respond equitably and fairly to regional needs and demands.

Finally, regarding the relationship between regime and community support, it can be hypothesized that affect for the regime will spill over to the community. Although the opposite flow of causality, i.e., from community to regime, also would seem plausible (Muller & Williams, 1980), a previous investigation (Kornberg, Clarke, & Stewart, 1979) has indicated that the flow of support in Canada primarily is upward, from regime to community. Consequently, it is assumed that support for the federal government will influence community support, but that community support will have no significant impact on support for the federal government. Before discussing the fit of the model to the data, we will describe how the latter were generated and how key variables were constructed. (Full details on variable construction are provided in the Appendix.)

#### Data and Measures

The data derive from structured interviews (averaging 90 minutes in length) with a national probability sample of 2744 Canadians eligible to vote in the 1979 federal election. To compensate for oversampling in certain smaller provinces, a weighting factor was used and yielded a representative national sample of 2670 cases.

# Support for Parliament and the National Political Regime and Community

Support for Parliament, the national political regime (the government of Canada), and the national political community (Canada) was measured by thermometer scales. Respondents were presented with a diagram of a thermometer scale ranging from 0 to 100 (50 was explicitly designated as a neutral point), and requested to indicate their feelings about political objects such as Parliament, the government of Canada, and Canada. Regarding the regime support measure. feelings about government, in the sense of regime. may be influenced by attitudes toward a "government of the day" (Citrin, 1974; Citrin et al., 1975; Miller, 1974a; Muller & Jukam, 1977; Tanenhaus & Foley, 1982). This tendency may be particularly strong in parliamentary systems such as Canada's,

'This conclusion derives from a two-stage least squares analysis in which national community support was regressed on regime support and vice versa (Kornberg, Clarke, & Stewart, 1979, pp. 900-902).

\*The survey and related research were funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Interviews were conducted immediately after the 1979 federal election. The data and details regarding sampling procedures and other aspects of this study are available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. All analyses and interpretations of the data presented in this article are the responsibility of the authors.

which have majority or single-party minority governments (Atkinson, Coleman, & Lewis, 1980; Kornberg, Clarke, & LeDuc, 1980). Sensitive to the potentially contaminating effects of partisanship on the measure of regime support, we regressed the latter on the former and computed residual scores. These residuals are used to measure national regime support in the analyses presented below.

'Empirically, the relationship between the government of Canada thermometer scores and identification with the governing party (i.e., the Progressive Conservatives) versus one of the opposition parties is statistically significant (eta = .28, p < .001).

10 The regression equation used to compute predicted government-of-Canada thermometer scores is: thermometer score = 58.43 + 2.72 × party identification. Party identification is a 7-point scale ranging from +3 (very strong government party identifier) to -3 (very strong opposition party identifier). It should be noted that partisanship does not correlate strongly with other endogenous variables in the model. Relevant correlations with community support, support for Parliament, evaluations of federal government performance, and assessments of the performance and responsiveness of MPs are .02, .06, .01, and .06, respectively. Correlations between partisanship and the exogenous variables are similarly weak.

It also is noteworthy that the data indicate strongly that respondents distinguished among the three support objects (Parliament, government of Canada, and Canada) when assigning thermometer scores. The mean inter-item correlation among these scores is .39; using the adjusted measure of regime support, the mean is .38. To place these figures in perspective, it may be observed that the mean inter-item correlation in 1979 among thermometer scores measuring levels of affect for party leaders, local candidates, and parties as a whole is .62 (Liberal), .68 (Conservative), and .71 (NDP).

"External evidence concerning the validity of the support measures is available in the form of relationships with opinions and behavior regarding alterations in Quebec's constitutional status. In 1979 and 1980 Quebecers were asked about various constitutional options for the province. As anticipated, those wishing to sever ties with Canada had much lower national community and regime support scores than did those opposing independence. (Etas were .50, p < .001, and .35, p< .001, for community and regime support respectively in 1979, and .55, p < .001, and .43, p < .001, in 1980.) Similarly, in 1974, persons in favor of "Quebec separating from the rest of Canada and becoming an independent country" had much lower scores on thermometer measures of national community and regime support (etas = .37 and .35, respectively). Additionally, analyses of voting in the 1980 sovereignty-association referendum with the use of identical support measures shows that Quebecers voting for sovereignty-association had much lower community and regime support scores than those who opposed it (etas = .66, p < .001, and

# MPs' Performance and Responsiveness

Two sets of questions were used to measure evaluations of the behavior of members of Parliament. One set requested that respondents assess several key aspects of the job performance of their present and past MPs (Clarke & Price, 1980, 1981). A second set of questions focused explicitly on judgments regarding the likelihood that MPs would respond to public needs and demands. The latter questions were used because democratic political cultures ascribe great value to legislative responsiveness (e.g., Pitkin, 1967; Eulau & Karps, 1977; Loewenberg & Patterson, 1979, pp. 167-195). In the analyses below answers to these two sets of questions are combined into one overall index. <sup>2</sup>

## Federal Governmental Performance

In general, it can be assumed that their political culture will condition the criteria that citizens emphasize when evaluating a political system (Kornberg, Clarke, & Stewart, 1980). In liberal democratic cultures, for example, fairness and equity can be expected to serve as important standards (Hochschild, 1981; Rae, 1981). Other criteria, however, have transcultural relevance and serve as standards for judging governmental activity in a wide variety of political systems. Perhaps the best example is the protection of the public's security from internal and external threats. In advanced industrial states such long-standing criteria have been supplemented by expectations concerning

.44, p < .001, respectively). The sovereigntyassociation proposition, had it been approved, would have enabled the Parti Québécois to initiate negotiations with the federal government to implement Quebez's political independence (sovereignty) in conjunction with an economic tie (association) with the remainder of Canada. Finally, considerable survey and other evidence indicates that disaffection with the Canadian polity is greatest among younger Québécois (e.g., McRoberts & Posgate, 1980; Pinard & Hamilton, 1977). National community and regime support, therefore, should be positively associated with age, and this is the case. In every survey (1974, 1979, 1980, Quebec referendum), scores on both support variables increase monotonically across five age cohorts (e.g., etas for 1979 = .29, community, and .24, regime).

<sup>13</sup>Principal components analyses of the performance and responsiveness items yield single factor solutions in both cases. Mean factor loadings are .74 and .75, respectively. The performance and responsiveness indexes are combined into one overall index to keep the political support model as parsimonious as possible. The correlation (r) between the component indexes is ± 44.

government's ability to intervene in the economy in order to generate wealth, control inflation and unemployment, and provide a panoply of welfare state entitlement programs (e.g., Heclo, 1974; Janowitz, 1976; Rose & Peters, 1978). In contemporary western democracies such as Canada, then, citizens can be expected to use a combination of such expectations and assumptions about the proper functions of government when evaluating governmental performance.

A battery of questions was used to tap public evaluations of effective and equitable and fair governmental performance. Respondents were asked whether the federal government-not a particular government of the day-should perform various activities and, if so, how well it has done them. For each task which they indicated government should carry out they were asked whether it has performed it "very well," "fairly well," or "not very well." Respondents also were asked if they "agreed strongly," "agreed," "disagreed," or "disagreed strongly" with a number of statements pertaining to the equity and fairness of governmental performance. A summary index was generated from responses to the two sets of items.13

# Governmental Impact on Personal Well-Being

Judgments of government's impact on personal well-being were measured by asking respondents whether they were satisfied or dissatisfied both with their economic condition and lives more generally, and whether, in their view, government has had "a great deal," "something," or "not much" to do with their condition. An index of evaluations of governmental impact on personal well-being was derived from responses to these four items."

<sup>13</sup>Separate principal component analyses of the items in the effectiveness and equity-fairness indexes yield single factor solutions with mean factor loadings of .55 and .51, respectively. Also, as one would expect in a polity where notions of equity and fairness constitute important standards for judging governmental performance, the effectiveness and equity-fairness indexes correlate quite strongly (r = +.40). Again, the use of an overall governmental performance index helps to maintain parsimony in the political support model.

<sup>14</sup>The component variables in the index, i.e., the measures of evaluations of governmental impact on material and more general well-being, have a strong positive correlation (r = +.48). This is not peculiar to 1979. Identical variables constructed using 1974 and 1980 national election study data also are strongly related (r's = +.44 and +.45, respectively).

# **Analyses of Political Support**

Before analyzing the determinants of support, it will be useful to inspect levels and distributions of support for Parliament and the national political regime and community. The hypothesized importance of public evaluations of governmental performance counsels that distributions of these evaluations also should be considered. We begin with the latter.

# Distributions of Evaluations and Support

Table 1 shows that many, but certainly not all, Canadians are satisfied with the material side of their lives. Slightly more people are very or fairly content with their lives as a whole. Significantly, many assign blame or credit to government for their condition, with a somewhat larger proportion indicating that it affects their level of material well-being. Scores on the index demonstrate that one-half of the sample is satisfied and believes that government bears some responsibility for this. One-third does not perceive that government has anything to do with their life situation, or they express an equally weighted mixture of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Finally, slightly less than one-sixth is on balance dissatisfied and thinks that government must assume some responsibility for their unhappy condition.

Table 2 presents public evaluations of the performance and anticipated responsiveness of members of Parliament. Many Canadians feel that the performance of their former and current MPs has been satisfactory, but relatively few believe it has been outstanding. Expectations regarding MPs' anticipated responsiveness also tend to be lukewarm, i.e., for four of five items, pluralities of respondents believe members are only "somewhat likely" to act responsively. MPs receive lowest grades for constituency service, with a sizable plurality (42%) judging it is unlikely that an MP would respond to their requests for assistance.

Table 3 reports responses to questions about the effectiveness and equity and fairness of the federal government. These responses indicate that Canadians believe the federal government should perform a wide range of activities on their behalf, including not only such basic functions as ensuring the common defense and protecting life, liberty, and property, but also intervening in the economy and providing for the general welfare.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>15</sup>Other recent studies also have indicated that most Canadians expect government to perform a wide variety of functions. For example, in a 1977 national survey

Table 1. Evaluations of Material and General Life Satisfaction

		Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Little dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	N
Level of Satisfaction with						
material side of life (%)		25	52	17	6	2656
life as a whole (%)		33	55	10	3	2655
**************************************		·····	Great deal	Something	Not much	N
Amount of Governmental						
Impact on						
material satisfaction (%)			31	36	33	2599
general life satisfaction (%)		-	17	33	50	2604
	−8 to −4	−3 to −1	0	1 to 4	5 to 8	N
Index of Evaluations of						
Governmental Impact on	4	10	22	20	16	2564
Personal Well-Being (%)	4	12	32	36	16	2564

which presented respondents with a list of 21 areas of possible governmental activity, in only 3 did more than one-quarter state that they wanted less government intervention. In 16 areas majorities indicated that they desired "more" or "much more" involvement. Mean percentages wanting more and less governmental activity were 55% and 11%, respectively. A 1979 national survey yielded very similar results. See Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke (1982, pp. 75-78); and Clarke et al. (1984, Chap. 2).

Many people judge that the federal government has performed most of these functions quite successfully. The major exceptions pertain to government's economic role, with large percentages citing Ottawa's failure to provide adequate employment opportunities (48%), control inflation (68%), or curb foreign investment (44%). However, despite dissatisfaction with its economic performance, people tend to believe that the federal government has acted equitably

Table 2. Public Evaluations of the Performance and Responsiveness of Federal MPs (N = 2670)

	Very good	Good	Bad	Very bad	No opinion
MPs' Performance to Date (%)					•
Availability to people of riding	20	54	9	2	15
Explaining federal government					
activities	14	51	17	3	15
Participating in parliamentary					
activities	14	51	8	2	25
Helping constituents with problems	12	47	11	2	28
Obtaining projects for riding	12	52	12	2	22
		Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not very likely	No opinion
MPs' Likely Responsiveness (%)				,	
Consider opinions of constituents when making decisions		15	44	35	7
Help to obtain something for riding when constituents make requests		26	50	18	6
Make substantial effort to perform constituency service tasks		16	33	42	9
Make substantial effort to be available to constituents for consultation		30	41	20	9

Table 3. Public Evaluations of the Effectiveness, Fairness, and Equity of the Federal Government (N = 2670)

			Federal g	overnment p	erforms
	Should not do	No opinion, don't know	Not very well	Fairly well	Very well
Effectiveness (%)					•
Provide welfare services	13	6	27	41	14
Keep armed forces strong	14	13	23	38	. 11
Protect lives and property	9	9	17	53	12
Provide employment opportunities	5	5	48	36	6
Protect civil liberties	7	13	21	51	9
Control inflation	2	5	68	23	2
Control foreign investment	8	15	44	28	4
Decent living standards in all regions	8	12	36	40	4
	Strongly			Strongly	
	agree	Agree	Disagree	disagree	No opinio
Fairness and Equity (%)					
Laws apply equally to rich and poor Benefits of federal system outweigh	8	46	32	7	8
costs	9	55	17	3	17
Parties look after interests of all					•
Canadians	6	64	20	3	7
Courts act speedily and fairly	4	<b>4</b> 9	29	5	13
Interest groups do not have undue					
influence	2	36	41	7	15
Civil service treats all Canadians fairly	2	· 54	26	4	14

and fairly. The major departure from this pattern is that nearly half of the respondents (48%) judges that interest groups enjoy undue influence in Ottawa.

The data in Table 4 depict the distribution of support for Parliament, the government of Canada, and Canada by region and ethnicity. On average, levels of support for Parliament are positive, albeit not high, in every region. Similarly, only modest regional differences characterize respondents' feelings about the government of Canada, with Quebecers being the least positive (X = 54). In every area of the country support for Canada exceeds that for Parliament and government generally. However, regional variations also are greater, with Ouebecers again expressing the least favorable attitudes toward the national political community ( $\overline{X} = 71$ ). Ethnicity also manifests only modest associations with support for Parliament and the government of Canada, but has a relatively strong relationship with support for Canada. As anticipated, persons of French descent, especially Québécois, are less supportive of the national political community  $(\bar{X} = 69)$ . This tendency is particularly strong among younger Québécois (i.e., those 35 or less), whose mean thermometer score for Canada is 65, fully 15 points below the national average (data not shown in tabular form).

# Testing the Model of Support

Multivariate analyses are undertaken to determine the roles that citizens' evaluations of MPs and feelings about Parliament play in the model of political support outlined above. Starting at the right-hand side of the model (with support for Canada), each endogenous variable is regressed on all preceding variables.<sup>16</sup> With the .001 level of

<sup>16</sup>Multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis. The average inter-item correlation (r) for the 12 variables in the model is only .12. Only 1 of the 66 correlations has an absolute value greater than .40, and only 5 have magnitudes of .30 to .39. Also, the determinants of the correlation matrices of independent variables for each equation defining the fully saturated version of the model range from .64 to .33, well above the conventional boundary (.10) for multicollinearity biases (Farrar & Glauber, 1967; Pedhazur, 1982, pp. 232-247; Weatherford, 1983, p. 172).

<sup>17</sup>The  $X^2$  goodness-of-fit test used is  $Q = 1 - R^2 m / 1 - M$  where  $R^2 m$  is the product of the residual paths in the fully saturated model, and M is the product of these paths for the overidentified model.  $X^2$  for the original model is 332.74; for the revised model, 99.18 (where df = the number of overidentifying restrictions in the model). Although the latter value remains statistically significant, large samples, such as those used in the pres-

Table 4. Levels of Support for Parliament, the Government of Canada, and Canada by Region of Residence and Ethnicity (mean scores)

	Parliament	Government	of Canada	Canada
Region				
Atlantic	- 58	2.15a	59	81
Quebec	55	-1.16	54	· 71
Ontario	59	-0.68	56	<b>85</b> .
West	58	1.31	59	82
Canada	57	0.00	57	80.
eta	.07 <sup>c</sup>	.06 <sup>d</sup>	.11 <sup>b</sup>	.29 <sup>b</sup>
Ethnicity				
Anglo-Celtic	58	0.83	58	84
French	55	-1.77	53	72
Other	58	0.17	57	81
eta	.06 <sup>c</sup>	.05 <sup>d</sup>	.10 <sup>b</sup>	.24 <sup>b</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Entries are the mean thermometer score residuals for regression of Government of Canada thermometer scores on the direction and strength of federal party identification.

statistical significance as the criterion for including or excluding linkages between variables, 15 of 23 hypothesized causal links are retained, with 13 in the anticipated direction. Six additional, unanticipated linkages also achieve statistical significance. As a consequence, the original model depicted in Figure 1 was revised as shown in Figure 2. Compared to the original, a goodness-of-fit test indicates that the revised model fits the data quite well, with the value of Q increasing from .86 to .96 (maximum value = 1.0). Path analysis of the revised model (using standardized OLS regression coefficients to estimate the strength of the linkages) shows that it reproduces the correlation matrix with reasonable accuracy, the average deviation between 45 actual and predicted correlations being .049.10 Direct, indirect, and total causal effects in the revised model are displayed in Table 5.

Three results of the path analysis are noteworthy. First, consistent with the proposition that orientations toward legislatures and their members influence the support process in Canada,

evaluations of MPs and level of support for Parliament exert significant direct or indirect effects or both on assessments of federal governmental performance and national regime and community support. Indeed, support for Parliament has the strongest direct and total effects on regime support of any variable in the model. It also has the second strongest direct effects on community support and assessments of federal governmental performance.19 Additionally, evaluations of MPs' performance and responsiveness manifest significant effects on regime and community support and have the strongest direct effects on parliamentary support as well as the strongest direct and total effects on judgments of federal governmental performance.

A second finding, anticipated by previous comments on the effect of assessments of MPs, concerns the more general importance of the evaluative basis of political support. Fully one-third of all linkages in the revised model involves variables

 $b_p < .001$ .

 $c_p < .01.$   $d_p < .05.$ 

ent study, mean that there is a high probability that  $X^2$ will be significant even when a model fits the data quite well. For this reason Q values (and changes in  $X^2$ relative to those in df) are more useful indicators of how changes in overidentifying restrictions improve the fit of a model (Pedhazar, 1982, p. 620).


<sup>18</sup> Indirect effects and spurious and unanalyzed components are computed using the matrix algebra routine developed by Fox (1981).

<sup>19</sup> As further evidence of the validity of the model it might be noted that assessments of federal governmental performance do not have a reciprocal effect on support for Parliament. A two-stage least squares analysis of a version of the revised model, including a link. from the former variable to the latter, demonstrated that the link was not statistically significant (p > .05). Support for Parliament, however, did retain its significant effect on governmental performance assessments (p < .001). Details are available from the authors upon request.

Table 5. Summary of Direct and Indirect Effects in Revised Model of Determinants of Political Support in Canada

	in Canada		·	
		Direct	Indirect	Total
Effects on support for	Canada	•		
Support for federa	government	.18	.00	.18
	eral government performance	.00	.03	.03
Support for Parlian	nent .	.20	.07	.27
Evaluations of MP'	s performance and responsiveness	.09	.01	.10
Evaluations of gove	ernment impact on personal well-being	.00	.02	.02
Age		.10	.03	.13
Level of formal edu	acation	.00	02	02
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.00	.00	.00
	Quebec-French	27	01	28
	Quebec-Non-French	11	.00	11
R = .50	West	.00	01	01
	Endows 1	,		
Effects on support for		17	00	17
	oral government performance	.17	.00	.17
Support for Parlian	nent Performance and responsiveness	.42	.03	.45
		.00	.11	.11
Age	ernment impact on personal well-being	.00 .00	.06 .03	.06 .03
Level of formal edi	ication	10	.00	10
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	10 .00	.00	10 .01
Region-cumienty.	Quebec-French	.00	.01	.01
	Ouebec-Non-French	.00	.01	.01
	West	.00	.01	.01
R = .51	11031	.00	.01	.01
ffects on evaluations	of federal government performance			
Support for Parlian	- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	.18	.00	.18
	' performance and responsiveness .	.27	.03	.30
	ernment impact on personal well-being	.18	.06	.24
Age		.00	.08	.08
Level of formal edu	ication	.00	.00	.00
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.08	.00	.08
	Quebec-French	.00	02	02
	Quebec-Non-French	.00	01	01
	West	.00	02	02
R = .44				
ffects on support for				
	' performance and responsiveness	.17	.00	.17
	ernment impact on personal well-being	.12	.02	.14
Age		.14	.04	.18
Level of formal edu		.00	.00	.00
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.00	.00	.00
	Quebec-French,	.00	01	01
	Quebec-Non-French	.00	01	01
R = .28	West	.00	01	01
	of MDs' performance and resonantiveness			
	of MPs' performance and responsiveness ernment impact on personal well-being	.14	.00	.14
Age		.22	.00	.22
Level of formal edu	ication	.00	.00	.00
Region-ethnicity:	Atlantic	.00	.00	.00
Orange and a second a	Quebec-French	08	.00	÷.08
	Quebec-Non-French	07	.00	07
	West	06	.00	06
R = .29				•••

Figure 2. Revised Model of the Determinants of Political Support in Canada\*



\*Path coefficients are estimated as standardized OLS regression coefficients. For all coefficients, p < .001.

measuring public evaluations of political figures and institutions. In this respect, judgments of the performance of MPs and the federal government are not the only relevant factors. Assessments of government's impact on personal well-being exert direct effects on perceptions of the performance of MPs and government, as well as on support for Parliament. In addition, they have measurable indirect effects on four of the five endogenous variables in the model. The pervasiveness of these effects indicates that citizens' cost-benefit assessments of the consequences of governmental activity for themselves and their families undergird the larger set of forces shaping support.

A third finding concerns the several sociodemographic variables in the model. As anticipated, the regional dummy variables for Quebec and the West have statistically significant negative effects on judgments about MPs' performance and responsiveness. These linkages may be interpreted as reflecting regional variations in political culture that condition the evaluative basis of political support. However, the region-ethnicity variables also influence support directly. In particular, the two Quebec variables have direct links with national community support. During the past decade much

has been written about Quebec's Quiet Revolution, with many scholars arguing that the province has undergone a profound cultural transformation involving a redefinition of political community (e.g., Bernard, 1978, pp. 71-93; McRoberts & Posgate, 1980, pp. 155-197). The direct negative links between the Quebec-ethnicity variables and national community support are consistent with this argument.

Age and level of formal education also have direct and indirect effects on political support. Age exerts direct positive effects on support for Parliament and Canada, and education has a negative impact on support for the federal government. These direct links suggest that the polity has failed to sustain high levels of supportive feelings among younger, better-educated citizens. Additionally, the less positive assessments of the performance and responsiveness of federal legislators among younger Canadians indicate that they may have acquired more stringent standards for assessing the behavior of their legislative representatives. The larger significance of this finding is that attitudes toward MPs, in turn, have both direct and indirect effects on national regime and community support.

# Political Support in Canada: Reprise

A principal aim of this investigation has been to examine the proposition that Parliament and its members exercise significant effects on political support in contemporary liberal democracies. Analyses in one such polity, Canada, are consonant with this proposition. Particularly impressive are the effects of support for Parliament on evaluations of federal governmental activity and support for the national regime and community. Whether these effects would be equally robust in presidential systems or constitutional hybrids where the legislature is not a preeminent representational institution and symbol of national sovereignty is a question worth pursuing in future studies.

Indicative of the role of MPs in the support process is the finding that judgments about them are linked directly and indirectly to support for Parliament and other aspects of the political system. A reasonable assumption is that some people base these judgments on personal interactions with MPs. For example, 24% of those surveyed in 1979 reported contacting or being contacted by a member of Parliament. For over fourfifths of them the nature of the contact involved constituency service requests. Although there is collateral evidence that MPs' casework activities may exercise a multiplier effect in that persons assisted may apprise family and friends of the fact, 20 probably only a minority of citizens forms their opinions about MPs in this way. Much more likely is that public opinion about members of Parliament is generated largely by impressions conveyed in the print and electronic media. Media representations of Parliament and its members are not invariably positive (Kornberg & Wolfe, 1980). Given this and the additional fact that significant proportions of the public do not fully comprehend how legislative behavior is conditioned and constrained by the parliamentary system (Price & Clarke, 1980), MPs are forced to try to improve their public image by engaging in what Mayhew (1974) has labelled "advertising" and "credit claiming" activities.21 However, since Canadian parliamentary committees are weak, party discipline is strong, and individual members are not highly visible or important participants in

<sup>20</sup>Nearly two-thirds of the respondents in the 1979 survey report that they "often" (27%) or "sometimes" (36%) discuss politics with such persons (Kornberg, Mishler, & Clarke, 1982, p. 100).

<sup>21</sup>The norm of party discipline means that, unlike American congressmen, MPs find it difficult to gain credit with constituents by taking public positions on major policy issues. This is the prerogative of party leaders. See Kornberg and Mishler (1976, Chap. 2).

the policy process (e.g., Jackson & Atkinson, 1980, pp. 167-171; Kornberg & Mishler, 1976, Chap. 3), it is not surprising that MPs' public relations efforts may be less than completely successful. One indication of this is the distribution of public sentiments concerning MPs' performance and responsiveness documented above.

Assessments of the behavior of legislators do not exhaust the range of public judgments of the performance of political figures and institutions that influence political support in liberal democracies. In such systems public evaluations reflect expectations that government will protect lives and property, provide a wide variety of social programs, foster economic growth while controlling inflation and unemployment, and otherwise promote the general welfare. Moreover, people expect these tasks to be discharged efficiently and, given the value ascribed to equity and fairness, they expect government to adhere to these principles as well. Analyses demonstrate that Canadians differ, in some cases rather sharply, in their estimates of governmental performance. Although these judgments exert direct and indirect effects on national regime and community support respectively, their impact is not as great as initially anticipated. We may speculate the effects of public judgments of the effectiveness and equity and fairness of governmental performance on support might have been considerably more pronounced had we been able to measure more precisely the importance citizens ascribe to each of the several areas of governmental activity. Again, investigating this possibility is an appropriate topic for future inquiry.

There also is evidence that the process by which support is generated or eroded "begins at home." Evaluations of government's impact on the material and more general well-being of oneself and one's family are related directly to assessments of MPs and support for Parliament. Additionally, these evaluations have direct or indirect effects or both on perceptions of governmental performance and support for the national political regime and community.

As argued in the introduction to this article, performance evaluations are not the sole sources of political support. Variations in support for national political communities and regimes also may have amorphous and complex roots in socialization processes that covary with deep-seated socioeconomic and demographic cleavages. Although the characteristics of this source of support necessarily make it an elusive quarry in empirical analysis (Sears, 1975, pp. 128-139), evidence of its existence in Canada is provided by direct associations between age, level of formal education, and region-ethnicity on the one hand, and the support measures on the other. Regarding age and education, younger people assign lower grades to MPs

and offer less support to Parliament and the political community than do older persons. The less educated are more supportive of the regime than are better-educated individuals. As for region-ethnicity, Quebecers, particularly Quebec-French, tend to have lower levels of national community support and to evaluate the performance and responsiveness of MPs more harshly than do Canadians living in Ontario. Westerners likewise tend to be more negative in their assessments of parliamentary representatives, whereas residents of the Atlantic provinces have atypically positive judgments of federal governmental performance.

From a socialization perspective, it is worth noting that socialization processes in all liberal democracies tend to be relatively haphazard. Informal norms limit the extent to which agencies such as schools or the mass media may be used to instill supportive attitudes toward community, regime, and authorities. To use these agencies more vigorously and overtly would risk contravening some of the core values upon which the legitimacy of such systems rests. In Canada, especially in present-day Quebec, generational differences in political socialization may be particularly important. In this regard, our findings demonstrate that French Quebecers who have reached the age of majority since the initiation of the Quiet Revolution in the early 1960s ascribe markedly lower levels of support to the national political community than does any other group of

Can a national parliament and its members halt, or even reverse, downward trends in political support in a liberal democratic polity? As the embodiment of the belief that the political system is representative of its citizenry, the Canadian Parliament, like its counterparts in other democracies, would appear to be better suited to the task of enhancing political support than are many other institutions and authorities. If the core

meaning of representation is responsiveness (e.g., Eulau & Karps, 1977; Pitkin, 1967), an optimal and seemingly obvious strategy to pursue would be to generate policies and programs and to engage in representational activities that meet citizen needs and demands. However, one need not labor the point that this prescription is more easily offered than implemented in an era when rising expectations and dwindling resources compound the problems besetting a country that historically has been characterized by reinforcing cultural, linguistic, and regional conflicts. Thus, how the Canadian Parliament addresses these issues in the decade ahead may provide a valuable test of whether legislatures in democracies experiencing similar stresses can augment support and thereby help to maintain the integrity of their political systems.22

<sup>22</sup>Computer simulation may be used to provide an indication of the magnitude of increases in political support attendant upon more positive orientations toward Parliament and the activities of MPs. Using the revised model (with appropriate stochastic error terms), increases of one-half a standard deviation in support for Parliament and evaluations of MPs yield average national community support scores of 82.95 over 30 runs of the model. This result compares (p < .001) with a validation mean of 79.17 for community support on this number of runs. (Actual national community support mean is 79.99, and the mean individual-level difference over 30 runs is 0.84.) If scores for Parliament and MPs are increased by a full standard deviation, the mean simulated community support score increases to 86.76 (p < .001) and less than 1% of the sample have scores equal to or less than 50 (the neutral point of the support scale). Whether it would be possible to effect such largescale changes in orientations toward Parliament and its members is problematic. On possible strategies of parliamentary reform in Canada see Clarke et al. (1980), and Jackson and Atkinson (1980). Naylor (1971) offers a useful guide to computer simulation.

# **Appendix**

MPs' Performance and Responsiveness. The question below was used to measure public assessments of the performance of members of Parliament.

Generally speaking, what kind of job do you think your members of Parliament, the one you have now and those you've had in the past, have done in the following areas. As I mention these different areas, would you tell me if they have done a very good job, a good job, a bad job, or a very bad job.

The areas mentioned included:

(a) being available to the people of the riding;

- explaining to people in the riding what kinds of things the federal government is thinking about doing;
- taking part in parliamentary debates, question period, and committee work and so forth;
- (d) helping people in the riding who have problems with the federal government to solve them;
- (e) getting projects and other things the riding needs.

Using these items, an index of evaluations of MPs' performance was constructed. For this purpose responses were scored: "very good job" = +2; "good job" = +1; "bad job" = -1; and "very bad job" = -2. Scores on the five items were summed to yield an index ranging from +10 to -10.

A second question focused on judgments about the anticipated responsiveness of MPs in various situations where legislators are expected to respond to constituent needs and demands:

Still thinking about the *federal* government in general, how likely is it, in your opinion, that a member of Parliament would do the following:

- (a) take into consideration the opinions of people like yourself when making up his or her mind on an important issue if he or she knew your feelings on it;
- (b) try hard to do or get something for the riding if people like yourself asked him or her for something or needed something;
- (c) try hard to do something about a specific personal or family problem that a person like yourself approached him or her with:
- (d) make himself or herself available at home in his or her constituency office and in Ottawa to people like yourself if they should need to call on him or her.

Response categories included "very likely," "somewhat likely," and "not very likely," which were scored +1, 0, and -1, respectively. The resulting index ranges from +4 to -4. When analyzing the effects of assessments of MPs' behavior on political support, the two indexes of MPs' performance and anticipated responsiveness were combined into one overall additive index ranging from +14 to -14.

Governmental Performance. To measure evaluations of the overall effectiveness of governmental performance, respondents were asked how well the federal government has operated in several areas. For each area a filter question was used to establish whether or not the respondent judged that it was desirable for government to involve itself in that particular type of activity. The preamble for the question is as follows:

Thinking now about the federal government generally, not a particular party government, I would like to read you a list of things people have said the federal government should consider doing. As I read each of these to you, would you tell me whether you think the government should or should not be doing these things.

Respondents then were presented with a list of possible governmental activities. For each activity which they indicated the government should perform, they were asked how well the government has performed it. Activities included:

- (a) providing welfare services for anyone who needs them;
- (b) keeping the armed forces strong enough to protect Canada from a possible attack from any source;
- guaranteeing the protection of the lives and property of all people;
- (d) insuring that everyone who wants to work has the opportunity to do so;
- (e) insuring that the personal liberties and rights of people never are endangered by the police, the courts, or the civil service;

- (f) insuring that inflation is kept under control;
- (g) limiting foreign investment and control of natural resources by foreign ownership;
- (h) insuring that people in every region of Canada have a decent standard of living by passing laws that benefit all regions equally.

"Very well" responses to these questions were scored +1, and "not very well" and "should not do" responses, -1. Other answers were scored 0.

A second battery of questions focused on perceptions of the equity and fairness of governmental performance. In this sequence, respondents were asked to "think about the federal government generally" and to tell the interviewer whether they agreed, agreed strongly, disagreed, or disagreed strongly with each statement, Statements included:

- (a) In some countries there may be one law for the rich and another for the poor but that is not the way the federal government works in Canada.
- (b) Although dividing powers between the federal and provincial governments may have presented problems at times, on the whole the benefits of our federal system far outweigh the costs.
- (c) Over the years, political parties generally have tried to look after the best interests of all Canadians, not just the interests of those who vote for them.
- (d) Over the years, the federal courts generally have acted speedily and treated people fairly.
- (e) In some countries, interest groups like business, labour, or farmers groups have had too much say in politics, but this hasn't been the case in Canada.
- (f) Although there may have been minor exceptions, over the years the federal civil service generally has treated all Canadians equally.

For these items "strongly agree," "agree," "disagree," and "strongly disagree" responses were scored +2, +1, -1, and 2 respectively. No opinion and "don't know" answers were scored 0. The overall index of federal governmental performance and equity and fairness was formed by summing the scores to the two sets of items.

Governmental Impact on Personal Well-Being. Judgments of personal well-being were measured using responses to questions regarding material and more general life satisfaction. Responses were scored: "very satisfied" = +2; "fairly satisfied" = +1; "a little dissatisfied" = -1; "very dissatisfied" = -2. These scores were multiplied by those for variables measuring assessments of governmental impact on the two types of satisfaction. The governmental impact variables were scored: "a great deal" = 2; "something" = 1; "not much" = 0. The resulting indexes (ranging from +4 to -4) were summed to yield an overall index (range = +8 to -8) of evaluations of governmental impact on personal well-being.

Age. The variable is measured as age in years.

Level of Formal Education. This is a five-category variable: elementary school or less = 1; some secondary school = 2; completed secondary school = 3; some college or university (less than B.A. or B.Sc. level) = 4; college or university graduate (B.A. or B.Sc. level or above) = 5.

Region. Four categories are used: Atlantic (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick), Quebec, Ontario, and the West (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia).

Ethnicity. Thirty-one ethnicity categories are collapsed into three: Anglo-Celtic, French, Other.

Region-Ethnicity. To avoid multicollinearity problems in the multiple regression analyses occasioned by the large concentration of persons of French ethnicity in Quebec, a set of dummy region-ethnicity variables is constructed. These are Atlantic, Quebec-French, Quebec-Non-French, and West. Ontario is the suppressed category.

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# Partisan Instability in Canada: Evidence from a New Panel Study

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One of the critical questions in the debate about the concept of party identification is its stability over time, particularly its stability relative to that of voting behavior. This article utilizes data from a new three-wave panel study to assess the properties of party identification in Canada, and to compare levels of partisan stability in Canada with those in Great Britain and the United States. In addition to directional stability, other features of the party identification concept and its applicability to Canada are examined, notably the constituency of identification across levels of the federal system. Analyses indicate that party identification in Canada is subject to considerable fluctuation, and that the U.S. pattern of relatively stable party identification coupled with substantial short-term swings in voting behavior reflect the institutional characteristics of the U.S. electoral system. The article concludes by suggesting that patterns of partisanship in Canada, although distinctive in certain respects, probably have important commonalities with those in many other contemporary liberal democracies.

The concept of party identification derives from more general precepts of social psychological theory which stress the importance of reference groups in processes of attitude formation and the development of a sense of personal identity. Political scientists who have traced the origins of the concept often cite Wallas's (1920, p. 83) description of political parties as objects that could be "loved and trusted" by individuals because they could be recognized from one election to another as being the same thing. Since the publication of the seminal work by Campbell and his colleagues (1960, 1966), the notion that voters develop partisan identities and that these selfperceptions serve as a powerful influence on voting choice has provided the basis for much of our theoretical understanding of the forces that act on individual voting behavior. As Miller (1976, p. 21) notes in a review of the evolution and application of the concept:

Received: October 5, 1982 Revision received: August 16, 1983 Accepted for publication: September 17, 1983

The authors wish to thank Kai Hildebrandt and Richard Price for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Party identification has become one of the ubiquitous concepts in national and cross-national electoral analysis. In one version or another, the concept has been used in innumerable studies of mass politics and has now been described or otherwise analyzed in at least fifteen different countries.

Although the concept of an enduring psychological predisposition in favor of a political party appears to have a high degree of theoretical generality, it would seem particularly applicable to polities characterized by a relatively stable twoparty system combined with electoral arrangements in which a large number of voting choices are required. In systems that do not possess one or both of these attributes, the meaning of the concept is less certain. Thus, although the concept of party identification has been applied to the study of electoral behavior in several countries, its utility in models of voting choice in non-American settings has been questioned, particularly in political milieux with multiparty systems, electoral systems less complex than that of the United States, or both (Budge, Crewe, & Farlie, 1976).

The importance of comprehending the characteristics of partisanship in different political systems goes beyond questions related to the determinants of individual voting behavior. In

particular, patterns and levels of instability in individual partisan ties are relevant for understanding aggregate change in party systems over time. A key indicator, for example, of hypothesized patterns of dealignment in several contemporary Western political systems has been an observed increase in the number of individuals without strong psychological attachments to political parties (Crewe, Alt & Sarlvik, 1977; Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1979). Similarly, hypotheses regarding partisan realignment involve the initial abandonment of an established party tie, followed by its replacement with an equally strong attachment to another party, either simultaneously or within some definable period of time. Theories of dealignment, therefore, postulate increased or increasing levels of partisan instability at the individual and aggregate levels, whereas theories of realignment require a specific sequence of events at both levels culminating in a changed but once again stable party system and pattern of identification.

In the past decade, two research developments have helped to advance our theoretical understanding of the concept of party identification along the lines suggested by Miller in his discussion of its cross-national applications quoted above. One of these has been the study of party identification in countries with party and electoral systems considerably different from those of the United States. A second, related, development has been a growing recognition of the need for accurate data on changes in party identification over time. To date, theoretically fruitful cross-national comparisons have been hampered by the absence in many countries of panel survey data which would permit reliable measurement of cross-time change in party identification at the individual level. Recall data utilized for this purpose, although suggestive of general patterns, are subject to challenge on methodological grounds and are limited in the amount of information they can yield regarding the actual dynamics of partisanship (Gutek, 1978; Niemi, Katz, & Newman, 1980; Weir, 1975).

Juxtaposing the results of the handful of existing panel studies suggests the existence of interesting and potentially important cross-national differences in key characteristics of party identification. Analyses of the three U.S. panel studies to date (1956-1960, 1972-1976, and 1980) have found relatively high levels of directional stability in individual partisanship (Converse, 1966; Converse & Markus, 1979; Markus, 1982), findings consistent with earlier conceptions of party identification as an enduring psychological tie between the voter and the party system. Studies in other countries, in contrast, have disclosed a greater tendency for party identification to travel with the

vote, thereby suggesting that partisanship in non-American political settings is more responsive to the various short-term forces associated with particular elections. In one of the earlier and best known comparisons, Butler and Stokes (1969, pp. 35-36) noted the strong tendency in Britain for partisan change to accompany vote switching although they did not question the overall utility of a concept of partisan self-image in the British case. In the Netherlands, however, Thomassen's finding (1976) that party identification was less stable than vote across a three-year period prompted him to conclude that the role of party identification in explaining voting behavior in that country was doubtful.

The findings of such panel surveys should be considered in conjunction with the results of recent analyses of nonrecursive models of electoral choice that demonstrate that party identification should be conceptualized as endogenous to the matrix of forces operative in the electoral arena during particular time periods (e.g., Cain, 1978; Clarke & Stewart, 1982; Fiorina, 1981; Jackson, 1975; Markus, 1979, 1982; Markus & Converse, 1979; Page & Jones, 1979; Shively, 1979). Rather than being unmoved movers, the strength and, in some instances, even the direction of party identification are subject to the short-term effects of voters' prospective and retrospective evaluations of candidates and parties.

Although American panel survey data indicate high levels of continuity in the direction of party identification, there is evidence that, in certain circumstances, the directional stability of party identification in the United States is not impervious to short-term forces. In particular, the panel study by Jennings and Niemi suggests that levels of directional change in partisanship can be substantial. Their research shows that, in the late 1960s and early 1970s at least, levels of partisan change varied across generations, with the identifications of younger persons being considerably less stable than those of their parents (Jennings & Niemi, 1981, pp. 48-52). Secondary analysis of their data by Markus (1979) shows that tendencies toward partisan change were at least partly a function of reactions to salient political issues. Such findings notwithstanding, the weight of the evidence suggests that, in the American case, short-term forces primarily influence the strength rather than the direction of party identification. In this respect, the United States stands in contrast to other countries such as Britain and the Netherlands, where it appears that such forces can have sizable effects on both the directional stability and the strength of partisan attachments.

In sum, recent studies in the United States and elsewhere indicate that the nature of party identification remains imperfectly understood. Clearly, the hitherto-prevalling conception of party identification as a stable, exogenous force in models of voting behavior and election outcomes seems inadequate, both in the American case and a fortiori, in other Western polities where requisite research has been conducted. Taken together, existing evidence suggests that the theoretical status of party identification in such models, and the more general utility of the concept for crossnational inquiry, cannot be definitively established until more is learned about the characteristics of partisan attachments in different political milieux.

In this article, we attempt to deepen and extend our understanding of the party identification concept by examining some of its crucial properties in one contemporary liberal democracy—Canada.1 Generally, it can be anticipated that a number of the important aspects of party identification in Canada will resemble those of the British case more closely than those of the United States or the Netherlands. The Canadian party system, with two major parties and a strong third party, is similar to that of Britain in the 1970s, and the electoral systems of the two countries are identical. However, Canada, unlike Britain or the Netherlands, is also a federal system. Surprisingly little is known about patterns of partisanship at multiple levels of government in federal polities. Unlike other federal systems such as the United States, West Germany, or Australia, provincial politics in Canada often are quite distinctive, with party systems such as those of Quebec or British Columbia differing greatly from that of the national arena. The opportunity to investigate more fully the question of dual loyalties, and the particular meaning that these may have for broadening our understanding of the party identification concept, makes the Canadian case an important one for cross-national research.

An examination of party identification in Canada is facilitated by the availability of a major new three-wave panel study which greatly enhances our ability to measure the stability of the components of partisanship in this country and to make direct comparisons with the known properties of party identification elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> Specifi-

¹An examination of the characteristics of party identification in Canada based on cross-sectional studies may be found in Irvine (1975); Jenson (1975, 1976); Meisel (1975), and Sniderman, Forbes, & Melzer (1974). See also Clarke et al. (1979). For a comparison using panel data of party identification in Canada with other countries, see LeDuc (1981). On the dynamics of partisanship in Quebec, see Clarke (1983).

<sup>2</sup>The 1974-1979-1980 National Election and Panel Studies were conducted by Harold Clarke, Jane Jenson,

cally, we are able to investigate the nature and extent of instability of party identification in Canada, as well as some of the characteristics of Canadian party identification deriving from the existence of autonomous federal and provincial party systems. If provincial and federal partisanship are mutually reinforcing, then those whose identification is consistent across the two levels of the political system should be more likely to be stable than those whose identification is inconsistent. Furthermore, if it were argued, as the classic literature might suggest, that cross-level inconsistency in partisanship represents a state of cognitive dissonance, then it can be expected that changes in provincial partisanship will be in the direction of federal partisanship (or vice versa). i.e., in the direction of consistency. If, however, in a decentralized federal system such as Canada's, inconsistent identification reflects a more general independence of political orientation toward the two levels of government, one would not anticipate a trend toward resolution in favor of consistency, but rather an approximately equal flow in both directions.


The value of the Canadian panels for investigating these and related questions is enhanced by the timing of recent federal elections, which provide a rare opportunity to contrast movement over a relatively limited period of time (1979-1980) with that over considerably longer intervals (1974-1979, 1974-1980). A three-wave panel also possesses a great advantage over one containing only two waves in that it is possible to distinguish patterns of sustained change from simple volatility. For example, one can distinguish persons who change partisanship for a short period only and then return to a former identification from those

Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon Pammett with funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Field work for the studies was conducted by Canadian Facts, Ltd. (Toronto). The 1974 survey employed a national cross-sectional sample of 2562 respondents interviewed immediately after the 1974 federal election. Details concerning the study design may be found in LeDuc et al. (1974, pp. 701-708). After the 1979 federal election, 1295 of these respondents were reinterviewed as part of the 1979 Election Study to form a 1974-1979 panel. A total of 822 of the original respondents were interviewed a third time after the 1980 federal election to form a three-wave panel, together with 926 new respondents drawn in a 1979 crosssectional sample. These two groups together form a second (1979-1980) panel of 1748 respondents. Weights are applied in all three panels to approximate national cross-section samples of the Canadian electorate. Further information on these studies may be obtained from the principal investigators or from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

who change or abandon partisanship on a more permanent basis. The existence of recent panel studies for comparable time periods in both Britain and the United States provides an additional bonus, in that it permits more accurate comparisons of patterns of partisanship in Canada with those in other countries, thereby advancing our understanding of the theoretical generality of the party identification concept.

To orient readers unfamiliar with the Canadian case, we may observe that data on party identification in Canada (Figure 1) depict an electorate in which the vast majority of voters identify at least "fairly strongly" with a party. Similar to

Figure 1. Direction and Intensity of Federal Party Identification in Canada: 1980 National Sample



Intensity of party identification



Fairly strong

Weak

Table 1. Turnover in Party Identification and Voting Behavior: 1974-1979 and 1979-1980 Canadian Panels (%)

	Pa			
	Same party in both waves	Different parties	Moving to or from non- identification <sup>a</sup>	Total
1974-1979 Panel <sup>b</sup>				
Voting for the same party in 1974 and 1979 elections	. 48	4 .	8 .	60
Voting for different parties in 1974 and 1979	7	10	5	22
Moving to or from nonvoting	10	4	4	18
Total	65	18	17	100
1979-1980 Panel <sup>c</sup>				
Voting for the same party in 1979 and 1980 elections	58	3	7	68
Voting for different parties in 1979 and 1980	7	7	3	17
Moving to or from nonvoting	10	3	2	15
Total	75	13	12	100

a Includes respondents reporting nonidentification in both waves (3% in 1974-1979 and 3% in 1979-1980).

the British case, but in contrast to that for the United States, the number of respondents who classify themselves as independents or who decline a party identification is small. Also, unlike the results of recent surveys in Britain and the United States, the percentage of Canadians reporting only a weak partisan attachment is relatively small (LeDuc, 1983). Again dissimilar to the British and American cases, no sustained pattern of aggregate change is suggested by the Canadian data, the direction and strength of identifications in 1980 being generally very similar to the results of every national survey conducted since 1965 (Clarke et al., 1979; Meisel, 1975). Identification with the Liberal party, long the dominant party in Canadian federal politics, continues to exceed that for all other parties by a substantial margin. Percentages of respondents identifying with the Progressive Conservative or the New Democratic parties, the second and third largest federal parties, are substantially smaller than that for the Liberals, and are likewise at levels very similar to those for previous national surveys. Social Credit, an erratic factor in Canadian politics since the 1930s, has witnessed its level of partisan support erode very slowly over the past decade and a half (from 6% in 1965 to 1% in 1980), and it is no longer a significant political force in national politics.

In both direction and intensity of partisanship, then, the survey data portray a seemingly stable party system and a partisan electorate. Of course aggregate stability should not be taken to imply individual stability. Nevertheless, it is clear that party identification in Canada has not been subject to extensive weakening or dealignment, and it is unlikely, although not impossible, that these data mask an ongoing process of sustained realignment or other secular change. Whether this portrait of aggregate stability reflects patterns of stability at the individual level is an empirical question that can best be addressed via the panel surveys.

## The Directional Stability of Partisanship

Although the Canadian party system appears stable in the aggregate, it is nevertheless a system that contains large numbers of "flexible" partisans, including many who report instability of partisanship at some time in the past. The Cana-

'The concept of flexible partisanship is developed at some length in Clarke et al. (1979, pp. 135-164 and 301-319). In the 1974 national sample, respondents were classified as flexible if they reported no party identification or weak identification (34%), if they recalled hav-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>b</sup>Diagonal percentages. N = 1213. Excludes nonvoters in both elections.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>c</sup>Diagonal percentages. N = 1558. Excludes nonvoters in both elections.

dian electorate likewise contains durable party identifiers, for whom long-term forces are powerful predictors of voting choice (Clarke et al., 1979, pp. 343-348). To investigate individual-level stability in partisanship, we examine first the turnover of party identification and vote between two proximate pairings of elections (1974-1979 and 1979-1980) as shown in Table 1. We use 3 x 3 tables for this purpose because it is desirable to include nonidentifiers in the analysis and to distinguish clearly between the adoption of a new party identification and the abandonment of a former one. The inclusion of nonidentifiers is especially important for comparative purposes. Butler and Stokes' finding, for example, that party identification in Great Britain has a greater tendency to travel with vote than in the United States has been shown to derive largely from their decision to include British Liberal party identifiers in the analysis while excluding American Independents (Cain & Ferejohn, 1981). When both groups are included, the conclusion drawn is somewhat different. The same point may be inferred from Converse's (1966) study of the dynamics of partisanship in the United States. Although his analysis of the 1956-1960 panel shows little actual turnover of party identification, a much higher level of instability is evident if movement from identification to independence and vice versa is considered. Similar arguments may be applied with respect to nonvoters. The exclusion of nonvoters eliminates a type of electoral change that is known to be an important element of the dynamics of both individual voting behavior and electoral outcomes (Clarke et al., 1979). Linkages between nonvoting and partisan instability therefore require careful examination.

During the five years between the 1974 and 1979 elections, less than half of the panel (48%) was stable with regard to both party identification and vote (Table 1). Between the 1979 and 1980 elections, the comparable figure is only 58%, although these two contests occurred within a nine-month span. This finding suggests that time alone is of limited importance in accounting for partisan instability. Time is seemingly less important than the existence of opportunities for change, such as those provided by exposure to short-term forces generated by events such as elections. Relatedly, a noticeable proportion of the movement in both the 1974-1979 and 1979-1980 cases is accounted

for by the entry and exit of transient voters including, in each instance, 10% of the panel who fail to vote in one of the paired elections but who show no change in their partisanship. This effect represents the mobilization or demobilization of persons whose identifications are directionally stable over the period surveyed. To this group may be added an additional complement of transient voters who do show changes in partisanship-8% in the 1974-1979 panel and 5% in the 1979-1980 panel-but whose partisan leanings, or lack thereof, are reflected in their voting choice in only one of the elections in question. This category divides about equally in both instances between those shifting between parties and those moving between partisanship and nonidentification.

Particularly interesting is the cell (7% in each panel) that combines stability of partisanship with variability in voting choice, because it is this group that most closely fits the concept of partisanship described in the early American voting studies. Although this cell demonstrates that the Canadian electorate contains individuals whose partisanship survives periodic changes in voting behavior, it is perhaps of greater importance to note that this group is considerably smaller than is commonly reported in American studies and that it is smaller than (in the case of 1974-1979 panel) or equal to (in the 1979-1980 panel) the proportion of the electorate for whom partisanship travels with vote (center cell of Table 1). These

<sup>4</sup>For example, if partisanship and vote in Canada and the United States are compared directly across the two-wave panels, it is evident that the relationship between party identification and vote differs even though the proportion who report both stable partisanship and vote is nearly identical. Considering only those respondents in the 1974-1979 Canadian panel and the 1972-1976 U.S. panel who report both a party identification and a vote, the following pattern is obtained:

Party Identification			
Stable	Unstable		
70	5		
10	15/100%		
71	4		
22	3/100%		
	70 10		

For more than 90% of those reporting a change in both party identification and vote, the direction of movement is the same for both.

Congressional rather than presidential vote is used in these analyses because it provides the nearest approximation to the Canadian and British electoral system. Also, there are three congressional elections (1972,

ing changed their party identification in the past, or if they held differing federal and provincial partisan identities (30%). On this basis, 63% of the sample were classified as flexible in partisanship by reason of holding at least one of these attributes. Similar proportions are found in the 1979 and 1980 national samples.

two groups, found in the center and center-left cells of each panel in Table 1, represent two basic types of partisan-vote change. Clearly, there are Canadian voters whose partisanship is durable, supported by various long-term forces that may change only slowly, if at all. For these individuals, party identification is more stable than voting choice in any given election. But there are also those for whom partisanship is as unstable as voting choice itself, changing with the vote in response to various short-term forces associated with elections.

There is, it may be noted, a third group of individuals who do not fit either of the two basic types described above, but who collectively account for a significant portion of the total movement found in both panels, namely persons who decline to identify with a party in one or both of the two waves of the respective panels. In the American studies, these are commonly referred to as "independents," but the term "independent" is rarely used in Canadian politics, either by survey respondents or by analysts. Although Canada, unlike the United States, does not have a large or increasing contingent of political independents, the role of nonidentification in the dynamics of partisanship in Canada is an important one. At a given point in time only about one voter in ten does not report a party identification at the federal level (see Figure 1) and, if federal

1974, and 1976) available in the panel but only two presidential elections (1972 and 1976), thereby facilitating direct comparison with Table 4. However, if presidential rather than congressional vote is used in a two-wave analysis similar to that shown above, the percentage reporting the same party identification and vote is 68% rather than 71%. Other cells vary from those shown above by only 1% when presidential vote is used.

and provincial identifications are considered together, the percentage of voters lacking a party tie in some form is even smaller. However, this nonpartisan tenth of the electorate is not a fixed entity. In each of the two-wave panels (1974-1979, 1979-1980), the percentage of respondents who maintain continuous nonidentification is only 3%, and the percentage doing so across all three waves (1974-1979-1980) is about the same. In Canada, therefore, most nonidentifiers are not a permanently unaligned contingent of voters, but rather individuals caught at any given time in the process of movement from one party identification to another or away from a party and back again. Like a single frame clipped from a strip of movie film, nonidentification in Canada is a static fragment of a dynamic process.

Although this pattern suggests that the number of true independents is actually very small in Canada, it also may be interpreted to mean that the phenomenon of nonidentification is somewhat more widespread than it appears in a single cross-section survey. Although only one voter in ten reports nonidentification in any given wave. and only 3% do so continuously, 22% of the total panel report nonidentification in one of the three waves. Nonidentification reflects electoral behavior less than does partisan change in that it occurs as often in conjunction with stable voting preferences as with a change of vote or a move to nonvoting. In the aggregate, it is as important a source of instability across time as directional partisan change.

The various types of movement across all three waves of the panel are summarized in Table 2. Over the three waves, 41% of the respondents display stability of partisanship and vote. As noted, nonidentification occurs in conjunction with both stability and instability of voting choice. The three other main types of movement in the panel are delineated by the cells italicized

Table 2. Summary of Turnover in Party Identification and Voting Behavior in Three Panel Waves: 1974-1979-1980 (percentages of total sample)<sup>a</sup>

Vote	Party identification			
	Same in three waves	Changing at least once	Moving to or from non- identification	
Voting three times for the same party	41	3	7	
Switching at least once	11	16	9	
Not voting at least once	13	6	6	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>N = 791. The table excludes nonvoters in all three elections. Rows and columns do not total, and do not total to 100%, because not all categories are mutually exclusive. A respondent, for example, who switched in one pair of elections and did not vote in the other is counted in two cells. The same is true of those who moved to or from nonidentification and also changed party identification.

bIncludes 2% of sample that reported continuous nonidentification.

Table 3. Turnover of Party Identification and Vote in Three-Wave Panels in Canada, the United States, and Great Britain (%)

· :	Canada 1974-1979-1980	United States 1972-1974-1976	Britain 1974 (Feb.)- 1974 (Oct.)-1979
Party Identification			
Same in three waves	59a	68	73
Changing at least once	23	ĬĬ	23
Moving to or from nonidentification <sup>b</sup>	22	24	6
Voting Behavior			
Voting for the same party in three elections	49	39c	57
Switching at least once	33	28	28
Abstaining at least onced	24	39	19
Specific Partisanship/Vote Patterns			
Same party identification and vote in three-panel wa	aves 41	33	52
Changing both party and vote at least once Same party identification, but switching vote	16	4	13
at least once	11	19	11
Same party identification but abstaining at		- <del>-</del>	
least onced	13	25	11
N	791	772	706

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>The percentages total more than 100% because categories are not mutually exclusive.

for emphasis in Table 2, each of which represents a distinctive type of movement of party identification or vote or both. Sixteen percent of the sample report a change in partisanship together with a change in vote in at least one wave of the panel, whereas 11% report partisan stability combined with at least one voting switch. The third of these cells, at 13%, consists of those who report the same party identification across the three waves, but were not mobilized to vote in all three elections. Together with the fully stable group and those moving to or away from nonidentification, these represent the main categories of stability and change in partisanship and voting in the Canadian electorate.

In assessing the picture of party identification in Canada presented by these data, a comparison with other countries is useful: Table 3 replicates and summarizes the analysis up to this point with the use of panel studies in the United States and Britain conducted over approximately the same period and with similar research designs and virtually identical measures. Of the three countries,

For purposes of this analysis, identical definitions of party identification are used in the U.S. and British

Canada has the smallest percentage of respondents maintaining the same party identification across all three panel waves. The meaning of this statistic is illustrated by the particular characteristics of party identification in each country. The percentage reporting a change in the direction of party identification in the United States is significantly lower than in Britain or Canada, reflecting the unusually stable character of U.S. party identification even during a politically volatile period. Similar to Canada, Britain displays a relatively

studies. The U.S. data were collected by the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The British data were collected by Bo Sarlvik and Ivor Crewe and made available by the SSRC Survey Archive, University of Essex. In both cases, neither the principal investigators nor the exchives are responsible for the analyses or interpretations of the data reported here.

'The political instability associated with the Vietnam war-Watergate period in American politics and the landslide character of two of the last three presidential elections provide simple but powerful testimony on this point.

bIncludes continuous nonidentifiers in all three waves: Canada, 2%; United States, 4%; Britain, less than 1%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>c</sup>For House of Representatives.

dBut excluding nonvoters in all three elections, which makes a significant difference only for the United States in which 17% of the total sample report not voting for Congressional candidates in all three elections.

high degree of directional change in party identification, but is distinguished by the much smaller role played by moves to or from nonidentification. Partisan instability in Canada, then, is greater than in Britain or the United States because it incorporates both of these features, whereas the other two countries display only one of them in significant numbers.

When voting choice is taken into account (Table 3), the picture changes considerably. The three countries differ only slightly with regard to vote switching between elections, although Canada is still the most volatile of the three. But it is the very high incidence of nonvoting which distinguishes the United States from the other two cases and results in the relatively small percentage of Americans (30%) who report voting for the same party across the three elections. Also distinctive in the American case is the combination of high levels of stability in party identification with considerable volatility in voting behavior (Table 3). Although Canada stands between Britain and the United States in terms of the percentage maintaining a stable identification and vote, it is in fact quite similar to Britain in displaying a greater tendency for party identification to travel with the vote. Overall, then, although there are some distinctive features in the patterns of partisanship and voting in Britain and Canada, it is the United States that appears to constitute the special case.

To this point, the primary concern has been to measure levels of partisan and electoral change and to distinguish broadly between certain types of change, e.g., variations in the direction of party identification, moves to and from nonidentification, and the reentry and exit of nonvoters. We should recognize, however, that variations in partisanship, particularly when measured across a pair of elections, may conform to a number of different patterns, some of which constitute an enduring change and others of which might be more properly classified as ongoing volatility or fluctuation. For example, individuals who abandoned a party tie in 1979 but returned to it in 1980 might be said to have followed a classic pattern of short-term deviation, rather than one of longer-term partisan change. In contrast, voters who adopted a new party tie in 1979 and kept it through the 1980 election are displaying a potentially more permanent alteration of partisan attachment. The three-wave panel can be of considerable value in isolating and identifying these types of movement which, if systematic, may suggest patterns of realignment or dealignment. When a change of partisanship occurs in the second wave of the panel, it is possible to use the third wave to confirm the nature of that change. Where the variation occurs in the third (1980) wave, however, no additional information is

available that would permit a more detailed classification. Within these limitations, it is possible to classify patterns of partisan stability and change in the three-wave panel.

Such a classification is presented in Table 4. The first category comprises the 59% of the panel who have directionally stable partisan ties across the three waves of the panel. More than half of these persons are Liberals, indicating the extent of the advantage this party traditionally has enjoyed in Canadian federal politics. The remaining 41% report directional differences in party identification at some point in the six-year period and display a myriad of specific patterns of partisan change. However, most of these can be grouped into broad types that are readily associated with familiar processes of electoral and partisan change. Thus, slightly more than 6% of the total sample display what might be called a homing pattern of partisanship, that is, abandoning a party identification in 1979 but returning to it in 1980. Most of these are also Liberals, a finding consistent with the temporary decline in Liberal voting associated with that party's defeat in the 1979 election and its subsequent return to power in 1980. A somewhat larger proportion of the panel (14%) displays a pattern consistent with an ongoing process of alignment or realignment, involving a change in 1979 which was subsequently confirmed in the 1980 interview. Given the differing circumstances of the 1979 and 1980 elections, there is every reason to suspect that these represent "real" alterations in partisanship which may have consequences beyond voting choice in specific elections. Although no single party benefits substantially from these sustained changes, fewer than a third moved toward the Liberals, whereas more than two-thirds favored either the Conservatives or the NDP. The term "alignment/realignment" is appropriate in describing the patterns of movement of these respondents as individuals, but it should not be understood as necessarily having such consequences for the party system as a whole. Rather, it appears to be a fragment of the ongoing process of interchange among the parties, in which each gains and loses a certain number of new adherents.

This general pattern is echoed by the small complement of respondents who appear to have undergone a process of dealignment, in which the abandonment of a partisan tie has not been accompanied by the assumption of a new one. This group is exceedingly small in Canada, particularly in comparison with the United States, which has shown marked tendencies toward dealignment in recent years (e.g., Nie et al., 1979, Chap. 4). In the former country, the number of nonidentifiers assuming a party tie is nearly as great as the

بك

Table 4. Summary of Stability and Change Patterns in Party Identification: Three-Wave Panel, 1974-1979-1980 (%)

59
6
14
6
7
8
100

number of identifiers abandoning one, leaving the size of the nonidentifier group virtually constant across the period covered by the national surveys. Clearly, dealignment has not been an important part of the process of partisan change in Canada. Some of the change patterns, of course, do not fit any of the categories detailed above, either because variation occurs only in the third wave of the panel and therefore cannot be classified, or because it is part of a pattern of multiple movement. Of the latter group (7% of the sample), it might be said that the pattern is one of simple volatility-ongoing instability devoid of any clear directional component. Although some of the respondents in this category may eventually settle into a pattern of stable partisanship, it is likely that this group is more representative of that segment of the electorate for whom partisanship is continuously unstable, buffeted by a variety of short-term forces associated with varying perceptions of parties, party leaders, and issues.

## Cross-level Consistency

In federal systems, the relationship between partisanship at the federal (national) and provincial (state) levels is relevant to any examination of the properties of party identification generally. Although investigations of cross-level variation in party identification in other federal systems such as the United States and Australia have disclosed that few voters maintain multiple partisan allegiances (Aitkin, 1977, pp. 44-47; Aitkin & Kahan, 1974, p. 446; Jennings & Niemi, 1966, p. 100), there is good reason to believe that the marked differences between the federal and provincial party systems in Canada might be associated with greater cross-level variability. Canadian political parties at different levels of the federal system are quite distinct, even in those provinces where they carry the same name, which may affect partisan attachments in a direct and meaningful way. In several provinces, there are strong provincial parties which either are absent entirely from the

federal scene or which fail to compete successfully for support at the federal level. The Parti Ouébécois in Quebec and Social Credit in British Columbia are good present-day examples of this phenomenon, and historically there have been several important provincial political movements which have had no exact federal counterpart. In addition, a number of provinces such as Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Ontario have political parties that, although they bear the same names, cannot, to paraphrase Wallas, be recognized as being the same thing at different levels of government. Even in the Atlantic provinces, where federal and provincial party alignments are relatively similar, the nature of individual-level partisan linkages at the two levels must be treated as an empirical question. Separate measures of federal and provincial party identifications used in the Canadian surveys provide an opportunity to study multiple-level identifications as a component of partisanship in a decentralized federal system.7

The survey data show that only a minority of Canadians maintain a fully consistent party identification across levels of the federal system with respect to both direction and intensity, although about two-thirds do so with regard to direction alone. The proportion of fully consistent identifiers in the nation as a whole has remained virtually constant across the three waves of the panel (44% in 1974 and 45% in 1980), indicating that inconsistency of partisanship across level is an established feature of Canadian politics and not merely part of a transitional phase of a general partisan realignment or the rejection in some pro-

'A separate "state party identification" question has rarely been asked in U.S. national studies. In the Australian surveys, level of party identification has been probed only as a followup to the general party identification question. In the three Canadian studies, however, full sequences covering direction and such variables as intensity were asked for each level.

vinces of federal parties in favor of provincial ones. Although cross-level inconsistency is greater where the provincial party systems are most distinctive (e.g., in Quebec, British Columbia, and Alberta), it is of more than minor importance in the partisan fabric of virtually every province. In Ontario, for example, barely half of the provincial respondents (e.g., 51% in 1980) are fully consistent across level, whereas 17% of Ontarians in the most recent survey report split (i.e., directionally different) identifications at the two levels of government. Even in the Atlantic provinces, where partisan consistency tends to be greater than elsewhere, there is substantial variation in both direction and intensity between federal and provincial identification. For example, 58% of Nova Scotians and 60% of Newfoundlanders reported fully consistent identification in 1980. whereas 9% and 13%, respectively, were split party identifiers.

The panel data also provide an opportunity to investigate relationships between patterns of change in federal and provincial party identification. In the aggregate, approximately the same proportions of respondents report changes in provincial as in federal partisanship across the threewave panel, and the nature of these changes is very similar. Fifty-six percent maintain the same provincial party identification throughout, whereas 29% show at least one change in provincial party attachment (compare Table 3). Twenty percent of the panel report a move to provincial nonidentification at some point, about the same as the percentage doing so federally. Such moves, however, may be either related to, or completely independent of, changes in federal partisanship. Respondents whose party identification was inconsistent across level in 1974 are somewhat more likely to have reported a change in either federal or provincial identification over the course of the three-wave panel (r = .23). But this does not necessarily imply a move in the direction of consistency. As noted above, one might hypothesize that inconsistency of identification is an inherently unstable condition, creating a dissonance which must eventually be resolved in favor of one level or the other. Alternatively, the salience of both levels of government and the federalized nature of the Canadian party system suggest that this may not be the case. If the adoption of two separate identifications is consonant with the broader realities of Canadian politics, and if these identifications are to some degree compartmentalized within their respective spheres of relevance (i.e., federal and provincial politics), then no dissonance will be created and inconsistency will prove to be relately enduring, both at the individual level and in the aggregate.

For the three-wave panel taken as a whole,

slightly fewer than half (47%) remain consistent with regard to direction of partisanship across the three interviews, whereas 14% maintain a position of inconsistency, a total of 61% showing no change in directional consistency. A change in partisan consistency indicates, by definition, that identification with either a federal or provincial party has changed across the period examined. When both direction and intensity of partisanship are taken into account, treating changes in intensity alone as "partial inconsistency," only 19% are found to maintain a position of continuous and full consistency, and only 29% of the panel show no change at all in cross-level consistency over the six-year period (data not shown).

These are impressive levels of change over a relatively short period of time, but they do not reflect any kind of drive toward consistency on the part of individual partisans. Approximately equal numbers move away from a position of federalprovincial consistency as move toward such a position. This is best seen within categories of partisan change (Table 5). Of those who report a change in either federal or provincial partisanship between any two waves, there is in fact a slightly greater tendency in the direction of inconsistent rather than consistent federal-provincial party identifications. Similarly, among those who report changes in intensity only, the move is as likely to be to a new position of partial consistency as to one of full consistency. In short, it is not possible to infer from the patterns of change shown in either of the panels in Table 5 that changes in the direction or intensity of party identification represent tendencies toward the resolution of dissonant federal-provincial identifications. The alternative conclusion, that inconsistent partisanship is commonplace in the Canadian political environment and not in itself a source of great dissonance, appears much more convincing.

# The Dynamics of Partisanship: Summary and Conclusion

The separate treatment of intensity, stability, and consistency presented above should not obscure the fact that a number of different types of change can occur either simultaneously or in sequence. Persons who moved to nonidentification, for example, are likely to report a subsequent partisan change. Similarly, persons who change the direction of their party identification are prone to alter partisan intensity as well, either at the same time or subsequently. Such changes, however, are not all of the same magnitude. Variation in the direction of party identification is of a higher order than a change in intensity, even when the two occur together. Thus, to summarize the various types of movement analyzed above, one may

Table 5. Changes in Consistency of Federal and Provincial Party Identification: 1974-1979, 1979-1980, and Three-Wave Panels, by Stability of Identification (%)

	1974-1979	1979-1980	Three-wave panel
Stable identifiers (federal and provincial)			
Remaining fully consistent	41	38	34
Remaining partially consistent	12	11	4
Remaining inconsistent	15	23	14
Becoming fully consistent	17	15	19
Becoming partially consistent	15	13	18
Other <sup>a</sup>	•••	-	11
•	100%	100%	100%
N	647	1028	360
Unstable identifiers (federal or provincial)			
Remaining consistent	21	17	13
Remaining inconsistent	19	26	15
Becoming consistent	30	27	24
Becoming inconsistent	30	30	31
Other <sup>a</sup>		_	17
	100%	100%	100%
N	577	557	411

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Denotes all non-monotonic patterns in three-wave panel.

think in terms of a hierarchy of partisan change, arraying the three panels along single dimensions as shown in Figure 2. In these distributions, individuals reporting changes of several different types across a period are classified in terms of the higher type only, thereby producing an ordering of the degrees of partisan movement found in a panel. It is particularly instructive to note that nearly four-fifths of the three-wave panel report some type of variation in federal partisanship over the six-year period, although a large number of these are changes in intensity only.4 The effects of time may be seen in the higher level of change shown by the 1974-1979 panel generally in comparison with that for 1979-1980, with the exception that intensity is as likely to vary over the shorter period as the longer one. This is not to say that change across the 1979-1980 panel is trivial. Indeed, only two respondents in five had not altered the direction or strength (or both) of their party identifications over the nine months separating the two interviews.

How can we account for the substantial instability in identification with political parties in Canada? Part of the explanation lies in the weakness of sociodemographic correlates of both


\*If changes in provincial party identification also are included, the percentage showing no change across the three-wave panel is reduced to 17%.

party identification and vote and the corresponding sensitivity of attitudes and behavior to short-term forces. At both the federal and provincial levels, Canadian party images are dominated by issue- and policy-related items, and by references to governmental performance and leadership, and such factors are frequently cited by respondents as reasons underlying a change in party identification. These images tend to change easily in response to new issue concerns or changes in party

'A multivariate analysis of the effects of seven sociodemographic variables (region, religion, languageethnicity, social class, age, sex, and community size) shows that no more than 10% of the variance in electoral behavior could be explained by such factors (Clarke et al., 1979, pp. 124-127). Similarly, Rose (1974, pp. 13-20) ranked Canada twelfth on a list of 15 countries in terms of the amount of variance in individual voting behavior that could be explained by region, religion, and occupation. See also Irvine and Gold (1980).

"Respondents in the 1974 National Election Study who recalled having in the past identified with a different political party from their current one (36%) were asked to indicate their reasons for changing parties. The responses distributed as follows: policy, 31%; leaders/leadership, 25%; party performance, 16%; local candidate, 13%; personal reasons, 7%; all other, 9%. Equivalent responses from the 1979 and 1980 surveys are very similar.

# Figure 2. Summary of Changes in Federal Party Identification: 1979-1980, 1974-1979, and Three-Wave Panels (Percent of total samples)



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Includes continuous nonidentifiers-3% of 1979-1980 and 1974-1979 panels, and 2% of three-wave (1974-1979-1980) panel.

programs or leaders. Ideological or group-based images, historically an important psychological source of the stability of party ties in many countries (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), are distinctly weaker elements of the structure of political party images in Canada (Clarke et al., 1979, pp. 194-202).

Also conducive to partisan change are highly salient federal and provincial party systems which compete for the attention and allegiance of the electorate. The substantial separation of these party systems diminishes opportunities for crosslevel reinforcement of partisan attitudes at either level. Such opportunities are further inhibited by structural factors such as the independent timing of federal and provincial elections and the more generally decentralized nature of the federal system. Many Canadians respond to the cues from two quite distinct party systems by maintaining two separate partisan identities and seem to find no inherent psychological conflict in so doing. At any point in time, then, a sizable minority of voters hold multiple partisan identities, a phenomenon not commonplace even in other federal polities, and all voters are continually exposed to two distinct sets of party images associated with parties operating in recognizably different party systems. These conditions enhance the likelihood of partisan change at both levels of the federal system.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that we do not interpret our findings as suggesting that the properties of party identification in Canada are sui generis. Rather, as noted in the introduction, research over the past two decades in a number of countries has demonstrated sufficient instability in party identification over time to generate a debate on the cross-national utility of the concept. In comparative perspective, it appears that a strong tendency to combine a stable party identity with considerable variation in voting behavior remains a peculiarly American phenomenon, perhaps attributable to the institutional features of the U.S. electoral system. This debate and any American idiosyncracies notwithstanding, it remains possible to argue that the party identification concept has widespread applicability. Citizens in many countries readily identify with political parties, and such identifications can and do provide cues that affect both perception and

behavior (Miller, 1976). However, as the Canadian data illustrate, the bases of such identifications are not necessarily long-term, and identifications are not necessarily stable. Although the party identifications of a substantial minority of Canadian voters are durable, that is, strong, stable allegiances resistant to the corrosive effects of short-term forces, there is a majority whose partisan identities are flexible, being amenable to change in response to such forces.

When reflecting upon the broader significance of this mix of partisan types in the Canadian electorate, it is significant to note that this phenomenon is not simply a function of processes of generational replacement or cataclysmic political upheavals (Clarke et al., 1979, Chap. 5; LeDuc, 1981). Rather, the process of partisan change is an ongoing one, with individual-level variations in party identification frequently being associated with reactions to such mundane occurrences as the varying salience of issues, changing party leader images, and the conduct of election campaigns. Such events and conditions, of course, are hardly unique to Canada, but rather constitute much of substance of normal politics in all contemporary liberal democracies. This fact, taken together with evidence that in a number of these polities the relationship between social cleavages and party systems has weakened discernibly over the past two decades (e.g., Crewe, Sarlvik, & Alt, 1977; Inglehart, 1982; Ladd & Hadley, 1978; Lipset, 1981), suggests that patterns of partisanship not unlike those documented in this article may characterize an increasing number of Western European and Anglo-American political systems. The ratio of what we have termed durable and flexible partisans will likely vary from one such system to another, but in all cases, the latter may be a significant and growing proportion of the electorate. To determine if this is so, and thereby to enhance our understanding of the theoretical utility of the party identification concept for comprehending both individual political behavior and broader system-level processes of political stability and change in the 1980s, additional cross-national comparative inquiries will be essential.

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# The Just and the Advantageous in Thucydides: The Case of the Mytilenaian Debate

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As no passage in Thucydides is more important, so none is more dramatic than the Mytilenalan Debate. Having resolved to punish harshly a rebel city, the Athenians repent and reconsider. Exhorted by Kleon to maintain their original decision and by Diototos to abandon it, the Athenians must scrutinize the relationship between justice and expediency. Diodotos, who professes to argue from interest only, narrowly prevails in the debate. There is, however, much more to his speech than meets the eye. For it proves misleading to say that he is arguing merely from interest—and then, on a deeper level, to say that he is arguing from justice. In fact no passage in Thucydides, including the Melian Dialogue, raises starker questions about the status of political justice.

In the current state of the profession, few writers command the attention of both political scientists and political theorists. One who still does is Thucydides. If either party has neglected him somewhat, it is my fellow theorists. They are concerned, after all, with justice, and the world of Thucydides, it is widely held, is one in which justice looms small. There is some talk of it, of course, if less from Thucvdides himself than from his conniving characters. "Even in Thucydides," as Hoffmann (1981, p. 40) has put it, "when statesmen, in their speeches, argue about their respective positions and ambitions, they reason in moral terms of rights and wrongs." That, however, is not to say that they are in the habit of heeding such appeals, or that Thucydides takes them much more seriously than his characters do.

If, then, we may speak of traditions of realism and idealism in the study of international affairs, Thucydides owes his place in the curriculum to his reputation as an archrealist. In the present study I seek to commend him to political theorists, yet without disgracing him before political scientists. I do so by reconsidering an episode, the so-called Mytilenaian debate, which is commonly held to

Received: July 7, 1983 Accepted for publication: September 13, 1983

The author thanks the University of Toronto and the Earhart Foundation for their generous support of his research; the Library of the American Academy in Rome and its Director, Rogers W. Scudder, for their hospitality in 1980-1981; and the Harvard University Department of Government and its Chairman, John D. Montgomery, for research and clerical assistance in the final stages of the preparation of this article. He also thanks Christopher Bruell and the referees for this journal for their helpful comments.

show Thucydides at his most realistic or scientific. This view is correct, so far as it goes; hence the relevance of my presentation to political scientists. They, however, are likely, if they are guided by received opinion, to underestimate Thucydides' subtlety. For the realism of Thucydides is not quite what goes by that name today. Although it is true that he does not exaggerate the role that justice plays in human affairs, neither does he altogether deny it. And as he is mindful of the power of justice, so is he of the problems that justice presents. The status of the claims of right in relations between unequal powers; the nature of human accountability, both individual and collective; and the rationale for punishment among human beings: such are the questions that haunt the pages of the Mytilenaian debate.

I

In the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War, the island city of Mytilene conspired with Sparta and revolted from the Athenian empire. Spartan aid never came, however, and the city, besieged, was compelled to surrender. The facts of the surrender were these (3.27ff.). The city was an oligarchy, and it was the ruling few who had effected the revolt. With food running low, however, and no reinforcements in sight, the Spartan commander on the scene had distributed heavy arms to the many. These had promptly turned them on the few, threatening to surrender the city to Athens unless such grain as remained in it was

<sup>1</sup>I cite Thucydides throughout according to the standard form of reference: book, paragraph, and where necessary, sentence (e.g., 3.46.2). I used Thucydides 1966-1967; unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

handed over to them. The oligarchs, alarmed at the prospect of a capitulation from which they would be excluded, now resolved to surrender the city to Athens themselves.

The dramatic debate at Athens that follows is about punishing the demos. Thucydides nowhere reveals, however, how the people had regarded the revolt of their oligarchic masters against democratic Athens. That the rulers had preferred a disarmed demos to an armed one goes without saying, and likewise that the demos proved to prefer revolt to starvation. Neither proves anything about the people's disposition toward Athens. Thucydides' silences here have spawned a vast and inconclusive literature. To me they suggest his unwillingness that our response to the ensuing debate turn on the facts of these matters. Like his speakers, he has bigger fish to fry.

## 11

The debate that Thucydides re-creates is not a consideration but a reconsideration. The Mytilenaians had surrendered on condition that their fate be referred to the Athenian people (3.28). The Athenian commander on the scene had proceeded to pick out a thousand of the oligarchs and ship them to Athens as the ones most to blame for the revolt. The Athenians, however, in the heat of passion, resolved to kill not only these, but the whole male citizenry and to sell the women and children as slaves. They forthwith dispatched a ship to Mytilene to enforce this decree (3.36).

Like most decisions taken in a towering rage, this one registered concerns not of advantage, but of justice. Mytilene, almost alone among the allies of Athens, had never been reduced to subjection and tribute, but had retained her walls and fleet, continuing powerful, prosperous, and free. In return she had betrayed Athens in a manner that argued long premeditation, introducing a Spartan fleet into the heart of the Athenian seaborne empire. Retributive justice was the Athenian concern: premeditated treason the verdict (3.36.1-3).

So, too, when the Athenians awoke the next day with a massive moral hangover, what concerned them was the justice of their decision, not its expediency. "They began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was, that not the authors only, but the whole city should be destroyed" (3.36.4, trans. Hobbes). The way was open to a

'See Andrewes (1962, p. 78), Bradeen (1960), Gillis (1971), Kagan (1974), Legon (1968), Macleod (1978, pp. 76-77), Quinn (1971), Ste-Croix (1954). I agree with Westlake (1976) (although for different reasons) that Thucydides' reticence here is intentional.

reconsideration of the matter, that is to say, of its iustice.

This last point is worth stressing in the face of a seeming anomaly. The reconsideration as it unfolds appears to turn far less on the question of the justice of the decree than on that of its expediency. This results from the strategy adopted by Kleon, "the most violent of the citizens and at that time by far the most persuasive with the demos" (3.36.6). Having carried the motion of the previous day, it is he who in the present debate speaks most violently and persuasively against rescinding it. In so doing he takes two steps decisive for the discussion. To the question of the justice of the decision he adds that of its expediency. And in addressing these foreign policy issues, he raises the domestic one of loyalty, in particular the loyalty of clever speakers such as those with the nerve to defend Mytilene. He seeks to harden hearts not only against the rebels, but against any domestic rival who might try to get the better of him by defending them. These two steps are connected, and we must keep both of them in mind in approaching the great speech of Diodotos which follows.

It makes sense for Kleon both to introduce the theme of advantage and to assert its priority to justice. He has reason to fear that this second time around an appeal to justice alone might fall flat. It is after all on just this issue that the mood of the crowd has shifted, and the numerous speakers preceding Kleon (3.36.6) have likely harped incessantly on the injustice of yesterday's decree (Andrewes, 1962, pp. 71-72). The situation demands that Kleon try to rebut this claim, but also-and especially, given that the odds there seem to be against him-that he present a compelling argument finessing all discussion of justice. Although reiterating the justice of his decree, therefore, he opts to defend it more vigorously still on grounds of expediency-while insisting that these must prevail over those of justice. This is one half of his strategy; the other is rank intimidation.

Although we may loathe Kleon's speech, there is no denying its power. It is a masterpiece of populism, playing alike on the people's distrust of elites (3.37) and on their distrust of themselves for not being distrustful enough of elites (3.38). Kleon makes it clear (or any rate persuasive) that all who would speak for repeal of the decree are manifest enemies of the people. The result is a highly daunting speech, to be dismissed by no opponent who values either his name or his skin.

In the other, interwoven, strand of his speech, Kleon expounds his new, improved position on Mytilene. He begins with what seems an unlikely assertion. He claims both that the Athenians live with their subjects as fearlessly and trustfully as with one another, and that their empire is an outand-out tyranny (3.37.2; cf. 1.122.3, 2.63.2, 6.85.1). Although highly implausible, this is not, strictly speaking, a contradiction. An unusually strong, good-natured, and shortsighted ruler (cf. Plato, Republic 487e ff.) might be blind to the fact that he owed his rule to the first of these qualities alone. So it is with the Athenians, according to Kleon. Their empire rests on brute force, but they administer it as if, like the democracy that they experience daily, it rested on openness and trust. They are tyrants without facing up to it, and so without acting as tyrants must: in this consists their democratic incapacity for empire (3.37.1). In so arguing, Kleon is able both to tax the Athenians with their leniency and the Mytilenaians with their ingratitude; to urge his listeners to see to their safety without attention to the niceties of justice, while assuring them that justice concurs with safety in demanding the slaughter of the Mytilenaians. If problematic in theory, this approach works admirably in practice, for it appeals in turn to the two harshest passions: fear and anger.

By justice Kleon means just retribution, an eye for an eye. Living as we do in an age so squeamish about punishing, we are inclined to brand all such retribution as vengeance. As Nietzsche (Genealogy of Morals, II) has pointed out, however, this lex talionis ("law of equivalency") in fact arose to restrain vengeance. Vengeance seeks punitive damages; it would inflict on the offender a grief greater than that by him inflicted. This distinction between vengeance and retribution is useful for seeing through Kleon's speech, which professes the moderate principle while inciting to unrestrained bloodlust.

The trick lies in Kleon's method for calculating the equivalency of punishment and crime. Early on in his speech, he protests against delay in chastising the rebels,

which is all to the advantage of the guilty. For the victim proceeds against the culprit with his anger blunted, instead of punishing him while the pain is still fresh, and exacting as equivalent a retribution as possible (3.38.1).

So, too, at the end of his speech he urges the Athenians to try to regain the frame of mind into which the first news of the revolt had put them (3.40.7): justice is to be calculated from the perspective of maximum anger.

We have already seen why Kleon can present the Mytilenaians as "hav(ing) wronged [the Athenians] more gravely than any other city" (3.39.1). The Mytilenaians themselves, speaking earlier to a most receptive audience, had been hard put to justify their actions (3.10-14). It should be clear, however, that Kleon's version of equity is to act on those passions that least conduce to it. To nurse our initial rage is precisely to foreclose any justice transcending our wounded vanity and interest; it is to erect getting our own way in life into a principle of universal justice. Kleon's recipe for justice is simple: don't count to ten. Finding the Athenians now disposed to consider seriously the question of the rights and wrongs of their action, he tries to recall the blood to their eyes so as to preclude any such reflection.

On the specific question of the guilt of the Mytilenaian commons, Kleon has curiously little to say. He notes that "all alike assaulted us," and that "the people rose together with the few, believing this to be the safer risk" (3.39.6). He clearly expects his listeners to reprove so perfidious a calculation of safety. Most of his effort he devotes to blasting the revolt as such, in the hopes that the anger of his audience will spill over from the few to the many.

As mentioned, Kleon does not limit his appeal to alleged considerations of justice. He also addresses those of interest. And here his case is clear. Unless the Athenians demonstrate that the penalty for rebellion is death (3.40.7), all of their subjects will soon be up in arms, the prize of success being freedom, and the price of failure being nothing terrible (3.39.3). The result would be catastrophic. "If, then, you do as I tell you, you will do what is at the same time just towards the Mytilenaians and advantageous" (3.40.4). The just is advantageous, for it deters future transgressions.

Kleon notes near the end of the speech that if the Athenians let the rebels off,

you will not be gratifying them, rather you will be passing judgment on yourselves. For if they did right to rebel, then you must be doing wrong to rule. If, however, be it ever so unbecoming, ruling is what you see fit to do, then, yes, even if it is unfair, still you must punish these men, or have done with empire and play the honest man in safety. (3.40.5)

Thus does Kleon try to have it both ways: the Athenians are just rulers who may justly punish defection, or they are unjust ones, and as such must punish it regardless. Justice and necessity join in condemning Mytilene.

Kleon's speech does suggest, however, certain avenues open to his opponents. Some of these he traces himself, albeit with the intention of closing them. He asks who will be so impudent or corrupt as to maintain "that the crime of the Mytilenaians is advantageous to us" (3.38.1), thus affirming the primacy of considerations of interest over those of justice—and suggesting the possible tack

that punishment should be rejected as just but counterproductive. He concedes that were the offense involuntary or compelled by an external force (the enemy), it would then be worthy of indulgence (3.39.2, 7). It is just these two arguments that inform the reply of Diodotos.

In a somewhat different vein, and to underline that never has ally been better treated than the Mytilenaians, Kleon goes so far as to blame their revolt on Athens for having coddled them:

Why, if we had long ago esteemed them in no way differently from the others, they never would have gotten so insolent. For it is as natural for human beings to despise servility as to be awed by firmness. (3.39.5)

Here the very basis of the charge of ingratitude begins to sound like grounds of exculpation: people are like that. Similarly, Kleon stresses the puffed-up folly of the rebels, deterred neither by the failures of others nor by their own prosperity (3.39.3). Such folly he offers as culpable, as aggravating rather than extenuating. It is not too surprising, however, that Diodotos offers it as the latter.

#### Ш

The more we consider the speech of Diodotos, the most remarkable in Thucydides, the more we see how much it owes to Kleon. It too begins with an analysis of deliberation so outspoken as to mask its cunning (3.40-43). In decrying Kleon's practice of besmirching his rivals' motives in speaking as they do, Diodotos besmirches Kleon's motives in speaking as he does. By sowing distrust of those who sow distrust, he reaps the fruits of that practice even while decrying it. He proves to agree with Kleon that trust is everything in democracy-everywhere image is king, and the tactics of Kleon are necessary. Diodotos' analysis of the limits of direct democracy is too subtle to detain us here. We must note, however, the boldest of his bold but sly assertions: that the city is such that it is impossible to benefit it except by deceiving it (3.43.3). He thus summons us to consider what deception lurks within his treatment of the Mytilene question.

If there is one thing in Thucydides that almost every critic agrees upon, it is that Diodotos' plea

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3.15 and Ps.-Aristotle [Anaximenes?] *Rhet. ad. Alex.* 29; Moraux (1954, p. 17); Orwin (1984), which discusses this aspect of the debate at length. The outstanding treatment of the rhetorical structure of the two speeches is Bodin (1940); cf. Ebener (1956).

for clemency rests on expediency rather than justice. Such agreement is understandable. Diodotos does begin by insisting that what should matter is not the deserts of Mytilene but the interests of Athens (3.44), and he ends by stressing the impossibility of a policy combining the two (3.47.5). The fact remains that justice is not absent from his speech. Kleon has merely forced it into hiding.

Diodotos begins this section of the speech by talking even tougher than Kleon. He comes forward, he says, neither to accuse nor to defend; the issue, "if we are sensible men," is not "their justice" but "our good counsel" (3.44.1).

For though I should pronounce them ever so unjust, I would not for that bid you kill them, unless it would be advantageous to do so: nor, though they had some claim to indulgence, would I recommend it, [unless it] appeared to be for the good of the city. (3.44.2)

This is the line of argument for which Diodotos is celebrated. We should recall, however, that the first to elevate interest above justice was Kleon: even if unjust, his decree is necessary. Diodotos stands this on its head: even if just, the decree is idiotic.

This is quite a rhetorical stroke. Kleon, whose notion of justice is unrestrained vengeance, is made to look soft for having bothered with justice at all. Harshness itself—Kleon's territory—responds to Diodotos' appeal to dispense with all considerations of justice.

There are four stages to Diodotos' self-styled argument from interest. Having sketched them I will show how they also constitute an argument from justice.

The interest at issue is that of deterring revolts. Diodotos therefore begins his attack on the decree with a blanket deprecation of the deterrent power of the death penalty. Although death dogs many offenses far less grave than rebellion, still individuals and cities dare, blindly confident in the soundness of their schemes. "All are by nature prone to transgress, whether acting as private men or as the people assembled, and there is no law that can prevent it...." (3.45.3).

In support of this view Diodotos makes a sur-

'Among the most eminent authorities: Bury (1909, pp. 137-139), Cochrane (1929, pp. 103-104), Finley (1942, p. 177), Grene (1965, p. 29), Pearson (1962, p. 25), Romilly (1947, pp. 137-149), Ste-Croix (1972, p. 13), Stahl (1966, p. 121), von Fritz (1967, p. 688), Wassermann (1956, p. 29). Most recently, Pouncey (1980, pp. 86-87), Proctor (1980, p. 61), and Walzer (1977, pp. 9-10).

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prising assertion about the earliest times. It is "likely"—he does not offer it as certain—that in those days the penalties for the greatest crimes were lighter (3.45.3). Not that he pretends that olden times were a golden age. Offenses abounded then as now-they are, as he has said, endemic to our nature-and punishments therefore soon grew more severe. Nor does he argue that men were wiser then. In fact he presents them as having been as naive as inexperience could make them. Experience brought ever harsher punishments, as those in force continued to fail to contain human nature. This process of learning culminates in the insight of Diodotos himself. Where the men of old had fondly trusted that even mild punishments would deter transgressions, Diodotos sees that none does, however terrible. His sombre wisdom stands at the furthest remove from the hopefulness of antiquity. Yet on the relevant practical point, the two, remarkably enough, concur: neither innocence nor experience leans to harshness as the remedy for

Diodotos neither has nor claims special access to the truth about the earliest times. Neither the poets, the traditional authorities in such matters, nor the researches of Thucydides himself (1.1-23, 2.29, 2.102, 3.96.1) support Diodotos' version of them. The poets speak of a true golden age, Thucydides of universal penury and violence. Diodotos seems almost to have borrowed his crimes from the latter and his punishments from the former. One wonders why he asserts this combination as "likely."

There is only one assumption on the basis of which Diodotos' account makes sense. It is that from the dawn of punishment its unique and unwavering purpose has been the deterrence of future offenders, with no concern for settling accounts with those in hand. Not retribution (justice) but only deterrence (advantage) has ever moved human beings to punish: such is Diodotos' tacit premise. Only thus could we explain the alleged progression from mildness to harshness, as men continued to transgress despite all previous increments of harshness. So too the inference that only with the passage of time have even the gravest offenses incurred corresponding penalties. Diodotos' account of penal justice abstracts from the concern with justice.

How "likely" an account of punishment this is will appear above all from the case at hand. Neither in wrath nor in doubt have the Athenians given one thought to deterrence. As their first impulse had been to crush the transgressors as they deserved, their second had been to wonder whether all whom they had marked for destruction deserved it. Diodotos' deadpan account of punishment thus ignores just those aspects that have dominated the case before him. By present-

ing the "history" of punishment as if it were a matter of deterrence only, he unobtrusively nudges his listeners toward acquiescing in this perspective. In asserting the primacy of advantage over justice, he is developing one side of the appeal of Kleon—in order to turn the tables on Kleon.

A policy of self-interest divorced from justice begins by sounding ruthless. It implies the use of harshness without scruple whenever that serves some useful purpose. It further implies, however, the use of harshness only when it serves some useful purpose, i.e. some purpose other than justice. In the case of punishment the indicated motive is deterrence. Diodotos seems to argue, however, that in fact harsh punishment never deters. His tough approach implies not sterner punishments, but the abolition of punishment. Explicitly he wisely leaves it at suggesting that to kill the Mytilenaians would, although just, serve no useful purpose.

By exploiting Kleon's harsh insistence that interest precedes justice, Diodotos gets away with attacking Kleon's harsh policy without yet questioning its justice. Appearing to accept Kleon's equation of justice with vengeance, he appeals to the brutality underlying it by presenting himself as harsher even than Kleon and his justice, all to promote a policy that is anything but vengeful.

Thus far Diodotos has maintained that however just Kleon's policy, it would not advance Athenian interests. He now proceeds to argue that it would harm them. Although failing to deter rebellions, Kleon's policy would deter surrenders (3.46). As of now an ally that has rebelled and finds itself hopelessly beleaguered will yield as Mytilene did, hoping to extenuate an untimely revolt with a timely surrender. To kill the Mytilenaians, however, would be to proclaim the same fate for those who capitulate early and for those who will not do so at all; it would be to drive all cities to resist to the bitter end. Having impoverished herself with long sieges, Athens will regain only ruined towns, unable to pay either damages or tribute.

The third stage of the argument at first seems almost parenthetical. It is linked to the second by the general reflection that the Athenians should look to their interests (which means to their tribute) rather than sit as strict judges of justice.

Presently, however, we do the opposite, and if we have defeated some free people which, ruled by force, has risen (as is reasonable) for its independence, we suppose that we must punish them harshly. We ought, however,

'For a different interpretation of this aspect of Diodotos' speech, see Strauss (1964, pp. 234-235).

not chastise free men to excess after they have risen, but watch them to excess before they rise, and forestall their having a mind to do so; having overpowered them we should put the blame on as few as possible. (3.46.5-6)

The last clause of this passage leads naturally to the fourth stage of the argument. It is that by acting as Kleon advises, the Athenians would delight their enemies. At present the demos in each of the subject cities is well disposed toward them, and if forced to revolt by the oligarchs, forms an Athenian fifth column. If, however, the Athenians kill the Mytilenaian people, "who took no part in the rebellion, and as soon as they acquired arms, of their own free will surrendered the city," not only will they be "guilty of the injustice of killing their benefactors," but they will gratify oligarchs everywhere. Henceforth even when the people have been compelled to rise by hated rulers, they too will hold out to the end, Athens "having served notice that the same punishment awaits those who are guilty and those who are not" (3.47). Indeed, Diodotos concludes, even if the demos at Mytilene were guilty, the Athenians ought to look the other way rather than lose their only allies in the other cities.

Diodotos has moved from the expediency of distinguishing lesser from greater offenders, i.e., the Mytilenaians from rebels who refuse to surrender, to that of distinguishing between the wholly blameless and the starkly guilty. This last discrimination is one to be made among the Mytilenaians. Both of these arguments, as well as the intermediate sally on the superiority of prevention to cure (3.46.6), implicitly define expediency in the matter as deterrence. A properly calibrated scale of penalties could be counted upon to achieve the desired effects: deterring halfway offenders from going the rest of the way, and the innocent from throwing in their lot with the guilty. Kleon's scheme too would deter, and infallibly, but, as we have seen, in the wrong direction.

This clear emphasis on the deterrent force of punishment (obviously including capital punishment) might seem to clash, both logically and rhetorically, with the first stage of the argument. For there Diodotos had seemed to deprecate that very power of punishment that he is now so concerned to exploit to its fullest. There is, however, no logical contradiction, nor does the speech prove unpersuasive. Diodotos has never actually asserted that punishment deters no transgressions, but merely that there are transgressions that punishment cannot deter and that most rebellions fall among them. When he moves from the psychology of revolt to that of surrender, his more hopeful assessment of the power of deterrence will not jolt his listeners.

The issue between Diodotos and Kleon is not

whether punishment deters, but at what stage of a rebellion its power to do so is most reliable. Kleon's error is to place all his eggs in the frailest of baskets, the prospect of deterring the commission of what is after all a crime of passion. He would brandish the likelihood of failure before men dazzled by their hopes of success. Diodotos, on the other hand, would rely on punishment primarily to persuade rebels to cut their losses once they can see that you've got them cornered. He would exploit the power of fear at the juncture when the minds of men are most defenseless before it.

Diodotos would of course be remiss were he too not concerned with forestalling as many rebellions as possible. On this his position (3.46.6) follows from the rest of his argument. What counts is not so much the harshness of the penalty as its certainty. To dissuade offenders beforehand, make them feel cornered from the beginning. The best deterrents are bright streetlights and a cop on the beat (cf. Wilson, 1983).

#### IV

Diodotos' argument from interest is thus a consistent one. It is also something more. It is what he more than once denies, that is, an argument from justice in the usual sense of just deserts.

At the climax of the speech, where it matters most, the appeal to justice finally breaks the surface (3.47). There, as we have seen, Diodotos states directly that to kill the Mytilenaian demos would be more than a stupidity; it would be a very grave crime. This is not an aberration, a cri de coeur which escapes Diodotos despite his resolve to speak only of interest. It is fully in character with the rest of the speech, which indeed has been planned precisely to provide the proper prelude and sequel to it. In fact one could not follow Diodotos' self-styled argument from interest without at the same time imbibing a sense of the injustice of the decree.

For maximum clarity I enclose two charts of the plan of Diodotos' argument. Its structure is ABA'B', interweaving two trains of thought, each of which unfolds in two stages. Chart 1 outlines these as arguments from interest, Chart 2 as simultaneous underhanded appeals to justice.

Although the argument outlined at the right of each chart requires no further comment at this stage, a few words may be in order concerning the one on the left. Its unity consists in two points, the recurrence of the mention of freedom as the end for which the Mytilenaians had acted (3.45.6, 3.46.5-6), and the assertion that although guilty as charged, yet they acted only as they could not have helped acting (3.45.4-6; 3.46.5). The stages

#### Chart 1.

- (A) (45) Harsh punishment will not prove expedient in the sense that Kleon pretends, because transgressors, including above all rebel cities striving for their freedom, simply cannot help themselves.
- (B) (46.1-4) That it is expedient to punish the less guilty less harshly than the more so.
- (A') (46.5-6) That harsh punishments are not expedient in deterring free men from asserting their freedom; instead one must watch them carefully.
- 4. (B') (47) That it is expedient to punish the guilty and not the guiltless.

#### Chart 2.

- (A) (45) That although guilty in the usual sense
  of having done the deed, the Mytilenaians are
  guiltless in having been driven by overwhelming
  compulsion, including the yearning for freedom
  and empire, two of the "greatest things."
- 2. (B) (46.1-4) That although guilty, they are not as guilty as they might have been.
- 3. (A') (46.5-6) That although they did rebel, in so doing they acted as befits free men.
- (B') (47) That the people at least are entirely guiltless, i.e., did not rebel, and what is more handed over the city.

differ in that Stage 2 emphasizes the first of these points in a way that transforms the import of the second. In having risen for the sake of freedom as free men will inevitably do, the Mytilenaians have a claim not only on the sympathy of the Athenians but on their admiration as well. Not only have they failed as a result of errors to which all men including Athenians are liable, but they have dared and failed for the sake of something that Athenians prize above all others.<sup>6</sup>

Leo Strauss (1964, p. 234) has rightly remarked that at the first stage of his argument (A), Diodotos vaguely suggests that although guilty, the Mytilenaians might deserve clemency. He does this by implying not that their guilt is less than flagrant—it is too soon to challenge that presumption—but rather that the flagrantly guilty are as such somehow worthy of sympathy; hence his assimilation of all transgression to human folly, his depiction of a world in which crime as such comes equipped with a built-in alibi. There is, he asserts, no circumstance of human life, from poverty with its daring that necessity inspires, to abundance with its craving for more (pleonexia) fed by arrogance and presumption, which is not in the grip of some fatal and imperious passion. "Hope also, and longing (eros), the latter leading and the former following close behind," lure men to their ruin, as does fortune, which by favoring a few deludes all (3.45.6). Embracing as it does the conception of the criminal intention as well as the bungling (if any) of its execution, his plea constitutes as sweeping an exculpation of wrongdoing as has ever been uttered.

Diodotos could hardly expect his audience to endorse the view that transgressors of every sort are blameless. He escapes the onus of having aired it by pretending to be speaking only of interest, i.e., of the problem of deterring transgressors. He casts upon his listeners the shadow of a doubt about punishing even flagrant offenders, without compelling his audience to confront—in which case they would certainly reject—it. Thus he solicits a sympathetic hearing for his next suggestion, that the Mytilenaians were not such flagrant offenders after all. It is to this end also that he first mentions here the "greatest things," freedom and empire, for which cities are only too prone to hazard everything (3.45.6).

Diodotos invokes these "greatest things" in explaining that the tendency of cities to err is even greater than that of individuals, bent as they are on such glorious prey. This mention serves as well, however, to dignify and justify transgressor cities far above their individual counterparts, the criminals within each city. For freedom and empire are the ends that Athens too respects the most. Diodotos is no moralist on behalf of freedom; the two greatest things are to enjoy it oneself and to deprive others of it. Athens

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Huart (1968, p. 484, n. 1; 1972, p. 30, n. 25); Romilly (1947, p. 141 and n. 1).

presently manages both, whereas Mytilene, deprived of both, rose up to obtain them (3.2). Diodotos reminds the Athenians that the rebels are their mirror image, not only in their fallibility but also in their aspirations. In revolting from servitude (even so mild a one as that of a privileged subject of Athens), they have done only what the Athenians would themselves have done.

It is this last suggestion to which Diodotos returns in the third phase of his argument (A'), when he lectures on how to treat free men. Having just reminded his audience that although guilty of rebellion, the Mytilenaians had not pushed it as far as they might have, he plants the thought that rebellion itself, far from being culpable, is the proof of qualities the Athenians admire. From here, having intimated by now that the Mytilenaians have been swept by forces beyond their control (A) to commit a less-than-flagrant version (B) of what is after all not much of an injustice (A'), Diodotos concludes that of even this offense, so hedged about with extenuations, the mass of Mytilenaians is innocent (B').

Every step of the argument from interest thus bears an implicit appeal to justice. We have spoken above of the fix in which Kleon's speech has placed Diodotos. His response is to finesse Kleon by coming on even harder than he. He appeals to the people's fairness while reassuring them that he is speaking only to their toughness (3.48).

Even so, the vote is a close one (3.49.1). Kleon has changed more minds than Diodotos has changed back. The final act of the drama unfolds. A second ship is dispatched and hastens to overtake the first. This it just barely succeeds in doing, but only because this first ship had dawdled on its "horrid business" (3.49.4). We can picture the oarsmen, Athenian men of the people all, plying ever more slowly as rage yields to doubt and doubt to remorse. This is a nice touch. It reminds us that the whole story hinges on a spontaneous change of heart of the Athenians. Had they not once again fallen prey to Kleon, they would not have needed Diodotos.

V

From the depths of Diodotos' argument from interest pipes the still, small voice of justice. In this seems to consist the deception that he has promised (3.43.5).<sup>7</sup> There are, however, two further

With the exception of Strauss (1964), only Winnington-Ingram (1965), Huart (1968, 1972), Macleod (1977, 1978), and Manuwald (1979), among all the commentators on this passage, have discerned in it one or the other elements of the appeal to justice which I have em-

complications. The justice for which he settles seems to fall short of the standard implicit in the bolder reaches of his argument. And, if this is so, the problem of reconciling advantage and justice recurs at a deeper level of the speech.

Diodotos asks in the end only that the Athenians spare the mass of the Mytilenaians while trying at their leisure the thousand ringleaders (3.48.1). He must anticipate that they will kill these latter at least, as they shortly do on the motion of the ubiquitous Kleon (3.50.1). He surely grasps that politics is the art of the possible. He asks no more of the Athenians than that they act as their own second thoughts had suggested (3.36.4); they had never questioned the guilt of the oligarchs. Neither, when push comes to shove, does he. He makes the innocence of the people emerge by contrast with the guilt of the rich (3.47). But can Diodotos regard the rich as guilty?

There are, as I have shown, two strains to Diodotos' appeal, one that presupposes common sense notions of justice (BB'), and one that calls them into question (AA'). The genius of the speech lies in its subordination of the second of those strains to the first. An argument absolving the flagrantly guilty serves in practice merely to further the plea that some of the accused are innocent, and an implicit defense of rebellion, to gain a hearing for the claim that some of the defendants took no part in one. Rhetorically, this makes perfect sense. It raises, however, some troubling questions. What must Diodotos think—what are his most attentive and sympathetic listeners to think—of the justice of killing the oligarchs?

The side of Diodotos' argument that provokes this question gains in significance from the fact that he is not quite alone in expressing it. Several other speakers, mostly Athenians, offer versions of it (1.75-76, 4.59-64, 5.85-114, 6.16, 6.81-85; cf. 4.108). Human nature, their argument runs, is subject to certain necessities in the form of overmastering passions which drive societies to expand to the limits of their power. Despite the recriminations of the weak, they are not more just than the strong; they are merely weaker (cf. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, I.13). Societies are of two

phasized. None, however, has presented the structure of the argument as a whole as implying such an appeal or grasped that each stage of the case from interest has implications for our sense of justice. It was Strauss who, by noting (p. 234) that the treatment of deterrence at 3.45 raised questions not of expediency only, suggested to me that the speech as a whole called for the kind of interpretation I have attempted. The interpretation and its errors are my own. See also Bruell (1974a) and Corsi (1974), followed by Bruell (1974b).

kinds, those powerless to heed the call of empire, and those powerless to resist it.

If Diodotos' emphasis differs from that of other exponents of this thesis, that results at least in part from the crucial difference in rhetorical intention. What Athenian speakers otherwise offer in defense of their empire, he reworks as an excuse for rebellion against it. He transforms an apologia for the powerful into a plea on behalf of the powerless.

Diodotos does not, however, so much alter the thesis as he draws out certain latent implications of it. So, for instance, he adds freedom to empire as one of the "greatest things" that nature bids cities pursue. The former, however, is clearly implicit in the latter. If all cities would rule if they could, it follows that none would be ruled, and that freedom is a sort of mean between the two conditions. If human nature is such that Athens cannot but strive to rule, it is such that her subjects cannot but resist her, and if (as other exponents of the thesis suggest) the ruled ought not to blame their rulers, then neither should rulers blame their rebels. The thesis thus implies a certain sympathy of the strong for the aspirations of the weak: in raising the theme of freedom. Diodotos appeals to this.

Second, Diodotos extends the compulsion to transgress to a tendency to err in so doing. This he does the more easily in that one Greek word denotes both (hamartanein, "to miss one's mark," "to go astray"). He thus deepens the pathos of the lot of failed rebels, whose errors are to be assigned to the same overwhelming forces that drove them to venture. This argument is especially effective in the present case, where the whole business was bungled from the start. Further, by casting the blunder of the revolt not as contemptible but as a symptom of universal human weakness, Diodotos forges yet another bond of sympathy between victor and vanquished.

Last, Diodotos extends the thesis from cities to individuals. For this too there is an evident practical reason. Wishing to convey that the Mytilenaians, although flagrant transgressors, might yet deserve sympathy, he must suggest that the whole class of transgressors has some claim to it. He begins therefore with the most striking case, not of extenuating circumstances, but of the want of any, and that is the case of common criminals. This done, he proceeds to show how much worthier of solicitude is a rebel city (3.46.5-6).

These differences notwithstanding, the intention of Diodotos in propounding the thesis is formally the same as that of the others who do so. He seeks to extenuate alleged transgression as so deeply rooted in the character of the actor that the usual categories are inapplicable. All offenders are owed the benefit of a kind of insanity defense.

This defense, however, as appears from its extension to all, rests neither on individual pathology nor (as so often in apologies for criminals today) on allegations concerning environment. It points the finger not at the aberrations of this or that individual or society, but rather at human nature itself. It thus casts transgression not as aberration, but as the natural norm. Diodotos' argument thus foreshadows Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Nietzsche: if transgression is the natural norm, we can no longer view it as transgression.

There may, then, after all be some truth in Diodotos' assertion that the present case admits of no reconciliation of justice and interest. And it is not only that the Mytilenaian demos, even if involved in the revolt, ought for reasons of expediency not be punished. It is also that expediency demands the punishment of the oligarchs, although they acted on the same principles, and were enthralled by the same natural compulsions, as their erstwhile punishers.

It is true, of course, that Diodotos could not reasonably have hoped to do more than save the *demos*. Even that proves a near thing. He salvages as much of ordinary justice as circumstances permit. The question remains, however, whether he would have wished to salvage more of it.

The difficulty may be stated as follows. Diodotos urges Athens to seek her own good without anger and so without inflicting gratuitous harm; the debate suggests that it is from anger above all that such harm arises. The insight on which all turns, however, remains that of the "Athenian thesis" affirming the primacy of one's own good. It offers no apparent basis for a principle of action superseding one's good. For the same reason that you might come not to blame other societies for preferring their good to yours, so you can hardly blame yourself for preferring yours to theirs. The first insight entails the second.

Yet Diodotos' speech is nothing if not a plea for an enlightened view of one's good. This it is not only in obvious respects, but in a deeper one. If Diodotos shares a common outlook on life with other exponents of the "Athenian thesis," he carries it a step further than they, and that proves to make a very great difference. For what is elsewhere an assertion of the priority of one's own good to justice becomes in his mouth a general teaching of human weakness or irrationality. The compulsions to which human nature is subject here figure as its undoing: they are that from which we would wish ourselves free. And from which we should strive to free ourselves? It is notable that Diodotos declares that individuals enjoy a tighter grip over themselves than cities; that individual is best advised who does not lose his head to the city (3.45.6; cf. 1.70.6).

In Diodotos we see at least a glimmer of that

negative orientation that Hobbes thought he discerned in Thucydides. While he speaks of freedom and rule over others as the "greatest things," these figure in context less as the greatest goods than as tending to the greatest evils. They madden men and plunge them into incurable folly; it is hard not to regard this as diminishing their goodness. A certain wisdom, rare among individuals and unknown among cities, looms as in practice the greatest political good.

Diodotos' speech confirms the primacy of the good of one's own city even as it lifts us far above the city's perspective on its good. His own intervention in Athenian affairs (which is his only one) seems compatible with both these aspects of his understanding. It is tempting, as well as plausible otherwise (cf. 4.108.4), to speculate on the kinship of the thought of this otherwise unknown figure to that of Thucydides himself.

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### **Communications**

### Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346)

Habent sua fata termini. The term "security dilemma" is used by R. Harrison Wagner (1983) in a games-theoretical context and in such a fashion that its "common" or "proper" definition to which Wagner refers becomes difficult to understand. At any rate, in his usage it is far removed from its original meaning, which was established in the early 1950s when the concept became of fundamental importance for a general theory of conflict, especially in the area of international politics.

As I first defined it (Herz, 1951) and subsequently applied it to the field of international relations (Herz, 1959, see especially chap. 10, "The Security Dilemma in the Atomic Age"), the security dilemma is a "dilemma," i.e., a situation or a predicament in which groups like nations find themselves when they confront other groups (or, at least, one other group) whose intentions they cannot fathom. There then arises a fundamental social constellation of mutual fear or mutual suspicion, in short, a mutual dilemma of "kill or perish" that accounts for ensuing competition for power, arms races, wars. I gave this condition such prominence in my writings because I considered this predicament, that is, a sociopsychological phenomenon, as basic for understanding power politics (and therewith political realism), rather than the concepts that other political realists thought fundamental (e.g., Hans Morgenthau's animus dominandi or Reinhold Niebuhr's "sin of pride"—that is, anthropological or theological concepts). That the term was, so to speak, in the air can be seen from the fact that, when I first used it, another author, the British historian Herbert Butterfield, had referred to it as the "Hobbesian dilemma," an "absoute predicament" that lies "in the very geometry of human conflict' (Butterfield, 1950, 1952). The nuclear age (with its "two skorpions in the bottle") has given the concept and the situation their ultimate and tragic poignancy. Only if one understands the security dilemma in its starkest form can one try to discuss possible mitigations, such as policies of peaceful coexistence, arms control, detente.

It would be foolish to insist on authorship when a term or concept has become so well known that it is now used generally without reference to a first (or first) user(s). What should be opposed is its use in a context and fashion alien to its original use and meaning.

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### Comment on Wagner (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 330-346)

Referring to a model of the superpower arms race we developed (Brams, Davis, & Straffin, 1979), R. Harrison Wagner says (p. 334) we "denied [the] players the opportunity simply to cheat (by assuming they will cooperate conditionally)."

We denied them nothing. Rather, we assumed conditional cooperation (CC) to ascertain when this was better for the players than always defecting in the second stage of a two-stage Prisoners' Dilemma. (The second stage, in effect, tells the players, as in Wagner's model, that they cannot count on having the last say.)

It turned out that, in the main case we analyzed (players had the same detection probability), CC was always better than defecting in three out of four geometric regions—and sometimes better in the fourth, depending on the detection probability. In other words, we did not assume away the strategy of defection; instead, we derived the result that CC was better than defection for the players under specified conditions.

Wagner, using a different model, reaches a similar conclusion when the players can respond to each other. We are sorry he did not understand that our model and conclusions are in the same spirit as his.

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### Comment on van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes (Vol. 77, March 1983, pp. 112-122)

Van de Kragt, Orbell, and Dawes's article, "The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems," claims to present a new, spontaneously arising solution to the problem of efficient provision of a public good. Unfortunately, although there are potential points of interest in the reported experimental results, this solution concept is neither new, nor does it arise spontaneously, nor is this a "public goods problem" in the most important sense.

Let us consider these problems in reverse order. The central, defining feature of the public goods problem is that each individual's contribution provides a net gain to the group, but a net loss to the contributor. Thus, it is individually rational not to contribute, but "socially rational" for everyone to contribute (see, for example, Olson, 1965, pp. 9-16). The problem presented by van de Kragt et al. is a game with a contribution threshold, above which a prize is awarded to all and below which no prize is awarded. There, the contribution may provide a net gain to the individual contributor, although there is a potentially larger net gain to be had by not contributing, depending on how many others contribute. The two concepts are compared in Table 1. In the published experiments, it is in a player's interest to try to avoid making any contribution, but ultimately he or she can be put in a position in which there is a gain from contributing, and perhaps even a loss from not doing so. Although this can provide a sticky negotiating problem, it is not the public goods problem. In the true public goods problem, there is an inefficient, dominant-strategy outcome. In the authors' game, there is an equilibrium that is inefficient (no contributors), others that are efficient (those where the minimal number contribute), and no dominant strategy.

The Minimal Contributing Set (MCS) is not a "solution" in the sense of being sufficient, merely by its existence, to drive participants to provide public goods optimally. First, as Table 2 in van de Kragt et al. indicates, communication among participants is crucial to optimal provision. It is only when they are allowed to communicate that participants can arrive at an ex ante agreement about who will provide the public good. Second, the structure of the experiment, as imposed by the experimenters, facilitates the enforcement of such an agreement. Following the communication period, all players are required to write down separately whether they choose to contribute or not. If they have previously designated a minimal contributing set, that set of contributors is certainly a Schelling point (Schelling, 1960) in exactly the sense surmised by the authors. More precisely, it is a built-in way to cut off negotiations, a technique whose importance is also discussed by Schelling, leaving the now-silent players to choose between 1) fulfilling their assigned roles as contributors or noncontributors; or 2) cheating, and foregoing the prize that would have been a net gain for every player. The particular structure of this experiment, not the underlying nature of the game, makes the MCS occur.

Finally, the MCS suggested by the authors as a new solution concept is nothing other than good old Nash equilibrium: when the minimal number are contributing, any defectors will cause forfeiture of the prize, and any extra contributor would just be wasting his money. This is illustrated in Table 1 (Threshold game), column 4, if

Table 1. True Public Good Problem versus Van de Kragt et al. Threshold Game

		Number of other players contributing \$5							
		6	5	4	3	2	1	0	
Public good game <sup>a</sup>	_		,				:		
Player i contributes	•						2		
\$5		\$14	12	- 10	8	6	4	2	
\$0		17	15	13	11	9	7	5	
Threshold gameb			1						
Player i contributes			:						
\$5	, .	\$10	10 '	10	0	0 '	. 0	O	
\$0		15	15	5	5	5	5	5	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> A symmetric, *n*-player Prisoner's Dilemma. Entries show total payoffs to a representative player, *i*. <sup>b</sup>The five-contributor game played by Van de Kragt et al's experimental subjects. "Risk" version.

player *i* is already a contributor, and column 5 if player *i* is not a contributor. Now there are, to be sure, two kinds of Nash equilibria in this game; the outcomes designated as MCS outcomes are distinguished by being the only Pareto-efficient Nash equilibria. In a game with extensive communication, it is quite reasonable to predict a Pareto-efficient equilibrium, if one exists.

As a final point, there is an important epistemological issue here, relating to whether or not we should alter the well-known model of human behavior peculiar to these models. Considerable work has been undertaken by economists and political scientists on public goods problems using a utility-maximizing model of participants. Does their theory require the addition of extra features, such as "role" and "reasonable behavior," in order to describe the observed behavior? This is precisely what the authors are suggesting.

The authors claim that the MCS does not require any assumption "that subjects are interested in any utility beyond that contained in the definition of the game" (p. 116). Yet the MCS does incorporate a number of confounding concepts pertaining to "role," "criticalness," and "reasonable behavior." All of these notions lie outside the analysis of choices made by utility-maximizing individuals. If these components were necessary for predicting the outcomes of the experiments, then the MCS would constitute a theoretical advance. But these concepts are in fact superfluous.

Although "role" is well defined within the experiment (as an assignment of contribution duties to an individual), it really only describes the endogenous process by which, in this experiment's structure, the standard equilibrium process is allowed to operate. "Criticalness" is presented as a means for specifying the pivotal role played by designated investors. Yet this is part of the equilibrium property built into the game-once an agreement is reached, no one has any incentive to withdraw. Finally, "reasonable behavior" is viewed as a means of foreclosing the consideration of alternative strategies—the problem of infinite regress in games of pure strategy. Purportedly, "reasonable behavior" eliminates such a regress. However, expectations of reasonable behavior in these experiments are unnecessary, since unilaterally departing from the agreement represents a self-defeating move for any participant. Consequently, these additional concepts peculiar to the MCS are extraneous, given the equilibrium properties built into the game.

Although we are not subscribing to the position that implausible assumptions ought to be retained if predictions can be derived, neither are we suggesting that assumptions can be freely manipulated without regard for antecedent work. An ex-

tensive body of work on public goods problems does exist, with well-established results (see, for example, Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1978; Laver, 1981: Olson, 1965). If the experiment faithfully replicates that problem and yields compelling evidence that individual strategic behavior is at variance with expected behavior, then there may exist grounds for rejecting or modifying previous theoretical formulations. However, the authors provide an institutional setting at variance with public goods formulations. Further, their results correspond nicely with expected behavior by utilitymaximizing participants. The secret here lies in the structural solution provided to the game by the experimenters, not in a new solution to the public goods problem.

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## Comment on Maddox (Vol. 76, December 1982, pp. 805-809)

It was a most gratifying surprise for me to read an article that still considers worthy of attention -exactly twenty years later-my article in this Review on "Constitutionalism" (Sartori, 1962). Maddox's discussion surely enriches the debate. But is his disagreement with me as fundamental as it appears to him? I wonder. I certainly agree with Maddox's basic tenet that constitutionalism seeks to balance gubernaculum with jurisdictio, that is, an efficient exercise of power with its control. A constitution in which the controls "overpower power" simply leads to impotent government and simply attests, in my view no less than in Maddox's, to poor constitutional engineering. How about, however, a constitution that is all gubernaculum and no jurisdictio? This was and remains my point; namely, that power without control does not add up to a "constitution" in the meaning intended by the theory of constitutionalism and of constitutional government. Hence my argument was centrally aimed at dispelling the ambiguities or the deceptions or both resulting from two very different definitions of the term constitution, namely, i) a constitution is "any state form," and, ii) a constitution is "the garantiste state form." Does Maddox seek to legitimize as a constitution the one of the Third Reich (certainly a state form), or the one of Stalin (a facade constitution that remains dead letter)? I do not have that impression at all. So, which is the bone of contention?

Although I doubt that we are all that far apart in substance, certainly Maddox objects to my historical reconstruction of the concept of constitution. Over more than two thousand years he perceives a continuity where I perceive a discontinuity. I asserted that when the word constitution was picked up by the American and French 18th century constitution-makers it had become a "vacant term" that was employable for the specific garantiste meaning that it obtained (on that I insist) during the 18th and 19th centuries. Instead Maddox holds that we use today the word constitution very much in the sense in which Cicero used constitutio: "the establishment of the state order" (p. 806).

The beginning, we both agree, is in the verb constituere which basically means "to establish," to institute, whose corresponding noun forms are constitutio and, in the plural, constitutiones. The verb was frequently used and was part and parcel of the ordinary language. Its noun forms, however, were used far less frequently and largely acquired, when used, a technical meaning. Therefore, it is essential to separate the "casual," ordinary language meaning of constitutio (which is nothing but the noun form of the verb constituere) from the "special" meaning given to constitutio and to constitutiones in the Roman legal terminology and, from there onwards, in the political theory that debated matters of government and law. Instead Maddox's counter-evidence draws in three instances (Livy, Apuleius, and Boethius) on extra-legal sources; in two instances on authors (Tacitus and St. Augustine) that use the verb, not the noun form; and is thus left to rest on the sole witnessing of Cicero.

Here Maddox is quite right. I did dismiss Cicero too sweepingly, and my including Cicero in the "casual" usage was indeed a sloppy way of putting it. In order to reinforce Maddox's point that Cicero was quite "deliberate" (not casual) in his usage, let me place his constitutio in context, that is, in relation to the two crucial occasions in which the verb-form constituere signaled the wane of the

Republic. Let it thus be recalled that in 82 B.C. Silla became dictator reipublicae constituendae. dictator for instituting/reconstituting the republic; and that in 27 B.C. Augustus was in turn empowered rei publicae constituendae. The dates tell that Cicero's De Republica (54-51 B.C.) represented the major and last attempt to save the Roman republic. He was indeed swimming against an inexorable tide; but precisely for this reason Cicero was prompted to use constitutio not only as a way of translating the Greek politela ("the total composition, the shape or form of the state"), but also in a narrower and, I would say, garantiste-like meaning. The passages of Rep. 1.41 and 1.70 that Maddox quotes (p. 806, nn. 7, 8) and translates with some forcing (descriptione aut disciplina hardly mean "division of powers") are suggestive of a republican-specific meaning of constitutio. If so, however, Maddox's case is enfeebled rather than strengthened. Assuming that "every mention of the word in English follows in some sense from this [Cicero's] original usage" (p. 806), why should it not follow from his republican-garantiste rather than generic connotation? I note this for the sake of the argument. In fact Maddox does not demonstrate the continuity that he is assuming, and the fact remains that Cicero was both the first and last author to use constitutio as he did. In the subsequent legal and political theory literature one finds no trace of Cicero's meanings. As regards constitutio as a rendering of politeia, the latter was the Greek title of the work of Plato that we know as The Republic-and respublica indeed remained, Cicero notwithstanding, the standard Latin equivalent of the Greek notion. And Cicero's narrower meaning was neglected even more. In their technical usages constitutio and constitutiones importantly applied to edicta (edicts) or to decreta (decrees). They were, thus, "decisions" (not leges) taken and enacted by the Emperor. The underlying rationale is this: When something is established by the deciding of a magistracy, then it is a constitutio (what is established by it).

Along this track Maddox does not contradict me. He is left to quote McIlwain, who "argued the most cogent case for Roman imperial constitutionalism" (p. 806). But, on the point, "constitutionalism" is besides the point. On the point McIlwain wrote (in the same work cited by Maddox) that still at the time of Bracton (1225 circa) "and for centuries after, "constitution" always means a particular administrative enactment much as it had meant to the Roman lawyers" (1958, p. 24, my emphasis). Thus McIlwain exactly confirms my thesis. For how many "centuries after"? I am not sure, but the sure thing is that at the time of Cromwell several attempts were made at establishing a written constitution, and that

none of the documents in question was called by the English "constitution"; they were variously called, instead, covenant, instrument, agreement, fundamental law. The compelling conclusion thus is that Cicero's meaning was and had been a "dead meaning" for some seventeen centuries.

I still may be asked by Maddox how I dispose of "Roman constitutionalism." Let me simply reply that the constitutionalism in question is largely a matter of fictio iuris, and that although "legal fictions" are indeed essential to legal logic, nonetheless I very much doubt that the empire did in fact establish "a system of law which protected the rights of citizens" (Maddox, p. 806). I would rather say that to the extent that the Roman citizen was protected, he was protected by leges (not by constitutiones) and, basically, by the Roman private (not public) common law system. The problem with retrodictions—and "constitutionalism" applied to Rome or Greece is a retrodiction-is that they do "inevitably project a modern frame of reference into a very distant and different world" (as I argued in this Review in 1965, p. 442). Thus, with reference to Rome we speak of a constitutionalism that did not impede the extensive killings and the arbitrariness that our constitutionalism (the one for which we have coined the word) impedes.

Fine points aside, the central one is that Maddox faults me with privileging a "Whig version of constitutionalism" that he declares a "narrow and somewhat dogmatic stipulation" (p. 809). But I cannot recognize myself in the above. To begin with, was Benjamin Constant a Whig? The question is of consequence, for Constant's monumental Cours de Politique Constitutionelle (1817-1820) was the single most influential source of the constitutions that were in fact enacted across Europe in the wake of the 1830 and 1848 revolutions. And the answer is no. Constant's constitutionalism had no Whig paternity: it essentially came from direct experience, from the constitution-making of the French revolutionaries and of the Napoleonic era. Now, I am a Whig (so to speak) just about as little as Constant. Throughout my 1962 article I was strongly critical of the English constitutional theorizing, and it is in fact the case that my underpinning of the modern notion of constitution is derived from, and sustained by, the actual texts of all the written constitutions enacted in Europe during the 19th century and up until the 1920s. If so, and turning to the next point, how can my definition be a "stipulation"? Stipulative definitions stand in contrast to lexical definitions, that is, the definitions that enter dictionaries precisely on account of widespread acceptance. This being so, my definition of constitution cannot be assigned to the stipulative variety: take any dictionary, and there it is (alongside other definitions, to be sure). Much to the detriment of my originality, my 1962 article represented a vindication of the standard lexical definition for some 150 years at least. Finally, and moreover, since my case is abundantly discussed and supported by abundant evidence, I do wonder what "dogmatic" means to Maddox. Perhaps Maddox has in mind a definition (a stipulation) of the word dogmatism that I cannot find in my dictionaries.

Despite all the foregoing bickerings, in the end I still ask myself: which is the bone of contention? If Maddox reads me as implying that constitutions are required to limit government at the detriment of the governing function, let me assure him that he misreads me. I do believe that constitutions are required to balance, if always uneasily, the control over power with the exercise of power. In the end, then, are we not both saying that gubernaculum alone is a mockery of constitutionalism?

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### Comment on Hibbs (Vol. 77, March, 1983, pp. 135-138)

Douglas Hibbs (1983) claims that I (Beck, 1982) have seriously underestimated the long-run impact of party on unemployment, and that administration-oriented explanations of economic outcomes are both statistically and conceptually inferior to party-oriented explanations. As to the first claim, we shall see that Hibbs's own new (1982) results about the impact of party on unemployment are now closer to my results than they were to his original (1977) results, and that, correctly interpreted, there is nothing in his Comment that is inconsistent with my conclusion. Moreover, we shall see that there are serious technical problems with the procedure recommended by Hibbs. The second difference between us, relating to whether one prefers party or administration types of explanations, is more complicated, more fundamental and not resolvable in the Communications Section of the Review;1 we shall see that Hibbs's dismissal of the explanatory power of the administration model is based pri-

<sup>1</sup>A more technical discussion of these issues is available from the author.

marily on sleight of hand. It may appear that the differences between Hibbs and myself are of a statistical nature; this is not the case. Thus, before embarking on a technical journey, it would seem useful to set out what is a stake in our dispute.

#### What Difference Does It All Make?

Why does it matter whether the eight-year party impact on unemployment is 2.4% or 1%? It matters because, if Hibbs is correct, parties must differ significantly in their programs, and they must have the capability of implementing those programs. Indeed, Hibbs's findings suggest both immense differences in program and an enormous degree of governmental capability; his 2.4% party impact on unemployment is very close to the change in unemployment from trough to peak in the typical postwar business cycle.

In making his claim, Hibbs conflicts with two widely shared assumptions about American politics: large programmatic differences conflict with the Downsian notion of electorally induced party convergence, whereas the government capability requirements conflict with the view that the American state is weak vis-à-vis civil society and the private economy. My more modest estimates for party impact leave room for party differentiation without contradicting other accepted views of American politics.

More is at stake in deciding between the party and administration explanations. In the Hibbs view, outcomes are sociologically determined; working-class people vote for working-class parties who reduce unemployment so as to make the working class better off. In this view, there is no room for political leadership, no room for coalition dynamics, and precious little room for economic constraints on what the state can do. Unfortunately, this means that the economic policies of the latter halves of both the Nixon and Carter presidencies, to say nothing of the current deflationary policies of Mitterrand, must simply. be anomalies. Hibbs is correct in noting that my article does not contain a theory that explains those anomalies, but the administration approach may start us down a path that can yield a more satisfying model of electoral politics than the Hibbs party-class linkage model.

# How Large Is the Party Impact on Unemployment?

Originally, based on the period 1948-1976, Hibbs (1977, p. 1436) found an eight-year party impact on unemployment of 2.36 percentage points; he now finds that figure should have been reported as 2.08 points (1982, p. 14). In my arti-

cle, I found about a one-point difference. The difference between us becomes even smaller if we look at his new estimates based on the somewhat longer period of 1948-1980 (1982, p. 2). For that period he estimated a value for b (short-run party impact) of .086 and for d (speed of adjustment) of .88. Given those figures, the eight-year impact of party on unemployment would be only 1.4 percentage points. Hibbs's own new estimate is now closer to my estimate than it is to his own earlier estimate. Moreover, the null hypothesis that party has no impact on unemployment could not even be rejected with his new estimates.

What about Hibbs's claim that I underestimated the eight-year impact of party by factors of either four or eight. Since my conclusion (1982, p. 90) was that party had an eight-year impact of about one percentage point (not .13%), I am quite happy to accept Hibbs's calculation based on my simple dummy variable model; his calculation shows an eight-year impact of 1.08%. I chose to derive that conclusion from my models 7 and 8 (the trend models) rather than using Hibbs's procedure, because his procedure requires great faith in 32 period forecasts, a faith that the models simply do not warrant.

Hibbs obtained his estimated eight-year impact by putting a small quarterly impact through a difference equation 32 times; this yields a large impact. Unfortunately, Hibbs does not tell us that as we forecast farther and farther into the future, the standard errors of those forecasts become larger and larger (see Box & Jenkins, 1976, p. 128). This is not surprising; a model that captures so few of the structural features of the economy would not be expected to be very good at long-range forecasting. Even if we assume that Hibbs's model is correct, and even if we assume that we know the coefficients of that model with certainty, a confidence interval for the eight-year Democratic influence on unemployment ranges from an increase of 1% to a decrease of 2%. Moreover, this confidence interval is unduly optimistic, given the large standard error of his party impact variable. b. Thus, given the inherent large errors associated with 32-quarter forecasts, it is impossible for the Hibbs procedure to tell us very much about the world; in particular, it cannot exclude the hypothesis that party has no long-run impact on unemployment.

To avoid this problem, I estimated my models 7 and 8, which included trend terms for how long a party had been in office. These models allow assessment of the impact of eight years of party rule without making forecasts for a longer time period than any sensible person would make. (There is a cost to this procedure; it forces us to estimate differential party impacts conditioned on unemployment when a party took office.) Based

on those models, I estimated an eight-year party impact of 1%.

The important point is that if one wants to use the Hibbs procedure, model 4 is the appropriate model, and the estimated eight-year impact of party is 1.08% (plus or minus a huge error); if one wants to avoid that huge error, then model 7 or 8 is appropriate, and the estimated eight-year impact of party is either .75 (model 7) or 1.25 (model 8). It would be a mistake to apply the Hibbs procedure to models 7 or 8, unless one believed that a president's quarterly impact on unemployment increased linearly over his administration. In particular, applying the Hibbs procedure to my model 8 is tantamount to assuming that in the final quarter of his administration, a president can increase or decrease unemployment by over one percentage point; if that were the case, both Ford and Carter should have been able to have won reelection.

In short, correct application of Hibbs's method yields conclusions consistent with my own. Party surely does have an impact on unemployment, but it is not nearly as dramatic as Hibbs originally claimed.

#### Party or Administration

Hibbs's second major objection to my article rests on the claim that using the administration variable complicates the model without adding significantly to its explanatory power. He fails to note that administration improves the party model to the same extent that party improves the simple autoregressive model. Hibbs argues that the increase in adjusted  $R^2$  of .005 (really .008) and the reduction in error variance of .01 owing to the inclusion of the administration variables is unimpressive. Let me put those figures in context.

The simple autoregressive (AR2) model for unemployment (with no political terms at all) has an  $R^2$  of .94; there is little variance left to explain. Adding Hibbs's party variable to the AR2 model reduces error variance by .013; breaking up the party dummy variable into administration dummy variables reduces it further by .012. Similarly, adding party to the AR2 model increases corrected  $R^2$  by .009; adding administration to party further increases that figure by .007. Thus, administration outperforms party roughly to the same extent that party outperforms the simple AR2 model. If "readers may judge for themselves the importance of [the former] difference" (1983, p. 138), then I suppose that they may equally judge for themselves the importance of using the party variable.

An additional objection of Hibbs to the administration model (vis-a-vis the party model) depends upon his use of rank ordering of the administra-

tions. My results indicate three clusterings of administrations: Hibbsean Democrats (Truman and Johnson); Hibbsean Republicans (Eisenhower and Ford), and centrists (Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter). The latter group far more resemble one another than they do their party counterparts. The important point is not that party does not matter (it does), but rather that there are substantial differences between some Republican presidents, substantial differences between some Democratic presidents, and substantial similarities between some Republican and Democratic presidents.

More generally, the important difference between Hibbs and myself is not over adjusted  $R^2$ 's, but rather over the implications of the party explanation. Thus, for example, Hibbs would have left labor parties always adopting positions favored by trade unionists. Yet as Gourevitch (in press) has shown, although trade unionists in the early 1930s favored demand stimulus policies, not all labor parties adopted such policies; in particular, both the British and German labor parties rejected demand stimulus, whereas the Swedish Social Democrats (and to a lesser extent the American Democrats) accepted it. In Gourevitch's view, different social groupings have interests, but how those interests come together into coalitions and eventually determine policy is a complicated question. The crucial question of why trade union preferences get translated into a variety of different labor party policies has no place on the Hibbs agenda.

Finally, let us turn to the experience of the 1980s. Hibbs's final two paragraphs are pious indeed, but they also illustrate some of the pitfalls of the party-class linkage model. Hibbs wishes to blame the high level of U.S. unemployment on Reagan's Republican policies. Although no one would deny some relationship between the recent recession and Republicanism, the Hibbs explanation is overly simple. First, it cannot account for the fact that Volcker was appointed by a Democratic president, and that Draconian monetary policy dates to October 1979. Second, in the Hibbs view, it is irrelevant that the Republican president is Ronald Reagan, rather than George Bush, Charles Percy, or Howard Baker, and that Reagan represents a somewhat different set of interests from either Bush, Percy, or Baker. Finally, in 1983, France, like the United States, is also suffering from its highest level of post-Depression unemployment. The Socialist Mitterrand's shift from traditional left-wing demand stimulus policies to traditional right-wing deflationary policies, with increasing rather than decreasing unemployment rates, must be embarrassing to proponents of the party-class linkage model.

Finally, the juxtaposition of Hibbs's compas-



sion with my "nihilism" is unwarranted. Hibbs sees the battle as between class-based parties; I see it as among social coalitions seeking control of administration and political leaders seeking the support of social groupings. Both of us are interested in the political sources of unemployment and other forms of human suffering.

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# Comment on Goodin (Vol. 77, June 1983, pp. 420-434)

In a recent article, Robert E. Goodin (1983) argues that "rational voters should occasionally vote perversely. If they want left-wing outcomes, they should vote for right-wing candidates, and vice-versa. That is where the logic of instrumental rationality inexorably leads" (p. 433). In this note, I correct some technical and conceptual errors in Goodin's analysis. Contrary to his claims, I show that the result is not robust against slight changes in his model. "Perverse voting" is neither plausible nor rational.

#### Goodin's Model

Candidate platforms are represented by normal probability distributions over some dimension of choice. Voters prefer the candidate whose mean position is closest (in Euclidean norm) to their own most preferred point on this dimension. The candidates, denoted L and R, have mean positions l and r (l < r) with standard deviations  $\sigma_l$  and  $\sigma_r$ , respectively. The candidates are prohibited from taking extreme positions; e.g., if L is elected he must adopt a position to the right of

 $s_l$   $(L \ge s_l)$ , or if R is elected, he must adopt a position to the left of  $s_r$   $(R \le s_r)$ . Goodin implicitly assumes in his hypothetical calculations that less than half the probability mass for each candidate is truncated (i.e.,  $s_l < l$  and  $s_r > r$ ), and I will also make this assumption.

#### Truncation

The discussion on p. 424 of Goodin's article clearly states that voters calculate the expected value of the candidates' platforms as if these distributions were truncated from the left (below) at  $s_l$  and from the right (above) at  $s_r$ . Goodin's formulas on the same page, however, are for the median of the truncated distribution rather than its mean. I will argue below that in the situation described by Goodin neither the mean or the median of the truncated distribution is particularly relevant, but, in any event, Goodin's calculations in the tables and figures on pp. 425-431 do not have the expected utility interpretation that he desires.

To calculate the mean of a truncated normal density, the following well-known formulas can be used (Johnson & Kotz, 1970, p. 81).

$$l^* = E(L|L > s_l)$$

$$= l + \sigma_l \frac{\phi(s_l - l) / \sigma_l}{1 - \Phi[(s_l - l) / \sigma_l]}$$

$$r^* = E(R|R < s_r)$$

$$= r - \sigma_r \frac{\phi[(s_r - r) / \sigma_r]}{\Phi[(s_r - r) / \sigma_r]}$$

where  $\phi(\cdot)$  and  $\Phi(\cdot)$  denote the unit normal density and distribution functions, respectively.

The median of the truncated distribution can also be calculated.

$$med(L|L > s_l) = l +$$

$$+ \sigma_l \Phi^{-1}(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \Phi [(s_l - l)/\sigma_l])$$

$$med(R|R < r_l) = r$$

$$+ \sigma_r \Phi^{-1}(\frac{1}{2} \Phi [(s_r - r)/\sigma_r])$$

These formulas can be used to produce the entries in Table 1 of Goodin (1983), which is reproduced below with the (correct) truncated mean calculations. As can be seen, Goodin's miscalculations actually understate his case relative to the mean of the truncated distribution.

#### Constraints on Candidate Positions

The most serious weakness in Goodin's model is his formulation of constraints on candidate positions. As Goodin would have it. if a candidate is prohibited from taking an extreme position, he is no more likely to take a position similar to the one he is prohibited from taking than a very dissimilar one. For example, if McGovern had won the 1972 presidential election and had been unable to persuade Congress to pass his welfare plan, it seems plausible that he would have settled for the most generous plan to which Congress would have consented. Formally, it seems reasonable to assume that when candidates are prohibited from taking an extreme position. they adopt the most similar (i.e., closest) feasible position, so voters assign the probability mass attached to infeasible extreme positions to the point of truncation. Then the expected candidate positions are given by:

$$\begin{split} & l_c = l^* + (s_l - l^*) \, \Phi[(s_l - l)/\sigma_l] \\ & r_c = s_r + (r^* - s_r) \, \Phi[(s_r - r)/\sigma_r] \end{split}$$

The result below establishes an ordering over the location parameters of the various truncated distributions.

Proposition 1.  $l \le l_c \le \text{med}(L|L \le s_l) \le l^*$ and  $r \ge r_c \ge \text{med}(R|R \le s_r) \ge r^*$ .

*Proof.* To show  $l^* \ge \text{med}(L|L \ge s_l)$ , let  $z = (s_l - l)/\sigma_l$  and note that:

$$l^* - \operatorname{med}(L|L \geqslant s_1)$$

$$=\sigma_l\left\{\frac{\phi(z)}{1-\Phi(z)}-\Phi^{-1}\left[\frac{1}{1}+\frac{1}{1}\Phi(z)\right]\right\}$$

For  $l > s_l$ , z < 0 and  $\phi(z)/[1 - \Phi(z)]$  is increasing in z and  $0 < \Phi^{-1} [\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\Phi(z)] < \Phi^{-1}$  (%) with  $\Phi^{-1}(z)$  strictly convex and increasing on the interval [\frac{1}{2},1]. It follows that:

$$\Phi^{-1}(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\Phi(z)) \leq 2\Phi(z)\Phi^{-1}(\frac{3}{2})$$

so it suffices to prove:

$$\frac{\phi(z)}{\Phi(z) [1 - \Phi(z)]} > 2\Phi^{-1}(34)$$

for z < 0, which can be shown by observing that  $\phi(z)/\Phi(z)$   $[1 - \Phi(z)]$  is decreasing on  $(-\infty,0]$  with the above condition satisfied for z=0.

Next, to show  $med(L|L \ge s_l) \ge l_c$ , we need to show that:

$$\Phi^{-1}[\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\Phi(z)] \geqslant \phi(z) + z\Phi(z)$$

for z < 0, which is easily demonstrated by an argument similar to the previous paragraph.

For  $l_c > l$ , we use:

$$l_c - l = \sigma_l \{ (\phi(z) + z\Phi(z)) \}.$$

The expression in brackets is increasing in z with  $\lim_{z \to -\infty} z \Phi(z) = 0$ .

Table 1. Sample Calculations of Effects of Truncation

Degree of Truncation	Truncated Median O	Truncated Mean σ	Truncated Mean (Modified) O
0.023 (2σ)	± 0.02	± 0.06	± 0.01
0.067 (1.5σ)	± 0.08	± 0.14	± 0.03
0.169 (σ)	± 0.22	± 0.29	± 0.07
0.308 (0.5σ)	± 0.39	± 0.51	± 0.20
0.461 (0.1 <i>o</i> )	± 0.61	± 0.74	± 0.35

The second portion of the proof is similar to the first.

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As shown in Table 1, with this modified treatment of candidate constraints, severe truncation is required to affect the candidate's mean position. The corresponding condition for "perverse voting" is much more stringent than in the case of the truncated median or (unmodified) mean. Only when the candidates take very similar positions (i.e., r - l is small) and the degree of truncation is severe can  $l_c$  be to the right of  $r_c$ . But it is in this situation that the asymmetry of candidate constraints makes the least sense. Even without this more plausible treatment of candidate constraints, Goodin's "perverse" result vanishes if candidate constraints are treated symmetrically. It is this feature of Goodin's model that generates his peculiar findings. Despite his claims to the contrary, this assumption cannot be relaxed.

Finally, one might question the relevance of any analysis of this type as anything more than an amusing play on words. If a supposedly left-wing

candidate cannot really take left-wing positions, then his platform should not be characterized as left wing.

#### Conclusion

Goodin's article contains an error that I have corrected here. Its central defect, however, is more fundamental. Silly assumptions will produce silly results. Very plausible and minor changes to his model contradict his conclusion that "rational voters should occasionally vote perversely."

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### **BOOK REVIEWS**

# American Government and Politics

Aging and Public Policy: The Politics of Growing Old in America. Edited by William P. Browne and Laura Katz Olson. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 266. \$35.00.)

William P. Browne and Laura Katz Olson have edited an excellent collection of articles on the politics of aging in America. As the editors note, there have been a great number of studies on the physical, psychological, and social problems of aging, but few on the political problems of aging.

An obvious relationship between aging policy and politics can be made given the size of the national budget—more than 25% for aging programs and services—however as a political force, the elderly do not have a coherent set of policies backed by a consensus among aging groups. Instead, diverse and fragmented interests struggle for government attention and concern. In addition, some of the elderly do not identify with these aging groups or with other older people.

Despite this diversity, the elderly do represent a significant force in American politics. This force, along with cooperative government officials who initiate programs and help expand benefits for the elderly, provide a unique form of political action. As a result of the large number of diverse programs, there is a growing network of national, state, and local agencies and service providers who maintain a forum for aging policy advocacy. This is buttressed by a general impression that aging groups are active and retain sufficient political strength that has resulted in the transfer of a disproportionately large share of government resources to the elderly.

This expansion of national expenditures for the elderly has not produced economic security for all of the aging population. Many of the articles in this volume explore this problem. Jennifer L. Warlick notes the way in which government transfers have tended to reduce poverty in aged families headed by males but not females. Jacquelyne Johnson Jackson reviews the economic problems of the elderly black. Paul K. H. Kim discusses the policy problems of the rural elderly. Not only do the elderly in rural areas have the same problems as urban dwellers, but they also face problems of geographical isolation and the

dispersion of limited and often inadequate aging programs and services. In addition to these specific studies, Robert H. Binstock provides a survey of the diverse economic conditions of the elderly.

Significant political issues are given in-depth coverage. Douglas Dobson, analyzing the voting behavior of the elderly, finds that the elderly do not vote as a bloc: the aging process has little significant impact upon voting behavior. Henry J. Pratt discusses the background of the various national interest groups representing the elderly. Dale Vinyard argues that the executive branch is not as supportive of aging policies as Congress, yet remains an important arena for policymaking for the elderly. Problems of the administration of aging programs and services in a federal system are explored by David K. Brown. In his thoughtful conclusion, David Brodsky notes the problems of expanding aging programs and expenditures versus declining social program support in an era of economic decline.

While it may be true that political support for social welfare programs has declined, it is not clear that future political support will decline significantly for aging programs. One might speculate that the so-called "baby boom" that will retire in the early part of the twenty-first century will provide more than ample political support. Instead, major problems remain in the area of financing aging programs. Since social security represents the bulk of national expenditures on aging, it may be necessary to consider a public-private solution through a revision of the pension system.

Overall, this is a useful volume that will be of interest to specialists and students of aging policy.

JOHN W. CRITZER

Mount Saint Mary's College

Education Policy and Evaluation: A Context for Change. By Louise K. Comfort. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982. Pp. xiii + 199. \$22.50.)

Comfort begins with the almost universally accepted notion that the stated goal of the Elemen-

tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)-"equality of educational opportunity"-has not been met. Rather than extensively document and rehash what we already know (that is, the failure of ESEA and national public education policy in the United States), Comfort focuses on enhancing our understanding of the reasons for these failures. With congressional passage of ESEA, the federal government set out on a course designed to bring about an enormous innovation in educational policies and practices, for as Comfort notes: "It is clear that ESEA was intended as an instrument for planned educational and social change" (p. 36). Yet, for all the efforts of the federal government, the policy simply failed (that is, it proved ineffective). But, why? Comfort is able to identify and then thoroughly discuss several significant barriers to the development of a national educational policy. This discussion (chaps. 3-6) amply illustrates the conflicts created when federal political and administrative officials assumed the role of "change agent" in the development and implementation of educational policy, and hence enables one to gain tremendous insight into those factors that contributed to the failure of ESEA. Herein lies the major contribution of this book to the rapidly developing field of policy analysis and the study of specific education policies.

Comfort's review of the evaluation reports of programs funded under ESEA, Titles I and III (IV-C) for selected school districts in California over a 12-year period revealed four major barriers to education innovation. First, failure of ESEA was attributable to unresolved conflicts in policy goals. Passage of ESEA "was accomplished by blurring the conflicting issues and stating the goals of the program in terms sufficiently general that few people could disagree" (p. 52). Yet, the very vagueness of the goals of ESEA, which intended to soft-pedal real conflicts of interests, led only to open controversy as the policy moved into the implementation phase. Second, the sheer scope of the administrative jurisdiction and the complexity of the administrative procedures involved in translating national education policy into school district practice also proved to be a barrier. In short, the fragmented nature of the American governmental system proved to be a hindrance to educational change. Third, difficulty was encountered in the actual implementation of the policy because of the lack of planning. In retrospect, it appears that few attempts were made to clearly and accurately assess the interactive conditions at multiple levels involved in putting the national policy into practice. Moreover, the difficulties in the implementation process were exacerbated because of the lingering existence of unresolved conflicts in policy goals and problems

that derived from the broad scope and complexity of administrative structure. Finally, the difficulties encountered in establishing a functional evaluation process constituted a fourth obstacle to innovation in educational practices through the ESEA.

Although these are some of the same obstacles to effective public policy that have been suggested by George Edwards and Ira Sharkansky in *The Policy Predicament* (W.H. Freeman, 1978) and George Edwards in *Implementing Public Policy* (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980), Comfort's treatment of them in an in-depth case study is a noteworthy contribution to the literature in policy analysis. By examining the unique manifestation of what many consider to be common barriers to policy effectiveness, Comfort underscores a point repeatedly made by Charles O. Jones in *An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy* (Duxbury Press, 1977)—each public policy is characterized by its own distinct policy process.

J. EDWIN BENTON

University of South Florida

Voting in Revolutionary America: A Study of Elections in the Original Thirteen States, 1776-1789. By Robert J. Dinkin. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. x + 184. \$27.50.)

If this book would be available in a less expensive paperback version, it would make an interesting supplementary assignment in American politics, American history, and voting and elections courses. In its present edition it is likely to make its way only into the collections of graduate institutions, scholars in the field, and specialized undergraduate institutions.

The book ably carries forward the study Dinkin began in 1977 with Voting in Provincial America (Greenwood Press) and covers the entire electoral process, not just "voting," as the title suggests. There are chapters devoted to "Revolutionary Era Elections," "The Electorate," "The Candidates," "Nominations," "Electioneering," "Voting Procedures," "Turnout," and "Voting Behavior." Notes, all at the back of the book, a preface, epilogue, bibliographic essay, and index complete the work.

Dinkin has attempted to deal with his subject in a way that will be useful to both historians and political scientists. While historians may not be used to some of the political science categories and terminology, and political scientists may be surprised not to encounter any tables until the penultimate chapter, the monograph does contain a wealth of material that each may find useful. In discussing each topic, Dinkin tries, within the limitations imposed by uneven availability of material, to cover each of the 13 states separately as well as offering generalizations about the new nation.

Dinkin believes that most historians have neglected the Revolutionary era, seeing the 1790s when national parties emerged as the period of major transformation, and he seeks in this work "to provide the first comprehensive analysis of the subject" (p. ix). Indeed, he has gathered reference items from many sources.

As to the explanation of the voting behavior that Dinkin chronicles, he says:

All in all, it seems impossible to advance any single theory of voting behavior for the Revolutionary era. While some voted out of a sense of duty or attended for social reasons, most voters came out because they thought they would have an impact. There were many factors influencing the size of the turnout: the restrictiveness of the suffrage qualifications, the types of officials to be selected, the proximity of the bulk of voters to the polls, the age and location of the community, the degree of political maturity and factionalism present, and the relative importance of the issues. A person's inclination to vote was also affected by certain personal characteristics, such as his overall attitude toward government, his ethnic or religious ties, and especially his economic status. (pp. 146-147)

One can hardly fault Dinkin for the lack of a more definitive result, when recent studies of voting behavior have reached remarkably similar conclusions that a person's decision about whether or not to vote, and for whom, is the result of a complex interaction of numerous factors.

Based on his scholarship, Dinkin reaches the conclusion that "from looking at the voting process in the Revolutionary era, it is clear that the American election system had begun to take on many modern, democratic characteristics" (p. 148). More generally, he provides additional support for those who, contrary to Charles Beard, assert that the U.S. Constitution is a democratic document: "Thus, by the close of the Revolutionary era, most adult white males and even a few others had obtained the elective franchise. Property qualifications had been reduced, religious requirements practically abandoned, and racial restrictions removed in some cases" (p. 43). To obtain the many illustrative examples that underlie this assertion, one can do no better than to read Voting in Revolutionary America and its predecessor, Voting in Provincial America. I hope that Dinkin will continue the series with a study of the further democratization of electoral processes in America through the Jacksonian period and beyond.

DON RACHETER

Central College

The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support. By George C. Edwards III. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. x + 276. \$16.95, cloth; \$8.95 paper.)

Studies of the American presidency have remained largely untouched by the behavioralist methods that have so influenced related areas such as electoral or legislative behavior. Moreover, books that focus entirely on the president's relationship with the public are rare despite the pertinency of public standing to presidential leadership. The Public Presidency addresses both of these points in providing a thoroughly researched examination of the president's relationship to the American public while grounding several of its most important findings in quantitative methods.

According to Edwards, American public opinion is neither crystalized nor coherent. Moreover, interpretations of public opinion through election results and White House mail are often misleading. Even with modern polling, such factors as intensity, response bias, and issue complexity remain problems. Thus, the nature and means of ascertaining public opinion continue to complicate the president's understanding of what the public wants.

Presidential efforts to lead public opinion through direct appeals or simplifying themes vary in success with the president's skills and public's predispositions. More problematic are presidential attempts to manipulate the economy, public relations, or the truth itself. Still another form of presidential leadership of public opinion involves presidential coattails. Through regression analysis Edwards finds that coattails were responsible for only 76 House victories since 1952 (that is, 2%), although small margins have been critical at times. Presidential efforts to influence public opinion remain worthwhile, therefore, but they must be qualified by means and limits.

The president finds himself in an adversarial role relative to the press, although not without the means to exert considerable influence. As chief newsmaker he has unmatched access to the press. He may control the size and number of press conferences, thereby affecting the superficiality of the questions he faces. Prepared by elaborate dry runs, he may learn to relate large portions of his press conferences to lengthy opening addresses,

call on predictable reporters, solicit questions, and provide some articulate responses while intentionally obfuscating others. In addition, he may selectively leak news items, court the sympathetic local press, or even harass critical members of the press. For its part, the press capitalizes on personality, "horse race," and electoral consequences while abbreviating and simplifying stories via themes, symbols, and stereotypes. The resulting trivialization is what distorts the news rather than any systematic ideological or partisan bias.

In examining the basis for public approval of the president's job performance, Edwards employs cross-sectional and multivariate analysis using data from the Gallup and University of Michigan surveys. Unlike public expectations, which are often unrealistic and contradictory, public evaluations of the way the president is handling his job were found to be fairly reasonable. Citizens demonstrate some personal detachment in evaluating the president on the basis of his management of national concerns. They do not expect immediate success in realizing policy goals, but do demand personal competency in a president along with some degree of policy success in the long term. Edwards concludes in an epilogue that the American political context requires the Chief Executive to seek public support, but provides no guarantees he will find it.

One hesitates to suggest that flaws exist in this important work, but there are a few minor ones. Although lucid in its organization and expression, the book's framework is used more as a clothes tree for information than a set of developmental themes leading to a full summary ending. Also, more of the methodological discussions could be appendixed. Finally, there is a disapproving tone that runs to sarcasm in a case study of press coverage found in chapter 4.

The overwhelming strength of this book is its scholastic leadership. Its thoroughness provides an authoritative standard to challenge other authors. The book is crammed with interesting and little-known information and is exhaustive in its documentation. The quantitative methods lead to some of the most important conclusions yet provided in research on public support and may help pioneer a stronger behavioralist direction in presidential scholarship. Although that order is quite tall, what is certain is that *The Public Presidency* will become indispensable reading in understanding the popular basis for presidential leadership.

JAMES A. DAVIS

Oklahoma State University

Political Parties in American Society. By Samuel J. Eldersveld. (New York: Basic Books, 1982. Pp. xii + 477. \$18.95.)

The Future of American Political Parties: The Challenge of Governance. Edited by Joel L. Fleishman. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982. Pp. vii + 174. \$6.95, paper.)

A common theme of students of political parties in recent years is that the American party system is in a state of decline. Although there is not a consensus on why parties in this country have fallen on such hard times, many observers would agree with David Broder that "the party is over" (or at least about to wind down). Political Parties in American Society by Samuel J. Eldersveld and The Future of American Political Parties edited by Joel L. Fleishman are both more optimistic about the direction of party development. While not ignoring the very real problems that beset parties, both volumes essentially argue, in Fleishman's words, "that the party system is not in a permanent spiral of decline" (p. 2).

Clearly Eldersveld's textbook is an impressive work. Not only does it deal with every major aspect of the American party system, but also Eldersveld has accomplished what all good textbook authors strive for. He has drawn upon the large number of studies in the field and has gracefully integrated the findings of many scholars into the text. Eldersveld has accomplished much more, but the limitations of a short review do not allow a complete summary of the book. However, there are several points that should be highlighted.

One of the strongest chapters concerns the campaign process and strategy in America. Eldersveld argues that the image many people have of the political process is formed during campaigns—the only time that a large number of citizens are attentive to what is happening in the world of politics. In fact, it may be such exposure to the political system, particularly when viewed through the often-cynical prism of television news programs, that has contributed to the increase in nonvoting. This decline in voting is a serious problem for Eldersveld, who believes that "the basic public support for parties and party leaders atrophies during a period of low turnout and the dynamism of an active and participative system may be replaced by withdrawal, low interest, and above all a politics less responsive to the public" (p. 352).

As noted, Eldersveld does not believe that the party system is in a terminal state of decline. He argues that organizational activity at the grassroots level is as high or higher than it has ever been, and that the state and national parties are newly revitalized and showing signs of increased activity. Both of these developments are signs of a

healthy party system. Still, these can be no gainsaying that the political system is undergoing a degree of demobilization and dealignment. What seems to have changed is the public's attitude toward parties. Eldersveld argues that "what is new and significant is the declining relevance in public cognitions of parties combined with an increased neutralism and indifference to parties" (p. 419). Still, Eldersveld remains optimistic that the parties will continue to play a central role in the American political system.

Eldersveld has written a fine text that is impressive in terms of the breadth and depth of its coverage. The book does suffer somewhat because it devotes only a few pages to the historical development of parties and the growth of an antiparty culture in the United States. It is important for understanding the current state of parties in America that there is an ambivalence, even a hostility, to parties that has deep roots in our history and our political culture. Nevertheless, the book will help any student of American government gain a better understanding and appreciation of the party system.

The Future of American Political Parties is a collection of five essays that attempt to assess American political parties and to offer reform proposals that will lead to strengthened parties. Some of the ideas have already become reality, such as the proposal to involve more party officials and officeholders in the presidential nominating process, and others, such as attempts to discourage splitticket voting, are part of a reformers' wish-list that is unlikely ever be achieved.

In addition to pointing out the problems that face the party system, the essays are useful because they indicate areas of party regeneration. "State Parties in an Era of Political Change" by Robert J. Huckshorn and John Bibby canvasses the shape of state parties and finds that they are better organized, better financed, and better staffed than in previous years. F. Christopher Arterton, in "Political Money and Party Strength," argues that the GOP has gained strength through its extraordinarily successful fund-raising and campaign efforts. Arterton does point out that the national committees of the Republican party now more closely resemble a PAC than "a revitalized and nationalized version of traditional parties" (p. 131). Gary Orren offers a discussion of the antiorganizational spirit that is an integral part of American political culture and examines the differing styles of American party politics. He argues that coalitional, pragmatic parties are better suited to "the institutional and attitudinal properties of the American political system" and to the "antipartisanship" that is prevalent in the country (pp. 29, 31). Overall, the essays in The Future of American Political Parties offer valuable discussions of the current state of parties in America and suggest a number of ways we can strengthen the party system.

Indeed, both books can help students of American government gain a greater understanding and appreciation of the importance and centrality of the party system. As Eldersveld reminds us, "the great policy decisions are those that parties, and the leaders produced by parties, have had a major role in. . ." (p. 408).

JOHN W. EPPERSON

Simpson College

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Anatomy of a Statute. By George C. Greanias and Duane Windsor. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982. Pp. ix + 187. \$23.95.)

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was adopted in 1977, the product of Watergate-era revelations of widespread secret payments to foreign officials by American corporations doing business abroad. The authors of this study, both teachers of administrative science at Rice University, regard the law as an inappropriate effort by the Carter administration to export American ethical standards by treating the corporation as "a proconsular instrument of United States foreign policy" (p. 133). Characterizing the FCPA as "the Volstead Act of international trade" (p. 133), both for its idealism and its ineffectiveness, Greanias and Windsor conclude that the law should be substantially amended to achieve a more realistic set of objectives.

An earlier version of the FCPA proposed by the Ford administration would simply have required corporations to disclose the details of all foreign payments to the United States government and to their own stockholders. When Jimmy Carter took office, however, he advocated combining the disclosure requirement with an outright prohibition of bribery itself. The FCPA was enacted with overwhelming support from both parties and became an important part of Carter's avowedly moralistic foreign policy. In the authors' view, therefore, American corporations have been beset by vague statutory language and onerous reporting requirements that they are institutionally ill-equipped to handle.

Greanias and Windsor have produced a solid case study, rich in detail though somewhat repetitive. The book's most serious weakness is the authors' failure to demonstrate that the FCPA has not done what it was intended to do: to deter overseas corporate bribery. And while the authors report much confusion in corporate offices over exactly what the law proscribes, their prediction

that American businesses faced with inscrutable commands and intimidating penalties will simply retreat from the international marketplace is just that—a prediction. They can marshall no evidence to show that this has yet occurred.

Such evidence, however, would be beside the authors' point. Their real complaint is less with the actual impact of the FCPA than with the premises that underlie it. The most useful part of this book is its analysis of the contemporary businessgovernment relationship. Taking the FCPA as an example of the increasingly politicized environment in which businesses must operate, Greanias and Windsor argue, in effect, that such politicization ought to stop at the water's edge. They prefer the Ford administration's "marketplace" approach to the foreign payments problem: requiring disclosure of all payments and—except when foreign officials discover violations of their own bribery laws-leaving it to American stockholders and consumers to judge the efficacy and morality of such practices.

This book makes a thoughtful contribution to current debates about the proper scope and nature of government regulation. Its limitations are largely those of any case study that rests a broad theoretical argument on a narrow empirical base. To what extent can the reader—or even the authors—generalize from the case at hand to other similar ones? One wonders how far Greanias and Windsor are prepared to extend their argument for limiting the role of the United States government in the overseas operations of American businesses. After all, the corporationas-government-proconsul role did not originate with the FCPA, nor will it end even if the authors' proposed amendments are adopted. As Greanias and Windsor acknowledge, Ronald Reagan is no less committed than his predecessor was to the use of American economic power to achieve moralistic foreign policy objectives. One wishes that the authors, instead of concluding as they do by comparing the FCPA to the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, had looked at the FCPA alongside other statutes that subordinate corporate interests to American foreign policy objectives.

RICHARD J. MAIMAN

University of Southern Maine

Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power. By Edward Keynes. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 236. \$17.95.)

Keynes, through the use of historical examples and constitutional analysis, argues that a compliant Congress and acquiescient federal judiciary have granted the president sufficient discretion to

mold a prerogative national war-making power. While Keynes claims no originality introducing readers to both the concurrent and prerogative war-making theories, he does add an intriguing judicial perspective to the problem. The book's thesis asserts that federal judges, save those in Youngstown Sheet and Rubs vs. Sawyer, in adjudicating individual constitutional challenges. have imposed their values to legitimize an executive prerogative war power. In so doing, the federal courts have intruded into the constitutionally defined separation of powers between Congress and the president. He contends that the courts have neither the authority nor the necessary information to decide individual issues raised from concurrent war powers questions. At best, the courts ought to only cautiously resolve the most fundamental disagreements between Congress and the president when actions fall in that "Twilight Zone" of concurrent power. Except for the most extreme cases of interdepartmental friction, the courts ought to tread carefully when refusing to invoke the political question doctrine.

The early chapters trace the substance and theory of the Constitution to English war practices and John Locke's treatises. Noting that the Constitution explicitly rejects both federative and prerogative war power theories, Keynes points out that both Locke and Montesquieu implicitly recognize that complete separation of powers is both impossible and undesirable. While Keynes explains different theories that may justify joint action under unique circumstances, it is the offensive/defensive war theory that commands paramount interest. The Constitution grants Congress offensive, and the president defensive, war capabilities. Only when repelling an invasion, or an imminent threat of one, may the president pursue his war powers. In all other circumstances Congress, through grants contained in Article 1, Section 8, clauses 11, 14, and 18, has complete war-making power.

The middle chapters of *Undeclared War* trace historical examples, such as President Lincoln's naval blockade, and federal court decisions to demonstrate how the offensive/defensive theory has given way to a national, prerogative war power housed with the president. While this transformation can be blamed in part on congressional acquiescence, Keynes places considerable blame on the Supreme Court's ruling in the *Prize* cases, which legitimized Lincoln's fusing the commander-in-chief clause with the take-care clause into a prerogative war power. This, Keynes asserts, laid the foundation for twentieth-century executive prerogative war power and ultimately presidential constitutional transgressions in pursuing the Vietnam conflict.

Keynes's major contribution is his analysis of

several federal court decisions tracing the court's increasing reluctance to invoke the political question doctrine when determining individual's constitutional challenges of war powers legislation. The federal courts rationalized their ability to do so when Congress and the president disagree on military conduct, as happened when President Nixon continued his aggression in Southeast Asia after Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

Kevnes does not object to judicial adjudication in war powers cases, however he cautions the judiciary to tread carefully when deciding these issues. Federal courts have neither the information regarding issues with sensitive international consequences nor the constitutional authority to alter the traditional separation of powers in ways that shift the offensive war powers from Congress to the president. This right belongs to the people by utilizing democratic means. In other words, such action is a political question not open to judicial interference. Ultimately, Keynes warns the federal courts not to intervene except in those issues where fundamental questions exist between the separation of legislative/executive war powers.

This book is clearly written, conceptually tight, and a worthy addition to constitutional literature. It adds a valuable and useful perspective to the concurrent war powers question. Towards that end, Keynes should be commended for a solid, scholarly effort.

KENNETH PAUL NUGER

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press, and the Polls during Watergate. By Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 353. \$32.00, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

In the decade since the American political system took the shocks of Watergate scores of books have covered the event from almost every possible angle. Since Watergate became a codeword to generally refer to wrongdoing within the Nixon administration, and since there were many participants, the numerous Watergate books with their purported lessons and explanations of the event became somewhat of a cottage industry. So why another Watergate book now, and what have the Langs to offer a decade after the events? Quite simply, The Battle for Public Opinion is the definitive social science book on Watergate.

The Langs survey how the national media covered Watergate before the 1972 election. Many scholars have maintained that coverage in the na-

tional media was deficient to the point that Watergate was hindered from becoming a carnpaign issue. The Langs, noted social scientists, argue persuasively that the national coverage was certainly adequate. Citizens knew the basic facts of the break-in and the Woodward-Bernstein stories as passed on by the national media before the election, yet these did not translate into any relevant political responses from the electorate. It was only after the media began covering official events like trials and Senate hearings that Watergate began to generate political responses from the citizenry. According to the Langs, Watergate made the public agenda because it had made the official agenda, and it had begun to receive institutional responses to clear patterns of wrongdoing. The media was not covering "pseudoevents," but they were reporting details from institutional clashes.

The battle then evolved into a battle for public opinion between a coalition of anti-Nixon forces and the president, who tried to influence citizens to believe that he was not involved in an obstruction of justice. The Langs indicate that the mass audience never was an active force in the drama, but rather that citizens responded to events. Yet they also make it clear that the accumulative effect of how the media covered Watergate in terms of quantity and intensity helped shape perceptions for citizens as well as for the major actors in the political battle.

By using some original data and scores of empirical work done on almost every aspect of Watergate, from "decline in trust" studies to political socialization studies and network polls, this book is able to present a broad overview of the Watergate story. Among the many items in Watergate folklore that the Langs dismiss is the notion that "the system inevitably worked." Although this seems to be an important myth that the media helps perpetuate some 10 years after the incidents, it is not clear to the Langs that the system will always work. In many instances during Watergate the whole series of investigations could have ended if certain lucky breaks did not continue to happen.

The Langs, pioneers in the study of television and politics, cover the interplay between public opinion and televised coverage of the Ervin Committee, the Saturday Night Massacre, the Rodino Committee, Nixon's press conferences and addresses, the new rituals of resignation transition, and the Ford pardon.

The book is well written, with excellent research and documentation. It shows what two skilled people can do with a good idea—to chart the interaction between events, news media coverage, and public opinion during the constitutional crisis called Watergate.

The Battle for Public Opinion could be used in courses on the presidency, public opinion, media, and politics, and even in some introduction to American government courses. Because of the book's comprehensiveness and focus, it is the best book from social scientists about Watergate.

JOHN ORMAN

Fairfield University

Workplace Democracy and Social Change. Edited by Frank Lindenfeld and Joyce Rothschild-Whitt. (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1982. Pp. vii + 447. \$20.00 cloth; \$12.00 paper.)

Faced with high levels of employee dissatisfaction and low-levels of worker productivity within an economy that is shifting rapidly from industrial production to service and information related activities, American management has undertaken an expansive search for techniques designed to improve labor-management relations and increase the quantity and quality of organizational output. Today's better educated, predominantly whitecollar work force does not respond well to the authoritarian and hierarchical management practices designed for industrial drones. The clear trend is toward a more democratic workplace, with a greater degree of worker participation in decision making. Interest appears very high in many public and private sector organizations (even the U.S. military) in techniques such as quality circles, labor-management committees, and other forms of worker participation that democratize the workplace. Of course, there are different degrees of worker "participation," ranging from employer manipulation and cooptation of employees to real worker involvement in important organizational decisions.

Workplace democracy, as discussed by Lindenfeld, Rothschild-Whitt, and the other contributors to this volume, lies at the far left on the spectrum of participative management. It goes beyond the Human Relations School's focus on changing how the employee experiences the work situation, and further than the reversals in extreme task specialization and division of labor sought through "job enlargement," to an attempt to alter actual power relations between management and workers. Workplace democracy in its purest sense means that all employees are both workers and managers; the traditional organizational power structure represented by the pyramid is completely abolished and replaced with collective authority. Workplace democracy violates the

treasured principles of bureaucratic organization described by Max Weber, including hierarchical authority, specialization of labor, rule-bound administration, and impersonality of decision making. It also treads firmly on the principles of scientific management and "Taylorism."

The book is organized into five parts, each preceded by a brief introduction that helps integrate the diverse subject matter. Part 1 examines definitional issues and the organizational characteristics of workplace democracy. Part 2 considers the impacts on individual workers, which include positive factors like reduced grievances, lower turnover and absenteeism, and fewer strikes, along with negative psychological costs such as increased interpersonal friction and conflict. Part 3 contains case studies of large-scale workers cooperatives; Part 4, small, self-managed collectives. The last section treats the relevance of workplace democracy for social change in the larger society. A fascinating array of experiments in organizational democracy are examined including strawberry growers' coops, "New Wave" food coops, worker-owned refuse collection companies, a "Feminist Illegal Abortion Collective," producers' coops in the plywood industry in the Pacific Northwest, the Mondragon system of workers' cooperatives developed by Jose Maria Arizmendi in the Basque region of Spain, and a worker-managed insurance corporation with 340 employees (IGP) in Washington, D.C.

Despite some recent successes, the movement a democratic workplace faces serious obstacles, including achieving efficiency in small organizations, avoiding what seems to be an inevitable drift towards bureaucratization and oligarchy, making decisions within an environment of organizational democracy, and developing an institutional support system, not to mention formidable legal problems. However, the tone of the readings is optimistic. Several authors identify two promising channels for future workplace democracy: reopening closed plants through worker ownership and management and developing participative management processes within existing bureaucratic organizations. Ultimately, however, the success of workplace democracy depends upon the development of an accompanying political movement to thrust the concept into the mainstream of the American workplace.

The contributors to this book are unabashedly supportive of the principles of workplace democracy without being unduly polemical (with a couple of exceptions). The articles are about equally divided between original contributions and previously published manuscripts in publications running the gamut from American Sociological Review to the Coop Newsletter. The

authors represent a smorgasbord of academic disciplines and occupations, although sociologists are predominant.

Workplace Democracy and Social Change does not represent a major contribution to social science-very little theoretical or data-based work is included. It is, however, an important contribution to the literature on worker participation because of the broad range of applications of workplace democracy that are examined and the preliminary efforts by Rothschild-Whitt and Paul Bernstein (chaps. 1-2) to define the parameters of this area of investigation. Enough practical advice is included to make the book required reading for those participating in experiments in organizational democracy or interested in doing so. The book is well-written and, with the exception of the last section which contains two questionable entries, quite cohesive for an edited work. Finally, Workplace Democracy and Social Change makes very interesting and stimulating reading for anyone interested in democratizing the American workplace.

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University of South Carolina

From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary. By Louis Sandy Maisel. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1982. Pp. 173. \$12.50 cloth; \$6.95 paper.)

Congressional election research has often bypassed one of the first steps in the recruitment process-party primaries. From Obscurity to Oblivion provides an insightful and unique addition to the understanding of this initial phase of congressional elections. Maisel focuses on the 1978 congressional primaries, using three rich and complementary sets of material: personal reminiscences from his own unsuccessful bid for the Democratic nomination in Maine's First District, results of a mail questionnaire to 251 other primary candidates (largely nonincumbents), and comments drawn from in-depth interviews with 39 of the candidates. Using these three sources, Maisel constructs a well-organized account of why and how candidates attempt to run for Congress, considering in successive chapters their decisions to run, campaign organizations, the money raised and the money spent, strategies, and tactics.

Emerging from the book is an intriguing theme that candidates' decisions to run, while partly analytic or rational, are more profoundly emotional choices (pp. 16, 35). The candidates questioned often made decisions in 1976 and 1977 for their bids in 1978. At such early junctures, they

lacked adequate information on who else might run, where support might lie, and how to discern the vulnerability of incumbents. Instead, the candidates based their decisions largely on political intuition. Ultimately, the candidates ran because they genuinely wanted to do so, regardless of limited chances for success. This theme of emotionally based candidacies provides a needed contrast to other work in the field that too often presumes the rationality of candidates and the strategic character of their decisions.

As revealed by Maisel's findings, campaigns never fully surmounted these emotional and often ill-planned origins. Many organizations were all but stillborn. They encountered difficulties in finding campaign managers, leading many candidates to play the role themselves. Largely volunteer staffs were severely overtaxed, and efforts at recognition-building were seriously underfinanced. Interestingly, Maisel observes a clear gap between financial expectations and reality. Many candidates anticipated raising far more money than they were actually able to obtain. Maisel sums up a typical primary campaign:

[Candidates] might plan a basic tactical approach to implement a rather sketchy strategy; they might draw up a tentative budget, based on inaccurate income and cost projections; they might decide what they want to have done in the field by the candidate and the workers, though the number and ability of those workers is totally unknown. Frequently, they cannot think about their opponents because they do not even know who those opponents will be. They cannot set contingency plans because they cannot foresee most situations that might arise. . . . a congressional primary tends to be one long 'ad hoc' experience. (p. 95)

The book is not without problems. Personal anecdotes often supplant more rigorous analysis of the questionnaire results and more extensive use of the interviews. While the chronology of Maisel's campaign is interesting, certain items from the questionnaire receive only cursory attention in the text; others receive no attention at all. Events unique to Maisel's own experience are detailed at the expense of more generally applicable hypotheses from the questionnaire-interview data.

Despite these problems of balance, the book is a contribution to the study of the congressional nomination process. Maisel rightly concludes the work by noting the difficulties surrounding congressional primaries as mechanisms for choice. With low voter turnout and inadequate candidacies, primaries may be offering caricatures of choice, rather than meaningful choice. The book provides a solid assessment of how caricature disguised as choice may emerge and subsequently

shape competition in general elections for Congress.

LYN RAGSDALE

University of Arizona

Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability Claims. By Jerry L. Mashaw. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 238. \$25.00.)

The Social Security Administration (SSA) operates the largest system of administrative adjudication in democratic societies: more than 1.3 million disability claims are filed annually. SSA's model of bureaucratic rationality which seeks accuracy, efficiency, and fairness, of necessity must practice compromise, consistency, and fiscal restraint. Bureaucratic rationality consists of searching for the good within the constraints of the possible. Since the present disability claims process is a zero-sum game, Mashaw uses it to explore how much "good" decisions are worth in government. Since the claims examiners making disability determinations are employed by 50 state agencies ranging in function and outlook from general welfare assistance to vocational rehabilitation programs, there is the additional operational dimension of federalism.

Should we declare bureaucratic rationality "permanently disabled"? "An administrator faced with these problems-value indeterminancy, factual ambiguity, and organizational stress-might respond in many ways (suicide perhaps)," says Mashaw (p. 74). Actually, bureaucratic routine, decisional practice, unpublished written instructions, and interpretations have generated an internal administrative rule of law. Given recent media attention to disability recipients cut from the rolls whose appeal was successfully adjudicated only after their deaths, some may disagree with Mashaw: "My conclusion is that bureaucratic rationality—at least as practiced by SSA in the disability program—is a promising form of bureaucratic justice" (p. 222).

Despite its high price to length ratio, this book is strongly recommended for use in graduate seminars in public policy or law. From the opening statement "the history of American administrative law is a history of failed ideas" (p. 1), Mashaw raises all the right questions. He displays a wide-ranging knowledge of the regulatory literature with adroit references that augment the comparative value of this book for class discussion.

When governments make bad decisions, we are prone to say, depending upon our philosophic outlook, "That's because bureaucrats don't act like courts (or are not following their advice), or because the legislature left too much policy choice to the agency," or else, "Aha! That just goes to show that anything worth doing by way of regulation or social welfare can be done via the common law in a minimal state" (p. 225). If we are to develop a positive model of bureaucratic competence, we must answer the insightful questions raised in this cogent book. Rather than the particular program, Mashaw explores the disabilities of how government treats us.

DAVID L. MARTIN

Auburn University

Market Reforms in Health Care: Current Issues, New Directions, and Strategic Decisions. Edited by Jack A. Meyer. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983. Pp. xv + 331. \$19.95, cloth; \$10.95 paper.)

Adequate health care for all Americans was and is a noble social goal. We began by funding health care for older Americans (Medicare) and for the impoverished (Medicaid). Government also systemically encouraged employers to provide health insurance for the rest of us.

With approximately 90% of all Americans covered under some form of health insurance, this text offers an unspoken tribute to the relative success of American health policies. The workings of Medicaid for the elderly and the provision of extensive medical insurance by most large employers permitted many Americans to consume health care and hospital services with little regard to the cost of those services. These fortunate Americans had access to health care based on need alone—and the increased demand for these services has pushed up the price of health care for the rest of us and has drained public resources from other programs to support publicly funded health care programs.

Market Reforms in Health Care is somewhat more narrow in focus than the title suggests. Citing a need for greater efficiency and deregulation of the health care industry, the chief substantive proposals discussed in the book are (1) increased cost sharing by the individual for a portion of his health care needs, (2) federal aid to low income people that increases with need, (3) fixed dollar subsidies for specific health care services, and (4) increased competition among providers and private insurers (p. 4). The proposals are examined in detail, often in the context of specific health care reform bills introduced in the 97th Congress. Attention is given to the likely impact of making employer contributions to health insurance costs fully taxable to the individual worker as ordinary income. Also, giving the insured more choices as to level of health insurance and wider utilization of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) is discussed.

Most contributors seemed to be in sympathy with the pro-competition ideological bias of the American Enterprise Institute, although Barton Weisbrod correctly warns that a pro-competition strategy may not work because health care consumers are ill-informed, and much of the demand for services is generated by doctors. It comes as a surprise that little attention is given to the potential for cost containment by deregulating the provision of health care services, and none of the authors seems aware the changes in existing entitlement programs may increase the utilization rate among those eligible. Less surprising is the absence of any survey research data in the book or any articles that examine public health care policy in other nations. Also lacking is any discussion of the cost and public policy implications of the increasing number of citizens in advanced old age who become passive consumers of public health care resources.

With one or two exceptions, contributors to Market Reforms in Health Care accept the status quo of partial federal responsibility for health care. In this volume, they carefully examine the limited number and variety the pro-competition proposals that might limit the rate of cost increases in existing programs.

GAYLE R. AVANT

Baylor University

The Nine American Lifestyles. By Arnold Mitchell. (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1983. Pp. xii + 302. \$19.95.)

Academics, like other people, have stereotyped notions about how different sorts of lifestyles imply different political attitudes. Yet with only isolated exceptions, we never have bothered to try finding out whether our stereotypes have any basis in fact, and if they do, what it means.

Arnold Mitchell, Director of the Values and Lifestyles Program at SRI International, is not a political scientist, and the ostensible purpose of this volume is to help people in marketing and advertising make money by correctly predicting changes in consumption habits. Never mind; political scientists will find this book both informative and provocative. What Mitchell has done is to isolate several lifestyles that are distinctive both in terms of their consumption habits and in terms of their political outlooks. Admittedly, his two poor "need-driven" groups, survivors and sustainers, do not have the resources (either psychic or economic) to be very important in the political arena. The same cannot be said of the

three politically conservative "outer-directed" groups: belongers (the traditional lower middle class), achievers (affluent persons likely to be business managers), and emulators (young people who seem to want to be achievers).

Set against these latter three groups are the liberal "inner-directed" persons, whom other commentators have labelled "the New Class," and who include "experientials" (living more or less the Marin County hot-tub lifestyle), the "societally conscious" (representing the mainstream of liberal academics, bureaucrats, and political activists), and "I-Am-Mes" (young people who will become experientials or the societally conscious). Mitchell claims the existence of a ninth group, "integrateds," but doesn't have any data to support their existence.

The fastidious will find plenty to quarrel with, both methodologically and theoretically, in this book. Mitchell and his colleagues identified the eight groups through a sort of eyeball cluster analysis of a large body of survey data, which analysis was supposedly theoretically guided. Perhaps the researchers simply imposed their own preconceptions on the completed interview schedules.

Theoretically, the distinction between conformist "outer directedness" and supposedly autonomous "inner-directedness" is suspect. It has become merely jejune to point out that selfconsciously nonconformist groups are in fact intensely conformist. Such jejuneness somehow does not deter psychologists from labelling as "inner-directed" or "self-actualizing" people who act in highly predictable (indeed stereotypical) ways, which usually are the ways their friends (or some identifiable reference group) act. Somehow, the groups so labelled tend to share the values and lifestyle of psychologists. Never mind; Mitchell lays out his data with such admirable clarity, and writes so well (this is, after all, a trade book), that one can easily supply an interpretation different from his.

The clear correlation between consumption habits and political attitudes strongly suggests that lifestyle is, in fact, an indicator of class identification. The fact that such expressions may be unconscious or half-conscious, or rationalized in plausible terms, does not make them less important.

Not surprisingly, these groups have rather distinctive places in the economic structure. Experientials and (especially) the societally conscious are likely to be professionals, and the achievers (although including many professionals) are disproportionately business managers or self-employed. It would seem that lifestyle is not some ephemeral matter of mere fashion, but rather part of a structure of attitudes linking peoples' posi-

tion in the economy to their political views.

It seems to me that political scientists should have started to explore these issues long before Arnold Mitchell.

JOHN MCADAMS

Marquette University

The Political Economy of Deregulation: Interest Groups in the Deregulatory Process. Edited by Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983. Pp. ii + 164. \$15.95, cloth; \$7.95, paper.)

Federal deregulation of the American economy has been one of the most significant political undertakings of the last decade, and its consequences will be monitored closely in the years ahead. Noll and Owen, with five colleagues contributing case studies, have produced this book too early to soundly assess deregulation's effects, and thus must focus on the process of deciding to deregulate. Readers will get a review of arguments for and against deregulation and a compilation of examples frankly supporting the pro-deregulation stance.

The book's key theme is that economic regulation, when substituted for competition, strongly benefits some special interests, seriously harms others, and ultimately does the public interest no good. By applying an interest group model of analysis, the authors seek to demonstrate how interests benefited by regulation do prosper, how they become more dependent on regulation and more influential in impeding its reform, and how their prosperity under regulation is at the cost of the public's general prosperity. Noll and Owen begin by outlining the framework of deregulation and the interest group model to be applied to this framework, and they introduce the "predictable" arguments that interest groups make in debating deregulation. Their associates follow with case studies in financial regulation, pollution control, oil price policy, surface transportation, and airline regulation. Noll and Owen return in their conclusion to state: "Viewed through the lens of economic analysis, much of regulation appears to be a peculiarly cruel hoax" carried out to protect "well-organized interests against [the] public interest" (p. 155).

As this quotation implies, although interest group analysis is the ostensible methodology being brought to bear, economics provides the real criteria for judgment. In fact, interest group analysis of the deregulation process proves less useful to Noll and Owen than they apparently wished. Early in the book they remark that "the

interest group model does not fully explain events-why, for example, airline or trucking deregulation eventually took place despite interest group pressures. We do not understand this political process as well as we understand the essentially economic model of interest group formation" (p. 7). Political scientists reading the case studies will probably agree with this confession. Important interest groups are identified, but a free-market-inspired cost critique of regulatory policy generally takes the place of substantial political analysis of interest group behavior. The notable exception is Marcus Alexis's chapter on surface transportation regulation, a neat and concise history of ICC politics leading to the deregulating Motor Carrier and Staggers Rail Acts of 1980.

The economic criteria being applied deserve some comment. Although the authors cannot demonstrate deregulation's success conclusively, they adhere to their claim that competition must be presumed superior to regulation in all areas of the economy. This has some startling results in argument. For example, Alfred E. Kahn, writing on airline deregulation, asserts that pointing to regulatory policy's success in creating a "strong integrated national system" of airline service is irrelevant to judging the wisdom of deregulation. "The pertinent question was not whether the performance of the airline industry as of the middle 1970's was 'satisfactory,' in some absolute sense. It was, rather, how that performance . . . compared with the results that might have been or would be achieved if the industry were instead open to competition" (p. 139). For those wanting preliminary indication of what results were anticipated, Kahn's reply would have been-and presumably still is—that "the essence of the case for competition is the impossibility of predicting most of its consequences" (p. 140). For air travelers, that could also be the essence of the case against it.

Cost analysis of the kind that informs this book rarely supports the case for regulation, but that is insufficient proof of competition's superiority. Noll and Owen start by equating competition to the public's economic interest, yet can only say at the end that "the benefits to the public of competition are theoretical and diffuse, but no less real than the benefits of regulation to particular interests" (p. 161). In relation to an economy as complex and interdependent as the United States', that is a weak guarantee for both economic interests and disinterested scholars.

DAVID MENNINGER

University of California, Los Angeles

Who Gets What from Government. By Benjamin I. Page. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 264. \$15.95.)

Page has two purposes: "(1) to discuss how U.S. government policies affect people's income and the overall income distribution, and (2) to explore what political factors make government policies take the shape they do" (p. xi). He accomplishes these objectives admirably, but goes far beyond mere discussion and exploration by concluding that our present political processes and policies need overhaul or revision.

In his opening chapter, Page informs his readers that substantial equality—including economic equality—is both desirable and required to a higher degree than prevails in the contemporary United States. He presents data supporting his conclusion that the private economy generates very unequal incomes and that government actions do not produce a substantial degree of equality (p. 19).

Determining accurately who actually bears the burden of taxes is difficult, but Page is convinced that federal taxes "have some moderately redistributive effects" (p. 35), while state and local taxes are "regressive or proportional over the range of most Americans' incomes" (p. 40). Following his analysis of taxes including personal and corporate income, payroll, property, and sales, he concludes that "the net effect of all U.S. taxes, federal, state, and local, is not very progressive, if progressive at all" (p. 21).

The next three chapters consider social welfare programs, public goods (for example, defense, science and technology, administration of justice), and law and regulation. Page examines the political processes that determine policies in these areas and argues persuasively that organized interest groups, political parties, and public opinion play a major role largely for the benefit of the wealthy. Thus, he finds that the United States is pushed toward "social welfare policies that are not very egalitarian" (p. 100); that "public goods spending is not helpful" in lessening income inequality" (p. 155); and that capitalism "does almost certainly impose serious limits upon the degree of equality that can be attained. The U.S. Constitution and the legal system, in that sense, significantly contribute to inequality" (p. 203).

These three central chapters are difficult to read since the subject matter is indeed complex. Page works valiantly to review and evaluate the relevant work of others including W. Irwin Gillespie, Richard A. Musgrave, and Morgan Reynolds and Eugene Smolensky; to make such terms as tax incidence, equilibrium effects of regulation, and relative poverty understandable; and to show the relevance, if any, of such measures as the Gini

coefficient, Lindahl equilibrium, and the Laffer curve.

Page also offers some cross-national comparison and finds that other capitalist economies (for example, Japan, Canada, Australia) as well as socialist economies (for example, Sweden, Norway) manage to maintain vigorous economies over time with a higher degree of income equality than prevails in the United States. These nations, he believes, also take better care of their poor, aged, and jobless than we do.

Page is not sanguine that the problem of income inequality will be alleviated adequately in the United States unless and until we "face up to the prospect of working toward an alternative economic and social system" (p. 219). His strong belief that the United States' economy would actually be strengthened by more equitable distribution of the country's wealth is easier to accept than his proposals for achieving that goal. Conservatives will laud his refutation of the welfare state as an adequate solution, while liberals will appreciate his faulting of supply-side economics.

Many political scientists will not adequately appreciate Page's work because of its heavy economic emphasis. Similarly, many economists will fault the book as too political. Such criticism, however, is high praise, since the book makes a major contribution to our understanding of the close and continuing interrelatedness of political and economic systems. The book deserves a wide audience, and its message should spur dialogue around the question raised in its provocative title.

GEORGE S. BLAIR

Claremont Graduate School

Consequences of Party Reform. By Nelson W. Polsby. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 267. \$24.95, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

Curtis Gans is quoted early in this book as claiming that it has become "fashionable" for certain political scientists "to blame the reforms undertaken by the Democratic Party after its 1968 convention for all manner of political ills" (p. v). So it has. This is because appraising the impacts of changes in presidential nomination procedures is a large analytical task. Success at it requires subtle discernment of interrelationships between electoral and governmental institutions and behavior. Nelson Polsby provides such discernment in this volume.

Polsby defines two sorts of party reforms of the 1968 to 1975 period: (1) alterations in Democratic delegate selection procedures that encouraged a proliferation of primaries, thus increasing the in-

terpretative role of the mass media in the nomination process; and (2) regulation of campaign finance practices that made immediate success upon entering the primary process a survival imperative for presidential candidates. Polsby explains first the genesis of the reforms, and then their impacts upon parties, presidential governance, and the broader processes of political intermediation and mobilization. A final section assesses the reforms in reference to normative criteria of participation, peer review, and deliberation, and also discusses possible reforms of the reforms.

Polsby does not address these topics in a polemical manner. His primary argument is that the reforms were "partially responsible, and facilitative in character, that they were necessary but not sufficient pre-conditions of a particular set of institutional problems toward which the American political system evolved in the wake of the turmoil of the late 1960's" (pp. 4-5). His analysis of specific reform effects remains consistent with this carefully analytical premise; never are overly simple causal claims asserted. For example, although Polsby indicates that Jimmv Carter's disinclination toward a coalitional style of governing as president was consistent with his experience mobilizing a narrowly based faction as a candidate for the nomination in 1976, he quite readily admits that a host of other reasons exist for Carter's presidential behavior.

Perhaps the most pointed references in the book are to certain harsh statements, replete with righteousness and heated idealism, from members of the literati in 1968 about coalitional politicians such as Hubert Humphrey. It is out of the anger of liberal upper-middle-class professionals and intellectuals that the post-1968 party reforms were born. Upon reading Polsby's account of these troubled times and the rules changes they produced, one is struck by how indicative the reforms are of the potential failings of traditional political liberalism. They attempt a uniformly national solution to certain problems best solved at state and local levels, such as how parties should allocate delegates according to candidate support in caucuses and primaries, and they are urged on the basis of the honorable intentions of the reformers rather than upon a careful understanding of the actual effects of the rules changes themselves.

A few questions of authorial emphasis do arise. The genesis and operation of new campaign finance rules are given less attention than are the delegate selection rules changes. More detail on finance reforms would appropriately balance Polsby's analysis, since each of the two new sets of rules are essential components of the new nomination environment. One wonders if Jimmy

Carter will prove to be all that representative of postreform presidents. The reforms may make it easier for a candidate unappreciative of coalitional politics to win the nomination and White House, but this alone seems unlikely to portend major alterations in the conduct of the presidency.

The best parts of this book are very good indeed. Polsby's sections on the possible pattern of a "politics without parties" and the appropriateness of the criteria of deliberation, peer review, and participation in evaluating the nomination process provide important subjects for classroom discussions and lectures. This is an excellent title for adoption in both graduate and undergraduate parties courses. It should be read carefully by all concerned with the specific operations and broader systemic effects of the current presidential nomination system. Polsby's prose style is consistently lucid and lively; the notes to the text are quite thorough.

STEVEN E. SCHIER

Carleton College

Regional Conflict and National Policy. Edited by Kent A. Price. (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1982. Pp. xviii + 142. \$18.00 cloth; \$6.95 paper.)

Much of the discussion concerning the New Federalism has centered around governmental fiscal policy and expenditure techniques, or the issue of realignment of patterns of governmental interaction. This book takes a somewhat different approach. Here, the primary focus is on issues relating to energy policy and natural resources. In the introductory chapter, Kent Price describes his view of regionalism in the United States and how opposing forces within different sections are counterbalanced. The recent trend emphasizing movement of population and resources from the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt is explored and analyzed in some depth. The impact of politics, economic decisions, and cultural factors relating to the preservation of natural resources and production of energy are also discussed.

Each of the following chapters deals with one or more aspects of energy or resource policy taken within a regional framework and perspective. The first chapter, by Nathan Rosenberg, describes the historical dimensions of regionalism and suggests that, despite seemingly broad changes, the new trends that are emerging are actually a continuation of those previously developed and can be reconciled with Turner's frontier thesis suggested several decades ago. In the next chapter, Hans Landsberg examines the energy crisis of 1973 and

1974. There is also a discussion of the Clear Air Act of 1977 and of conflicts between producers of Eastern and Western coal. Allen Kneese presents three case studies dealing with energy/resource policy: a discussion of the water quality in the Colorado River, the coal tax imposed by Montana, and a legal challenge filed by the State of New Mexico against the U.S. Department of Energy regarding a nuclear waste disposal site in the state. Richard Stewart presents a discussion of the legal framework surrounding interstate resource policies. Included in this essay are a description of the commerce power (as outlined in the Constitution), regulation and taxation of natural resources, congressional powers, the concept of "judicial deference," and a series of examples of situations related to what Stewart terms "transboundary nonmarket impacts." Next, there is mention of the concept of externalities by Clifford Russell, who suggests that three classes can be identified: pecuniary, real, and political externalities. The implications for regional development and federalism of each of these types are explored, and the essay concludes with mention of new approaches being developed. In the Epilogue Gilbert White summarizes some of the issues raised previously and tries to suggest areas for further exploration. For example, White again asks, What is regionalism and regional conflict? How has this type of conflict been handled? and What are the prospects for future national policy in the energy and resource fields?

Taken as a whole, this collection of essays is quite impressive and adds a useful dimension to the dialogue surrounding federalism and regional conflict. Some of the chapters are quite short and therefore superficial in spots, and one might wish that some of the theoretical contents presented could be carried forward and applied in greater detail. Nevertheless, Regional Conflict and National Policy can be recommended to scholars of federalism, as well as those concerned with the impact of regionalism on public policy in the fields of energy and resource.

RICHARD D. FELD

University of South Florida and Eckerd College

The Political Integration of Women: Roles, Socialization and Politics. By Virginia Sapiro. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 205. \$16.95.)

Virginia Sapiro poses her central question thus:

Does the character of the connections between women's private and public life disconnect women from politics? If women do not simply 'have' private lives but, rather, are privatized, it must. Privatization breeds political marginality. (pp. 32-33)

She tests this assumption about disconnecting connections by operationalizing privatization with the by now familiar Michigan indicator "women and men should have equal roles" versus "women's place is in the home." The battery of Michigan feminism indicators from which this is drawn arouse some justified criticism, but this one evinces face validity for Sapiro's purposes. She places her measure of privatization in harness with the role statuses of education, marriage, motherhood, and homemaking and uses multiple regression techniques to assess their import in shaping women's political roles, or the lack thereof.

The women for whom these interactions are to be specified are the youth generation of the massive parent-child Survey Research Center Socialization Panel Study; Sapiro uses responses from the 1965 and 1973 waves. This group was chosen because they were one of the first generations of women to come of age contiguously with the most recent reappearance of the women's movement. They are, as she points out, taking up their adult roles and responsibilities "during one of the most important eras in the history of women" (p. 63). As justifiable as this choice is, it is lamentable that the maternal generation was excluded from analysis. We will remain ignorant of the degree to which they, too, could respond to changes in the culture's view of women's status. Sapiro argues, and rightly I believe, that studies showing increased gender role differentiation in young adulthood over that found earlier in life reveal the power of a largely conscious gender role structuring (in contrast to assumptions that the child is simply mother to the woman via role adoption). But it is for this reason that I would like to see whether restructuring of roles might occur after young adulthood, as seen in the maternal generation.

Sapiro's findings, a bit slim at times, nonetheless paint a picture of privatization associated with views of citizenship dependent on trust and passive support rather than active participation and psychological involvement. Privatization depresses the resources—efficacy, sophistication, knowledge, attempts to communicate and influence—upon which we draw in our political lives. She finds that marriage, motherhood, and, especially, homemaking can variously interact with privatization to further marginalize women, even these children of the women's movement era.

Accompanying, and at times overshadowing, Sapiro's empirical analysis are excellent treatments of the history of women's emergence as a new political group and interpretations of her findings, which would stand alone as contributions to feminist and socialization theorybuilding. Chapters 2 and 7 especially provide brief but imaginative and provocative immersions in the dilemmas of women and politics that will be valuable pedagogical tools. The chapter endnotes and the bibliographic essay are fine interdisciplinary resources. There are occasional editorial errors, as with citing 1898 rather than 1915 as the original publication date of Charlotte Gilman's Herland (Pantheon, 1979). These can be easily corrected when the book comes out in paperback, as it should if it is to have the classroom exposure it deserves.

Sapiro's book is "not, strictly speaking, an analysis of the effects of feminism on women's political roles" (p. 79). Nor is it; for some it may be an illumination of the need for feminism instead. In any case it stands alongside Rita M. Kelly and Mary A. Boutilier's The Making of Political Women (Nelson-Hall, 1978) as a vitally needed study of the crossroads of political socialization and gender roles. It is manifestly to be hoped that Sapiro or someone of her caliber will continue the research on the 1980 wave and maternal generation of the Socialization Panel Study.

SUE TOLLESON RINEHART

University of South Carolina

Turned-On TV/Turned-Off Voters: Policy Options for Election Projections. By Percy H. Tannenbaum and Leslie J. Kostrich. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983. Pp. 240. \$25.00.)

Once every four years, network projections of the outcome of the presidential election before the polls close have the potential for influencing voters who have yet to cast their ballots. The 1980 election was a case in point, since Reagan won in an unexpected landslide, leading the networks to call the election early. But the extent, and even the existence, of the impact of the projections, whether on partisan choice, or turnout, or on voting for local races, is difficult for social science to specify. Survey methods are too crude to measure the relatively subtle effects on what is at best a small segment of the electorate.

Despite the lack of firm evidence of the magnitude of the impact of early network projections, concern with their potentially disruptive influence led Percy Tannenbaum to consider possible policy alternatives to deal with the problem. The result is this volume, the product of collaboration among

Tannenbaum, Leslie Kostrich, and members of a Berkeley communications policy seminar. After considering the evidence on the extent of the problem and presenting the criteria by which he expects to evaluate possible solutions, Tannenbaum analyzes proposals to provide for uniform poll closings, to control the use of exit polls, and to limit the dissemination of network projections. A separate chapter considers what individual states can do, an important consideration since many alternatives require states relatively unaffected to bear many of the disadvantages incurred by the solutions. Tannenbaum ultimately suggests that Western states close their polls an hour earlier, that they delay reverting from Daylight Savings to Standard Time until after the election in leap years, and that networks voluntarily delay their election coverage by one hour in the West.

The value of this book, it seems to me, lies in the careful, craftsmanlike manner in which Tannenbaum proceeds. He explicitly acknowledges the lack of firm evidence, but he recognizes that policies must be considered even without clear information. He is aware of the various interests involved and the points at which they have their greatest impact, and he is realistic in treating the chances various proposals have of adoption. The product is a balanced treatment of the alternatives by one who obviously wants something done but who has no particular axe to grind.

The drawback of the book is that the subject is relatively minor. Tannenbaum concludes that many of the proposed alternatives stand little chance because the perceived need is not great enough. As long as policymakers do not see early network projections as "an unacceptable blot on the [electoral] system" (p. 104), evaluating policy proposals seems a sterile exercise, since few policy entrepreneurs would be willing to risk their political capital to work for their adoption. What redeems this book is the quality of its work; it can serve as an example for others involved in policy analysis and a standard against which we can compare those efforts.

JAN P. VERMEER

Nebraska Wesleyan University

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Planning, Implementation, and Analysis. By David Leo Weimer. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 229. \$29.95.)

Students and practitioners of energy policy, public policy, and national security, joined by a sizable community of lay followers, are justifiably concerned about, and puzzled by, the infamous history of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(SPR)—the centerpiece of U.S. energy and security policy. Why, for example, were there still only about 400 million barrels of crude oil in the SPR by the end of 1983? Why has it been so incredibly difficult to implement a policy measure with very wide acceptance and no major opponents? A careful, comprehensive, and well-documented answer to these questions is now available. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is an excellent contribution to economic and energy policy history and a useful example of solid public policy analysis.

The work is tightly organized into two major sections. The first relatively short four chapters lay out the background and history of the SPR. Weimer is able to blend the elements from bureaucratic politics, energy policy, and economic analysis necessary to explain what happened to the SPR on the way to implementation. He also sets the history in a rather thin, but still serviceable analytical framework consisting of a four-stage evolutionary process of policy implementation.

The principal analytical issues of SPR implementation, especially establishing the optimal final size, are explained and put into historical context in the second set of four chapters. Weimer perceptively delineates the central questions, their implications, and their policy history. These chapters combine an important sense of objectivity (except perhaps occasionally letting the Department of Energy off a bit easy) on a controversial topic and superbly clear explanation of the technical decisions, including the pro and con arguments at each major programmatic step.

The work is also timely for at least two reasons. First, both analysts and officials agree that the SPR is finally large enough to be usable in an energy emergency. Yet the nation now finds itself without an effective and credible policy for getting the SPR's crude oil out into the market. Furthermore, there has never been a physical test of the system's ability to actually distribute crude into our national network of pipelines and refineries. This book should lend weight to the ongoing attempts in Congress and the research community (see, for example, reports from the continuing workshops on Energy Emergency Preparedness, Keystone, Colorado) to have the federal government fully test the physical system and make detailed preparations for using the SPR.

Equally important and timely is the book's repeated warning that without full preparations now for the final two stages of site work, which will bring the SPR's salt dome storage capacity to the 750 million barrel, and eventually 1 billion barrel, levels, we will exceed by years even our currently planned completion schedule. As long as the administration is totally occupied with

reducing the federal budget deficit, there will be continuing feuding with Congress (which has been a consistent defender of the SPR) over reductions in the fill rate and new delays in the final two storage phases.

The subtitle of the book could well have been "Failure in Policy Implementation," since this is the emphasis and primary public policy contribution of the work. Although heavier by far on the substance of the SPR and the associated bureaucratic politics than on original analysis of public policy implications, Weimer's case on the SPR does demonstrate well the strengths and limitations of analysis in influencing policy formulation and implementation. It also serves as a vivid reminder of how a program of obvious importance to national security (but with no clear political constituency) can be subjected to numerous, often extraneous, delays, even when there is strong congressional support.

DAVID A. DEESE

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Crime and Public Policy. Edited by James Q. Wilson. (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 334. \$22.95, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

Aside from the introduction and conclusion written by Wilson, this volume contains three substantive sections: "Crime Rates and Criminals," "The Social Milieu of Crime," and "The Criminal Justice System." Given the breadth of this work, one would expect a corresponding lack of sophistication and insight in its essays. This is not the case, and the work as a whole is more integrated around a central set of concerns than is common in most edited works.

To a great extent, credit for this must go to Wilson, who not only put this work together but who also prepared the grounds for making its writing possible. "It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to produce this book fifteen years ago," he notes at the outset of this collection. "Not only were scholars and practitioners in an adversarial relationship, but there were precious few scholars who had an interest in systematically examining the consequences of current policies or in trying to design and test better approaches" (p. 5). Wilson fails to note the formative role that he himself has played over the past 15 years in establishing the context within which the essays contained in the volume could be written. In a sense, this new work represents an emerging consensus about how the problem of crime and policies developed to address crime are to be understood, a consensus that has emerged since the 1960s and to which Wilson has lent his voice.

In every essay in this book, the author either presents material supporting the idea that there is little that can be done to change "human nature" or suggests policy innovations for lowering crime rates that involve the expansion of policing and the more systematic use of incarceration to concentrate the impact of punishment policies on those seen as the prime contributors to crime. Little credence is given to the alternative views that once formed part of debate in criminal policy circles; that is, to the suggestions that the problems of crime are rooted in poverty, exploitation, or are attributable to other systematic social causes.

Hence, Jan M. Chaiken and Marcia R. Chaiken's "Crime Rates and the Active Criminal" discusses the major methodological barriers to establishing causal links between crime rates and specific behaviors, and then establishes a particular statistical measure—the violent predator (pp. 24-27)—whose activity is identifiable with large amounts of crime. Richard J. Herrnstein, in "Some Criminological Traits of Offenders," is at once cautionary about specifying a criminal type and profoundly radical in considering the role that physiognomical (pp. 33-34) and physiological factors (pp. 44-46) play as indicators of the potential criminality of individuals.

The studies that focus on the social milieu of crime analyze the family, schools, and employment in a uniformly clear and theoretically coherent manner. There is little that public policies can do to effect change in the kinds of family structure, school problems, or employment problems that have a bearing on crime. The presentation of the various studies, of course, varies somewhat in quality from author to author. Perhaps the best is that presented by Charles A. Murray, "The Physical Environment and Community Control of Crime," which is both clear and interesting, analyzing as it does the severe limits of the "defensive space" theory as an instrument for crime prevention.

The provocative third section begins with an essay by Mark H. Moore evaluating to what extent the control of what he labels "criminogenic commodities" (guns, alcohol and drugs) is related to crime, and concludes that such control usually fails to reduce crime and sometimes increases it (pp. 125-144). Another essay, by Laurence W. Sherman, concerning the role of the police in deterring crime argues for a more aggressive approach to crime control by the police through increased surveillance of crime areas and more use of studies devoted to identifying those most likely to commit crimes.

This volume ceases to be cautionary and

becomes most enthusiastic concerning the positive impact that policies can have when it turns to the question of prosecution and sentencing procedures. Brian Forst recommends that prosecutors use computers to summarize information about the crime histories of suspects and convicts in determining which cases to pursue (pp. 170-171) and to assist judges in determining, in a systematic manner, how to sentence convicted criminals. Steven R. Schlesinger suggests bail reform, reduction of the use of habeas corpus appeals, as well as an abolition of the exclusionary rule (all actions which could be taken exclusively by the courts) in order to prevent the escape of the criminal from the bonds of justice through administrative technicalities and the too-liberal use of bail.

These policy suggestions would require a substantial reinterpretation of the Constitutional protections now afforded criminal suspects and convicts. Yet the authors of this work do not seem to be very concerned about the protection of such rights, preferring instead to emphasize the other sets of rights with which they feel these ones conflict—the rights of citizens to be protected from crime. An explicit analysis of this conflict is missing; one wonders if the conflict is as great as is largely assumed throughout this work.

Crime and Public Policy is likely to become a standard work in the rapidly changing field of criminal justice as the expression of the consensus that exists in the early 1980s concerning policies devoted to the control of crime. Wilson and his colleagues provide few comments on the meaning of this change, on the relationship between punishment and how U.S. society understands itself, but the volume is impressive enough as it stands.

THOMAS L. DUMM

University of Houston, Downtown

Schools in Conflict: The Politics of Education. By Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst. (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan Publishing, 1982. Pp. vii + 322. \$22.50.)

This volume is a revision of Wirt and Kirst's The Political Web of American Schools (Little, Brown, 1972), one of the first books to bridge the gap between educational administrators and political scientists by providing an overview of the political characteristics of school policymaking. Like its predecessor, it concentrates on the policy process, using David Easton's systems theory as a framework for analytically separating and categorizing experiential items.

It would be a mistake, however, to view the new book as simply an updated version of the old. A

major difference in tone can be gauged by the difference in titles. Schools in Conflict emphasizes the political turbulence of the late sixties and seventies. The earlier book depicted a system in which a few headquarters professionals determine most policies in "their" school districts. The current book labels the period from 1960 to 1980 as an era of "nobody in charge," with the local superintendent having lost the ability to control outcomes. Multiple constituencies (for example, parents, taxpayers, minorities, and teachers) posit demands relating to shared control, finance, teacher power, and other concerns central to educational functioning. These groups and state and federal actors have strong influence on the shape of the local school district's agenda. Local school politics has become "more complex and less malleable" (p. 23). Wirt and Kirst now argue that in some states the issue has become "how much change and agitation a public institution can take and still continue to function effectively" (p. 22).

The purpose of Schools in Conflict is to proffer an analytical framework, and hence meaning, to the vast and sometimes confusing array of actors and conversion forums currently involved in educational politics. While explicating the generation and disposition of educational demands, the authors give an eminently readable overview of research on political socialization; access channels to school policymaking; the significance of -referenda; and the local, state, and federal conversion processes. The lion's share of the attention goes to politics at the state level, partly because Wirt and Kirst think the current slashing of federal aid is likely to reinforce state activism. Special attention is also paid to the role of courts. particularly in desegregation and school finance reform.

When Harmon Zeigler reviewed the earlier book in the September, 1976, American Political Science Review (70, 987), he praised the exhaustive literature survey. The present volume cannot hope to cover the field as completely, if only because the political science community now generates so much more research on school politics. However, I regret the absence of a chapter on school politics in an age of retrenchment, particularly discussion of how property tax cutbacks and teacher layoffs affect educational turbulence. Wirt and Kirst's own emphasis makes it almost mandatory that they attempt to analyze how various interest groups respond to the new zero-sum politics. Are demands generated and converted in novel ways when they relate to "who loses, who gets fired" rather than "who wins, who gains control of the new federal program"? Political scientists need to know because retrenchment politics may well be at the heart of local and state school agendas through most of the eighties.

The chief use for this book is likely to be as a text in school administration and politics of education courses. Despite the lack of coverage afforded retrenchment and several other current educational issues (for example, merit pay), the book is highly recommended as a graduate text because of its broad range of concerns, logical structure, clear prose, and use of systems theory to link disparate research studies and create a whole greater than the sum of the research cited.

HINDY LAUER SCHACHTER

New Jersey Institute of Technology

When Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Government Expression in America. By Mark G. Yudoff. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 326. \$28.50.)

Mark Yudoff's subject is one that for the most part has escaped scholarly examination. His concern is that government's ability to control the flow of ideas and information constitutes a substantial threat to democratic government that escapes review under traditional First Amendment analysis. Literature on the First Amendment typically centers on the government as a censor disrupting the ideal of a marketplace of ideas. Within this context, freedom of expression is valued as a means of protecting minority interests against overreaching majorities. For Yudoff, this static, eighteenth-century understanding of freedom of expression ignores the reality of twentieth-century communications systems. Today the state need not resort to the heavy-handed technique of censorship to ensure that its message is heard to the exclusion of others. As government's power to communicate has expanded, so has the danger that the citizen will be manipulated to accede to government policies and goals.

The task of accommodating the First Amendment to a world in which government dominates the communications network is complicated by the state's legitimate role in educating the citizenry and furthering policy choices. To unduly limit government's ability to communicate would itself be a serious blow to democratic government. Yudoff seeks a middle ground through a model of free expression designed to further "mutually affecting communications" between the people and their leaders. Drawing upon Charles Black's theory of judicial review in which constitutional adjudication is keyed to enforcing the conditions necessary for a functioning political system, Yudoff seeks to free First Amendment jurisprudence from a preoccupation with minority rights and the intent of the Framers to one grounded in the broader norms of majority rule, consent, and the realities of the modern industrial state. The result is a concept of freedom of expression in which minority rights constitute only one part of a larger First Amendment whole designed to ensure that majority rule rests on individual choice and not government manipulation.

A substantial portion of When Government Speaks is devoted to the role of the judiciary in enforcing an expanded First Amendment. Not surprisingly, cases in which individuals seek to redress traditional First Amendment rights pose little difficulty. Given the judiciary's propensity for considering First Amendment claims in terms of a balancing of interests, courts need only weigh the virtue of pluralism as an additional factor to be measured against the state's justification for suppressing speech. Substantial difficulties arise, however, when private parties petition courts to place restraints on government speech. Because few plaintiffs would be able to show an individualized interest in government speech apart from that of all citizens, the standing requirements of the federal courts might prove a particularly burdensome threshold issue. As Yudoff makes abundantly clear, the difficulty of fashioning appropriate judicial remedies in cases that survive preliminary challenge should give pause to even the most enthusiastic proponent of judicial activism. Moreover there is the inescapable problem of linedrawing. Is there a principled way for the judiciary to distinguish propaganda from information? What standards might courts employ to measure the worth and impact of government expression? To begin to ask such questions is to suggest the complexity of the problem of government speech in a system of free expression.

Doubtful of the wisdom of placing in the judiciary complete control of government speech, Yudoff recommends joint judicial and legislative responsibility through the *ultra vires* doctrine. Legislative authorization would be necessary to justify government speech, and the task of the judiciary would be to enjoin any speech lacking such justification. Such an approach frees courts from the constraints of constitutional analysis while placing final and ultimate control in the legislature. As Yudoff notes, the primary benefit of this approach is that it seeks to compel and focus legislative attention on the government speech issue.

This is a fine book. It is a carefully constructed, meticulously researched examination of a problem many citizens may vaguely sense but few have investigated in a systematic and scholarly fashion. When Government Speaks warrants careful consideration.

MARK SILVERSTEIN

Boston University

## Comparative and Other Area Studies

Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of Its Politics. By Robert J. Alexander. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. v + 159. \$21.95.)

As part of the Hoover Institution-Praeger Latin American series, this volume provides a general introduction to Bolivian politics. Following a brief discussion of the Bolivian population, geography, and economy, Alexander devotes the bulk of the volume to the nation's historical development with chapters on the pre-Columbian and colonial era, the early years of independence, the Chaco War, the 1952 to 1964 revolutionary era, and postrevolutionary Bolivia. A concise overview of the principal political groups, a survey of Bolivia's foreign relations, and Alexander's brief prognosis for the future complete the book.

The book is strongest in its treatment of the revolutionary period; in comparison, the contem-

porary era is treated only sketchily. As a basic introduction to Bolivian politics, some simplification is inevitable and indeed necessary. Unfortunately, given Alexander's emphasis on straight political history, the book fails to provide an analysis of the economic and social determinants of contemporary Bolivian politics. His assertion that Bolivia's political future depends on the continued economic development of the country is not explored. What is the relationship between economic development and political stability in Bolivia? Indeed, what does Alexander mean by economic development? The relationship between economic growth and equitable distribution of wealth is particularly interesting in the Bolivian case. As Jonathan Kelley and Herbert S. Klein demonstrate in their study, Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality (University of California Press, 1982), the 1952 Revolution served to redistribute wealth in the short term but to create a

new elite class in the long term. While Alexander describes some of the economic and social causes of the Bolivian Revolution, he devotes little attention to the Revolution's effects on social and economic inequality.

Similarly, his discussion of contemporary political actors is much too brief, leaving the reader with many questions: What is the relative power of the various groups such as peasants, unions, and students? Where do they get their power, and what do they want? While Alexander is certainly correct in deemphasizing the formal structures of the government (covering them in less than two pages), he does not devote sufficient attention to the informal relationships between the principal political actors in contemporary politics. For example, the relationships between the Church, the military, the miners' unions, and the peasants, fascinating in their dynamic complexity, are barely addressed in this study.

The relationship between Bolivian politics and the international system is not addressed adequately. U.S.-Bolivian relations are only briefly touched on (indeed, almost as much attention is devoted to Soviet-Bolivian relations as to U.S.-Bolivian ties). Given Bolivia's historic dependence on international markets for its mining and agricultural exports, international factors are particularly important in Bolivian political and economic development.

The main shortcoming of this volume is that Alexander does not place the Bolivian experience in a broader context. The reader is given no sense of why Bolivia has been so unstable or even whether such instability is unusual in Latin American nations. Nor does Alexander provide a theoretical context for understanding Bolivian politics. The dominant paradigms in the field of Latin American politics—dependency theory, corporatist approaches, even development theories—are largely ignored by Alexander in his concentration on political history. The lack of an explicit theoretical or geographic context limits the usefulness of the study for Latin American area experts.

Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of Its Politics is best suited for the undergraduate classroom, where its coverage of basic background details and its relatively clear writing style provide a readable introduction to Bolivian politics.

ELIZABETH G. FERRIS

Lafayette College

Political Terrorism and Energy: The Threat and Response. Edited by Yonah Alexander and Charles K. Ebinger. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xiii + 258. \$29.95.)

This book is an important addition to the growing literature on political terrorism. Its focus is the historical and potential effect of terrorism on energy supply, a topic rarely discussed in a systematic, comprehensive, and empirical fashion in other publications dealing with terrorism. In this regard the book is a significant contribution. It constitutes a convincing response to those who argue that terrorism is, comparatively, an unimportant phenomenon.

The book attempts to go beyond the simple proposition that a modern, industrialized country is highly vulnerable to a terrorist attack. It does it in two major ways: by focusing, sometimes in great detail, on potential targets for such attacks, and by dealing with strategies, methods, and techniques for responding to attacks (or even to potential attacks).

The volume adds little to what we already know in general about terrorism in the contemporary world. Yet, the general chapters by John M. Collins (theoretical in nature) and Yonah Alexander (mainly empirical) give a good background to the uninitiated reader. Collins emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between different types of terrorism with the most relevant, from the point-of-view of this volume, being probably "radical" terrorism (of the "revolutionary" type), while Alexander focuses on the support given to terrorists by some states and the mode of international links among terrorist groups.

One of the truly fascinating studies in the volume is the one by David Ronfeldt and William Sater that compares the "high-technology terrorists" of the past with those we may have to confront in the future. The authors try to penetrate the psychological mindset of terrorists who, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, used dynamite, often in order to destroy completely (so they believed) the existing order. The analogy to what might be the psychological makeup of nuclear terrorists in the future is quite clear and rather disturbing, and it seems that this type of analysis could give us some useful insights. Yet, the authors could have used more sophisticated psychological methods. Hopefully other scholars will take up the task of analyzing with more rigor "dynamite terrorists" in order to enable us better to understand potential "nuclear terrorists." Of particular significance is the question of the conditions under which a conventional terrorist group could become, out of desperation, a nuclear terrorist group, a possibility that seems quite real.

The rest of the chapters in the volume deal more specifically with the link between energy supply and contemporary terrorism. Less attention is given to the larger political questions, possibly one of the book's most serious shortcomings. The analysis, by and large, is based on the available relevant data, and in most cases the data base is truly useful. Thus, the volume includes a list of incidents of public utility and petroleum company facilities (1974 to 1977), a list of oil loading terminals in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean supplied to the author, Lisa Maechling, by "an international oil company that prefers to remain anonymous" (p. 120), and a list of cases of sabotage to energy-related targets such as powerlines, oil storage facilities, refineries, and oil tankers.

Almost all authors call attention to the extreme vulnerability of the world's energy-related facilities and operations. The book includes a detailed discussion of these components of the oil logistics systems that are most vulnerable to an attack, with the conclusion being that the Middle Eastern oil loading terminals are particularly vulnerable, somewhat of an Achilles' heel of the whole system. The analysis suggests that a relatively small effort on the part of determined terrorists could easily lead to a complete shutdown of the system for a long period of time (a minimum of 18 to 24 months). One of the authors is extremely dubious about the ability of the Rapid Deployment Force to protect the Middle Eastern oil facilities or to repair them quickly in the case of a major act of sabotage.

The book gives serious attention to the danger of nuclear terrorism, mentioning hundreds of nuclear-related incidents. Of particular value is a discussion of important policy questions regarding nuclear terrorism. This analysis makes the book useful not only for students of international affairs but also to students of public policy in general.

ILAN PELEG

Lafayette College

Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union. Edited by Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982. Pp. xxix + 526. \$60.00.)

The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management. By William J. Conyngham. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 332. \$34.50.)

The "hairbrained schemes" for which Khrushchev was overthrown in 1964 included attempts to reform the economy by political changes from above. Neither the theoretical nor political groundwork had been well prepared. In the Brezhnev period there ensued a vigorous if confined discussion in the Soviet specialist press on the theory and practice of economic reform. Drawing upon historical Soviet experience as well as foreign-developed theories and practices, a number of reforms were devised, tried, and critically evaluated in the 1960s and 1970s. They included changes in pricing, planning, horizontal and vertical linkages, success-indicators, and others. Attempts were made by the political leadership to use the social sciences, broadly defined, both to develop (politically) realistic reform measures and to mobilize specialist support for them. Among the social sciences so used was Soviet "management science" whose practitioners, like their Western counterparts, are far from unanimity on concepts, hypotheses, theories, and models. In The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management, William J. Conyngham has performed the valuable service of making available to Western readers the Soviet discussions and controversies about how to alter Soviet economic management to improve the economy's performance. This work is a veritable tour de force of the subject.

Wasting little time on preliminaries, Conyngham sets the reader down in the midst of the ongoing Soviet discussions on management reform. The focus is on one hand upon contributions from theorists of management rather than from line officials, on the other hand by apparatchiki and other political officials. Conyngham presents a large number of Soviet contributions in such a way that almost every piece of work is seen to critically analyze its intellectual predecessors and is, in turn, critically analyzed by its successors. If the flow of the discussion is not always smooth, it is because scholarly discussions do not always proceed in neat precise moves. If the discussions sometimes appear baroque and opaque, it is due to the extremely complex and abstract terminology in which organization theorists the world over talk to each other.

The consequences of the economic problems afflicting the Soviet economy include declining secular growth rates, technological backwardness, and low labor productivity. Conyngham sees reform proposals falling generally within three categories: cybernetic-based systems analysis, greater use of market mechanisms, and behavioral (human relations) changes in the relationship of formal to informal organization. While Conyngham discusses the political and institutional constraints upon reform, his more important contribution lies in discussing the problems inherent in conceptualizing and implementing realistic reform proposals. A full-scale cybernetic control

system, for example, would be as grandiose as any of Stalin's nature transformation schemes. Before a cybernetically controlled economy can be developed, there must be an enormous quantity of high-quality compatible computer hardware. But the backwardness of many sectors of the Soviet economy hampers things. For example, hardware development is beset by many of the same problems—poor quality control, hardware and software incompatibilities, unreliability of supply—for which the cybernetic solution is sought. In this catch-22 situation, it is difficult to play catch-up.

Is micromanagement generic in all firms, or is it situation-specific? Might the management structure of a defense industry in the Soviet Union, because it is relatively well-supplied (or for other reasons), differ from management in a civilian goods plant? Conyngham's discussion of Soviet management theory does not raise this question, leaving the impression that both he and they accept the generic approach to management. Much Soviet management theory is borrowed from, or at least related to, Western theory. It would have been helpful if Conyngham had included more discussion of Western, specifically American, management experience so that the reader could have had the benefit of a comparative perspective.

Whereas Conyngham looks at the Soviet management modernization problem as a whole, the authors in the Amann and Cooper volume, Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union, present a disaggregated analysis of the difficulty of institutionalizing innovation in the Soviet economy. In 10 chapters, some of which are nearly of monographic length, the contributors, a multidisciplinary team of engineers and economists at the University of Birmingham, England, examine innovation in the machine tool, chemical, and defense industries, and in the processes of group technology, management automation, control instrumentation, and absorption of foreign technology. One theme that reoccurs in many of the chapters is the difficulty of playing technological catch-up. The authors document, for example, how reliance upon importing foreign models or plans weakens innovative capacity of the domestic design bureau so that backwardness is institutionalized. This conclusion complements Conyngham's observations. The wealth of detail that enlivens each chapter's analysis makes this book an outstanding contribution and worthy sequel to Amann and Cooper's earlier endeavor, The Technological Level of Soviet Industry (Yale University Press, 1977).

Is a Soviet-type centrally planned economy inherently unworkable and inefficient? Both Conyngham and the authors in the Amann and Cooper volume decline the opportunity to make such a sweeping pronouncement. They acknowledge that the weakness of market relationships creates difficulties. While expressing guarded pessimism about finding solutions, they do not rule it out altogether. Whether the coordinating and innovating functions of the marketplace can be gotten around by other mechanisms is a task which is perhaps the truest test, not of economic or managerial but of political innovation.

ARON G. TANNENBAUM

Lander College

The Politics of Canadian Public Policy. Edited by Michael M. Atkinson and Marsha A. Chandler. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983. Pp. 283. \$30.00, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

"The object of this collection of essays is to explore the roles of the state in a variety of policy settings, and to provide an overview of different approaches to the analysis of the policy process. To this end, these studies describe the substance and processes of policy-making as well as the forces that give rise to public policy" (p. 15).

Eleven substantive chapters by 15 authors appraise topics including language policy in Quebec, the politics of provincial resource policy, legal aid in Canada, technological innovation and industrial policy, Atlantic Canada fisheries policy, health policy in Canada, and policy consequences of northern development.

Americans might be interested in the discussion by J. Robert S. Prichard and Michael J. Trebilcock, who assess why a government might resort to public ownership rather than such alternatives as taxation, expenditure policy, and regulation to attain a particular interventionist objective. They note that the puzzle of public enterprises (that is, those wherein a government provides goods or services to the public on a commercial or quasicommercial basis) is the patchwork pattern of its trans-Canada manifestations.

Prichard and Trebilcock examine why crown corporations—public enterprises that are Canadian corporations in which the government has a de facto controlling interest—are chosen by politicians in particular settings. They distinguish the characteristics of public ownership from private-sector regulation and also distinguish departmental bureaucracies from crown corporations.

To determine appropriate subsidies, a government needs a great deal of information about a firm's costs. The concept of monitoring is the core explanation of why a government might favor public ownership over private-sector regulation. The presence or absence of a relevant competitive market is influential because this affects monitoring costs.

Moreover, the limitations of direct regulation

become apparent where regulatory objectives are evolving or uncertain. In railways, airlines, and utilities, a firm's policies must adapt to a constantly changing environment; it will be difficult to issue a stream of orders to dictate behavior of the private firm.

Crown corporations might, on the other hand, also be favored over departmental bureaucracies in that public concerns engaged in market-type activities in competition with private-sector concerns should be sufficiently removed from the political process to compete without excessive political intrusion. "In particular cases, politicians will find it advantageous to be able to claim credit for positive activities of government or government agencies, but at the same time will want to be able to establish some distance from these activities where there are zero or negative political returns. The crown corporation structure facilitates this distancing strategy to a greater extent than a departmental bureaucracy, where the principle of ministerial responsibility severely circumscribes its utilization" (p. 214).

Overall, the editors of this well-balanced collection of essays of moderate depth are correct: "A tidy, consistent view of the state and policy-making would be more satisfying, but these essays suggest that no such view is readily available. There are, instead, multiple avenues of analysis, and the challenge is to combine these for a wide and cumulative understanding of Canadian politics and policy-making" (p. 16).

GEORGE STEVEN SWAN

Widener University

The Structure of the Defense Industry. Edited by Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 372. \$27.50.)

The purpose of this excellent volume is to describe and analyze the role of defense industries in the economic and industrial structures of modern states since World War II. The book is well worth reading for its scholarship and analysis. Both developed and developing nations are considered, irrespective of their political economic organization. To this end, 10 case studies examine the economic aspects of defense industries in nine states, with a general chapter on developing countries.

The case studies include, "The United States," by Judith Reppy; "The Soviet Union," by David Holloway; "France," by Edward A. Kolodziej; "The Federal Republic of Germany," by Michael Brzoska; "Sweden," by Per Holmstrom and Ulf

Olsson; "Czechoslovakia," by Stephen Tiedtke; "Italy," by Sergio Rossi; "China," by Sydney Jammes; "Israel," by Gerald Steinberg; and "Developing Countries," by Herman Wulf. Frank Blackaby has written an introductory chapter, "The Military Sector and the Economy." Editors Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg have supplied the Preface and two appendixes, Ball's on British defense industry, and Leitenberg's on the military uses of raw materials.

Frank Blackaby introduces the case studies with a useful discussion of the impact of defense expenditure on three economic variables: growth, employment, and inflation. Appropriately, he restates the old point that military expenditures impose opportunity costs on societies in the form of foregone private or public goods and services. However, he concludes that barring major changes in defense spending trends, "it is a mistake to consider that the military sector is responsible for such macro-economic developments as upswings in prices or unemployment" (p. 20). He does not rule out a relationship between military spending and economic performance but, to the contrary, suggests a number of possible relationships, especially industrial and structural consequences in developed and developing countries.

Blackaby provides a good beginning for the following case studies. The editors require each case study author to address a set of core topics designed to establish the economic parameters of national defense industries. These topics, as set forth in the Preface, include the historical context of the defense industry, defense industry employment, measures of defense sector output, comparisons to national totals and other sectors, the capital value of the defense industry, the types and amounts of government inputs, comparisons of civilian and defense research and development, labor inputs and internal organization of major producers, competition in the defense industry, arms exports, regional employment concentration in defense production, the importance of defense contracting for particular industrial firms or sectors, defense industry raw material consumption, the use of highly trained labor, and finally the defense industry's role as a "leading edge" in maintaining national technological development. Each case study has been organized around these topics, thus producing a highly integrated set of chapters and greatly facilitating comparisons among the cases.

In their preface, Ball and Leitenberg contend that while political considerations are the main determinant of arms policy, economic arguments are employed frequently by opponents of arms reduction. Cuts in procurement, it is alleged, will impose hardships upon important firms, workers, trade balances, research, and development. Based upon the case studies in this volume, the editors write that reductions in defense production "would cause relatively minor economic dislocations in nearly all cases and that even this could be mitigated by the ability of economies to adapt to changing patterns of production" (p. 3). In general, the case studies support this conclusion.

All the case studies are of high quality, and the book is a valuable contribution to a growing literature concerning the political economy of defense. Some studies treat certain topics better than others, but generally the differences balance one another out. At certain points, government policies regarding data collection and publication undermine precision, but the authors show great skill in using the available information. The issue of conversion of defense production to civilian production is implied in the Preface, and some but not all authors discuss it. It would have been helpful had this issue been discussed more extensively, but this is a minor point. A case study of the United Kingdom would have been useful, especially given the conversion research produced there. However, Ball and Leitenberg indicate that efforts to obtain a British chapter failed. A statistical appendix on Britain is provided instead.

Finally, The Structure of the Defense Industry is a superb book for professional audiences, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates. It is appropriate for students of international relations, comparative politics, the political economy of defense, or peace studies.

M. STEPHEN PENDLETON

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El Salvador in Transition. By Enrique Baloyra. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xviii + 236. \$19.95, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution. By Tommie Sue Montgomery. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 252. \$22.50, cloth; \$10.95, paper.)

With the recent political instability, revolution, and U.S. government involvement in Central America has come a veritable flood of writings about the region. Although these two excellent studies of the historical and contemporary crisis in El Salvador cover relatively the same terrain, their approaches and conclusions are somewhat distinct.

Baloyra clearly approaches the current and historical crisis in El Salvador as a political problem. Although he briefly discusses the economic and social conditions that have led to the present crisis, he believes that the crisis was primarily

brought on by a lack of will and creative political management on the part of the military, which has controlled the state since 1931. He feels that the military, which had removed the coffee oligarchy from direct control of the state during the crisis of the Depression, failed to create an "active state" or embrace a philosophy of "positive government" that would have reordered the balance of social forces. Rather, "the Salvadorean capitalist state remained basically unreformed" (p. 11). In 1948, when another opportunity for basic reform presented itself, the military failed again. Baloyra writes (p. 17):

Instead, during the next three decades in El Salvador, the military controlled but did not dominate the society. It failed to become the hegemonic actor that could replace the oligarchy; it missed a number of opportunities to form a dominant coalition, and it prevented others from doing so.

The theme of the failure of the military to institute needed economic and social reforms, build a new political coalition, and destroy the oligarchy permeates Baloyra's work, but although accurate, the analysis leads him to almost ignore other social forces and organizations that present an alternative. While Baloyra acknowledges the rise of student groups, peasant and industrial unions, and other popular organizations, his approach, which focuses primarily on the government and elections, leads to an undue concentration on the military and the Christian Democratic party (PDC).

Baloyra's partisanship toward the PDC tends to ruin an astute political analysis of the events since the 1979 overthrow of the reactionary Romero regime by the relatively progressive "young military" officers. Although all of the evidence presented leads to the conclusion that the attempt by the PDC and the "young military" to reform the system has failed, Baloyra continues to act as an apologist for both, even as they move to the right. Although he is highly critical of the Reagan administration's attempt to force the PDC into an alliance with the "loyal" Right, Baloyra's preferred solution—an alliance of the PDC, the progressives in the military, and the noninsurrectionary left—had its opportunity and is now impossible. By Baloyra's own account, the progressives in the military have been routed by right-wing officers allied to the oligarchy, and the left-wing of the PDC, along with the balance of the noninsurrectionary left, has gone over to the guerrillas after experiencing violent repression by the military, the security forces, and their associated right-wing death squads.

Montgomery's book, Revolution in El Sal-

vador, is the more complete of the two. Whereas Baloyra gives scant attention to El Salvador's pre-1931 coup history, Montgomery begins with a compressed, although complete, chronicle of Salvadoran history since the Spanish conquest. While she concentrates on the same political developments as Baloyra, Montgomery focuses more closely on the socioeconomic roots of the present crisis.

Montgomery recounts the history of one-crop production in El Salvador—cocoa in the sixteenth century, indigo in the eighteenth century, and coffee in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—and the progressive expropriation of the peasantry these developments entailed. Montgomery argues that until the Depression, the coffee oligarchy, which directly controlled the state, controlled the peasantry through the brute repression of its own private armies and, later, the Rural Police and Mounted Police. The breakdown of the oligarchic state and its social control apparatuses during the Depression opened the way for direct military control of the state and military repression of the peasantry, whose attempt to revolt in 1932 was brutally crushed. While the military has been instrumental in modernizing the economy, according to Montgomery it has protected the coffee oligarchy's monopoly over the land and economy of El Salvador.

She feels that the balance of forces was changed dramatically by the efforts of progressives within the Catholic church who took up the call in 1965 from the Second Episcopal Conference of Latin American Bishops "to defend the rights of the oppressed" and make a "preferential option for the poor" (p. 99). These progressive churchmen and women set up Christian Base Communities which, while not outwardly political themselves, created the leadership and the basis for the Popular Organizations which, in alliance with the Left parties and guerrillas, today effectively challenge the military and the Right. Montgomery rightly focuses her attention on these groups because, unlike Baloyra, she has no illusions about the PDC or the military. Although from time to time the military has thrown up a reformist wing, the close alliance between the military and the oligarchy which, according to Montgomery, is solidified through graft and favors, has not waned. By her account, the PDC has moved to the Right with Duarte in charge and with the defection of more than 60% of its membership to the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), the political wing of the rebels.

Although both authors are highly critical of the past and present role of the U.S. in Salvadoran crises and favor negotiations with the opposition, Montgomery argues for negotiations with the participation of the guerrillas as well as the FDR.

while Baloyra rejects negotiations with the guerrillas and continues to hope for a "center-left" solution.

**DOUGLAS FRIEDMAN** 

The College of Charleston

The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency: Mining, Class and Power in "Revolutionary" Peru. By David G. Becker. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xxviii + 419. \$35.00, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

Like a number of other mineral-rich countries, Peru has taken a more assertive role in the expansion of its mining industry over the past decade and a half. David Becker's analysis of this transformation is principally concerned with the character of the "new bourgeoisie" that has taken shape in and around the mining sector, and with what this portends for economic and political development in Peru. The book rests upon impressive fieldwork and bristles with provocative ideas that intrude into a host of ongoing debates including those over class structures, corporatism, and prospects for democracy in Latin America.

"Bonanza development" is Becker's term for the overall strategy that Peru has been following: the use of its mineral riches (copper, tin, zinc, silver) "for financial support of the state and purposes of cooptation, . . . but coupling these to greatly expanded state activity oriented toward industrial promotion" (p. 64). He focuses his attention on the mining sector as the centerpiece of this strategy. He begins with institutional analysis of three components of the sector: large-scale transnational firms (the gran mineria), domestically owned medium-sized firms (the mediana mineria), and parastatal enterprises. He supplements this with a class analysis of bourgeoisie, middle class, and labor in the mining sector.

Becker argues that the world non-ferrous metals industry is an oligopoly controlled by a bourgeoisie now international in character, and that "certain bourgeois elites of the less developed countries are incorporated into this class element on a somewhat equal basis" (pp. 91-92). The more mature transnational firms have learned to pursue their own interests in developing countries while conforming to the policies of host country governments (the "doctrine of domicile"). Peru's major parastatal mining enterprise, MineroPeru (whose "class character...is indubitably capitalist" [p. 229]), has itself become a member of the oligopoly. The domestic bourgeoisie of the mediana mineria neither has been displaced by, nor seeks to exclude, foreign investment. Moreover, it "does appear to exhibit a good deal of entrepreneurial dynamism in business affairs and has proven that it can define its interests on the basis of national realities, independently of the concerns of foreign capital" (p. 199).

Becker intends several chapters as tests of propositions drawn from dependency theory. On each count he finds dependency theory wanting. More adequate, he argues, is a "post dependency hypothesis" drawn from the work of his thesis advisor Richard Sklar. This is the least satisfactory facet of a very substantial work. There is no coherent presentation of what Becker considers dependency theory to be, and the propositions he ascribes to dependency theory are coarse and mechanistic-dependency theory at its worst. In some regards. Becker's analysis does part company from even the most sophisticated versions of dependency theory. As a number of recent studies have shown, however, dependency theory cannot just accommodate, but should illuminate, thirdworld states capable of bargaining successfully with transnational firms or national bourgeoisies that can both forge links with transnational capital and exercise entrepreneurial leadership.

More interesting and more compelling is Becker's argument that the Peruvian bourgeoisie, "despite its international linkages, . . . is nothing other than a true dominant class" (p. 275). Viewing the mining fraction as both a reference group and a leading stratum, the Peruvian bourgeoisie has, Becker contends, both the ideological and the structural requisites to exercise hegemony over the working class, not through superexploitation and repression but through institutionalized incorporation. While still "tentative" at the present moment, he concludes "there are many indications that this hegemony can be strengthened in the years to come" (p. 319).

The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency has an abundance of riches, both empirical and theoretical. It deserves wide and careful reading.

DOUGLAS C. BENNETT

Temple University

Conflict, Politics and the Urban Scene. Edited by Kevin R. Cox and R. J. Johnston. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. V + 265. \$27.50.)

In a recent review essay appearing in this journal (1982, 76, 883) Bernard Grofman alerted us to the fact that a "renaissance" of sorts has been occurring in political geography, and he strongly advised political scientists to pay more attention to the scholarly work being produced in that field. I believe Grofman's suggestion is most appropriate,

but unfortunately few political scientists interested in urban politics are likely to find Conflict, Politics and the Urban Scene, edited by geographers Kevin R. Cox and R. J. Johnston, to be especially useful. Although the contributions to this volume are uniformly well-written and clearly conceptualized, specialists in urban politics are not likely to find many of them very enlightening, either theoretically or empirically.

Cox and Johnston, in their introductory essay, note that urban conflict is a phenomenon that has caught the attention of geographers only recently, and that it is widely recognized as something not adequately accounted for by the locational theory and analysis that had been dominating inquiry in human geography. The response, they argue, has resulted in two competitive theoretical postures. One involves internal revisions in locational analysis, adding factors such as externality effects, turf-based interest groups, and public institutional involvement to the previous focus on competitive market forces. The other is a more Marxist-influenced effort to place urban locational conflict in the context of more fundamental, and presumably more explanatory, classbased conflicts. The 11 chapters that follow, almost all of which are case studies, illustrate these different theoretical postures.

The bulk of the volume, the first eight contributions, reflect the influence of the first, revisionist posture. Overall, these eight selections demonstrate that the externality effects (positive and negative) associated with land use choices create conflict, and therefore often involve public institutions as well as market forces in the locational decision-making process. The chapters are primarily case studies of particular conflicts. Most of these are placed clearly within a useful conceptual framework, but the studies themselves are usually time- and place-specific descriptive accounts designed to illustrate the role of particular actors and/or the use of particular strategies in these conflicts. While as noted above these are invariably well done, political scientists concentrating on urban politics are not likely to gain new insights or understanding as a consequence of reading them.

J. Paul Herr's contribution is a good example of what these case studies have to offer. He does a fine job of briefly identifying the implications for both central cities and suburbs of the suburban relocation of retail business establishments. He then illustrates the fact that local governmental units (well aware of these implications) attempt to influence the locational choices of such commercial enterprises by recounting the competitive efforts of South Bend, Indiana, and the adjacent municipality of Mishawaka, to entice a major retail outlet (Sears and Roebuck) to serve as the

magnet store for either a proposed central city downtown mall or a new suburban shopping center. The documentation of this type of intergovernmental competition, with tax incentives and special public service packages being offered in order to improve a political jurisdiction's competitive position, is well done and will undoubtedly excite those who advocate metropolitan governments, but it will be fairly familiar ground to most urban-oriented political scientists. Another example is the contribution by B. T. Robson, an illustration of a "hidden agenda" of social considerations behind the ostensibly socially neutral objections to, in this case, a proposal to reroute traffic in an English city. Even the contributions that are not traditional case studies, such as R. J. Johnston's essay treating the use of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause to challenge exclusionary zoning and inequities in the provision of public services (both intra- and interjurisdictional) as an example of a "voice strategy" (as in "exit, voice, and loyalty"), provide little that will not already be familiar to a political science audience. Perhaps the most interesting chapters for most readers will be the two accounts. one by Ronald Bordessa and James Cameron, the other by W. S. Logan, of unsuccessful efforts at implementing centralized, metropolitan-wide land use plans, in Toronto and Melbourne respectively.

The three remaining contributions, placed in a section entitled "Beyond Locational Conflict," reflect the second, Marxian theoretical posture. These selections suggest that what often appears to be locational conflict is in fact better understood as more fundamental class-based conflict. While the empirical portions of these studies are not very exciting, the theoretical arguments are quite intriguing, and therefore these chapters can be expected to find a more interested audience among political scientists. Kevin R. Cox and Jeffrey J. McCarthy, for example, argue that what appear as "turf" issues to neighborhood activists, and also to those who study neighborhood activists, are really class issues which need to be responded to, and studied, as such. Ruth Fincher contrasts the rhetoric supporting Boston's downtown redevelopment policies (the revitalization of the city's economy generally and the municipal tax base specifically) with what she perceives to be the reality of those policies (facilitating the accumulation of capital by large-scale developers without improving the public fisc). And in the final selection, Peter J. Taylor and Harry Hadfield conclude that both the tenants and the managers in Britain's council housing program are the victims of a capitalist system that foists unprofitable but necessary activities onto the state.

Conflict, Politics and the Urban Scene may be well-received among urban geographers interested

in politics, but unfortunately political scientists interested in urban areas are likely to find it rather disappointing.

RICHARD L. ENGSTROM

University of New Orleans

Österreichs Parteien seit 1945: Zwischen Koalition und Konkurrenz. Edited by Peter Gerlich and Wolfgang C. Muller. (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumuller, 1983. Pp. xii + 378. 248 schillings, paper.)

This is a collection of 12 original essays by recent social science graduates, mainly in political science, and some who are still writing their dissertations at the University of Vienna. Like nearly all such works, the quality varies considerably. Peter Gerlich has provided the introductory and concluding chapters. The book is divided into three sections, political party development, party structure, and party environment.

Under the first section, the two major parties and the FPO and the KPO are covered. The treatment is straightforward and solid, with many references to the theoretical literature from Weber to Sartori. The chapter on the SPO by Franz Buchegger and Walter Stamminger is by far the longest and contains a content analysis of the party debates in the theoretical journal Die Zukunft and of the minutes of the party conventions. There are no new interpretations, but a lot of data are provided to support earlier, less empirically based conclusions. Herbert Gottweis's chapter on the OVP is less than half as long as the chapter on the SPO, an unfortunate development given the general propensity of scholars to concentrate on the socialist parties and neglect the bourgeois ones. Even the small Communist Party of Austria receives more coverage by Albert Lichtblau and Michael Winter than does the OVP. Noticeably missing in these chapters, as well as in the book as a whole, is any significant indication that an increasing voter dissatisfaction with the two major parties, especially the SPO, has been developing. By the end of 1982 there were at least 15 environmental parties. They merged and formed two parties for the 1983 Nationalrat election, receiving 3.29% of the votes. This was mainly at the expense of the SPO, which lost its absolute maiority.

The party structure section is misnamed; a chapter on this would have been beneficial. The chapter by Christian Haerpfer on the electoral system and its consequences is one of the best ones in the book, providing a good theoretical basis and a wealth of data. Walter Urban and Eva

Zeidner have done much interesting exploratory work on party membership figures. Party programs are analyzed by Erwin Riess and Norbert Winkler. Especially noteworthy is their treatment of the FPO programs, which contain many terms similar to those used by the National Socialists in the Third Reich. Their analysis is somewhat marred, however, by employing the term Fascism when National Socialism is really meant (pp. 203, 204).

Party finances come under the section on party environment. Muller and Martin Hartmann have collected extensive, difficult to obtain income and expenditure data and compared the SPO, OVP, and the FPO on a number of indicators. Muller has also provided a chapter on the parties' relations with the mass media. While Austrian parties are not quite as conscious of mass media as their European counterparts, they increasingly pay attention to it. Gerlich also notes this in his introductory chapter.

All in all, this is a good survey of the Austrian party system, although theoretically and methodologically cautious and conservative. The book is also not without a number of stylistic errors, and contains no subject index.

JOHN DRELIMANIS

Wentworth Institute of Technology

The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico. By Nora Hamilton. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 391. \$36.00, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

This historical treatment of Mexican government begins with pre-1910 conditions of public life, before the continuing Revolution (capitalized in Mexico to denote an ongoing program) became legitimatized with the Constitution of 1917. It emphasizes the presidency of Lazaro Cardenas (1934 to 1940) as the archtype of Revolutionary politics. Nora Hamilton contends that after this period of emphasis on social welfare, the Revolution began to put its reforms within the framework of a capitalist society. Yet she acknowledges that Mexico actually has evolved an economy in which the state's role often overshadows that of the private sector.

Hamilton draws on Marxist theory to investigate Mexico's development. Early in the study she points out her orientation and perspectives: the Marxist theory of dependency. Her definitions come from Engels, Weber, and Wallerstein, as well as lesser-known (among those who are not social scientists) theorists such as Maurice Zeitlin. James Petras, James Cockcroft, Ronald Chilcote, Andre Frank, and Pablo Gonzalez Casanova can

be discerned indirectly in the composite backgrounding.

In historical stages, Hamilton interprets Mexican public policies in recent decades as being limited to protect a dominant class. Marxian contentions of ongoing class warfare became blended into less ideological chronicling of post-Cardenas programs.

The numerous expropriations do not mollify Hamilton in her quest to apply the dependency theory to Mexico. In 1960 President Adolfo Lopez Mateos expropriated the entire electric power industry, matching or paralleling with another basic fuel supply the action of Cardenas in expropriating the oil industry in 1938 and the railroads in 1937, considering utilities and fuel sources to be parts of the lifeblood of any industrializing nation. Later the government would expropriate the telephone company, tobacco plantations, sugar plantations, sugar refineries, motion picture studios, motion picture theater chains, one of the television networks, both national airlines, luxury tourist hotels, automobile and truck assembly plants, steel and iron complexes, pulp and paper plants, and more recently the private banks and savings and loan system of Mexico.

Private enterprise became caught up in the growing socialization of the means of production, as the Mexican government pushed slowly but steadily deeper into ownership of Mexico's productive means.

Acknowledging this more obliquely than directly, Hamilton counters that the private-sector leaders have pushed a short-run policy of sacrificing income redistribution to the prospect of the long-range benefits from industrialization. She discerns a growing middle class but finds that out of line with the goals of Marxist theory. Not stated in the book, but observed in recent decades by many veteran researchers concerned with Mexico, is the increase in the number of middle-class consumers, whether employees of the state or of private entities.

This study amasses data from the National Archives in Washington and private and official archives in Mexico. Hamilton has invested time and effort in assembling considerable information, unfavorable and favorable, about state autonomy in Mexico, and her empirical descriptions are phrased competently. She sincerely strives to understand political power in modern Mexico, but her vision remains a bit narrowed by her adherence to the dependency theory.

Hamilton claims that while the state has continued to perform the functions of accumulation to further industrialization and modernization, it has "abdicated its social control function" (p. 277). She cites dependence on trade with the U.S., including taxes from that trade, and dependence

on loans from foreign sources. She refrains from crediting those "foreign sources" in much detail, but Mexico's economic expansion has certainly been underwritten in part by non-repaid loans from Chase Manhattan, Bank of America, Western Interstate Corporation banks in 13 Western states including Arizona, and American taxpayers indirectly through the Inter-American Development Bank, gifts and loans during the 1961 to 1971 Alliance for Progress period, the Export-Import Bank, and more recently through American-subsidized International Monetary Loan Fund credits.

Hamilton concludes with the suggestion that organization of "subordinate groups and classes (separate from the state)" can bring about a total social transformation, a polysyllabic rephrasing of a call for radical confrontation with the Mexican Revolutionary establishment to "expand its progressive orientation" (p. 286). Yet despite the orchestrated student riots of 1968 and the sporadic guerrilla violence and kidnappings of the 1970s, the state's continuing expansion of its activities led to the very brink of foreign debt bankruptcy in 1982. A pullback has begun only through politically unpopular austerity actions.

MARVIN ALISKY

Arizona State University

From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism. Edited by John H. Herz. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 311. \$35.00.)

Regime changes are complex and important and worthwhile studying. This volume is particularly intriguing because it deals with the painstakingly difficult transformation of non-democracies (be they totalitarian or authoritarian) into democracies.

However, studying this proves to be no easy task, since even a limited number of cases exhibit a great variety of experiences. Regime changes occur under different conditions, in uneven tempo, and with varying success. To study this transformation systematically, Herz establishes conceptual and operational parameters. The case studies should focus on the early period of democratization in eight countries. Their scope ought to be limited to the public policies that cope with the legacy left by the antecedent regimes. The contributors are to discuss the legal attitudes visà-vis the previous regime, and policies regarding not only the leaders of the old regime and their sympathizers in and outside the party but also the regime's victims. The media and education,

deemed responsible for the transformation of nondemocratic values, are also to be included in each study.

Although this is a good book, some problems must be noted. Its Germano-centric nature is problematic. A disproportionate one-third is devoted to West Germany; Italy, Austria, France, and Japan constitute a "semiperiphery"; and Spain, Portugal, and Greece are the Mediterranean peripheries. Consequently, only Germany receives an all-encompassing analysis. The other cases are condensed in single, short chapters that do not, and cannot, cover the agenda.

The authors differ in what they understand by democratization. While some are more concerned with institutional aspects, others stress societal attitudes, and two imply that a political system that favors capitalism is not really democratic. A clearer sense of what democracy is should have been shared and conveyed to the reader.

Consequently, the length of time that it takes for democratization to occur is also disputed. While most of the analysis of Germany is limited to the early years, the chapter by Frederick C. Engelmann on "Felix Austria" entails more recent developments like the "social partnership" of proporz democracy. While France is primarily treated from the point of view of the legal and illegal treatment of Vichy collaborators during the last stages of the war, the chapters on Spain, Portugal, and Greece necessarily discuss the democratization process as open and ongoing.

The authors also find it difficult to evaluate how successful the process of democratization was. We find Herz, Karlheinz Niclauss, Michael Fichter, and Jutta-B. Lange-Quassowski deploring the Beamtenstaat, the lack of success of decartelization, and the absence of democratic values in Germany. Yet, some would argue that the postwar transition of Germany was a success story. As is reviewed by Giuseppe Di Palma, the antecedent and the successor regimes usually combine properties: Italy before 1945 was neither purely authoritarian nor completely totalitarian. After the war it developed into a system whose legacy is not purely or fully democratic. Since the available alternatives (rule by the monarchy or by the Left) were non-options, what emerged was a system that disillusioned many. Similarly, France, dealt with in a chapter by Roy C. Macridis, was faced after the war by a no-option situation since the resistance was split amongst Gaullists and Communists. The unwanted constitution that developed resembled that of the Third Republic. It would not last. However, there were success stories, too. Austria preferred to waltz to proporz demokratie. Japan (Arthur E. Teidmann) disposed of its militaristic adventurism in favor of Japan Inc. And in Greece (Harry J. Psomiades),

Portugal (Kenneth Maxwell), and Spain (Edward Malefakis) the authoritarian regimes failed (lost their nerve) as the societies were ready to demand capitalism, Europeanization, and democratization.

The authors correctly stress the role of certain individuals like Adenauer, Suzuki, or Karamanlis in coping with nondemocratic legacies and allowing for the stable transition to a more democratic system. Also important is the role of the occupation (particularly the American, and in Germany and Japan). In fomenting democracy they were sensitive to the needs of the occupied (as with the framing of the Japanese constitution).

In summary, this is a valuable contribution to the relevant literature. The authors show sensitivity, provide interesting facts, and answer interesting questions. They also raise important issues which should be tackled next in the context of contemporary less-developed countries.

MICHAEL RANIS

Swarthmore College

The Political Education of Soldiers. Edited by Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983. Pp. 328. \$28.00.)

The central theme of this very useful book is the role of indoctrination and civic education in ensuring a high level of combat motivation and civilian control in contemporary armed forces. It takes its point of departure from the work of Morris Janowitz who, together with Stephen Wesbrook, has written articles in the first section that outline the theoretical and practical relevance of civic education. Janowitz argues that in the American military in particular, because of the change in the type of personnel being recruited, an "understanding of military purpose and national political goals is a more important 'morale' factor in the contemporary All-Volunteer Force than in the case of our former twentieth century conscript military" (p. 57). The primary vehicle for explaining the goals and purposes of military strategy is civic education, which is distinguished from indoctrination by its emphasis on imparting "knowledge and capabilities" rather than on controlling "attitudes, opinions, and behavior" (p. 16). In short, if the American military hopes to be an effective fighting force, it must begin to pay increased attention to raising the civic consciousness of its military personnel.

The second part of the book deals with the question of civic education/indoctrination in a number of countries including the U.K., Israel, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and West Germany.

All of the articles in this section are well written and will be of considerable interest to those interested in the overall question of civic consciousness in a variety of political systems. The third section, which deals with the American military, contains an exceptionally interesting and valuable article by Wesbrook on the historical development of political/civic training in the U.S. armed forces. It is a must for anyone interested in this question. Two other articles on the all-voluntary military in the U.S. complete the section.

Despite its overall utility-each chapter contains a useful bibliography for those interested in pursuing the matter further-there are some problems with the book. First, it would have been significantly improved by a conclusion that would put all of the articles into perspective. Second, and more important, while Janowitz and Wesbrook may be right in their call for more civic education in the American military (a debatable proposition to be sure), from a conceptual standpoint their attempt to make the book comparative is largely unsuccessful. In setting the stage for the various country studies, Wesbrook draws on Janowitz and Eric Nordlinger's works and argues that there are basically three models for analyzing civil-military relations: the aristocratic, in which there is a similarity in values between military and civilian elites; the democratic, in which civilian and democratic sectors are sharply differentiated in terms of expertise; and the penetration model with its emphasis on civilian control of the military. While the aristocratic model has largely disappeared, the democratic—which, Janowitz argues, calls for increased civic consciousness—is very much alive as is the penetration model with its primary emphasis on control, the major concern in communist countries. The articles in Section 2 raise questions about the validity of these assertions.

The articles by George Harris-Jenkins on the U.K. and Victor Azarya on Israel show that the situation in these "democratic" countries is far different from that in the United States. In fact, in the former case there is little interest in civic education, and in the latter it appears to serve a quite different function. Furthermore, the situation in communist countries is far more complex than the penetration model suggests. While William Darryl Henderson's excellent article on the Vietnamese army shows clearly the importance of control during combat situations, it is not always the key factor in civil-military relations in communist countries. In fact, I would argue that it is of prime concern during periods when there is an absence of a value consensus between the elite and the masses (e.g., in the immediate aftermath of a communist seizure of power) or when the system is under extreme threat (e.g., the Soviet Union during World War II). As Michael Deane notes, the Soviet political officer, and the entire political apparatus, has been concerned with a multitude of problems, many of which would appear to have little to do with "political indoctrination." For example, the company political officer spends a considerable amount of his time on problems such as alcoholism, discipline, and technical training.

Janowitz and Wesbrook are to be commended for producing this book. Its problems are less a reflection of the editors' shortcomings than they are indicative of the state of comparative studies in the field of military sociology, especially when communist systems are involved. There are certainly differences between civic education in communist and noncommunist countries. However, I suspect there may be more similarities than the Janowitz-Wesbrook model suggests.

DALE R. HERSPRING

Washington, D.C.

The Politics of Aristocratic Empires. By John H. Kautsky. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 416. \$28.00.)

The understanding of political change, John Kautsky suggests, can be enhanced by a consideration of the character of politics in contexts unaffected by the processes of change. Probing the intricacies of political life in such contexts, we might arrive at a more substantive knowledge of the nature of politics through the expansion of our analytical purview beyond the conventional preoccupation with politics in changing and modern societies. The context in which the analysis of the politics of "non-change" is attempted is that of "aristocratic empires." This concept, which Kautsky tries to establish as a new category of political analysis, designates political entities unaffected by commercialization, where power is wielded exclusively by a group of settled conquerors who live off the labor of an exploited peasantry. This exploitative relationship is the fundamental social nexus in aristocratic empires. Besides exploited peasants and aristocrats organized in their various hierarchies, an aristocratic empire also comprises townspeople, who form a parasitic appendage of the aristocracy. One of the book's most useful contributions is the analysis of the political impotence of the peasantry and the marginality of the townspeople as a distinctive feature of politics in aristocratic empires.

The concept of the aristocracy is programmatically posed against that of feudalism, which is bound in context to the West European experience. Feudalism is only one regional case of the world-wide phenomenon of aristocratic empires. which are distinguished both from primitive societies and from the vague category of traditional societies. Kautsky argues that most of these are characterized by commercialization, which sets in motion the processes of change that obliterate pure aristocratic politics. The absolute diachronic dichotomy between aristocratic politics and the political effects of commercialization is fundamental to the understanding of the whole argument. However, the fact that aristocratic empires as an ideal type are located in the continuum that ranges from primitive society to aristocratic empire to commercializing traditional society indicates that the aristocratic empire itself is not independent of some form of political change, even if that change involves the violent activity of conquest and settlement by bellicose nomadic tribes. Although the politics of change might be arrested in the new equilibrium of the aristocratic empire, the facts of conquest, settlement, and transformation of the nomadic tribe into an exploiting aristocracy inscribe a fundamental element of sociopolitical change in the very definition of aristocratic empires.

The argument proceeds by assertive generalizations supported by historical evidence drawn from a broad range of aristocratic empires on all continents over a period of five thousand years. The inescapable problems of this mode of analysis are threefold. First, the evidence derives from secondary sources, usually standard works but also occasionally from dated or debatable contributions. as it happens here with most of the sources on the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the argument is ab initio cut off from original research. Second. the broad sweep of the subject precludes a fuller exploration of some important insights such as the interconnection between conquest, commerce, and language and the distinctly ethnocentric nature of nationalism as a byproduct of recent European history. Third, one might note a more fundamental methodological issue. The great disparity of the evidence and the diverse examples and cases on which generalizations are based raise serious problems, at least in my mind, concerning criteria of comparability and the limits set to meaningful comparative analysis by the frequent lack of substantive and contextual affinities in the objects of comparison.

These reservations are not meant to belittle the essential contribution of *The Politics of Aristocratic Empires*. Its discussion of the behavioral patterns, values, and conflicts characteristic of aristocratic politics covers a neglected subject of

political analysis and places in perspective the aristocratic legacies of modern societies.

PASCHALIS M. KITROMILIDES

University of Athens

The Sources of Law. Edited by Chantal Kourilsky, Attila Razs, and Heinz Schaffer. (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1982. Pp. xiv + 375. \$28.80.)

In this book, the "Vienna Centre" (the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences) presents partial results of its first investigation in the field of law. The Centre was created by UNESCO with the purpose of "stimulating international comparative research projects carried out by researchers from Eastern and Western Europe" (p. 3). In pursuit of this goal, Erwin Melichar, president of the Austrian Constitutional Court, and Imre Szabo, director of the Institute of Legal and Political Science at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, codirected the work of leading law theoreticians from 10 European countries investigating sources of law as conceived in the respective legal systems.

The study encompasses Austria (H. Schaffer and E. Melichar), the FRG (D. Merten), France (C. Delage and D. Tallon), the GDR (K. A. Mollnau), Hungary (A. Racz and I. Szabo), Norway (M. Aarbakke and J. Helgesen), Poland (A. Lopatka), the USSR (S. L. Zivs), and Yugoslavia (B. T. Blagojevic and B. Kosutic). The French, Swiss, and Polish contributions are presented in French, the rest in English. A supplement provides a list of original denominations of individual legal enactments, the corresponding translation, and the enacting authority (pp. 369-375). All chapters include a concise "national" bibliography or notes with bibliographical references.

Each treatise deals with four questions: "a. definition of the concept of 'sources of law' in the national system; b. historical evolution of the national system of sources of law; c. elements of the current system; d. development trends in the national system of sources of law" (p. 4). "Sources of law" are conceived as formal sources of law. that is, not as social conditions and values determining the creation of law, but—to quote the Austrian definition—as "those types of forms of legal rules, in the shape of which law appears" (p. 17). The "empirical" part of the research should follow in the form of a "dynamic analysis" concerned "with the quantitative occurrence of the various sources of law within a given period of time" (p. 9).

With the prevailing attention paid to the ele-

ments of the current legal systems, the presented studies create instructive pictures of the pertinent structures of legal norms and of the underlying theories. For a case-law-educated lawyer they provide a rare insight into the general mechanism of the "written law system," as well as into national factual and methodological peculiarities, for example, the conceptual difference existing between the rather deductive West European and more empirical Scandinavian approaches. They also demonstrate the ways in which national legal systems cope with the norms of international origin.

The reports from the socialist countries seemingly exhibit the same qualities as the others. However, in a monolithic political regime the governing power resides outside of the official law-making and administrative organs that are mostly restricted to a formal declaration of the decisions taken by the ruling party. Consequently, the account of the formal legal sources does not disclose the factual process of their creation, their exclusivity, or regularity of application.

The unavoidable discrepancy between law in books and law in action, found in every legal system and necessarily also reflected in its descriptions, assumes in the case of monolithic political systems a new dimension of discrepancy between reality and fiction. The fictions offered in this book are at least rationally conceived and logically presented. Only the Soviet contribution tries to derive facts from political utterances, is poorly organized and, moreover, impaired by an uneven translation.

In general, the work constitutes a scholarly achievement highly useful for the understanding of legal systems existing in the participating West European countries and of some theoretical concepts advanced in the East European states.

ZDENEK KRYSTUFEK

University of Colorado, Boulder

Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change. By Daniel Levy and Gabriel Szekely. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 286. \$27.50, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

This book by a U.S. political scientist, Levy, and a Mexican political scientist trained in the United States, Szekely, is a limited treatment of the highly complex Mexican political system aimed at both the general reader and the student in the classroom. Although a joint authorship effort, the chapters were written separately by the two authors. Levy wrote chapters 1, 2, 4, and 6; Szekely, 3, 5, 7, and 8. The major theme of the book, as suggested by the subtitle, is that the

Mexican political system is remarkably stable for a Latin American country, but that it has been able to incorporate change into that stability. After an introduction that briefly discusses the land and the peoples of Mexico, the second chapter presents an overview of Mexico's political evolution. The institutionalization of the revolution, especially of the military and the church, are analyzed. It is noted that the business community remains as an important autonomous center of power.

Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the political actors and institutions in Mexico. The discussion focuses on the role of the president as the center of power. the PRI, organized labor and the campesinos, as well as business groups and opposition parties. In an analysis of the role of personal freedom and democracy there is a superb discussion of the role of the press in Mexico. It is recognized that political power is highly unequal within Mexico. The general conclusion is that "the Mexican political system is neither authoritarian nor pluralist—because it is both" (p. 118). The following chapter on social and economic policy will prove hard reading for the average undergraduate. The next two chapters are excellent discussions of U.S.-Mexico relations and the importance of the new oil discoveries for Mexican politics. The conclusion assesses the Mexican developmental model from four different perspectives. the regime, the business community, and both the national Left and the Marxist Left. The conclusion, which should surprise no one, is that Mexico has achieved a remarkable degree of stability by being flexible and by incorporating change into the system.

While a welcome contribution to the growing literature on Mexico, the book is somewhat of a disappointment, especially for those who have been looking for a satisfactory text for courses on Mexican politics. The basic problem is the organization of the book. The authors appear to have chosen topics on the basis of special knowledge they already had (for example, Szekely wrote his dissertation on oil policy), and they apparently decided to write their chapters on that basis. The result is that there is no analytical framework to make the book hang together. Stability may be the end result of the Mexican political system, but it is not a very good analytical tool. There does not appear to be a logical consistency to the way in which points are developed or phenomenon examined. For example, the president as an institution is discussed in chapter 3, his election in chapter 4, and then a very brief mention is made of the recruitment process for political elites. The role of the business community is discussed in several places. The chapter on economic and social policy would logically make more sense

before a discussion of demands from business, labor, and farmer groups. A critical problem is the introduction of major analytical concepts with little or no prior mention. For example, in chapter 3 the concept of corporatism is introduced briefly, then never mentioned again. In the succeeding chapter the terms democracy, pluralism, and authoritarianism are introduced and discussed with little effort to systematically define them. One minor irritating point: Numerous citations—and very good ones at that—are found in the chapter endnotes but are not found in either the Bibliography or the Index.

C. RICHARD BATH

University of Texas at El Paso

Socialism, Liberalism, and Dictatorship in Paraguay. By Paul H. Lewis. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xii + 154. \$18.95.)

This slim, highly readable volume sets out a limited goal and fulfills it well. It is the third in a Hoover Institution-Praeger series on Latin American politics intended to have "minimal theoretical analysis" and to reach a general audience including students, academics, and journalists (p. vii). Students and general readers should find the book informative and lively. Specialists will find the work of less value, although given the lack of attention generally paid to Paraguay, many specialists may find it useful.

The book consists of a history of postcolonial Paraguay and an analysis of the regime of Alfredo Stroessner, the military dictator who has dominated the nation since 1954. The title of the work is reflective of Paraguay's history:

Paraguay has experienced four rather well-defined stages of development since independence: the socialist state, the liberal era, the period of nationalist revival initiated by the February [1936] Revolution, and the *stronato* [Stroessner's dictatorship]. Each of these had its origins in violence; each gave rise to dictatorial regimes whose arbitrary acts created lasting resentments that continue to polarize politics. In fact, Paraguay's politics might be characterized as the clash of inherited resentments accumulated over generations. (p. 126)

The bulk of the book is composed of chapters on the structure of Stroessner's government, the base of his support, his policies, and the opposition.

Lewis sees Paraguay as an authoritarian society which has never experienced democracy, but which has had a long tradition of police state tactics and government use of terror. Nevertheless, Stroessner is sufficiently secure and adept that terror is used in moderation and generally without caprice as far as ordinary citizens are concerned. There is a limited pluralism, particularly for the elites, although independent organization of peasants or urban labor is suppressed quickly. Nonthreatening opposition is permitted and even institutionalized with representation in the Congress. However, opponents are carefully kept weak and divided and are subject to quick repression when they exceed narrow bounds. While Paraguay's already great economic inequality has increased significantly under Stroessner, Lewis sees few current signs of substantial social unrest. Although land is maldistributed, "the ratio of population to land is very low, and without land hunger there is no pressure from below for change" (p. 5). In fact, Lewis sees the peasants as "the bulwark of a highly conservative political system" (p. 4). In the urban areas, the sustained high growth rate has trickled down sufficiently to avoid working-class unrest, and a wide range of elites have prospered economically.

Stroessner has based his long period of rule on personal control of the military from which he came and a disciplined mass party which draws heavily on inherited loyalties. Lewis does not focus on the future, but he does argue that the regime is personalist and not institutionalized. It is held together by one very capable and hardworking individual. Traditional patterns and the demands induced by the process of modernization do not bode well for a smooth secession after Stroessner.

This work may be faulted by some as on balance a conservative critique, overly simplistic and lacking in theoretical concern. One certainly might have preferred a more sophisticated approach in the concluding chapter, which is somewhat conceptual in examining parallels between Paraguay and other Latin American regimes. It should be received successfully, however, by the student and informed lay audience at which it is aimed, while maintaining some value for professionals.

Although they are not extensive, the book contains endnotes, a bibliography of English and Spanish sources, and an index.

ROBERT E. BILES

Sam Houston State University

Chinese Medical Modernization: Comparative Policy Continuities, 1930s-1980s. By AnElissa Lucas. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xiii + 189. \$24.95.)

For those of us who have followed the pendulum-like swings of the Chinese political system

over the last three decades, AnElissa Lucas's Chinese Medical Modernization takes a positive step forward in helping us better understand the underlying factors that have informed policy debates within post-1949 China. The book moves well beyond the often-simplistic "two-line" struggle mode of analysis that has frequently characterized contemporary political analysis of Chinese affairs. And, because of the continuing importance of the topic in the overall list of Chinese development priorities, the book helps us gain a deeper appreciation for how the political variabilities of the Chinese system have interacted with the demands of medical science to yield a set of public policies that have gone a long way toward eradicating the health problems of over one billion people.

Lucas's main argument is that there are strong continuities in the substance and orientation of post-1949 policies in the medical area with those of the 1920s and 1930s. In particular, Lucas cites the commitment to a state-sponsored and supported medical system as the key element that has continued to be the core of medical modernization in China since the Republican period. She is critical of what she calls the "historical amnesia" of students of China who "suffer from a myopic focus on post-1949 changes in Chinese health care, as if China were an isolated nation influenced only by the postrevolutionary period of the modern present" (p. 9). In order to avoid this trap, Lucas examines the impact that the transnational diffusion of medical technology and organizational concepts have had on China, noting that the Chinese have "both benefitted from and contributed to the accumulated international knowledge of modern medical science, technology, and administration" (p. 1).

According to Lucas's analysis, the politics of medical modernization in China have centered on a series of policy oscillations that have fluctuated between emphasis on stressing quality to meet urban needs and emphasizing quantity to accommodate rural needs. These shifts have been a reflection of varying economic development policies and objectives throughout the post-1949 period. However, for Lucas, the pulling and tugging engendered by these shifts are really a manifestation of short-term adjustments rather than an. integral characteristic of medical modernization efforts. Lucas makes a convincing argument that most, if not all, of the political jockeying has been part of a long-term program designed to develop both urban and rural sectors while beginning to integrate a truly national organizational network for state medicine. When looked at from the perspective of the various medical development policies begun during the Guomintang period, Lucas's argument regarding the distinct policy

continuities takes on added salience.

On the whole, the book is well-documented, well-written, and well-organized. At the same time, however, the book would have benefited from a broader comparative perspective in which Chinese policies for medical modernization were compared with policies regarding some other sector, for example, steel development or scientific research. We never really come to learn whether the medical sector is idiosyncratic, or whether we might find similar important points of continuity in other areas. On a more normative level, in focusing on the public policy dimensions of medical modernization, the book appears to downplay the political radicalism of the Maoist period by suggesting that Maoist policies were merely part of a broader development strategy. While there is some merit in making this point, one cannot take it too far. One merely has to listen to the stories of highly skilled doctors and medical personnel who experienced serious disruptions in their training and work during the Cultural Revolution to recognize that the Chinese medical community. along with the community of scientists and technical personnel, suffered tremendously and at great cost to China. The present regime is making a serious effort to improve the environment for delivering both rural and urban medical care. This task, in view of continued shortages of funds, personnel, and know-how, constitutes a major challenge for Chinese leaders in the years ahead. Lucas has given us a solid foundation for understanding what to expect in the future as China attempts to modernize medical care along with its economy, national defense, and science and technology system.

**DENIS FRED SIMON** 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Law and Economic Development in the Soviet Union. Edited by Peter B. Maggs, Gordan B. Smith, and George Ginsburgs. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 293. \$21.50, paper.)

This book is the second volume or report of a research project funded by the National Council on Soviet and East European Research on law, the scientific-technical revolution (STR), and economic modernization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It deals with the effects of the STR on legal and political institutions; the publisher's abstract on page iii states that the book's emphasis is on effects of law on the STR. Despite the title, the articles in the book often deal generally or specifically with Eastern Europe. The book was published in late 1982, yet contains

research completed by early to mid-1981. This means that, for example, events such as the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the declaration of martial law in Poland, and post-Brezhnev pronouncements on STR and ideology are not analyzed. As with much recent research, events have outraced analysis, but the articles do faithfully represent the state of Soviet and East European law existing in the early 1980s.

The book consists of three articles dealing with general or theoretical issues of law and the STR in the USSR and Eastern Europe: the effects of law on economic development, law as a regulatory instrument, and constitutional rights and the STR. These are followed by seven case studies dealing with various aspects of the STR: professional training, interregional coordination, computerization of management, nuclear power, environmental law, currency credits, and East-West trade. Although the focus of the book is on law, it is unfortunate that the impact of the STR on political structures and processes is not addressed in greater detail. Examples of articles that deal with political factors include Zigurds Zile's discussion of the rampant violation and lax enforcement of environmental law; Gordan Smith's brief statement that regional party organizations have a great impact on the implementation and success of territorial-production complexes; Yuri Luryi's discussion of contradictions in the law and reality of professional training, which, in effect, turn the "right to a free education" into a costly obligation; and Stanislaw Pomorski's acknowledgement, in a postscript written after the declaration of martial law in Poland, that political systems organized according to the machine [read totalitarian] model "are incapable of any basic selfcorrection by way of peaceful change" (p. 50).

The case studies contain much revealing information about the nature of the STR in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Peter Maggs states that nearly all major advances in computer hardware and software in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are due to the copying of American products, and that this copying has not necessarily violated international or domestic law. Donald Barry discusses the cavalier attitude of the Soviets toward the dangers of a nuclear reactor accident. According to the Soviet view, Zigurds Zile relates, socialist society is inherently protective toward the environment, with "violations [being] an annoying exception" (p. 194). Hence, the need for law is minimal. George Ginsburgs examines how the Soviets increasingly gain control over economic processes in the CMEA countries because of the necessity of granting aid to cover these countries' hard currency debts with the West. However, this aid presents an increasing drain on the Soviet Union's hard currency resources. Erik Hoffman

and Robbin Laird discuss the controversy between the moderates and conservatives in the 1970s over the degree of centralization of the Soviet foreign trade system. They see the conservatives as rebutting the efforts to give foreign trade organizations and large enterprises relative independence in planning and carrying out their own export and import programs.

Although the book suffers from minor editorial problems, it ably contributes to the analysis of Soviet and East European institutions. It should, however, be read in conjunction with the superior first volume, Soviet and East European Law and the Scientific-Technical Revolution (Pergamon Press, 1981).

JAMES P. NICHOL

Library of Congress

The Transition to Democracy in Spain. By Jose Maravall. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 213. \$30.00.)

Communism and Political Change in Spain. By Eusebio Mujal-León. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 274. \$22.50.)

An analysis of the rise and fall in the fortunes of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) is the task undertaken by Eusebio Mujal-León in Communism and Political Change in Spain. Jose Maravall, in The Transition to Democracy in Spain, attempts the broader project of interpreting Spain's evolution to parliamentary democracy.

Overall, Mujal-León has met the challenge of interpreting the PCE in a valuable and long-overdue study. By far the largest portion of the book is concerned with the evolution of the PCE during the Franco period and its immediate aftermath. Only in the final chapters does the author attempt to draw a balance sheet on the PCE's contemporary performance.

Mujal-León traces the evolution of the PCE's strategy from its guerrilla war position of the 1940s to its policy of National Reconciliation in the 1950s and 60s. Crucial to the evolution of the Party's stance were its overtures to the Catholic Church. The connections with the Church were crucial to the success of the workers commissions, the first successful renewal of trade union activity in the post-Franco era and the heart of the PCE's influence in Spanish society. Mujal-León's analysis is less satisfying when he tries briefly to explain why the PCE did not reap further benefits from its overtures to progressive Catholics in the

post-Franco era. That support has apparently gone to the Spanish Workers Socialist Party (PSOE), but an adequate explanation has not been given.

Mujal-León traces with considerable clarity the process by which the PCE developed its Euro-communist politics. In the 1960s and 70s the Party developed a position that embraced parliamentary democracy, civil liberties, and a mixed economy with little emphasis on nationalizations. The Party also down-played its "vanguard" role and eventually in 1978 dropped the reference to Leninism in the Party statutes. Beginning with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Party took its distance from Moscow.

While many other commentators have noted these transformations of the PCE, Mujal-León goes somewhat deeper to lay bare some of the contradictions in this transformation. For example, while Santiago Carrillo, the Party's Secretary General, criticized the Soviets harshly, there was never a complete break in relations, and Soviet subsidies to the PCE treasury continued to flow. Mujal-León points out that Carrillo had used anti-Stalinism as early as 1956 to consolidate his power in the Party's organization. The limitation in the PCE's anti-Stalinism is demonstrated by the continued presence of considerable pro-Soviet forces within the ranks of the Party.

The PCE appeared to be on the verge of considerable political power in 1976, but as Mujal-León points out, the PCE's strength was based more on the weakness at that time of other forces on the Left than on its own vitality. The Party was largely bypassed during Spain's rapid transition to democracy, gaining less than 10% of the votes in the 1977 elections. The PCE had expected that the Francoist state would be liquidated through mass mobilizations giving them a share of the power, as had happened in Portugal in 1974, but instead the Francoist leaders under Adolfo Suarez engineered a smooth transition to parliamentary democracy without ever loosing hold of economic or political power. In analyzing the transition the author does not place enough emphasis on the class factors that were at work. Spain's large industrialists and other powerful sectors wanted to integrate Spain into the European community, and they threw their considerable weight behind the political transition. The weight of the Leftist forces during the transition has often been exaggerated.

Since its 1977 electoral defeat the PCE has undergone numerous identity crises. As its profound moderation did not yield the political space it desired, the Party has often turned its frustrations inward with numerous splits and purges. Membership has dropped sharply, and the Party's already meager vote totals were further eroded in the Socialists' 1982 landslide. Although inevitable

dissatisfaction with the moderate Socialist government could be fertile ground for a PCE comeback, such a prospect does not appear likely given the current disarray in the Party.

If there is any overall weakness in the analysis of the decline of the PCE in Communism and Political Change in Spain it is that there is not enough discussion of how the PSOE was able to succeed where the PCE failed. A companion study of the rise of the fortunes of the PSOE is long overdue.

Although a smaller volume, Jose Maravall's The Transition to Democracy in Spain seeks a broader focus than Mujal-León's monograph. Maravall, a Spanish political sociologist and activist in the PSOE, seeks to analyze the period from 1975 to 1981, when the Spanish parliamentary system was consolidated following nearly 40 years of Francoist rule. The work was completed prior to the Socialists' landslide victory in the fall 1982. Drawing heavily on extensive quantitative data on the Spanish population. Maravall makes several important hypotheses about the direction of the Spanish political system and also draws lessons for students of comparative politics interested in the question of transition from authoritarian to parliamentary democratic rule.

Maravall's basic thesis is that the transformation of the Spanish political system came about from interaction of "forces from above" and pressures and demands "from below." Following the death of Franco in 1975, the authoritarian system did not have the continued societal support necessary to continue as it had before, but neither did the "forces from below," the Leftist parties and the labor unions, have the sufficient power to force a clean and immediate break with the past. According to Maravall, this stalemate laid the basis for a fairly unique transition to parliamentary democratic rule. Other transitions had come after military defeat, the collapse of colonial rule, or internal rupture, but Spain was different. Carried out under the guidance of the old, Francoist political elite, the transition was not a mere liberalization of an authoritarian system, but rather the creation of a new political order that laid the basis for a real alternation of power. While the old forces did hold an inordinate amount of political power well into the transition period, their continued ability to rule without democratic and popular checks was ending by 1981.

Maravall demonstrates that while the political Left and the labor movement remained somewhat weak, their mobilizations, particularly in the 1976 to 1977 period, forced the Francoists into concessions that they otherwise would not have made.

While Maravall's analysis of the phenomenon of transition is reasonably sound, the work occa-

sionally suffers from a blurring of the author's role as political sociologist and his role as a leader of the PSOE. This problem is particularly evident in the opening chapter, where Maravall seeks to explain the demobilization of the Spanish working class after the 1977 elections.

Through an analysis of considerable data that has been gathered on political attitudes in post-Franco Spain, Maravall concludes as others have done, that apart from the sectors of Spanish society that were mobilized against the dictatorship, Spanish society, including the majority of the working class, is remarkably moderate. While committed to basic democratic values and sympathetic toward socialism, the working class was not extreme in its commitment to these values. Such analysis is clearly at the roots of the political direction of the PSOE, which officially abandoned Marxism in 1979 and went to the 1982 elections mainly stressing democratic reforms. Maravall seems to focus primarily on explaining why the PSOE did not attempt to counter the demobilization, which is a legitimate exercise for a politician but not for a political sociologist.

A major weakness of the book is that several key aspects of the transition (e.g., nationalist demands, economic crisis, and terrorism) are dealt with in a serious manner only in a short concluding chapter and then are not integrated directly into the major hypothesis of the book. Any fully adequate book on contemporary Spanish politics could not have less than a page on the nationalist movements in the Basque region and Catalonia and their effect on the overall political life of Spain. This omission is not adequately explained by Maravall. The Spanish tradition to parliamentary democratic rule is an important issue for all students of comparative politics. Maravall has contributed an important piece to our understanding, but more integration of the extensive data available on the national and economic questions is necessary.

**GARY PREVOST** 

Saint John's University

Racism and Migrant Labour. By Robert Miles. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Pp. ix + 202. \$9.95, paper.)

Robert Miles, a lecturer in sociology at the University of Glasgow, has written an often confusing and irritating book on the role of race and culture in one of Britain's most persistent post-World War II problems: (mostly colored) immigration. To be sure, Miles sets a straightforward enough task for himself: to show how the intellectual roots of the sociology of "race relations" has mis-

specified, rather than helped focus, the entire question of the place and role of migrant labor in advanced industrial societies.

Having somewhat defined the problem, Miles then proceeds with a tortuous exposition of the numerous errors of omission and commission of a number of British authors who, over the course of the past 15 years, have been often unwitting protagonists in confusing the debate. After a brief overview of the nineteenth-century literature on race and genetics. Miles concludes that there are "no scientific grounds for developing a typology of the world's population based on phenotypical variation" (p. 15). This overview, and the conclusions drawn from it, are rather elementary, and the reader is not shown the relevance that this discussion will have for Miles's thesis about migrant labor. In any event, both the critical review and the place of this literature on the immigration question have already been explored in John Higham's classic work, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (Rutgers University Press, 1955).

The next two chapters continue to focus on race and race and ethnic relations. In them, Miles scrutinizes a number of leading sociologists of race and ethnic relations and finds them to have contributed to the scientific and empirical confusion that surrounds the sociology of race (chap. 2). The work of J. Rex, for instance, is found wanting on both theoretical and methodological grounds, as are the works of P. L. Van den Berghe, O. Cox, and a number of Marxist scholars in that they necessarily result in "misleading and ultimately false conclusions" (p. 35) and "refract" the real problematic with migrant labor by placing undue emphasis on the primacy of racism and discrimination. For Miles, the task at hand is "to identify the conditions of the generation and reproduction of the idea of 'race,' which is to explain why certain sorts of situation and relations appear (i.e., are socially constructed) as 'race relations' " (p. 43). Similarly, for ethnic relations the problem is one of an undue emphasis on cultural idiosyncracies and on the ethnics' distinct set of interests, needs, and weltanschauungen (chap. 3). This discussion culminates with a reaffirmation of the need to view racism as merely an ideology (chap. 4) and with a prelude to what is to occupy the attention of the remaining half of the volume: that in order to gain insights on the current British problem with race relations, one has to utilize the tools of historical analysis and look at the political economy of migration in the nineteenth century.

It is here that the promise of the book begins to materialize with a good discussion of the ideological legacy of British capitalism and colonialism (chap. 5). Here, Miles makes a persuasive case for analyzing the "generation and reproduction of racism as a process" (p. 120) and for seeing racism as a consequence of the confluence of economic, political, and ideological relations (with the economic ones often playing a subordinate role). Miles then proceeds to look at Irish immigration to England and Scotland in the nineteenth century in a manner that is in fundamental accord with the most theoretically informed analyses on the place of international migration in the international division of labor and at the complex network of circumstances which, at specific historical junctures, coalesce into powerful agents for reallocating human resources across space.

There is no denying that what Miles discusses has been said elsewhere (especially in the many writings of Alejandro Portes; see especially Labor, Class and the International System by A. Portes and J. Walton, Academic Press, 1981). Miles's effectiveness here, however, and what finally ties this often disorganized volume together, is his ability to demonstrate how the Irish were "racialized" via the vehicle of migration. Although an important factor in how indigenous people view immigrants (and the U.S. experience attesting to this is by no means unique), race is but ancillary to the main question, which concerns the place of migrant labor in the labor market and, consequently, in the class structure of host societies.

DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU

Population Associates International

Capitalist Democracy in Britain. By Ralph Miliband. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. 165. \$19.95.)

What accounts for political stability in Britain? This is the question that Ralph Miliband asks in this stimulating application of his theory that the state acts as an "instrument" of the capitalist "ruling class." Miliband uses the conception of capitalist democracy that he developed in *The State in Capitalist Society* (London, 1969) to argue that Britain's ruling class has successfully contained popular influence. The reconciliation of capitalism and popular pressure has been uniquely harmonious and effective in Britain. The ruling class—those who control the means of production, persuasion, and coercion—has maintained dominance, recognizing that reform often blunts class conflict.

The ability of Britain's ruling class to contain popular pressure operates through parliamentarism, incorporation, indoctrination, and the "relative autonomy" of the state. Miliband's theme is that representative or parliamentary government has been, at successive stages of labor's growing "inclusion" in the governing process, an effective instrument of domination. Parliamentarism permits the ruling class to govern without trouble-some pressures from below because it prescribes popular participation yet limits its scope and impact, focusing political life in the House of Commons. The effect is to moderate M.P.'s behavior through isolation from radical influences and to limit the ideological and practical possibilities of radical—right or left—politics.

Parliament would not be effective in containing popular pressure if it were not for the ability of the labor movement to constrain its most militant members and for the indoctrination processes of diverse institutions to undermine the credibility of those espousing radical changes. Unions, defensive organizations incapable of revolutionary activity except perhaps in times of crisis, are agencies of containment. Similarly, the Labour party, while losing some control in recent years to militants, effectively restrains radicals. This incorporation is complemented by a daily dose of persuasion on the part of schools, churches, the media, and most intellectuals, which successfully convey the message of the "menace" of the Left.

Finally, the state itself plays a role in containing pressure and managing conflict. Elected officials must respond to the pressures of popular insurrection, union lobbying, and the electorate if they are to successfully remain in office. What this means is that elected officers need autonomy in deciding how to protect the long-term interests of capital. This "relative autonomy" is both essential to capitalist democracy's defense of capital and threatening to it. To assure that popularly elected governments are not pushed too far, other conservative elements of the state apparatus—top civil servants, the police, the military, and judges—promote the status quo.

Since the Reform Act of 1867, the ruling class has had to make increasing use of the mechanisms of containment in order to curb the growing influence of the underclass. In response to economic and political decline and a "state of desubordination" among the working class, condemnation of democracy coincides with an increase in repressive state power, portending a conservative authoritarian state. Only a strong and united socialist force can achieve progressive change and stem the tide of authoritarianism.

Miliband's analysis of the containment of popular pressure and the drift toward a strong state is cogent and insightful, particularly in delineating the ways in which the ruling class guards its advantages. Yet, does it really exercise disproportionate power? Should capitalist class dominance be measured by form (privilege and position) or by results (economic growth and

political stability)? The British ruling class in this latter sense has surely failed itself and the nation, as manifest in ideological polarization, intensitication of conflict, ineffective government, and national decline. By his focus on institutions and personnel rather than policy and consequence, Miliband cannot adequately assess the power of the ruling class. At the same time, Miliband's argument neglects to explain the development of challenges from below. His "iron law of containment" presupposes an undeveloped "iron law of democracy." Consequently, his analysis permits only one structure of power-elitism-and fails to appreciate the sources and consequences of challenges that limit and destabilize ruling class authority and power. Nonetheless, this work provides insight into the British political system and helps in the assessment of Miliband's analysis of the capitalist state.

JOEL D. WOLFE

Five Colleges, Inc.

The Political Economy of Growth. Edited by Dennis C. Mueller. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 285. \$23.50.)

This volume is organized around Mancur Olson's provocative theses about why some modern nation-states have a tendency to increase economic output more slowly than others. The first essay outlines the theory, presented in more detail in Olson's The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (Yale University Press, 1982). The remainder constitutes a collection of theoretical and empirical evaluations of some propositions that flow from Olson's characteristically succinct and tightly woven argument that Homo politicus gets in the way of Homo economicus. Barring major social disruptions such as war, the number and scope of special interest organizations increase over time. Distributional coalitions emerge that tend to slow decision making and restrict a nation-state's ability to respond and adapt in a Pareto optimally growth promoting way.

Kwang Choi offers a statistical test in which the buildup of growth inhibiting groups and coalitions is hypothesized to bring about lower rates of growth. Cross-sectional regressions of growth on a logistic measure of the sum of the number of years since political consolidation, controlling for disruptions, are supportive but not very powerful tests. The data are weak proxies for the complex social and political evolution that undergirds Olson's model. However justified, "time" is an unconvincing explanatory variable. Static tests of

dynamic processes are rarely illuminating, particularly where 10 or 11 cases are involved.

Moses Abramovitz illustrates some of these flaws and notes a number of others in highlighting the point that "the operational form in which Olson has cast his ideas makes it hard to distinguish clearly between "his theory and . . . the catch-up hypothesis" (p. 83). Frederic L. Pryor's "quasi-test" again points to data problems but does employ regressions of various measures of economic growth on quantitative measures of development, population size, political domination by a communist party, and ethnic and religious heterogeneity. While Choi notes "the model is clearly satisfactory" (p. 78), Pryor states "the results do not appear very favorable" to Olson's hypotheses (p. 101).

Five case studies empirically examine Olson's model via West German, British, Italian, French, and Swiss experience over the period after World War II. The support for Olson is mixed at best. Peter Murrell's study is tautological due to the assumption that industry growth rates are a measure of industry age (p. 115). Ursula K. Hicks and Jean-Francois Hennart both illustrate "Okun's razor," that there is a tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency. J.-C. Asselain and C. Morrisson indicate that in France's case the interest group - no growth link may go in both directions. Franz Lehner's study points out that Switzerland may be an outlier with regard to Olson's model. He points to the utility of Ulrich Widmaier's extension of Olson's earlier work for the current effort (Politische Gewaltanwendung als Problem der Organisation von Interessen, Hain, 1978) and feels that it should offer some testable insights regarding societal conflict.

Samuel Bowles and John Eatwell provide a Marxist critique of the nonclass nature of Olson's notions, pointing out that classes have different abilities to influence outcomes as well as different interests regarding the preservation, or destruction, or both of societal institutions. James W. Dean offers a similar analysis, which hinges in part on Olson's failure to consider business interest groups. The final essay is an interesting synthesis by Mueller.

Overall, this is a fascinating book that will become the companion classic to Olson's. As Pryor points out, even if most of the evidence is damaging to the theory (as it is), its adherents are unlikely to give up the faith. Three major queries have to be answered, however, before the faith is likely to spread, at least among political scientists. Some careful thought must be given to the notion of growth and how it is measured. This should be oriented not only to What is growth? but also to Why growth? Someone must accept the challenge of conceptualizing interest groups and distribu-

tional coalitions in a way that can be measured empirically. The passage of time is simply an unsatisfactory proxy. A number of data sets are available through the ICPSR and the Zentral Archiv which should aid this task (e.g., the third edition of The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, 2 vols., edited by C. Taylor and D. Jodice, Yale University Press, 1983). Nowhere in the book is there a dynamic formulation of the model. If Olson is correct, it should be possible to construct a theoretical model that maps changes in interest group activity aimed at redistribution into (non)growth in a single set of nation-states over a long period of time.

MICHAEL D. WARD

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State and Society in Contemporary China. Edited by Victor Nee and David Mozingo. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 303. \$29.50, cloth; \$14.95, paper.)

From 1949 to the present, the brief history of China is punctuated by repeated campaigns, movements, antimovements, and rectifications. How do the Chinese and their economy adjust to these constant changes, some of which have been violent and turbulent? The 10 contributors to this volume endeavor, from either political science or sociological viewpoints, to look at such political developments from 1949 on.

Gordon White's analysis of how the state has attempted to bring the "privileged" state cadres in line with the masses is useful. He reckons that three approaches have been used: (1) the conservative approach, that is, sending the bureaucrats to do manual work with the masses; (2) the liberal alternative of permitting non-Party citizens, particularly intellectuals, to criticize the system; and (3) the radical approach, the notorious and extreme example of which must be the Cultural Revolution. Each of these approaches, as attested by past events, has been unsuccessful.

If Tang Tsou's task is to raise questions and not to answer them (pp. 81-82), he has succeeded. Tang observes that, notwithstanding the many indications of positive improvements in China's political structure, he is unsure whether such changes will be sustained. There are strictures imposed by the crisis of leadership (p. 80), the incompatibility of the rural orientation of the populace with the urban sectors (p. 81), the weakness of the intellectuals and the professional classes (p. 82), and the continuing influence of the ultraleftists (p. 83).

David Mozingo's analysis of the People's Liberation Army in relation to the state, in particular the Chinese Communist party, is stimulating and, by and large, accurate. What Mozingo regrettably fails to describe precisely is the reason for China's difference from other developing countries in which the military could dominate politics effortlessly.

"Dictatorship of the proletariat" has been written into China's constitution. Has that expression any meaning? asks Maurice Meisner. The answer is that "dictatorship of the proletariat has appeared less prominently in Chinese theoretical pronouncements than it did during the preceding two decades" (p. 131). Meisner's view is not shared by Tang Tsou, who believes that the expression "may pave the way to a return to dogmatism and fundamentalism in the future" (p. 79).

Richard Kraus discusses the cadres, whom he sees as "the most problematic social group in the class analysis of contemporary China" (p. 146). The first-generation cadres were recruited from the peasant-worker classes, but the second and third generations are more likely to be drawn from the cadres themselves. The present Chinese administration will, sooner or later, be confronted with problems brought about by and associated with such changes.

Despite China's professed commitment to socialism, according to Edward Friedman many institutional impediments still exist, the most important of which is the "feudal restoration of fascism" (p. 168) rather than capitalism—which the Chinese communists erroneously conceive as their archenemy—because "China never was capitalist." Friedman's arguments are cogent.

Benedict Stavis's description of the dilemma of state power is journalistic and superficial rather than analytical. For example, his optimism that the rule of law will develop (p. 189) seems lacking concrete evidence.

Victor Nee's and Richard Madsen's essays overlap. Both deal with the local militia, and Nee "seeks to analyze the militia system in China in order to explore the intersection of control and autonomy as a structural feature of local government" (p. 224). His observations of the local elite in Xiamen and Fujian seem to confirm other studies. However, he quotes no historical antecedents to support one bold statement: "For the first time in history, a Chinese state succeeded in creating strong local government capable of mobilizing society" (p. 236).

Dorothy Solinger's essay, "Marxism and the Market in Socialist China," should interest both academicians and those Western businessmen interested in marketing goods and services in China. I found the best part of her essay to be the description of the "second economy" (pp.

203-206), that is, how connections (quanxi) and barter operate where no money changes hands.

Madsen contributes an astute ethnographic study of two generations of peasant youths (between the age of 15 and marriage) in Chen Village that borders Hong Kong. He concludes that the village youths who do not emigrate become "passive, dispirited...the result of frustrated rising expectations and a breakdown in the credibility of government ideology" (p. 263).

One distinguishing feature of the reference notes (pp. 265-296) is the use of Chinese magazines of independent views, for example, *Ming Bao* and *Qishi Niandai*, published in Hong Kong and reportedly read as "nebu" documents by high-ranking cadres in China.

FRANKIE FOOK-LUN LEUNG

Hong Kong

Iraq: The Contemporary State. Edited by Tim Niblock. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 283. \$27.50.)

This is the third volume of essays culled from the annual symposia of the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter (previous ones dealt with the Arab Gulf states and Saudi Arabia). The conference on Iraq, held in July, 1981, was cosponsored by the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies of the University of Basra, as was the following year's symposium on the Iran-Iraq War. As usual, the symposium's organizers have sought to strike a broad balance, as represented by the diversity of topics and international mix of participants. Several chapters deal with the state's role in social change, including class formation, the role of women, and the campaign against illiteracy. Others are concerned with Iraq's Arab and foreign policies: Iraq's role in Fertile Crescent unification schemes, relations with other Arab Gulf states, and the uncertain connection between Baghdad and Washington, as well as a comparison of the ideologies of Nasserism and "Saddamism." Those chapters that deal with economics seem to be the most substantial, though. They provide analysis of the agricultural, oil, industrial, and human resource sectors of the economy, as well as an examination of external influences on Iraqi development planning.

One of the more intriguing questions about modern Iraq is why this apparently abundantly blessed country, with all its resources in agriculture, water, population, and of course oil, has failed to live up to its high development expectations. The only attempts in this volume to answer the question lie in the economics chapters, which point out such problems as inefficient manage-

ment of the oil industry, an agricultural population which has become "peasantized" only within the last hundred years, the flight of agricultural labor to urban areas, the lack of skilled manpower in industry, planning difficulties due to frequent swings in goals and orientation, and the inevitable inefficiency associated with industrial decision making by committee. At least partly because the authors of these chapters make the attempt to address this central question, their contributions tend to be the most interesting. Appropriately, they can only hint at associated difficulties in political instability, ideological inflexibility, intercommunal tensions and strife, and Iraq's entanglement in international and regional disputes.

The volume's failure to address these issues directly (except in some aspects of foreign policy) produces an obvious imbalance. There is a notable reluctance to dwell on subjects presumably sensitive to the Iraqi government, and consequently the nature and exercise of Iraqi politics is studiously ignored. There is no mention of the central role that Tikritis (from the small central Iraqi town of Tikrit) play in the government, nor of how Saddam Husayn (and the ruling Ba'th party) have managed to monopolize political power for much of the past 15 years. The Shi'a of Iraq, who comprise a narrow majority of the total population but enjoy less than their proportionate share of political, economic, and social power and benefits, are mentioned only twice. The longrunning battle between Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds, at present quiescent but by no means concluded, receives delicate attention in but one chapter, and the evolution of Soviet-Iraqi relations is discussed only in relation to development planning.

Not surprisingly, self-censorship weakens the collective effort. There is also the inherent problem of maintaining uniform quality in a conference-generated, multiauthor work. Too many weak contributions hiding among those of better quality and the omission of any discussion of domestic politics ultimately combine to make this book largely disappointing.

J. E. PETERSON

Foreign Policy Research Institute

Social Democratic Parties in Europe. Edited by Anton Pelinka. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xvi + 190. \$26.95.)

This book is an updated English translation of the original German version published in 1980 under the title Sozialdemokratie in Europa: Macht ohne Grundsätze oder Grundsätze ohne Macht? The author, the translator, and the publisher all deserve praise for producing this excellent and readable work of scholarship that belongs in every library collection on political parties.

Pelinka focuses not on individual countries or parties but on common patterns and properties. He traces the historical origins of European social democracy from the latter half of the nineteenth century to about 1982, noting both similarities and differences from one party to another and the pressures today, for example, through the European Parliament, toward increasing transnational cooperation and coordination. Pelinka describes in some detail the differences between social democracy and communism and the ideological, political, and historical reasons for the split between these two branches of socialism during the First World War. He makes it quite clear that of the various distinctions that can be made, the most important is the social democratic insistence on pluralist democracy.

In spite of their many common features, Pelinka divides social democratic parties between government socialism, represented by the British Labour party and the Social Democratic party of Germany; and opposition socialism, represented at first by the Austrian and then by the French socialists. In fact, though, both strains can be found in each social democratic party, examples of which again are the British Labour party and the German SPD in the 1980s. The book was published too soon to note the possible change in 1982 and 1983 in the German SPD from a pragmatic government to a more militant opposition posture.

Pelinka describes the transition of social democratic parties from mass, class, and integration parties to modern catchall, or peoples', parties that pay less attention to ideology and members and more attention to personalities and the general public, including business interests. The absence of a strong communist party to its left and a decline in the number of parties encourages the trend toward catchall government socialism.

Membership structure and strength; the role of women as members and voters; the influence of religion; the importance of workers as voters and, increasingly, of white-collar employees as members; and, in particular in the SPD, the academization of the party, are described and explained skillfully with the usual effort to generalize across Europe. Party financing, the mass media, intraparty democracy, and contradictions between theory and practice are also dealt with in a manner that seeks common patterns.

In a chapter that was translated as "Position in the Political System," Pelinka looks again at government and opposition socialism and describes the interlocking effects of each type of party role on party structure, social structure, and policy impact. He concludes that "even without social democracy there is democracy [in Europe]; even without social democracy there is social balance. social security, and social welfare. Social democracy is not a political force that can or wants to act fundamentally differently from the other important forces of Europe; it is a force that makes policy somewhat differently and that changes society a little" (pp. 90-91). One reason why change under social democrats is usually less than dramatic is because most social democratic parties must join alliances in order to govern. Alliance policies vary, of course, among social democratic parties, but it is interesting to see that while there are four models of alliance policy, "an unequivocal preference for a left-oriented alliance policy can be detected only in France" (p. 93). Relations with trade unions, various grass-roots organizations, and with international federations as well as social democratic foreign policy orientations are also discussed in this chapter.

In spite of the trend toward pragmatism and modern catchall parties, Pelinka asserts that "of all the party groupings of Europe, Social Democracy is the one that has succumbed least to [the] temptation to operate without theory" (p. 128). The two "methodological traditions" in social democracy, i.e., socialism as an allembracing, mainly Marxist-inspired macrotheory, and socialism as a moral protest which demands reforms "are not in opposition but rather are points of emphasis that complement one another" (p. 130). The common bond of socialist theory was anticapitalism, to which has been added during the twentieth century an opposition to fascism and communism. This threefold opposition is a common denominator of social democratic theory; however, it is joined by a proposition toward political democracy and a collective economy. Nevertheless, social democracy is criticized from the Right as being too close to the communists, with whom it sometimes seeks arrangements and may appear at times to share "the totalitarian temptation."

The tension between theory and practice, between principled opposition and pragmatic governance, between dogma and tolerance of conflicting views, are common themes that run through this book as challenges that social democracy has had to meet in the past and will continue to meet in the future. Pelinka's contribution lies in having described the many contradictions, pressures, and dilemmas with a remarkable lack of passion but also with sympathy and understanding.

ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS

Economic Policy 1945 to the Present. By Sidney Pollard. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 197. \$27.50.)

The Wasting of the British Economy: British

This is a well-written account of the unique and unrelenting decline of the British economy over the last 30 years. An inability to grow as fast as other comparable advanced economies has resulted in Britain slipping from a position as one of the richest and most technologically advanced nations to one of the most backward. Pollard's account of this failure is intended primarily for the nonspecialist audience, and his strongly argued narrative is clear and coherent.

The book's central tenet is that the failure of the British economy is a failure of economic policy. Successive governments have inhibited investment and productive capacity deliberately in a misguided belief that short-term economic crises called for the restriction of public and private expenditure. The "stop-go" cycle of expansion and recession, so harmful to business confidence, reflects an overriding concern in British economic policy with the symbols of prices and other monetary indicators and a neglect of the "real economy," that is, goods and services produced and traded. Inflation and balance of payments difficulties have been regarded as the highest priorities for action, while investment and productive capacity—the efficiency of the supply side—are secondary. Yet actual experience confounds the assumptions of the policymakers. Prices rise most in period of stagnation, and rise least in periods of high activity. Similarly, the cure for inflation by "squeezing" production and reducing public expenditure is self-defeating, for rising unemployment places an added drain on the state in the form of benefits that need to be paid. Restrictions on capital goods investment. politically easier to cut than revenue expenditure. simply result in a loss of quality production and competitive efficiency, triggering further calls for dampening demand. The result is a vicious cycle of foreign exchange and inflationary crises which generate investment reducing strategies that dig deeper troughs for each succeeding crisis.

The tight monetary discipline of the Thatcher administration is thus seen not as a radical new departure but as continuing the destructive policies of recent decades. An underlying assumption in Pollard's account is that politicians are in thrall to the mistaken financial orthodoxies of the Treasury and a civil service whose contempt for production stems from an effete, amateurish ignorance of productive industry. In contrast, constant care and attention is paid to the interests of finance and the banks.

The lucidity of Pollard's account is unfortu-

nately not accompanied by sufficient substantiation of his propositions to come to firm conclusions about their validity as opposed to their plausibility. Alternative theses are particularly scantily considered. In an analysis that relies so heavily on attitudes as the explanatory variable ("hostility to manufacture," "ignorance of the real economy"), detailed consideration of the processes by which professional and other ideologies influence decision-makers is specially important. How do these processes differ from. for example, organized interest group pressure? Does the increasingly formal organization of British financial interests suggest their declining influence and the increased unreliability of informal and ideological influences, as others have suggested?

Despite the absence of detailed analysis, Pollard has written a clearly argued, coherent account of Britain's economic malaise that should be particularly useful for those wanting an initial guide to the area.

ROGER KING

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Transformation and Resiliency in Africa: As Seen by Afro-American Scholars. Edited by Pearl T. Robinson and Elliott P. Skinner. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 277. \$14.95.)

This is a collection of nine case studies of contemporary African societal, political, and cultural life as seen through the eyes of Afro-American scholars. These essays are, in theory, integrated by introductory and concluding chapters. Topics addressed include "Rural-Urban Labor Migration in Kenya"; "Public Corporation Expansion in Nigeria"; "Clientage and Political Change in Niger"; "Revolutionary Transformation in Ethiopia," and essays on selected aspects of African art, education, literature, and music. Given the wide-ranging nature of these topics, this review will focus on the methodological and theoretical perspectives that the case studies purport to hold in common. I take these perspectives to be twofold. First, borrowing from the justifiably acclaimed work of C.S. Whittaker, Jr. on dysrythmic change and the conflict between tradition and modernity in Nigeria, it is asserted that both transformation and resiliency exist in African political and social change. (Appropriately, Whittaker also wrote the Foreword to the volume.) Second, the essays are written from what the editors call an "Afro-American" perspective. Both themes are obviously important, and it is a

great pity that the only way in which the reader could be made systematically aware of their centrality to the case studies is to read the Conclusion first.

In the Conclusion, "Looking to the Future with an Eye to the Past," Pearl Robinson suggests how transformation in Africa is comprised of both continuity and adaptation. While neither a profound nor an original statement, it has, as she correctly points out, all too often been overlooked by many scholars intent on theorizing the study of Africa from either end of the ideological spectrum. Robinson argues this theorizing has been Eurocentric irrespective of which of her two schools-developmental or dependency-one chooses to examine. In contrast, we are offered an Afrocentric view stressing first, the interplay of indigenous African institutions with colonial and postcolonial phenomena; second, a "pragmatic pluralist" approach to theory to offset the determinist nature of Eurocentrism; and finally, a "wide ranging concern with the issue of equity." The acceptance of this alternative perspective at face value raises many other questions.

Neither development nor dependency theory can be dismissed in cavalier fashion. They are not as discrete, teleological, determinist, or generally as simplistic as the Afrocentric critique would, both implicitly and explicitly, have us believe. Further, the Afrocentric/Eurocentric distinction is not, I think, as sharp as Robinson suggests. The essays in the volume are not purely Afrocentric. just as development theory and dependency theory are not purely Eurocentric. Similarly, Robinson offers us an analysis that demonstrates a place for utility-maximizing rational choice theory within her Afrocentric scheme. Further evidence is to be found in Ed Keller's excellent discussion of the historical transformation of Ethiopia, where revolution is shown to have arisen out of tensions generated in the conflict between the modernizing and centralizing tendencies of the Empire (especially under Selassie) on the one hand and the residual strength of traditional institutions and relationships such as the church, aristocracy, and system of land tenure on the other. These conflicting elements would surely find a central role in the analysis of revolutionary transformation the world over, not simply or exclusively in Africa. The value of Keller's work, as with that of several of the other case studiesespecially Robinson's analysis of institutional convergence in a rural Hausa community-is not its Afrocentric approach, but rather that it is a combination of sound and restrained generalization (the essence of theory building) grounded in detailed empirical analysis.

The other major problem I have with the Afrocentric approach, or at least as set out here, is its similar inability to incorporate significant exogenous variables in a manner comparable to that in which the more dogmatic streams of dependency or development theory were unable to incorporate the possibility of indigenous African institutions resisting these exogenous influences. If the Afrocentric approach takes its plea for pragmatic pluralism seriously, it will need to think positively about adopting the best aspects of all contemporary theorizing, irrespective of intellectual origin. Otherwise it will be guilty of behaving little differently to the early scholarship on Africa, the intransigence of which receives fairly savage treatment in Elliott Skinner's introductory chapter, "Afro-American's in Search of Africa: The Scholar's Dilemma." Skinner demonstrates how it was long impossible for the Afrocentric perspective to gain legitimacy within the African Studies community. In context, Skinner's chapter-a historiography of the Afro-American study of Africa bears little relationship to the other case studies in the volume, and as such plays no role in integrating them. It is, however, a perfect illustration of transformation and resiliency in its ironic exposure of the inability of the first generation of U.S. scholars of African nationalism to recognize and respond to the emerging nationalistic sentiments of the younger generation of black scholars within their own ranks.

Skinner's essay is but one of several interesting and insightful essays. Yet as an attempt to create a homogeneous collection, *Transformation and Resiliency in Africa* unfortunately falls somewhat short of the mark. Further, the essays represent a specifically "Afro-American perspective" in name only. Perhaps more seriously, however, Afrocentrism as a "mode of analysis as well as a world view" (p. 252) raises as many epistemological questions as the Eurocentric perspectives that it seeks to replace.

RICHARD A. HIGGOTT

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Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton). By Stanley Rosen. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xv + 320. \$32.50.)

Rosen's impressively researched social history of Red Guard factionalism in Canton middle schools is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Cultural Revolution politics. The focus is on the structure of educational opportunities for students of different political class backgrounds—"good," "ordinary," and "bad"—and how this structure affected such

students' political behavior during the Cultural Revolution. His thesis is that the "pattern of factional formation and factional participation grew directly out of the contradictions and conflicts—some manifest, some latent—which had already divided the students before the GPCR" (p. 2).

The study is divided into two parts. Part 1 provides an account of the hierarchy of secondary schools in Canton prior to the Cultural Revolution and the shifts in the kinds of class backgrounds of students that were accepted in these schools during the years from 1960 to 1966, as the pendulum swung from an emphasis on academic achievement to political class origin. Part 2 details the formation of Red Guard factions and subfactions, outlines intra and interfactional disputes. profiles various Red Guard leaders and followers at different types of schools, their behavior during "radical" and "conservative" phases of the Cultural Revolution, and describes the fate of these groups as the Cultural Revolution wound down. The book ends with a brief description of recent changes in the educational system and the type of students that are likely to benefit from these changes.

Rosen's achievement is his ability, as a result of in-depth interviews in Hong Kong with more than 100 major participants of the events he chronicles, to detail with precision the many variations and complexities of Red Guard activity at different schools and by different groups of students within the same schools at different periods during the crucial years from 1966 to 1968. The findings confirm earlier, more general studies that pointed to the importance of class background as a determinant of Red Guard behavior, but Rosen's work refines and provides greater precision to our understanding. The major antagonists were not all those with "good" versus "bad" class backgrounds such as workers or peasants against the children of former landlords or capitalists. Rosen pinpoints the major factional split as that between those of cadre origin and those of middle-class (specifically intellectual) origin—precisely those two groups that were most affected by the pre-Cultural Revolution shifts in educational policy. Moreover, the extent and type of factional behavior was dependent on a student's immediate environment, that is, type of school. In fact, "patterns of factional formation . . . varied in largest part on the basis of whether a school was true elite, good, ordinary, or poor" (p. 194). Further differences could be found depending on the year of matriculation in a school—because shifting national policies during the early 1960s resulted in year cohorts with different class backgrounds predominant.

Rosen, unfortunately, is so engrossed with the rich detail yielded by his research that he rarely, if

ever, attempts to stand above his intricate explication of concrete behavior and events to draw even slightly broader conclusions or generalizations. Not only does he neglect to ask the question of what his study tells us about communist political systems in general, but he also neglects even to generalize about the Chinese political system. Certainly there is much material here relevant to questions about social stratification and mobility, class conflict, and interest group politics in socialist states; yet Rosen appears unaware that there is a rich literature on these topics to which his study speaks directly. And the implications of the central theme of the book—that commitments in this most ideological of mass movements were determined fundamentally by students' concerns for their future career chances-are left relatively unexplored. Rosen demonstrates this, but does not reflect on it. What, for example, does this say about ideological commitment in general in China or other communist systems? Is Rosen suggesting that ideological commitment, as demonstrated in the Cultural Revolution, is basically a mask for individual self-interest? All but the most obsessive of China specialists will finish this book frustrated that its author did not view his rich and important findings more broadly.

JEAN C. OI

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Developed Socialism in the Soviet Bloc: Political Theory and Political Reality. Edited by Jim Seroka and Maurice D. Simon. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. x + 198. \$18.00.)

The theme of this symposium is "developed socialism" in the Soviet bloc countries. The theory was first announced in 1967 by Leonid Brezhnev. The then-First Secretary of the Communist party of the Soviet Union suggested that it was a new stage on the road toward achieving a communist society. Six of the essays deal with "national perspectives" of this Brezhnev-formulated doctrine, and the last two with its "cross-national perspectives." There are 28 tables and two figures in the essays written by nine specialists in Soviet bloc area studies. The book also contains an index.

Although one finds useful information in the book, much of it is repetitive, dated, and some of it is available in previously published secondary sources as, for example, the data on "Growth of Real Per Capita Disposable Income in the Soviet Union" (up to 1975 through 1977) and "Annual Growth Rate in Real Income per Capita" (up to 1970 through 1975) (pp. 159, 161). A table on

"Soviet Welfare Expenditure" gives data between 1950 and 1974 only (p. 175), and "Public Expenditures as a Percentage of Factor Price GNP" merely for 1956 and 1962—that is, for the period before the announced arrival of "developed socialism." The latter table is based on a source published in 1969 (p. 181).

Data contained in Table 7.1, "Communist Party Memberships," (p. 130) and Table 7.3, "Social Composition of the Communist Parties (%)," (p. 134) are based on "Official figures as reported by the East European and Soviet Press." Since information from these unidentified publications, and referred to in the text, is not current, one might suggest that the authors should have researched and clearly identified the more recently published East European and Soviet periodicals that deal with these subjects.

In his essay "Is Developed Socialism a Soviet Version of Convergence?" Jeffrey W. Hahn resurrects the convergence theory put to rest many years ago. Maurice D. Simon writes that his essay "Developed Socialism and the Polish Crisis" was completed in December, 1981 "shortly after the declaration of martial law in Poland," and that "an earlier version of the chapter" had been published previously (p. 114).

JOSEF KALYODA

Saint Joseph College

Food Policy Analysis. By C. Peter Timmer, Walter P. Falcon, and Scott R. Pearson. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 301. \$25.00, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

Here is some of the best current thinking on the food problems of third-world countries. A product of the authors' teaching experiences in American universities and in national food agencies in the developing world, this book is a thoughtfully constructed manual of techniques to assist governmental decision making in an issue area of critical importance. Food policy, for Timmer, Falcon, and Pearson, "encompasses the collective efforts of governments to influence the decisionmaking environment of food producers, food consumers, and food marketing agents in order to further social objectives" (p. 9). It follows that the analysis is broad (addressing issues in agriculture, nutrition, trade, labor relations, and finance) and necessarily cognizant of the complexity of policy choice.

In this "macro food policy framework," the basic nutritional needs of individuals are not neglected; at the same time, the emphasis is placed on the macroeconomic levers available to government for the achievement of adequate and sustainable nutrition. The authors aptly note that the effects of macroeconomic policies on third-world food systems typically are "accidental fallout," taking place with little or no ex ante government intention (p. 221). Food Policy Analysis makes its contribution to the literature of development by clearly demonstrating the means by which such artifacts as exchange rates, interest rates, land rental rates, and the rural-urban terms of trade can influence the nutritional status of a population. The many piecemeal solutions to the world hunger problem offered in various forums are addressed here in what is perhaps politically the most relevant setting for dealing with hunger: the national level of economic planning. Difficult choices need to be made, between the interests of consumers and those of producers, between short-term and long-term objectives, and between domestic and international viability of the economy. At the crux of these matters, more often than not, is food pricing policy.

The preferred policy strategy suggested here, stripped to its bare bones and requiring adaptation to particular circumstances, is as follows: Carefully raise price incentives for farmers and stimulate productive employment, but accompany this with targeted consumer food subsidies to protect the nutritional status of the poor. At the same time, consider and diligently monitor the impacts of these interventions on food markets, the government budget, and the balance of payments.

After the Introduction, the analytical tools (often microeconomic models) and programmatic options are presented in discussions of food consumption and nutrition (chap. 2), food production (chap. 3), and marketing and food price formation (chap. 4). Chapters 5, "Macroeconomic Policies and the Food System," and 6, "Macro Food Policy," address most directly the variety of interconnected choices faced by national planners. Chapter 6 also provides a succinct summary of the normative issues, categorized in terms of "ideal answers," "nonanswers," and "elements of a workable food policy." Annotated bibliographies at the end of each chapter are useful keys to further reading, although the entries are drawn almost exclusively from various specialties within economics.

This book is likely to disappoint some readers due to problems of ideological implication as well as content. The analysis implicitly fits into a theoretical mold acceptable to a Bretton Woods institution (this is a World Bank publication). The food policy analyst is placed above the political fray of bureaucratic disputes and international economic negotiations; food policy decisions, it appears, take place in the sanitized neo-Keynesian

atmosphere of planning agencies. The normative viewpoint favors the improvement of food markets through minimum necessary public intervention. It complements much of the *laissez faire* thinking that enjoys new prominence in some development agencies. The analysis, consequently, is more meaningful for capitalist societies than for "command" systems, despite a claim that the methodology is equally applicable to both (p. 13).

The politics of food, taken broadly to include such phenomena as class pressures for policy restraint or reform, symbolic exploitation of food issues by political leaders, and the sensitivities of policy dialogues with aid donors, are not included in this book's coverage. This extraction of food policy analysis from its political environment is not unrecognized by the authors (p. viii). Nevertheless, there is irony in it: While the book promotes conscientious, well-informed policy choices, the political elements of such decisions effectively are left to intuition and guesswork.

JAMES FREMMING

Northwestern University

Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures. By Grant Wardlaw. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 218. \$29.50, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

Since the Munich Massacre, terrorism has become a major concern for law enforcement personnel and policymakers who must respond to the threat. Furthermore, social scientists have increasingly sought, to understand a particularly vicious form of political violence.

In contrast to the early studies, there now is an extensive body of knowledge on the topic of terrorism. Yet few works exist that concisely integrate the material that has been generated by the shock waves of continuing terrorist incidents.

In his Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures, Grant Wardlaw has authored a splendid text that will be of equal value to those in the station house or in the seminar room. Through fine writing and insightful observations, he has surveyed the major areas in the study of terrorism.

As a result of the fact that he studied the academic and operational aspects of terrorism long before the topic became fashionable, Wardlaw has the confidence to deal with the vexing problem of defining terrorism—a task which many other social scientists have avoided given the frustration that often accompanies such an endeavor. Wardlaw provides a balanced treatment of the definitional issue and also presents

different classifications that can be helpful in analyzing terrorism. He makes a particularly telling point that the public often ignores when traumatized by a horrible act of carnage, that is, "terrorism is not mindless. It is a deliberate means to an end" (p. 17).

Wardlaw then proceeds to give an excellent summary of the historical development of terrorism and notes current differences. He makes an effective case for the view that "the dividing line between terrorism and criminality has become less and less distinct with time" (p. 32). In effect, authorities will have to adjust to the fact that the motivation of individuals and groups will become more clouded in the future, therefore making prediction of, and responses to, incidents more difficult.

Wardlaw also explores how terrorists skillfully employ fear to maximize their impact by seeking "to isolate the citizen from his or her social context" (p. 34). He has successfully applied the classic writings of such individuals as Hannah Arendt in dealing with the sociological impact of terrorism.

In his chapter on future trends, Wardlaw deals with the subjective aspects of terrorism when he suggests that there is an "ecstasy factor" that has meant that "the exercise of terror may become an almost religious experience for the terrorist . . ." (p. 54). As events in the Mideast indicate, there are now those who may seek religious martyrdom by their acts and not political goals.

In the second part of the book, Wardlaw grapples with the fundamental problems associated with how a democratic government must reconcile the need for security with the maintenance of the rule of law. His list of policy options that should be considered in any antiterrorist campaign provides a fine basis for discussion of how open societies can copy with the challenge.

Chapter 10 is particularly interesting. While the public is fascinated with the exploits of such elite groups as the Special Air Service, Wardlaw explores the more serious matters of public policy associated with the dangers inherent in the potential militarization of the police that may be a byproduct of the implementation of antiterrorism tactical programs. His discussion of the issues related to forming a "third force" or paramilitary units is cogent, and he makes a strong case for the position that "the containment of terrorism should as far as possible be a police matter dealt with by existing police forces" (p. 101).

The sections on the convoluted United Nations' response to the threat and the British and German experience underscore the complexities surrounding the application of international and domestic law in dealing with the problem of terrorism.

Chapter 12 aptly stresses the crucial role in-

telligence plays in any counterterrorism policy and also provides a useful summary of the techniques authorities can apply in meeting the unique problems associated with the dangers poised by the activities of clandestine groups. In chapter 15, Wardlaw also gives a fine summary of the role behavioral scientists can play in assisting authorities to avoid the pitfall of placing "excessive reliance on technological solutions" (p. 161).

In his conclusion, Wardlaw suggests that terrorism will threaten in the next decades as a result of a number of factors including the proliferation of private security forces that might engage in counterterrorist visilantism for their clients.

Political Terrorism is an outstanding book, one that should be assigned as a required text for classes on the topic.

STEPHEN SLOAN

University of Oklahoma

New International Communism: The Foreign and Defense Policies of the Latin European Communist Parties. By Lawrence L. Whetten. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982. Pp. xx + 262. \$26.95.)

American scholarly interest in the West European communist parties has varied considerably since the end of World War II, when these parties first emerged as important political forces. That interest has been high during brief periods of communist participation in governments and when the Western communist parties displayed marked independence from Moscow; at other times, academic concern for these parties has waned. But the persistence of strong communist parties in four Latin countries-Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy—is perhaps the feature that most clearly distinguishes these political systems from the politics of northwestern Europe, and this phenomenon clearly deserves more consistent attention than it has been given.

As the domestic strength of these communist parties has been stabilized or reduced, their impact upon Western governmental policies has been largely a function of the degree of their cooperation with noncommunist parties and collaboration with other communist parties. When the Eurocommunist movement faltered in the 1970s, an attempt was made to substitute an ambiguous "New Internationalism" as a means for maximizing the parties' domestic and international influence. This ambitious and somewhat erratic enterprise is examined by Lawrence L. Whetten in his latest book.

Whetten, professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, assembled a battery of researchers for this project and organized a remarkably systematic study, the thoroughness of which is reflected in two appendixes detailing lines of inquiry. This team made exhaustive use of a variety of research materials, including interviews, scholarly articles, and press reports, as the bases for a wide-ranging profile of the Latin communist parties' policies and problems.

The main focus of the study is the parties' attitudes toward national and regional security policy and questions of European integration. The central hypothesis of the book is that of the "two key features of internationalism—Communist identity and high policy—it is the latter, foreign and defense matters, that plays the dominant role in the legitimation of nonruling Community parties." If the hypothesis is not proved, Whetten certainly makes a strong case. He clearly details the relationships between external policy and domestic political imperatives; since the domestic contexts are so varied, severe constraints are imposed upon the quest for a common approach to regional and world policy.

One common feature among these parties, Whetten notes, is lack of an adequate appreciation of the Soviet threat. Only the Italian Community party has developed the research support required for an independent, theoretically sophisticated approach to international problems, and that party has taken the lead in "New Internationalism," a flexible attitude toward relations among the Latin communist parties and collaboration with noncommunist parties and ruling communist parties. Prospects for the "New Internationalism" do not appear bright: The dynamic initiatives of the Italian Communist party confront the generally ineffective performance of the Spanish Communist party, the strong tilt of the French Communist party toward Moscow, and the continuing commitment of the Portuguese Communist party to "Proletarian Internationalism."

The most important product of this study is the demonstration that both the domestic political variables in security policy formation and policy outcomes among these parties are far more complex than is generally realized. Whetten's study is somewhat more sympathetic to the Latin communist parties than are most other Western scholarly works, and he seems to think that fears about the consequences of Communist participation in NATO governments have been overblown. Still, the presentation is generally well-balanced and objective, and Whetten does not allow personal preferences to intrude upon this rigorous, well-organized investigation of the questions raised at the outset. The overall result is a book of

exceptional merit, a valuable contribution to the literature on communism in Western Europe.

R. JUDSON MITCHELL

University of New Orleans

Iran since the Revolution. By Sepehr Zabih. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. 247. \$21.50.)

This book is a refreshing attempt to keep Iran's revolution in perspective. The book's message can be quickly stated: In 1978 and 1979 Iran erupted into a cataclysmic revolution leading to the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic republic under the Ayatollah Khomeini. Since then Iran has been going through an unseemly crisis of leadership precipitated by the continued failure of revolutionary leaders to establish their credibility.

The book contains 10 chapters, a postscript, a selected bibliography, and an index. The chapters examine chronologically what Zabih calls "the American connection" with the Revolution and the disintegration of the armed forces, the process of institutionalization of the revolutionary regime, the hostage crisis and its ramifications, the presidency and parliament, the resurgence of opposition that challenges the legitimacy of the Republic, the role of the parties supporting and opposing Khomeini, the rift between secular and fundamentalist forces, the outbreak of insurrections by the ethnic minorities, Iran's foreign policy, and a summary prognosis.

Zabih notes that Islam played a major role in events in Iran before and during the Revolution. What is not clear from his analysis is the nature and significance of that role. No doubt the Iranian Revolution was an upsurge of religious revivalism against materialism. Still, many saw the Revolution as a rejection of modernization and Western influence. It was also a reaction against tyranny. The success of the Revolution is attributed to Khomeini, a man of messianic power. But nobody, including Zabih, has offered a clear explanation of a situation in which a country that had been following a path of modernization on secular lines for a long time unhesitatingly squandered the achievements of several decades.

It is difficult to discover from the book whether Zabih prefers the late Shah or his rival, Khomeini. He treats the present regime somewhat kindly when he says, "the Islamic Republic . . . identified itself with the captors of diplomatic, military and civilian personnel of a foreign embassy" (p. 49). It was not just a question of identifying with the militants; it was through the encouragement and support given by the regime that

the militants were able to occupy the American Embassy. The Khomeini regime needed an outburst of anti-Americanism to maintain its hold on the people and thus claim legitimacy, a fact which explains the takeover of the embassy and the inordinate delay in releasing the hostages.

Zabih considers the work of Khomeini in the Revolution to have succeeded so far. But he warns that Khomeini's "insistence on creating a monolithic Shia theocracy may prove the undoing of the Islamic Republic, in the same way that the late Shah's perseverance in establishing a one-party state contributed to his ultimate downfall" (p.

232). In this case, Zabih may prove to be right.

Zabih exhibits a solid knowledge of Iranian politics, although he hesitates to probe behind the public record—that is, to consider the covert aspects of past and present Iranian politics. In sum, the book's greatest utility lies in the attention it gives to the personalities and politics in contemporary Iran, a critical area of our troubled world.

SHEIKH R. ALI

North Carolina Central University

## International Relations

Allies in a Turbulent World: Challenges to U.S. and Western European Cooperation. Edited by Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982. Pp. ix + 174. \$24.95.)

Allies in a Turbulent World is a collection of papers prepared for a colloquium convened under the auspices of the John F. Kennedy Institute, located in Tilburg, The Netherlands. As such, it both suffers from the usual drawbacks of conference and colloquium proceedings, and also garners the usual advantages. Although all of the authors are well-recognized in their respective fields, the chapters are uneven in quality and scope, and the totality of the chapters does not add up as the sum of all the parts. Furthermore, the book suffers from the common problem of colloquia that discuss contemporary issues in that the participants draw their observations from the more or less commonly held expectations of that particular moment—in this case November, 1981 to January, 1982—and once again subsequent history has proven its unpredictability, especially in economic matters.

The book's strength is that the contributors nevertheless try as much as possible to weave a larger context into their otherwise rather short-run observations without burdening the reader with historical summaries that should be well-known, thus getting to the heart of the matter in each case. Furthermore, the book successfully relates the political and security dimension of European-Atlantic relations with the political and economic—a crucial necessity in these days of increasingly complex interactions among states. As David Calleo puts it in his chapter on the Atlantic Alliance:

Four general trends have slowly been undermining the benevolent circumstances within which NATO has evolved:

- 1. The growing reality of strategic parity.
- 2. The deterioration of economic conditions.
- 3. The erosion of the transatlantic cultural identity.
- 4. The growing significance of security problems in the Third World. (p. 8)

S.I.P. van Campen's chapter, "NATO Political Consultation and European Political Cooperation," draws attention to the essentially divergent courses that the member-states of the European Communities and the United States have taken as regards consultation of foreign policy issues that transcend as well as include the Atlantic area. He offers a trenchant comment, which is not particularly reassuring: "If EPC has not substantially damaged NATO, this is in particular due to the fact that EPC has not become what it should have become" (p. 67).

Pierre Hassner's chapter is the book's most analytical, discussing "Pluralist Democracies in a World of Repression." As usual, Hassner leaves us with uncertainties because, as in much of his writings, he does not attempt to explain or justify particular national attitudes or foreign policies, a topic with which much of the book is concerned. As Hassner comments:

It belongs to the essence of pluralist democracies that some forces within them see them as more repressive than pluralist. It belongs to the essence of the world of repression that its results may be strikingly uniform (nothing is more similar to right-wing torture than left-wing torture) but that its sources are strikingly diverse (terrorism and repression, conservative tyrannies or oll-garchies, revolutionary totalitarian systems, revivalist fanaticism, and so forth).(p. 142)

Issues that divide Europe and America are discussed in separate chapters: détente (Eberhard Schulz), crisis management outside the NATO area (Lincoln P. Bloomfield), arms-control negotiations (Lawrence Freedman), trade (William Diebold, Jr.), monetary affairs (Susan Strange), and energy (Wilfrid L. Kohl). Frans Alting von Geusau's chapter, "Allied Strategy and Atlantic Security," reinforces a common theme of the book, that America is viewed by its European allies to be as much of a problem—and even a threat—to them as is the Soviet Union. He deplores this condition, as do many of the other contributors, but by making the point so strongly and consistently, he underscores for American readers the gulf in perceptions of security and national well-being that is causing the Atlantic to become a barrier rather than a bridge. How to restore a greater degree of mutuality in Atlantic relationships is thus a major theme, and rightly so in most of the contributors' views because of their concern that the current administration in Washington has not been helping matters much.

In his conclusions as the editor of the volume, Frans Alting von Geusau has, in my opinion, identified the major problem:

With respect to the need to maintain allied cohesion, national governments have failed in at least two areas. They have failed in many instances in their task to inform their electorates adequately about the reality of the international situation and the dilemmas of allied security. They have equally failed in their understanding of the psychology of mutual confidence in allied relations. (p. 163)

ROBERT S. JORDAN

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The World Tin Market: Political Pricing and Economic Competition. By William L. Baldwin. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 273. \$45.00.)

The central theme of this book, that "the performance of the world tin industry can best be understood as a process of political price determination imposed on a market that is structurally conducive to effective competitive processes" (p. 3), is pursued in nine well-written chapters. Baldwin, who is an economist, provides an authoritative analysis of the politics of tin in this study of commodity pricing in the context of international trade. Chapter 1 introduces the basics of tin as a metal. Then, after reviewing the role of tin in the economies of both producing and consuming countries (chaps. 2-3), Baldwin goes on to

examine supply and demand for tin (chap. 5), price and output of tin (chap. 6), the patterns of mine ownership (chap. 7), and mining costs (chap. 8). Through all of this runs the history of the industry from the early classic cartel effort, the Bandoeng Pool of 1921, to the post-World War II International Tin Council and the current Sixth International Tin Agreement (ITA). Baldwin's discussion of the evolving and conflicting concerns of producing countries provides insight into the broad international commodity debates underlying the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

For scholars interested in the national politics of Bolivia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, or Zaire, this book is worth consulting. These are the major tin producing countries, and the political pressures exerted by their tin exports are placed in an interactive and comparative context. The international politics of tin are interpreted through an exposition on the productive advantages of each tin producing country. The expensive mining of hard rock tin veins in Bolivia creates a very different set of policy constraints than the inexpensive mining of alluvial tin deposits in Southeast Asia. Baldwin makes clear the serious competitive difficulties facing Bolivia's tin industry. In that Andean country, the need for employment and the revolutionary potential of the tin mine laborers combine to create a great incentive for all Bolivian governments to press for a high floor price for tin. The Malaysian government, with abundant low-cost tin, has a greater interest in market arrangements emphasizing volume.

Baldwin concludes by observing that the history of the modern tin industry is characterized by "a succession of attempts by interested governments to counteract the effect of global competition that persistently frustrated private efforts to restrict production and raise prices. The international tin agreements are only the latest of these efforts" (p. 234). This conclusion is the basis for his interpretation of commodity politics. For instance, the government of Bolivia favors price raising export controls, while that of the United States, representing a consumer interest, favors price stabilizing buffer stocks. Baldwin finds that the United States' position of seeking stable free markets for tin may be unrealistic; that the alternate to the ITA is some other form of political pricing, although he does argue that an explicit tin cartel is unlikely.

Baldwin is to be complimented for going beyond a single discipline and region in trying to illuminate a major practical and theoretical problem: trade relationships between commodity producing countries and industrial country consumers. In addition to the interest it holds for economists, the book has much to offer scholars of the politics of development who may not have a direct interest in tin, Bolivia, or Malaysia.

WILLIAM CULVER

State University of New York of Plattsburgh

Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. By Richard K. Betts. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982. Pp. xiii + 318. \$24.55, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

The absence of a theory of surprise in the international relations literature has long been noted. With Surprise Attack, Richard Betts has made a major contribution to increasing our understanding of the dynamics of surprise. Coupled with Michael Handel's Diplomacy of Surprise (Harvard University Press, 1981), the foundation finally seems to have been laid for developing such a theory. Surprise Attack, however, is more than just a study of surprise. This question takes up only the first half of the book. The second half is devoted to the question of how does one design a system of defense to cope with the onset of surprise. NATO's central front and nuclear surprise are the principal focal points. The arguments put forward by Betts will also make Surprise Attack must reading for those interested in deterrence and defense planning.

After surveying nine surprise attacks which started wars or brought in additional states, Betts arrives at two conclusions shared by most observers of surprise: very little learning occurs as the same mistakes are repeatedly made, and not all of the potential dangers of surprise can be avoided. What is significant about these conclusions is how they were arrived at (through the use of comparative case studies) and their points of emphasis (the response pattern of policymakers).

Political, military, and financial considerations make it impossible and imprudent for policy-makers to hedge against all possible instances of surprise. Surprise is a problem primarily when it possesses the ability to invalidate the assumptions on which a state's defense plans rest and to lessen the effectiveness of its military capabilities. Surprise is also relative and operates at many levels. Bolts from the blue are rare, as some warning is almost always present. Given these considerations, Betts argues that a response to warning is not automatic. Policymakers must evaluate the situation and make a judgment about how much warning must exist before there occurs a response.

Betts feels that answering this question is especially important for NATO defense planners.

Conventional Western defense plans count more on being able to avoid surprise than on being able to prevail against it (p. 8). Yet, if the Soviets are to have a reasonable degree of confidence in victory, they must rely upon surprise as a force multiplier (p. 156). A hesitancy on the part of Western leaders to respond to warning threatens NATO's capacity to resist.

Because response to warning is not automatic. Betts holds that much of the deterrence literature is of little relevance because of its mechanistic. ahistorical, and apolitical nature. The principal challenge facing NATO is to contract the period of debate within and between governments (p. 296). The impossibility of completely anticipating the dimensions of the policy debate makes some type of delay inevitable. It also makes "the military capacity to recover from short warning . . . extremely dependent on political processes" (pp. 11-12). Military planners, therefore, must be prepared for situations in which indicators of Warsaw Pact activity are not countered. Betts asserts that the objective must be the development of strategies that "facilitate defense despite surprise, without compromising crisis stability" (p. 22).

If one were to find fault with Betts's treatment of his subjects, it is that not all of the material in Surprise Attack is original. Four of the 10 chapters have previously appeared in abridged and altered form as journal articles. It should also be stressed that the case studies are narrow in focus. Only enough is presented to establish a basis for generalization. Readers unfamiliar with the case may find it necessary to go back to lengthier treatments of them.

GLENN P. HASTEDT

James Madison University

Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture. Edited by Barry M. Blechman. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1982. Pp. xii + 308. \$14.95, paper.)

Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture is the collective effort and conference report of the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues. Organized in 1980, the consortium worked for two years reconsidering the U.S. strategic environment and analyzing U.S. strategic policies.

The consortium established a special working group of academicians and policymakers "to devise an integrated policy for strategic nuclear forces—one that embraced not only the weapons programs necessary to maintain an adequate military and political balance but that also con-

sidered whether and, if so, how negotiations could enhance U.S. security" (p. viii).

The resulting anthology is not a position paper from any fringe element but reflects instead a middle-road view of current strategic issues as they appear from the perspectives both of U.S. security management and of arms control. Although the moderate position will not satisfy some readers, the text presents a balanced, straightforward analysis by competent professionals with differing perspectives and disagreements within the middle ground.

Ten chapters address the major military, political, and technological issues and represent the individual efforts of the authors together with major input from the consortium meetings. Unlike many books of readings, which are loose collections of thoughts along a central theme, this text defines clearly the issues and provides a logical progression of analysis, with each chapter serving as a building block for later chapters. Blechman's introductory chapter makes no apologies for the world nor for the United States' nuclear arsenal, which to him reflects its status as a great power. Walter Slocombe's essay traces the development of U.S. nuclear weapons strategies and the resultant problems for each period since 1945. His is perhaps the most succinct conceptualization of the major nuclear policies and of the subtle shifts in policy experienced during the past 15 years.

The chapters by William Hyland and Marshall Schulman focus primarily on Soviet strategic policies with serious concerns, even foreboding, in evidence. Both agree that the Soviets have matched U.S. strategic capabilities in recent years, and this strategic confidence subsequently has led to more assertive Soviet behavior in international politics. Chapters by Christoph Bertram, William Perry, Alan Platt, Michael Nacht, and Michael May address the technical issues of specific strategic policies, all very pertinent in today's nuclear debate.

Joseph Nye's essay on the future of arms control is followed by the study group's collective summary, with opposing minority positions attached. Noting the shift of nuclear policy toward a greater reliance on nuclear weapons by the Reagan administration, the group opposes policies of strategic superiority by either superpower. Instead, the group seeks to restore the strategic nuclear balance and to give top weapons priority to the improved survivability of C'I capabilities. Modernization of U.S. strategic systems is encouraged, together with significant arms control efforts.

Although not a book for beginners, this is a useful text for the academically oriented layman because of its straightforward, nontechnical

analysis. There is little jargon here, but the book would benefit from a good lexicon. In short, this is a very useful and understandable text on a critical but complicated subject.

ABBOTT A. BRAYTON

East Tennessee State University

The Future of European Alliance Systems: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Edited by Arlene Idol Broadhurst. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xx + 316. \$22.50.)

NATO and the Atlantic Defense: Perceptions and Illusions. By Werner J. Feld and John K. Wildgren. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xi + 171. \$19.95.)

Probably few topics have received as close attention over the past 35 years as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the 1979 NATO two-track decision to modernize its intermediaterange nuclear forces (INF) and to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviets, NATO has once again come under intense public scrutiny and, in some cases, its continued viability has been seriously questioned. Both the "crisis" in the 1950s over German rearmament and the one in the 1960s over French withdrawal from the alliance subsided; the 1980s INF "crisis" will also. In the meantime, the alliance is being subjected to close analysis and reassessment on both sides of the Atlantic by officials as well as by the academic world and public.

The Future of European Alliance Systems is an important contribution to the literature on NATO and, contrary to a number of recent analyses, a constructive and sober assessment. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are treated only infrequently in such detail within the same volume. The book's comparative NATO/Warsaw Pact (WTO) approach is interesting because of the observations it permits the reader with regard to the prevailing alliance systems in Europe. To Broadhurst's credit, the book gains added credibility from its 12 authors who represent five of the NATO members and collectively have spent many years in positions dealing with European alliance issues. With the frequent references to the past, present, and future problem of Germany for both NATO and WTO, Broadhurst might also have solicited a German contribution to one of the sections on alliances.

The concept of alliance systems is discussed in three introductory chapters on "European Security Perspectives" which form the theoretical framework for the book. Broadhurst reviews the traditional rationales for alliance formation and alliance disintegration and concludes that no

single rationale or combination of them describes alliances adequately. This conclusion would appear to substantiate Hedley Bull's rejection of any real theory of alliances and his contention that theories are at most helpful in defining alliances. Martin Edmonds's chapter examines the strengths and weaknesses of NATO in its political, military, and economic dimensions and rejects the concept of an alliance based on military necessity in favor of a much broader and political definition. While the conclusion of all three authors underlines the need for expanded European initiatives, Bull forecasts a future European balance to the USSR without the United States.

The four chapters on NATO by Kenneth Hunt (U.K.), Pierre Lellouche (France), Marten van Heuven (U.S.), and Derek Arnould (Canada) offer the diversity of views suggested by their four nationalities. Arnould deals with the issue of how to extend the consultative mechanism to non-NATO countries, while van Heuven examines the role of the press and public opinion for the Atlantic Alliance. Hunt and Lellouche are refreshingly open in their comments, and-although Lellouche's arguments have also been made elsewhere—their arguments either are heard too infrequently in the United States or are couched in such diplomatic terms as to be ineffective. Hunt's assessment of the U.S. approach to threats outside NATO is unusually frank, and he accords the Europeans even, if perhaps more tempered, treatment. The Atlantic Alliance continues to be, he concludes, "a symbiotic one in which each side depends upon the other" (p. 84).

The four chapters dealing with the Warsaw Pact offer an in-depth and complementary treatment of the pact. Both Malcolm Mackintosh and Ivan Volgves offer fairly basic overviews of the organization and structure of the Warsaw Pact and underline the importance of the alliance to the Soviets in terms of allied control. Particularly interesting in this respect is the Volgyes discussion of stresses, tensions, and vulnerabilities of the pact. R. Ned Lebow and Lawrence Whetten address the issues of alliances and East European legitimacy within the present system. Both discussions avoid the easy generalizations in favor of very specific comments on the Warsaw Pact members and assessment of their impact on pact cohesion. While all four authors agree that nationalism and assertions of independence in certain policy areas are increasing, there is less agreement on the extent to which the East Europeans will vent those feelings and the probable Soviet reaction to East European unrest. Will the Soviets ultimately invade Poland, as Lebow suggests, because of an exaggerated concern for any sign of weakness? Or is the interdependency outlined by Whetten actually so strong that the unrest with

the prevailing system stirred by Solidarity will not survive the pressures against it?

The chapters in The Future of European Alliance Systems represent solid analysis and will more than satisfy the reader looking for material on the subject. One could say that the chapters may have even whetted the appetite. For instance, it would have been interesting for the WTO authors to have discussed more directly the topics addressed in the NATO section, such as the INF debate or the out-of-area issue. Furthermore, the reader trying to discern the potential future of alliance systems is left with questions. A concluding chapter of educated forecasting by Broadhurst based on the various scenarios proposed by the authors, even if couched in appropriately tentative terms, could have been instructive. The book is an important contribution to students of the European alliance system.

The Feld-Wildgren book, NATO and the Atlantic Defense, is more limited in scope and approach. It deals exclusively with NATO and looks specifically at the link between public opinion and policy. Its conclusions are based primarily on data from an extensive review of public opinion polling and surveys of media sources, with chapters covering public and NATO coverage, NATO-produced films, and public opinion.

After general comments on U.S. economic and military decline in the 1970s, Feld concludes that the perception of the defi Americain (American challenge) has not been replaced in West European eyes by a perception of defi Sovietique despite the increasing challenge posed by the Soviets. Suggestions for the future in his final chapter, "Policy Implications," warn of the need to "halt NATO's spreading cancer." The U.S. should become more responsive to the European desire for arms control and better economic management, while Europeans must become more sensitive to American public opinion and especially the necessity of a military force buildup.

While the compilation of polling data and newspaper analysis is interesting for the student of NATO affairs, it is unfortunate that Feld and Wildgren frequently are limited in their analysis by their dependence on external data sources. For example, data on the public image of NATO in the U.S. print media and television were based on a survey of the years 1977 and 1978 and three months in 1979 during NATO's anniversary, before the later-controversial INF decision. The value of the particular set of data was thereby uncertain for the concluding observations that deal primarily with the period subsequent to the December, 1979 decision. The scope of the data is often equally frustrating; for example, an indepth April, 1978 analysis was limited to only CBS and the New York Times, media sources reputedly with similar political orientations.

NATO and the Atlantic Defense is a good source book for the NATO analyst. Its strength lies more in its collection of data from a wide range of sources than in its analysis based on those sources. It is interesting that in many respects its interpretation of the "perceptional gaps that separate many West Europeans from Americans regarding security matters and East-West relations" (p. 123) resemble the conclusions reached by several of the authors in the Broadhurst book. Clearly, the alliance does not lack for analysis or critics.

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GALE A. MATTOX

Canada and the Reagan Challenge: Crisis in the Canadian-American Relationship. By Stephen Clarkson. (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1982. Pp. xv + 383. \$19.95, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

This list of issues dividing Canada and the United States grows ever longer; the stakes involved in their resolution larger. This is not surprising. Conflict is a predictable consequence of a close, intense relationship. The protectionist revival of recent years has created many of the disputes between the United States and Canada, our largest and most important trading partner. Bilateral relations have also been strained by deregulation of transportation, telecommunications, energy, and financial markets in the United States, as spillovers from increased competition have subjected regulated industries in Canada to great pressure. And, of course, misuse of shared common property resources such as airsheds and the Great Lakes is an important source of conflict. At the same time, both countries are committed to case-by-case negotiation of disputes, and this approach has never worked very well.

In response to the growing list of divisive issues, continentalists have called for greater integration: free trade, freer factor movement, further deregulation of price and entry controls, and the assignment of legally enforceable rights to common property resources. However, Clarkson is an economic nationalist. He would like to reduce conflict between the two countries by distancing Canada from the United States, repealing the logic of comparative advantage, and restricting consumer sovereignity. He is also a realist. He recognizes that the fantasies of both the continentalists and the nationalists will likely never be realized, that the current ad hoc approach to conflict resolution will remain the order of the day. and that the best one can hope for is to influence outcomes on a case-by-case basis. Like many Canadians, Clarkson has also recently discovered

the relative weakness of the American executive branch and the power of Congress. Consequently, he has concluded that if disputes are to be resolved in Canada's favor, Canada must increase its capacity to influence Congress. He also concludes that to influence Congress, Canada must show that what it wants is actually in the interest of the United States. These conclusions likely also apply to U.S. attempts to influence Canadian policy, although the targets of U.S. representation would be somewhat different. The United States simply cannot threaten Canadian values without shooting itself in the foot.

This book is especially valuable as an antidote to the perception widespread in the United States that protectionism is found only in other countries. Clarkson outlines clearly the dimensions of American protectionism, the recent proliferation of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and the role of interest groups in the elaboration of these policies. He is especially effective in showing how exclusive, special interests use reciprocity to justify further protectionism.

The one thing I don't understand is how Clarkson can be so discerning about American interest group politics and at the same time defend nearly identical policies and practices, with similar or worse outcomes, when they are found in Canada as "vital elements of a strategy of national development." I also cannot see how he can hold the Reagan administration responsible for the issues dividing Canada and the United States. Nor does Clarkson make any serious attempt to demonstrate its responsibility; he seems content to assert that Reagan is a dangerous conservative, promoting aggressive policies at home and abroad, and to leave it to the reader to make the connection.

FRED THOMPSON

Columbia University

Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking. By Melvin A. Friedlander. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 338. \$25.00, paper.)

Few matters pertaining to Middle Eastern politics are as surprising and fascinating than those periods when "peace" breaks out. Because peace happens so seldom, even when minimally defined, one almost begins to think that it is not supposed to happen.

Melvin Friedlander's book promises to help us understand how peace arrived in its most dramatic moment and colorful package. He sets out to describe and explain essentially how Sadat and Begin maneuvered their respective ways to Camp David. I suspect that his hope is that by showing us how these individuals were able to arrive at a peace settlement, others could translate a past success into a future one.

Sadat and Begin is not without certain positive qualities. Friedlander's discussion of the day-to-day events and manipulations that transpired before and during the Camp David peace process is useful for recalling details. It is an adequately documented work with a helpful bibliography.

Unfortunately, in a number of ways I found Friedlander's efforts to be more flawed than useful. There is neither a discernible systematic organizational scheme nor an analytical framework, and the narrative style, combined with an extreme fascination with the importance of Sadat and Begin, results in a thin analysis that ends by presenting politics as only melodrama. Although almost any analytical scheme has advantages and disadvantages, it seems to me that the choice apparently made by Friedlander to employ no systematic framework whatsoever is the least desirable one.

One might expect from the subtitle to find Friedlander making the case that Sadat's and Begin's policy choices were made and pursued within the context of their respective polities. And in this sense I additionally expected to be presented either directly or indirectly with an argument that the policymakers' international choices were substantially prefigured domestically. Had Friedlander fully developed such an argument, it would certainly be plausible and possibly compelling. He leaves the impression that Sadat and Begin were historical characters considerably larger than the contexts within which they had to operate. But a consequence of having nothing to evaluate with, or hold on to, is one of simply dangling or becoming mystical about "great people" and "leadership."

This lack of a useful organizational and analytical scheme also hinders Friedlander's account of the larger international setting of Camp David. Here again, one is presented with a picture of characters stepping out of, and quite beyond, existing structures and processes.

Finally, Friedlander's analysis contributes to an extension of what I see as dysfunctional Camp David mythology. According to Friedlander, Camp David, and by only a little extrapolation the entire Middle East peace process, can be accomplished only through the dedicated actions of "heroes on horseback." The "heroic" rendition of this chapter in history is wrapped in the following rhetoric: "Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin succeeded in March 1979 to lay the cornerstone for peace in the Middle East. Sadat lost his life in that effort . . . the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty bears testimony to what can be achieved with political will, courage, and determination" (p.

315). Testimonials such as this fail to help one usefully grapple with the many complexities of Middle Eastern international affairs.

CARL F. PINKELE

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Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts. By Joanne Gowa and Nils H. Wessell. (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1982. Pp. xi + 104. \$3.95, paper.)

This book, a part of Philadelphia Policy Papers series, seeks to develop theory on the applicability of explicit, agreed, mutual restraints on the superpower competition. The purpose of such ground rules would be to reduce the chances of confrontations that could escalate to nuclear war. Such rules are needed because of the weaknesses of other mechanisms: Tacit rules of the game are too ambiguous, crisis management carries with it too high of a risk of disaster should it fail, and linkage strategies depend on levers that are too weak and too incompletely controlled by the president to be greatly effective. Compliance with ground rules would be made likely by the norm of reciprocity, mutual interest in preserving the agreed upon regime of restraint, bureaucratic inertia, and the like.

The strongest part of the book is the discussion of types of agreed limitations and the conditions under which they are likely to be effective. Gowa and Wessell focus specifically on various limits on conventional arms transfers; confidence building measures, especially restraints on troop deployments and movements; naval deployments limitations; and consultative mechanisms.

Having discussed ground rules in the abstract, Gowa and Wessell turn to their potential applicability in specific situations. They examine three cases—the Horn of Africa, South Africa, and Yugoslavia—chosen to represent varying ripeness of U.S. competition with the Soviets. Their narratives of the historical backgrounds of each situation are all solidly done. When Gowa and Wessell speculate about the future and analyze American interests, though, their treatment becomes more suspect. For instance, they write: "The danger of a Soviet-American confrontation in another Somali-Ethiopian war lies in the heavy Soviet commitment to Ethiopia and the potential entanglement of the United States in any renewal of large-scale fighting" (p. 45). But the nature of both superpowers' policies in this region has been to preserve the territorial status quo. Such policies are the strongest safeguard against a serious clash in the area. Similarly, they write:

"The advent of a black government in the republic . . . would probably deny the West the strategic military resources of South Africa, while creating at least the potential for Soviet access to the country's well-developed naval facilities" (p. 67). Why would a nationalist black government do such a thing? It would certainly be harmful to its economy. As the examples of Angola and Zimbabwe demonstrate, revolutionary governments do set out to protect their ties to the capitalist trade and capital markets, not to destroy them.

The net impact of Ground Rules is to call into question the value of ground rules as an approach to conflict regulation. Sometimes, as in the Horn of Africa and South Africa, confidence building measures presume close superpower control over clients. In other instances, the approach seems to require superpower duopoly, so that third and fourth parties cannot challenge the interests of the superpowers and cause the regime to collapse.

The use of ground rules requires exceptionally clear thinking about the nature of American interests. In a number of places, Gowa and Wessell argue against particular hypothetical restraints because they would deny the U.S. some geopolitical advantage. But if the danger of nuclear war is indeed unacceptably high, one must ask whether any geopolitical advantage is worth the risk. On the other hand, if the risk is quite low, then how valuable are the ground rules?

More importantly, Ground Rules seems to fall victim to the tyranny of method. The authors note that, "One might also conjecture that agreement on the exclusion of external military personnel, particularly combat troops, from a region is not likely to be negotiable if either superpower is plainly not going to introduce its own forces or those of a proxy into the area. . . . Once either superpower has introduced forces under its control into the region in the absence of a countervailing response by the other, as is true in the Horn, prospects for an accord would seem to dim" (pp. 101-102). But such asymmetry of action reflects asymmetry of interests. Such situations do not contain the seeds of major crisis. To escalate a conflict in order to gain bargaining strength makes the ground rules an end in themselves. The original end, superpower stability, becomes sacrificed to the means.

PATRICK CALLAHAN

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Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars and the Law of the Sea. By Hannes Jónsson. (Hamden, Conn.: Shoestring Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 240. \$34.00.)

I had greatly anticipated reviewing this bookafter all, political science analyses of direct interest to Iceland aficionados are uncommonand, in fact, the subject matter proved fascinating. Hannes Jónsson clearly delineates many of the arguments and processes that underlay Iceland's four extensions of fisheries jurisdiction between 1952 and 1975, as that country moved from a 3-mile limit that followed the sinuosities of the coast to 4, 12, 50 and ultimately 200-mile limits measured from straight base lines. The author, an Icelandic civil servant and diplomat who played a facilitative role in these increasing claims, treats his topic from a predominately international law perspective. However, since he construes international law in a realistic manner. giving due weight to political, economic, scientific, and military considerations, and since each extension provoked a hostile British reaction, with three of the occasions featuring the prolonged interposition of British warships in avowedly Icelandic waters, the study could easily be relevant to readers with a variety of disciplinary concerns.

Hannes Jónsson demonstrates a much more thorough and sympathetic comprehension of Icelandic than British decision making. For Iceland, he draws upon many studies by other Icelandic authors, a large number of government publications (some of which he himself had composed), and extensive personal knowledge. Surprisingly, though, he deliberately omits, even from an 9-page bibliography, detailed studies of Icelandic politics by outsiders that seem indisputably germaine to his task (e.g., Donald Nuechterlein's Iceland: Reluctant Ally, Cornell University Press, 1961). Apart from references to parties and elections, Hannes Jónsson is also chary about providing information on Iceland's domestic political scene: In particular, he completely ignores his country's interest group structure, much of which is embedded in the fishing industry.

Data on British politics are more narrowly derived. Aside from official documents and correspondence and some material produced by the British Trawlers' Federation, the only written source explicitly cited is a 4-page account of "Britain-Iceland 1958-62" in M.D. Donelan and M.J. Grieve's International Disputes: Case Histories 1945-1970 (St. Martin's Press, 1973, pp. 164-167). Moreover, like many another Icelander, Hannes Jónsson vastly overrates the political influence of the British distant water fishing industry. He speaks, for example, of "the powerful political lobby at work in London [in 1958], con-

stantly demanding protection of the British trawlers in Icelandic waters"; of the marginality of the parliamentary seats at Grimsby and Hull probably providing "one of the main reasons why the British Government yielded to pressure from the fishing industry and sent the British warships to Icelandic waters"; and of the British government, 15 years later, having again "yielded to political pressure groups from Humberside and sent several British frigates into Icelandic waters . . . " (pp. 91, 95, 138). In actuality, Britain's distant water trawling interests possessed little political clout or savvy, especially in 1958. They scarcely knew their way around Whitehall. They certainly were not telling the Foreign Office and Admiralty what to do: They were being told. Lord Home, then Foreign Secretary, may have claimed otherwise in a December, 1960 letter to his Icelandic opposite number-"Your Government is fully aware of the difficulties which we face with our fishing industry . . . [especially given] the approach of the Spring fishing season" (p. 102)—but that is hardly persuasive evidence. Government officials often seek refuge in the plea that their hands are tied by constituent opinion.

Throughout his book, Hannes Jónsson completely rejects the British legal position, which he dubs "colonial," and, except for feeling that Iceland acted too slowly on a couple of occasions, consistently applauds the Icelandic approach, which he labels "progressive." He believes that Iceland in 1972 was legally justified in renouncing the 12-mile agreement that it had reached with Britain just 11 years earlier and unilaterally moving on to 50 miles, and he cites such elastic doctrines as rebus sic stantibus and prior duress to support his position. My own impression, and that of the International Court of Justice, is that Britain occupied sounder legal grounds at the time. Law per se, though, was not going to be determinative, and neither was power politics. Even as a middle-sized nation. Britain was far mightier than Iceland, but the disparity would scarcely help. As Walter Lippmann observed long ago, the exercise of power politics is often like trying to thread a needle while wearing boxing gloves. Iceland, in short, won all four of the fisheries disputes and Britain lost all four, not because of legal right and wrong, nor even because of tactical brilliance and foolishness, but because no counteraction was available to Britain that would not look clumsy and disproportionate.

MORRIS DAVIS

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The Third World in Soviet Military Thought. By Mark N. Katz. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. 188. \$18.50.)

Soviet military intervention in the Third World is a relatively new phenomenon. As the Soviets demonstrated their capability to intervene, not only did third-world conflicts assume a greater significance in international politics, but the implications of Soviet military involvement also became a more central—and more disruptive—aspect of East-West relations. Mark Katz addresses a neglected but significant facet of this subject.

On the basis of a survey of Soviet sources, primarily periodical literature, Katz traces the evolution of Soviet military thinking about conflict in the Third World through several phases including that of the Stalin and Khruschev eras, but the focus of the monograph is on three somewhat arbitrarily defined phases of the Brezhnev era. Katz distinguishes six aspects of primary concern to Soviet military-and incidentally also of academic and Party-writers: the link between local and general war, the typology of third-world conflicts, the effect of peaceful coexistence on local wars, the role of indigenous radical forces in the Third World, the interpretation of American thinking and involvement in local wars, and the role of the Soviet Union in third-world conflicts. Katz notes significant shifts in Soviet writing on each of these issues, reflecting changes in the Soviets' own capabilities as well as in American policies and in the nature of thirdworld conflicts and international political alignments.

Following a series of conservative military coups against radical leaders in the mid-1960s, the Soviets were obliged to reassess the assumptions of the Khruschev era. It had been thought that socialist regimes would proliferate and Soviet influence grow in the Third World without any significant effort on the part of the Soviet Union. In the Brezhnev era Soviet military writers expressed doubts about the ability of either radical political leaders or military regimes to establish socialism or become reliable allies of the Soviet Union. It was concluded that without greater military commitment, Soviet gains in the Third World would be eroded. At the same time, the military had become convinced that peaceful coexistence allowed greater Soviet involvement in third-world conflicts at less risk of direct Soviet-American confrontation. By the mid-1970s, they were not only confident of Soviet ability to effectively intervene in third-world conflicts, but also to deter the West from intervention. However, they had not begun to advocate military intervention until it had already proved to be successful.

That leads to the question, What is the relationship between Soviet military writing and Soviet policy? Katz's answer is that while changes in military thinking about the Soviet role in thirdworld conflicts have not preceded policy shiftschanging events are a more reliable guide to change in policy—discussion of a particular policy indicates that it has been judged successful and therefore likely to be pursued in the future. He also suggests that "Soviet military thinking sheds light on the changing expectations that the Soviets have vis à vis the Third World" (p. 11). No doubt but the conclusion that the changing expectations "shape" Soviet policy neglects the fact that any set of expectations can lead to more than one policy. The policymaking difficulties and the ideological issues raised by contemporary wars are indicated by the variety of formulations and typologies that Soviet writers have applied to defining third-world conflicts. How is the "just" side to be identified in a war that has no discernible class basis-territorial and ethnic conflicts as well as wars between socialist states?

The conclusions of the study are previewed in the Introduction, summed up at the end of each chapter, and grouped together and restated in the concluding chapter of the monograph. But this repetitiveness is a minor criticism of an important scholarly work. There is also a very useful and comprehensive 15-page bibliography consisting mainly of Soviet periodical sources.

In an epilogue Katz makes a number of policy suggestions for the United States. For instance, he argues that radical third-world regimes maintain a degree of independence from the Soviet Union which the United States should encourage—"refusing to deal" with them is self-defeating. Although not specifically derived from his conclusions, the observations on policy together with the conclusions of the study make a valuable contribution to the current debate over the implications of Soviet military intervention in third-world conflicts. Among other things, the monograph offers more data on which to base arguments over Soviet perceptions of détente and the relative "success" and "failure" of Soviet as well as American policies in the Third World.

RITA PUTINS PETERS

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Will Europe Fight for Oil? Energy Relations in the Atlantic Area. Edited by Robert J. Lieber. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. x + 230. \$23.95.)

This collection of papers is based on the Committee on Atlantic Studies' Conference on Energy

and the Atlantic Alliance held in October, 1981 in Italy. The primary topic is a fascinating and underexplored one—recent tensions in the relations between the United States and Western Europe due to the oil shocks of 1973 and 1974 and 1979 and 1980—but the quality of the contributions is decidedly uneven.

The best chapters do provide penetrating analyses of a couple of central themes. One such theme is that recent American oil policies have consistently emphasized containing the Soviet Union more than have European policies. For example, Robert Lieber underscores European skepticism about the American desire for an increased military presence in the Persian Gulf to protect oil fields from Soviet control (pp. 4-6). Bruce Jentleson contrasts the recent European resentment and defiance of American sanctions on the Soviet natural gas pipeline with the somewhat more effective American pressure on Germany in the early 1960s regarding Soviet oil pipeline construction (pp. 49, 53-55). Edward Wonder shows how the Reagan administration's anxiety over Soviet influence in Central America and the Caribbean relates to the large deposits of oil in Mexico, and how the Europeans have generally neither shared this anxiety nor the strategies accompanying it (p. 157). A second major theme is how the international economic downturn precipitated by the oil shocks has increased competitive tensions between the United States and Europe. Lieber reveals that these tensions are based on slowed growth, inflation, and unemployment in members of the Atlantic Alliance (p. 7), while Walter Goldstein indicates that a "third oil shock"—the appreciation of the American dollar in 1981 and 1982-has exacerbated tensions by causing Europeans to pay even higher prices for oil (pp. 173-174).

But many of the remaining chapters seem problematic. Contributions by Guy de Carmoy and Reimund Seidelmann seem deficient in that they are parochial expressions of French and German government positions on oil issues and do not take into sufficient account flaws or possible negative implications of official arguments. Frederick Gorbet's chapter presents a future energy outlook that, at least in the short term, has been inaccurate. For example, he predicts that the oil market would reach "balance" in 1982 (p. 20), whereas in reality the glut has continued and increased through 1983. Finally, Ronald Inglehart contributes an essay on domestic opposition within Western nations to nuclear power that seems to have little to do with the oil/gas focus of the rest of the book.

Most of the chapters do not address each other's arguments, and so controversial contentions often remain untouched (except perhaps in the editor's introduction). The analyses presented are not placed enough in the context of either American-European relations outside of the energy arena or international oil developments outside of the Atlantic Alliance. For instance, there is inadequate exploration in the first case of the interrelationship between friction concerning American missiles in Europe and that concerning oil security, and in the second case of the implications of the growing debt crisis in developing countries (partially precipitated by declining oil prices) and the declining cohesion within OPEC. Despite these difficulties, this book continues and expands an important dialogue on key transatlantic energy tensions facing the West.

ROBERT MANDEL

Lewis and Clark College

Soviet Style in War. By Nathan Leites. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1982. Pp. xxvi + 398. \$22.50.)

For this Rand Corporation Research Study, Nathan Leites examined a large number of Soviet military publications in an attempt to derive from them the major elements of the operational code of the Soviet military authorities and some insights into how Soviet forces, especially their ground forces, could be expected to behave in a future war. After an introductory summary of his findings, Leites proceeds by mean of vast numbers of quotations to demonstrate the Soviet High Command's concern with: (1) warding off a pervasive penchant for inaction at all levels and promoting the use of all-out, simultaneous, uninterrupted, and crushing actions against the enemy; (2) eliminating a tendency toward slowness and procrastination and fostering rapid and decisive actions; (3) countering various forms of lack of realism in regard to the diverse kinds of obstacles that are likely to confront Soviet forces in a war situation; (4) resisting a perceived penchant for passivity and timidity and instilling a strong offensive orientation and an understanding of the value of preemptive strikes; (5) enhancing the cohesion within the Soviet forces and splitting the enemy's forces and destroying their internal cohesion; and (6) combatting a disinclination among their subordinates to proceed in a rational and calculating manner under pressure and finding ways to disrupt the enemy's capacity to calculate, particularly through the use of surprise.

Then, in a short final chapter, Leites attempts to draw whatever inferences he can from his analysis of Soviet military attitudes at the tactical level for their rarely discussed views about strategic nuclear war. Here he argues that the strong Soviet emphasis on rapid, massive, preemptive counterforce attacks applies primarily to the fighting of a possible conventional or tactical nuclear war. While this orientation would also be applicable to a strategic nuclear war situation, Leites believes that it, as well as the Soviet argument that any use of nuclear weapons will inevitably escalate to the use of strategic weapons, is primarily designed to deter an all-out nuclear exchange since the Soviet authorities recognize that such an exchange would raise Soviet losses to an unacceptable level.

Leites's research will undoubtedly be of some value to those who wish to gain a fuller understanding of the major emphases in Soviet military science and military art. The discussion throughout of the Soviet stress on offensive operations and on the value of surprise will be of particular interest. With its many citations from military memoirs, Soviet Style in War makes it very clear how much the lessons of World War II continue to dominate Soviet military thought. In addition, the book effectively highlights what the military authorities perceive to be the negative tendencies among their own personnel and within Soviet society generally.

On the other hand, it seems doubtful that many readers will want to wade through what is essentially a massive collage of quotations. Most of the book consists not of Leites's own writing, but rather of snippets of varying length taken from Soviet publications and arranged under various headings and subheadings. Leites's method of content analysis appears to be one of a computer-assisted word search in which certain key words are found, and then all cases in which they appear, regardless of the context, time-frame, the service involved, or the size of the unit, are presented. The resulting work is extremely redundant and would certainly profit from being edited to perhaps a quarter of its present length.

Other problems with Leites's study include the fact that except for some works by Germans about their experiences fighting against Soviet troops in World War II, very few Western analyses of the Soviet military appear to have been consulted, and almost no comparisons are made between Soviet military thinking and that of their potential opponents. With his stress on continuity of Soviet military attitudes, Leites devotes little attention to changes in Soviet military thought since World War II and none to Soviet reactions to the type of operations carried out in Vietnam or Afghanistan. Although the "Bolshevik attitude" is referred to on numerous occasions, there is no discussion of political-military relations and very little on the broader aspects of

Soviet military doctrine. These and other drawbacks severely limit the book's value.

DAVID L. WILLIAMS

Ohio University

A History of the United Nations: Vol. 1, The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955. By Evan Luard. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. viii + 404. \$27.50.)

This study, the first volume of a projected history of the United Nations, describes the creation of the organization in Part 1 and the major events it dealt with during its first decade of existence in Part 2. Among the topics specifically analyzed in the much larger second section are: the negotiations for a Security Council force; Azerbaijan (Iran) and the Levant; Greece; Indonesia: Palestine: trouble spots in Europe such as Trieste, Berlin, and the human rights issue in Eastern Europe; the Korean War; Kashmir; Guatemala: some Far Eastern affairs such as the offshore islands, the captured United States' airmen in China, Chinese representation, and the Temple of Preah Vihear; disarmament; the Secretary-General and Secretariat; and membership disputes.

Luard's analysis is free from needless jargon and is, for the most part, factually accurate. It fails, however, to break any significant new ground, since it simply recapitulates facts which, for the most part, have been recited elsewhere. In addition, I found the inconsistency regarding documentation unsatisfactory. Without any discernible reason, Luard chooses to document an occasional fact or quotation (for example, p. 387. n. 1 on chap. 9) rather than all of his sources. Such paucity of documentation will limit this study's usefulness for serious academic scholars. Luard also fails to mention the existence of the 22 volumes of the records of the San Francisco Conference contained in the Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organizations and the existence of such essential analyses of the world organization as those by Inis Claude or Leland Goodrich among numerous others. A bibliography would also have been in order.

Luard does offer a useful analysis of the causes for the United Nation's failure to make more headway towards achieving peaceful settlements. "There was one reason above all others why the UN failed.... It was seen... rather as a battle-ground than as a peace chamber: as a means of scoring points rather than of securing settlements; as an instrument for confrontation rather than for conciliation" (pp. 381-382). In the negotiations leading up to the end of the mandate in Palestine,

for example, there was a "determination to resolve problems by counting heads and voting victories, rather than by any serious effort at conciliation and compromise between the parties mainly concerned" (p. 184). As Luard points out, "ironically enough, this was precisely the method which was later to be so often denounced and decried by Israel" (p. 185), and by the United States it might be added, as "the tyranny of the majority." In conclusion, Luard declares only a little too strongly: "If, throughout this period, the UN failed to become a forum for effective negotiation on world problems, or to find the means to solve them by consensus, and if it therefore failed to reach any decisions at all on many questions, it is the Western majority who must take the main share of the blame for it" (p. 375). The communist states would have probably acted in a similar manner if they had controlled the majority, Luard adds.

The U.N. was not without some achievements during its first decade, however. Luard sees Indonesia, Azerbaijan (Iran), the Greek Civil War, the Berlin Blockade, the captured U.S. airmen in China, and the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the Temple of Preah Vihear as some specific examples. The common thread here was that "the customary methods were abandoned and confidential negotiations were effectively instituted" (p. 380).

Although, as Luard himself admits, this is not going to be the "definitive... history of the United Nations" (p. vii), it will serve as an introductory text.

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Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations. By R. Judson Mitchell. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 159. \$10.95, paper.)

This text analyzes revisions in Soviet doctrine on international politics since the mid-1960s. Mitchell argues that the result of these revisions has been the development of an "ideology of a superpower." His analysis is based exclusively on a review of Soviet sources. Most of the sources analyzed were intended for the domestic audience, but Mitchell has also reviewed materials directed at foreign audiences.

In Mitchell's view, recent doctrinal revisions can be summarized into four categories: "reevaluation of factors in the correlation of forces," "identification of a qualitative change in the correlation and its consequences," "predictions concerning the restructuring of world politics," and "explicit revisions of previously accepted doctrines, particularly those of the Khrushchev era." Each of these revisions is related to Soviet foreign policy, and several have had an impact on domestic affairs as well.

Soviet theorists on international affairs have long emphasized the correlation of forces and the two-camp doctrine. In recent years, Soviet theorists have spoken of the importance of the subjective factor in this correlation. The growing importance of the subjective factor, an element of the superstructure, is related to objective changes in the correlation of forces, that is, the emergence of the USSR as a world power. Given the shift in the correlation of forces, Soviet spokesmen see continued gains for the socialist camp. One implication of this new emphasis on the subjective factor in world politics is that the socialist camp could be undermined by the imperialist camp. Such a possibility was developed in the articulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

One aspect of the restructuring of global politics has relevance for domestic politics as well. Soviet theorists now argue that there will be a division of labor in society even after the achievement of communism. Such a doctrinal revision serves to legitimize continued party control within the USSR and the world revolutionary movement. Continued elite rule is necessary precisely because of the importance of the subjective factor in the correlation of forces and the need to defend the ideology.

Several doctrines enunciated during the Khrushchev era have been revised. Khrushchev denied the possibility of bourgeois restoration in socialist states. Contemporary Soviet spokesmen, in the Brezhnev Doctrine and elsewhere, acknowledge that bourgeois restoration is possible. In addition, Khrushchev argued that the period of capitalist encirclement had ended. Contemporary Soviet theorists agree, but contemporary analyses focus on the growth of Soviet military power as the reason for the end of capitalist encirclement. Given the growth of Soviet military power and shifts in the correlation of forces, Soviet spokesmen now implicitly hint at a socialist encirclement of capitalism.

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Ideology of a Superpower can be criticized only on the basis of what it fails to include. In a sense, it is unfortunate that it was published in April, 1982. Much has changed in Soviet politics since that time, and these changes might have had an impact on doctrinal revision. No mention could be made of the impact, if any, of doctrinal revisions since Brezhnev's death. In addition, little is said about Soviet doctrine and doctrinal revisions on the subject of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. This is unfortunate given the importance of

such weapons to the correlation of forces and to Soviet-American relations.

Despite these omissions, *Ideology of a Superpower* is an important text that should be considered by scholars and policymakers. Mitchell has documented the assertion that Soviet doctrine and Soviet policy are related, and thus Soviet doctrine must be analyzed.

DAVID T. JERVIS

Temple University

The Soviet First Strike Threat: The U.S. Perspective. By Jack H. Nunn. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. xii + 292. \$31.95.)

In the parlance of national security analysts, "the threat" is a phrase applied in a variety of contexts. Above all others, however, this phrase has become a shorthand reference for the capabilities of Soviet strategic forces and the intentions of the leaders who control them. As with many other works, Jack Nunn's book is concerned with this understanding of "the threat." Specifically, Nunn focuses on "the threat of a disarming first strike . . . one that essentially eliminates the ability of the victim to strike back at the attacker" (p. 10). Nunn is interested in the evolution and accuracy of U.S. perceptions of the possibility of a Soviet disarming first strike. On balance, Nunn's work examines these issues competently and thoroughly.

Nunn takes an historical approach to his subject matter. Before examining the threat of a disarming first strike in the nuclear age, he devotes two chapters to an analysis of the preoccupation of past officials with earlier manifestations of a disarming first strike, namely, sea and air attack. This discussion, somewhat inappropriate for a book which purports to examine the U.S. perspective of the Soviet first strike threat, should have been reserved for a dissertation.

The core of Nunn's analysis is contained in chapters 5 through 7, which examine the possibility of a disarming Soviet strike through the eyes of officials from the Eisenhower era to the Reagan administration. These chapters benefit from thorough knowledge and extensive citation of government studies on Soviet first strike capabilities as well as a willingness to examine dissenting (largely military) viewpoints. They are concisely, clearly written, although it is a bit surprising that Nunn devotes relatively little effort therein to the Minuteman vulnerability problem that has generated such concern and controversy over the past decade. Also, while not critical to Nunn's analysis, it would have been beneficial had he included even a limited review of Soviet

perceptions of U.S. first strike capabilities or an informed discussion of the role of surprise in Soviet military strategy.

Chapter 8 contains Nunn's overall assessment of the validity of the disarming first strike threat. While his conclusions will engender disagreement from some quarters, they are presented forcefully and manifest thorough understanding of the issues. Nunn argues that in fact "there is no single disarming first strike threat. Not only is the concept itself dynamic... but also, the threat is highly dependent upon the strategy chosen to achieve the nation's security objectives..." (p. 249). From this foundation Nunn extends his argument to state that the U.S. perception of the disarming threat "has been derived then as much from how the country has viewed itself as from its view of the Soviets" (p. 253).

The consequences of the U.S. preoccupation on surprise and attendant force vulnerability have far-reaching ramifications for U.S. national security policy. As Nunn correctly observes, the "bolt from the blue" is a threat that has little validity today. However, the continuing focus on the first strike threat obscures the character of other threats confronting U.S. leaders. Nunn concludes that although a massive nuclear attack cannot be discounted, "the long-term military and political threat of expanding Soviet influence appears a more reasonable matter for concern" (p. 258). In the wake of this assessment Nunn's resulting prescription is for a security policy oriented for a long, steady struggle rather than sprints of concern generated by Soviet strategic capabilities. While not original, such advice never seems gratuitous.

JOHN M. CARAVELLI

Georgetown University

Imperialism and Dependency: Obstacles to African Development. By Daniel A. Offiong. (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 304. \$12.95, cloth; \$6.95, paper.)

In recent years radical critiques of contemporary North-South relations have achieved a certain respectability in Western academic circles: It is generally conceded, even among those who disagree with them, that the work of such authors as Cardoso, Sunkel, Wallerstein, or dos Santos adheres to the accepted norms of academic scholarship. Offiong's book derives from another, angrier and more polemical tradition: This is a book whose intention is not so much to investigate dispassionately as to convince. As such, it makes for lively and stimulating reading,

but it also falls prey to many of the pitfalls to which works of its genre are prone.

The main theme of the book is clearly and emphatically stated. In Offiong's view, "African underdevelopment is the result of economic imperialism and the consequent dependency" (p. 53), and the continent's "primary and most crucial problem is [its] position in the world economy and stratification of power" (p. 33). The process of African underdevelopment began, in his view, during the colonial period when "by exporting the profits created by African labour to Europe, the development of Europe was assured while dialectically this meant the underdevelopment of Africa" (p. 110), and is maintained today by American multinational corporations which "plunder" and "pillage" (p. 166) the countries in which they invest. While these broad themes are similar to those of many radical critiques, Offiong expresses them in an unusually contentious and freewheeling style. He does not, for example, hide his contempt for Western academics, whom he views as "apologists for imperialism" (p. 16), the "arch-priests" (p. 20) of an outmoded ideology whose work he variously styles "ignorant" (p. 49) and "nonsensical" (p. 24), marked by "egregious errors" (p. 24) and the "bias (polite term for racism) which generally characterizes white analysis of blacks the world over" (p. 258).

In many ways the book, although it was first published in 1980 (the American edition under review was published in 1982), seems curiously dated. The works cited, for example, are primarily of the 1960s or the early 1970s, with extensive attention to the early work of such modernization theorists as McClelland, Hagen, and Rostow and the 1960s writings of Frank, Fanon, and Nkrumah. The emphasis is on critiques of modernization theory, Western dependence on thirdworld minerals, and the misdeeds of the CIA, and there is little sense of more contemporary debates over corporatism, "associated-dependent development," and the autonomy of the state in underdeveloped countries. Even factual discussions are often outdated: for example, Offiong spends several pages (pp. 66-72) criticizing the European Community's Yaounde Convention, commenting that Guinea and Algeria cannot become members because "socialist countries that are former colonies cannot join" (p. 71), even though the Yaounde Convention was superseded by the Lome Convention nearly a decade ago, and both Guinea and Algeria are now associated with the Community. Moreover, the economic statistics cited seldom extend beyond the late 1960s or the early 1970s, which seriously undermines discussion of such problems as the third-world debt crisis.

In addition, the book is prone to casual over-

statement: Idi Amin's coup in Uganda was "masterminded" by the Israelis (p. 142): Mobutu's Zaire is a "puppet" of NATO (p. 49); the United States and its NATO allies "remove[d]" Nkrumah from office (p. 243); Richard Nixon was "put in office by business giants" (p. 79); NATO was formed "not to fight the Soviet Union and its allies but to facilitate the domination and exploitation of the underdeveloped countries" (p. 245). Part of the reason for this may be that the sources cited have been rather indiscriminately chosen, ranging from mainstream academic works and official reports to the writings of Gus Hall, to Nigerian newspaper articles, to the "typical racist commentary" (p. 92) on American television of John Chancellor and David Brinkley, to class lecture notes.

Finally, the book is poorly written: it is repetitive and poorly organized, relies heavily on very long block quotations, and is marked by numerous stylistic and spelling errors, and incorrect references.

Offiong's book does have some features that might recommend it to those within the broad mainstream of development studies. He is, for example, effective in attacking the cultural bias of the early psychological theories of modernization (n-achievement and the like) and the application of what he calls the "Calvinist cult" to the Third World (p. 14). And few would deny that there exist within most underdeveloped countries groups that have "connived with foreign interests to rob their countries of their much needed foreign exchange and have been involved in all sorts of unpatriotic activities that fail to aid economic development" (p. 75), or that "what poor countries need may not be expensive Euro-American four-wheel tractors which very few can buy, operate and repair, but better hoes and ox plows" (p. 135).

In sum, Offiong has written a lively, provocative, and at times illuminating analysis of third-world underdevelopment. Whatever their ideological persuasion, students of contemporary North-South relations will find it interesting reading.

VINCENT A. MAHLER

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The World Bank: A Critical Analysis. By Cheryl Payer. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982. Pp. 414. \$20.00, cloth; \$12.00, paper.)

The influence of the World Bank through the deployment of its resources over the strategies and possibilities of third-world development is enor-

mous. How this influence is brought to bear, the interests that it serves, and the ultimate impact on development prospects remain critical and knotty questions. Cheryl Payer's answers to these questions in this wide-ranging, even encyclopedic, book are unequivocal. Although the World Bank's mission has been to attack the sources of poverty, it has served to perpetuate and extend the sinews of world capitalism that sustain that poverty. The indictment made by Payer could not be more fundamental. The World Bank and the rhetoric of its most prominent president, Robert S. McNamara, assume that "the poor are poor because they have been 'left behind' or 'ignored' by their country's progress, when in fact most are poor because they are the victims of that so-called progress" (pp. 57-58). The purpose of the analysis, organized by the type of sectors—industrial, agricultural, mining, etc.—that the World Bank targets, is to reveal the systematic class bias of its activity. This bias is toward the interests of international capital, forging links with their domestic counterparts and creating the conditions for the secure and prosperous introduction of foreign investment. The World Bank, in this analysis, becomes an agent for the extension and incorporation of the international system of markets and capital, working at the edges through its myriad of lending programs and development projects.

Payer finds the class bias of World Bank programs in all the various development categories. Infrastructure investments serve the national bureaucratic and commercial classes. Structural adjustment financing diminishes domestic control over national economic choices and encourages the dismantling of protectionist barriers. Agricultural programs destroy subsistence farming and integrate it into larger markets. Investments in oil and gas industries are carefully delimited to avoid encroaching on the domain of the multinationals.

The strength of the book lies in its analysis of the World Bank as an institution that has developed an ideology of development and sought to advance it systematically through a structured agenda and set of programs. Quite apart from judgments concerning the Bank's impact on poverty, one cannot fail to be convinced of its emergence as an active, entrepreneurial organization working on the periphery to selectively foster productive enterprise and (indirectly) the social groups and classes disposed to support it.

But for those who find the interesting questions to be not only whether the World Bank serves to strengthen the international capitalist system but also how the Bank influences the changing position and resources of actors within that system, the book will not be entirely satisfactory. If foreign investment and enhanced industrial productivity are completely inimical to the economic and welfare opportunities of the Third World poor, Payer will have provided the definitive brief for World Bank complicity. But if the returns on World Bank development and investment programs are more mixed, Payer will have only raised vexing questions. For example, as Payer notes, the World Bank has sought to enhance the analytic capacities of host governments in raw materials foreign investment ventures through such projects as geological surveys (pp. 199-203). More attention to these cases, where the Bank has explicitly attempted to alter international bargaining patterns, might reveal how the international institution has exercised its influence at the margin or has been used as a resource by domestic governmental and commercial elites.

These issues that seek to draw out the variable impact of World Bank activities and the contingent relationship between international capital and domestic structures do not command much attention in this book. Rather, Payer is concerned with drawing out the midwife relationship of the Bank to international capital. From this it is a simple step for Payer to argue that the World Bank has a regressive impact on world poverty. This is because in some sense the conclusion is built into the premises—namely that the international system of capital and markets is inimical to the Third World poor. For the reader who shares this premise, the empirical analysis is effective exposition. For the reader who does not share this premise, the empirical analysis will not be sufficient to make a convincing case.

Nonetheless, this book provides an important and provocative interpretation of the political economy of a powerful international organization. Payer advances our understanding of how that organization buttresses foreign investment behavior and impinges on domestic development opportunities. Debate will continue on whether the World Bank has helped perpetuate or abate Third World poverty and unemployment. What is increasingly clear, and well-argued in this book, is that the World Bank has become a forceful and programmatic presence within the capitalist system for a particular style of development. For good or ill, that presence is substantial.

JOHN IKENBERRY

The University of Chicago

American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus. By George H. Quester. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. Pp. 276. \$27.95, cloth; \$12.95, paper.)

Without ever using the term Vietnam syndrome George Quester has evaluated the history of U.S. foreign policy and its current confusion in an effort to restore faith in U.S. foreign policy exceptionalism and in the value of U.S. "altruistic interventionism." The book adds significantly to current debates over U.S. foreign policy by arguing that the old consensus was valuable and sensible, and that its present decline is not a simple swing of the pendulum away from interventionism toward isolationism, but rather represents a fundamental confusion among Americans about the proper objectives of the United States in the international arena. The Vietnam syndrome, by inference, is as inappropriate as current reactions to it. Neither revisionist nor realpolitik interpretations of U.S. involvement in the world at large are adequate, and both ignore the crucial thread of liberal U.S. aims in the world: the creation or support of political democracy.

Quester's historical description of U.S. intervention as "altruistic" is uneven. At times, lacking a straightforward proof of this admittedly difficult thesis, he seeks to demonstrate by exclusion that altruism must have been an important, if not primary, U.S. motivation when compared with radical (economic) or realpolitik (balance of power) explanations. He admits that the apparent racism of both U.S. domestic and international preferences for whites and white regimes throws a monkey wrench into the altruism argument. However, in granting the point and demonstrating its problematic nature for the rest of his argument, Quester strengthens his argument with clear and insightful descriptions of the ambiguities and contradictions of U.S. preferences. The chapter on ethnic politics and racism is superb.

As the book moves into more current issues, the argument is stronger than it was in the beginning of the book. Quester shows that U.S. foreign policy consensus splintered after Vietnam. For the first time, not only the means but also the aims of the U.S. came into question. The debate, Quester asserts, comes down to a choice between political democracy or economic democracy. He argues that a preference for political democracy is no longer uniformly held among Americans, and that they are looking back at the history of U.S. foreign policy with doubt. Perhaps the aim of economic equality should have come first, at least in some instances, and perhaps it is a more appropriate goal for the developing world. In an analysis that echoes Tocqueville. Quester asserts that while both equality and liberty are desirable

objectives, they are in conflict. Nonetheless, the liberty objective that the U.S. pursued through altruistic intervention in foreign countries remains a valuable one. This objective could serve as the focus of a rebuilt U.S. foreign policy consensus.

Some sections and fleeting references in the book are curiously dated. It is not clear whether the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred before the book was finished. It would have been significant in the evaluation of Soviet motives and actions. A discussion of oil and OPEC politics seems to ignore the decline in demand and falling price of oil and the relative decline of OPEC. The OPEC argument in general is appropriate—signifying a decline in the strict bipolarity of the international system. The specifics of the argument, such as the role and motives of Saudi oil production and pricing, are not convincing. The book unfortunately suffers from a few editing oversights such as a mislabeled supply and demand graph in the OPEC discussion and occasional lapses in sentence continuity. But these lapses are not important. The issue that Quester addresses, the role of the United States after Vietnam as compared to its heritage of support for political democracy, is provocative and theoretically interesting. Quester's plea for a new consensus and description of the current confusion are eloquent, clear, and important.

BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF

Oberlin College

Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the United States and Europe, 2 vols. Edited by Terrance Sandalow and Eric Stein. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. xxxix + 600. \$39.50.)

This two-volume work includes a meticulous codification of the rulings of the Supreme Court and the Court of Justice that have effected economic integration inside the United States and the European Economic Community. The individual reports presented in the book are concerned exclusively with tracing both courts' attempts to define the boundaries of central and local authority in the creation of interstate markets. The documentation of legal rulings in the substantive chapters is a remarkable reference source for those interested in the contribution of law to economic union. Three aspects of economic integration are treated: the free movement of goods (chap. 3), the free movement of people and corporations (chap. 4), and court restraints on the taxation policies of individual states (chap. 5). These chapters are immediately preceded by a chapter on the growth of central legislative authority. A final chapter considers court rules that have arisen in response to attempts by central legislatures to preempt the economic authority of the constituent states.

The format followed in these chapters, however, is disconcerting. Two authors present separate compendia for each system's court rulings on the topic under consideration. The authors of the chapters do not offer either summaries and conclusions about the respective systems or comparisons between the two systems. These tasks are left for Sandalow and Stein to undertake in an introductory chapter. The two major failures of this book are found in their overview. Sandalow and Stein have not brought the compilations together for comparative analysis. Nor have they convincingly demonstrated significance in the relationship between court rulings and economic integration.

In what ways can the European Economic Community and the United States be compared? Instead of dealing with this question through use of the legal research presented in the body of the book, Sandalow and Stein have written an introductory chapter to guide the reader "from one complex legal order to another" (p. xi). Their contribution is not very instructive. Some appropriate contextual differences between the two systems are acknowledged: the historical process of creating a nation in contrast to creating an economic union, the legal distribution of central power, the functional variation across each system's central institutions, and the lack of parallel between the constituent states of both the United States and the European Community. The editors do not, however, attempt a resolution of the difficulties these differences pose for comparing the contribution of law to economics.

Is it possible to assign importance to courts in determining market conditions when courts are the only dimension of the two systems taken into consideration? Sandalow and Stein believe that economic patterns in the United States and the European Community are similar. The major characteristic with which they are concerned is the successful development of an interstate market system. The Supreme Court and the Court of Justice have contributed to this integration. Only a few references to the rest of the book are made to support this claim. The reader is told, for instance, that the free movement of goods between states has been promoted by the "principles developed by both courts" which "demonstrate steadfast opposition to 'protectionist' policies' (pp. 24-25). This has not been established in Vincent Blasi's treatment of the Court of Justice (pp. 175-218). Even if similar principles could be attributed to both courts, does this mean that the courts have overwhelmed those nonlegal forces in each system that advocate protectionism? In another vein, does similarity in the movement of goods within both systems give significance to the principles of courts? Sandalow and Stein avoid the issue by asserting, but not demonstrating, that the Court of Justice "may be approaching the role of a constitutional court in a federal system" (p. 4). What bearing do similar roles have on the tendency of both systems to integrate markets? The significance of court principles and roles is lost because the editors fail to place the courts within the larger context of each system's political economy. These two volumes contain an excellent account of the evolution of each court's rulings on economic issues. But the omission of a broader framework within which to assess the importance of courts for economic union raises more questions than the book answers.

M. MARK AMEN

University of South Florida

United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads. Edited by George Schwab. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 268. \$29.95.)

This is a useful volume of 10 essays representing various views of "political realists" about American foreign policy issues. In a memorial article about Hans J. Morgenthau, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. emphasizes that realism is a reaffirmation of the American "tradition" in international affairs.

It is obvious, however, that the realists who delivered the papers at the fourth City University of New York Conference on History and Politics do not agree on the meaning and implications of the central concepts of this book: the national interest and détente. The general public is confused about these seemingly open-ended terms; the historians and political scientists represented in this collection definitely enlighten us, but they do not clear away the confusion.

The national interest is generally defined by realists as the country's security interest in protecting its territory, population, and independence. John H. Herz, in the best essay in the volume, "Foreign Policy and Human Survival," broadens the concept. He argues that "traditional political realism will lose its realistic aspect if it fails to recognize that national interest is now merged with the interests of all in global survival" (p. 167)—since the world faces nuclear, demographic, economic, and ecological catastrophes.

Several of the authors mishandle the concept of détente. If one holds the ultra-pessimistic view that the Soviet Union has achieved, or is on the verge of achieving, military and political supremacy in international politics, then perhaps one could argue, as does George Schwab, that "détente has contributed to destabilizing the global arena of states" (p. 57). However, if one assumes that the United States and the Soviet Union have achieved military parity and that this rough equality will probably exist for decades, then détente is a system of conflict management—no more, no less.

Politicians consistently misuse the concepts of national interest and détente. Ideally, or perhaps idealistically, historians and political scientists should be able to carve out more precise meanings for such ideas, since they are such crucial factors in the politics of American foreign policy.

The basic philosophical foundations of political realism are persuasive. *United States Foreign Policy at the Crossroads* is an excellent presentation of these beliefs. For example, G.L. Ulmen insists that "understanding power as the means of avoiding war is the essence of political prudence" (p. xxi). He further argues, "power can no longer be gauged in 'purely' military terms. Indeed, the very character of the postwar world rules out the possibility of 'purely' military, 'purely' economic, or 'purely' humanitarian policies. Even human survival is a political question" (p. 230).

ROBERT H. PUCKETT

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The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts. Edited by Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiii + 210. \$25.95.)

The research produced on the Iran-Iraq War has hardly been commensurate with the conflict's importance. In part, this dearth is a product of the war's remoteness. For while scholars have generally been denied access to both countries in recent years, journalists have also been severely restricted in their ability to report on the war. Thus, any scholarly attempt to interpret and analyze this disastrous conflict is both welcome and important. Awareness of the war's origins, dangers, and possible implications is essential.

This volume is only partially successful in filling the gap. The book seems to have been hastily assembled, with little coordination and excessive overlap among some contributions. This overlap is understandable in light of the limited primary sources available and the difficulty in doing research in either country on the war. The fact that we all read the same newspapers and magazines, the authors of this volume included, explains the repetitiveness of some chapters, the

lack of some contributions' apparent connection to the war, and the fact that others contradict one another in a potentially useful way that the editors have neglected to exploit. As with most "current events" books, this one, as the editors themselves note (pp. viii-ix), is already in part outdated. Such books are also characterized by a highly descriptive tenor rather than by a reliance on more systematic analysis founded on theories and concepts well-known to most social scientists. This is regrettable, as the Iran-Iraq War falls conceptually at the nexus of comparative politics and international relations. Furthermore, a variety of theories that deal with multiethnicity, international conflict, and notions of dependency could have been employed profitably. That they are not, sheds light on the volume's shallowness.

Despite these shortcomings, the book does have some useful and interesting chapters. I particularly enjoyed Nikki Keddie's chapter on the minorities question in Iran; little has been written on Iran as a multiethnic society. The linkage between such minorities and the war is barely highlighted, but Keddie does draw attention to Iran's heterogeneity so that its significance becomes unquestionable. Keddie has provided a valuable chapter that should be read by those interested in Iranian politics and society.

Perhaps the volume's strongest chapter is that by Barry Rubin, who attempts to link the Iranian Revolution with the important issue of Gulf security. Rubin's analyses of the growth and role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the relationship between the ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its policies are excellent. Furthermore, he notes how the distribution of power in the area has changed, pointing out that a "shakey" Iran "tends to make the Gulf more unstable," while a strong Iran presents other types of challenges (p. 142).

Other noteworthy chapters include one by Tareq Ismael on the role of ideology in Iraqi foreign policy. Like Keddie's chapter, it provides an interesting treatment of an important topic but barely touches on the war. Nazih Ayubi discusses inter-Arab relations and, although he focuses on the Gulf, he considers the Palestine issue and the role of Egypt in a pragmatic and informative fashion. Finally, Claudia Wright investigates the manner in which the war has compelled Iraq to rethink and redefine its foreign relations, particularly with the superpowers.

Given the dearth of scholarship on this important and disturbing war, some contributions to *The Iran-Iraq War* are well worth reading.

JERROLD D. GREEN

University of Michigan

The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind. By Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiv + 188. \$21.95.)

Developing countries, or the Third World, according to the orthodoxy of post-World War II Soviet ideological writings, may be classified into four primary categories and distinguished according to respective levels of social and economic development. The first group would include the most backward nations of Tropical Africa which have a traditional economic structure based largely on so-called precapitalist production relations and a very low per capita income. The second group consists of the more developed countries of Tropical Africa and a number of Southeast Asian countries where the "transformation" of traditional economic systems has begun, and where backward social structures are gradually disappearing. The third group is made up of a number of Middle Eastern and North African countries, as well as Malaysia and Sri Lanka. Economically speaking, these nations concentrate primarily on the production of raw materials for export while simultaneously striving to establish viable processing industries. Countries in the fourth group, the Latin American nations and the Philippines, sometimes called countries of "medium-developed capitalism," have the most highly developed economies. Furthermore, the Soviets see India as an extraordinary case that includes features of the second, third, and fourth groups. Last, from this uniquely Soviet perspective all the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania are developing nations with the notable exception of the socialist countries, African countries with racist regimes (e.g., the Republic of South Africa), countries under the rhetorical political domination of imperialism, and the countries of Japan, New Zealand, and Israel.

The central thesis of Valkenier's book pertains to the modifications in Soviet theory and practice which, over the past 25 years, have resulted from various disappointments with the initial expectations of easy success for Soviet-type "socialist" policies and institutions in the Third World. Accordingly, the USSR has experienced difficulties with generating a satisfactory pattern of trade exchanges with these countries and can no longer afford the aid which these nations require. In many respects, Moscow has become disenchanted with the feasibility of speedy socialist remedies for the numerous problems associated with backwardness and, furthermore, has had to realize the incongruity between the Soviet and third-world pro-

grams for restructuring international economic relations (p. x). According to Valkenier:

This thesis—which rests on the perception that increasingly more Soviets have a sense of the limitations on power—runs counter to prevalent interpretations in some Western quarters. Numerous commentators and analysts assume that: (1) the optimistic and competitive goals formulated by Khrushchev remain unchanged and are still the operational code in the Kremlin; (2) the USSR still intends to and is capable of gaining control over the vast raw material supplies of Asia and Africa; (3) the Soviets possess a magic systemic formula guaranteeing success for socialist revolutions in the developing countries; and (4) they command unlimited resources to buy goodwill or to prop up client regimes. (p. x)

Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier's analysis of post-World War II Soviet-third-world relations is, beyond doubt, a book that challenges many of the prevailing Western views and, in many respects, the orthodoxy of Soviet development economics previously mentioned. Valkenier is successful in her challenge and, as a result, contributes to our understanding of the problems affecting multilateral relations and the prospects for future Soviet-third-world economic cooperation. Indeed. Valkenier's study is one of the more thorough examinations of Soviet scholarly works and polemics, official statements, and statistics to have been published in recent years. Furthermore, Valkenier, sensitive to East European influences upon Soviet economic rationality, nicely isolates the key viewpoints influencing the current climate of Soviet opinion in which important decisions and revisions are under discussion at the same time as there is less normative prodding from the Party (p. 60). Valkenier is also very thorough, and thus productive, for further isolating three schools of Soviet thinking on how to deal with developing nations (pp. 148-150).

What does one learn from an examination of Soviet economic relations with the developing countries over the past 30 years? Quite simply, according to Valkenier, that an understanding of the evolving practice and ideology enables us to go beyond the simple static assertion that the USSR seeks to expand its influence in the Third World and to add a more dynamic element, that is, "how" Moscow sees its ability to pursue this goal. Over the past three decades it has become clear that Soviet economic capabilities do not match Soviet political aspirations; thus, the "economic bind" (pp. 147-148). Furthermore, the debates and disagreements outlined by Valkenier "belie the contention that the Soviets, because of the straightjacket of Marxism-Leninism, are incapable of adaptation, change or moderation" (p.

150). Finally, what are the policy implications for America? According to Valkenier:

We should be aware that some circles in the USSR are coming to grlps with the demonstrable fact that there are limits to Soviet power in the Third World, as well as to the advantages to be derived from close identification with the post-colonial grievances. Some even hold that support of Third World causes is disruptive to Soviet American relations and threatens world peace. Should this "globalist" view come to shape concrete Soviet proposals, Washington should be ready to respond and not miss the chance to seek mutual restraint or a cooperative relationship. (p. 150)

To conclude, Valkenier's work should be mandatory reading for the serious student and scholar interested in Soviet-third-world relations. Well written, timely, and insightful, Valkenier's analysis advances Western understanding of the perceptions and policymaking processes of the Soviet Union.

JOHN M. CARFORA

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The Power of Power Politics: A Critique. By John A. Vasquez. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 303. \$27.50.)

John Vasquez makes an important contribution in clarifying much of the confusion and disagreement that has existed over the evolution and contemporary nature of the field of international relations.

Vasquez reviews and applies Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm for two principal purposes: to describe the way in which realism provides the basic assumptions about the world that serve as the foundation of international relations inquiry, and to evaluate the degree to which realism adequately explains international phenomena. Vasquez reviews the theoretical and empirical literature of the last three decades, analyzing it both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Vasquez finds that the realist paradigm has dominated the three major activities of scholars in international relations (or in any scientific discipline): theory construction, data collection, and hypothesis testing. Most of the work conducted by international relations scholars has been consistent with realism's three fundamental assumptions:

 Nation-states are the most important actors for understanding international relations.

- There is a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics.
- International relations is the struggle for peace and power.

"The power of the realist paradigm to guide the development of the field toward normal science has been overlooked by scholars because of a preoccupation with and misunderstanding of the 'behavioral' revolt' (p. 19). Vasquez argues that the behavioral revolution did not result in a substantive change in the discipline, but a methodological one. Refinements and modifications in the power politics approach—the original foundation for realism—did occur as the field became more interdisciplinary and systematic, but the rudiments of realism nonetheless remain.

While Vasquez demonstrates that realism served as the basis for the study of international relations, he also concludes that the paradigm has been unable to provide a body of knowledge based on statistical analyses that adequately explains global interactions. In fact, the findings that have resulted from the rise of behavioralism demonstrate a number of anomalies that are beyond the reach of the realist paradigm. Therefore,

while there is no need at this point to decide whether the realist paradigm should be rejected, it can be concluded that the research of the seventies has called that paradigm into question, that the paradigm has still failed to satisfy the criteria of accuracy and centrality, and that it has satisfied the criterion of scientific importance less well than status, social psychological, or cognitive psychological explanations of global behavior. (p. 223)

Vasquez does suggest areas of inquiry which have gone beyond the realist paradigm: transnational relations, issue politics, and Marxist approaches. However, the thrust of the book is to describe and evaluate realism, not to offer an alternative. For those in search of a paradigm that offers a more profound understanding of human interaction and behavior, the work by John Burton has been unfortunately overlooked. In *Deviance*, *Terrorism*, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems (St. Martin's Press, 1979), Burton describes an alternative paradigm for understanding social control and evolution based on the individual's pursuit of human needs.

As in any work, The Power of Power Politics has flaws that affect the final product. The review of the theoretical literature could have been condensed. The data utilized for the evaluation of realism did not include qualitative studies (e.g., comparative case studies). Furthermore, the title of the book is a misnomer: The Power of Realism would have been more accurate, since the con-

cepts of power politics and realism are clearly distinguished, and the former is subsumed by the latter.

Overall, this is an important book for understanding the evolution of a discipline. John Vasquez's work should be read by people who are interested in the future direction of the field of international affairs.

JEREL A. ROSATI

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Brezhnev's Peace Program: A Study of Soviet Domestic Political Process and Power. By Peter M.E. Volten. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 368. \$24.50, paper.)

Volten, a staff member in the Directorate of General Policy Affairs in the Ministry of Defense, The Hague, Netherlands, has attempted in this work to analyze Soviet foreign and military policy in terms of the domestic context of decision making. The book argues for an integrated analytical approach to the analysis of Soviet politics but is not consistent in its application. The goals of the project are only partially achieved. The domestic context of foreign policymaking is largely confined to the top elite in the Politburo and in the military. The most successful chapters concern military doctrine, defense policy, and armaments, the areas of Volten's greatest expertise.

The book is divided formally into two sections: Part 1 deals with foreign policy, and Part 2 focuses on security policy. In many ways, this work impresses the reader as two separate studies linked by the first and last chapters. Nevertheless, the concluding chapter skillfully ties together the two parts of the book and succeeds in summarizing effectively Volten's key arguments.

In terms of content, Part 2 is clearly stronger than Part 1. The first chapter presents a summary of Western scholarship on Soviet foreign policy. The overview is relatively thorough, as evidenced by the profusion of footnotes (123), but less than 20% of the sources date from 1977 or later. Volten tends to focus on the classic interpretations of Soviet politics and foreign policy.

Brezhnev's speech on foreign policy to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971, later called the "peace program," is the subject of much of Part 1. The speech articulated the Brezhnev approach to foreign policy characterized in detente, which had begun a few years before. In the remainder of Part 1, Volten analyzes the domestic discussion, especially among the top leadership, which he believes followed Brezhnev's attempt to put forward a personal foreign policy. According to this work,

Brezhnev, over the next few years, was forced to make concessions and to return to collective decision making in foreign policy, but the argument is neither forceful nor convincing. For example, differences of opinion on the role of foreign trade versus economic self-sufficiency between Brezhnev and Kosygin are mentioned but not thoroughly analyzed. Other differences among the leadership elite are also cited, but the hypothesis that Brezhnev was forced to retreat from unilateral policymaking is not argued persuasively, and numerous questions remain unanswered. Brezhnev was a consensus leader, and it is not at all clear that the speech to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress was an independent effort. Moreover, it is not clear why the speech was later called the "peace program" rather than the doctrine of détente. The work only partially describes the international dynamics that modified and curbed the leadership's optimism about détente and foreign trade with the United States between 1971 and 1975. Did the opposition exist from the outset or only after the policy began to falter in the mid-1970s?

Part 2 clearly demonstrates Volten's expertise on military policy. He discusses Soviet military doctrine and weapons' capability with facility, and Part 2 is much more readable. Students doing research on the Soviet military will find Volten's work a useful source book.

A weakness of the overall work is the style of presentation, which suggests a doctoral dissertation with extensive footnotes rather than a polished monograph. Tangential arguments and extensive details distract from the main theses. The abundance of notes (114 pages of notes to 239 pages of text) is not fully warranted, and some could be eliminated in a revision. The small type size and format further inhibits the readability of the work.

The book has a good bibliography but no index. Given the complexity of the subject matter, an index would be desirable. The book is a useful reference tool for undergraduate libraries and would be helpful for the student studying foreign policy or military decision making. The specialist in Soviet politics will value some of the discussions of specific issues by the Politburo and the military establishment, but the work does not make a major contribution to the methodology of studying Soviet decision making despite the goals professed at the outset.

NORMA C. NOONAN

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Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications of Case Studies from the Johnson Administration. Edited by Sidney Weintraub. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Pp. xvii + 234. \$23.00.)

During the Great Behavioral Revolution, in which 100 equations were to bloom, there was a tendency to dismiss the case study approach to political science as inherently ideographic, atheoretical, and ascientific. This was, to be sure, not totally without justification. Library shelves already were stacked with monographs that were more impressionistic than rigorous in their methods of analysis and which, while interesting stories in themselves, had little cumulative value. Yet as both cause and effect of the revealed limitations of quantitative analysis, the case study approach has been undergoing a major rehabilitation. Its old thick descriptive virtues are being preserved, while the introduction of such techniques of systematic analysis as cross-case comparisons and the conceptualization of discrete phenomenon in terms of measurable and recurring variables are making it possible to overcome past limitations and to test and develop theory.

Sidney Weintraub's Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy is in this new case study tradition. His central concern is with the general question of explaining the success, or lack thereof, of economic coercion as an instrument for influence in international relations. He begins by reviewing "Current Theory" (chap. 2), which he summarizes as the argument that "economic coercion is rarely successful" and with which he identifies such authors as Johan Galtung, Klaus Knorr, Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, Peter Wallensteen, Richard Stuart Olson, and Margaret Doxey (p. 23). He then challenges the validity of this argument on conceptual and empirical grounds. Drawing on a 1979 article in International Affairs (London) by James Barber ("Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument," 55, 370), Weintraub stresses the need to disaggregate the objectives motivating a coercer state before dismissing economic sanctions as a failure just because the target state was not compelled to change its policy. Such tangible influence may be the formal objective, but in addition there are undisclosed objectives, such as settling for a smaller influence gain or playing to relevant domestic political audiences, and implicit objectives, such as maintaining international credibility by acting decisively rather than conducting business as usual (pp. 47-48). "When all objectives are determined and attention is given to them rather than solely to the objectives stated formally for the record, success is much more common than the critics of economic coercion have led us to believe" (pp. 57-58).

This contention is supported by empirical data drawn from six cases of economic coercion during the Johnson administration. These case studies (involving Indonesia, Egypt, Chile, South Africa, and two cases with India) were written by six of Weintraub's graduate students at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, who made extensive use of the archives at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. While in only one case did the United States achieve its formal objective, the authors find successes at the other levels of objectives in four of the five other cases. On the basis of this data, Weintraub concludes that "existing theory on economic coercion needs reformulation" (p. 57).

But while such a conclusion follows from the particular set of cases investigated herein, this is not a sufficiently representative sample to warrant such generalizations. One cannot generalize from such "low politics" issues as influencing the development policy of India or pressuring Chile not to raise its copper prices to the "high politics" of deterrence of external aggression by a major power, compellence of war termination, or destabilization of unfriendly regimes. While early on Weintraub acknowledges that all his cases are cases of unilateral coercion with foreign aid as the principal instrumentality and with the relationship involving the United States and a third-world country, he ignores such limitations when he contends that his cases provide the basis for a reformulated theory. In the end, they beg the critical question of the interrelation of politics and economics on the center stage of international relations.

On a more methodological note, the point is well taken that policy objectives, especially in foreign affairs, are much more complex than what is provided for public consumption. But there is a disturbing sense of tautology in calling coercion successful because it served implicit objectives (that is, those which cannot even be documented through archival research). At minimum some sense of net gain needs to be introduced-for example, even if one assumes that by embargoing natural gas pipeline equipment exports to the Soviet Union the United States benefited by demonstrating our will to act, how much did we lose from the intense intra-alliance dispute that we set off? Is shooting oneself in the foot any more credible than not acting at all?

These limitations notwithstanding, Economic Coercion and U.S. Foreign Policy is a valuable contribution to the international relations literature. It stands as an excellent example of archival-based empirical research and of a comparative case study approach, and it should continue to stimulate further debate and development of economic coercion theory.

BRUCE W. JENTLESON

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## Normative Theory

Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. By Harold J. Berman. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 657. \$32.50.)

This book was written, Berman confesses, "in order to find a way out of our present predicament," an age characterized by social disintegration and the decline of unity and common purpose. Given that the cause of this bleak situation is attributable in large measure to the decline of law as an expression of the "community's vision of its future and its past" and as the object of its "passionate loyalty," Berman seeks to resuscitate the Western legal tradition by teaching us what law once was—and what it again can be. The thrust of this book is to recover the "autonomy, the integrity, and the ongoingness of our legal tradition" (p. 41). Berman's scholarly approach yields a magnificent volume, broad in scope and

rich in detail; this may be the most important book on law of our generation.

One of the main defects of contemporary jurisprudence is the fragmentation of law into parts so isolated that there is no longer a corpus juris. What passes for law in our time is, in fact, nothing more than a "hodgepodge . . . of ad hoc decisions and conflicting rules, united only by common techniques" (p. 38). To remedy this juridical malaise, Berman encourages an "integrative jurisprudence" that combines positivism, natural law theory, and the historical school of jurisprudence. The point is simple: "Law has to be believed in or it will not work" (p. vii). Berman's project is to posit what he calls a "social theory of law, the belief that law in the Western tradition is not merely the effect by also the cause of social, economic, political, intellectual, moral, and religious developments that constitute the Western tradition. Law is much more than an instrument of political or economic domination; it is an important part of the basic structure of Western society" (p. 43).

To argue his case for this social theory of law, Berman traces the rise of the Western legal tradition and Western legal science beginning with the Papal Revolution of 1075. For it is there for the first time in Western society that "rule by law" and "rule of law" become important goals. From this point of departure on the canon law as the first modern Western legal system, Berman delves deeply into the development of the various secular legal systems: feudal law, manorial law, mercantile law, urban law, and royal law. The result is a history of Western law unlike any other.

This book demonstrates that law is more than the will of the lawmaker; it is "custom transformed." Law, to be law, has to be rooted in the "deepest beliefs and emotions of a people" (p. 558). When it ceases to be thus understood, it ceases to serve as the foundation of civilization and community. It is by reminding us of the original foundation that Berman offers a thoughtful way out of our present predicament.

Whether or not one agrees with Berman's premises or accepts his conclusions, this book will have to be taken seriously by anyone researching and writing about the Western legal tradition. Berman may very well be our Blackstone.

GARY L. MCDOWELL

Tulane University

Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism. By Allen E. Buchanan. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982. Pp. xiv + 206. \$23.50.)

This book is both thorough and wide-ranging. It begins with an interpretation of some aspects of Hegel's political theory that influenced Marx. There follows an exposition of Marx's moderate and radical critiques of capitalism. It is Buchanan's argument that Marx's evaluation of both capitalism and, to some extent, communism rests jointly on his early humanism and his later materialist theory of consciousness. Marx's radical evaluative perspective on capitalism is shown to be external to the juridical conceptions of capitalist society. Marx's theory of exploitation is explained and defended against some criticisms. The chief conclusion here is that Marx's concept of exploitation is not limited to the wage-labor nexus but is rather a part of the wider theory of alienation. Buchanan then turns to what he calls Marx's theory of revolutionary motivation. Without appeals to justice and other internal, juridical principles, Buchanan argues, a revolution cannot be justified to the proletariat. And such appeals are not consistent with Marx's theory. The Marxist effort to show that revolution is a matter of proletarian self-interest is refuted from several angles, including a very original analysis of revolution as a public good.

Although there is much to learn from the preceding parts of the book, the centerpiece is a long chapter comparing Marx and Rawls on justice. It begins with a lengthy exposition of Rawl's theory. Buchanan repeatedly stresses the need to distinguish Rawls's ad hoc remarks from his theory, arguing that many of Rawls's selfstyled Marxist critics misinterpret the theory. Ten points are singled out for detailed comparison. Thanks to Buchanan's very generous reading of Rawls, his theory emerges from this comparison rather well. It is, as it were, exonerated on six of the counts. On the other four, Marxist criticisms are sustained. There four are its individualism, its utopianism, its split of political equality from economic equality, and its measurement problems in assessing alternative means of favoring the least-advantaged class.

Buchanan then concludes this study by detailing objections to the radical and moderate interpretations of Marx's critique of justice.

The preceding account of the book hardly does justice to it. There is much to think about, and much with which to disagree. Considering how much there is in the book, it is disappointing to see Buchanan conclude his comparison of Marx and Rawls by writing "that Marx's thought presents a serious challenge to Rawls's System" (p. 161). Indeed, that seems little enough to conclude after a 50-page chapter. Buchanan is certainly right that Rawls and his theory are often confused by critics. Some of these critics though are bound to feel that Buchanan has sometimes followed the man and not the theory, for example, when he passes uncritically on the collapse of the distinction between the difference principle and the maximin criterion (p. 130) and ignores the essential role of income and wealth in defining the least-advantaged class (p. 123). Moreover, the space devoted to the expositions of Hegel, Marx, and Rawls is not always proportional to the use made of these expositions in subsequent argument. Finally, it must be said that Buchanan is yet another writer content to interpret Hegel as laboring to bring forth Marx (p. 9) and unwittingly sireing fascism (p. 166). It is inevitable that an ambitious and creative book like this one should leave specialists on Hegel, Marx, and Rawls unsettled, but that is as it should be on occasion.

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Marxism and Philosophy. By Alex Callinicos. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. 177. \$19.95.)

In 1923, amid the embers of the postwar revolutionary period in Germany, Karl Korsch published his famous book, Marxism and Philosophy. Korsch attributed some of the blame for the failure of socialist revolution in the West to the hearty and optimistic ideology of the Second (Socialist) International. This faith in an inevitable collapse of capitalism, guaranteed by the scientific laws of historical materialism, had a twofold effect on the socialist movement. First, it contributed to the ideological complacency of socialism; there was no need to be troubled by recent developments in philosophy, since the whole enterprise of philosophy had been superseded by Marxist social theory. Second, it contributed to the political complacency of socialism; confident of its ultimate victory in the social-Darwinian struggle between the classes, the socialist parties combined the rhetoric of confrontation and revolution with a reformist practice based on the achievement of steady and incremental inroads into the bastions of established power. Korsch prescribed large doses of philosophy, particularly Hegelian philosophy, as a cure for the debilitating overconfidence of Marxist socialism.

Fifty years later, in the distinctly unrevolutionary era of Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl, Alex Callinicos assumes the title of Marxism and Philosophy for his diagnosis of the malaise of Marxism. Like Korsch, Callinicos detects a weakness in the philosophical foundations of Marxist social theory. Unlike Korsch, Callinicos sees Hegelianism as the problem. Callinicos agrees with the struggle of the young Marx and Engels against the metaphysical obscurantism of Hegelian philosophy and its offshoots, but disagrees with the founders about the surpassed nature of philosophy as a whole. From this perspective, Korsch and his contemporaries were correct in their call for a restoration of a philosophical dimension to Marxism but wrong in their revival of philosophical Hegelianism. Callinicos believes that Lukács, Adorno, and Althusser are the leading figures in contemporary Marxist philosophy. In his interpretation, two of these thinkers, Adorno and Althusser, have taken the necessary first step in the rehabilitation of Marxist philosophy: the critique of the Hegelian legacy. Only a deHegelianized Marxism will be able to develop a consistent approach to troublesome concepts like ideology.

Callinicos's surprising alternative to Hegelianism is rigorous to say the least. Abandoning Hegel, Callinicos turns to the schools of "post-Fregean" analytic philosophy and philosophy of science. Long existing in mutual ignorance at best, long mutual adversaries at worst, Callinicos nevertheless

recommends a synthesis of Marxism with the Anglo-American analytic tradition in philosophy. If the first part of Callinicos's book reveals a Marxism too often prone to a loose and politically tendentious use of concepts like forces of production, relations of production, and ideology, the second part provides a stark contrast. Here, where the very possibility of making any meaningful statement about the external world is constantly in doubt, the canons of philosophical rigor eliminate the flaws of Marxist concepts.

But does the hermetic rigor of the analytic tradition eliminate Marxism itself? The second part of Callinicos's book is almost completely devoid of political content. One of the few exceptions occurs during the discussion of language and ideology, where Callinicos objects to Habermas's characterization of lies, threats, and racist jokes as aberrations of "'ordinary language communication." Among other criticisms, Callinicos finds this characterization to be "an unwarranted intrusion of Habermas's ethical and political views" (p. 144). What Callinicos never provides is any indication of how the analytic tradition can discuss deception, violence, or racism as anything but unwarranted intrusions of ethical and political views. This theoretical difficulty has practical implications. Despite his stated admiration of the theoristactivists from Marx and Engels through Luxemburg and Gramsci, Callinicos's advocacy of analytic philosophy shatters even the illusion of the unity of theory and practice that underlay the classical Marxist tradition. If it is an unwarranted intrusion to label a joke racist, how much more of an intrusion would it be to engage in actions aimed at the elimination of racism?

There can be no question of Callinicos's sincerity, still less of his competence. He is one of the few thinkers who is able to write about Marxist theory and analytic philosophy with equal facility. Despite my objections to his proposed synthesis, the two parts of Callinicos's book can be read separately with profit. But it is this sincerity and competence that provides the irony of the 1983 version of Marxism and Philosophy. The abyss between Marxism and the analytic tradition is never more visible than it is here in this eloquent and scholarly attempt at a synthesis. If philosophy means analytic philosophy, then the title of this book should have been Marxism or Philosophy.

JOHN BOKINA

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The Left and Rights: A Conceptual Analysis of the Idea of Socialist Rights. By Tom Campbell. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp. 253. \$11.95, paper.)

T.D. Campbell is professor of jurisprudence at Glasgow University and eminently qualified to examine dispassionately the often cavalierly disregarded question with which this important book is concerned. For Campbell, much of the possibility of any dialogue between liberals and socialists hinges upon the status of "rights" within socialism. If the ideals of socialism can be expressed in the language of rights, then a continuity within the liberal tradition exists that could facilitate compromise and comparison. If not, liberals and socialists can only continue like all foreigners to shout at each other in the hopes of making their essentially alien languages understood. Campbell's approach is to try to ascertain the conceptual rather than the historical compatibility of rights and socialism, and to articulate "a philosophically acceptable theory of rights which holds for socialists as well as non-socialist systems of thought" (p. 2). Not all socialists, of course, reject the language of rights. Those whom Campbell terms revolutionaries do so because this language is seen as tied to the legal and coercive system of competitive bourgeois society, whereas socialism is assumed to create deeper, cooperative and noncoercive bonds that make rights unnecessary. "Reformist" socialists, however, seek to retain at least part of the language of rights, emphasizing in particular rights to own the means of production, to employment and welfare, and to trying to reorient the idea of rights toward that of human and social needs and away from abstract conceptions of human liberty.

Half of Campbell's book is devoted to exploring four main areas of socialist complaint against rights theories. In criticizing the "moralism" of rights, socialists attack the attempt to ground rights generally in moral rights, the latter of whose basis is rarely clearly ascertainable but which is often reduced to some presupposed moral or natural law. Here Campbell shows, however, that rights can also be seen as social rights grounded in custom and convention, hence without obscure metaphysical foundations unacceptable to historical materialism. Second, the legalism of rights is often derided by socialists as embodying a purely formal, rule-worshipping notion of justice that is intrinsically conservative. Here Campbell argues that organizational rules are required in all societies, and that such rules are a precondition to all substantive forms of justice. Third, it can be argued that all rights ultimately rest upon a threat of coerciveness that would have to be removed in a far more harmonious socialist society. Here, however, Campbell defends a concept of noncoercive sanctions drawn in part from H.L.A. Hart, while arguing that organizations to monitor rights and prevent their violation could still operate within such a definition. Finally, rights can also be seen as ineradicably connected to the tenets of philosophical individualism prevalent in Western capitalist societies, and hence as an expression of the predominance of selfishness in most areas of social interaction. What Campbell terms an interest theory of rights, however, can be contrasted to both power and contract theories to provide the idea of a potentially unselfish interest in something which the concept of a right is designed to help secure.

Campbell spends much of the latter half of his book defending and clarifying the reformist socialist notion of rights and rejecting the revolutionary critique. In part this consists of outlining how more traditional conceptions of human rights could function as a basis for political obligation in a socialist society, and why a priority of social and economic rights would not necessarily entail the rejection of the absoluteness of certain more traditional human rights. Freedom of expression as a dominant political right is given a particularly detailed treatment, and the "right to work" clearly explored, while the general concept of welfare rights is defended at length.

Campbell's book is the most important contribution to the literature on this topic ever written and merits wide circulation and discussion. Given the usual ideological hostility towards many rights notions by socialists, and the skepticism as to any meaningful future compatibility between rights and socialism expressed by many nonsocialists, not a few readers are bound to find Campbell's project modestly utopian. In particular, the problem of noncoercive sanctions is less likely to prove persuasive than might be hoped. Nonetheless, as a simple effort at clarifying one of the most important and most underestimated areas of modern political debate, this is an extremely valuable and welcome book.

**GREGORY CLAEYS** 

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Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the Legislative State: Vol. 1, Corasius and the Renaissance Systemazation of Law; Vol. 2, Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Foundations of Corasius' Systematic Methodology. By A. London Fell. (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983. Pp. xx + 358 and xvi + 336. \$30.00 each.)

Modern scholars of the Renaissance regard Jean Bodin's Six Books of The Republic (Paris, 1576) as the *locus classicus* of the emergence of the idea of the State as an autonomous and sovereign (legislative) entity. As the prodigious scholarship in these two volumes demonstrates, Bodin's conception of the State as a sovereign legislative entity was inspired by the Aristotelian conception of law advanced by Bodin's forgotten contemporary, the French jurist, Joannes Corasius (1515-1572).

Through careful, painstaking explication of Corasius' principal work, On Reducing Civil Law to an Art (1560) (in Opera [Wittenberg, 1603, 2 vols.]), Fell traces Corasius' attempt to answer his contemporaries' (for example, Christophorus Ehemius) claim that despite the fact that it can be taught by method, "jurisprudence is not an art or science, but rather a virtue and a part of prudence . . . [and] that jurisprudence cannot properly be reduced to a science" (vol. 1, p. 54).

The methodology employed by Corasius in answering his nominalist opponents is that of Aristotle's four causes (and four questions), which are found, among other places, in Aristotle's *Physics* II. The four causes are the efficient, formal, material, and final. While Aristotle never resorted to the four causes in his analyses of law, Corasius utilizes them "as an organizational device" (vol. 1, p. viii) to prove that since law has a form identical with other activities exhibiting a universal character, it is not "based on opinion or only on the whim of the more powerful men... but rather . . . is derived from solid and true principles of nature" (vol. 1, p. 59).

Corasius' use of Aristotle's four causes is (following Cicero) by way of their division into three categories. The first of these, the efficient cause, is embodied in the person of the lawmaker—or, more precisely—that entity's power to make law. It is here that Corasius sows the seed for the later emergence in early modern thought of the idea of legislative power as "the most sovereign power" (vol. 1, p. 19). The principal locus of the second or material cause of law is in the interpretations of law given by judges, whose authority and power is clearly subordinate to that of the legislature. The final cause of law, justice and the state, is in effect a legislative ideal: promotion of public good.

These two volumes are the first of four (the remaining two are to be published in late 1984 or early 1985) described by Fell as "a multi-volume study of interpretative textual problems centering on the encyclopedic art of law in Renaissance jurisprudence..." (vol. 1, p. viii). Of the first two, as its subtitle suggests, Volume 2 serves as something of an encyclopedia of the classical, medieval and Renaissance foundations of Corasius' systematic Aristotelian methodology. But these two books do much more than save an important historical figure from the forgotten

regions of Renaissance jurisprudence. They are a stunning and architectonic rendering of the intellectual and cultural milieu that gave birth to the modern idea of the State. Their publication can only be regarded as an auspicious beginning to what will surely be a major contribution to the modern understanding of Renaissance jurisprudence and political theory.

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The Limits of Obligation. By James S. Fishkin. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982. Pp. viii + 184. \$18.50, cloth; \$6.95, paper.)

There is obviously a great need to come to grips with the ramifications of the ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor of the world, as well as with the incontrovertible fact that our planetary existence is becoming increasingly global in scope. Certainly it would require a callous refusal to reflect if one did not find thought-provoking the spectacle of a part of the globe increasingly awash in a sea of baubles, while a still larger part suffocates under astronomical birth rates and a wretchedly tenuous grip on a mere hand-to-mouth existence. Whether the resulting spiritual decay on the one hand, or the physical suffering on the other, is more disquieting remains an open question.

In The Limits of Obligation, James S. Fishkin attempts to deal with the moral issues that arise from reflecting on the obligation of the rich to attend to the suffering of the poor. In the process he tries to demonstrate that there is a tension inherent in liberal thought which this issue helps make visible. Fishkin claims that two central components of the liberal faith are the commitment to impartiality, that is, the need to give equal concern and respect to all men, and the commitment to individual liberty (p. 170). Accepting the principle of impartiality allegedly forces us to accept certain "general obligations" which we have towards all men. However, to fully discharge these general obligations would in almost every circumstance require a change of lifestyle that would be truly heroic, or an intrusion into the arena of individual freedom that would be found intolerable. But liberal principles of negative freedom require the existence of what Fishkin terms a "robust sphere of indifference"; otherwise almost all trivial actions would be considered potentially moral and imply obligatory behavior.

However, in our generally accepted moral universe, we do not see heroic action as obligatory, nor do we conclude that every action represents moral behavior. But we do generally believe that a certain minimum altruism is obligatory; otherwise we would be considered callous. Fishkin tries to show that when these generally accepted first principles are raised from the level of individual action to the level of collective action, they come into such tension that to successfully meet our general obligations would require heroic action as well as an intrusion into our robust sphere of freedom.

What Fishkin seems to have accomplished is the replacement of the traditional tension between liberty and equality with the modified, albeit not altogether different, tension between liberty and universal cosmopolitan obligation. He repeatedly claims that he has no intention of proposing a resolution of this tension; he is attempting no more than to make the contours of the problem clearer. He does, however, conclude his argument by asserting that "some great revision in our assumptions or in our actions is required" (p. 171). As an example of what he has in mind, he reminds us of the difficulty political theorists once perceived about the possibility of combining a democratic regime with a large territory. This tension was resolved by the invention of the idea of representation. Fishkin intimates that a similar conceptual invention is what is presently required if we are to save the principles to which we are generally committed. But in the absence of such an invention, and despite Fishkin's repeated disclaimers, in the confrontation between "general obligations" and a "robust sphere of indifference" the general obligations seem to retain a certain sovereignty and inviolability; for to drop them would allegedly be to reject our common humanity.

While Fishkin's argument is somewhat compelling given the first principles that he choses and the way he frames the issue, one wonders if there are not several suppressed premises which if explicitly confronted might force the reformulation of the issue. For example, when confronted with the fact that a reigning moral universe leaves individuals attached to conflicting principles, one might be led to conclude that this demonstrates the insufficiency of the entire horizon and hence the need to open it for reconsideration. But Fishkin never engages in this reflection nor pushes for any deeper ground for his premises than to observe that they are generally accepted, and that to quit them would be to radically change our way of life. Yet it is clear that for Fishkin it is precisely such a radical change in our prevailing notions that is required and intended. If that is the case, we should be just as radical in questioning the inviolability of Fishkin's "general obligations" as he seems prepared to question our present understanding of an acceptable obligatory intrusion

into our reigning way of life. From Fishkin's point of view, it is apparently clear that liberalism must, like Marxism, be committed in principle to a cosmopolitan approach to solving the global problems confronting contemporary humanity. That, however, would certainly seem to be a premise that must be brought out into the open. and its ramifications explored explicitly. These more substantive discussions are not enjoined. To that extent The Limits of Obligation tends to be a house built in midair, the foundation of which has been finessed under the guise of a claimed modesty of purpose and a reliance on generally accepted premises. Nonetheless, the problem Fishkin addresses is not one that can be made to go away by some grand xenophobic or isolationist myopia. But contrary to Fishkin, the problem could with equal justice be addressed from the perspective of the obligation those of us in the West have to ourselves to halt our own spiritual decay in the face of a runaway materialism, as by reflecting on our general obligations to all of humanity.

GREGORY B. SMITH

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Rousseau's Social Contract: The Design of the Argument. By Hilail Gildin. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. vii + 206. \$22.50.)

Within our generation and the last, Rousseau scholarship has come of age. Thinkers of the past took sides: Either Rousseau was a reckless individualist or a despot. Today, scholars take seriously Rousseau's own claim that his philosophy is not divided, but a concordant whole. Hilail Gildin's little book continues this latest endeavor well.

What does Gildin give us as Rousseau's design? It originates in an axial moral principle, which is to "avoid the situations that put our duties in opposition to our interests, and which show us our good in others' harm" (Confessions, Book II); in the Social Contract we learn the same. This principle was implanted in our instincts and made us all both equal and free. Once men lost their innocence, first their equality, then their freedom withered. Hence, "political freedom will occupy in Rousseau's thought the place that peace occupies in the thought of Hobbes" (p. 12). The manner in which Gildin examines the intimate relation between equality and freedom strikes me as the great strength of his essay.

Gildin goes on. The general will, not being a mystical whole, can come into being solely from particular wills. Whereas most scholars have been stymied by how this is possible, Gildin appeals to an explicit and concrete illustration (pp. 33-34, 54-56) in a contemporary layman's book on law: An interest common to all, but requiring everyone's cooperation, may have its dark side, for a citizen may try out of self-interest to reap the fruits of everyone else's cooperation by omitting his own. Consequently, since the general interest is almost never as palpable as one's own, even when these two interests coincide, citizens need laws.

How the general will can act in this way and do so infallibly must be "both qualified and elaborated" (p. 44). It is precisely through the general will that one's self-interest becomes more closely identified with the public interest; i.e., the citizen seeks his own interest through the general will. To do otherwise would bring harm to his compatriots. This is freedom. It is also the equality that Rousseau is concerned to protect and that is "inseparable from freedom" (p. 49). While it is always possible that a majority decision may be unfair, yet "once the majority cannot be trusted . . . there is nothing else that can be trusted" (p. 58). Hence the problem of the general will does not lie in the source of its authority; its salvation consists in "seeing to it that a legitimate sovereign exists" (p. 60). On the whole, taking men as they are, Rousseau sees that it is selfinterest that "guarantees the rectitude of the general will" (p. 59), because it is out of selfinterest that hope for freedom and the courage to find it arise in the first place. Civil religion apotheosizes this will and helps to ensure the sovereign's integrity. Beyond this, the tribunate safeguards the sovereign itself by making sure that its majorities are true and not collusive (pp. 165. 175).

One final note. In a very large degree scholarly endeavor is a joint enterprise. Albeit that Gildin consults several important sources at the top of the field, he excludes others that he might have taken into account. I mention only Charles Hendel's 1934 work, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist (Bobbs-Merrill) and Judith Shklar's Men and Citizens (Cambridge, 1969).

R. M. PETERSON

California State Polytechnic University

Political Theory and Public Policy. By Robert Goodin. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. 286. \$27.50, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

For some time now the literature on public policy has been dominated on one hand by incrementalists and public choice economists, and on the other by deontologists who take rights as the basis for morally serious decision making. Robert Goodin tries to chart an alternative course in *Political Theory and Public Policy*. In the first section of the book, he examines and rejects the methods of deontologists (turning on "thought experiments" and "crazy cases") and the assumptions underlying incrementalism. Instead, he opts for an approach operating "in the shadow of utilitarianism" (p. 16). By this he means a utilitarianism unlike that of public choice economics, one that will take seriously notions of dignity and self-respect as well as choice.

The second section of the book details some of the revisions necessary to accomplish this. These include a reliance on "loose laws" to specify social goals while preserving administrative flexibility, a demythologizing of "choice" to reveal its grounding in the idea of dignity, and an examination of the ways moral principles can be enacted into policy that also respects people's self-interested motivations. This last leads Goodin to recommend market socialism as a means of separating the political (moral) determination of ends from the market (self-interested) specification of means.

The third section brings Goodin's moral sensibilities to bear on three concepts that receive wide play in public choice analyses: impossibility, risk, and uncertainty. The first, Goodin warns, often turns on manipulated perceptions, the second usually ignores the effects of maldistribution on the risk-behavior of its victims, and the last is used routinely under the rubric of discounting to justify policy biases against future generations.

In the last two chapters Goodin applies this morally sensitized utilitarianism to the questions of nuclear power and defense policy. Not only are meaningful long-term risk assessments about nuclear power impossible Goodin argues, but the technology requires measures inimical to democratic participation and freedom to bring the risks from known threats within acceptable limits. He then critiques the arguments used to exempt defense activities like chemical and biological warfare research from the public debate applied to such civilian activities as recombinant DNA research.

The work has some flaws. Those familiar with Lowi may be dismayed at the political naivete of Goodin's prescription of loose laws. The suggestion of a market socialist scheme, while intriguing, overlooks the sustained repression the Yugoslav experiment has required, an omission at odds with the concern for democratic values underlying Goodin's critique of nuclear power. Further, his dismissal of the rights approach to policy analysis because it leads to a "preoccupa-

tion with classic 'conscience issues'-most conspicuously war, discrimination and abortion" (p. 13) is misplaced. Not only are such issues of recurrent general concern (Philosophy & Public Affairs did not create the continuing public agonizing over abortion), but Goodin's condemnation also ignores contributions from this tradition such as Henry Shue's Basic Rights (Princeton University Press, 1980) that deal with larger issues such as world hunger. Finally, Goodin's passing discussion of political creativity that confines it to "playful eccentrics" like Jerry Brown (p. 135) leaves the impression that Goodin views the role of political theory in policy analysis as a negative one concerned only with setting limits to the activities of planners and politicians.

These flaws are offset by important strengths, however. Goodin's review and refutation of incrementalism's justifications is thorough and accurate. His analysis of the role of dignity in defining the limits of choice should haunt public choice economics. His discussion of risk marks a considerable advance in the literature on that concept. Finally, Goodin's examinations of nuclear power and defense policy are models of careful and perceptive criticisms of public policies. For these at least, the book certainly merits the attention of policy analysts and political theorists.

JOHN D. HARMAN

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The Politics of Utopia: A Study in Theory and Practice. By Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. Pp. 292. \$27.50.)

The authors proclaim that the book under review is the first book on utopian political theory and practice to emerge from English political science. Unlike French and American social science, which have been consistently interested in utopianism, English scholars consider utopian political thought as a form of literary fantasy. Goodwin and Taylor thus engage in an uphill battle to persuade their academic colleagues that utopianism has a legitimate place in English political theory.

Goodwin fights the theoretical skirmish in this battle in the first four chapters; Taylor fights the practical skirmish in the next four chapters. Each author contributes one more chapter at the end of the book. On the first page (p. 15) of the first chapter Goodwin asks the perennial question, "Is utopia necessarily unrealizable because of its ideal nature?" Although as the theoretician she does not answer this practical question directly, Goodwin does say that utopia is a vision which tran-

scends conventional idealism by its integrated view of "the good society" and by its implicit criticism of existing society.

Both authors in separate chapters survey utopian political thinkers chronologically from such classics as Plato's Republic, Thomas More's Utopia, Marx's Communist Manifesto, and Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia to such recent works as Marcuse's Eros and Civilization, B.F. Skinner's Walden Two, E.F. Schumacher's Small Is Beautiful, and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia. Taylor focuses on the social and economic conditions which were responsible for translating utopian ideas into concrete movements and organizations. He begins with liberalism, moves on to socialism (both utopian and Marxist) and positivism, and concludes with communitarianism, including American communities like the Shakers and Oneida, the Israel kibbutzim, and town planning or what Americans call urban planning. Taylor's prose style is verbose and expansive, while Goodwin's ideas are densely packed inlong, Teutonic sentences.

Goodwin's positive answer to the question, "Is utopia really necessary?" in chapter 9 is based on an economic model of rational political choice. She accepts the logic of Kenneth Arrow's paradox that individual choices cannot be aggregated to produce a single collective or social choice which is consistent with each individual choice. Therefore, in utopia the content of "the good" must be defined independently of personal preferences. Goodwin is sensitive to the work of critics of utopia like Popper and Talmon who would surely charge that her utopia is totalitarian. But she rejoins that the authoritative allocation of scarce resources in her utopia is justified "in all cases where one man's appropriation of an extra portion may detract from another man's chance of enjoying an adequate portion" (p. 224).

Goodwin undoubtedly presents her theory of utopia in terms of an economic model in order to appeal to the empirical and pragmatic bias of her English colleagues. Given the nature of her audience the form of Goodwin's argument is not surprising, but from the standpoint of continental European and American political thought, it is unfortunate.

In chapter 2, "Taxonomy and Anatomy," Goodwin asks, "does utopia only permit us to do what we ought to what to do?" (p. 65). She discusses this question briefly and alludes to other moral assumptions which various utopias make about human nature and motivation. But she makes no systematic arguments based on human nature comparable to her argument based on the economic model of rational choice. This is unfortunate because a presentation based on a more systematic concept of human motivation would

have been more universally heuristic. Moreover, it would have made the book more internally consistent. In the end, as Taylor states in the last chapter, utopia and the study of politics have a common goal—the quest for the good life.

STEPHEN A. GRAHAM

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The Foundations of Conservative Thought: An Anglo-American Tradition in Perspective. By William R. Harbour. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Pp. 220. \$15.95, cloth; \$8.95, paper.)

Harbour identifies and discusses the general propositions he feels represent the essence of Anglo-American conservatism in a lucid and authoritative style well-suited for undergraduate courses in political ideologies. However, there are several inconsistencies in his argument which derive from his failure to investigate fully certain political philosophies and historical analyses in his treatment of the topic.

Among the points Harbour covers are conservatism's theocentric view of the universe; its conception of man as special, in that he has a soul with which to make moral decisions, yet flawed since he often uses his extraordinary power to make evil choices; its understanding of the limitations of politics; its preference for order and tradition over revolutionary change; its belief in natural law; and its distinction between theoretical and practical reason with prudence their bridge. He stresses conservatism's recognition of the inherent religiousness of man along with his need for strong family ties and private property and its standard of community which seeks to develop a reciprocal relationship between individuals, factions, and the public interest.

Harbour delineates what he calls the "libertarian" and "traditionalist" conflict within conservatism. The former strain tends to value freedom most highly, while the latter emphasizes justice and virtue. Despite such significant differences, he concludes that the two are philosophically reconcilable. Given Harbour's rendering of the flawed view of human nature explicit in conservatism, the compatibility he ascribes to these approaches is debatable. Truly flawed persons would seem to require both spiritual and civil guidance. And while such guidance would not eliminate freedom, neither could it promote this value as an end in itself.

Harbour pays insufficient attention to the posi-

tion of Aristotle in the development of conservatism. After all, it was Aristotle who introduced the standard of community to Western political thought, long before Edmund Burke, whom Harbour identifies correctly as the father of modern Anglo-American conservatism. It was Aristotle who, in opposition to Plato, presented the archetypical arguments for the maintenance of the family and private property. Indeed, Burke's definition of prudence and case against abstract theoretical reason in politics is virtually a literal reproduction of Aristotle's original thesis in the Ethics. Moreover, the classical statement of the dangers of revolution is found in Aristotle's Politics. The identification of Aristotle as the progenitor of Western conservatism is significant, because he, even more than Burke, stands firmly in what Harbour calls the "traditionalist" school. Perhaps Harbour's willingness to find ample common ground for conservative libertarians and traditionalists can be traced to his neglect of Aristotle's contribution.

Surprisingly, Harbour does not confront directly the issue of the role conservatism might play in the United States, which for 200 years has been an essentially liberal nation. Under our pluralist system of government, individuals and factions enjoy an advantage over the public interest. Consequently, a tradition of community, which once characterized English history for example, has never really dominated American public life. Thus, American conservatives are forced into the awkward posture of defending an abstract concept rather than a concrete American tradition. Harbour underestimates this problem by characterizing liberalism's emphasis on individuals and factions at the expense of community as a recent phenomenon dating from the Johnson administration's War on Poverty rather than a congenital American condition recognized by such historians as Clinton Rossiter and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Equally puzzling is Harbour's contention that in order to be consistent with their veneration of religion, conservatives must support prayer as a daily exercise in the public schools. Roger Williams, an early American religious conservative, observed that forced worship "stinks in God's nostrils." Nor is formal public school prayer prudential from a conservative point of view. The scores of religious denominations residing currently in the United States raise the predicament of which prayer to use. If local governments choose one denomination's blessing, they violate others' First Amendment privileges. If they make up a blessing of their own, they establish a civil religion. This dilemma is ignored by Harbour. I find his coverage of the religious implications of conservatism generally weak. especially in his deletion of John H. Hallowell's

influential efforts to comprehend politics from a religious perspective.

ETHAN M. FISHMAN

University of South Alabama

Modern French Marxism. By Michael Kelly. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. vi + 240. \$24.50.)

This book is primarily a work of intellectual history, its subject being the development of Marxist philosophy within the French Communist Party (PCF).

Kelly identifies certain central issues in Marxist philosophical debate in France and attempts to trace the way in which they have been treated from the 1870s to the 1970s, although he gives most attention to the period since World War II. The issues treated concern the nature of dialectical materialism. They include such questions as the nature of materialism, the existence of an objective dialectic in nature, and the relation of consciousness (including philosophical thought) to the natural and social world.

Kelly attempts to work at several levels in writing his history. He wants to provide not only a survey, but also a "critical" one in which the "theoretical and practical implications, strengths and weaknesses" of different positions are discussed (p. 3). He also aims to consider issues "in their historical context, and related to the changing configuration of French politics and society, and to international relations" (p. 3).

Although these ambitious aims are not met consistently throughout the book, it is in some ways a useful work. Its focus on the PCF is what distinguishes Modern French Marxism from several other recent works on aspects of the subject. As Kelly correctly points out, the recent anglophone literature in the field has dealt primarily with those thinkers—existentialist, Christian, New Left, etc.—who have been critical of the PCF. Kelly is anxious to rectify what he sees as an "imbalance" in the way French Marxist philosophy has been portrayed, although he insists that his focus on party theorists "is not making any judgements of legitimacy, or suggesting that only those studied are really Marxists" (p. 98).

Kelly's book does begin to correct the "imbalance" he identifies, and in doing so it provides a useful survey that includes the work of some thinkers who are little known outside France and whose writings are often unavailable in English. However, the book also suffers from some serious problems. A major weakness is that, while Kelly does attempt to deal with the political context of some of the work he discusses, he does not really attempt to locate communist philosophy in the context of French intellectual life. His focus is so firmly on philosophy within the PCF that the encounter of communist philosophers with the wider world of French thought—with, for example, existential phenomenology, structural linguistics, or deconstruction—is never brought to life. When the views of those outside the PCF are mentioned, they are treated so cursorily and often unsympathetically that it is hard to have a sense that serious alternative views existed and presented a real challenge to the Party philosophers.

Unfortunately, Kelly's claim simply to be correcting an "imbalance" and not to be judging what is "really" Marxism is not accurate. The one-sidedness of his account arguably stems from a conviction that the views of mainstream communism on the key issues of "dialectical materialism" are indeed the only correct ones. This conviction becomes particularly apparent in the treatment of those such as Lefebvre and Garaudy, who had belonged to the PCF for many years and then parted company with it. Kelly simply endorses the Party view that by criticizing objective concepts of the dialectic and truth they opened the way to "eclecticism" and "pluralism," hence to serious political deviations and even (in the case of Garaudy) to "the dismemberment and liquidation of Marxism" (p. 181). That either of these thinkers might perhaps have developed a valid critique of Party philosophy or politics is not a proposition that is even considered by Kelly.

In his attempt to correct the "imbalance" in our understanding of Marxist philosophy in France, Kelly identifies himself so fully with the positions of the PCF that his critical capacity—which is at times considerable—becomes suspended at just those points in his narrative where it is most needed.

SONIA KRUKS

New School for Social Research

Eugene V. Debs: Citizen and Socialist. By Nick Salvatore. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982. Pp. xiv + 437. \$24.95.)

This Bancroft Prize winner deserves the praise it has already received. On the whole it is well-written, and the scholarship is both broad and deep, although Salvatore errs in his passing remark (p. 217) referring to Judge Learned Hand as a member of the Supreme Court. Salvatore's work will be of great value to students of labor history, third-party movements, American socialism, and the political culture of the United States.

This book presents an admiring but certainly not an uncritical view of its deeply interesting subject. Debs exhibited occasional signs of neurotic behavior in personal life, although Salvatore mercifully spares us any attempt at psychobiography, and in political life there were outbursts of utopianism and moralism which may have weakened the impact of his leadership. Even so, Debs was clearly the most significant figure in the history of American socialism. Deeply committed to democracy, and despite a brief attraction to the newly successful Bolshevik Revolution, he rejected the trap of vanguardism. Eugene Debs provides, through the example of his career, a compelling illustration of both the weaknesses and strengths of the democratic socialist tradition in America.

The intellectual framework of this study, although never stated with any degree of formality, is of considerable interest. The whole of Debs's work and the values he brought to it were rooted in the preindustrial social order of the place of his birth, Terre Haute, Indiana. Periodically, Salvatore returns to this setting, portrays the changes wrought by corporate, industrial capitalism, and shows the strains imposed by these momentous developments. Against this background is set Debs's struggle to come to terms with a rapidly changing political economy. Thus the book emerges almost as a case study of an individual's reaction to the pressures of sudden modernization.

Against those who argue that socialism is an alien import into American thought and culture, Salvatore clearly shows the extent to which the ideas of Debs sprang from a long tradition of American radicalism extending back to Paine and Jefferson, through Garrison and Lincoln, and on to Bryan, with the whole influenced by the evangelical Protestantism so central to nineteenth-century reform. The key to Debs's thought was a slowly evolving notion of manhood, a concept defined publicly through the action of citizens working as part of a community. The ideal was an independent citizen-producer, a standard which Debs came increasingly to see in deep conflict with industrial capitalism.

Contrary to a myth—in part self-propagated—Debs did not experience a sudden conversion to socialism following his brief imprisonment after the Pullman strike. Not until after the defeat of Populism in 1896 did Debs make a sharp break toward an increasingly class conflict-oriented socialism. The movement he led reached its apex in 1912 and then rapidly collapsed. One could wish that Salvatore's survey of the reasons was more systematic; still, there are interesting suggestions and much useful analysis of the socialist vote. Such standard explanations as factionalism and repression will not do, although both existed. Following a suggestion of H.G. Wells, Salvatore speculates that one cause of the decline may have

been the social welfare activities of the urban machines, but much more fundamental is his belief that the same political culture on which Debs drew had a too-powerful affinity for reform and that the class-conscious rhetoric of the socialists ran afoul of the individualism inherent in the prevailing culture. The Debsian critique was close enough to the mark for him to draw a large personal following, but one that was difficult to translate into votes.

And so Debs failed—but in so doing he raised issues that still persist in American democracy. As Salvatore writes (pp. xii-xiii), "the value of the individual in a corporate-dominated society; the meaning of work in a technological environment geared primarily for profits; and the importance of citizenship amid widespread malaise brought on in large part by the manipulative practices of political leaders—all these are questions of vital concern today."

JAMES P. YOUNG

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Human Nature under Fire: The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. By Gordon J. Tolle. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982. Pp. 167. \$22.00, cloth; \$10.00, paper.)

Gordon Tolle's analysis and evaluation of Hannah Arendt's theoretical achievements finds her work to be defective and deficient in comparison with the accomplishments of Aristotle. Tolle writes that Arendt's reflections on human nature in The Human Condition are deliberately misleading and dissembling. Although he claims that Arendt's works are superior to those of most contemporary writers, Tolle concludes that her philosophy is affected by a lack of any vision of natural standards or purpose. Her work is defective because she provides no guidelines or solutions for the modern crisis of authority. Using Arendt's philosophy as a vehicle, Tolle attempts to establish a necessary theoretical relationship between views of human nature and political authority. Despite Arendt's claims to the contrary, Tolle wishes to prove that she adhered to an implied concept of human nature. Thus, Tolle seeks to establish a connection between that view of human nature and Arendt's conception of . authority.

Tolle views Arendt's analysis of authority as superior to her defective analysis of human nature. In his best chapter, "Arendt's View of Authority/Legitimacy: The Dependence of the Concept on a Certain View of Human Nature," he illuminates Arendt's insight that authority con-

sists of giving advice, of augmenting, commenting on, and representing a regime's founding fathers. Whoever can comment on the meaning of the beginning has authority, because all authority rests on opinion. Both Arendt and Tolle believe that without religious ties, authority crumbles. Thus, the modern crisis is central to Arendt's vision of politics.

Tolle all too briefly notes Arendt's unique definition of the political in contrast with the private subjective, prepolitical world of the household and life of the private individual. To be free is to be active in the public realm, to speak in the public forum with authority, and to participate in civic affairs. Arendt deplores the extension of the private, subjective realm of necessity and of the material into the public arena.

Human Nature under Fire is concluded with a comparison of Arendt's and Aristotle's views on authority and human nature. Given Aristotle's status as a master theorist, Tolle's judgment that Arendt's work does not equal Aristotle's may be anticipated by the reader. Tolle claims Arendt made more radical demands upon human nature than Aristotle did. However, in the final chapter, he first notes a secularized Christian influence upon her thinking derived from St. Augustine and Christ. Tolle asserts that because Arendt's con-

ception of human nature was developed from a nonpolitical, Christian, and personal context, it is inapplicable to modern political life. But Tolle gives no evidence in his text to sustain this criticism. Had Arendt only taken Aristotle instead of St. Augustine as her mentor, she would have written a more adequate theory of human nature and provided clearer solutions for the modern crisis.

Tolle fails to explore and elaborate upon Arendt's distinctive contributions to modern political theory. He assesses her theoretical achievements by stressing her weakest theoretical arguments. He does not explain why Arendt's interest in St. Augustine was so dire a theoretical mistake for a Jewish philosopher to make. The introduction of this fascinating topic in the conclusion of his book is Tolle's major evaluative error. Hannah Arendt's philosophy reflects the experiences of those prevented from speaking and sharing in the public arena. Perhaps those excluded from participating in the public forum appreciate her quiet wisdom and patience more than does the author of *Human Nature under Fire*.

M. SUSAN POWER

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## Empirical Theory and Methodology

The Political Use of Symbols. By Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb. (New York: Longman, 1983. Pp. xiv + 178. \$22.50, cloth; \$9.95, paper.)

One of the distinctive features of the human species is its well-developed semiotic capacity. As Kant has shown, we can never know things "in themselves." Rather we must deal with our sensory representation of things as organized by our categories of understanding. Symbolization is thus fundamental to the human experience, and therefore to students of politics.

The pervasiveness of the semiotic function, its integration into everyday life, makes it resistant to analysis. Unlike many of the things political scientists study, there are no clearly delineated boundaries limiting the scope of inquiry. It therefore takes courage to study symbols. The pioneering work, and still the standard for the field, is Murray Edelman's Symbolic Uses of Politics (Univer-

sity of Illinois Press, 1968). Elder and Cobb acknowledge an intellectual debt to Edelman (indeed, their title seems to be a play on his), and yet their work is markedly different. It is much closer to the tradition of structural-functional analysis and to the type of socialization literature spawned by that tradition.

The title of the book can imply interest in manipulation, an important focus of Edelman's work. This is not a central concern of Elder and Cobb, however. On the contrary, they tend to downplay the manipulative potential of symbols (pp. 21, 57-58, 151). The authors are more concerned with the inherent properties of symbols (their affective and cognitive components), establishing a typology for symbols, and in discussing the social functions of symbols. Chapter 4 contains an interesting discussion of symbols in relation to political culture and might profitably be read first.

The book suffers from reductionist tendencies.

Elder and Cobb acknowledge, for example, that government decisions usually have distributional as well as symbolic significance, and even that purely symbolic decisions can affect subsequent distributional decisions, but they nevertheless tend to view the political world simply as symbol propagation. Thus, an "important factor" in the shift away from environmentalism is Ronald Reagan's use of the term "environmental extremists" to describe them (p. 32). Given that popular support for environmentalism remains high, such reductionism is unconvincing. Reagan's environmental policy success is not attributable to symbolic formation.

While an appropriately broad perspective is set forth in the initial chapter, it is odd that the actual examples of symbols considered by the authors come from a sharply circumscribed political stratum. Political figures, communism, democracy, welfare, the flag, and the NRA are the sorts of things to which Elder and Cobb devote attention. If we are to understand how people come to political consciousness, however, we cannot avoid consideration of such symbols as the Super Bowl, Calvin Klein jeans, Miss America, video games, Leo Buscaglia, and the Beatles. *Precisely* because most people are inattentive to politics (p. 10), such things are important politically.

The authors' professed loyalty to what they call "modern social science" makes their propensity for ad hoc explanations curious. Thus they argue the majesty of the presidency protected Jimmy Carter from Ted Kennedy. Unfortunately for Carter, it did not protect him from Ronald Reagan. Jacobo Timmerman will be interested to learn that Jimmy Carter's human rights policy was pointless because it was ill-defined and susceptible to exploitation. There are at least a score of such breezy observations in the book. At other times Elder and Cobb are so careful that they end up not saying anything at all: "Just as symbols can serve as a basis for social solidarity, they can also provide a basis for social differentiation" (p. 121).

The summary statement at the end of chapter 3 (p. 80, emphasis added) fairly reflects this tendency and perhaps will give readers a sense for whether the book is useful to them:

Popular expectations regarding the use of a symbol, albeit often diffuse and vaguely articulated, define important limits to its use. While these limits are often fairly broad, they do pose real constraints on those who would exploit the power of the symbol. The price of this protection lies in the restrictions it imposes on departures from the status quo. While new or novel usage may be accepted, considerable persuasion is likely to be required. Moreover, unless care is taken

to assure appropriate feedback, the potency of the symbol is *likely* to be diminished.

J. HARRY WRAY

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Change in Organizations: New Perspectives on Theory, Research and Practice. By Paul S. Goodman et al. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1982. Pp. xv + 446. \$19.95.)

The change agent in management has been considered an advocate or one who encourages and produces alterations in society and organizations. But in this work, change is viewed as an elusive concept; it is an abstraction imputed to reality rather than an inherent attribute of reality. The concept cannot be expressed in absolute terms but only in relational or relative terms.

This study is a compendium, or edited work, of scholars in the organizational and behavioral field who offer 10 selections that explore the ways planned, accidental, and evolutionary changes occur in organizations. The purpose of the book is to design new theoretical frameworks for bringing about effective change in individuals, groups, and in organizations as a whole.

Paul Goodman opens the study with a literature review of planned organizational change and organizational adaption. Chris Argyris follows with an organizational focus on single- and double-loop learning, including strategies for change. Barry Staw further investigates entrenched but unconscious forms of behavior that inhibit adaptability at both individual and organizational levels.

Clayton Alderfer moves the discussion from the individual level to the intergroup level by presenting a case study of changing white male attitudes and beliefs regarding race relations. Next, Robert Cole examines various forms of participatory work structures in Japan, Sweden, and the United States, while Paul Goodman and James Dean are concerned with the process of institutionalization (changes that become a permanent part of organizational structure).

Edward Lawler next presents a framework for creating high-involvement work systems by examining the relationships among different design options, motivation, individual performance capability, coordination, control, and organizational effectiveness. Ken Smith's focus is more philosophical, claiming that no new theories of change are possible until we improve the accuracy of interpreting and formulating theories about change, while Karl Weick examines the meaning of change in the context of loosely coupled subsystems. Finally, Robert Kahn integrates the

major themes and identifies new directions for change.

Kahn concludes that what is needed are studies of process theories of organizational change, theories that tell us how such change comes about. Also, such change should be studied over time on an ongoing basis, since organizations change by such means as merger, acquisition, managerial succession, incorporation of new technology, and other similar factors. Organizational change also should be studied in relation to environmental events because organizations respond to environmental constraints, demands, or opportunities. In addition, populations of organizations as well as single organizational units should be analyzed.

This work is highly theoretical and thought provoking and offers useful material for organizational study. One must be prepared for the theoretical and behavioral vocabulary of model building, single and double loops, escalation systems, and loose coupling systems that permeate the book. The status report that introduces the material is interesting but tedious and laborious. Nevertheless, the substance of the work is well done. The study of individuals, counterforces, attitudes toward race, and philosophical problems illustrate the inappropriate and unwanted persistencies in organizational life. In addition, the failure of organizations to maintain long-term change, the aplication of durability and diffusion at cross-national levels, and the use of loosely coupled systems presents a basis for future study. The book includes an exhaustive bibliography.

FRANK T. COLON

Lehigh University

Shifting Involvements: Private Interests and Public Action. By Albert O. Hirschman. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. 138. \$14.50, cloth; \$5.95, paper.)

Why do people fluctuate between infatuations with either their private interests or public issues? Because they inevitably experience disappointment with one and shift their involvement to the other. With this thread, spun from theories of psychology, Hirschman reweaves economic theories of collective action, fashioning new insights at once disarming and provocative.

Hirschman focuses on the endogenous forces that push us to change our preferences after being disappointed, rather than on exogenous forces that pull us to satisfy our preferences, presumed by economists to be unchanged. Consumption activities yield both pleasure, the experience of

traveling from discomfort to comfort, and comfort, the alleviation of a nervous system aroused by hunger, thirst, or pain. To experience pleasure, we must sacrifice comfort, at least temporarily. Food, Hirschman reasons inductively, gives us almost pure pleasure; more durable goods give mostly comfort. Durables inevitably disappoint us because we mistakenly expect them to produce continuing pleasure. In fact, we come to take for granted the comforts they provide. Services disappoint us as well, because their quality varies so much more than the quality of common durable goods and declines on average when output expands. As societies experience waves of progressive economic development where creature comforts proliferate, disaffection accompanies satisfaction.

People shift between private and public concerns when their reigning ideology, or "second-order desires" which justify their preferences, conflict with their efforts to satisfy those preferences, or "first-order desires" (p. 69). An ideology enforcing private property rights, for example, reinforces the desire to consume. When consumption produces disappointment, the conflict pushes people away from that ideology towards a public-regarding one. Consistent with our evidence on political participation, the nouveau riche on the rebound, according to Hirschman, lead revolutions.

To a much greater degree than for private action, the benefits of collective action inhere in striving rather than in achievements. A truly maximizing person increases the benefit accruing to him, not by shirking or free riding as Mancur Olson suggests, but by increasing his efforts on behalf of the public policy he espouses. To Hirschman, mass political actions confirm his theory and disconfirm Olson's.

Public life, in turn, inspires those who misconstrue its demands to overcommit themselves, and addicts those filled with the false euphoria of a common cause. Rules such as "one man, one vote," however valid, frustrate people trying to express the intensity of their preferences. Reality again fails expectations. Foreshadowing a withdrawal to private life, people reject ideologies that make public-regarding actions virtuous. So it goes.

Despite all that it weaves together, Hirschman's theory might unravel if we tug on its dangling threads. Impressions aside, can we really document shifting involvements, turns from private to public and back again "marked by wildly exaggerated expectations, by total infatuation, and by sudden revulsions" (p. 102)? Can we distinguish exogenous from endogenous events? Was the Vietnam War an "exogenous happening" (p. 73) or the public-regarding action of a society on the

rebound? Can we distinguish private interest from public action? Is the contrast between pursuing public affairs and pursuing a better life for oneself (p. 7) more illusory than real for both second- and first-order desires? An ideology of private property rights promotes diligence in its defense and serves a public goal. Disaffection with the material prosperity of the 1960s may have pushed people towards protesting the Vietnam War, but political decisions that threatened their private lives must have pulled them, as well. If we cannot make distinctions of this sort, we cannot subject Hirschman's theory to empirical disproof and so demonstrate its superiority over the traditional economic theories that he attacks.

This may be unfair. Hirschman admits to attempting a "phenomenology" (p. 8), not a finely honed theory with generalizable and empirically testable deductions. That licenses him to be less rigorous, yielding bountiful food for thought. But readers of his *Exit*, *Voice*, and *Loyalty* (Harvard University Press, 1970), for example, may find this more labored and, therefore, less elegant. It may not be as durable.

STEVEN M. MASER

Willamette University

The Social Sciences: Their Nature and Uses. Edited by William H. Kruskal. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 166. \$12.00.)

A series of lectures and discussions was held in 1979 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Social Science Research Building at the University of Chicago. The manner of celebration followed a tradition that began at the building's dedication in 1929 and was repeated at its tenth and twenty-fifth anniversaries. As on the earlier occasions, the presentations were published with the intention of providing a glimpse at the state of the social sciences.

The 12 distinguished social scientists whose contributions appear in the current volume offer an abundance of challenging insights, although most of the chapters are unrelated to each other. Mary Jean Bowman writes about time and its uses, Norman Bradburn about the difficulty of defining seemingly simple terms like urban and rural, Paul Peterson on social determinants of income, and James Coleman about the uncertain benefits of social policy research. These descriptions hardly do justice to the authors' ideas, but

the subjects are so diverse as to circumscribe efforts at a collective assessment.

A few contributors address the most trenchant question of the volume, which is raised by Herbert Simon in his essay, "Are Social Problems Problems that Social Science Can Solve?" Simon's answer is no for "big problems" like war, poverty, and disease, and yes for "small problems" like organizational decision making and racial inequality. When applied to "big problems" the contribution of the social sciences seems limited to a deeper understanding of ourselves, but for other problems the social sciences can play "a significant constructive role" in their solutions (p. 18).

Lee Cronbach is more skeptical. He believes that laws are "beyond the reach" of social science and consequently, "empirical generalization is doomed as a research strategy" (p. 70). The social scientist should ask questions and supply concepts but avoid "definitive assessments of proposed actions" (p. 71-72).

Simon's categories are suspiciously tautological—he seems to be saying that if social science cannot solve a problem then by definition the problem is "big"—but his fundamental argument is more convincing than Cronbach's. Race relations, for example, have been affected by social science contributions: Sociologist's findings have influenced court decisions in favor of desegregation, and the work of political scientists has helped advance black electoral accomplishments.

Philip Converse disputes Cronbach in another dimension. He acknowledges that the social sciences are unlikely to see a Newton and attain the neatness of many of the natural sciences. But he questions Cronbach's assumption that no social science laws exist. The issue is arguable, but since the first "law" within the realm of social processes has yet to be produced, Cronbach's doubts must be respected.

Political scientists especially should appreciate Converse's chapter on "The Impact of the Polls on National Leadership." His enthusiasm for polls is tempered by the fact that wording in questionnaires is frequently confused, answers misinterpreted, and improper signals given to those who exercise "the levers of power" (p. 157). He is optimistic, however, that current research will lead to a mitigation of these problems.

William Kruskal tries admirably to find linkages among the exciting essays in this volume, but the goal is often elusive. He writes that some of the papers "are about, or relate to, the use of social science research in the formation and carrying out of broad policy decisions." Others are "primarily surveys of social science topics, or exemplary pieces of social science research, or—of course—both together" (p. x). Kruskal is correct. Once the reader comes to terms with the

book's organizational gallimaufry and its overly ambitious title, he is treated to a rich intellectual experience.

LEONARD A. COLE

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Mathematical Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. By Anatol Rapoport. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983. Pp. xii + 507. \$49.95.)

This is an introduction to applied mathematical methods in political science, anthropology, psychology, and sociology. All major types of mathematical languages which have been applied to the social sciences are clearly presented with numerous in-depth substantive examples from the literature. The book contains five parts (the fifth is the Conclusion), the first three representing the core (classical calculus-based analysis, probability, and set theory methods such as graphs and game models). Since the organization is by formal, mathematical methods, and not by areas of substantive application, the book is an excellent companion to students undergoing formal mathematical training. It assumes, in fact, a background in introductory calculus and probability. But the presentation also assists readers in exploring applications to other substantive areas. The substantive applications are so clearly organized that students following substantive courses in the social sciences can easily draw on the appropriate sections of the book in order to deepen their understanding of mathematical theories in these PRATR

On the surface, the book is analogous to other modeling textbooks, such as M. L. Bittinger and J. C. Crown's Mathematics: A Modeling Approach (Addison-Wesley, 1982). However, the breadth and depth of applications in this book are superior and more up to date. In particular, the relationship between theory and evidence is far more complete in this book. For example, empirical evidence is shown for many models, and Part 4 is dedicated exclusively to a connoisseur's survey of quantitative and measurement techniques illustrative of the role of empirical evidence. However, mathematical methodology correctly takes precedence over measurement issues. One drawback for a book of this nature is the absence of exercises. However, the diligent reader can supplement this by using, say, Bittinger and Crown's extensive exercises.

The exposition of models is current, clear, and complete. One of the strengths of the book lies precisely in the clear demonstration that mathematics can be productively applied to the study of

substantive social phenomena. This is most definitely not a survey of content-free mathematical structures. The book covers a very extensive set of applications for the analysis of power, coalitions and alliances, arms races, bargaining, individual and collective decision making, perception, crises, and war. A useful bibliography is included, although in a fast-growing area such as this many more recent references could be added.

A valuable pedagogical point stressed throughout Mathematical Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences is on the importance of recognizing isomorphisms across diverse social phenomena—an indispensable skill for modelbuilding and theoretical development in any science. For example, Part 1 illustrates similar mathematical models (calculus) applied to arms races, perception, and demography; chapter 9 provides examples of distributions of size in language, economies, alliances, etc. This emphasis on recognizing isomorphic situations is wholly consistent with the modern view of mathematics as a family or content-free formal languages. Readers taking full advantage of this orientation will find this book very valuable for developing their own innovations in mathematical social theory.

This is Rapoport's first major textbook, although it is an enlarged, English version of his *Mathematischen Methoden in den Sozialwissenschaften* (Wurzburg: Physica-Verlag, 1980). He is best known for his pioneering work in game theory, particularly among international relations specialists. The book is based on a teaching experience of more than 30 years, and particularly on a course taught by Rapoport at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna.

The book can be used at two levels. For advanced undergraduate courses, major portions can be used with undergraduates who have studied some calculus of taken a course in mathematics for social scientists. The book can also be used in graduate courses when training requires some introductory calculus. Optimally, the book should be supplemented by exercises, such as found in *UMAP* modules or in Bittinger and Crown's textbook. A significant pedagogical contribution of this text is given by the extensive set of insightful hints and practical recommendations, based on Rapoport's personal scientific experience.

CLAUDIO CIOFFI-REVILLA

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

What Role for Government? Lessons from Policy Research. Edited by Richard F. Zeckhauser and Derek Leebaert. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983. Pp. 363. \$37.75.)

The editors of this collection of former conference papers (the conference was the 1981 meeting of the Association for Public Policy and Management) attempt to marshall the forces of microeconomics to answer a macropolitical science question. It may be comforting to political scientists to see that the forces are not up to the task. Although the editors include some material relevant to issues concerning the proper role of government in society, the core of this work is a series of applications of the principles of welfare economics and cost-benefitism to specific policy topics in the areas of income maintenance and health. It is with considerable variation tht the individual authors succeed in addressing more limited questions of traditional concern to economists—estimating the distribution functions of income tax proposals, assessing the effects of the Council on Wage and Price Stability or OPEC II on inflation, reinterpreting the negative income tax experiments, or reviewing the "value of life" debates. If these provide only piecemeal answers to the broader question suggested in the title, it may be because the real issues at stake have more to do with the role of economics than the role of government.

The editors and authors spend a great deal of time fencing off various turfs—carefully defining what is social, what is political, and what is subject rational scrutiny. The process begins in this text with an unusual essay by Joel Fleishman criticizing the Moral Majority for attempting to impose their morality on a democratic society. The essence of democracy, Fleishman maintains, is that morality and legality are separate realms and that the coercive power of the state should not be applied to the former. Unfortunately, Fleishman provides no clue as to how this standard would be applied to concerns other than those of the Moral Majority.

The separate realms of the economist and politician receive greater, although less careful, attention. Arnold H. Raphaelson surveys the cost-benefit literature on the Davis-Bacon Act and finds that economists have been unable, and are not likely to be able, to arrive at unambiguous conclusions about the Act's net benefit to society. Raphaelson concludes, however, that cost-benefit analysis is not the "real problem" (p. 135). The real problem seems to be that, in the end, political and Pareto-optimal criteria will decide the issue.

Ivy E. Broder and John F. Morrall III face a related and more interesting quandary. Their detailed cost-benefit analysis fails to justify potentially life-saving OSHA and EPA carcinogen regulations when standard willingness-to-pay estimates for the value of human life are used. Their solution is that the enactment of the regulations be justified by including a consideration of the social benefits of "altruism and pecuniary externalities" in the value of life calculations. There may yet be hope for the dismal science. Because it would be difficult to quantify these benefits, however, Broder and Morrall argue that the task should be left to the politicians.

Thus Broder and Morral endorse political decision-making criteria in a situation where the economic calculus is straightforward, while Raphaelson criticizes resorting to political criteria in a situation where the calculus is uncertain.

Both the editors, in an introduction, and Fleishman, in a postscript, argue the cause of public policy analysis as if economics and management science encompassed the whole field of study. This might be of some concern to the psychologists and sociologists who study education policies and "action programs." Not all of policy analysis is informed by the tradition that progresses, as Fleishman suggests, from Aristotle to Robert S. McNamara (p. 324). And too little of it, this whole work suggests, is informed by traditional political theory.

GARY M. KLASS

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## **Annotations**

Encyclopedia of Associations, 1984: Vol. 14, International Organizations. Edited by Denise S. Akey. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 114. \$130.00/3-issue subscription.)

This volume of the Encyclopedia of Associations extends coverage to nonprofit organizations that are international in scope and headquartered outside the United States. Sections include trade, business, and commercial organizations, agricultural organizations, legal, governmental, public administration, and military organizations, scientific, engineering, and technical ones, educational and cultural organizations, those concerned with

social welfare, health, medicine, and public affairs, fraternal, nationality, and ethnic organizations, religious organizations, veteran, hereditary, and patriotic ones, hobby and avocational organizations, athletic and sports organizations, labor unions, associations, and labor federations. Entries include basic organizational information plus description of the association's work. Index includes names and key words.

Political Parties of the Americas, Canada, Latin America, and the West Indies, 2 vols.: Anguilla-Grenada and Guadeloupe-Virgin Islands of the United States. Edited by Robert J. Alexander. Pp. xix + 410 and ix + 454. \$65.00/set.)

Another entry in the five-volume reference guide to significant political parties from the beginnings of party systems in eighteenth-century England through the present, this volume covers political parties in all of the Americas except the United States. Country chapters provide a brief political history of the area followed by a brief bibliography and then capsule discussions of individual parties. Text also provides crossreferences for French or Spanish or Portuguese party names (except for the major French Canadian parties which are listed under the French original) and for some coalitions that essentially functioned as political parties. Appendixes provide chronology of party foundings, their geneologies, party classifications based on ideology (Christian Democratic, Communist, Fascist, National Revolutionaries, Socialists, and Trotskyists), and interest groups (agrarians, black power, feminist, and labor). Text includes index.

The United States in the World Economy: Selected Papers of C. Fred Bergsten, 1981-1982. By C. Fred Bergsten. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. x + 245. \$23.95.)

This collection of Bergsten's recent papers examines the United States in light of international economic interdependency, assesses the international monetary system, analyzes current problems in world trade and international investment, and discusses policy toward developing countries. Text concludes with a brief introduction to the Institute for International Economics, of which Bergsten is director. Volume includes index.

Congress Off the Record: The Candid Analyses of Seven Members. Edited by John F. Bibby. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Pp. 53. \$4.95, paper.)

Based on roundtable discussions held between the spring of 1979 and the fall of 1982, these edited transcripts provide the candid and anonymous views of seven congressmen first elected in 1978 and reelected in 1980. Comments from these four Republicans and three Democrats are organized into chapters on starting a career in the House, working in committees, the House floor, the congressional party, interest groups, the presidency, the electoral process, the second term, and perspectives on the Senate. Bibby provides brief organizing commentary throughout the chapters. Text includes brief introduction and postscript.

A Dictionary of Marxist Thought. Edited by Tom Bottomore. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. xi + 587. \$27.50.)

With contributions by more than 80 scholars, this guidebook provides sometimes brief, sometimes lengthy discussions of key concepts in Marxist thought, dramatis personnae in its evolution, and a variety of schools of Marxist interpretation and criticism. Entries include references for further reading. Text includes bibliographies of Marx and Engels's works cited and of all other works cited. An index permits some cross-referencing of concepts, personnae, and schools of thought.

Setting Municipal Priorities, 1983. Edited by Charles Brecher and Raymond D. Horton. (New York: New York University Press, 1982. Pp. xv + 252. \$27.50.)

This volume is the fourth in an annual series on the fiscal and economic situation in New York City. Part 1 of the extant volume builds upon previous editions, reviewing such matters as the local economy and revenue, intergovernmental aid, expenditures and services, and debt and capital management. Part 2 contains a special study on foreign immigration and another on financial planning and the role of state government. Text includes index.

The Changing Politics of School Finance. Edited by Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe and Allan Odden. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1983. Pp. xvi + 287. \$29.00.)

Published as the third annual yearbook of the American Education Finance Association, this text contains nine scholarly overviews on such topics as turning-point election periods in education, the politics of federal aid, state-level politics and school financing, the courts and school finance reform, the impact of finance reform, tax and expenditure limitations, public aid to private schools, financing urban schools, and the politics of declining enrollments and school closings. Text includes index.

Readings in the Constitutional History of India, 1757-1947. Edited by S. V. Desika Char. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. xvii + 789. \$53.00.)

This compilation of primary documents traces the development of the British administrative system in India from the early charters and settlements of the East India Company (1600 to 1757), through its early administrative system (1757 to 1793) and the presidency governments (1794 to 1833), to centralized administration (1833 to 1858) and then decentralization and growth of representative institutions (1858 to 1917), and finally toward responsible government (1917 to 1947). An additional part covers war, the Pakistan movement, and independence (1939 to 1947). An introductory chapter provides political and social background for the documents. Text also includes glossary, notes, bibliography, and index.

The American Presidency: A Guide to Information Sources. By Kenneth E. Davison. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. xvi + 467. \$48.00.)

This bibliographic guide of books, articles, and documents on the American presidency focuses on materials written since 1945, giving special emphasis to those published since 1960. Part 1 includes a chapter on aids to research as well as topical chapters on the office of president, general works on the presidency, first ladies, presidential elections, functions and powers of the president, the institutionalized presidency, problems of the presidency, presidential documents, presidential libraries and museums, and private organizations and publishers. Part 2 contains a chapter on each of the American presidents from 1789 through 1982. Text includes author, title, and subject indexes.

Politics in America: Members of Congress in Washington and at Home. Edited by Alan Ehrenhalt. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1983. Pp. xix + 1,734. \$29.95.)

This compendium provides biographical profiles of each member of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, their committee assignments, election data and campaign finance, their votes on key issues, scores on CQ's presidential support, party unity, and conservative coalition indexes, and ratings calculated by such interest groups as the Americans for Democratic Action, Americans for Constitutional Action, the AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Text also includes brief survey of current politics in each of the 50 states, state maps for congressional districts, listings of standing, select, and joint committees of the United States Congress including membership, address, and telephone numbers, and an index.

The Managed Economy: Essays in British Economic Policy and Performance since 1929. Edited by Charles Feinstein. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 284. \$39.95, cloth; \$17.95, paper.)

Covering a 50-year period of Great Britain's economic performance, the 13 essays reprinted here focus on Britain's variable economic performance and on policies designed to improve it. Three essays directly examine Keynesian theory and applications, while four others analyze the British economy from a Keynesian perspective. Three express concern over Keynesian policy, and a fourth adopts a monetarist approach. Text includes index.

Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament. Edited by Charles Gordon. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983. Pp. xlviii + 1,200. \$131.25.)

This authoritative guide to British parliamentary practice updates the 1976 edition to include developments pursuant to the House of Commons Administrative Act of 1978 as well as other significant changes adopted over the past several years. The text's 41 chapters are contained in three major sections: (1) constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament; (2) parliamentary proceedings for public business; and (3) parliamentary proceedings for private business. An appendix reports House of Commons standing orders for public business as of March, 1983. Text includes index.

Lieber's Code and the Law of War. By Richard Shelly Hartigan. (South Holland, Ill.: Precedent Publishing, 1983. Pp. vii + 157. \$17.95.)

This text reprints Lieber's tract on "Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Law and Usages of War," his "General Orders No. 100" providing instructions for the government of U.S. armies in the field, and other selected correspondence and documents. Text includes an introduction by the editor, a select bibliography, and an index.

Music and Politics: Collected Writings, 1952-81. By Hans Werner Henze. Translated by Peter Labanyi. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982. Pp. 286. \$24.95.)

Based on a German collection published in 1976, this translation includes some pieces not found in the original and excludes others. Selections generally focus on Henze's efforts to balance personal and artistic freedom with social and political consciousness. Essays cover most of his major compositions, many significant acquaintances, and reflections on art and politics. Text includes chronology and index.

The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Edited by George C. Herring. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983. Pp. xl + 873. \$47.50.)

Although Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo released most of the Pentagon papers to the public in 1971, the four volumes included here were withheld because Ellsberg feared negative repercussions on a negotiated settlement for the Vietnam War. These volumes were part of the government's case against Ellsberg; during 1982, a still-unknown source released the negotiating volumes to Jack Anderson, who subsequently released them to the Washington Post and the New 'ork Times. By 1977 all but 60 pages had entered the public domain. This text reproduces that archive copy. Topically the volumes contain a brief introduction and analysis plus lengthy event chronologies for each of 13 different negotiating initiatives or contacts. Extant text also provides an introduction, glossary of names, index, and a section of annotative notes.

The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers: Vol. 1, 1826-August 1919; Vol. 2, 27 August 1919-31 August 1920. Edited by Robert A. Hill. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. cxvii + 575 and lv + 710. \$38.50 each.)

Volume 1 of a projected 10-volume series introduces the Garvey family through Jamaican slave records and ends with Garvey's address at Carnegie Hall before the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) and the African Communities' League of the World, Volume 2 follows the rapid growth of UNIA from the days following the Carnegie Hall address through the First International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World a year later. The documents and manuscripts cover such topics as Garvey's personal life, the UNIA, his programs for racial nationalism, the Black Star Line, the federal investigation of Garvey, and much more. Each volume includes a chronology, introduction, informational appendixes, and index. Of the projected 10-volume set, volumes 1 through 6 are to focus on America, 7 and 8 on Africa, and 9 and 10 on the Caribbean.

The Annual Register: A Record of World Events 1982. Edited by H. V. Hodson. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. xiii + 549. \$75.00.)

Now in its 224th volume, this register covers major events in the United Kingdom, the Americas and Caribbean, the USSR and Eastern Europe, Western, Central, and Southern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Equatorial Africa, Central and Southern Africa, South Asia and the Indian Ocean, Southest and East Asia, and Australasia and the South Pacific. Other chapters record activities and developments in international organizations, religion, science, law, the arts, sports, and economic and social affairs. Text also includes selected documents and reference material, some obituaries, a chronicle of principal events in 1982, and an index.

Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record: Vol. 1, 1981-1982. Edited by Jack W. Hopkins. (New York: Homes & Meier, 1983. Pp. xxxv + 892. \$149.50.)

Designed as a companion to Africa Contemporary Record and Middle East Contemporary Record, this sourcebook begins a new series for Latin America and the Caribbean. Essays on current issues include the inter-American system, U.S. national security interests in Latin America,

arms control in the region, the reorientation of U.S. policy, the region's economic and business outlook, its external debt, U.S. investments there, change and development, U.S.-Mexican relations and problems, and more. Part 2 presents a country-by-country review focusing on such matters as politics, defense and security, social affairs, and the economy. Part 3 contains key documents from 1981 to 1982; Part 4 provides certain social, economic, and political data; and Part 5 includes very brief abstracts of recent books relevant to the study of Latin America and the Caribbean. Text includes index.

U.S.-South Asian Relations, 1947-1982: Vol. 1, Kashmir Question 1947-1964, India 1947-1982; Vol. 2, Pakistan 1947-1965, The Kutch Conflict, Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965, Pakistan 1965-1982; Vol. 3, Bangladesh Crisis and Indo-Pak War of 1971, Bangladesh 1972-1982, Nepal 1947-1982, Sri Lanka 1948-1982. Edited by Rajendra K. Jain. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1983. Pp. xlvii + 697, xlviii + 657, and xl + 495. \$100.00/set.)

This three-volume set compiles some 1,500 documents regarding U.S. political, economic, and military involvement with the countries of South Asia. Materials are drawn from U.S. and South Asian documents, memoranda, telegrams, reports and resolutions, public addresses, letters, and much more. Broad topic areas include the Kashmir Question, U.S. relations with India and Pakistan, the Kutch and Indo-Pak conflicts, Bangladesh and the Indo-Pak War, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Each volume includes an index and assorted data-based appendixes.

Guerrilla and Terrorist Organisations: A World Directory and Bibliography. By Peter Janke. (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1983. Pp. xxvi + 531. \$60.00.)

This text offers a broad survey of organizations throughout the world that have attempted to threaten established governments since World War II. A section is devoted to each of seven regions: Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, the Far East and Oceania, North America, and Latin America. Groups are arranged alphabetically by targeted country within each region. Brief introductions provide background on the political context of violence for each region and for each country within a region. Text includes an index of groups and a list of acronyms.

International Handbook of Contemporary Developments in Criminology: Vol. 1, General Issues and the Americas; Vol. 2, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Edited by Elmer H. Johnson. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 319 and xx + 696. \$95.00/set.)

A comparative survey of criminology as an occupational system, this handbook includes a typological essay by the editor, topical reviews of international organizations and criminology, the International Society for Criminology, criminology in developing nations, women and criminology, and radical criminology, and some 40 area study essays covering the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Contributors were asked to consider such questions as the meaning of criminology as a discipline, the recruitment and education of criminologists, relation to cognate disciplines, and the crime problem providing the subject matter for criminological inquiry. Each volume contains an index.

Images of Revolution: Graphic Art from 1905 Russia. By David King and Cathy Porter. (New York: Random House, 1983. Pp. 128. \$30.00, cloth; \$16.95, paper.)

This surprising book contains selected graphic and political art found in the satirical journals that were published during the Russian Revolution of 1905. Text includes introductory commentary by Cathy Porter and some photographs. Text also includes a brief bibliography on this form of graphic Russian political satire.

A Practitioner's Guide to Information Sources and the Literature on County Government: An Annotated Bibliography. By Cortus T. Koehler. (Sacramento: County Supervisors Association of California, 1983. Pp. 92. \$6.00, paper.)

A complement to John C. Bollens's American County Government (Sage Publications, 1969), this bibliography emphasizes materials written in the past 15 years. Select entries include technical and academic books, theoretical, technical, and administrative periodicals, in-house county reports, and organizations preparing and distributing information of interest to counties. Text includes more than 650 entries (most with a very brief annotation), an index, and appendixes on state associations of counties, professional organizations, and additional sources of information.

Government Programs and Projects Directory: A Guide to National Programs and Projects Administration by the Executive Departments and Independent Agencies of the United States Government. Issue No. 1. Edited by Anthony T. Kruzas and Kay Gill. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 141. \$85.00/3-issue subscription.)

The first of three issues designed to consolidate information about federal programs, this issue references more than 400 programs of the executive department and independent agencies. Entries include the name of the program or project, its sponsoring agency's name and address, the program's legislative authorization if available, a program description, funding information if available, and the sources of information used to prepare that entry. Text presents entries hierarchically by department, agency, program, and project, with alphabetical entries within each grouping level. An index includes program name and subject keywords.

Biographical Dictionary of Internationalists. Edited by Warren F. Kuehl. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 934. \$75.00.)

Included here are biographies of those active leaders in national or international nongovernmental organizations promoting world organization or cooperation, of those holding significant posts in functional international bodies, of those gaining public recognition as originator or exponent of ideas or proposals for international organization, of those whose lifestyle or beliefs promoted transnational cooperation, and of those who actively promoted transnationalism in nonpolitical arenas. Entries included basic information on birth, death, education, and career, a sketch of the person's work as an internationalist, and a selected bibliography. Appendixes categorize subjects by birthplace and country with which identified, career, and type of internationalist. Text includes index and notes on the contributors.

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Vol. 42, April 7-June 23, 1917. Edited by Arthur S. Link. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xxvi + 595. \$32.50.)

Now into its second decade of publication, this series presents verbatim documents relating to Wilson's personal life, his political leadership, his efforts at economic and military mobilization,

and his wartime diplomacy. The extant volume begins as the United States enters World War I and chronicles Wilson's role as commander-inchief, the formation of a Committee on Public Information to rally public opinion and the subsequent controversy over censorship, his successful requests to Congress for selective Service Act, bond issues to aid near-bankrupt allies, the Espionage Act, his continued efforts to secure price control legislation, his encouragement of the new Russian democracy, and much more. Documents are arranged chronologically, but the table of contents lists materials under such categories as addresses, statements, press releases, correspondence, reports, memoranda, and collateral materials. Volume includes index.

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson: Vol. 43, June 25-August 20, 1917. Edited by Arthur S. Link. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xxiv + 564. \$32.50.)

Another entry in this expansive series, Volume 43 covers the summer months of U.S. mobilization for the war. These materials document Wilson's effort to maintain control over the mobilization effort as well as American diplomacy while facing such issues as the demand for women's suffrage, the campaign of the Anti-Saloon League, labor unrest, violations of civil liberties, squabbles threatening the U.S. shipbuilding program, Japan's claim to a paramount interest in China, and peace proposals from German moderates and Pope Benedict XV. Materials are arranged chronologically. A table of contents arranges entries by type of document, and an index permits name and subject cross-referencing.

The Diary of Beatrice Webb: Vol. 2, 1892-1905, "All the Good Things of Life." Edited by Norman MacKenzie and Jeanne MacKenzie. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 376. \$25.00.)

This volume of the diary begins shortly after Beatrice Webb's marriage to Sidney in 1892 and ends with her entry into public life in 1905. This time period covers the liberating transition from Britain's Victorian to Edwardian age; the floundering of British agriculture and the increased importance of factories, mines, and foreign trade; the growing strains of imperialism, jingoism, socialism; and much more. The Webb's monumental A History of Trade Unionism was published during this period in 1894. Text includes introductory materials by the editors, a chronology, brief bibliography, and an index.

Successful Dissertations and Theses: A Guide to Graduate Student Research from Proposal to Completion. By David Madsen. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1983. Pp. xv + 174. \$12.95.)

Topics in this guidebook include a discussion of problems in starting and completing the dissertation, the role of research adviser and committee, selecting and refining the research topic, preparing the research proposal, following basic research procedures, organizing, outlining, and writing drafts, the thesis defense, adapting the thesis for publication or presentation, and using the library and locating essential resources. Text includes examples, bibliography, and index.

Scholars' Guide to Washington, D.C. for Southeast Asian Studies. By Patrick M. Mayerchak. (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 409. \$29.95, cloth; \$12.50, paper.)

The ninth in a series of guides to the use of scholarly resources in the Washington, D.C. area, this text introduces the serious researcher to available materials on Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Resources examined include libraries, archives, and manuscript repositories; museums, galleries, and art collections; collections of music and sound recordings; map and film collections; data banks; research centers; academic programs and departments; U.S. government agencies; Southeast Asian embassies and international organizations; associations; cultural exchange, technical assistance, and religious organizations; and publications and the media. Appendixes record relevant information on many of the resources cited and provide information on housing, transportation, and other services to visiting scholars. Text also includes bibliography, name index, subject index, and more.

Political Parties of Europe, 2 vols. Edited by Vincent McHale. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xviii + 700 and xvii + 596. \$95.00/set; \$65.00/volume.)

The second of five historical reference guides to significant political parties from the eighteenth century to the present, this encyclopedia covers 34 European countries, the historical states of Estonia, pre-1945 Germany, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the European Parliament. Chapters include a brief introduction to the state's

political history, a select bibliography, and an alphabetical listing plus description of the major party systems. Most chapters include cross-referenced entries and data on electoral history. Appendixes include a chronology of political events, a genealogy of parties, and a grouping of parties under ideologies and associated interest groups. Text also contains an index.

The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789. By Robert Middlekauff. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 696. \$25.00.)

This volume is the second in a series consisting of nine chronological and two topical volumes summarizing scholarship on American social, political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, and military history. Written in narrative style, the extant volume focuses on government, politics, constitutionalism, and war starting with the Treaty of Paris and ending with the Seven Years' War. Text includes footnotes, a general bibliographic note on the works of other historians, and an index.

Economics for Policymaking: Selected Essays of Arthur M. Okun. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 665. \$25.00.)

This collection of 31 essays serves as a posthumous tribute to a leading economic policy advisor. Essays cover the causes and cures of inflation, implicit contracts, output, employment and unemployment, fiscal and monetary policy, economic performance between 1960 and 1980, economic forecasting, economic policy formulation, and equality and efficiency. Text includes a bibliography of Okun's works and an index.

World Development Report 1983. Edited by Rupert Pennant-Rea et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 214. \$20.00, cloth; \$8.00, paper.)

The sixth in its series, this World Bank Report contains a section examining the economic recession of 1980 to 1982 and the outlook for developing countries and a second section on the role of management and institutions in development. The latter section covers such topics as the search for efficiency, the role of the state, pricing for efficiency, national economic management, managing state-owned enterprises, project and program management, managing the public service, and

reorienting government. Text also includes a tabular annex of world development indicators.

Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel: Vol. 3, Armistice Negotiations with the Arab States, December 1948-July 1949. Edited by Yemima Rosenthal. (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1983. Pp. 758 and lxxv + 229. \$69.50 includes companion volume.)

The third volume of a projected annual series of documents on Israeli foreign policy, this book covers the negotiations leading to the armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria in 1949. Chronologically the materials overlap the time period covered in volumes 2 and 4. The text contains documents in Hebrew and English, and a companion volume provides English summaries of Hebrew materials and an English index to the main and companion volumes. The main volume is divided into four sections, one each for Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, and its appendixes provide English and Hebrew texts of the armistice agreements. Both the main and companion volume contain lengthy introductions providing historical background for the documents.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Vol. 5, Part 1 and Part 2: Western European Security. Edited by William Z. Slany. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Pp. xxxv + 1,882. \$28.00.)

This volume adds yet another contribution to the unfolding official record of U.S. foreign relations as reflected in government documents now made publicly available. Topical contents include U.S. participation in the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council, U.S. involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the U.S. posture toward a European Defense Community, diplomacy regarding the Brussels Treaty Organization, and other diplomatic efforts aimed at forging defense security for Western Europe.

American Foreign Policy Basic Documents 1977-1980. Edited by Louis J. Smith et al. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Pp. xlix + 1,458. \$27.00.)

This compilation of public documents from the Carter administration resumes a series first begun in 1950 under the title A: Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, continued with American Foreign Policy,

1950-1955: Basic Documents, released annually between 1956 and 1967 as American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, and then ending. This resumption projects a multiyear volume for 1969 to 1972 and another for 1973 to 1976, plus annual volumes beginning with 1981 documents. Topics in the extant volume include principles and objectives of American foreign policy, its organization and conduct, U.S. national security policy, arms control, foreign economic policy, the United Nations and international law, and human rights. Additional documents are arranged by region of focus: Europe and Canada, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. Volume includes topical index for the more than 700 documents presented.

Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945: Vol. 6, The Third Reich, First Phase, November 1, 1936-November 14, 1937. Edited by Howard M. Smyth et al. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. Pp. lxxxi + 1,140. \$18.00.)

Following World War II, the British Foreign Office, the United States Department of State, and later the French government jointly agreed to publish English versions of selected archival documents captured from the German Foreign Ministry and Reich Chancellery. This volume is the last entry in Series C (1933 to 1937) and introduces the first five topical volumes in Series D (13 vols.). Documents in the present volume are arranged chronologically, beginning with Mussolini's proclamation of the Rome-Berlin axis (1936) and ending with the German Ambassador to Moscow reporting failure in efforts to modify the Soviet demand to close all but two German consulates in the USSR. Documents missing from the captured archives, and hence not included in this volume, include the secret files of the Legal Department, Political Department, and Economic Policy Department as well as some of the files from the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister and some open files from the Economic Policy Department. Text includes an analytic or topical list of documents, appendixes on the organization of the German Foreign Ministry, German files used, a list of principal persons, and a glossary of German terms and abbreviations.

Surveys, Polls, Censuses, and Forecasts Directory: A Guide to Sources of Statistical Studies in the Areas of Business, Social Science, Education, Science, and Technology. Issue Number 1. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 92. \$175.00/3-issue subscription.) This guide provides timely information on the name of a survey or poll, its sponsoring agency, a description of its purpose or objective and the nature of the sample if relevant, its frequency, time coverage, geographic coverage, format on which the resulting research is available, and other citations regarding the survey or poll. Each issue contains about 400 entries, and three issues are scheduled for yearly publication. Each issue includes a cumulative subject and sponsors' name index.

World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators: Vol. 1, Cross-National Attributes and Rates of Change; Vol. 2, Political Protest and Government Change. By Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. xxvi + 305 and xv + 216. \$25.00, vol. 1; \$22.50, vol. 2.)

This edition updates and sometimes improves upon aggregate material reported in the last edition. Cross-national attribute data typically are reported for 1960 and the 1975 to 1978 period, although the machine-readable media contain considerably more data. Reported growth rates for as many as 154 countries on several variables utilize sometimes different beginning and ending time-points, and some reported values include more time-points than do others. The second volume introduces an updating and major expansion of data series on political protest and violence, state coercion, elections, and government change in the period from 1948 to 1977. Almost 90,000 events can be found on the archive tapes. although the extant volume reports only a small fraction of that information. Text includes time series profiles by country for selected variables reported in Volume 2, discussions of data reliability, archiving, operationalizations, various informational appendixes, and an index for each volume.

Annual Review of Military Research and Development: 1982. By Kosta Tsipis and Sheena Phillips. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. x + 171. \$24.95.)

The first in a planned series on military research and development, this endeavor was undertaken to act as an early warning on weapons systems that could be destabilizing, unnecessary, ineffective, or technically dubious, in addition to providing objective information on ongoing military research and development. The first volume includes brief history of U.S. military research and development funding, a description of fundamen-

tal technologies with extensive military applications, and close examinations of particle-beam weapons, laser weapons, and cruise missiles.

UNCTAD 1963-1983 Bibliography. (Geneva: United Nations Library, 1983. Pp. 81. Price unknown.)

This reference guide surveys written materials on the activities of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) since it was first established. Part 1 includes entries on general bibliographies, monographs, and articles, while Part 2 covers UNCTAD Conferences 1 through 6. Part 3 catalogs entries on topics of special interest to UNCTAD. Specifically excluded from the bibliography are official UN documents and publications, newspaper articles, and articles a page or less in length. Weekly news magazines are not covered systematically.

Yearbook of International Organizations, 1983/84: Vol. 1, Organization Descriptions and Index. Edited by Union of International Associations. (New York: K. G. Saur/Gale Research, 1983. Pp. 1,500. \$168.00.)

This twentieth edition with expanded coverage now includes some 20,000 organizations including federations of international organizations; those with universal, intercontinental, or regional membership; organizations emanating from places, persons, and other bodies; those with special forms such as foundations or funds; international organizations gounded in a particular country; international organizations now inactive or dissolved; religious orders, fraternities, and secular institutes; plus multilateral treaties and agreements. An enormous index includes recently reported, proposed, or uncomfirmed international organizations, in addition to all working language names for the organizations included, their abbreviations, subject and other keyword identifiers, sponsoring bodies, former names, and executive officers.


Government Agencies. Edited by Donald R. Whitnah. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xxviii + 683. \$49.95.)

This text includes informational profiles on some 100 agencies of the federal government by more than 100 scholarly contributors. Several existing agencies are not covered, largely because needed information was lacking, or because they had been created in the recent past, or because

their scope appeared too narrow. Some defunct agencies also have been included, particularly certain New Deal agencies and some wartime boards and commissions. Entries are alphabetical. Text includes an index and appendixes on chronology, genealogy, umbrella agencies, and categories of agency service.

Three Hundred Years of German Immigrants in North America: 1683-1983. Edited by Klaus Wust and Heinz Moos. (Baltimore: Heinz Moos Publishing, 1983. Pp. 185. \$24.50.)

This bilingual edition is a pictorial history and tricentennial tribute to German immigrants to North America. Text includes essays on the motivation for emigration, immigrant expectations, and the influence of these individual and groups in the New World. Text also includes selected biographical sketches, more than 500 illustrations, a chronological appendix, an index, and a brief bibliography.



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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